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Convincing the Reluctant Superpower: Political Communications, Influence, and Public Diplomacy

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Convincing the Reluctant Superpower: Political Communications, Influence, and Public Diplomacy

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand the real influence that public diplomacy may have over American foreign policy vis-à-vis its effect on public opinion. In order to examine that influence, the paper uses the case of American intervention against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, or Dash) to examine how different kinds of elites influence American public opinion through political communication. It tests RM Entman's Cascading Activation model of elite influence as a framework to understand public diplomacy, replicating his qualitative study of press coverage with specific focus on foreign sources. It also expands the model by testing elites' respective abilities to directly influence opinion, using a controlled randomized survey experiment. The results of the mixed-method analysis demonstrate that elites from foreign countries, NGOs, and transnational organizations may have greater influence over American foreign policy outcomes than domestic elites outside of the President's administration. These foreign and transnational elites are relied upon by the press to define the realities of international crises long before the domestic debate on intervention begins, limiting the range of appropriate responses to a crisis. Moreover, the quantitative experiment demonstrated that Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi had greater influence on opinion regarding the specifics of intervention policy than President Obama or Senator Harry Reid. These findings indicate that the identity of the matters when attempting to influence American public opinion, and quantitative research may help identify those who are best suited to promote a certain foreign policy goal.

Keywords

Political Science, Political Communications, Public Diplomacy, International Relations, Foreign Policy, ISIS, ISIL, American Foreign Policy, American Politics, Political Science, Social Sciences, John Lapinski, Lapinski, John

Disciplines

American Politics | International Relations | Other Political Science | Peace and Conflict Studies | Social Influence and Political Communication

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Chapter 1: Introduction

American foreign policy has long been defined by a polarized dichotomy between active interventionism and isolationism. These two forces have long been in conflict with each other, with the mood of the nation often coming into conflict with the realities of American interests abroad (Holmes, 2015). For example, the 1930s were a period of “deep introversion” when isolationism reigned, but the external realities of Pearl Harbor and World War II forced the nation back towards interventionism (Holmes, 2015). The current state of American foreign policy is no different. On September 27, 2014, *The Economist* published an article entitled “Mission Relunched” on how the United States’ military involvement against the terrorist group known as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh) would define its role in the international community.¹ While discussing the relative decline of American world power and how the continued interventionist role of the US against ISIL would define its role in world politics, the author comments that “America, meanwhile, seems swamped by the forces of disorder, either unable or unwilling to steady a world that is spinning out of control.”² Despite these internal “forces of disorder,” a *New York Times* op-ed published on September 11, 2014, the day after President Obama announced an expanded intervention effort against ISIL, claimed that “by the time President Obama announced the authorization of airstrikes in Syria Wednesday night, *he clearly felt that he had little choice militarily or politically*” (emphasis added).

¹ For the full article, please visit <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21620191-fight-against-islamic-state-will-help-define-americas-role-world-mission-relaunched?spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709>

² For the full article, please visit <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21620191-fight-against-islamic-state-will-help-define-americas-role-world-mission-relaunched?spc=scode&spv=xm&ah=9d7f7ab945510a56fa6d37c30b6f1709>

With such strong anti-interventionist headwinds, it is truly remarkable that political pressure forced the president to act. The situation presents a distinct puzzle regarding how a mandate for military action coalesced in a war-weary America, and its answer lies in understanding public opinion. This dramatic shift between isolationism and interventionism is symptomatic of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes, preventing or enabling the mobilization of political capital necessary to legitimize “willing” intervention in international crises. With public opinion’s power to shape such important foreign policy decisions, it is only natural that elites would seek to influence this powerful political force to suit their own preferences.

Given the international nature of the crises that set the world “spinning out of control,” those who are significantly affected by these crises do not only live in the United States. Thus, the affected foreign governments, international institutions, and peoples have a critical interest in obtaining the aid and support of the American government in tackling the crises that affect them. As the push for expanded airstrikes against ISIL demonstrated, obtaining the support of the American public can be vital to the success of any effort to obtain aid. The processes of foreign and transnational actors advocating and obtaining widespread support for intervention in international crises falls distinctly in the area of public diplomacy.

This paper seeks to understand the real influence that public diplomacy may have over American foreign policy vis-à-vis its effect on public opinion. However, in order to study the effectiveness of public diplomacy on any foreign policy matter, public diplomacy must be understood within the context of the whole debate surrounding each issue. With a myriad of different messages attempting to influence public opinion on each foreign policy issue, the

effectiveness of public diplomacy can only be truly measured in comparison to domestic political communication. Since the public is generally uninformed about foreign policy issues, communication about foreign policy has a significant capacity to shift public opinion, especially when it comes to intervention (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). With this powerful political force up for grabs, understanding how foreign and domestic elites try to align public opinion with their preferences is critical to understanding the formation of foreign policy, particularly policy regarding intervention. However, not every elite is equally effective at influencing public opinion.

The leading model that outlines the hierarchy of elite influence over public opinion at the core of this thesis is Robert Entman's Cascading Activation model. In this model, different foreign policy actors and elites have varying levels of influence over frames reported by the news media (Entman, 2004). These elites include both current and former leaders of domestic and foreign governments, their staff, government officials, and foreign policy experts outside of the government. However, Entman's study only presents enough research to give a theoretical outline to the general hierarchy of these elites' respective influence, and he spends little time on communication from foreign elites. I extend his model by adding further empirical evidence to test its validity and, if the evidence supports it, to use the Cascading Activation model to understand public diplomacy's influence on American foreign policy. Using mixed-method analysis to evaluate this evidence, I address whether there are significant differences in the extent to which domestic and international forces shape public opinion.

In a case study of contemporary news coverage, I attempt to replicate the study upon which Entman bases his model with some slight methodological alterations in order to examine

how news coverage may affect policy decisions as well as public opinion. By examining how the news treats frames originating from different “news-worthy” sources during a critical period surrounding a high-profile foreign policy announcement, this study hopes to determine how Entman’s proposed differences in elite influence over news frames may affect policy outcomes.

To bolster the findings of the qualitative case study, this paper also pairs it with a randomized controlled survey experiment that quantitatively measures the effects of communication from domestic and foreign sources on public opinion. By not only observing how frames from foreign sources are treated by the domestic press but also how frames from different elites are processed by their intended audience, I hope to establish a stronger link between communication and the resulting political pressure for intervention. Adding this quantitative aspect to a study of both Entman’s model and public diplomacy will not only help depict how this particular form of political communication can influence foreign policy, but it will also introduce an additional method of inquiry into the still nascent field of public diplomacy.

