White or Foreign? Differentiating Perceptions of the Racialization of National Identity in Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand

Lucy Hu

University of Pennsylvania, lucyhu@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej

Part of the Comparative Politics Commons

Recommended Citation


This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/237
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
White or Foreign? Differentiating Perceptions of the Racialization of National Identity in Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand

Abstract
Past literature has established that often in a white-majority society, a national label is associated with the white population more than people of other ethnic origins. Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand share many historical and institutional similarities, making them valuable comparative cases. While scholars have researched national identity to varying degrees in these countries, the gap remains in comparative analysis of perceptions of national identity. This thesis first analyzes comparative public opinion data to establish differences in the degree to which national identity is racially-exclusive in the case countries. Second, it compares historical immigration policy, multiculturalism policy and programs, and ethnic activism in each country to understand what causes varying levels of racialization. The data analysis reveals ‘American’ as the most racially-inclusive national identity and ‘Australian’ as the least. The thesis also finds that presence (or lack) of ethnic activism can best explain the variation between the four countries, while the institutional variables were inconsistent with the variation. These results contribute to understandings of the drivers of national identity construction and lend support to arguments in the wider public opinion literature that social movements are more influential for opinion formation than legislation. The surprising result that multiculturalism policy was not mapped with more inclusive national identities also provides policymakers with insight on the effectiveness of different policy pathways to promote inclusion. Additionally, given the extensive negative consequences of exclusion documented in psychology literature and for civic engagement, these results illuminate pathways towards more inclusive societies.

Keywords
race, opinion change, national identity, comparative public opinion, inclusion, belonging, issp, ethnic activism, immigration policy, multiculturalism policy, Social Sciences, Political Science, Michael Jones-Correa, Jones-Correa, Michael

Disciplines
Comparative Politics | Political Science

This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/237
White or foreign? Differentiating perceptions of the racialization of national identity in Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand

Lucy Hu

Advisor: Michael Jones-Correa

This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of

Bachelor of Arts Degree
Department of Political Science with Distinction
College of Arts and Sciences
University of Pennsylvania

2020
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project could not have been possible without the guidance of my thesis advisor, Michael Jones-Correa. I first approached Dr. Jones-Correa with an ambitious yet blurry idea, and without his help, it would have remained that way. At every step of the way, his guidance propelled the thesis along; I was always confident knowing that he could resolve any qualms I ran into. I truly appreciate his wisdom and dedication to the project.

I also give my sincerest appreciation to Eileen Doherty-Sil, who has been my professor, major advisor in political science, and the coordinator of the honors’ thesis program. Not only has Dr. D given her warmest support to the thesis candidates, but she has also encouraged me personally throughout my academic career in numerous ways, for which I am deeply grateful.

Thank you to Professors Josephine Park and Wendy Roth in the English and Sociology departments at the University of Pennsylvania who both provided extremely helpful guidance when the project greatly needed it.

My academic career would not be where it is now without the support of the faculty and staff of the Penn Program on Opinion Research and Election Studies (PORES) and past supervisors and mentors who have expanded my data science skills, political knowledge, and hopes and ambitions.

I express my deepest gratitude to those around me, near and far, who have listened to my experiences, philosophies, and ramblings about race and identity over the past few years. For me, this journey has been extraordinarily personal, and I am eternally grateful to all who have lent an ear and a heart at one point or another. Finally, to my parents, who have made all of this possible: thank you for your sacrifices for the benefit of my opportunities — you have given me the privilege to undertake this thesis. This is dedicated to you.
Unlike many fields of research, race and ethnic politics is one in which researchers usually have some sort of personal connection. For me, incidentally, comparative politics is one of those fields too.

I had the opportunity to spend two months of this research project in New Zealand, my home country. On the eve of my return to the United States, I experienced a verbal and physical racial attack in public. The incident was scarring, but the timing was potent.

This thesis project is the culmination of years of personal rumination on the complications caused by minority racial identities in the struggle for national belonging. It was not until I left my native New Zealand that I realized racial exclusivity was not universal. Living in New Zealand, the United States, and (temporarily) the United Kingdom has channeled my struggles into a belief that solutions lie in comparison and emulation.

A 24-hour flight separates my two worlds; so, too, do my experiences as a racial minority. After the incident that occurred at home, this project seemed more important than ever. The burden has always been on minorities to keep the faith in a nation which oftentimes disservices them. Through comparison and emulation of the most inclusive parts of each country, perhaps this burden will eventually cease to exist.
ABSTRACT

Past literature has established that often in a white-majority society, a national label is associated with the white population more than people of other ethnic origins. Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand share many historical and institutional similarities, making them valuable comparative cases. While scholars have researched national identity to varying degrees in these countries, the gap remains in comparative analysis of perceptions of national identity.

This thesis first analyzes comparative public opinion data to establish differences in the degree to which national identity is racially-exclusive in the case countries. Second, it compares historical immigration policy, multiculturalism policy and programs, and ethnic activism in each country to understand what causes varying levels of racialization. The data analysis finds ‘American’ to be the most racially-inclusive national identity and ‘Australian’ to be the least. The thesis also finds that presence of ethnic activism (or lack thereof) can best explain the variation between the four countries, while the institutional variables were inconsistent with the variation. These results contribute to understandings of the drivers of national identity construction and lend support to arguments in the wider public opinion literature that social movements are more influential for opinion formation than legislation. The surprising result that multiculturalism policy was not mapped with more inclusive national identities also provides policymakers with insight on the effectiveness of different policy pathways to promote inclusion. Additionally, given the extensive negative consequences of exclusion documented in psychology literature and for civic engagement, the results of this thesis illuminate pathways towards more inclusive societies.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. i

Preface .................................................................................................................................. ii

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. iii

List of Tables and Figures ...................................................................................................... vi

Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................... 1

  *Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand* .................................................. 3
  *Research Design and Organization* .................................................................................. 6

Chapter Two: Literature Review .......................................................................................... 9

  *United States of America* ................................................................................................. 10
  *New Zealand* .................................................................................................................. 13
  *Canada* ............................................................................................................................ 15
  *Australia* .......................................................................................................................... 16
  *Comparative Public Opinion Studies* .............................................................................. 18
  *Evaluation of Existing Literature* .................................................................................. 21

Chapter Three: Observed Variation in National Identity Construction ......................... 24

  *Data and Methods* .......................................................................................................... 24
  *Results* ............................................................................................................................. 27
  *Discussion* ...................................................................................................................... 37

Chapter Four: Ethnicity-Based Immigration Policy ......................................................... 42

  *1800s Asian Exclusion* .................................................................................................... 43
  *Interwar Years, 1919-1939* ............................................................................................ 45
  *Post-World War Two* .................................................................................................... 47
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-1970s</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison and Evaluation</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: Institutional Multiculturalism</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmations of Multiculturalism in Policy</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Programs Supporting Multiculturalism</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison and Evaluation</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Six: Ethnic Activism</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Social Movements</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Minority Movements</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of Ethnic Activism: Public Recognition of Ethnicity</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison and Evaluation</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusion</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What explains variation in national identity?</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is public opinion fixed or malleable?</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Tables and Figures

## Tables

Table 1. Comparison of literature in each country, by topic .............................................. 21
Table 2. Rankings of countries by factors valued in national identity construction .......... 37
Table 3. Institutional Multiculturalism Comparison ................................................................. 69
Table 4. Ethnic Movements Comparison .............................................................................. 82
Table 5. Effects of Ethnic Movements: Public Recognition of Ethnicity Comparison ......... 83

## Figures

Figure 1. Potential sources of varying national identity construction ................................. 7
Figure 2. How important is it to have [nationality] citizenship? ........................................... 27
Figure 3. How important is it to have lived most of one’s life in [country]? ....................... 27
Figure 4. How important is it to have been born in [country]? ........................................... 27
Figure 5. How important is it to have [nationality] ancestry? ............................................. 27
Figure 6. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’s] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY]. ................................................................. 30
Figure 7. Maintain distinct traditions or adapt and blend into larger society? ................... 30
Figure 8. Maintain distinct traditions or adapt and blend into larger society? Comparison of non-whites and whole population .................................................................................. 32
Figure 9. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]? ................................................................. 33
Figure 10. Strength of feeling of belonging to New Zealand: 2008, 2010, 2012 .............. 36
Figure 11. Scale of National Ethnocentrism ....................................................................... 37
Figure 12. Timeline of key race-based immigration policies in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 1850-2000

Figure 13. Presence of the phrase “ethnic activism” in global English literature

Figure 14. Scale of Ethnocentrism compared with scales of independent variables

Figure 15. Ethnic activism as the strongest predictor
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The question of ethnicity is addressed in a peculiar manner on the New Zealand census. If one were white, one would tick “New Zealand European.” However, if one were Asian, or Pacific Islander, one would tick “Chinese,” “Samoan,” or another nationality-based descriptor.¹ “Chinese” and “Samoan” are not preceded by the “New Zealand” qualifier like “European” is, causing Kiwis of Chinese and Samoan descent to erase their New Zealand identity in a way white New Zealanders are not forced to do.

Subtle and everyday occurrences of exclusion insidiously remind minorities that they do not quite belong in white-majority societies, which accept those of European ancestry as the ‘default,’ the ‘baseline,’ and the ‘local.’ Often reminded that they are considered foreign in their own land, racial minorities confront constant perceptions that they may not really be from their hometowns, instead hailing from countries to which they may have never even been.

Like New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the United States also have large numbers of racial minorities within a white-majority population. The four countries are bound by common values, institutions, and settler-colonial histories. But belonging to these places is a different story, with disparities across the four countries, and being perceived to belong is yet more complex and varied. What makes someone appear Canadian or Australian? How does one feel American? Who is seen to belong in New Zealand? And how does racial identity complicate the messy struggles for inclusion in these immigrant-receiving nations? Despite their similarities,

¹ The ethnic categories on the 2018 New Zealand census were, from top to bottom: New Zealand European, Māori, Samoan, Cook Islands Maori, Tongan, Niuean, Chinese, Indian, other. See: https://www.stats.govt.nz/assets/Reports/2018-census-design-of-forms/2018-Census-Design-of-forms.pdf
these countries draw different boundaries of belonging in their willingness to afford their national label to non-white members of their community.

This thesis compares the degree to which public conceptions of national identity are racially-exclusive in Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand — in other words, the extent to which the public views being [Canadian, Australian, etc.] as equal to being white — and seeks to explain what causes varying levels of racialization between the countries’ national identities by comparing institutional and behavioral explanations.

This project makes three key contributions. First, it contributes to understandings of the complex and varied role race can play in conceptions of national identity, introducing the idea that ostensibly similar settler societies can differ on their relative inclusion of minorities. Scholars have explored national identity in each of the four case countries to varying degrees, theoretically and through empirical public opinion analysis. However, one fundamentally missing piece in the existing literature is robust comparative analysis of national identity perceptions in each country. Second, this thesis finds drivers of change in national identity perceptions to make an argument that conceptions of national identity are malleable, not fixed. Again, it uses comparative analysis, combining data and history, to understand the pathways that lead to national identity construction, finding that particular social interventions have historically been able to re-shape national identity. Third, although the thesis focuses on the drivers of national identity, it also contributes to the wider public opinion literature through its methodology. Scholars have extensively explored the nature of changes in public opinion on a wide variety of issue areas, comparing the influence of a range of factors. This thesis asks whether institutions or social movements can change public opinion more effectively — or at all.

---

2 For example, the case of LGBT rights presents a particularly interesting area of research for scholars. While public opinion is typically stable over time, support for same-sex marriage increased from 35% to 61% between 2006 and
The contribution of this project is also reflected through its implications. As globalization continues, the population of minorities who struggle with inclusion in racially heterogeneous societies will only rise. Negative psychological detriments have been documented extensively in literature for these populations, which lead to societal disparities. Crucially, subtle exclusionary behaviors such as microaggressions constitute a new ‘invisible’ racism, whose insidiousness can be more damaging than overt forms of racial prejudice. Additionally, exclusion can lead to decreased patriotism and civic engagement among minorities, leading to a weaker sense of nationhood at large. Comparative research is extremely helpful in better understanding how to improve inclusion efforts in these countries. Without comparative analyses on policy and public opinion trends, countries may unnecessarily endeavor to reinvent the wheel. Countries can learn from one another. For example, if non-white immigrants experience more inclusion in one country than another, it is beneficial to investigate the causes of this, which may be of interest to both policymakers and social activists.

Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand

Consistent with intuition, research has shown that settler societies (like the United States) have been more in favor of immigrant adoption of mainstream identities and have offered easier access to citizenship than non-settler societies (like France), which have been less accepting or even acknowledging of alternative identities. This has been well researched, but less explored is why settler societies themselves might differ in their relative acceptance of racial minorities.

---


Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand share many similarities, making them valuable comparative cases to tease out causes of differences in their inclusion of their non-European citizens. Of particular importance is their shared demographic history of an indigenous population, British settler-colonization, and significant non-white immigration. In addition, other factors, such as their broadly similar institutions and socioeconomic development facilitate robust comparative analysis. The first important similarity across the four cases is the presence of an indigenous population. Canada’s indigenous population comprises First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples; Australia’s includes Aboriginal Australians and Torres Straight Islanders; New Zealand has its indigenous Māori population, and the United States’ indigenous population is made up of Native Americans. Second, each country was colonized by British settlers and became part of the British Empire, which instituted a dominant Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking culture that underlay institutions and societal structures. Third, each country is a significant immigrant-receiving nation. While there were extensive immigration restrictions in place across the cases, policy liberalization in each country led to high levels of non-white immigration in the second half of the twentieth century. The United States population is 61% non-Hispanic white,\(^4\) Canada is 81% white (19% identify as ‘visible minorities,’\(^5\)) and 76% of New Zealanders are of European ancestry.\(^6\) Australia’s census does not collect information on race and ethnicity, but the Australian Human Rights Commission estimated the white population to be 76%,\(^7\) similar to that in New Zealand.

Although the term ‘white’ has historically been contended in race literature and across societies, for the purposes of this thesis, the conception of white refers to populations of European descent. This thesis takes a more societal-focused approach and classifies those perceived to be of exclusively European ancestry as white, and those perceived to be of any other ancestry as non-white. This largely fits with Statistics Canada’s definition of ‘visible minority.’

In addition to broad resemblances in their demographic histories, there are other similarities that make the four case countries useful for comparison. Notably, each ranks within the top 15 most developed countries in the world, according to the United Nations’ Human Development Index, which assesses development through education, life expectancy, and gross national income. The four countries also share other societal similarities — they are all representative democracies, follow the common law legal system, and have market economic systems.

Furthermore, there is already extensive scholarship comparing these four countries on social issues and governance. Scholars have compared Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand on monetary policy, health outcomes among indigenous populations, and immigration policy, among other areas, indicating that their broad similarities allow for useful comparisons highlighting diverging policy pathways and social change.

