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Peaceable Kingdoms and Information Technology

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Peaceable Kingdoms and Information Technology

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13 Peaceable Kingdoms and New Information Technologies

Prospects for the Nation-State

How will global communications technologies transform the nation-state? Could they threaten its existence as the linchpin of the international system? Those who ponder new technologies gathering steam in the early twenty-first century and the ponderously creaky social formation called the nation-state disagree about the likely outcome of the collision between them. Some prophets have imagined an end to two centuries of nation-state tribalism and armed conflict. Other visions sketch powerful nation-states hemorrhaging sovereignty from onslaughts by predatory supercapitalism. Dramatic fantasies of doom and salvation have always accompanied shifts in communications technology. They are less informative about the likely character of the future than about important strains in the social structure of societies experiencing technological change.¹

Social distance changes when technological innovation raises or lowers customary communicative barriers. Writing, telegraphy, and telephony all have transformed social distance in this fashion. Today we are witness to the restless and continuing reorganization of local, intermediate, and global social distances by the Internet, cell phones, instant messaging, tape cassettes, compact disks, digital imagery, and more on the way. It would be surprising if major shifts in how humans communicate with one another had no important implications for social structure. At the level of lived existence, social structure is visibly anchored by conventions of proper social distance in face-to-face exchanges between persons of similar or different statuses. Related conventions govern mediated interaction. Such rules govern public and private boundaries and generate procedures for establishing trust in role encounters. The most visible shifts in communication technology rearrange familiar social distances and imperil this carefully calibrated social trust. Because they are both unsettling and exciting, such rearrangements are a prominent theme of popular culture, which faithfully registers popular desires and fears that emerge from them.

It would be hard to conclude from inspecting contemporary popular culture that the fate of nations *as nations* hangs in the balance of new communications technologies from the perspective of most citizens, however. According to popular discourse, new communications technologies affect morality, and not for the better. Likewise affected are civility and various kinds of authority, including parental authority, many forms of professional authority, and the private authority citizens have over information about their own lives. But the stability of the nation-state seems secure in popular imagination. (This is a different matter than the fate of particular nation-states, which always hangs in the balance.) Popular assessments do not guarantee that drastic political consequences do not lie ahead. They do mean that popular identification with nation-state belonging is an especially stable feature of modern social and personal identity.

Communicatively speaking, nation-states descend from eighteenth-century newspapers, nineteenth-century telegraphy, and twentieth-century broadcasting. Measured against the history of other significant communications technologies, digital technologies thus seem destined for large political consequences, popular assessments notwithstanding. Discussion on this point is necessarily speculative, and humility is definitely in order for any effort to discern through a glass darkly the long-term consequences of technological change. Still, with no thought that nation-state forms are eternal or inevitable, it is far from obvious that the nation-state will be a front-line casualty of new forms of global communications. Nation-states are likely to weather the transformations of digital technology for a long time to come.

How shifts in communications set in motion transforming cultural shifts has always preoccupied theorists of the grand sweep, for whom print offers the prototype example. One of the best known, Elizabeth Eisenstein, argues that the cultural episode we call the Renaissance flowed directly from the diffusion of printing.² She also gives print a propelling role in two powerful ideologies of Western modernity, early modern science and Protestantism. For Harold Innis, the transformative power of printing is a function of the dramatic expansion it made possible in cultural memory, and in its exponential enlargement of the transmission and distribution of information. Computing likewise vastly amplifies cultural memory (the dimension Innis calls "time-binding")³ and transmission and distribution in real time (which Innis calls "space-binding"). For Innis, communication technologies that bind both space and time in new ways, as printing did and computing

now does, foster geographically large, politically centralized forms of empire. The United States is this kind of empire.