Defining Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is a subfield of political science still in formation. Even the definition of the term “public diplomacy” has changed dramatically since the field began to take shape in the 1980s. The study of public diplomacy emerged during the Cold War with “the struggle for hearts and minds” raging throughout the world, and it has developed alongside the monumental and interrelated shifts in international relations, politics, and mass communications (Gilboa, 2008). The Cold War origins of public diplomacy scholarship can be seen in Malone’s 1985

definition of public diplomacy as direct communication with foreign peoples. HN Tuch (1990) expands this definition to provide purpose for this communication, saying that public diplomacy was a government's communication process with foreign publics to build understanding for its nation's "ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies." Frederick (1993) provides purpose for that understanding, saying that it was intended to influence foreign governments by influencing their citizens.

Due to the indirect nature of public diplomacy's influence on foreign governments in this Cold War-era definition, international relations scholars have often equated public diplomacy to soft power, citing that they both involve communication, education, and persuasion to influence foreign policy rather than the traditional economic or military force (Gilboa, 2008). However, the use of the term "soft power" should not be mistakenly interpreted to mean that this non-traditional foreign policy tool is less important than more tangible ones. New goals and means of foreign policy emerging from the end of the Cold War, a number of democratic revolutions around the world, and the development of global 24-hour news and the Internet have emphasized that favorable image and reputation are now critical aspects of a nation's foreign policy (Gilboa, 2008). Some scholars have even gone so far as to say that public diplomacy, as the means to obtain favorable image and reputation and utilize them accordingly, has become more central to foreign policy than traditional power politics (Melissen, 2005). However, limiting the definition of public diplomacy to national governments attempting to win over the foreign public is a drastic oversimplification, as it completely ignores non-state actors. Given the post-Cold War developments in mass communications and the rise of non-state actors in the arena of international politics, more recent scholarship extends the scope of public diplomacy to include

the use of the media and other channels of communication by state and non-state actors to influence public opinion in foreign societies (Gilboa 2000, 2001).

Within this definition of public diplomacy, there are different avenues to influence attitudes and policy reflected in three different models. The Basic Cold War model reflects the original zero sum game between governments, where each state attempts to win the support of the people in a foreign nation and use that support to influence that nation's foreign policy choices. The Nonstate Transnational model incorporates the advent of nonstate actors and the development of the global media, in which actors exploit the global media to build support for their causes amongst the public who then pressure their governments to act. Finally, the Domestic Public Relations model factors in the processes of government and the use of public opinion polling, where foreign governments hire lobbyists and political consultants in a target country with the express intent of influencing foreign policy (Gilboa, 2008). In this paper, I limit my examination to the Nonstate Transnational model model, as I seek to observe how communication from leaders of both foreign governments and transnational organizations can influence public support for intervention.

Political Communication and Public Diplomacy

Though the study of public diplomacy involves examining how or why one actor is able to exert influence over another's foreign policy, there has been little systematic research into directly identifying and quantifying that influence. In his review of public diplomacy literature, Eytan Gilboa (2008) recognized that public diplomacy scholarship generally took the form of analytical historical accounts. These studies have made relatively limited contributions to the

development of public diplomacy theory and methodology due to their methodological homogeneity (Gilboa, 2008). The resulting lack of quantifiable evidence leaves a significant gap in analytical capabilities concerning extremely volatile and important events such as international conflicts and humanitarian crises. With lives, international reputations, and countries' futures at stake, every possible avenue of exploration should be taken in order to answer questions that facilitate crisis resolution. Since public legitimacy is critical to the fate of any policy handling international crises, we must ask ourselves, "Do world leaders really have the ability to directly influence public opinion in foreign countries when it comes to policy preferences?" If so, we must take the steps necessary to discover which foreign leaders are seen as the most legitimate partners by the American public and enlist their help.

This study takes a different approach to the study of public diplomacy that I believe can help answer these questions. As Gilboa (2008) noted, scholars of public diplomacy rarely utilize political communications theory in their studies. This lack of developed scholarship presents an opportunity to marry a number of existing areas of inquiry to provide new depth to our understanding of public diplomacy. Since the Nonstate Transnational model describes the use of the global media to build international support for a cause, studying how this particular form of political communications affects opinion is critical to understanding the power of public diplomacy. In other words, I believe that quantifiably measuring and comparing the effects of political communication from different leaders may reveal the extent of these elites' influence on foreign policy decisions regarding international conflict. These beliefs are predicated on a constructivist view of international relations where individual leaders and the nature of the institutions are critical to understanding policy outcomes, as I am claiming that both individuals

representing nations and international organizations and the public opinion in the involved countries could matter in the outcomes of a nation's foreign policy calculus.

Chapter 2: Public Diplomacy and the Principles of Political Communication

Indexing Theory, The Press, and Elite-Driven Opinion

Since this study focuses on the influence of political communications inherent in the Nonstate Transnational Model, understanding how an elite's attempt to influence opinion actually reaches the public is critical to understanding the influence of this form of public diplomacy. The process of political communication that links specific frames about an issue to public opinion originates in the press's relationship with elites. In their need to craft cohesive narratives about different events and policies, the media turns to elites for information and opinion that can be used for content and inform their reporting (Entman, 2004). With the media influencing public opinion by reporting events and different elites' reactions to them, understanding how elite opinion drives the frames in the media coverage is vital to understanding the underlying principles of Entman's model.

At the most basic level of this relationship between elite opinion and media coverage is Indexing. Indexing theory claims that the sides of debate between elites are closely mirrored by the range of frames offered by the media (Bennett & Manheim, 1993). Thus, if there is little disagreement about a certain policy, the range of opinions shared by the media is relatively narrow, but that range widens if there is heated debate amongst elites. In this regard, the media functions as a vehicle for government officials and other elites to criticize each other rather than offering its own substantive and independent contribution to the foreign policy debate (Mermin, 1999). Since the opinion of a reporter is rarely "newsworthy" outside of the editorial section, the media generally waits for another elite to offer a new counterframe and reports that frame instead of offering their own interpretation of events. The media's resulting lack of original contributions

to the framing of foreign policy issues demonstrates that the elites who reporters rely on when crafting a narrative are the ones who drive public opinion. The ability to link frames to specific elites also allows for qualitative research that traces an elite opinion's influence on the media by studying how coverage treats the frame that elite used to voice his or her opinion.

Entman finds that the range of opinions reported in the press is not the only way that coverage can affect opinion. The way that the press substantively treats a frame in their reporting can also effect the prevalence and power of the frame in public opinion (Entman, 2004). The "magnitude" of a frame can be affected in coverage through the number of mentions the frame is given in coverage, where those mentions occur in news coverage concerning relevant issues or events, and how a reporter treats the frame while discussing it (Entman, 2004). The reporter's treatment of the frame can either highlight the frame as newsworthy or simply include it as a matter of following the norms of "fair reporting" procedure, which reduces the frame's capacity to activate the desired schemas and shift public opinion (Entman, 2004). By prioritizing certain sources as more "news-worthy" than others, reporters relegate statements from actors they label as "less influential" or as "merely used to balance the coverage" to the back pages of papers and the bottom of articles, minimizing the impact of what these "less important" elites say on public opinion (Entman, 2004). Thus, by examining the frequency and placement of frames in news coverage as indicators of what the media believes is most important, one can determine which elites have significant influence over the media's thinking concerning relevant events and issues.