---

12 See, for example: Ather H. Akbari and Martha MacDonald, “Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States: An Overview of Recent Trends,” International Migration Review 48, no. 3 (2014): 801–22; Kirsten Lovelock, “Intercountry Adoption as a Migratory Practice: A Comparative Analysis of Intercountry...
Research Design and Organization

This thesis follows a two-part investigation that first, establishes differences between the countries’ public attitudes, and then second, explains this variation. The first part analyzes survey data from the International Social Survey Programme and domestic surveys to establish that there are in fact differences in national identity across the four cases, and posits a hierarchy of most to least racialized national identities. This ranking is represented in a proposed Scale of National Ethnocentrism. The second part turns to a qualitative study of comparative history to explain the rankings of this Scale. The three possible explanatory variables analyzed are ethnicity-based immigration policy, institutional multiculturalism, and ethnic activism. These three variables allow for an institutional versus behavioral comparison, contributing to one of the thesis’ underlying questions of whether institutions or behavior drives national identity construction. It is likely that a vast array of independent variables work together to explain differences in national identity perception, and a multitude of variables have been found to influence national identity construction, including economic development\textsuperscript{13} and immigrant growth.\textsuperscript{14} However, the goal of this thesis is not to cover every possible cause of national identity construction. Instead, the three variables explored — immigration policy, federal policies promoting multiculturalism, and ethnic activism and movements — are three areas where,


despite their many commonalities in other realms, Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand differ meaningfully; analyzing these potential sources of variation in public opinion is likelier to yield some explanatory leverage on the differences highlighted in public opinion across the four countries. As exemplified in Fig. 1, the theory of this thesis argues that each of these independent variables may act through specific mechanisms which lead to opinion change on national identity. Immigration policy is likely to cause demographic shifts which can lead to changing perceptions of the boundaries of the national community. Multiculturalism policy is likely to create systemic inclusiveness which can foster inclusiveness among the public. Ethnic activism is likely to garner public attention and recognition for minorities’ experiences which can sway public opinion on minorities’ place within the nation.

**Figure 1. Potential sources of varying national identity construction**

This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter two explores existing public opinion literature on the racialization of national identity in each of the case countries individually. It also outlines existing comparative studies on public perceptions of national
identity, including scholarship that explores the causes of variation in national identity construction. Chapter three analyzes survey data and its results position the United States as the least racialized national identity, followed by Canada, New Zealand, and Australia as the most racially-exclusive national identity. Chapters four to six are each devoted to one of the three independent variables: ethnicity-based immigration policy, institutional multiculturalism, and ethnic activism to explain why the United States has the most ‘color-blind’ national identity and Australia the least. Chapter seven moves to a discussion on which of the variables best helps explain the ranking found in chapter three’s Scale of National Ethnocentrism. To preview its conclusions, this thesis finds that ethnic activism is the most powerful driver of national identity construction — countries that experienced more ethnic activism have less racialized national identities, whereas countries that lacked minority protest have more racially-exclusive identities. The institutional variables examined here did not prove to be credible predictors of racialization of national identity. Immigration policy was broadly similar among the countries, and any specific differences across the four cases were inconsistent with their placement on the Scale of Ethnocentrism. Multiculturalism policies across the four countries were clearly different, but the ranking of policy liberalism placed Canada and Australia at the top, incompatible with their rankings on the Scale of Ethnocentrism. This counterintuitive result lends support to the argument that bottom-up approaches are more effective than top-down approaches in changing public opinion. The thesis concludes with the implications of this research, as well as future avenues of investigation. Ultimately, this thesis uses comparative analysis to determine why similar groups of people experience different levels of inclusion in ostensibly similar societies and seeks to contribute to broader understandings on public opinion shifts over time.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

What characteristics, beliefs, or even behaviors define a nation and its people? Literature on nationalism and national identity is vast, spanning across time, place, and fields of research. This project, however, focuses on the racial dimensions of national identity construction in public opinion. While researchers in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have thoroughly explored many dimensions of belonging, they have explored less which racial groups are seen as more genuine members of the national group.

This literature review first examines existing public opinion studies in each of the countries individually, finding a range of research with differing emphases. The most relevant literature to this thesis focuses specifically on the association of race with nationality, but this approach has only been pursued in the United States and New Zealand. Hence, this chapter reviews two other main topics to supplement these studies: literature comparing civic and ascriptive notions of national identity (explained below) and research on attitudes towards immigrants of varying ethnic origin.

Second, this chapter looks at existing comparative public opinion literature on national identity. Like the second part of this thesis, existing comparative literature seeks to explain differences in how national identity is perceived across countries, taking into account societal factors such as economic development. However, there are no studies comparing the four case countries, and the types of variables explored are not comprehensive.

A framework frequently used in national identity literature, the civic versus ascriptive divide refers to two differing conceptions of what people perceive to constitute national identity. The more ascriptive, immigrant-excluding definition of national identity emphasizes factors such
as ancestry and nativity. For example, an ascriptive view of ‘Britishness’ would indicate a homogenous view of Brits who reflect a certain physical image or history. For the purposes of this thesis, when a national identity is found to be more ‘ascriptive,’ it is likely to be more ethnocentric and racialized. Second, a more voluntaristic, civic, or achievable definition of national identity includes factors such as respect for institutions and “feeling” like a national.\(^{15}\) Under this view, one is fully British if one respects the country’s institutions and feels British, regardless of one’s race or culture. For the purposes of this thesis, when a national identity is found to be more ‘civic,’ it is likely to be less ethnocentric and racialized. This framework is found in each of the countries’ national identity literatures as well as the comparative studies.

**United States of America**

It is no overstatement to say that national identity in the United States has been greatly studied. The literature exploring nativist versus civic conceptions of identity is vast, both in the form of theory and data analysis. Fitting within literatures as distinct as psychology (investigating how people group themselves) and political science (exploring American nationalism and patriotism), analysis on what being American means is more abundant than present studies in the other three case countries.

The United States has long been described by political theorists as both an ethnic and civic nation,\(^{16}\) and polling has tapped at what Americans make of the divide. More relevant to the present investigation, one study has been foundational in explicitly testing the association of different racial groups with the American label. The first study to ask “who’s American” and

\(^{15}\) For the “achievable” factor definition, see: Wright, 838.

place racial prejudice at the core of national identity, Devos and Banaji’s (2005) seminal ‘American = White?’ study showed that while Americans outwardly committed to egalitarian principles, African and Asian Americans were consistently implicitly less associated with the ‘American’ label than white Americans. In addition, even Asian Americans themselves subscribed to the American = White effect, while African Americans did not. This supports Kim’s (1999) widely-cited work on racial triangulation, arguing that Asian Americans are perceived to be more foreign than white or black Americans. Prior to Devos and Banaji’s study, Citrin et al.’s (1990) study established the existence of the nativist sentiment that a strong majority of Americans thought that speaking English was very important in making a ‘true American.’ While there have been no studies that have directly replicated the ‘American = White?’ study in the United States, results from other polling and studies are consistent with Devos and Banaji’s findings. For example, Citrin et al.’s (1994) analysis revealed that Americans routinely favor European immigrants over those from Latin America, Asia, or Africa. Ostfeld (2015) found that race of immigrants did not affect attitudes towards immigration policy, but that white Americans showed greater opposition to immigrants with “dark skin tones and stereotypically Afrocentric features” in close social contexts. Closely related to opinions on which racial groups belong in the United States, negative attitudes towards immigrants based on

---

18 Devos and Banaji, “American = White?”
19 Devos and Banaji.
culture have also been documented extensively in American literature: in the studies of Burns and Gimpel (2000),
Chandler and Tsai (2001), Brader et al. (2008), Valentino et al. (2012), and Mangum (2019).

Literature on the civic versus ascriptive divide has also been vast. Summarizing this literature, Schildkraut’s (2014) review argues that there is wide agreement among social groups that civic components are more important than ascriptive ones in American national identity, although some sects of the population endorse ascriptive views. Additionally, there is some indication that external factors can influence national identity over time — literature found an increase in ascriptive ideas after 9/11.

National identity public opinion literature in the United States has also focused on different racial groups’ self-evaluation of Americanness. In the 1990s, public opinion polling analysis showed that black, white, and Hispanic Americans all report a strong sense of closeness to the United States. However, more recent literature demonstrates varying results. Black Americans were less likely than whites to identify with the American label, but Hispanics and

other people of color reported the same level of closeness as whites.\textsuperscript{31} Blacks were also less likely than whites to consider themselves as “typical Americans,”\textsuperscript{32} or set hard boundaries — such as speaking English and being born in the United States — against being an American.\textsuperscript{33} Notably, Asians, Native Americans, and Hispanics were as likely as whites to consider themselves as typical Americans.\textsuperscript{34} Another study found that black Americans felt American but thought they were not perceived as such by white Americans. Cuban Americans did not feel American or think they were perceived as such, although length of residency increased feelings of inclusion.\textsuperscript{35}

It is evident that the United States holds a somewhat exclusionary national identity with an association of whiteness, in both the ‘American = White?’ study and attitudes on immigration. However, civic notions of national identity are widely accepted, and results have also pointed to variation among racial groups in their self-evaluations of feeling American — it appears that some minority groups consider themselves fully American even if implicit attitudes point to whiteness as more commonly associated with the country.

\textit{New Zealand}

Public opinion studies in New Zealand have investigated the relationship between ethnic origin and conceptions of national identity, although this has tended to focus on the Pakeha (white) population and Māori, rather than non-indigenous racial minorities. The literature has

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Analysis of the Public Perceptions of the American People 2002 survey in Theiss-Morse, \textit{Who Counts as an American?}, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Theiss-Morse, 83.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Theiss-Morse, 91.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Theiss-Morse, 83.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
also found mixed opinions — New Zealanders appear to generally commit to civic notions of national identity but also hold a racial bias against non-white immigration.

Of immense relevance to the present investigation, Sibley and Liu (2007) replicated Devos and Banaji’s (2005) ‘American = White?’ study in New Zealand, finding that among Pakeha participants, Pakeha and Māori images were associated with being a New Zealander, but Asian images were not. They also found ingroup favoritism among Māori and Asian New Zealanders: each saw themselves more implicitly associated with New Zealand symbols than the other group, although Māori showed much stronger levels of ingroup favoritism than Asians. Although this study could have contributed to the literature of national identity perceptions of immigrants and all racial minorities, it focused on explaining the result that Pakeha saw Māori as equally associated with New Zealand as themselves, as opposed to exploring why Asians were not seen in the same way.

There has only been one study that has focused on the ascriptive versus civic divide in New Zealand. Humpage and Greaves’ (2017) study found wide support for civic components of national identity, indicating a generally inclusive identity, although certain ascriptive factors, especially speaking English, were considered important. They also used individual-level characteristics to explain variation. New Zealanders who lean politically right, vote New Zealand First, or have lower levels of education were more likely to relate to ascriptive views, whereas being female and Māori increased the likelihood of prescribing civic notions of being a New Zealander.

---

38 New Zealand’s third largest political party in Parliament, advocating for nationalist ideals.
39 Humpage and Greaves, “‘Truly Being a New Zealander.’”
Ward and Masgoret’s (2008) study found that New Zealanders strongly endorsed multiculturalism and viewed immigrants more favorably than EU citizens did, but less so than Canadians. An explanation of the difference between New Zealand and Canada pointed to Canada’s federal multiculturalism policy, in place since 1971 (and explored in chapter five). New Zealanders were also more likely than Australians to agree that society should be made up of different races, and favored integration rather than assimilation for acculturation. However, their affinity for immigrants depended on cultural distance and region of origin of the immigrants, with a hierarchy prioritizing Australian, British, and South African immigrants.

Canada

While Canadian scholars have thoroughly explored national identity and race, analyses using public opinion have been more modest. Additionally, researchers have paid attention to immigrants’ and minorities’ own conceptions of ‘Canadianness.’

Like in New Zealand, there is limited Canadian scholarship on the ascriptive versus civic divide in national identity perceptions. Raney’s (2009) analysis showed that there is a strong national identity rooted in civic components. However, it also showed that public opinion is changing, with an increase in cultural nationalism between 1995 to 2004 (Canadians began to prioritize the importance of factors such as speaking English and being native-born), and a decrease in support for civic notions like respect for institutions. This increase was partially explained through ingroup survival responses to increased immigration and terrorist events in

---

41 Ward and Masgoret.
North America, indicating a malleable construction of national identity that can change with events.

Literature on public attitudes towards immigrants of varying national groups is also very limited in Canada. However, one study finds that native-born white Canadians have grown increasingly accepting of immigration and racial diversity over time. 

Importantly, Canadian literature includes the opinions of immigrants themselves. The strongest variable leading immigrants to feel Canadian is time spent in their host country. In addition to self-prescribed feelings of belonging, to immigrants, being Canadian also involves supporting multiculturalism and a society that supports cultural and civic freedoms. In addition to quantitative data analyses, qualitative interviews also detail minorities’ perspectives on how they are perceived. In Mahtani’s (2002) investigation of the place of mixed-race identities within Canada’s nationhood, mixed-race interviewees said that “authentic” Canadians were of British or French blood and that they continued to be positioned as outsiders.

*Australia*

Whether one must be white in order to be seen as Australian has not been sufficiently explored through public opinion research. However, while national identity perceptions have not
been comprehensively scrutinized, researchers have paid great attention to attitudes towards immigration in Australia.

Like in Canada and New Zealand, Australian research on civic versus ascriptive or ethnocultural views of national identity is sparse. McAllister’s (2016) study found that civic and ethnocultural views were both present in the Australian population, but ethnocultural views were far stronger in influencing attitudes on immigration, indicating only “partial progress [of the government’s multiculturalism policies] in generating a strong sense of civic identity within the Australian population.”48 One national identity study found that a majority of Australians believe it is important to have been born in Australia to be “truly Australian.”49 Being able to speak English, an ethnocultural factor, is seen as more important, while feeling Australian, a civic component, is even more significant.50

Attitudes on immigration have been studied extensively in Australia, and while they do not directly translate into national identity perceptions, they reveal general attitudes towards the inclusion of racial minorities in Australia. Scholars have studied broad opinions on immigration levels,51 but more relevant to the present investigation is attitudes on immigrants by region. Data tables from Betts’ (2005) analysis of the 2001 Australian Election Survey (AES), show that a majority of Australians wanted less immigrants from the Middle East, over a third wanted less immigrants from Asia, and only 13.9% wanted less British immigrants.52 This result is supported by an earlier aggregate analysis of polls from 1984 to 1990 finding a majority opposition to

50 Jones, 289.
51 See, for example: Katharine Betts, “Cosmopolitans and Patriots: Australia’s Cultural Divide and Attitudes to Immigration,” People and Place 13, no. 2 (June 2005): 29+.
Asian immigration. Immigrants themselves also had racial biases: British-born immigrants were more likely to want an increase in immigration from their own group than Asian immigrants. Bilodeau and Fadol’s (2009) analysis showed that negative attitudes towards immigration in Australia are linked to a historical legacy of governmental distrust in its Asian neighbors. Other literature has identified new conservative movements that believe Asian immigration to be a threat to white Australians.

An abundance of immigration literature points to a general attitude that favors white immigrants over non-white, but the gap in research remains in exploring how willing Australians are to call non-white members of their community “Australian” once they have reached and settled in the country.

Comparative Public Opinion Studies

Studies directly using public opinion data or experiments to compare conceptions of national identity (such as Devos and Banaji’s ‘American = White?’ piece) across countries remain limited. However, a few studies have sought to explain why variation in belonging does exist across countries, which is the subject of chapters four to seven of this thesis. This literature has focused on national identity as either more ascriptive or more civic.

