



10-4-2011

A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game

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Recommended Citation

Michael Brautbar and Michael J. Kearns, "A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game", . October 2011.

Brautbar, M. & Kearns, M., A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game, *Algorithmic Game Theory, 4th International Symposium, SAGT*, Oct. 2011, doi: [10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_21](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_21)
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Abstract

Social and other networks have been shown empirically to exhibit high edge clustering—that is, the density of local neighborhoods, as measured by the clustering coefficient, is often much larger than the overall edge density of the network. In social networks, a desire for tightknit circles of friendships — the colloquial “social clique” — is often cited as the primary driver of such structure. We introduce and analyze a new network formation game in which rational players must balance edge purchases with a desire to maximize their own clustering coefficient. Our results include the following:

-Construction of a number of specific families of equilibrium networks, including ones showing that equilibria can have rather general binary tree-like structure, including highly asymmetric binary trees. This is in contrast to other network formation games that yield only symmetric equilibrium networks. Our equilibria also include ones with large or small diameter, and ones with wide variance of degrees.

-A general characterization of (non-degenerate) equilibrium networks, showing that such networks are always sparse and paid for by low-degree vertices, whereas high-degree “free riders” always have low utility.

-A proof that for edge cost $a \geq 1/2$ the Price of Anarchy grows linearly with the population size n while for edge cost less than $1/2$, the Price of Anarchy of the formation game is bounded by a constant depending only on a , and independent of n . Moreover, an explicit upper bound is constructed when the edge cost is a “simple” rational (small numerator) less than $1/2$.

-A proof that for edge cost less than $1/2$ the average vertex clustering coefficient grows at least as fast as a function depending only on a , while the overall edge density goes to zero at a rate inversely proportional to the number of vertices in the network.

-Results establishing the intractability of even weakly approximating best response computations.

Several of our results hold even for weaker notions of equilibrium, such as those based on link stability.

Disciplines

Computer Sciences

Comments

Brautbar, M. & Kearns, M., A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game, *Algorithmic Game Theory, 4th International Symposium, SAGT*, Oct. 2011, doi: [10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_21](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_21)

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A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game

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1 Introduction

The proliferation of large-scale social and technological networks over the last decade has given rise to an emerging science. One of the primary aims of the empirical branch of this new science is to quantify and examine the striking apparent structural commonalities that many of these large networks share, despite their differing origins, populations, and function. For example, one empirical narrative in this vein that is still unfolding is the claim that large-scale networks from social, economic, technological and other origins often share the properties of small diameter, heavy-tailed degree distributions, and high edge clustering.

Because of this, one of the primary goals of the theoretical branch of this new science is the formulation of simple models of network formation that can explain such apparent structural universalities. Interestingly, to date such efforts have mainly fallen into two categories. In the stochastic network formation literature, probabilistic models for network growth are proposed that exhibit one or more of the structural universals of interest in expectation or with high probability. In contrast, in the game-theoretic network formation links do not form randomly, but for a “reason” (rationality), and the interest is in the structural and other properties that can arise at population equilibrium. The game-theoretic models to date have primarily technological, rather than sociological, motivations, such as efficient routing concerns in communication networks (see [18, 13] for good overviews of both approaches, as well as Related Work below).

In this paper we introduce and study a new network formation game explicitly motivated by an empirical phenomenon often cited in large social networks: the tendency for friendship to be transitive, or for friends of friends to be friends themselves [13, 8]. In sociology and other fields, this notion is quantified by the *clustering coefficient* of a network, and a long series of studies has documented the fact that social networks routinely exhibit much larger clustering coefficients than would be expected from their overall edge density alone [19, 13]. In social networks, homophily (the tendency for like to associate with like), the tendency for introductions to be made through mutual acquaintances, and a human desire for tight-knit cohorts are all cited as possible forces towards high clustering coefficients [12, 8]. Given the frequent observation of clustering in social networks, and the long history of sociological and psychological theories regarding its origins in individuals, it is of interest to examine the consequences when clustering is considered the primary source of utility in a network formation game. In the same way that previous papers have taken abstract human or organizational desires, such as those of being well-connected or centrally placed in a network, and studied them as network formation games [14, 3, 11, 10], here we do so for the notion of clustering.