A particularly relevant finding from Entman's study concerns the press's treatment of foreign sources as a secondary source of policy opposition. Entman specifically notes that when there is little domestic opposition to a policy, the press only then turns to foreign sources in order

to “balance” their coverage with criticism of White House policy (Entman, 2004). To illustrate this finding, he uses the examples of military intervention in Grenada, Libya, and Panama under Presidents Reagan and H.W. Bush. In these cases, Entman finds that due to widespread public support for intervention, “open debate among U.S. elites did not break out... because journalists had almost no sources to quote who cast doubt on the administration’s framing of the *problem*” (Entman, 2004). Instead, “the source of many critical assertions was foreign” (Entman, 2004). In certain circumstances, this finding seems somewhat suspect due to other media pressures that Entman outlines. For example, some of those foreign sources could determine their own nation’s policy and thereby have a great deal of influence over how the United States ultimately acts in the arena of foreign relations. However, if the media’s use of foreign sources is, in fact, limited to times of relative domestic unity, their public diplomacy efforts would have little influence over public opinion concerning any American foreign policy.

Entman also notes that despite the press’s ability to weave together narratives and to expose different frames to the public, it is ultimately up to each individual audience to digest the information they receive (Entman, 2004). Therefore, even if a frame is given secondary treatment in news coverage, it can still become salient in public opinion given the right circumstances. However, the media’s agenda setting power by priming certain frames over others means that how the press processes and communicates the frames from elites often helps determine how the public thinks about an issue. The multiple pressures on the press to maintain balanced coverage and help predict future events in a limited amount of space for content lead reporters to treat frames from different sources in different ways. Thus, not every elite will have the same level of influence over press coverage, and therefore not every elite will have the same

capability to influence public opinion. Once a frame has been included in news content, however, it becomes critical to understand how the public internalizes that information and factors it into opinion formulation.

Framing, Priming, and Public Opinion

First and foremost amongst the relevant forces in political communications is framing. Framing, as Entman defines it, is the selective highlighting of certain facets of events or issues and making connections between them to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution (Entman, 2004). As my study is in part an attempt to expand Entman's Cascading Activation model to consider public diplomacy efforts more extensively, I have chosen to follow his definition of framing as well.

Within the larger definition of framing, he distinguishes two categories of frames, substantive and procedural. Substantive frames involve defining effects or conditions as problematic, identifying causes, conveying moral judgment, or endorsing remedies or improvements (Entman, 2004). One hypothetical example relevant to public diplomacy would be when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein) promotes some form of aid to a conflict he calls a "humanitarian crisis." In this hypothetical, the conflict is the cause of the situation defined using a moral judgment and aid is the endorsed remedy. Procedural frames deal with the legitimacy of political actors based on technique, success, and/or representativeness (Entman, 2004). For example, a member of Congress could contest the President's decision to use certain levels of military force without congressional approval by

objecting to the constitutionality of the decision, utilizing a “technique-based” procedural frame to question the move’s legal legitimacy.

Frames interact with interpretive schemas in the minds of the public, which are psychologically grouped clusters of information people use to process similar ideas and events, understand them, and evaluate them accordingly (Entman, 2004). Schemas enter long-term memory, and any new information that plays into one of them has the potential to bring up feelings associated with the original events that put the schema into place. Once entrenched, these first impressions are “difficult to dislodge,” as Entman puts it (Entman, 2004). Schemas may not only include memories of prior events related to the new information being processed, but they also may include evaluations of the individuals who communicate the information to them and of the institutions those individuals are tied to. Substantial criticism from Ayatollah Khameni of Iran, for example, may be inherently rejected by the American public regardless of its merit due to their views of Khameni and the nation he leads. This inherent legitimacy built into the cognitive schemas of the public plays into the capacity of different public figures to affect Entman’s framing competition, a process which this study hopes to observe.

Though the use of schemas to evaluate new information occurs in the minds of individuals, Entman treats the schemas in the minds of members of the public as relatively monolithic. However schemas are far from monolithic, as different people bring different cognitive experiences to the same events. Similar to how the media indexes elite opinion in news coverage, I believe that public opinion measurements index a range of schemas. For example, liberals and conservatives may interpret the same frame from the same source in different ways based on their pre-existing opinion about the person communicating that frame. This pre-existing

opinion may originate, in part, from their ideological schemas. These similarities amongst individuals' cognitive processing of frames can be measured through controlled experimentation using priming.

Priming is another effect closely tied to the framing process in political communication that also shifts public opinion. By priming, or drawing attention to, an international crisis, public opinion may shift because the most recently and frequently considered information has greater influence over decision making- often called an agenda-setting effect (Iyengar et. al, 1984, Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The agenda-setting effects of priming makes it a useful tool in controlled political science experiments, as it allows researchers to identify a causal relationship between the primed content and a subsequent shift in the experimental group's opinions in comparison to a control group. When the public is primed on a certain issue, opinions about its most relevant aspects are effected the most. This shift is especially prevalent when discussing low-knowledge issues such as foreign affairs. Krosnick & Kinder's study (1990) highlights the power of priming on low-knowledge issues, finding shifts in opinion on intervention and isolationism were especially noticeable. Not only does this finding support the potential for efficacious public diplomacy efforts for military intervention, but it also indicates that there may be a similar influence on opinion concerning forms of intervention outside of direct military action, including the delivery of medical aid, arms, or economic aid.

Since Entman's study relied on qualitative analysis of media coverage and historical public opinion polls, a controlled randomized survey experiment directly priming audiences with frames from different foreign policy elites may offer empirical support for his model with greater methodological depth. By comparing shifts in opinion between groups immediately after priming

them with statements from domestic or transnational actors about a relevant international crisis, I hope to determine measurable differences in the hierarchy of communicators in Entman's cascade and thereby reveal their respective influences over said international crisis. I intend on combining the resulting comparisons of communication by domestic, international, and transnational actors in order to identify and understand the international and transnational actors true capacity to galvanize American public opinion and thereby influence American foreign policy.

Chapter 3: Entman's Cascading Activation Model And Public Diplomacy




Figure 1: Entman's Cascading Network Activation Model³

Entman's model hinges on the conflict that arises from elites' need for public opinion's political capital and their varying opinion-shaping capabilities. Since public opinion can be critical leverage against political opponents, presidents, chief foreign policy advisors, elites, and the media are all in a constant battle to control the dominant frame that reaches the public (Entman, 2004). However, since some individuals and actors have more power to influence that frame than others, Entman's research outlines a tiered system of influence over press frames-

³ Taken from Entman (2004), p. 10

hence the “cascade” (Entman, 2004). As can be seen in Figure 1 above, the institutional position of the elite can significantly influence the amount of control that elite will have over press framing (and therefore, public opinion), with the White House administration at the top, then other elites both in and out of official government office, and then the media.