54 Betts, “Migrants’ Attitudes to Immigration in Australia: 1990 to 2004.”
Explanatory variables for the variation have also fallen along two lines: macro-societal forces (which influence a whole society’s attitudes) and individual-level characteristics (which influence one person’s attitudes) that contribute to opinion formation. For example, a prominent macro-societal influence on national identity perceptions is economic development. Industrialization, and thus the growth of the economy, has been found to lead to a stronger embrace of civic notions of national identity. Lazic and Pesic’s (2016) study compared factors that led to ascriptive or civic perceptions of national identity in 17 European nations. They explored the effect of historical legacies (democratic traditions, dominant religious denomination, and ethnic composition), structural characteristics (GDP per capita, level of urbanization, migration rate, and tertiary education attainment rate), and individual characteristics (gender, age, and university education) and found that GDP per capita was most strongly positively correlated with the spread of civic notions of national identity. However, economic development only increased civic components of national identity up to a certain level of development, after which it had no influence. Additionally, the researchers found that civic and ascriptive notions did not have an oppositional relationship: while economic modernization increased the importance of civic components of national identity, people did not reject ascriptive notions to the same degree, attesting to the multifaceted nature of national identity.

Although in past literature GDP per capita appears to correlate with changes in national identity, it is an imperfect explanation of national identity construction. First, GDP per capita, and economic development in general, hides many lurking variables that could instead explain how national identity changes, for example, liberalization of policies from governments on the

---

issue of ethnic diversity as governmental resources increase, or increased societal activism in promoting social issues. Additionally, economic development would not be an appropriate method of comparison for every country — Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United States are developmentally similar, so this would not explain variation in national identity perceptions.

Another societal force found in the literature is immigration proliferation. Wright’s (2011) longitudinal analysis found a trend among participant countries in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) that immigrant growth was associated with a more exclusive definition of who belongs, with economic prosperity of countries having minimal significance.\textsuperscript{59} Canada deviated from the trend and displayed higher levels of ascriptive nationalism than expected based on its high immigrant growth, while Britain and Sweden showed less ingroup exclusivity than their immigrant growth might predict. As Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand’s history of immigration expansion is similar, this relationship is also unlikely to hold true for the case countries.

Although this thesis focuses on macro-societal forces, individual-level factors can also give insight into the drivers of national identity construction. Jones and Smith’s (2001) multi-factor analysis compared macro-social and individual explanations, and found influence of both.\textsuperscript{60} The strongest individual-level differentiators of holding voluntaristic (as opposed to ascriptive) views were social class (education and income) and immigrant status. It also found that both ascriptive and civic constructs of national identity were simultaneously present in

\textsuperscript{59} Wright, “Diversity and the Imagined Community.”
\textsuperscript{60} Jones and Smith, “Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity. A Comparative Multi-Level Analysis.”
individuals’ minds. In Europe, individual education was also connected with the incidence of ascriptive constructs of national identity.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{Evaluation of Existing Literature}

Based on the literature on national identity perceptions in each of the four countries, it is near impossible to propose a robust ranking of the countries’ relative racialization of their national labels because of the inconsistencies in the volume of literature on each topic.

\textbf{Table 1.} Comparison of literature in each country, by topic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Racialization of national identity studies</th>
<th>Civic versus ascriptive national identity studies</th>
<th>Attitudes towards immigrants by ethnic origin</th>
<th>Findings from other studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>‘American = White?’ study shows racialization</td>
<td>Abundant literature: civic attitudes dominant</td>
<td>Abundant literature: bias against non-white immigrants</td>
<td>Minorities feel belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>‘New Zealand = Bicultural?’ study shows racialization</td>
<td>Limited literature: civic attitudes dominant</td>
<td>Limited literature: bias against non-white immigrants</td>
<td>Less support for multiculturalism than Canada, more than Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Limited literature: civic attitudes dominant</td>
<td>Limited literature: acceptance of non-white immigrants</td>
<td>Minorities feel belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Limited literature: ethnocultural attitudes dominant</td>
<td>Abundant literature: bias against non-white immigrants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States has by far the greatest amount of literature on all aspects of ethnicity within national identity. Although the United States literature demonstrated the dominance of the white identity, civic notions of national identity were generally stronger than ascriptive, and other immigrant-based groups may see themselves as equally American. New Zealand revealed similar attitudes overall, with a clear bicultural national identity prioritizing white and Māori New Zealanders, excluding other racial groups. However, the literature in New Zealand has been quite limited. The same is true in Canada, where there is no direct experiment testing the

\textsuperscript{61} Lazic and Pesic, “Components of National Identities - a Comparative Sociological Analysis.”
association of race with national identity. Its lack of literature overall creates an unclear picture, although the limited literature reveals that Canada does appear to be slightly more accepting of non-whites than the other countries. Lastly, Australia appears to be the least accepting — researchers found strong ascriptive notions of national identity as well as an abundance of evidence of hierarchies favoring immigrants with origins in white, Anglo-Saxon native countries. However, there is a clear gap in the national identity literature on public opinion on the Australian label. Without harmonized data among the four countries, a definitive ranking cannot be suggested. Thus, the focus of chapter three is to analyze comparative data in order to create an accurate comparison of the three countries’ relative racialization of national identities.

The comparative literature aimed at explaining variation in national identity construction focuses on macro-societal factors that can contribute to opinion formation, which is the target of this thesis, but it has three clear gaps. First, the research focuses on factors such as economic development and immigrant growth, which leaves in question the effects of institutional variables such as multiculturalism policy, or behavioral factors such as movements. Second, one use of comparative analysis is that it provides opportunities for countries to emulate successes. While the literature presents correlations among variables, it does not adequately explain why these exist. Current comparative studies that empirically analyze public opinion data tend not to qualitatively analyze historical pathways or policy developments that cause the observed results. On the other hand, theoretical national identity pieces do not incorporate concrete public opinion data. The gap in the literature remains in the marriage of empirical results with analysis of causal pathways, rooted in history. Third, there are no studies comparing the national identities of the four case countries discussed here.
This thesis fills the gap in the comparative literature by first, analyzing the variation between the four case countries using a harmonized dataset and second, explaining the variation using previously unexplored institutional and behavioral explanatory factors that represent potential historical pathways to opinion formation.
CHAPTER THREE: OBSERVED VARIATION IN NATIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

While research in Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand has to some degree explored the racialization of national identity, this has not been harmonized and compared among the four countries. Differences between conceptions of each national identity may exist. This chapter uses survey data to investigate and present differences between how each country draws its borders of inclusion towards non-indigenous racial minorities. These differences set the foundation for the next three chapters, which investigate variables that may explain discrepancies in public opinion between each country.

Data and Methods

The primary data source used for the comparative analysis presented here is the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).62

The module used in the present analysis is national identity, which asks questions on national consciousness and identity. Respondents are aged 18 years and over. There have been three iterations of this module: 1995, 2003, and 2013. As the 2013 national identity survey was only fielded in the United States, the 2003 ISSP is used as it is the most recent survey which includes all four case countries.

62 Founded in 1984 by Australia, Great Britain, Germany and the United States, the ISSP is a cross-national collaboration that conducts annual surveys on social science topics. There are currently 42 member countries, including the four case countries studied here. Each nation is represented by an institutional member — an academic organization, university or survey agency. There are currently 11 modules of topics, for example, role of government, social inequality and environment. Each year focuses on one of these modules, with multiple iterations of each completed since 1984; See: ISSP Research Group, “International Social Survey Programme: National Identity II - ISSP 2003,” GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, 2012, ZA3910 Data file Version 2.1.0. doi:10.4232/1.11449
This investigation uses four clusters of survey variables (seven questions) to establish variation in national identity racialization among the case countries:

1. **Civic National Identity Construction Questions:** How important do you think each of the following is for being truly [NATIONALITY]?
   a. To have [COUNTRY] citizenship
   b. To have lived in [COUNTRY] for most of one's life
   c. To have been born in [COUNTRY]
   d. To have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry

2. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY's] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY].

3. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

4. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]?

This thesis uses these variables to construct an image of national belonging and to diagnose how each country draws its boundaries of belonging, focusing on whether the boundaries are racialized. Although this investigation centers around the role of race in national identity, one limitation of survey research is that many potentially useful questions cannot be accurately answered because of social desirability bias. There is no comparative survey which directly asks respondents which race belongs more within the nation. Hence, the collection of variables analyzed is designed to tease out nuances of national belonging despite the limitations in data. The first question targets civic devotion aspects of national identity. Questions 2-4 target ethnocentric notions of national identity. Comparing how each country responds to the civic versus ethnic questions can provide insight on the degree to which racial minorities are accepted into the national ingroup.
A race indicator variable is created in order to cross-tabulate and compare the responses between whites and non-whites. This variable is split into two groups: the *white plus indigenous population* and the *non-white, non-indigenous population*. As Australia’s dataset does not ask for respondents’ racial groups, the race indicator variable was constructed using the variable asking for their most spoken language at home, with a non-European language speaker coded as a non-white, non-indigenous respondent. No respondents reported speaking an indigenous language. Undoubtedly, this is an imperfect construction of one’s race, as many racial minorities may speak mostly English at home, so there may be an overrepresentation of minorities in the white category. However, this design is used to prevent exclusion of Australia from many of the analyses that center around comparing white responses to those from minorities. This limitation is accounted for in the results, although the Australian results do in fact follow the trends set by the other countries, despite the flawed race construction variable. On future reference for these analyses, “whites” refers to the *white plus indigenous population* while “non-whites” points to the *non-white, non-indigenous population*.

As a minor supplement to these data, the New Zealand General Social Survey (2008, 2010, 2012) is also used to further illustrate New Zealand’s public opinion on belonging.

Most of the analyses were conducted using weighted proportion tables, comparing responses from each country directly. In addition, to strengthen the validity of comparisons, weighted t-tests were used to test the statistical significance of differences between countries.63

---

63 Each country’s ISSP data follows a different weighting scheme. The American and Canadian datasets come with pre-prepared weights based on demographic factors as well as survey research adjustments. New Zealand’s data remains unweighted as the weighted data shows only minor adjustments in estimates. For the present investigation, weights were constructed for the Australian dataset based on gender, education, and age targets from the 2001 Census.
Results

1. Civic National Identity Construction Variables:

**Figure 2.** How important is it to have [nationality] citizenship?

**Figure 3.** How important is it to have lived most of one's life in [country]?

**Figure 4.** How important is it to have been born in [country]?

**Figure 5.** How important is it to have [nationality] ancestry?

*Data: ISSP Research Group*
Figs. 2-5 display the cross-national differences in perceptions of what is considered important to be “truly” part of a nationality. These variables focus on civic devotion and sustained contact with the nation, as opposed to ethnocentric views on nationality.

Over 80% of Americans and 74% of Canadians regard citizenship as very important, whereas only 57% of Australians agree, a statistically significant difference between all three countries. Only 4% of Americans and 6% of Canadians think it is not important to be citizens in order to be truly American or Canadian. New Zealand’s distribution is statistically distinct from its North American counterparts’, but not Australia’s.

Question 1b paints a similar picture: Where almost 60% of Americans think it is very important to have lived in the country for most of one’s life, only 35% of Australians think the same. Thirty-two percent of Australians think it is not important to have lived in the country for most of one’s life to be considered truly Australian, while only 18% of Americans reject this requirement. Canadians and New Zealanders lie between these two contrasts and remain statistically distinct from the other two, with Canada holding views more similar to Australia, and New Zealanders leaning towards Americans.

Australia and the United States again take contrasting approaches on the issue of whether it is important to have been born in the country to truly be a member of its national community. New Zealand and the United States are almost equal in their opinions: a strong majority (77%) of each nation believe it is very or fairly important to be have been born in the country and only 23% believe one can truly be a New Zealander or American without having been born there. There is no statistically significant difference between the opinions of the two countries. Australia is much more split — 59% of Australians think birth place is important, and over 41% believe it is not, a statistically significant difference from New Zealand and the United States (p
Canada’s 69%/31% split lies between the two extremes, different from each to a statistically significant degree. Australia and the United States also clearly contrast on the extremes of opinion: well over half (55%) of Americans believe birth to be very important, while only a third (33%) of Australians agree.

The survey question on the importance of ancestry in determining one’s national identity can be interpreted in many ways, so the reliability of this variable is somewhat limited. However, it is understood here to mean the importance of multiple generations of settlement. Following a pattern well established over the last three variables, Australians are the least likely to think that ancestry is important; only 38% think it is important while a strong majority of 62% regard it as unimportant. New Zealanders lie on the other extreme — a majority (60%) believe it is important to have New Zealand ancestry, while 40% believe it is not. Americans and Canadians are more split on the issue, although Canadians are the least likely to think that it is very important to have ancestry. All countries are statistically distinct on the issue.

Among these civic descriptors of national identity, Americans value living in the United States, having U.S. citizenship, and being born in the country more than any of the other countries. It clearly values a civic devotion to the nation. Consistently on the other side of the spectrum, Australians do not believe that these factors are very important, and are the least likely to place importance on any of the four variables. Most of the variables show statistically significant differences between the countries, but Australians and Americans stand on opposite ends to a statistically significant degree on all four questions. New Zealanders and Canadians fall in the middle — New Zealanders place importance on having multiple generations of ancestry and being born in the country, and are not as concerned about citizenship as North Americans.
Canadians value citizenship almost as much as Americans, but are unlikely to value ancestry as highly.

2. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’s] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY].

3. Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

Figure 6. It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’s] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY’S NATIONALITY].

Figure 7. Maintain distinct traditions and customs or adapt and blend into larger society?

The previous results on civic devotion are illuminated by the variables highlighting an ethnic-conscious approach to national identity. Question 2 asks how much respondents agree with the statement that it is impossible for people who do not share a country’s customs and traditions to fully share the country’s nationality. This question acts as a proxy to indicate a
country’s tolerance for multiculturalism, and by extension, people from ethnically distant backgrounds. Again, there is a contrast between Australia and the United States. This time, however, 43% of Australians agree that it is impossible for those who do not share Australian customs to become fully Australian, while 32% of U.S. respondents agree, a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.00001$). More people in each country disagree with the statement than agree, except for in Australia. Canada and New Zealand did not differ to a statistically significant degree with around 37% agreeing with the statement, showing less inclination towards multiculturalism than the United States but more than Australia. Canadians were, however, the most likely to strongly agree out of the four countries that sharing customs and traditions is important to being fully Canadian.

Question 3 presents the most curious case of variation.

The question allows respondents to choose from two options:

1. *It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.*

2. *It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society.*

There is extraordinary variation across the four countries in this case. Americans are evenly split — almost half (48%) think that it is better if groups maintain their distinct customs, while the other half (52%) prefers assimilation and blending. In the other three cases, clear majorities favor assimilation instead of maintaining distinct cultures, including 65% of Canadians over two-thirds (69%) of New Zealanders. Australia presents an even more striking contrast to the United States: a strong majority of 82% of Australians agree that it is better for groups to adapt, while less than a fifth (18.2%) think that groups should remain distinct, which almost half of Americans prefer. Here, each country is distinct from one another to a statistically significant degree, except for New Zealand and Canada.
Isolating each country’s (non-indigenous) racial minorities’ answers on the question and comparing them with the whole population’s opinions reveals many useful truths. First and most superficially, it reveals the discrepancy between the dominating societal attitude (mainly dictated by the white population) and any dissenting minority populations’ opinions. Perhaps more crucially, incongruency between the two can reveal discord between the white and non-white populations, indicating a population that shows less understanding towards the minority or immigrant experience, or even dissatisfaction towards minority presence from the majority population.

Fig. 8 reveals that the strongest incongruency exists among Canadians, with a 17 percentage point swing in favor of maintaining traditions when only minorities are asked. In Australia, there is a 12 percentage point difference, but even among minorities, only 30% believe that it is better to maintain distinct traditions rather than assimilate, still less than white and non-
white Canadians combined. New Zealand also has a difference of 8 percentage points between minorities and the general population. It is the United States’ result, however, that is the most noteworthy. The opinions of racial minorities do not differ from the general population at all — American whites and non-whites are congruent with each other, indicating that general public opinion effectively reflects the minority experience. The other countries’ — especially Canada’s — discrepancies between minority and majority opinions indicate less societal understanding of the immigrant experience than Americans show.

4. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]?

Figure 9. How close do you feel to [COUNTRY]?

“Whites” = white plus indigenous population, “non-whites” = non-white, non-indigenous population; Data: ISSP Research Group
Although the variable ‘How close do you feel to your country’ has its limitations for this particular study, some insight can be gained from comparing responses of non-indigenous minorities with responses of the white and indigenous populations.

The first comparison is the overall minority “closeness” levels between each country. New Zealand and Australia lead the cases with 96% and 93% of racial minorities respectively feeling close or very close to their countries. Meanwhile, 87% of Canadian minorities feel close or very close, and the United States trails the group with 78% feeling the same. Forty-five percent of New Zealand and Canadian minorities feel very close and only 37% of Australians feel the same, but this is not a statistically significant difference (p = 0.3). However, American minorities are the least likely to feel this way, at 32%.

The second — and more relevant — comparison looks at the difference between white and minority responses in each country. Canada has the closest mapping between its white plus indigenous population and its non-white population. New Zealand, Australia and the United States all have substantial differences between how close whites and non-whites feel towards their countries. While 63% of white and Māori New Zealanders feel very close to their country, only 45% of non-whites do, an 18 percentage point difference. Australia’s white and non-white populations see a 15 percentage point difference, while the United States has the most pronounced difference at 56% of whites feeling very close and 32% of non-whites feeling the same, a 24 percentage point difference.

The United States displays the lowest level of affinity among minorities towards their country. However, as national circumstances can vary aggregate results, the more important finding is the dissonance between white and non-white responses. There is a great discrepancy between responses from the white population and minorities in Australia, New Zealand and the
United States, with Canada being the only country with almost perfect congruency among its people of different racial backgrounds.

While these results offer some insight into the overall congruency of majority and minority feelings towards the nation, they must be taken with their limitations. First, the construction of the race variable for the Australian data itself is the first (and previously explained) limitation. The potential overrepresentation of minorities in the white sample may lead to false similarities between white and minority opinion. However, a 15 percentage point difference was still found in how close each group felt to Australia. This limitation indicates that the true difference between the white and minority “closeness” levels may be even greater than 15 percentage points, which would match results from New Zealand and the United States.

Second, the question asks respondents about “how close” they feel towards their country, rather than explicitly about belonging or inclusion. There could be a multitude of reasons why one might feel close (or not) to one’s country that are unrelated to inclusion, including political climate, geographical affinity, and other personal reasons, which could affect whites and non-whites differently. Ultimately, this question is mainly useful in providing insight on the discrepancy between whites and non-whites in the feelings they have towards their country.

Other domestic datasets can be used to supplement the ISSP. Specifically, the New Zealand General Social Survey (GSS) asks respondents about the strength of their belonging to New Zealand.64

---

These results substantiate the finding from the ISSP data showing that New Zealanders tend to place importance on being born in the country and having New Zealand ancestry. Across all three years, less than one tenth of New Zealanders of European descent felt that they did not belong, whereas up to 29% of Asians felt this way in 2010. Over half of white New Zealanders felt that they very strongly belonged in all three years, while only a fifth to a quarter of Asians felt this way across the survey years. New Zealanders of Pacific Island descent displayed higher levels of belonging than Asians, but not as high as Europeans. Māori consistently displayed the highest level of belonging, with over two-thirds claiming a very strong belonging to the country.
The other countries’ General Social Surveys do not ask this useful question, but the NZ GSS provides a useful substantiation of the finding that belonging within the New Zealand national community tends to depend on race and ancestry.

Discussion

According to these results, a ‘Scale of National Ethnocentrism’ can be created from a set of criteria, ranking the countries by the extent to which race determines inclusion in their national labels.

Table 2. Rankings of countries by factors valued in public national identity construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>✓ (1)</td>
<td>✓ (1)</td>
<td>✓ (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>× (3)</td>
<td>✓ (2)</td>
<td>× (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>× (2)</td>
<td>✓ (3)</td>
<td>× (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>× (4)</td>
<td>× (4)</td>
<td>× (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ = yes, × = no, (1) = ranking [1 = less racialized, 4 = more racialized]

Source: Compiled by author.

Figure 11. Scale of National Ethnocentrism

Source: Compiled by author.
The three main criteria in the Scale of National Ethnocentrism, derived from the analyzed survey data, are the value of civic devotion (such as citizenship) in public opinion, the value of multiculturalism (as opposed to assimilation) in public opinion, and whether societal public opinion matches attitudes of minorities. When the four countries are assessed on these three main dimensions, a distinct hierarchy shows the United States as the most ‘color-blind’ in extending people its ‘American’ label and Australia as the least.

*United States:* Leading the other countries in racial inclusivity, the United States is the most likely to believe in the importance of being born in the country and having lived there for most of one’s life as important factors of being American. It also values citizenship. However, it is the only country without a majority favoring assimilation over multiculturalism. It has the greatest proportion of people who believe in maintaining distinct ethnic traditions (rather than assimilation), and the least likely to believe that to be truly American, one must share American customs and traditions. Lastly, the general population’s opinions towards multiculturalism conform with those of racial minorities, suggesting a high level of harmony between minority preferences and those of the majority. Previous literature both contrasts and complements this analysis. Although Devos and Banaji (2005) found that the American label is associated with whiteness, they also found that some American minorities felt that they were fully American despite the implicit testing.65 Additionally, the present analyses are consistent with previous research finding widespread support for civic constructions of American national identity. The results from this analysis do not argue that the American national identity is fully racially inclusive — it simply highlights that it may be more so than the other three countries. Additionally, it is important to address the fact that as the United States is a large and very

65 Devos and Banaji, “American = White?”
heterogenous country, there is likely to be inter-state variation in perceptions of what it means to be ‘American.’ However, these geographical differences can be likened to any other demographic differences within any country that are associated with differences in opinion. This thesis aims to capture the aggregate American opinion and compare it with the aggregate opinions of the three other case countries.

**Canada:** The standout civic variable that Canadians deem as important is citizenship. Other than the legal declaration that one is Canadian, civic devotion is not important. Canadians also show less of a preference for multiculturalism than the United States, leaning more towards assimilation — a somewhat surprising result, considering Canada’s multiculturalism policies (explored in chapter five). Canada also displays the highest level of incongruency between majority and minority opinion on the topic of assimilation, displaying a strong dissonance between groups. However, Canadian non-whites feel equally as close to their country as the white and indigenous population, suggesting that there may be a specific ‘Canadian’ culture to which every citizen can relate, regardless of race, which is consistent with previous studies finding a high level of belonging among immigrants themselves. Canada’s results, however, also challenge existing literature which has found more acceptance of civic aspects of national identity. Ultimately, these analyses fill a crucial gap in Canada’s existing national identity literature.

**New Zealand:** With a national identity more racialized than Canada’s, New Zealand also only places importance on a couple of aspects of civic devotion. Being born in New Zealand and having ancestry is highly important to being a true New Zealander, but citizenship is not. This finding conforms to New Zealand’s comparative preference for assimilation and homogeneity rather than a mix of traditions, customs, and cultures. In addition, there is a moderate level of
dissonance between minority attitudes on multiculturalism and that of the whole population. The GSS also displays dramatically lower levels of belonging felt by immigrant-based racial minority groups. This analysis also conforms to existing literature finding that immigrant groups are less associated with the New Zealand label. However, like in Canada, it negates research that finds that New Zealanders embrace civic notions of national identity.

Australia: Diametrically opposed to the United States, Australians are the least likely to think that any of the civic variables (citizenship, sustained contact, etc.) are important to be truly Australian. However, they are the most likely to agree that one cannot become fully Australian without sharing their customs and traditions, and they are the biggest proponents of assimilation and blending. Additionally, Australian non-whites are more likely than the general public to favor multiculturalism in their national community, revealing dissonance among groups. Interestingly, minorities in Australia are more likely than even whites in each other country to call for assimilation, reflecting a pervasive ethno-cultural approach to being Australian. On all of the variables linking culture and nationality, Australians showed the most ethnocentric attitude, indicating a clear and distinct racialization of national identity. This is consistent with existing literature finding strong bias against non-white immigrants in Australia as well as presence of ethnocultural conceptions of national identity.

The overall distribution of results show that to be American is to civically commit to the country through either generations of presence, many years of residency, or actual citizenship. As long as one is a U.S. citizen, it is still ‘American’ to preserve one’s ethnic traditions. To be Australian (and to a slightly lesser extent, New Zealander and Canadian) is to commit to the culture, to assimilate, and to integrate ethnically, as nationality is viewed more as one dominant

---

66 Sibley and Liu, “New Zealand = Bicultural?”
ethnic or cultural group. Overall, these results are consistent with some previous findings, but not all. However, the areas of inconsistency are where the literature is previously lacking, so these results do not negate well-established findings in research.

Although these data point more to cultural aspects of nationality than racial, these findings still strongly indicate a racialized nationality. This is because having one dominant cultural group makes it easier for people of the dominant phenotype (European descent) to claim the culture and be accepted as part of the ingroup. Hence, those that are not part of the majority racial group may be perceived to not be part of the main cultural group, either. Under these conditions, racial minorities are therefore more likely to be labeled as foreign, rather than national insiders who simply have a different culture.

These results point to the objective of this investigation: what explains the variation in these countries of what it means to belong? Why are boundaries of belonging drawn along racial lines for Australia more than for the United States? The following chapters are dedicated to the second part of this investigation: explaining the variation.
CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNICITY-BASED IMMIGRATION POLICY

Immigration regulation is one of the most important tools for a nation to control who can and cannot enter the country. In each of the four case countries, immigration policy has historically been used to exclude people based on race, ethnicity, and national origin. Conceptions of national identity can shape immigration policy, but crucially, with such control over inflows of different ethnic groups, immigration policy may in turn shape conceptions of national identity through curating the ethnic demographics of the country. This chapter investigates the extent to which immigration policy in the four countries has affected the racialization of their national identities, through the mechanism of demographic shifts.

In the early half of the nineteenth century, most immigrants from western Europe were welcomed — and actively recruited — to Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and Australia. However, the latter half of the century saw the onset of restrictive policy based on race and national origin. This chapter traces the similarities and differences in immigration policy in these countries from the onset of restrictive policy to the present. It finds broad similarities in how the policies in each country have created more multiethnic states. However, as the demographic makeups of the countries have changed in similar ways, conceptions of national identity have not changed in congruence.

---

67 Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, British immigration was heavily encouraged by the government, for example through setting up offices in the UK to begin promotion work. See: Valerie Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-1990 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), 42–44.

The exclusive immigration policies of the four case countries have their roots in the early gold rushes of the nineteenth century. Chinese migration surged after gold was discovered in California (United States) in 1848, in Australia in 1851, in British Columbia (Canada) in 1858, and in New Zealand in 1861.69 Each country responded similarly through their immigration policies.

In Australia, individual colonies took restrictive action against Chinese immigration in the 1850s and 1860s, including imposing a poll tax on all Chinese arrivals, until a uniform restriction was adopted in 1888. In 1896, the colonies extended the restriction to “all coloured races.”70 In 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia enacted the Pacific Island Labourers Act, which allowed for the deportation of Pacific Island workers and imposed a ban on further migration.71 Shortly after, Australia officially adopted the Immigration Restriction Act, commonly known as the White Australia policy, which excluded non-Europeans from immigrating to Australia.72 The White Australia policy remained in effect for 72 years.73

Although Canada did not employ legislation explicitly called an immigration restriction act, its immigration policy restricted Chinese migrants from the 1880s onward, and later, all non-white immigrants. In 1885, an act was passed to levy a head tax of $50 on immigrants of Chinese origin, which was raised to $500 in 1903.74 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Canadian Immigration Branch instructed its agents in the United States to withhold assistance to

70 Hawkins, 13.
72 Hawkins, *Critical Years in Immigration*, 11.
73 Hawkins, 15.
black Americans who wanted to immigrate to Canada. The quasi-official policy of excluding black Americans almost became official legislation in 1911, but was never implemented.\textsuperscript{75} Under a final act of exclusion, the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 ensured complete termination of Chinese immigration.\textsuperscript{76} White Canada policies were abandoned in 1962, 11 years ahead of White Australia policies.\textsuperscript{77}

In the second half of the nineteenth century, European New Zealanders saw Chinese gold miners as ‘sojourners’ or temporary visitors who were not to settle in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{78} The government enacted the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 which imposed a £10 poll tax on each Chinese person entering New Zealand, in addition to allowing only one Chinese entry per 10 tons of cargo. Similar to the Canadian amendments, the poll tax was increased to £100 in 1896, and one Chinese was allowed for every 200 tons of cargo.\textsuperscript{79} The poll tax, only abolished in 1944,\textsuperscript{80} was similar to that imposed in Canada and Australia as it required approval from the British Crown.\textsuperscript{81} The government passed the Asiatic Restriction Act of 1896 which stated “it is expedient to safeguard the race-purity of the people of New Zealand by preventing the influx into the colony of persons of alien race including Asiatic.”\textsuperscript{82} The act defined Asiatic to include Asia and its islands but exclude “persons of European or Jewish extraction,” or migrants from India, as it was also part of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{83} Despite objections from the British government, New Zealand tried to pass legislation to restrict Indian and other Asian immigrants.\textsuperscript{84} In 1899,

\textsuperscript{75} Knowles, 85–86.
\textsuperscript{76} Hawkins, \textit{Critical Years in Immigration}, 19.
\textsuperscript{77} Hawkins, 8.
\textsuperscript{78} Yong and Voss-lamber, “Race and Tax Policy,” 150.
\textsuperscript{79} Yong and Voss-lamber, 150–51.
\textsuperscript{80} Yong and Voss-lamber, 152.
\textsuperscript{81} Yong and Voss-lamber, 149.
\textsuperscript{82} "Asiatic Restriction Act 1896 (NZ).” 60 Victoriae 1896 No 64 § (1896).
\textsuperscript{83} Asiatic Restriction Act 1896 (NZ).
New Zealand enacted the Immigration Restriction Act which prohibited the entry of immigrants who were not of British or Irish ancestry or could not fill out the application form in “any European language.” This was effective in keeping out the Chinese, Indians, and other “race aliens.”

The United States responded to increased Chinese migration with a similar poll tax scheme in California. In 1852, a poll tax of $50 was imposed on every Chinese immigrant, and in 1862, a further Chinese Police Tax was imposed on almost all Chinese people in California. In 1882, the United States Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which limited legal immigration to 100 Chinese immigrants a year and banned immigrants from bringing their wives. This act was renewed in 1892 and 1902, and not repealed until 1943. The Chinese Exclusion Act slowed but did not entirely halt migration from China — the Chinese were the most obvious group of illegal immigrants on the west coast at the turn of the twentieth century. In contrast, the other three countries legislated for a complete and effective ban on Chinese migration.

*Interwar Years, 1919-1939*

During the interwar years, none of the case countries were tolerant towards non-European immigration. Non-discriminatory immigration policy was too contentious to suggest in both Canada and Australia, and both countries focused on attracting and recruiting British immigrants.