Benedict Anderson ties his grand argument about print to felt solidarity more than to increases in mechanical capacity. He argues that the emergence of nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the direct outcome of the diffusion through print of nationalist sentiment. Shared written vernaculars linked colonial bureaucratic elites in "imagined communities" that nourished new-nation sensibilities. Anderson sees modern nations as communities of strangers imagining one another as comrades through shared texts that provide the affective bonds of nationhood.⁴ If, in fact, community boundaries are as malleable as printed imaginings of them are fluid and abundant, global communities are possible because global texts may be distributed with little effort. But there is a gap in Anderson's formulation between the moral sentiments people have and the claim that these convictions arise automatically from the existence of an appropriate vehicle along which they may travel.

Nation-states are not simply well-coordinated daydreams of language and information. They are communities of moral obligation whose members' bodies are committed to mutual common defense. Such commitments include sacrifices willingly undertaken by citizens and acquiescence to the state's willingness to compel citizen sacrifice through conscription and other means. Where popular readiness for sacrifice is lacking, visible state compulsion will imperil national unity and purpose. The Vietnam War provides the living memory example for the United States. Mere diffusion of information and propaganda proved unable to persuade a large enough majority of citizens that North Vietnam posed a threat to American national security. Where lives and not only words are at stake, more than mere textual imagination of new political forms is needed to create or sustain the affective glue of enduring group cohesion. By the same logic, there is a missing piece in most assessments of the role digital technologies will have in the larger political transformations we might expect them to facilitate.

WHAT IS ESSENTIAL TO COLLECTIVE IDENTITY?

To resolve this issue we must consider the nation as the locus of collective identity for its citizens. Among all the overlapping communities of identity to which modern persons belong, why does the rhetoric of sweeping technological change focus especially on *nations*? Eric Hobsbawm puts the puzzle this way:

It [the nation-state] is, in Benedict Anderson's useful phrase, an "imagined community," and no doubt this can be made to fill the emotional void left by the retreat or disintegration, or the unavailability of real human communities and networks, but the question still remains why, having lost real communities, people should wish to imagine this particular type of replacement.⁵

If we could say why nation-states constitute the core group of belonging in modernity, as Liah Greenfeld and other theorists of nationalism insist they do, we might better understand the cohesive dynamics of contemporary communities and better predict the likely rearrangements of time and space that digital technologies will encourage.⁶

Hobsbawm has no doubt that there exists a *real* human community, even if humans have somehow contrived to lose it. How this could happen is not a trivial question, but I take Hobsbawm to be asserting a foundational mode for human society. He perhaps implies that "real" communities are organized around face-to-face interaction, which makes possible the authentic connections upon which "real" communities depend. At the very least, more bodies cannot be made without such interaction!⁷ I believe the same applies to collective action for solving the most difficult tasks of survival, and propose that what makes nations the key source of political identity for modern people is that national communities are the most potent bloodletters, the most visible users of bodies in the contemporary world. To paraphrase Weber's description of the state, sovereignty at its most basic is having legitimate killing authority.⁸ Citizenship is a relation of submission to such killing authority.

Without bodies, society is impossible, to be more concrete about it. The more removed from immediate bodily presence the community of belonging is from those who must be persuaded to belong to it, the more dramatic must be the means of overcoming the gap that mediated forms open up between belonging as a moral relationship and intimacy as an experiential condition. Where members have personal experience of all other members in small-scale societies, there is no gap between belonging and intimacy. Where connections are attenuated by distance and mediated through texts—in the sprawling industrialized nations where readers of this essay are likely to live—ties of compelling psychological and social power must be generated in the absence of physically intimate bonds that unite members of face-to-face communities.