We thus introduce and analyze a network formation game in which rational players must balance edge purchases, each of fixed cost, with a desire to maximize their own clustering coefficients. Like most of the prior work in formation games, we consider a unilateral, rather than bilateral, edge purchase model (Twitter rather than Facebook); such a model is appropriate for many, though obviously not all, social networks. Our results include the following:

- Construction of a number of specific families of equilibrium networks, including ones showing that equilibria can have rather general binary tree-like structure, including highly asymmetric binary trees. This is in contrast to other network formation games that yield only symmetric equilibrium networks. Our equilibria also include ones with large or small diameter, and ones with wide variance of degrees.
- A general characterization of (non-degenerate) equilibrium networks, showing that such networks are always sparse and paid for by low-degree vertices, whereas high-degree “free riders” always have low utility.
- A proof that for edge cost $\alpha \geq 1/2$ the Price of Anarchy grows linearly with the population size n while for edge cost α less than $1/2$, the Price of Anarchy of the formation game is bounded by a constant depending only on α , and independent of n . Moreover, an explicit upper bound is constructed when the edge cost is a “simple” rational (small numerator) less than $1/2$.
- A proof that for edge cost α less than $1/2$ the average vertex clustering coefficient grows at least as fast as a function depending only on α , while the overall edge density goes to zero at a rate inversely proportional to the number of vertices in the network.
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Several of our results hold even for weaker notions of equilibrium, such as those based on link stability.

In the extended version of the paper we also consider other variants of the game, including a non-normalized version of clustering coefficient and bilateral edge purchases one [7].

2 Related Work

Models of social and technological networks can be roughly divided into two categories — stochastic generative models and game-theoretic models.

A stochastic generative model captures the dynamics of a specific stochastic process and characterizes the networks created in the limit of that process. Perhaps the most notable stochastic generative models are the preferential attachment model [4] and the small-world model [20]. In the preferential attachment model nodes arrive one at a time and each new node stochastically connects to a fixed number of previous nodes, where the probability of connecting to a specific node is proportional to that node’s current degree in the network. Networks created by the model are known to have a limiting power-law degree distribution [5], a prominent property of various social networks. In contrast to the preferential attachment model, the small-world generative model assumes that all nodes are given in advance. In that model one starts with a ring lattice on the n nodes and rewires each edge independently with some fixed probability. Networks created this way are known to have low diameter and a large average clustering coefficient, for a large range of the rewiring probability [20]. While

the preferential attachment model and the small-world model are able to only generate networks with some properties of real social networks, a recent model following similar lines as that of preferential attachment was shown to being able to generate networks with several more properties of real social networks [17].

A second approach to modeling social and technological networks is based on game theory. A node is equipped with a utility function that for each outcome of the game quantifies how good the outcome is for that node. The utility of a node is a function that depends on the structure of the outcome network and the cost of the edges the node purchased. Game theoretic formation models roughly divide into unilateral and bilateral games. In unilateral games a node can purchase an edge to another node without asking for that node's consent. In a bilateral game each edge is a result of mutual consent between the edge's endpoints. In both variants once the edge is constructed both parties can use it¹. The seminal work of Fabrikant et al. [11] present an Internet routing latency game where the utility of a node is the sum of its shortest path distances to all other nodes plus the cost of the edges the node purchased. The game is perceived as a minimum latency game where a node's goal is to route packets quickly to their destination. The authors showed that regular trees are Nash Equilibrium (NE) networks of the game and raised the question whether the game has non-tree NE. Albers et al. [1] provide the first construction of a cyclic NE for the game using methods from finite affine spaces. Alon et al. [2] provide a combinatorial construction of a link stable network with diameter three for the routing game.