---

85 Beaglehole.
86 Yong and Voss, “Race and Tax Policy,” 156.
87 Yong and Voss, 157.
in the 1920s. Canada categorized central and northern Europe as “the preferred countries” for immigration and decided to encourage immigration from these countries in 1928.\(^9\)

New Zealand prohibited Germans and Austro-Hungarians from entering without a permit from the attorney general under the Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act of 1919. Until 1947, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act of 1920 required non-British or Irish immigrants to apply for entry, and was used to curb immigration from Asia and southern Europe.\(^90\)

The United States also moved towards exclusion during these years. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 restricted immigration from the Empire of Japan, and the Immigration Act of 1917 created an Asiatic Barred Zone, restricting all immigrants from Asia.\(^91\) In 1921, the government enacted the Emergency Quota Act, which allocated each sending nation an immigration quota equal to 3% of the foreign-born population of that country on the 1910 census.\(^92\) This was extended and made permanent by the Immigration Act of 1924 which shifted the target quotas to match the 1890 census, favoring immigration from ‘Nordic’ Europe.\(^93\) In 1919 Senator James D. Phelan said, “our business is to build up, as the Australians are so gallantly trying to do, a white man’s country.”\(^94\) However, with the perception of being ‘raceless,’ this act also had the effect of restricting white immigration from the British dominions, with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa only receiving the bare minimum quota of 100 entries in 1929.\(^95\) In the late 1920s, Mexicans were also targeted for immigration restriction. Nativist organizations sought to restrict the entry of Mexicans based on their racial

---

\(^92\) Anne Rees, “‘Treated like Chinamen’: United States Immigration Restriction and White British Subjects,” *Journal of Global History* 14, no. 2 (July 2019): 239, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022819000056.
\(^93\) Rees, 240.
\(^94\) Rees, 240.
\(^95\) Rees, 240.
ineligibility to citizenship, but this was complicated by the difficulty to racially categorize them and the fact that the U.S. conquest of Mexico stipulated automatic citizenship for Mexicans in conquered areas.\textsuperscript{96} While Congress did not impose quotas on Mexican immigrants or exclude them on racial grounds, it sought to exclude them administratively. In 1929, U.S. Consuls refused visas to all Mexican laborers by strictly enforcing existing provisions of immigration law, such as through the ban on contract labor and the literacy test. Mexican immigration, which had averaged around 59,000 per year, dropped to 3,000 per year in two years.\textsuperscript{97} By the late 1920s, deportation of illegal immigrants was also not racially equitable — when confronted by Immigration Services, illegal European immigrants were more likely to avoid deportation than Mexicans.\textsuperscript{98}

\textit{Post-World War Two}

The era following World War Two brought dramatic change to immigration policy in all four countries — but at varying times.

After the war, Australia had an urgent need to expand its economy through immigration, and adopted a “populate or perish” attitude. However, its goal was to expand while preserving a British majority. The initial 1945 proposal comprised admitting British and other European immigrants in a ratio of 10 to 1, but practical considerations resulted in entry of 170,000 displaced Europeans between 1947 and 1952.\textsuperscript{99} This led to broad recruitment of all European nationalities in the 1950s and even limited recruitment from the Middle East. The White

\textsuperscript{97} Ngai, 90.
\textsuperscript{98} Ngai, 90.
\textsuperscript{99} Hawkins, \textit{Critical Years in Immigration}, 32–33.
Australia policy stood, but the government began to liberalize policy in the second half of the 1960s. In 1966, the government abolished the discriminatory provision introduced in 1957 which only allowed non-Europeans to naturalize after 15 years of residency, compared with five years for Europeans.\textsuperscript{100} The same year, the House of Representatives announced a move to evaluate each migrant application based on skills, but that Australia would maintain an aim of preserving a homogenous population.\textsuperscript{101} In 1973, the newly elected Whitlam government instituted a new immigration policy which entirely disregarded race as a factor for selection.\textsuperscript{102}

Canada did not have the same security concerns as Australia after World War Two, so its government categorized immigration as a low public policy priority.\textsuperscript{103} Although the post-war government under Prime Minister Mackenzie King repealed the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, his accompanying statement in the House of Commons effectively preserved White Canada for another 15 years.\textsuperscript{104} He asserted that existing restrictions on Asiatic immigration must remain and that the government was opposed to “large-scale immigration from the Orient.”\textsuperscript{105} The new Immigration Act of 1952 placed all authority of selection of immigrants to the discretion of the cabinet, based on factors such as nationality, ethnic group, and ability to assimilate.\textsuperscript{106} Finally, in 1962, new regulations eliminated race as a factor in immigrant selection — applicants were considered for education and other skills, irrespective of race or national origin. The one discriminatory facet that remained was that only Europeans and those from the

\textsuperscript{101} Hawkins, \textit{Critical Years in Immigration}, 33.
\textsuperscript{102} Hawkins, 104–5.
\textsuperscript{103} Hawkins, 36.
\textsuperscript{104} Hawkins, 37.
\textsuperscript{105} Hawkins, 38.
\textsuperscript{106} Knowles, \textit{Strangers at Our Gates}, 130.
Americas could sponsor a wide range of relatives, but this was abolished in 1967. Canada became the first of the three large immigrant receiving countries (ahead of the United States and Australia) and New Zealand to abolish discriminatory policy.

Similar to Australia, New Zealand experienced a labor shortage following the war. Driven by this, in 1947, the government introduced schemes to encourage immigrants from the United Kingdom. However, the continued labor shortage in the 1950s forced the government to extend the scheme to include Dutch, Danish, Swiss, Austrian, and German immigrants under 35 years of age. The Department of External Affairs explicitly defended discriminatory regulation towards Asians in a memo in 1953: “Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are and intend to remain a country of European development. It is inevitably discriminatory against Asians – indeed against all persons who are not wholly of European race and colour. Whereas we have done much to encourage immigration from Europe, we do everything to discourage it from Asia.” Like in Canada and Australia, policy liberalization began in the 1960s with the Immigration Amendment Act of 1961 which required all non-New Zealand citizens (except Australians) to have a permit before entering. British and non-British people were equal for the first time in law, but in practice, this was only a formality for the British and Irish who were issued with permits on arrival. In 1974, for the first time, immigration policy aimed at fulfilling skill shortages regardless of race or nationality replaced discriminatory regulations.

---

107 Knowles, 143.
109 Beaglehole.
110 Beaglehole.
Similar to Australia and New Zealand’s experience, World War Two caused a labor shortage in the United States. In 1941, the government implemented the Bracero Program, a joint agreement with Mexico to bring temporary Mexican agricultural laborers to work in the Southwest. Five million Mexicans went to the United States under the program which ended in 1965.112 Although the policy encouraged many Mexicans to move to the United States, many Mexican nationals migrated outside the Bracero program, which prompted a contradictory program in 1954: Operation Wetback deported Mexican workers, many of whom were American citizens that were wrongfully removed.113 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, commonly known as the McCarran-Walter Act, pointed in the direction of policy liberalization. It abolished Asian exclusion and removed official race and nationality barriers to citizenship. However, it granted a minimal quota of only 100 entries per year to Asian countries and imposed a quota to restrict non-white immigration from Jamaica, while continuing to exempt the Western Hemisphere from quotas to exploit cheap Mexican labor.114 The landmark Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, passed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, altogether removed the nationality quota system which heavily favored British, Irish, and German immigrants and replaced it with a system based on non-racialized and non-nationality-based preferences, with each region and country receiving an equal allotment of visas.115

112 Park, Immigration Law and Society, 42–43.
113 Park, 46–47.
Post-1970s

After each country dismantled explicit race-based immigration policy, each implemented a preference system, but with slightly different focuses. All four countries followed a model of immigration favoring human capital (traits such as education) and family reunification, but since the 1990s, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia began to move away from this towards a labor-market focused model.\textsuperscript{116} In the United States, the legalization of unauthorized migrants has become an important policy debate.\textsuperscript{117}

However, the post 1970s era has seen differences among countries. Notably, in New Zealand, although immigration officially became non-discriminatory in 1974, scholars have critiqued the government’s use of immigration policy as a tool to “whiten the population.”\textsuperscript{118} Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, as successive public opinion polls showed xenophobia towards Asian immigration, the government responded by implementing tighter English language requirements.\textsuperscript{119} In Canada, policy liberalization led to a dramatic change in the demographics of immigrants: from a large majority of European migration in 1966, the 1970s and 1980s saw majorities coming from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America.\textsuperscript{120} The United States implemented the Diversity Visa Lottery through the Immigration Act of 1990, which granted permanent residency allotments to nationals of underrepresented countries. Literature on the consequences of this program has been abundant and varied, with some

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{116} Akbari and MacDonald, “Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States,” 806.
\textsuperscript{117} Akbari and MacDonald, “Immigration Policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.”
\textsuperscript{119} Spoonley and Bedford (2012) note, ‘it was not immigrants that were regarded as a “problem”; it was specifically Asian immigrants;’ Paul Spoonley and Richard Bedford, \textit{Welcome to Our World? Immigration and the Reshaping of New Zealand} (Auckland, N.Z: Dunmore Pub, 2012) quoted in; Simon-Kumar, “Neoliberalism and the New Race Politics of Migration Policy.”
\textsuperscript{120} Knowles, \textit{Strangers at Our Gates}, 161.
\end{flushleft}
scholars critiquing it as a way to minimize Mexican and Asian immigration while maximizing European and African immigration.\textsuperscript{121}

Figure 12. Timeline of key race-based immigration policies in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 1850-2000

United States
1852: Poll Tax on Chinese in California
1882-1943: Chinese Exclusion Act
1917-1924: Immigration from Asia banned
1890-1914: Gentlemen’s Agreement, restricts Japanese migration
1941-1945: Bracero Program
2000: Operation Webback
1965-: non-racialized immigration policy

Australia
1855: Poll Taxes begin (state administered)
1880-1960: Restrictions extended to “all coloured races”
1901-1973: Immigration Restriction Act (White Australia)
1973-: non-racialized immigration policy

New Zealand
1881-1944: Chinese Immigrants Act (Poll Tax)
1896-1920: Immigration Restriction Act bans non-British/Irish
1899-1920: Immigration Restriction Act (Ban)
1920-1947: Amendment: non-British/Irish must apply for entry
1947-1960: British and European migration encouraged; Asian discouraged
1961-1974: British and non-British people equal in law, not in practice
1974-: non-racialized immigration policy

Canada
1885-1923: Chinese Immigration Act (Poll Tax)
1923-1947: Chinese Immigration Act bans Chinese immigration
1947-1962: Asian immigration restrictions remain
1962-: non-racialized immigration policy

Source: Compiled by author.
Comparison and Evaluation

Through analysis of the development of immigration policy, it is evident that the four countries all experienced similar demographic shifts because of loosening immigration restrictions. Each country originally had extremely restrictive policies that allowed for (and at times encouraged) migration from Europe, while reducing immigrants from outside of Europe. Each country then began policy liberalization in the latter half of the twentieth century, leading to far more multiethnic populations than previously seen. While the demographic makeups of the countries have changed in similar ways, conceptions of national identity have not. As Australia and New Zealand experienced large increases in Asian migration, their national identities remained more racialized and ‘white-exclusive’ than the United States’ or Canada’s. Since immigration policies among the four countries are broadly similar while national identity conceptions are vastly different (shown in the Scale of Ethnocentrism), immigration policy is unlikely to account for the variation in the racialization of the four countries’ national identities.

Of course, differences between the countries’ immigration policies do exist. However, even if we examine these nuanced differences more closely, the variation observed in immigration policy nevertheless does not entirely match with the ranking on the Scale of Ethnocentrism. Overall, the least restrictive immigration policy history belonged to Canada, followed by the United States and then Australia. New Zealand’s immigration policy development has been the most restrictive of the case countries.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, each of the countries responded to increased Chinese migration by implementing poll taxes on Chinese arrivals, although the United States and Australia imposed these a few decades before they began in Canada and New Zealand. The similarities continued as each country moved to tighten regulations against Chinese at the turn of
the century. Again, the timeline differed with the United States implementing the first Chinese Exclusion Act, and Canada the last.

During the interwar years, each country moved to solidify restrictions, but divergences emerged. Canada took more restrictive action against Chinese immigrants. The United States continued restricting Asian immigration, but also moved to limit immigration overall. However, rhetorically, the immigration quotas appeared ‘raceless,’ as they also imposed quotas on other British-settler nations. Official rhetoric still indicated that the United States preferred Nordic European immigration, while it became clear that New Zealand was even more restrictive — the government favored British and Irish immigrants above any others, even including Southern Europeans, with a ban on Germans and Austro-Hungarians immediately after World War One.

After the second world war, Australia, New Zealand and the United States experienced labor shortages which caused some expansions to immigration regulation. Australia’s ‘populate or perish’ scheme broadened policies to include all European nationalities, while New Zealand reluctantly opened up to Western Europe. The United States started the Bracero Program to attract Mexican labor. The 1950s continued to bring elite rhetoric against Asians in New Zealand (and even Canada), but Canada and the United States were the first countries to begin policy liberalization in the early 1950s. Canada abolished racialized immigration criteria in 1962, and although the United States deported Mexican laborers (and some U.S. citizens, wrongfully) in the late 1950s, it embraced non-racialized immigration policy in 1965. Australia eventually followed suit by 1973. New Zealand attempted to hold on longer to its policies, with liberalization beginning in the 1960s, and full rejection of race-based immigration embraced in the mid-1970s.
In the post-1970s era, the countries have diverged further. The New Zealand government oftentimes used immigration policy as a tool to curb rapid Asian immigration, reminiscent of past anti-Asian attitudes. Canada and Australia’s models focus on the labor market, whereas the issue of unauthorized immigration has become salient in the United States.

In aggregate, Canada and the United States’ less restrictive immigration policies appear to account for their relatively less racialized national identities on the Scale of National Ethnocentrism compared with Australia and New Zealand. However, Canada has the least restrictive policy, which does not explain why it has a more racialized national identity than the United States, nor does Australia’s immigration policy explain why its national identity is more racialized than New Zealand’s.

The Scale of National Ethnocentrism also roughly matches the timeline of key immigration policies. Canada and the United States were just ahead of Australia and New Zealand in dismantling their racialized immigration policies. Rhetorically, New Zealand and Australia also held onto British preferences for longer and continued advocating against Asian immigration in the 1950s and 1960s. However, regardless of timing, the patterns and trends remain similar across each case country. A difference of a decade between the dismantling of similar policies cannot explain the nuanced variation observed in the first part of the present investigation. Although immigration policy could have contributed to the national conversation around different ethnic groups, it cannot have created the variation in national identity and racial attitudes across the four cases observed in the public opinion data.
CHAPTER FIVE: INSTITUTIONAL MULTICULTURALISM

While immigration policy determines who is allowed to enter a country, governments often institute domestic policies and programs aimed at shaping attitudes towards ethnic minorities already in the country. Legislative affirmations, programs, institutions, and other government initiatives that promote multiculturalism can shape public opinion on belonging of ethnic minorities through the mechanism of increased systemic inclusiveness.

Multiculturalism theory has posited that affirmation of group identities leads to higher levels of acceptance towards ethnic out-groups, while some social psychological theories such as social identity theory (SIT) have emphasized negative outcomes stemming from social categorization. Those on the SIT side of the argument argue that group identification leads to in-group protective behaviors. On the other hand, scholarship has found empirical evidence that multicultural policies do not fuel majority backlash or hinder societal engagement.

---


instead, modest evidence shows that they promote inclusive membership and increase national belonging of ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{127}

This investigation contributes to the debate through a comparative lens — it uses two measures of institutional multiculturalism to determine whether governmental efforts contribute to a less racially-exclusive national identity. The first is governmental affirmations of multiculturalism through policy, and the second looks at governmental offices and programs that promote multiculturalism. These programs include both ethnic culture-centered initiatives and immigrant integration programs. Both of these measures contribute to increased systemic inclusiveness, which has the potential to influence public opinion.