Entman goes on to note that certain individuals can have greater influence over framing than other elites in their tier of the cascade or, indeed, even elites in higher positions in the cascade. In this case, Entman gives the example of a news anchor who is so trusted and respected that he or she could be considered an “Expert” in the higher tier when he opines on an issue and offers his own substantive frame (Entman, 2004). Thus, both the media’s and public’s regard for a specific elite can also effect how that elite’s frame is treated and internalized. The findings from this example reveal a deeper underlying claim than the superficial observation that institutional positions help determine the press treatment of elite opinion, which then influences how the public think about an issue. At the core of the Cascading Activation model is the belief that an elite’s identity, which combines both institutional and individual aspects, is critical to understanding his or her influence over public opinion.

Figure 1 also depicts the flow of communication concerning a foreign policy issue or decision, helping illuminate the flow of information between levels of Entman’s cascade. The convergence of all elite opinion on the media depicted in the diagram demonstrates the influence the media has over both elite and public opinion. For example, when communication concerning foreign policy from the White House is reported by journalists, the main points of the administration’s frame are packaged into sound bytes that are then used to construct a narrative for news content. Opinion leaders and other elites outside of the administration then have the

chance to look over the White House's stance, challenge or accept its frame, and offer a frame of their own. The media can factor these outside opinions into their coverage in a number of ways that either promote the counterframes or diminish their influence (Entman, 2004). This process works in reverse as well, as the media packages the "most important" public opinion measures into a narrative that affects the way elites, elected officials, and administration bureaucrats understand what the public wants. Thus, for Entman, the media's reporting functions as the go-between for the elite opinion leaders and the people, influencing both public opinion and policy outcomes.

Entman's Model and Its Place in the Field of Public Diplomacy

Adding further empirical evidence in support of Entman's model and developing its understanding of foreign leaders' place in the cascade would mean three things. First, it would mean that the Cascading Activation model would be a useful tool in the study of public diplomacy - "expanding" it to public diplomacy as Gilboa puts it (Gilboa, 2008). Second, it would mean that public opinion can be used as a sound, measurable indicator of what influence certain international actors wield in both general US foreign policy and specific crises. For example, statements promoting international intervention in a crisis by a UN representative might be able to shift public opinion in countries more than similar statements by a representative of a third party nation, indicating that the UN (or at least that spokesperson) has more legitimacy as a partner in intervention efforts than the third party nation (or their spokesperson). Finally, a confirmation of Entman's model would lend further credence to the underlying assertion of the model, which is that press coverage creates or reflects the hierarchy

of influence that certain individual elites hold over public opinion concerning foreign policy. By combining content analysis with a controlled randomized survey experiment, this study will also reinforce Entman's claims by directly observing how individual influence can affect how the public processes frames rather than simply implying influence by looking at timely polls.

Despite the potential for theoretical and methodological expansion in the field of public diplomacy built in to this study, it remains only a small step towards fully applying Entman's model to this field of research. Political communication from a foreign source about a specific policy issue only breaches the depth of what public diplomacy can be, even within the Nonstate Transnational Model. Political communication that falls within this model can also include less pointed messages to build general support for an organization, nation, or cause that could eventually translate into favorable foreign policy. This use of positive affect to influence public opinion could also be studied using a similar methodology to the one which I propose in this paper, but I choose to focus more narrowly on what I see as the logical first step in adding quantitative communications research to the study of public diplomacy: foreign elites' communication regarding specific US policies.

Second, this study (and the use of Entman's model for that matter) only extends to foreign influence over US foreign policy. Though Gilboa notes that there has been little research into foreign public diplomacy efforts in the United States (Gilboa, 2008), neither Entman's original model nor this study are necessarily generalizable to public diplomacy efforts in other nations. Further research is necessary to determine whether this paper's findings can be replicated outside of the United States.

Finally, this study only examines the influence of a certain aspect of public diplomacy efforts. Though the use of the global media to communicate with a target public and build support for a cause may be effective, there are other methods to influence a government's foreign policy within the purview of public diplomacy that this study does not address. The Domestic Public Relations Model includes a wide variety of public diplomacy methods that use behind-the-scenes methods to influence governmental decision making which deserve further research to compare their efficacy to the more public methods studied in this paper.

I believe this paper is also a step towards addressing the generalizability issues I have outlined. The issues discussed above reflect some of the methodological limitations of the current body of public diplomacy research, as controlled quantitative research has yet to be significantly applied to any model of public diplomacy. Though this lack of research limits the larger generalizability of this study, it also reveals a methodological gap that must be addressed. This paper is consequently an attempt to help build a body of research that uses the experimental methodology from the field of political communications to fill that gap.

Hypotheses

Given that the case study in this paper focuses on how Entman's Cascading Activation model can be applied to public diplomacy, the first question of this paper regards whether or not Entman's model will be confirmed by my case study's evidence. Due to his lack of focus on sources covered by the Nonstate Transnational model, I believe my examination of these sources' efforts to influence public opinion will result in a more nuanced understanding of their place in Entman's cascade. **With influential foreign leaders and transnational organizations**

constantly engaging in the struggle to secure public support for their preferences in American foreign policy, there should be a more distinct place for foreign elites in the cascade (H1).

Since the press acts as the mediator between elite and public opinion in Entman's model, my second hypothesis (which is the first of the quantitative study) reflects the effects of media treatment of different sources on public opinion. **In concordance with the Cascading Activation model, priming frames from different actors in the cascade will shift aggregate opinion to varying degrees (H2).** In a sense, the way the media treats different sources in their coverage will be reflected in those sources' relative capacities to influence public opinion. Within this hypothesis, however, there are a number of corollary hypotheses that relate to the different identities of the communicators and how they fit into the various cognitive schemas present in the minds of the people processing the new information offered by the primed frame.

First, I will address the different identities of the communicators. Even before the opinions of their audiences truly come into play, some of these communicators are more well-known than others. A well-known, "higher-profile" communicator may lend more attention to the frame they are presenting to the audience than a relatively unknown one, regardless of the audience's qualitative opinion of the individual relaying the information. Entman's cascade reflects this hierarchy by placing the presidential administration in a level above that of other elites who do not have as high public profiles in the United States (Entman, 2004). However, simply placing the whole "administration" on one level of familiarity is an oversimplification, especially in an era when only one third of Americans are able to name all three branches of

government, let alone members of the administration outside of the President.⁴ **Thus, my first corollary hypothesis (H2A), is that American presidents will affect aggregate opinion more than any other individual communicator.** After this peak position in the cascade, I believe the order put forth by Entman's cascade will follow.