Bala and Goyal analyzed a general formation game where the utility of a node is a two-parameter function where the first parameter is the number of nodes a node is connected to in the outcome graph, and the second parameter is the number of edges the node bought [3]. Under a mild monotonicity condition on this utility function the authors showed that the Nash Equilibrium networks of the game are trees and the strict Nash Equilibrium networks are star-like (plus the empty network for some edge costs).

Borgs et al. [6] have recently introduced a unilateral network formation game motivated from affiliation networks. In their model a player can unilaterally initiate social events with a cost proportional to the number of invitees. Any two players that meet regularly at events will then form an (undirected) edge. The utility of a player is its degree in the network minus the cost of events he initiated. The authors show that the class of NE of the game contains sparse networks as well as power-law networks and that the average clustering coefficient of each NE network is bigger than the inverse of the average degree in that network.

Jackson and Wolinsky [14] were the first to introduce a general bilateral game, called the "connections model". The utility of a node in this game is a sum of discounted shortest path distances to all other nodes plus the cost of the edges adjacent to the node. The authors presented the notion of link-stability where no two nodes want to purchase a missing edge between them, and no node wants to unilaterally remove an adjacent edge. The authors presented a partial

¹ A third type of formation games, where edges are purchased unilaterally and can only be used by the purchasing party, is rarely considered in the literature.

characterization of all link stable networks of the game. A specific version of the game, where the edge cost is not uniform but depends on a metric on the network nodes, was further analyzed in [15]. The authors showed that for a specifically chosen discount factor for the utility of path lengths the link-stable networks of the metric version include regular networks, complete networks, chain, and star networks. However, the analysis is limited to specific values of the discount factor and no general characterization of equilibria networks is given.

Evan-Dar et al. [9] analyze a formation game for bipartite exchange economies. The network is bipartite containing buyers on one side and sellers on the other and edge purchases represent trading opportunities between its endpoint parties. The authors were able to provide a complete characterization of all NE of the network formation game which is rather exceptional in the literature.

The Price of Anarchy measure was introduced by [16] to quantify the inefficiency of NE networks with respect to a central designed solution. It is defined as the ratio between the best welfare (sum of node's utilities) of a network to the worst welfare of a NE network. The routing game presented by Fabrikant et al. was shown to have a low Price of Anarchy [11, 1].

3 Preliminaries

The game we shall study, which we will refer to as the *CC game*, is a one-shot, full information game on n players that shall form the vertices of an undirected graph or network. The pure strategies of the game are the possible sets of undirected edges a player may purchase to the other $n - 1$ players. The price of all edges is the same and known in advance to all players. The edge price is denoted by α .

As in a number of previously studied network formation games, we consider edge purchases to be *unilateral* — a player may purchase an edge to any other party without consent from that party — but all players may potentially benefit from the edge purchases of others. In this sense edges are undirected, but we also need to keep track of who purchased each edge. Given the edge purchases of all players the outcome of the game yields a directed network on n nodes, denoted as G , where an edge from node u to node v is present if and only if u purchased an edge to v . Throughout we shall analyze both the properties of the directed graph G , as well as the undirected graph it induces.

We denote by I_v the set of nodes that purchased edges to v and by O_v the set of nodes v purchased an edge to. We denote the in-degree of v in G as $in-deg(v)$ and its out-degree as $out-deg(v)$. The total degree of v is defined as $deg(v) = in-deg(v) + out-deg(v)$.

We denote the number of triangles that v is part of in G by $\Delta(v)$. The number of triangles containing v in which the two other nodes both belong to I_v is denoted as $\Delta_I(v)$. Similarly, the number of triangles containing v where the two other nodes belong to O_v is denoted as $\Delta_O(v)$. The number of triangles containing v where one of the other nodes belongs to I_v and the remaining one belongs to O_v is denoted as $\Delta_{I,O}(v)$. These sets are all disjoint by definition and we have $\Delta(v) = \Delta_I(v) + \Delta_O(v) + \Delta_{I,O}(v)$.