\textit{Affirmations of Multiculturalism in Policy}

Canada and Australia have both explicitly affirmed principles of multiculturalism in federal policy, while New Zealand and the United States have not. In the 1970s, the prime ministers of Australia and Canada announced an official federal policy of multiculturalism. New Zealand has remained legislatively committed to biculturalism, while the United States has not made any federal-level policy affirmations on cultural diversity.

Until the dismantling of White Canada and White Australia, both countries’ policies shifted to emphasize the assimilation of immigrants.\textsuperscript{128} In the 1960s, a ‘new nationalism’ movement developed in Canada under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who commented that the new Maple Leaf flag encapsulated the construction of new local symbols to replace British race


patriotism.\textsuperscript{129} Importantly, Quebecois nationalism was developing among French-Canadians at this time, and the Pearson government responded by emphasizing a Canadian identity that included French-Canadians, with the official adoption of bilingualism in 1969.\textsuperscript{130} Hence, biculturalism was a large facet of this ‘new nationalism’ movement, and integration was the foundation of official policy towards migrants in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{131} Biculturalism and bilingualism then became the main precursors to the rise of multiculturalism as various other ethnic groups, such as the Ukrainian Canadian Committee, voiced dissatisfaction with biculturalism. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced an official policy of multiculturalism in Canada, emphasizing that although there were two official languages, there was no official culture, nor did one ethnic group take priority over another.\textsuperscript{132} This landmark declaration had the fundamental goal of improving intercultural relations through two pillars: support for the maintenance and development of cultural communities and the promotion of intercultural contact and the reduction of barriers.\textsuperscript{133} This became enshrined in the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988.

\textbf{Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988 — Key Clauses on Canadian National Identity}

\textbf{3 (1)} It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to

- \textbf{(a)} recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage;

- \textbf{(b)} recognize and promote the understanding that \textbf{multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and identity} and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of Canada’s future…\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{129} Mann, 485.
\textsuperscript{130} Mann, 497.
\textsuperscript{131} Mann, 486, 489.
\textsuperscript{132} Mann, 490–91.
Not only was the Prime Minister’s formal announcement instituted by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988, but the Canadian government also agreed to include an affirmation of multiculturalism in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, Section 27 of the Charter states: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”

In addition, Canada also legislates for minority representation in mainstream media. The Broadcasting Act 1991 stipulates that the programming provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation should “reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada,” and that any programming provided by alternative services should also “reflect Canada’s regions and multicultural nature.”

Australia also had a similar ‘new nationalism’ movement, but the demise of Britishness and the need for a local identity was triggered predominantly by external events such as the UK accession to the European Economic Community in 1973, rather than a similar Quebecois nationalism movement. Integration was at the core of the government’s approach to migration during the early to mid 1970s, but multiculturalism replaced this in the latter half of the decade. Soon after the election of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in 1975, his administration began promoting multiculturalism as the central idea of national identity. A government-appointed body recommended a series of programs to support multiculturalism in a special report in 1977, which the government accepted, affirming Australia as a multicultural nation. In a 1978

---

138 Mann, 493.
139 Elsa Kolet, “Multiculturalism: A Review of Australian Policy Statements and Recent Debates in Australia and Overseas,” text, October 8, 2010, Australia,
parliamentary speech, seven years following Canada’s declaration, Prime Minister Fraser announced “[t]he Government accepts that it is now essential to give significant further encouragement to develop a multicultural attitude in Australian society. It will foster the retention of the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups and promote intercultural understanding.”

Recognized as the foundation of Australian multiculturalism, the Racial Discrimination Act, passed in 1975, outlawed racial discrimination in certain areas of public life, satisfying Australia’s commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. However, scholarship has criticized the act’s limited ability to actually promote multiculturalism. One criticism has argued that it focuses on individual, discrete forms of discrimination and not social, political, and economic experiences of difference and that it has no impact on how minorities are represented in media. However, like the Canadian Broadcasting Act, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act of 1983 specifies that the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the country’s national broadcaster, must “contribute to a sense of national identity and inform and entertain, and reflect the cultural diversity of [emphasis added], the Australian community.”

In contrast, neither the United States nor New Zealand has instituted any explicit national policies affirming multiculturalism. The United States has made no affirmation of


140 Koleth.
142 Lim, 49–50.
multiculturalism in federal policy. A search of “multicultural” in the United States Code reveals no statutes that uphold multiculturalism in a manner similar to that of Canada or Australia. Similarly, New Zealand has made almost no explicit affirmation of multiculturalism in national-level policy. A search of “multicultural” in New Zealand statutes reveals one mention. The Law Commission Act 1985 stipulates that the Commission must “take into account te ao Maori (the Maori dimension) and shall also give consideration to the multicultural character of New Zealand society.” However, like Australia and Canada, New Zealand implemented a Broadcasting Act which stipulates that one of the primary functions of the Broadcasting Commission is “to ensure that a range of broadcasts is available to provide for the interests of … minorities in the community including ethnic minorities.” This calls for programming that caters to minorities’ interests, rather ensuring minority representation, for which Australia and Canada legislates.

Significantly, and in contrast to the other countries, the relative lack of statutory multiculturalism is explained by New Zealand’s legislative commitment to biculturalism. The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand’s founding document, is based on a principle of state biculturalism between the Crown and Māori. Extensive scholarship has documented the

---


difficulties and tensions between biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand society. In particular, attempts at state-sponsored multiculturalism would be treated with suspicion and controversy by Māori. Hence, “biculturalism has occupied the pre- eminent place of political and policy debates, and there has been little room for multiculturalism.”

Notably, biculturalism was a large part of high-level national identity discussions in both Canada and New Zealand. However, biculturalism led to the emergence of multiculturalism policy in Canada when Ukrainian Canadians pressed for more inclusion, while it did not have a similar effect in New Zealand. In Canada, the presence of a white, non-British immigrant minority during biculturalism debates led to shifts towards explicitly multicultural policies, whereas New Zealand’s British and Irish-exclusive immigration policies may have contributed to biculturalism’s endurance in the country as there was a lack of credible opposition to biculturalism. However, similarities exist between policy in Canada and Australia. As the significance of British identity diminished, both countries required a new local national identity. New Zealand legislators hung onto Britishness as one pillar of its bicultural national identity, at the expense of affirmations of multiculturalism. Australia and the United States never experienced official biculturalism — but the demise of Britishness in Australia led to a multicultural project, while the United States has not affirmed multiculturalism in policy.

Government Programs Supporting Multiculturalism

The presence of government programs that support multiculturalism in the four countries follows a similar pattern to one found in these countries’ affirmations of multiculturalism. For this investigation, ‘government programs’ include both institutions promoting culture and diversity and immigrant-integration programs. Canada has the most extensive array of government departments, offices, and initiatives aimed at upholding multiculturalism. Australia also has various offices aimed at promoting multiculturalism and ethnic affairs. New Zealand has some governmental integration initiatives but limited multiculturalism offices compared to those found in Canada and Australia. The United States federal government has almost no multiculturalism or integration offices and initiatives, although individual states and localities take some responsibility in this area.

Canada’s main institution supporting multiculturalism is the Department of Canadian Heritage, simply known as Canadian Heritage. Specifically, the Community Support, Multiculturalism, and Anti-Racism Initiatives Program (known as the Multiculturalism Program) — under the mandate of Canadian Heritage — has three funding components: events, projects and community capacity building aimed at supporting intercultural understanding. The Multicultural Program shifted between the jurisdiction of Canadian Heritage and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), but its policy objectives have revolved around identity, social justice, and civic participation. Although Canadian Heritage and CIC have been the main

---

players in promoting multiculturalism, many other federal departments contribute in other areas of immigrant integration, such as Human Resources and Social Development Canada and Status of Women Canada.\footnote{Andrew and Hima, 57.} With its Action Plan against Racism, Canadian Heritage has served as a leader in linking federal departments and coordinating efforts supporting multiculturalism.\footnote{Andrew and Hima, 57.} Aside from programs explicitly promoting cultural development, Canada has also led in the field of immigration integration programs. From 1947 to the early 1990s, language learning programs for immigrants were focused on assimilation, but since the early 1990s they have centered around integration and preparing new immigrants for the Canadian labor market.\footnote{Yan Guo, “Language Policies and Programs for Adult Immigrants in Canada: Deconstructing Discourses of Integration,” \textit{New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education} 2015, no. 146 (2015): 41–51, \url{https://doi.org/10.1002/ace.20130}.} Canada’s adoption of provincial-level commitments to multiculturalism also emphasizes the country’s position as a leader of policy affirmations of multiculturalism. After Canada declared a national multicultural policy, many provinces acted quickly to institute their own acts and mandates.\footnote{Joseph Garcea, “Provincial Multiculturalism Policies in Canada, 1974-2004: A Content Analysis,” \textit{Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal} 38, no. 3 (2006): 1-6.} The national government also has various agreements with provinces, which either incorporate them in decision-making, or fully devolve responsibilities to the provinces over immigrant settlement initiatives. One such example is the Canada-Ontario Immigration agreement.\footnote{Andrew and Hima, “Federal Policies on Immigrant Settlement,” 60.}

After Australia affirmed multiculturalism in the 1970s, the government established multicultural resource centers and expanded existing settlement services, such as English language teaching, on-arrival accommodation and orientation assistance, interpreting and translating services, and assistance with overseas qualifications recognition.\footnote{Koleth, “Multiculturalism.”} The Fraser government also established the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) which

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnote{Andrew and Hima, 57.} Andrew and Hima, 57.
\footnote{Andrew and Hima, 57.} Andrew and Hima, 57.
\footnote{Koleth, “Multiculturalism.”} Koleth, “Multiculturalism.”
\end{thebibliography}
advised the government on multicultural affairs. However, this was replaced by the Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) in 1987. The OMA, currently under the purview of the Department of Home Affairs, sponsors a few programs that promote multiculturalism: the Fostering Integration Grants Scheme helps community organizations deliver programs that assist migrant integration; the Community Languages Multicultural Grants Program funds community language schools to help young Australians learn another language in their community. In 1997, the Prime Minister announced a new National Multicultural Advisory Council, now named the Australian Multicultural Council (AMC), which provides independent advice to the government on multicultural affairs, social cohesion, and integration policy and programs. Additionally, through the 1980s, states and territories instituted Ethnic Affairs Commissions and Migrant Settlement Councils, and there was a nationwide consolidation of multicultural institutions.

While Australia’s governmental introduction of multicultural programs draw similarities to Canada’s, it is not as extensive — Canada’s programs extend across many federal departments, including ones ostensibly unrelated to multiculturalism, while Australia has a specific department that delivers multicultural programs. However, both countries have local-level institutions targeted at advancing multicultural policy.

Formal institutions promoting multiculturalism were essentially non-existent in New Zealand until the turn of the twenty-first century, when Prime Minister Helen Clark’s Labour government set cultural diversity as a key policy priority. An Office of Ethnic Affairs was

---

162 Koleth.
165 Koleth, “Multiculturalism.”
established, later renamed the Office of Ethnic Communities. Under the Department of Internal Affairs, the Office serves as the “government’s principal advisor on ethnic diversity in New Zealand.” It also provides information and services to ethnic communities and administers funds to support community development and social cohesion. It specifically caters to those who identify their ethnicity as Asian, African, Continental European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern — notably this leaves out Pacific Islanders and Māori, who fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Pacific Peoples and the Ministry of Māori Development, respectively. However, the Office of Ethnic Communities operates under the sole responsibility of the Minister of Ethnic Communities, as there are “no legislation, Crown entities or statutory bodies associated with this portfolio.”

Another major pillar of the Labour government’s early 2000s policy was the Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy (the Strategy), which has five outcome goals for immigrant integration: employment, education and training, English language, inclusion, and health and wellbeing. For each outcome, the Unit offers services and programs to new migrants, for example, funding for English classes, or New Kiwis, a service matching migrants to employers.

---

168 See: https://www.mpp.govt.nz/
169 See: https://www.govt.nz/organisations/te-puni-kokiri/
Although they are less extensive, New Zealand’s programs aimed at including and integrating ethnic minorities draw similarities to Canada’s and Australia’s. However, they began many decades later, at the turn of the twenty-first century.

While in Canada, immigrant groups receive integration support and ethnic development through financial and symbolic support, the United States government favors “distant, neutral relations with immigrants, ethnic organizations, and community advocates.” Its community building policy has been “largely laissez-faire,” with only recognized refugees allowed to access government resettlement funds. The former U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) did not offer new immigrants any programs similar to those in Canada. One minor program is U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) Citizenship and Assimilation Grant Program, which gives grants to public or private nonprofit organizations to provide citizenship instruction and naturalization application assistance to lawful permanent residents. However, this program is minor compared to the abundance of immigrant integration programs in the other countries and it is only targeted at lawful permanent residents. The relative lack of Congressional or federal action on both immigrant integration and ethnic culture promotion has led state governments to implement programs such as funding for English language instruction. Overall, the United States has historically lacked institutions aimed at promoting multiculturalism through immigrant integration or other programs, directly contrasting the other three case countries which all have integration programs and other cultural empowerment efforts.


173 Bloemraad, 867.

174 Bloemraad, 870.


Comparison and Evaluation

Table 3. Institutional Multiculturalism Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Affirmations of Multiculturalism in Policy</th>
<th>Government Programs Supporting Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Canada        | • 1971: PM announces official policy of multiculturalism  
• 1982: Multiculturalism recognized in Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms  
• 1988: Canadian Multiculturalism Act  
• 1991: Broadcasting Act                                                                 | • 1988: Multiculturalism Program  
• Programs in multiple federal departments (Canadian Heritage leading)  
• Immigrant integration programs  
• Provincial-level programs                                                                                           |
| Australia     | • 1975: Racial Discrimination Act  
• 1978: PM announces official policy of multiculturalism  
• Immigrant integration programs  
• State/territory programs                                                                                               |
| New Zealand   | • None (affirmations of biculturalism instead)                                                                 | • 2001: Office of Ethnic Communities  
• 2004: Migrant Settlement and Integration Strategy                                                                              |
| United States | • None                                                                                                     | • State programs                                                                                              |

Source: Compiled by author.

The two facets of institutional multiculturalism that have been investigated are official affirmations and government programs. Government programs comprise initiatives that promote ethnic culture as well as immigrant integration programs. Both facets seek to increase systemic inclusiveness in a country, which can potentially influence public opinion. While institutions that promote ethnic culture clearly bolster ethnic groups’ belonging within the national community, immigrant integration programs are also important in the advancement of multiculturalism, as it fosters intercultural contact, and therefore a potentially less racialized national identity. For
example, Canada’s Multiculturalism Program has been based on a “two-way street” philosophy, where both immigrants and the host society adapt to create a multicultural society.\textsuperscript{177}

The degree to which each country embraces multiculturalism in its governmental institutions differs greatly. The Canadian government has been the most vocal about formally affirming multiculturalism, and it has also instituted federal programs on ethnic empowerment and immigrant integration, in addition to provincial and municipal government involvement. The Australian government has made similar affirmations, although it has not issued a formal act or amended its founding document to reflect multiculturalism in the same way Canada has. It has instituted formal offices that cater to multicultural affairs as well as implementing immigrant integration programs, so its efforts are comparable to those in Canada. Clearly, there is a difference when analyzing New Zealand and the United States, which both do not make any governmental level affirmations of multiculturalism. The New Zealand government is strongly committed to biculturalism, while the federal government in the United States remains neutral with respect to multiculturalism. Institutionally, New Zealand has fairly recently established offices that cater to ethnic communities as well as a well-developed immigrant settlement program, whereas the United States government offers no immigrant integration programs.