Given that there are generally few stories about foreign news in the American media (Lent, 1977; Robinson & Davis, 1990), I expect that there will likely be more familiarity with high-profile domestic elites than foreign ones. **Therefore, I hypothesize that domestic elites outside of the administration will have more influence over aggregate opinion than less familiar international and transnational leaders, who will have the least amount of effect on aggregate opinion (H2B).**

My next series of hypotheses deal with the how the different subsets of schemas that respondents bring to the experiment affect their responses after being primed. Though these hypotheses are related to the overall process of how Cascading Activation functions on a micro-level, I wish to separate them from H2 as they do not deal with the affects of priming on aggregate opinion. Given appropriate sample sizes of survey respondents who fall into the categories I seek to measure, I will be able to evaluate these hypotheses by comparing responses to policy-related questions by demographic breakdowns.

Of the demographic characteristics that I will measure in my survey, I plan to specifically examine responses in relation to respondents' education levels and partisan identification.

Activation of opinion about foreign affairs has been shown to be prevalent in highly educated

⁴ See the Annenberg Public Policy Center Poll for the Civics Renewal Network, <http://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Civics-survey-press-release-09-17-2014-for-PR-Newswire.pdf>

individuals who are invested in their views (Robinson 1967 & 1972; Price & Zaller, 1993). Druckman and Holmes (2004) also show these individuals with higher levels of political sophistication about an issue strengthen their opinions rather than changing them when primed. However, these same politically sophisticated individuals, by definition, know more about politics and politicians than the average individual, so they are also more likely to be familiar with the “lower profile” international and transnational actors they are primed with. **Thus, I hypothesize that priming these more educated respondents will be affected by agenda-setting and reinforce their existing beliefs across all treatments, but there will also be a different hierarchy of actors in their cascade than less educated respondents (H3).** Higher political sophistication has also been shown to be significantly associated with increasingly partisan attitude structures (Zinni, Mattei, & Rhodebeck, 1997). **Therefore, I predict that my findings related to primed respondents who self-identify as ideologically partisan will reveal a different hierarchy of influence than what is observed on aggregate (H4).**

Chapter 4: The Experiment

Entman's Methodology and Qualitative Case Study Construction

Though Entman offers many insights into how the press treats elite opinion and how that may affect public opinion, his book, in my opinion, is more theory than rigorous empirical study. His book offers evidence for his model through qualitative case studies, but he does not really start out with a discreet hypothesis and often changes data sources, namely different channels' nightly news broadcasts, without notice in between different chapters. Moreover, there is no experimental evidence in Entman's study regarding the actual internalization of these competing frames by the public. He instead uses timely polls that can be influenced by confounding factors like methodological differences between polling organizations, poor question wording, and public opinion concerning issues that have nothing to do with the foreign policy in question. This lack of strong empirical evidence presents a significant issue with the complex, tiered system of influence over public opinion he proposes. Despite these issues, Entman's study presents some methodological guidelines that can be used to attempt a more empirically focused recreation of his study. Furthermore, his inclusion of public opinion measurements in his model allows for quantitative experimentation that can reinforce or overturn his conclusions.

Entman's study is composed of a series of case studies analyzing the struggle over framing during critical periods of high-profile foreign policy news coverage. In order to analyze how the media may have framed these events, Entman examines coverage from a sampling of sources - nightly news broadcasts on CBS or ABC, daily coverage in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, and weekly coverage in *Time* and the now-defunct *Newsweek* magazines (Entman, 2004). In the first major case study of the book, Entman points to research that CBS

news coverage can be “safely treated as broadly representative of ABC and NBC broadcast coverage,” and also notes that there is literature supporting the claims that the framing in these three networks’ coverage has been found to be similar enough to generally be treated as equivalent (Entman, 2004). Entman also justifies his selection of the *Times* and *Post* by calling them “perhaps the two most influential newspapers” (Entman, 2004). Most interestingly, Entman cites *Time* and *Newsweek’s* ability to peruse a week of other sources’ coverage prior to the print deadlines and distill it into a narrative generally reflecting the main themes in the media (Entman, 2004). These selections may have skewed his study’s findings given that the rise of ideologically-affiliated news on TV and online has significantly reduced the audience of “the traditional news media” since 1990 (Baum in Coglianese, 2012). Indeed, Entman notes that his findings are not necessarily generalizable to all mass media concerning the framing of the event he is studying. Despite these limitations, Entman’s sample of “premier” print and television media allows him to observe how exemplars of the news media treat different sources of framing within their stories, giving his theoretical conclusions greater significance than his findings regarding the specific framing of certain events in foreign policy news. Therefore, to replicate the strengths of Entman’s study, I have chosen to use the same print news sources for my case studies (excluding *Newsweek* for obvious reasons), as those data sources remained constant throughout his book and have the largest body of data to compare findings.

Though I chose to replicate Entman’s data collection methodology, I also chose to shift the period of data collection to reflect my focus on public diplomacy and policy outcomes rather than simply examining news coverage in and of itself. Since public opinion has the potential to impact policy decisions, opinion-shifting coverage relevant to intervention must be examined

during a period when the decision to intervene is actually being made. Unlike Entman, who tends to look at the media's interpretations of critical events after they happened, I sought to observe how coverage of an unfolding crisis affects policy outcomes. Reflecting this research goal, I shifted my case study's two-week-long "critical period" of news coverage to span the week before and the week after a significant foreign policy announcement. The policy announcement I have selected also satisfied the policy goals of international elites appealing to the American public, allowing for the study of how the press treated their public diplomacy efforts. In my analysis, I chose not to merely look at foreign criticism of the administration frame, but rather all comments and frames in the news put forth by foreign sources during this period. By analyzing the framing competition in a case that I am also able to test in a controlled randomized survey experiment, I can observe how effective specific elites in the cascade are at influencing public opinion. Given that influence on the public's understanding of an international crisis, one leader could potentially sway policy outcomes to a significant degree by convincing the public to support or oppose intervention.

Case Study Selection

My use of a mixed-method analysis posed unique challenges for a study examining both competing frames and individual influence. For the qualitative study, which traces the media's treatment of different elites' frames throughout the data collection period, there had to be adequate disagreement about policy solutions to attribute distinct frames to the various elites opining on the matter. For the quantitative study, there had to be enough widespread agreement to control for potential differences in framing presented in the experimental stimuli and establish

that the independent variable is the identity of the elite communicating that frame. Moreover, the crises need to be high-profile and recent enough for the American public to know about them and have some opinion. In the past year, there has been one crisis that fits this description perfectly- the ISIS/ISIL crisis.

Elites throughout the cascade have agreed that the terrorist group ISIL is a threat and that something needs to be done to address them. However, there has also been significant disagreement as to how involved the US government should be in helping resolve the crises. By examining news coverage in the two weeks surrounding President Obama's September 10, 2014 announcement of an expanded airstrike campaign against ISIL in Syria and Iraq (September 3-17), I was able to gauge how the press treats the frames put forth by the President, his supporters, and those who disagree with policies. Given the high profile of these crises, especially during the critical period which I have selected, I was also able to find experimental stimuli from elites throughout the cascade with frames that were similar enough to control for the public's predisposition to favor one frame over another.