The *clustering coefficient* of a node v in G is defined as the probability that two randomly selected neighbors of v are directly connected to each other: $CC(v) = \frac{\Delta(v)}{\binom{deg(v)}{2}}$ if $deg(v) \geq 2$, and 0 otherwise. In the CC game, players must balance their desire for high clustering coefficient against their edge expenditures. The utility of v in the game is defined to be $utility(v) = CC(v) - \alpha \cdot out-deg(v)$. When the edge cost $\alpha \geq 1$ all strategies for a node v are dominated by the strategy to purchase no edges at all, so we will assume from now on that $0 < \alpha < 1$. Most of our results will consider the natural case in which α is a constant not depending on the population size n — forming edges has a fixed cost — though we will occasionally discuss cases where α diminishes with increasing n . Some of our results will also depend on α being a rational number.

As in much of the related literature, our main interest in this paper is to study the properties of the *pure* Nash equilibrium (NE) networks of the CC game. For some of our results we shall slightly refine this notion to exclude some degenerate cases and thus focus on the interesting ones. Note that the empty network (no edge purchases) is a trivial NE with zero social welfare (total utility) that we will omit from consideration. We also ask that players who purchase edges have non-zero utility. Note that (at least) zero utility can always be obtained by purchasing *no edges*. This condition demands that the action taken by only a subset of the players (those buying edges) be better than only one of their many alternatives (buying no edges), and even then only in the case that the latter gives zero utility. It is thus a considerable weakening of the standard notion of a *strict* Nash equilibrium. We next codify these restrictions:

Definition 1. *A non-degenerate NE is a non-empty, pure Nash Equilibrium of the CC game in which $out-deg(v) \geq 1$ implies $utility(v) > 0$ for all players v .*

The *social welfare* of a given network is defined as the sum of all players' utilities. The (non-degenerate) Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio of the highest social welfare of any directed network with n nodes to the worst social welfare of any non-degenerate NE.

4 A (Partial) Catalog of CC Game Nash Equilibria

We begin by constructing a number of families of non-degenerate NE of the CC game, focusing primarily on the network topologies that can arise at equilibrium. Each of these families is defined for arbitrarily large population size n , and has social welfare scaling linearly with n . We do not propose this catalog to be exhaustive; indeed it is interesting to see the diversity of structures that can arise at equilibrium, and we suspect there are others. Subsequent sections are devoted to the study of general properties of non-degenerate NE.

The first three constructions below are sufficiently simple that their equilibrium proofs can be established by straightforward calculations that we omit. We do provide the equilibrium proof for our last, and richest, construction.




Fig. 1. A variety of Nash Equilibrium networks of the CC-Game: Disjoint Triangles NE (a), Popular Victims NE (b and c), Triangular Hub and Spokes NE (d), Binary Tree-Like NE (e).

Disjoint Triangles NE. Perhaps the simplest non-degenerate NE consists of $n/3$ disjoint triangles. The nodes in each group form a triangle by purchasing one edge each (Figure 1a). Clearly this structure is a non-degenerate NE for any $0 < \alpha < 1$; for n divisible by 3 it also maximizes the social welfare, a fact we shall use throughout.

Popular Victims NE. This non-degenerate NE shows a case where the most “popular” (highest degree) nodes suffer the lowest utility. Let $n \geq 4$. The construction is as follows: a player u connects to a player v , and each other node connects directly to both u and v by purchasing two edges (Figure 1b). When the edge cost is inversely proportional to n , $\alpha = \frac{2}{n-1} - \epsilon$, for any $\epsilon > 0$, this network is a non-degenerate equilibrium. To see this, notice that all players other than u and v are playing their best responses and get a positive utility provided $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$. Node v cannot improve its utility since all nodes are connected to it. Last, if $\alpha < \frac{2}{n-1}$, u wouldn’t want to remove the edge it purchased to v and therefore is playing its best response. Furthermore, u is getting a positive utility.