How to bind the loyalties of the foot soldiers who must be enlisted to project nation-state power abroad and ensure domestic tranquility at

home—and the loyalties of the families that offer them? It is no accident that Clausewitzian total war was invented and theorized contemporaneously with the rise of the nation-state. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was a Prussian officer and veteran of German and Russian campaigns against both the French Revolutionary Army and Napoleon in the regimental system that antedates modern nation-state military organization. Regimental armies were invented by absolutist rulers seeking an end to the structural instabilities of feudalism. In that system rulers were required to reward noble princes with land for fighting men and services rendered. Through strategic alliances and the acquisition of ever more territory, ambitious feudal lords might contrive to topple the rulers they served only to become vulnerable themselves in an endless, exhausting cycle of bloodshed and conquest.⁹

Regiments, or standing armies, changed this. Skills in the strategic command of men at war were transferred from an aristocratic class of princes to a bureaucratized officer corps forbidden to acquire territorial holdings. In exchange for fighting services, men at arms were housed and maintained permanently at the ready by the sovereign power. By this means a ruler with a body of dedicated landless fighting men at his disposal no longer faced the nobility as a rival military power.¹⁰ The nobility was brought into court, a waning decorative testament to a dying social system. Standing armies required two innovations. Royal taxation of a merchant bourgeoisie anxious to have peace for the sake of commercial enterprise solved the economic problem of sustaining permanent armed bodies of landless men. And cultivation among the citizenry of a willingness to make any sacrifice at all in the service of the nation, an ethic of total war, provided both justification and engine for social and psychological unity.

Clausewitzian theories of war were conceived within the assumptions of emerging centralized states. Lawful bearers of arms bound to surrender their lives to authority on demand were distinguished from irregular soldiers outside disciplined authority. Our image of total war is masses of men standing in rows, slaughtering and being slaughtered, perhaps for hours at a time. Such wars of attrition became the blood sacrifice rituals of nation-states partly because they aroused emotions of religious intensity and force. The ritual lesson of total war is that Durkheimian sentiments of solidarity manifest as nationalism can be generated where—but more to the point only if—blood sacrifice is great enough to trump competing ties of kinship, ethnicity, class, and religion that threaten it. Large numbers of casualties unify the community by equalizing the sacrifices of citizens. A large sacri-

face guarantees that blood, the most magical of bodily substances, sooner or later touches everyone in the group. Soldiers are touched directly. All who are connected to them by kinship or close affiliation are indirectly touched. The greater the number of soldiers sacrificed (short of a sacrifice too great for the group to sustain itself, which possibility is used to wring ever greater dedication from those who are called), the more demanding and personal is the shared ordeal of every member of the community in sending them, and the larger the community that may be thus unified. Where men have lost what Hobsbawm calls a "real" community, only conditions this severe can generate a shared bond equivalent in moral strength to those long associated with face-to-face social intimacy.

Compared to one knit together by blood rituals, can such solidarity be generated in the famously imagined Andersonian textual community? Events experienced in one's own skin provide the deepest forms of emotional life available to humans. Textual experience is derivative by definition.¹¹ Though Anderson never systematically considers the content of national texts, these contribute to solidarity largely by cementing bodily sacrifice to nationalism. The specific examples of national texts Anderson puts forward are of exactly this kind, though he fails to notice that the crucial mechanism of connection is sacrifice rather than print, which provides a necessary means of distribution but not the engine of motivation. And though shared texts disseminate and amplify knowledge of sacrificial bodies, texts simply as texts cannot create the compelling feelings of responsibility we call patriotic obligation and guilt. In rituals of national solidarity, texts play a supporting liturgical role. There is no substitute for real blood shed by striving and suffering bodies in producing the conviction of shared national kinship.

The limiting size of political communities, therefore, is not only how much physical territory can be coordinated and integrated through systems of transportation and communication, nor even the number of people that can be kept in line by force. The size of political communities is limited by the size of a population *for which it is possible to enlist men's deepest moral sympathies through body-to-body ties*. The farther-reaching the links of movement and message, the more citizens are bound to be physical and moral strangers to one another. The more citizens are strangers, the more dramatic and compelling—the more *violent*—must be the rituals that elicit their willingness to sacrifice despite (and frequently in defiance of) family, religion, and other body-based affiliations that compete for moral supremacy and have the capacity to derail or destroy national purpose. Texts play a critical

role in recalling past national sacrifice. But without real bodies to back them, as gold backs currency, and without periodically renewed ritual offerings of those bodies that constitute the real treasure of the community, enduring groups can neither maintain themselves or address serious threats to their existence.