Experimental Methodology

Given my study's differences from Entman's study, I believe that the quantitative methodology I propose adds robustness to his theoretical framework by providing an alternative method of measuring individual influence over public opinion. By establishing a clear causal relationship between communication and opinion shift, I was able to tease out the differences between the various communicators' capabilities to influence public opinion. Overall, I believe revealing these relationships shines a light on the inner workings of Entman's Cascading

Activation model both in the original environment in which he proposed it and in the realm of public diplomacy.

To establish measurable effects of various elites' support for intervention on public opinion, I primed randomly sorted groups of respondents on Amazon's Mechanical Turk with video clips of various leaders calling for some form of American action against ISIL. Mechanical Turk has been shown to be a source of robust data with strong internal validity that is often more representative than convenience samples often used by political science researchers (Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011 and Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). With such a sound source of data, the main challenge in the quantitative experiment was the selection of the treatment videos.

The most critical variable that my experimental design had to control for was the content of the message in the treatment videos. When dealing with a hotly debated issue, widely varying frames might resonate differently amongst primed individuals, shifting public opinion due to the content of the message and obfuscating the influence of the communicator. Though it is nearly impossible for each elite's message to be exactly the same when using videos for experimental stimuli, it is possible to get relatively close by choosing actors who agree on problem definition and policy solution. To achieve this level of control, I used videos of three different leaders across the cascade that were about 70 seconds long. The first treatment video was of President Obama calling for the passage of his proposed Authorized Use of Military Force bill (AUMF) to combat ISIL. The second was of Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid calling for passage of the President's AUMF. The third treatment video was of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi advocating for aid from the international community (America implicitly being the main

contributor of that aid). The control group viewed an unrelated video selected to have no impact on opinion (an instructional video on tying bow ties).⁵

Following the priming instrument, I asked respondents a series of questions concerning their opinions on current and potential policy options to address the ISIL crisis. I then compared the results across the different groups in order to measure how opinion shifted due to the different treatments. Since it is unreasonable to expect the same amount of opinion shift due to priming an individual actor across every question in the survey instrument, I examined the comparative magnitudes of the shifts in reported opinion between treatment groups. In other words, I looked at who influenced opinion more or less, whether that influence reinforced or changed reported opinions, and whether those differences were statistically significant. This experimental design allowed me to best address the confounding factors in my experiment while still providing adequate priming stimuli to measure how priming with different leaders affected opinion.

⁵ Please refer to Appendix A for transcripts of the treatment videos.

Chapter 5: The Results

Case Study Findings

The shift in the qualitative data collection period demonstrated a completely different role for foreign elites than the one described in Entman's study. Once the White House started leaking the specifics of President Obama's September 10th announcement, the media focused its coverage of the ISIL crisis on the roll-out of the expanded airstrike campaign, the effectiveness of the American coalition-building efforts, and the foreign and domestic reactions to the President's policy shift. However, coverage prior to the policy announcement focused on the realities on the ground in Iraq and Syria. With the press trying to create a narrative about what ISIL was doing, how successful they were, and how war had affected local communities, NGOs and foreign elites from the region had significant power over the story that reached American readers. After the September 10th announcement, the role of international sources in news coverage expanded to include elites' reactions to American coalition-building efforts across the world. Thus, foreign elites generally had distinct roles in the American media's coverage that differed greatly from the roles of domestic sources, who often focused on the domestic policy debate. This finding actually contradicts Entman's findings regarding the primary use of foreign sources, as foreign sources were used significantly by the press to support the White House frame. In fact, the amount of foreign-sourced information that supported the administration's framing of events in Syria and Iraq was vastly greater than the total amount of foreign-sourced criticism. To break down what this comparison means in terms of real news coverage, let me define the frames I observed and outline how they were translated into coding.

The Obama Administration Frame

The White House's framing of the ISIL crisis was encapsulated in President Obama's September 10th speech where he committed to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIL. He presented ISIL as a brutal terrorist group that, having already publicly butchered two American journalists, would pose a serious threat to the United States if left to its own devices. Moreover, he highlighted ISIL's persecution of minorities, women, and children to emphasize the humanitarian necessity of intervention. In order to assuage public fears of entering another quagmire in the Middle East, President Obama committed to forming an international coalition with partners around the world, including Arab nations, to pursue an expanded air campaign against ISIL and to provide aid to moderate Syrian rebels and the new Iraqi government. He also promised that there would be no American combat troops on the ground. Instead, the President compared this new military strategy to those that had been "successfully pursued in Yemen or Somalia for years." According to President Obama, a more limited version of this strategy had already been successful in helping Kurdish and Iraqi troops save "the lives of thousands of innocent men, women, and children." Ultimately, he called on Congress to support his efforts with legislation approving the aid and training of Syrian rebels. Though he did not need Congress's authority to act, the President claimed, he believed "we are strongest as a nation when the president and Congress work together."

The frame in this speech can be boiled down to a few key points. First, ISIL is a serious threat to human rights and international peace and security. Intervention is vital to dealing with this threat, and every expedient measure possible must be taken. Second, there must be strong cooperation between the US and the international community to combat ISIL. American troops

on the ground, for a number of reasons, is not an option. An active international coalition demonstrates that the world opposes this terrorist group, and it prevents the negative impact of an isolated American intervention. An American ground invasion would simply mobilize jihadist support around ISIL and undercut domestic public support for intervention. Third, American-led airstrikes have worked in the past and will be effective against ISIL going forward. Finally, the President does not need congressional approval to act. Though he called for Congress to act to show support, the unilateral actions the President announced were supposedly permitted through a previous AUMF allowing for the use of a certain amount of force without prior congressional approval.

When analyzing news coverage, I coded any information in articles attributed to foreigners or transnational organizations like the UN or Human Rights Watch (HRW) that reinforced the narrative presented by the Obama administration as “supportive.” This category included quotes from local tribal leaders about the need for American airstrikes and aid, reports from the UN and NGOs about human rights offenses committed by ISIL, and statements from foreign leaders about the serious security threats posed by ISIL. However, the “supportive” category of references also included statements from ISIL sympathizers which played into the Administration’s characterization of the terrorist group. For example, in a *New York Times* front page story covering ISIL sympathizers in Turkey, a young boy’s reaction to the beheading of American journalist James Foley was encapsulated in a hate-filled pronouncement: “Journalists, infidels of this country, we’ll kill them all.” Though this quote obviously communicates the boy’s opposition to American Middle East policy, it fits in nicely into the narrative that ISIL would pose a serious threat if left alone. Since the reporter clearly intended to use this quote to

demonstrate the ambitious and bloodthirsty nature of a growing terrorist group and its doctrine, I coded this foreign source as “supportive.”