Note that this network is “paid for” by low-degree vertices, all of whom enjoy high utility, while the high-degree victims u and v suffer low utility. We shall show later that in fact this is a property of all non-degenerate NE.

Triangular Hub and Spokes NE. Consider the network shown in Figure 1d; it is easily verified that for edge cost $\alpha = \frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$, for any $\epsilon > 0$ this is a non-degenerate NE. Furthermore, this construction can be scaled up to make the “hub” node have arbitrarily high degree at the same (constant) edge cost, and disjoint copies of this construction of different size can be combined to form new non-degenerate NE. In this fashion we may create non-degenerate NE whose (total) degree distributions are effectively unconstrained.

Binary Tree-Like NE. We next construct a large family of non-degenerate NE obtained by the following construction. We take any rooted, directed binary tree T (with edges always oriented towards the leaves), where the root has out-degree of one, and replace each directed edge in T with a local gadget of the type given in Figure 1c. As an example of the construction, consider starting with the rooted, directed tree T on five vertices shown in Figure 1e (inset). The resulting network $G(T)$ is given in Figure 1e.

It is worth emphasizing that this construction yields a rather rich family of non-degenerate NE with a variety of asymmetries possible, which is somewhat unusual in the network formation game literature. At one extreme it contains connected, small diameter networks (constructed from balanced binary trees) and on the other extreme it contains connected, large diameter networks (constructed from path-like graphs). Since the argument that the construction does yield NE is considerably more involved than for our previous examples, a formal theorem is given. The proof is omitted due to lack of space and is given in the extended version of the paper [7].

Theorem 1. *For any rooted, directed binary tree T where the root has out-degree of one, let $G(T)$ be the directed network obtained by the construction described above. Then for any edge cost that is smaller than some constant independent of network size, $G(T)$ is a non-degenerate pure NE of the CC game.*

5 General Properties of CC Game Nash Equilibria

Given the apparent diversity and potential asymmetry of the NE of the CC game, what general statements might we hope to make about their topological and utility properties? Certain very basic and crude characterizations are easily obtained — for instance, the fact that any NE has at most $\frac{n}{\alpha}$ edges follows from the fact that each node can purchase at most $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ edges at equilibrium since all utilities are non-negative. Notice that this observation does not imply a non-trivial restriction on the total degree or utility of any individual node.

In this section, we prove a considerably stronger characterization motivated by the commonalities in the NE described in the last section. Namely, we prove that any (non-degenerate) NE is paid for by nodes of low total degree and high utility, while high-degree vertices are always victims of low utility. This characterization will then be applied in the following section to obtain non-trivial bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the CC game.

Theorem 2. *Let $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$. Then in any non-degenerate NE of the CC game:*

- *For any node v , if $\text{out-deg}(v) \geq 1$, then $\text{deg}(v) < \frac{3}{\alpha}$, and $\text{utility}(v) = c(\alpha) > 0$, where the strictly positive constant $c(\alpha)$ depends only on α , and not the population size n . Moreover, when $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ is integral, $c(\alpha) > \frac{\alpha^3}{9}$.² Thus, vertices purchasing an edge have low total degree and a positive, constant utility.*

² A similar bound holds for “simple” rational α ; see the proof.

- For any node v with $\deg(v) \geq \frac{3}{\alpha}$, $utility(v) < \frac{3}{\alpha(\deg(v)-1)}$. Thus, high-degree vertices have low utility.