All this sounds strangely primitive in an era when textual authority is plainly powerful. In the modern West, it might be said that all bodies are disciplined with respect to literacy. Some are disciplined in its use, others are disciplined to keep away from it. Social distinctions based in literate practice separate those who use and expend their bodies in physical work from those with relative discretion to preserve and protect their physical bodies from labor and hardship. Those with access to literate currencies learn to conceal their bodies in the production and manipulation of literate signs through costly strategems of self-control. It is the privilege of the preserved body to remain concealed within and protected by the practices and products of literacy. Compared to the less socially esteemed body, which remains relatively more visible and unprotected, suppression of the body is the condition of literate achievement.¹²

Those whose cultural power depends on controlling the production and reception of texts make up the textual classes. Those who depend on the labor of their bodies, who cannot conceal themselves behind texts, comprise the bodily classes. In Western history the agonistic play of texts against bodies was propelled decisively forward by the Reformation, a deep and sustained attack on traditional body-based forms of ritual magic in the name of textual authority.¹³ For the performative magic of bodies, manifest in the transmutation of bread and wine, curing the sick, and even baptism, the sixteenth-century Reformation substituted an equally magical commitment to textual authority and practice, manifest as correct scriptural belief. Now focused on the system of secular constitutional law, reverence for literate authority still undergirds the system for conferring and distributing social resources and prestige in modern industrialized societies.¹⁴

Textual communities do not engage in blood fighting. They leave this task to the body classes. In textual communities, intellectuals are front men. Stereotypically not in control of their own bodies, ridiculed as asexual, powerless to command other bodies, intellectuals legitimize textuality to the bodily classes. Existing at the sufferance of more powerful (textual) elites than they, they are charged to idealize textual sensibilities as noble, ethereal, and morally exalted. The body class learns its subordinate social place from these textual class missionaries. Through rituals of cultural deference,

body class members are schooled not to notice that the true power of the textual class consists of controlling and disposing of the bodies of nontextual classes.

Electronically mediated communications are simply the most contemporary form of textualized messages. Like texts that have preceded them, digital texts are abstracted from the bodies that produce and receive them. Like these texts, they are endlessly duplicated and effortlessly distributed. Even digital prophets who expect nation-states to recede as residues of a primitive past, replaced by text-based digital communities, are historically familiar. The vision of a universal textual language that links metropolitan cultures while effacing traditional rural populations recalls Enlightenment elites who offered this dream to liberal cosmopolites of eighteenth-century Europe. Internationalism, observes Tom Nairn, has always been the ideology of metropole intelligentsia, not rural peasantry or the countryside.¹⁵

Literate elites benefit first and disproportionately from new textual technologies. They reinforce their elite positions by absorbing and dominating these technologies. They imagine the extension and triumph of their technology over all others. They have a stake in ignoring the sacrifice of nonelite bodies to support their dominant position. In industrialized countries, this sacrifice is exacted especially from police and soldiers whose bodies guarantee the safety of textual elites through forcible expulsion of illegal immigrants, and from the poor who lack textual skills for amassing cultural capital in the struggle for status. These dispossessed fight back with their bodies—and mostly lose.