Though the “supportive” coding scheme outlined above could also include the coverage of the execution videos published by ISIL itself, I chose not to code quotes or descriptions of the videos during data collection. Since I wanted to look at how third-party foreign and transnational sources’ framing impacted US policy against ISIL, I did not include the substantial coverage of the execution videos’ messages that would dilute the data regarding framing from other foreign sources.

Generally, I recorded a “reference” to a frame whenever the press quoted someone or reported something “according to” a source. Sources were divided into officials inside the Obama administration, domestic sources outside the executive branch, and foreign or transnational sources. To evaluate Entman’s claim about the role of foreign sources, I also sorted references from foreign or transnational sources into three categories evaluating the kind of frame offered. Not only could these sources support the White House frame, but they could also be coded for one of the two kinds of opposition to President Obama’s intervention policy.

The Pro-Intervention Opposition Frame

Pro-interventionist opposition framing mostly focused on procedural criticism of President Obama’s leadership, but it also included some substantial criticism that the policy solutions the president offered as remedies did not go far enough. The procedural criticism covered by this frame, though usually originating from Congressional leaders and other domestic elites, generally hit at President Obama’s failure to act sooner to combat the ISIL threat. Though

pro-interventionist substantial criticism was somewhat less common, it endorsed a wide range of policy solutions that would constitute “doing more” to combat ISIL. Domestic pro-interventionist frames ranged from criticizing the President’s refusal to consider the use of ground troops in Iraq to, as one *Times* op-ed called for, advocating a partnership with the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Internationally, substantial pro-interventionist criticism of White House policy included everything from Syrian rebel leaders calling for military aid against Bashar al-Assad to an Assad spokesperson calling for the inclusion of the Syrian government in the US-led coalition coordinating airstrikes against ISIL.

Though both procedural and substantial criticisms raised concerns with the voracity and effectiveness of the President Obama’s proposed solutions, they endorsed the same problem definition and the same general policy solution as the White House. With both the President and his hawkish critics promoting intervention to the public, foreign policy doves could be pressured to side with the White House to ensure limits are placed on military action. Thus, if pro-interventionist criticism is internalized in public opinion, its political capital will still largely support the President’s pro-intervention position despite his policy’s supposed failings.

The Anti-Interventionist Opposition Frame

The anti-interventionist frames criticizing White House policy on ISIL are the building blocks of the “forces of disorder” from the *Economist* article referenced in the introduction. These frames touch upon the long history of what Entman calls the “quagmire” schema that has been prevalent in modern American politics since the Vietnam War. The quagmire schema presents foreign intervention as a mistake bound to escalate and evolve into a costly drawn-out

war without adequate congressional supervision. Within the category of critical frames that activate this anti-interventionist schema in the ISIL policy debate, there are also both procedural and substantial frames.

The anti-interventionist procedural criticism that was especially prevalent in the *New York Times* after the September 10th speech concerned President Obama's constitutional authority to order military action unilaterally. Though these criticisms address substantial implications for the future of government and executive power, they are classified as procedural because they have nothing to do with the actual merits of intervening against ISIL. Anti-interventionist procedural criticism still gives the President some leeway to act, as it only opposes the way intervention policy was enacted. Like the pro-interventionist critical frames, it still shares the same problem definition and endorses the same solution. Indeed, since his September 10th speech, President Obama has proposed a new AUMF to address this very kind criticism. However, he has also maintained his position regarding the legitimacy of the efforts previously outlined in his previous policy announcement. The simultaneous convenience and problem of unilateral executive action is that critics can only debate the constitutional legitimacy of a policy after it has already been implemented - yet another reason why it is important to study how the public understands international crises *prior* to announcements of White House policy.

The substantial criticisms that fell within the anti-interventionist quagmire schema focused on mission-creep and the costs of war. These frames often compared the new military intervention to the previous fiasco in Iraq under George W. Bush that cost the US billions of dollars and thousands of lives while creating the politically unstable situation that allowed for ISIL to rise to power. Substantial anti-interventionist frames also highlighted the potential for

significant civilian casualties and cast potential partners as war-weary and unwilling to act. Just as Human Rights Watch reports on ISIL's butchering of innocents could implicitly advocate military action, NGO reports on civilian casualties from Iraqi military shelling could discourage a potentially flawed intervention on the side of a government that kills its own people. However, a less-intense version of the "quagmire" schema also undergirded the President's reluctance to commit combat troops to the fight against ISIL. Many of the fears within this schema informed President Obama's decision to impose limits on intervention and use his September 10th speech to reassure the public that it would "be different than the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq."

The other substantial criticism of the Obama administration frame is the assertion that the US should not bother committing money and lives to combat terrorists that do not pose an immediate threat to the US. Critics who use this frame point to the fact that intelligence officials have said that there has not been any "credible information" uncovered to suggest an imminent terrorist attack on American soil. This evidence is basically used to contest the notion that there is a problem at all. ISIL may be doing terrible things, critics concede, but they encourage the public to oppose intervention because these terrorists have no current plans to directly harm the United States. Needless to say, the vast majority of these critics who are advocating this frame are domestic elites.

Newspaper Coverage of the ISIL Crisis

Overall press coverage of the crisis in Iraq and Syria was overwhelmingly supportive of the narrative offered by the Obama administration.⁶ Not only did the vast majority of the coverage between news and editorials (70.2% of all related coverage) support the Administration's frame, but critical coverage was further split up between the two different opposition frames. The two newspapers also tended to emphasize different kinds of critical frames in their respective coverage. Critical content in the *Washington Post* mainly focused on the pro-interventionist critical frames from domestic sources, which ranged from op-eds criticizing the administration's lack of action, to hawkish criticism from Congressional Republicans about the President's self-imposed limits on American involvement, to critical quotes that "derided" a presidential gaffe from a press conference. In the *New York Times*, anti-interventionist frames were given more emphasis than in the *Post's* coverage, publishing articles on the front with substantial criticism that reframed the ISIL threat using expert analysis. For example, the day after the president's address announcing an expanded intervention effort, an article was published on the front page claiming that "some officials and terrorism experts believe that the actual danger posed by ISIS has been distorted in hours of television punditry and alarmist statements by politicians."

However, despite some *Times* reporters' front page efforts to reframe the ISIL crisis through an anti-interventionist lens, only about 27% of *Times* articles featured on the front page included serious criticism as article. The other 43% of *Times* articles featured on the front page that included critical frames used them to meet the media's obligations to cover the political

⁶ To view a breakdown of the content analysis, please refer to Appendix B

situation of the policy being debated. This “political” motivation forced reporters to use opposition frames to balance coverage and help predict how Congress or the international community would act in response to White House framing and policy. Rather than fully debating the merits of one frame over another, the obligatory inclusion of multiple frames diluted the critical frames’ power by using them merely as a way to understand the policy debate and the context of the political horse race.