Proof. We start by proving the first part of the theorem. Let v be any node in a non-degenerate NE network that purchased an edge and has an in-degree of at least two (the claim is trivially true when in-degree of v is at most one). The upper bound on v 's total degree is derived from the fact the v 's utility is higher than what it could have gotten by purchasing no edges at all:

$$\frac{\Delta(v)}{\binom{\deg(v)}{2}} - \alpha \cdot out\text{-deg}(v) \geq \frac{\Delta_I(v)}{\binom{in\text{-deg}(v)}{2}}.$$

Simplifying, we get

$$\Delta_I(v) \left(\frac{2}{\deg(v)(\deg(v)-1)} - \frac{2}{in\text{-deg}(v)(in\text{-deg}(v)-1)} \right) + \frac{\Delta_{I,O}(v) + \Delta_O(v)}{\frac{\deg(v)(\deg(v)-1)}{2}} \geq \alpha \cdot out\text{-deg}(v).$$

Since $\frac{2}{\deg(v)(\deg(v)-1)} - \frac{2}{in\text{-deg}(v)(in\text{-deg}(v)-1)} < 0$, we get

$$\frac{\Delta_{I,O}(v) + \Delta_O(v)}{out\text{-deg}(v)\deg(v)(\deg(v)-1)} > \frac{\alpha}{2}.$$

By using $\Delta_O(v) \leq \binom{out\text{-deg}(v)}{2}$ and $\Delta_{I,O}(v) \leq in\text{-deg}(v) \cdot out\text{-deg}(v)$, we get

$$\frac{in\text{-deg}(v)out\text{-deg}(v) + \frac{out\text{-deg}(v)(out\text{-deg}(v)-1)}{2}}{out\text{-deg}(v)\deg(v)(\deg(v)-1)} > \frac{\alpha}{2},$$

so $\frac{1}{\deg(v)} + \frac{1}{2\deg(v)} > \frac{\alpha}{2}$, or alternatively, $\deg(v) < \frac{3}{\alpha}$.

Next, we prove a lower bound on v 's utility that follows from it being strictly positive (non-degeneracy). Recall that $utility(v) = \frac{\Delta(v)}{\binom{\deg(v)}{2}} - \alpha out\text{-deg}(v) > 0$. Since $\deg(v) < \frac{3}{\alpha}$, the RHS of the utility expression can only equal one out of a finite number possible of possibilities that depend only on α and not on n . In particular, for each α we can choose the worst possible value that still renders $utility(v)$ strictly positive. We denote that value by $c(\alpha)$.

Furthermore if $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ is integral, by taking a common denominator the left hand-side can be written as a strictly positive numerator divided by a denominator of $\frac{1}{\alpha \binom{\deg(v)}{2}}$. Using $\deg(v) < \frac{3}{\alpha}$, we get that v 's utility is bigger than $\frac{\alpha^3}{9}$. (More generally note that if $\alpha = p/q$ for integers $p < q$ and thus rational, a similar argument yields a lower bound of $\frac{\alpha^3}{9p}$ on the utility, and thus “simple” α give constructive lower bounds.)

We next prove the second part of the theorem. Consider a node v with a total degree of at least $\frac{3}{\alpha}$. We saw earlier that a node that purchased edges has

a degree of less than $\frac{3}{\alpha}$ so v could not have purchased edges at all. Moreover, a node u that purchased an edge to v has degree less than $\frac{3}{\alpha}$ and so v is part of less than $\frac{3}{\alpha}$ joint triangles with u . Therefore the total triangle count of node v is less than $\frac{1}{2}d \cdot \frac{3}{\alpha}$. Thus, v 's utility is less than $\frac{\frac{1}{2}d\frac{3}{\alpha}}{\binom{d}{2}} = \frac{3}{\alpha(d-1)}$.

6 The Price of Anarchy

As has been mentioned, a disjoint union of triangles is a maximum social welfare NE, whereas all the specific families of NE given in Section 4 have a social welfare growing linearly with the population size n . In this section we prove that the non-degenerate Price of Anarchy is upper bounded by a function depending only on α , and not on n , for all $\alpha < 1/2$, and give an explicit expression for the upper bound when α is a "simple" rational (small numerator). This turns out to be a fairly straightforward consequence of the characterization given in Theorem 2. The proof can be found in the extended version of the paper [7].