VISIONS OF THE GOOD STATE

In fairness, the vision of a universal culture is not limited to the textual class. If societies may be broadly classed as dominated by textual or bodily elites, there are instances enough of the latter. With the instructive exception of Nazism, bodily elites have not been dominant in the modern West. In recent history, Khmer Rouge nationalists forced urban-educated elites into the countryside to labor for Pol Pot's body-dominated ruling cadres. The Taliban of Afghanistan visited draconian spectacles of punishment on those who failed to comply with the strict bodily observances mandated by their own brand of Islam. Mao's Great Leap forward was launched in the name of a utopia of the body and the political subordination of the textual classes. The brutality of bodily regimes is more visible than that of textual regimes, their injustices more easily recognized and denounced from outside. Falling

behind in a society dominated by textual elites has a more hidden profile since less literate and nonliterate groups lack means and skill to call effective outside attention to the economic and physical violence visited on them. The chains of social and economic dependence are also longer in textualized regimes than in regimes of the body. Elaborated, textually mediated connections between power-holders and those at the mercy of power are not only less visible, the less participants know one another, but arguably more difficult to intervene in as well.

Those who foresee a decline in nation-state sovereignty do not argue that nation-states are too big or too small or otherwise unable to provide physical protection and sustenance to their citizens. After 200 years it is clear that the administrative and political form of the nation-state offers a stable foundation for productive societies. Prophets of nationalism's demise claim that digital technologies portend a centrifugal denationalizing power of irresistible force. This is a surprising claim if we consider that other distance- and time-annihilating communications technologies—telegraphy, radio, and television—have expanded rather than contracted the power of nation-states.

Prophets of denationalization like Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Francis Fukuyama argue that the digital "despatialization" of the world spells the "end of politics" and the nation-state as the most prominent of political structures.¹⁶ Just as Daniel Bell once proclaimed that information age technologies portended the "end of ideology," Francis Fukuyama has claimed that history, conventionally understood as dramas of nation-state strife, is at an end.¹⁷ His version of technological transformation proposes a Hegelian progression from nationalism to liberal democracy, a view also advanced by early twentieth-century thinkers such as Durkheim in France and Dewey in the United States.¹⁸ A less sanguine stages-of-history argument is offered by theorists who take to heart Marx's admonition that the existence of nation-states has long permitted capitalists to divert workers from their true class interests. These critics hope for the end of what Fukuyama labels the thymic aspects of nationalism—chauvinism, ethnocentrism, racism, fascism, and militarism. Thus John Lukacs observes that the struggle of the twentieth century was not a struggle of classes but nations.

What could replace the tottering nation-state? Benjamin Barber, Wilson Dizard, and Walter B. Wriston predict that increasing economic interdependence across political borders will prevail over political interests that fuel armed conflict.¹⁹ The European Union (EU) offers a hopeful model for proponents of this view. It is also an ambiguous one since its success rests on

the political stability of its nation-state members. A successful EU would not resemble a new political form so much as a superstate of those now comprising it. Still, Samuel Huntington has warned that commercial contacts are a dubious thread on which to hang hopes for peace.²⁰ No nations were more economically interdependent than Germany and France in August 1914, or the Germans and the Soviets in June 1941.²¹ Commerce is as likely to inform people about their differences as their commonalities. One of the lessons of the antebellum U.S. Post Office was that mail from Northern abolitionists inflamed Southern resentment toward the North wherever it circulated. Increased communication may as easily sharpen conflict as promote harmony.

The debate over America Online's policy of removing individual subscribers and messages that "harass, threaten, embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is unwarranted" offers a quick snapshot of the issues that surround digitally communicated conflict. The issue here is instructive because it represents no great challenge to nation-state peace and security. It simply offers a window on the quotidian comings and goings of social exchange in the cyberage.²² By excluding the rude, America Online hopes to minimize conflict and provide an atmosphere of civility for millions of subscribers. The unmourned victim of this policy is open democratic communication in which conflict is no less likely than harmony to manifest itself. If America Online's goal is not democratic access for the rude and civil alike, but eliminating uncivil disagreement, powerful compulsory restraints must be applied. These will always serve the most entrenched notions of the status quo. The tactics of pacification never eliminate force. They simply disguise it. America Online itself exists only so long as a nation-state able to exercise force is willing to defend it. All nation-states, even the most democratic, are supported by violence, even when they have learned to hide it behind layers of distracting text.