The Scale of National Ethnocentrism, which classes the United States as the least racialized national identity, does not match the ranking of multiculturalism institutionalization. Australia has a high level of institutional multiculturalism at the governmental level, but it actually has the most racially-exclusive definition of national identity. Institutional multiculturalism is almost non-existent in the United States, even though it has the most racially-accepting national identity. Although Canada and New Zealand’s relative institutionalizations of

\textsuperscript{177} Andrew and Hima, “Federal Policies on Immigrant Settlement,” 56.
multiculturalism may offer some insight into the relative exclusivity of their national identities, the cases of Australia and the United States indicate that, surprisingly, multiculturalism policies in government cannot cleanly explain what racializes a country’s national identity.
CHAPTER SIX: ETHNIC ACTIVISM

Contrasting from institutional explanations for the racialization of national identity, ethnic activism represents a behavioral explanation of the Scale of National Ethnocentrism. Protests and activism have the ability to effect political and social change. This chapter explores the degree to which minority activism has affected public opinion in the four case countries.

In the case of racialization of national identities, ethnic activism can advance public recognition of minority groups, thus instituting them as part of the national ingroup. This chapter first outlines existing literature on the effects of social movements on policy and public opinion. It then explores cases of ethnic activism in the four case countries, before noting the public recognition of minorities that activism has created in each. Public recognition is measured through commemorative history dates for minority groups and the presence of ethnic studies within academia. Finally, the countries are compared against the Scale of National Ethnocentrism to evaluate whether ethnic movements are a major cause of racialization of national identity.

Effects of Social Movements

Vast bodies of literature have explored the effects of social movements, in particular on policy development and public opinion. While this investigation focuses on how protests impact public opinion, it is important to acknowledge the wider impacts of social activism.

In terms of policy impact, researchers have found that protest matters to differing degrees depending on the wider political climate and the stage of policy development. For example, protest movements can raise the salience of issues to legislators, evidenced by the U.S.
environmental movement, but a social movement’s policy impact is affected by the favorability of political opportunity structures. Additionally, U.S. Congressional attention to both rights issues and women’s suffrage movements have shown that protest has the most legislative impact during the agenda-setting stage of lawmaking. Similarly, Taiwan’s LGBT mobilization achieved success through favorable political conditions, including those created by the Sunflower Movement in 2014, another social movement.

Studies have also shown the impact of protest on public opinion shifts, notably in the realm of LGBT activism. While public opinion remains stable over time for many issues, LBGT rights have experienced a rapid transformation in public attitudes in recent decades. A key factor for this change has been LGBT activism, especially during the AIDS crisis.

Specifically on ethnic activism, studies have demonstrated the direct influence minority protest behavior has had on government institutions: increased pro-minority rights behavior has given cues to politicians to respond to these stated preferences. Movements have also been a crucial factor in influencing policy outcomes within the context of state ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Additionally, grassroots organizations and local protests during the civil

---

rights era in the United States pushed demands for social change into the consciousness of the public.\textsuperscript{185}

This investigation contributes to the literature on whether minority movements affect shifts in public opinion. While policy impacts of ethnic activism have been documented, it is argued here that ethnic activism changes public opinion on national identity, through raising awareness of ethnic minorities’ experiences, thus instituting them within the national conscience.

\textit{Ethnic and Minority Movements}

During the second half of twentieth century, a fever for revolution and challenges of status quo discrimination spread across the globe, with the rise of numerous movements demanding increased rights for marginalized communities. However, ethnic minorities in the four case countries behaved very differently throughout these consequential decades.

\textbf{Figure 13.} Presence of the phrase “ethnic activism” in global English literature, 1940-present

\textit{Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer.}

The presence and depth of ethnic movements in the four countries perfectly map with the ranking of the Scale of National Ethnocentrism, with the United States clearly exhibiting the highest level of minority activism, followed by Canada, New Zealand, and finally Australia.

In the United States, minority activism dramatically escalated starting in the 1950s with the onset of the civil rights movement, a struggle for black Americans to gain equal rights under the law. There is an extensive body of scholarship documenting the movement and its effects on policy and social change, highlighting its saliency in American history. Key events of the civil rights movement included: Montgomery Bus Boycotts (1955-1956), Little Rock Nine (1957), Woolworth’s Lunch Counter (1960), Freedom Rides (1961), the Birmingham Campaign (1963), the March on Washington (1963), and Bloody Sunday (1965). The civil rights movement also spurred the rise of the Chicano Movement in the 1960s. This movement represented ethnic empowerment among Americans of Mexican descent and consisted of multiple movements including a youth movement, a farmworkers’ movement, the movement for political empowerment, and the struggle for control over “homelands” in the U.S. Southwest. The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense rose to prominence in the late 1960s and advocated for racial pride and community control of resources. Drawing inspiration from the Black Power and anti-war movements, the Asian American movement also emerged in the late 1960s as a coalition building campaign among Asians of all ethnicities. In San Francisco, the Black

---


Panthers helped Asian youth set up the Red Guard Party using a similar model to its own. A key development of the Asian American movement was the coining of the term “Asian American” when Yuji Ichioka co-founded the (explicitly pan-Asian) Asian American Political Alliance (AAPA). The creation of this phrase was crucial to the institutionalization of Asians as part of the American national community, thus reducing perceptions of Asians as foreigners and widening the inclusivity of the American national identity.

Minority activism has also been present in Canadian history, but it has not been as consolidated or full-bodied as the United States movements. African Canadians often confronted racism through local activism and legislative mechanisms. They used formal anti-discrimination organizations to advocate for legislative protections such as the Fair Employment and Fair Accommodations laws. These organizations included the Nova Scotia Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NSAACP), Southwestern Ontario’s South Essex Citizen’s Advancement Association (SECAA), and the Negro Citizenship Association (NCA). Commonly, African Canadian activism efforts had ties to efforts from Jewish organizations combatting racism and religious discrimination such as the Jewish Labour Committee. Importantly, Canadian activists cited the United States civil rights movement as a reason for Canada to take more aggressive action against racism. They used the U.S. movement to challenge the notion that Canada was already sufficiently ahead of their southern neighbor on issues of racial tolerance and equality. One notable case of individual activism was the case of Viola Desmond, an activist who brought the struggles of African Canadians in Nova Scotia into the national

---

191 Waters, 390.
spotlight. By publicly rejecting segregation, Desmond became a national symbol in the struggle for equal rights. Asian Canadian movements were also tied to the Jewish Labour Committee as campaigns for anti-discrimination often coalesced around this committee. There were also specific committees aimed at particular legislative goals. In 1946, a group of Chinese Canadians formed the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. A redress campaign for Chinese Canadians discriminated against under the head tax and Chinese Exclusion Act began in 1984. The Chinese Canadian National Council has been active in pursuing the redress as well as other goals related to anti-discrimination. Inspired by the Asian American movement, Asian Canadian youth formed groups which began a “radical Asian Canadian cultural production.”

*The Asianadian*, an anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-homophobic social justice magazine raised Canadian consciousness of the Asian experience and played a key role in promoting a pan-Asian identity.

As we move down the Scale of National Ethnocentrism to the more racialized nationalities, the relative decrease in minority activism becomes apparent. While scholarship on American minority movements is abundant, the lack of literature on ethnic activism in New Zealand and Australia is clear.

In New Zealand, the nature of ethnic activism has historically been very different from that in North America, focusing on the plight of Māori, the indigenous population, rather than prominent immigrant groups. Influenced by the plethora of international movements in the

---

196 Li, 21.
197 Li, 28.
1960s, Māori protest movements emerged over independence, land, and waterways. In 1971, the first protests emerged at Waitangi during Waitangi Day celebrations (New Zealand’s public holiday commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi), and went on to become a regular occurrence. Waitangi Day activism has manifested in many forms of marches and protests and continued through to the 2000s. In the 1970s, Māori came together in cities, leading to social changes that became known as the ‘Māori renaissance.’ These developments all led to a thickening foundation of biculturalism in New Zealand. Aside from the Māori movements, New Zealand has seen limited amounts of activism from other groups. Directly inspired by the Black Panther Party in the United States, the Polynesian Panthers was established in 1971. It engaged in political activism, ran food co-ops, and promoted Pacific languages. The other major ethnic group in New Zealand — Asians — lack a history of activism similar to that observed in the United States and Canada. New Zealanders of Asian descent did not engage in a movement which instituted them within the national community in the same way that the Asian American movement did.

Ultimately, New Zealand’s activist focus on the indigenous population further instituted biculturalism as the dominant societal objective, with multiculturalism taking a backseat. The lack of activism from other minority groups combined with a resurgence of Māori cultural pride contributed to the racialization of the ‘New Zealander’ label to most include those who appeared Māori or white.

---

199 Keane.
Represented by the lack of scholarship in the area, Australia’s history almost completely lacks national activism movements from racial minorities who seek to institute their ethnic culture as Australian. However, there were a few isolated occurrences. Against a backdrop of increasing international attention on indigenous issues, Australia’s indigenous civil rights campaign emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. This movement challenged legislation on land rights and social benefits as well as raised awareness of discrimination and encouraged indigenous Australians to resist it.  

A landmark pamphlet titled ‘Control or Colour Bar? A Proposal for Change in the Australian Immigration System’ was published by the Immigration Reform Group (IRG) in 1960. This influential pamphlet challenged policy restricting Asian migration by stating that public opinion had shifted. Historians have regarded the pamphlet as key in dismantling the White Australia policy.

Effects of Ethnic Activism: Public Recognition of Ethnicity

Ethnic activism affects public opinion towards national identity insofar as it garners recognition for ethnic groups’ presence within a nation and its history. This recognition, and thus the effects of ethnic activism, can be measured through commemorative dates and ethnic studies in academia.

The United States celebrates heritage through a number of commemorative months, including African American History Month (February), National Hispanic Heritage Month (September 15 - October 15) and Asian Pacific Heritage Month (May). Canada, like the

---


United States, celebrates heritage through commemorative months: Black History Month and Asian Heritage Months are February and May respectively, and June 27 is Canadian Multiculturalism Day. New Zealand commemorates a number of Pacific Language Weeks and a Chinese Language Week, but there are no commemorative dates focused on diverse heritage like those in the United States and Canada. Australia does not officially have any commemorative history months, although the Department of Home Affairs publishes a lengthy calendar of cultural and religious dates to raise awareness.

Another measure of the extent of ethnic minority involvement in public life is the institutionalization of each group’s history within scholarly discourse. Formally acknowledging a group’s history at the elite academic level ingrains its narrative as part of the national community’s own history.

In the United States, ethnic studies programs emerged directly as a result of activism that pursued this goal. Strikes and protests at San Francisco State University beginning in 1968 aimed to achieve goals for more curriculum and institutional control by minorities. After months of protests, a settlement was reached that created the first ever School of Ethnic Studies in the United States, a program that comprised American Indian studies, Asian American studies, Black studies, and La Raza studies. The legacy of this spread across the nation, with

---

innumerable institutions of higher education offering ethnic studies programs. In 2017, 321 degrees were awarded in Ethnic Studies.

In Canada, the presence of ethnic studies programs is more sporadic, with Asian Canadians noting a lack of “institutional space similar to Asian American Studies.” However, ethnic studies can be found at select universities in Canada. As of the present investigation, of the ten top-ranked universities in Canada, only one — University of Toronto — has a program focused on ethnic studies. The University of Toronto is also the only institution that offers an Asian Canadian Studies minor program. McGill University is the only other university to offer a Canadian Ethnic and Racial Studies minor, although it does not offer Asian Canadian or Black Canadian studies programs. The other universities do not offer formalized programs in ethnic studies.

New Zealand has eight universities. As of the writing of this thesis, none of the eight have ethnic studies programs that are comparable to Latino Studies, Asian American Studies, or African American Studies in the United States. Most of the universities offer Māori/Indigenous Studies programs and Asian Studies or Pacific Studies. These programs,

---

211 Li, Voices Rising, 23.
212 According to the QS World University Rankings 2020.
213 Robert F. Harney Professorship and Program in Ethnic, Immigration, and Pluralism Studies is a program within the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. See: https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ethnicstudies/about-us/
214 University of Toronto Undergraduate Programs: https://future.utoronto.ca/academics/undergraduate-programs/
216 The other universities analyzed were: University of British Columbia, University of Alberta, Université de Montréal, McMaster University, University of Waterloo, University of Calgary, and Queen’s University.
217 Analysis conducted through examining majors and minors offered under Bachelor of Arts programs at the eight universities: University of Auckland, University of Otago, Victoria University of Wellington, University of Canterbury, University of Waikato, Massey University, Lincoln University, and Auckland University of Technology.
218 See, for example, Māori Studies at the University of Auckland: https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/study/study-options/find-a-study-option/maori-studies.html
however, are not focused on the history of Asian and Pacific Islander New Zealanders — they exclusively explore the regions of Asia and the Pacific, separate from New Zealanders of such ancestry, and are thus irrelevant to scholarship of ethnicity in New Zealand.\footnote{See, for example, Asian Studies at the University of Otago: \url{https://www.otago.ac.nz/languagescultures/programmes/asian-studies/index.html}}

Academia looks similar in Australia. Of the top-ranked university in each of Australia’s seven states plus the Australian Capital Territory, none had majors or minors relating to the study of Australia’s minority ethnic groups (except for indigenous studies), as of this investigation.\footnote{Analysis conducted through examining majors and minors offered under Bachelor of Arts programs at the eight universities: University of Melbourne, University of Sydney, Australian National University, University of Queensland, University of Adelaide, University of Western Australia, University of Tasmania, Charles Darwin University.} Classes are occasionally offered on race and ethnicity,\footnote{See, for example, class “Ethnicity, Religion and Race: Understanding Social Diversity” at the University of Tasmania: \url{https://www.utas.edu.au/courses/cale/units/hga324-ethnicity,-religion-and-race-understanding-social-diversity}} and many universities offer formalized indigenous studies programs, although not on other ethnicities in Australia.

\section*{Comparison and Evaluation}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Country} & \textbf{Movements} \\
\hline
United States & \begin{itemize}
  \item Civil rights movement
  \item Chicano Movement
  \item Black Panther Party
  \item Asian American movement
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Emergence of term “Asian American”
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize} \\
Canada & \begin{itemize}
  \item African Canadian activism
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Legislative mechanisms
    \end{itemize}
  \item Asian Canadian activism
    \begin{itemize}
      \item Redress committees
      \item The Asianadian
    \end{itemize}
\end{itemize} \\
New Zealand & \begin{itemize}
  \item Māori renaissance and protests (\textit{impeded multiculturalism})
  \item Polynesian Panthers
  \item No Asian movements
\end{itemize} \\
Australia & \begin{itemize}
  \item Aboriginal movement
\end{itemize} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Ethnic Movements Comparison}
\end{table}

\textit{Source: Compiled by author.}
The comparison of ethnic movements and public recognition of ethnicity in each country maps very closely with the ranking of countries on the Scale of National Ethnocentrism.