Theorem 3. *For edge cost $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{2}$ the non-degenerate Price of Anarchy for the CC game is lower bounded by $\Omega(n(1-\alpha))$, and for edge cost $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ it is upper bounded by an expression that depends only on α . Moreover, when $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ is integral the Price of Anarchy is upper bounded by $\frac{36(1-\alpha)}{\alpha^4}$ ³*

While Theorem 3 upper bounds the non-degenerate Price of Anarchy independent of the population size n for $\alpha < 1/2$, it leaves open the question of the exact dependence on α and whether it is even real or not. Indeed, all specific constructions in Section 4 have a constant Price of Anarchy independent of α , even when α is a small numerator rational. We leave the resolution of this dependence as an open problem.

It is natural to ask how robust the results we have described so far are with respect to modifications of the equilibrium notion — especially in light of the results in the following section, where we will prove that even approximate best-response computations for the CC game are intractable. Indeed, it is for similar reasons that in other network formation games, researchers often consider weaker notions of equilibrium, such as *link stability* (which asks only that players cannot improve their utilities by adding or dropping a single edge purchase).

Notice that an equilibrium concept resilient only to the addition or removal of a single one edge already has a Price of Anarchy of $\Omega(n(1-\alpha))$ for any edge cost, since a network with one triangle and many isolated nodes is then in equilibrium no matter how small α is (a single edge purchase can never help). However, define *k-stability* to be the equilibrium concept in which players cannot benefit by switching from their assigned edge purchase set S to any other edge purchase set S' for which the symmetric set difference $|S - S'| \leq k$. (Thus standard link stability corresponds to 1-stability.) For any fixed value of k , computing best responses under *k-stability* becomes a computationally tractable problem, and for $k \geq 2$, all of our results can be shown to hold under this notion as well:

³ A similar bound holds for "simple" (small numerator) rational α .

Theorem 4. *For all $k \geq 2$, Theorems 2 and 3 remain true when we replace NE by k -stability.*

The proof is omitted, but mainly involves technical modifications of the proof of the first part of Theorem 2 to consider the utility effects of dropping only the most beneficial edge purchases, rather than all edge purchases.

We end by noting that a low PoA implies that the average vertex clustering coefficient is high.

Corollary 1. *For edge cost $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ the average vertex clustering coefficient grows at least as some function $g(\alpha)$ independent of the network size, while the network's overall edge density goes to zero at a rate smaller or equal to $\frac{2\alpha}{n-1}$.*

7 Intractability of Best Responses

A natural question that arises in many complex network formation games is how difficult it can be to compute best responses, which would seem a prerequisite to reaching NE dynamically; for instance, best-response computation was shown to be NP-hard to compute for a routing formation game [11]. Here we show that best responses in the CC game are intractable even to approximate, thus motivating the weaker notion of k -stability in the last section.

Theorem 5. *Given a directed graph G and a node v in G (where G represents the edge purchases of the other nodes), the edge cost α (encoded as a rational number), and an integer $f \geq 1$, computing a strategy (set of edge purchases) for v with CC game utility at least $\frac{1}{f}$ of the best-response utility is not polynomial time computable, unless $P = NP$.*

The proof is given in the extended version of the paper [7].

One way to deal with the inapproximability of best response is to focus on computing best responses under k -stability, $k \geq 1$. Although the problem of computing best response under k stability for each node becomes tractable for fixed values of k , the corresponding dynamics doesn't always converge to a k -stable network, as shown in Figure 2. Therefore there is no simple solution to the inapproximability of best-responses.

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


Fig. 2. Here we consider the weakest notion of best response, where a node can either add or remove at most one edge to improve its utility. Edge cost can be taken to be any $0 < \alpha < 1$. Figure 2a shows the initial network, and in each consecutive round the network is drawn after the node colored gray played its best-response under k -stability, $k \geq 1$. The dynamics returns to its initial configuration after six rounds as shown in Figure 2g, so it never converges to a k -stable network.

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