Invent the printing press, Thomas Carlyle is supposed to have said in an early version of the optimism that drives utopian prophets of globalization, and democracy is inevitable. Apparently not. The printing press has been as useful to entrenched totalitarian states as to model democracies. If electronic communications were inherently democratizing, we could depend on "technologies of freedom" simply to wear down the hierarchies that frustrate democracy.²³ But technological form provides no democratic guarantees. Global communications systems often require expressly undemocratic centralizing infrastructures in order to stay up and running. If global electronic communications could further democracy, would this be a gain for

world peace? James Lee Ray asserts that liberal democracies have never attacked one another by force of arms.²⁴ He also acknowledges that democracies have not been reluctant to initiate war against nondemocracies or to colonize vulnerable peoples. Having divested themselves of colonial empires in the twentieth century, the most powerful among them project force geopolitically through client states caught in webs of dependence that constantly threaten escalating conflicts.²⁵ The notion that citizens linked by new forms of communication will have no motivation to fuel the passions of nationalism simply disregards the history of nation-state violence by democracies and nondemocracies alike.

I hasten to acknowledge that the arguments put forward here apply to textual, or explicitly re-presentational, technologies. Were forms of virtual interaction to become genuinely indistinguishable from face-to-face encounters, all bets are off. I am prepared to believe that body re-forming technologies might present genuine alternatives to the body-based moral communities of nation-states. In fanciful visions from teleportation to human cloning, they constitute the limiting case for the present analysis.

THE POLITICS OF THE BODY

However secure their political form for the near term, nation-states do face significant challenges in an era of globalized computing. The perception that bodies are increasingly detached from "real" human communities offers a vantage point from which groups whose livelihoods are directly threatened, and whose cultural and social authority is greatly reduced by digital technologies will interpret their situation and consider their options. They include workers who provide personal services (e.g., travel agents, financial consultants, real-estate brokers, messengers, traveling salesmen, private-practice physicians) that can be offered more efficiently and extensively by new technologies, or whose consumers can be cream-skimmed by electronically based providers. They include educators, librarians, and other petty bourgeois members of the textual class whose professional authority is eroded by networked databases and automated retrieval systems. They include body class workers in domestic manufacturing whose living standards have declined along with these industries. They include those who lack basic literacy skills, and are able to command only the most menial of jobs in the digital economy.

Those who experience the erosion of bodily authority as a loss of social power experience it as the destruction of morality, civility, authority, and

autonomy. At home and abroad, such groups may be expected to resort to rituals of restoring the purified body to power. In the United States a presidential impeachment focused around the sexually scandalous (and lying, finger-pointing) body was consistent with such anxiety. So are moral panics about sex and violence; health issues such as smoking and irradiated food; and perceived assaults on the family such as gay marriage, abortion, and priestly pedophilia. The politics of the body is registered in increased resistance to immigration and other expressions of tribal resistance to impure bodies. It predicts ever greater hostility from those who, lacking textual skills, find themselves on the wrong side of the global and national economy. Nor should we be surprised to see enhanced punishments (more prisons incarcerating more bodies and lesser crimes punished with penalties that display the stigmatized body to the community) for bodily crimes from murder to prostitution. We can expect the rhetoric of alarm eventually to embrace computing itself as a threat to the nation-state (the Taliban, for example, forbade computing on the grounds that monitors could receive forbidden images). Such expressions already haunt the political discourse of marginalized body-class groups who fear conspiracies by international textual elites such as the United Nations and the Trilateral Commission.