The United States leads the four cases with the highest level of minority activism. Movements in the United States cleanly coalesced around specific goals for the three largest minority groups, and each movement drew momentum from the previous. Fundamentally, the Asian American movement created the term ‘Asian American,’ which was key in establishing those of Asian descent as fully American. The movement also brought together various Asian ethnicities under one umbrella term, instituting a new ‘Asian American’ identity, mitigating the view that they were foreigners from particular Asian countries. The presence of specific commemorative dates reflects public recognition of minority groups’ history as American history. Additionally, the presence of African American, Asian American, and Latino Studies in higher education has ensured that the histories of these groups are reflected clearly, accurately, and comprehensively. The ubiquity of ethnic studies programs in the United States further ingrains ethnic minorities within the national community. Hence, the United States’ ranking as
the least racially-exclusive national identity conforms to its history of activism and the recognition that arose as a result.

Canada’s activism has drawn inspiration from movements in the United States, with a cultural awakening of black and Asian identity, but its history has not been organized as clearly. The relative lack of ethnic studies programs — especially Black Canadian and Asian Canadian studies programs — reflects this and has relegated Canada’s minority history to a few key moments and instances of activism. Nevertheless, ethnic studies does exist at some universities, even if it is not widely offered as a major or minor program of study. Canada also celebrates ethnic heritage through official commemorative months. It is also important to note that Canada’s minority activists used more legislative advocacy to gain more legal rights for minorities compared to U.S. activists’ tactics which focused on gaining public awareness. This key difference led to differing levels of public recognition for minorities, and thus explains the difference between the countries’ public attitudes towards who belongs in the national ingroup.

While Canada earns its spot as the second least racialized national identity, there are clear differences between the country and its southern neighbor in their activist histories.

The second most racialized national identity belongs to New Zealand, and there is a clear drop in minority activity compared with Canada. In New Zealand, most minority activism has come from Māori who also drew inspiration from international movements of the time. The abundance of indigenous activism further instituted a narrative of biculturalism in the nation, to the detriment of multiculturalism and a pan-racial, inclusive national identity. However, there were small occurrences of Pacific Islander activism. As New Zealand minorities engaged in less activism, they also gained less public recognition than American and Canadian minorities. The lack of both official commemorative heritage dates and ethnic studies programs in New Zealand
(and abundance of indigenous studies programs) clearly situates the country on a different plane than its North American counterparts. New Zealand’s history of ethnic activism therefore matches its ranking of having a more racialized national identity than the United States and Canada.

Australia’s history of minority activism is comparable to that of New Zealand. It has had no prominent minority movements, although it has had a few isolated occurrences of ethnic activism, including from indigenous Australians. The lack of commemorative dates as well as ethnic studies programs in universities also substantiates the relative dearth of ethnic history, as is the case in New Zealand. However, Australia’s indigenous activism has also been less salient than the New Zealand Māori renaissance. This could have led to less non-white public activity overall, leading to a relatively more white-exclusive Australian national identity than in New Zealand. Again, a diminished history of ethnic activism and the resulting lack of public recognition conforms with the country’s ranking as the most racialized national identity of the four case countries.

It is important to recognize that in each of the four countries, differing political landscapes as well as social conditions would have caused differing levels of ‘need’ for minority activism. However, regardless of the causes of protest, the presence of minority activism is crucial in achieving public recognition for minorities’ plights, histories, and overall presence within a country. Therefore, even if there were a lack of protest in a country because of sufficient policy responsiveness to minority issues, the lack of protest itself paradoxically decreased public awareness for that group, a necessary ingredient for favorable public attitudes on who belongs within the national ingroup.
CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis has asked the central question of what drives public perceptions of national identity. Canada, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand share many broad similarities which allow for isolation of differences to explain observed variation in national identity construction. The four countries share a comparable demographic history which in each case includes an indigenous population, British settlers, and substantial, multi-ethnic immigration. Additionally, they are also analogous in cultural values, economic structures, and development levels. While this would suggest similarities in public perceptions of belonging in these countries, the four nations differ on the extent to which their national label is given to people of varying ethnic origins. Chapter three found clear differences in how racially-exclusive ‘American’ is compared with ‘Canadian,’ ‘New Zealander,’ and ‘Australian.’ Public opinion data analyses revealed that the American label was the most racially-inclusive national identity while ‘Australian’ was the least. These results pointed to the fundamental question of whether national identity is fixed or malleable: the analyzed variables compared institutional and behavioral explanations, leading to the conclusion that public perceptions of national identity can change as human behavior compels it to do so.
Figure 14. Scale of National Ethnocentrism compared with scales of independent variables

Scale of National Ethnocentrism

Less racialized nationality

United States

Canada

New Zealand

More racialized nationality

Australia

Level of ethnic activism

More ethnic activism

United States

Canada

New Zealand

Less ethnic activism

Australia

Openness of immigration policy

More liberalized immigration policy

Canada

United States

Australia

More restrictive immigration policy

New Zealand

Presence of multiculturalism policy

More affirmation of multiculturalism in policy

Canada

Australia

New Zealand

Less affirmation of multiculturalism in policy

United States

Scale of National Ethnocentrism (see chapter three) compared with rankings of case countries of the three investigated variables (see chapters four, five and six). Source: Compiled by author.
Institutionalism versus behavioralism: what explains variation in national identity?

Figure 15. Ethnic activism as the strongest predictor of varying national identity construction

The variation seen in the Scale of Ethnocentrism can best be explained with the behavioral independent variable — ethnic activism. The other two variables are incompatible with the ranking of the countries’ racialization of national identities. Although immigration policy can control inflows of migrants and might therefore impact conceptions of the nation, a more restrictive immigration policy did not clearly point to a more racialized national identity. Additionally, the policies of the four countries were broadly close enough to result in similar demographic shifts — populations in each of the countries grew increasingly more multiethnic in the latter half of the twentieth century. If immigration policy and the demographic shifts that resulted were a key explanation of the racialization of national identity, it would be expected that the countries’ national identities would all evolve together to embrace minorities as the population of non-white members increased. This has not been the case, with the greatest point of contrast between the American and Australian identities. Therefore, even if restricting
immigration contributed to racially-exclusive national identities, the United States and Canada were able to overcome the exclusivity, indicating that other variables were at play. Like immigration policy, legislating for multiculturalism is a governmental channel which can craft the national narrative on inclusion and exclusion. Unlike immigration policy, though, institutional multiculturalism is explicitly targeted at promoting racial diversity and inclusion, directly affecting racial minorities already in the country. Additionally, it is possible for a government to uphold federal-level multicultural policy while implementing restrictive immigration policy. Multiculturalism theory posits that these policies lead to higher acceptance of outgroups,\(^{222}\) while social identity theorists believe that these policies lead to social categorization and ingroup protective behaviors.\(^{223}\) This thesis did not find that multiculturalism policy was linked to more inclusion for non-white members of the nation. Although the opposite was not proven either, it is a surprising result that Australia had implemented high levels of federal-level support for multiculturalism, yet had the most racialized national identity, while the United States had the most inclusive national identity without any federal promotion of multiculturalism. Both measures of institutional multiculturalism analyzed (policy affirmations and government programs) displayed the same clear hierarchy, placing the governments of Canada and Australia as the most supportive of the multiculturalism project, followed by New Zealand and the United States. Hence, even if multiculturalism policy did contribute to a racially-inclusive national identity, it is apparent that another variable was a stronger determinant, able to overcome any effects of multiculturalism policy. For example, whether or not multiculturalism policy had a net positive effect in Australia, it was certainly not positive


enough to overcome whichever variable drove the United States to embrace a more racially-accepting national identity.

The institutional variables could not sufficiently explain shifts in public opinion in this investigation. A behavioral explanation for the racialization of national identity, ethnic activism’s effects aptly explain how each country has embraced minorities in its national ingroup. Literature has found that protests have impacted policy development and public opinion in a variety of issue areas. This thesis found activism’s ability to shift public opinion in the area of national identity. The United States experienced high levels of activism, with specific goals of cultural awakening, embracing ethnic identity, and gaining awareness of ethnic experiences. The Asian American movement is one example of ethnic activism centered specifically around identity concerns. In contrast, Canada’s movements focused more on achieving legislative goals rather than employing aggressive tactics to gain public attention. This key difference between the two North American countries’ histories reveals that activism which gains public recognition is the key to influencing public opinion. This substantiates public opinion researchers’ findings — in the context of the civil rights movement, Lee (2002) challenges the well-documented elite opinion theories that argue exclusively for top-down influence, instead finding that public views on race are altered and transformed through non-elites in social movements.  

New Zealand’s Māori movements worked to the detriment of multiculturalism as it highlighted the country’s bicultural attitudes, but it also proved that the New Zealand identity was less ‘white-exclusive,’ conforming to previous research finding the country to be ‘white-and-Māori-exclusive.’ New Zealand’s national identity ranks as less racially-exclusive than Australia’s not because it

---

224 Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion.
225 Sibley and Liu, “New Zealand = Bicultural?”
embraces multiracialism, but because it embraces biracialism. Australia’s lack of ethnic activism agrees with its racialized national identity.

The United States had the least amount of institutional policies targeted at promoting multiculturalism, whereas the other three countries had the least protest movements. This finding could indicate a responsiveness from the parliaments of the three countries to ethnic demands, eradicating the need for protest. However, these top-down policies paradoxically raised less public awareness of minorities’ struggles, which this thesis argues is the key to shifting public attitudes on their belonging. Although it could be argued that multiculturalism policy should also create public recognition for minorities’ struggles, the results of this thesis demonstrate that the presence of multiculturalism policy is not consistent with public recognition of minority experiences nor the relative racialization levels. It is a counterintuitive and surprising result that countries with these tailored policies do not show more inclusivity, but it remains consistent with Lee’s (2002) research arguing that in some cases, bottom-up initiatives are more effective than top-down.226 Although some research has been conducted on the effects of multiculturalism policy, this paradox represents an avenue for future exploration.

Institutionalism versus behavioralism: Is public opinion fixed or malleable?

While the results of this thesis focus on drivers of national identity, they contribute to the literature on public opinion change more generally. Scholarship on the connection between institutions, or law, and social change is extensive. On one side of the debate, researchers have shown that law can consolidate and influence cultural change as it does not “only codify existing customs, morals, or mores, but also… modify the behavior and values presently existing in a

226 Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion.
particular society.”²²⁷ U.S. Supreme Court decisions have been found to influence public opinion, although this is conditional on factors such as the salience of the issue, the political context, as well as individual-level characteristics.²²⁸ On the other side of the debate, many researchers have argued for the limited power of institutions and legislation to influence public attitudes. As an example, Anleu (2010) argues that in the case of the women’s movement, “it is naive to assume that simply reforming statutes will directly transform discriminatory social practices and enduring attitudes towards women.”²²⁹ Literature supporting the effects of social movements on public opinion has been documented in chapter six, and generally points to the effectiveness of activism for motivating attitude shifts, for example in the civil rights movement and on the issue of LGBT rights.²³⁰ Through the case study of national identity, the results of this thesis lend support to the argument that legislation is limited in its scope to change public opinion, while social movements can influence public attitudes through changing the public consciousness. Ultimately, this thesis advances the view that public opinion is malleable.

Implications

Globalization has led to a new generation of non-white natives in white-majority societies for whom the boundaries of belonging and acceptance are blurry. These immigrants and their descendants are often relegated to an identity that is not their own and frequently struggle to define their national, cultural and racial identities in the context of their heterogeneous

²³⁰ See: Lee, Mobilizing Public Opinion and; Garretson, The Path to Gay Rights.
environments. This experience has received little attention in the mainstream, despite its ubiquitous effects spanning multiple continents.

One important implication of these findings are the negative psychological consequences of decreased belonging for non-white members of national communities, extensively documented in psychology literature. A pervading societal attitude that racial minorities are foreigners instead of valid members of the national ingroup leads to a contemporary form of racism called racial microaggression, which manifests as pervasive, automatic, and daily interactions that are often dismissed as benign and innocent but convey strong messages of inferiority and exclusion.231 Although these messages appear minor and innocuous, it has been proposed that these daily experiences can have more influence on racial anger, frustration and self-esteem than more overt forms of racism.232 Targets of racial microaggression have reported experiencing stress, anxiety, helplessness, academic disengagement, anger, and frustration.233 Additionally, the ‘perpetual foreigner’ stereotype has significantly predicted lower hope and life satisfaction for Asian Americans and depression for Latino Americans.234 Identity denial also leads to negative physical health consequences — Albuja et al.’s (2019) experiment showed slower cortisol recovery among bicultural participants who were denied their American identity compared with participants under identity-irrelevant conditions.235 Furthermore, and crucially,

234 Huynh, Devos, and Smalarz, “Perpetual Foreigner in One’s Own Land.”
the invisible nature of this type of racism prevents perpetrators from realizing their complicity in creating psychological issues and disparities in employment, health care, and education for minorities.236

Another important implication of these findings lies in the consequences for nationhood and civic engagement. National attachment research has shown white Americans displaying the greatest level of patriotism and nationalism compared with Asian Americans, Latino Americans, and African Americans.237 In the United States, the ‘perpetual foreigner’ stereotype was found to be a significant predictor of identity conflict and a lower sense of belonging to American culture among ethnic minorities.238 The perception that racial minorities are foreign and the resulting decreased sense of national belonging among non-whites can lead to dangerous outcomes for a representative democracy which encourages civic participation among all groups. Consistent with the relative racialization of their national identities, the four case countries diverge on ethnic representation in government. The United States has the highest proportion of racial minorities in its legislature, at 22% of members of Congress (nevertheless short of its 39% non-white population) in 2018.239 In 2015, in Canada’s most diverse parliament, visible minorities consisted of 14% of the legislature, and 19% of the population.240 The New Zealand Parliament had even less minority representation, with only 10% of members identifying as Pacific or Asian,

238 Huynh, Devos, and Smalarz, “Perpetual Foreigner in One’s Own Land.”
despite these two groups making up 19% of the population.\textsuperscript{241} Māori made up 15% of the population but 22% of Parliament, attesting to the civic effects of strong feelings of belonging in a country. Australia paints the most dire picture of the consequences of exclusion of ethnic minorities. While 24% of Australians are non-white, non-white Australians made up only 6% of Parliament in 2018, with 94% of legislators having Anglo-Celtic or European heritage.\textsuperscript{242} These rates of ethnic minorities running for and being elected to office send a stark reminder of the need to readjust national narratives to include all groups.

While the individual and societal consequences of minority exclusion are grim, the results of this thesis highlight an important strand of optimism. Change is possible when it comes to who is seen to belong. Ethnic activism is a useful tool for minorities to assert themselves into the national consciousness, gaining recognition for their rightful place as legitimate and full members of the national community. While this investigation in no way argues that the United States’ national identity is perfectly inclusive, it does highlight one area in which its history of racial mobilization contributed to less exclusion of minorities. Importantly, the success of its social movements represent an example the other three countries in the studies (especially New Zealand and Australia) can emulate. Indeed, the consequences of these results transcend the four countries explored here — the need for, and positive effects of, minority activism is a universal lesson that can be applied to all immigrant-receiving nations.

Future avenues of research include further investigation into the link between national identity and civic engagement as well as specific causal mechanisms within social movements


that promote inclusive national identities. In particular, policymakers would find useful an investigation on whether top-down approaches are wholly ineffective in fostering inclusiveness compared with bottom-up approaches, or whether there are in fact different policy pathways besides existing forms of multiculturalism policy that can help inclusion efforts. For now, the message presented by this research is clear: while everyone belonging to a national community should be granted its national label, minorities must demand it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Asian Restriction Act 1896 (NZ), 60 Victoriae 1896 No 64 § (1896).


Lovelock, Kirsten. “Intercountry Adoption as a Migratory Practice: A Comparative Analysis of Intercountry Adoption and Immigration Policy and Practice in the United States, Canada