That the modern technologically integrated state will strike with special vengeance against body-based challenges is also clear. Terrorism is the obvious case. Consider also domestic hate crimes, which increase penalties for violent assaults motivated by prejudice against bodies that are symbolically privileged in the current political climate—minorities, women, gays. Such penalties demonstrate to members of the body class, the primary perpetrators of bias crimes, that angry efforts at retribution for the raw deal they perceive themselves to have from a society that disdains the bodies they offer will be dealt with more severely than text-based injustices. Red-lining, employment discrimination, and corporate consolidation are deeds on paper that eliminate jobs, pensions, and health care. For those without recourse to the textual machinery of expensive litigation or relatively protected textual-class employment, these deprivations result in lost life opportunities. Textual class crimes may be less visibly brutal than hate crimes but are no less determinative of the life courses of their victims, and the number of their victims is significantly greater. Thus do the social sorting mechanisms of a textual society deflect and devalue the body class and keep it under control, not least by keeping its members divided against themselves.

CONCLUSION

Nation-states are the form that human tribes take in a technological world. Though digital technology may support and re-present blood sacrifice to citizens as print and broadcasting have done before it, the existence of nation-states requires forms of blood commitment by citizens for which, finally, there is no substitute. Texts give central authorities far-reaching power to monitor bodies at a distance. Such coordination has been among the chief contributions of computing technology to nation-state power. But if texts, including digital texts, provide the means, they cannot provide the distinctive glue of group loyalty. To replace the nation-state with alternative moral communities will require new rituals of sacrifice and fertility able to compete with nation-state war in emotional scale and power. Such rituals are not impossible to imagine; they could well make total wars of attrition look limited and civilized. They should give us great pause. If nation-states turn out not to be adequate suppliers of sacrificial ritual demand, what new levels of ferocity and brutality might be necessary to command the dedicated loyalties of more extended communities of strangers?

Not that brutality has ever been partial to particular political forms. Lynching, clan warfare, domestic violence, and slavery are all robust genres in the familiar record of man's inhumanity, and none requires nation-states for their expression. They remind us that enduring communities at every level organize violence, like sex, to promote their own survival. The collective tension that surrounds violence does not arise, in the first instance, from its destructiveness to individuals, but from the knowledge that energies so powerful can destroy the very communities they are deployed to sustain. This powerful combination of creativity and destruction is part of violence's religiously compelling aura. Whatever new computing technologies offer in the way of challenges and opportunities for the nation-state will be faithfully manifest in the fortunes and misfortunes, advances and retreats, rewards and punishments of the interface between bodily violence and increased textual coordination and control. To chart the most disruptive consequences of the digital revolution, follow the bodies.

NOTES

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1. See Carolyn Marvin, *When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking about Communication in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

2. Elizabeth Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-modern Europe*, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

3. Harold A. Innis, *Empire and Communications* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972) and *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).

4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). A similar perspective is shared by Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

5. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 46.

6. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 18.

7. Even this is no longer certain, but on the scale that replenishes national populations, reproduction will continue to be a face-to-face activity for the foreseeable future.

8. For an extended analysis of nationalism and patriotism as civil religion, see Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

9. The classic discussion of this transformation is Norbert Elias, *The Civilising Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmond Jephcott (1939; Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

10. See John Keegan, *The History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

11. By "text" I refer throughout to mass-mediated messages, both printed writing and printed images.

12. See Carolyn Marvin, "The Body of the Text: Literacy's Corporeal Constant," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80, no. 2 (May 1994): 129–49.

13. See Peter Burke, "The Repudiation of Ritual in Early Modern Europe," in *The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 223–38.

14. European regimental armies, the priestly classes of the new body-based religion of nationalism, were organized over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, just as ritual claims on the body by traditional Christianity were weakening.

15. Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited* (London: Verso, 1997).

16. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *The End of the Nation-State*, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

17. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

18. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992).

19. Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad Vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, 1996); Walter B. Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World* (New York: Scribners, 1992).

20. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

21. Edward Luttwak, *Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

22. Amy Harmon, "Worries About Big Brother at America Online," *New York Times*, January 31, 1991, section 1, 20.

23. Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Technologies of Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

24. James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).

25. John J. Mearsheimer, "Here We Go Again," *New York Times*, May 17, 1998, section 4.