One example of the use of critical framing to characterize the political horse race and predict congressional action is from an article in the *Times* where a Republican lawmaker was quoted saying, “A lot of Democrats don’t know how it (ISIL intervention) would play in their party, and Republicans don’t want to change anything. We can denounce it if it goes bad and praise it if it goes well and ask him (President Obama) what took him so long” (parentheses added). Though there is substantial criticism underlying the reasons why Democrats “don’t know how it would play” and why “Republicans don’t want to change anything,” the emphasis on process distracts from the substantial arguments that motivate the political maneuvering highlighted in this quote. Furthermore, when characterizing the political situation, an article’s author can undercut the validity of a critical frame with quotes from other elites. For example, when some articles covered domestic criticism of President Obama’s “no strategy” against ISIL gaffe, some reporters either cited White House aides clarifying the president’s remarks or simply stated that critics were “misinterpreting” the comments.

Unlike Entman, who focuses on comparing substantial and procedural framing in front-page articles, I sought to measure media treatment of critical frames in high-profile articles both substantial and procedural frames in the policy debate. As President Obama has recently turned

to Congress for approval of a new AUMF, procedural criticism has been shown to affect some changes in foreign policy. Thus, it is important to understand how seriously the press treat both kinds of frames. To address this need, I coded critical frames in articles featured on the front page as either contributing to the policy debate (“Policy”) or included to understand the political environment (“Politics”). With only 28% of articles featured on the front page containing serious contributions to the policy debate and two-thirds of all coverage in the data collection period supporting the administration frame, it is safe to conclude that the administration’s position was generally supported by the media.

Quoting the Cascade and Media Use of Foreign Sources

Though the aggregate number of references to the administration, domestic elites, and foreign and transnational sources was roughly equal over the data collection period, the apparent equality of media attention falls apart upon closer examination. The first significant evidence of the media’s unequal treatment of sources lies in the frequency that the two different papers reference the different levels the cascade. The *New York Times* paid significantly more attention to foreign sources than the *Washington Post*, which more frequently turned to domestic experts and administration officials for input. One potential reason for this may lie in the identity of each newspaper. The *Post* is a paper that is published in a city where government is the main industry. Thus, understanding the inner workings of the White House and Congress is critical to many of its readers’ jobs, and the *Post* likely catered to those interests. Moreover, the dearth of think-tanks in the city trying to maintain or improve their reputations allowed for reporters to frequently consult with a number of experts eager to share their opinions about any and every

issue. The *Times*, on the other hand, is known as the “newspaper of record.”⁷ Thus their focus may emphasize recording the events on the ground, promoting the use of foreign sources over domestic analysts who are “secondary sources.”

The data that are most telling about the roles of different elites in foreign policy news coverage, however, come from both papers’ use of sources in front page articles. Prior to the September 10th policy announcement, articles featured on the front page referenced “Foreign and Transnational” sources more than either other group, with 40.2% of references in featured articles in the sample period. These references largely characterized the realities of the ISIL crisis on the ground, but they also included reactions from foreign experts and government leaders concerning the geopolitical threat posed by ISIL or the latest barbaric murder committed by the terrorist group. Moreover, many of the domestic elites referenced in this period were former White House officials and Middle East or counterterrorism experts from think-tanks analyzing the crisis from afar. Once reporters found out about the upcoming White House policy announcement, there was a noticeable change in front page coverage. Reporters began outlining the administration’s positions, asking thought leaders for their analysis of the policy, and taking the temperature of members of Congress to gauge how much political support there would be for the President’s proposed policies. After President Obama announced the administration’s strategy for combatting ISIL, the press not only had to monitor the realities of the ISIL threat abroad, but they also had to cover the policy debate at home that spawned from the president’s speech. This shift in coverage priorities lead to a marked drop in the percentage of foreign sources referenced in both papers’ front page articles coupled with a rise in the percentage of domestic sources

⁷ See Encyclopædia Britannica, “The New York Times,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/412546/The-New-York-Times>

referenced. With the policy debate especially critical to the lives of Washingtonians, references to foreign and transnational sources in articles featured on the front page of the *Post* dropped from 29% to a mere 5.9% of references in front page articles during the data collection period. The drop in foreign or transnational references in the *Times* coverage was much less severe, dropping from 45.5% to 37.5% of references in articles featured on the front page, but the drop still reflected the need for the American media to cover the “domestic” policy debate.

With both the *Times* and the *Post* relying heavily on foreign and transnational sources to help define the conditions on the ground abroad, it becomes clear that these sources are critical to identifying the problems that inform the debate over foreign policy solutions. Sources ranging from local tribal leaders to major NGOs to the UN made it incredibly difficult for the “ISIL is not a direct threat” frame to gain traction by regularly highlighting ISIL’s vicious authoritarian rule, its human rights violations, and the threat posed by its widespread recruitment of fighters from western nations. With 83.4% of all foreign and transnational sources communicating some kind of pro-interventionist frame, ISIL was easily labeled as a serious and immediate threat to international peace and security (69.9% reinforced the White House’s narrative and 13.5% called for even greater intervention). The strong international support for the Obama administration’s problem definition was also reflected in a *Post*-ABC poll that was first reported in the September 9th *Post* and later mentioned in the September 12th *Times*. The survey of a random sample of 1,001 adults revealed that “nine in 10 Americans now see the militants as a serious threat to vital U.S. interests” and that 71% of the American public favors airstrikes. As the poll was conducted prior to the president’s September 10th speech announcing the expansion of airstrikes in Iraq and

Syria, it is clear that the political capital had already been mobilized behind military intervention before the domestic policy debate truly began.

The Disappointing Case of Time Magazine

The lack of data from my chosen data collection period in *Time* was surprising. When I finally came across the double issue magazine that covered both weeks of the period I had selected for analysis, not only was the ISIL crisis not even mentioned on the magazine cover, but I also discovered that there was barely any hard news in the issue at all. It was the “Answers Issue,” which spent a significant portion of the issue answering random questions of varying importance with slick graphics and short blurbs. Instead of covering the issues of the day, it spent many pages answering life’s most important questions, such as “Where is the richest suburb in America?” and “When will we discover aliens?” Needless to say, this magazine made me rather discouraged about the current state of the print media.

Time had only 2 relevant articles and one short quote from Senator Rand Paul on the “Briefing” page. Senator Paul’s quote was a politically-focused use of the quagmire frame, claiming that Hillary Clinton would get the US “involved in another Middle Eastern War” if elected president. The caption that gave the quote context further reinforced the horse-race treatment, saying that Senator Paul was talking about “how his non-interventionist stance could attract Democratic votes in 2016.”

The two articles, however, reflected the focus of the press on policy debate once the White House announced its policy. There was a short column in the world news section on the burgeoning civil war in Libya where regional powers had started calling in air strikes against

Islamist militants for “fear for their own stability” due to the rise of ISIL. The second article was more substantial, dedicating two pages to the “bitter debate over a new war in the Middle East” and procedural criticism about President Obama’s unilateral expansion of airstrikes. There were no foreign or transnational sources referenced in the article, as the main focus of the article was the supposed constitutional implications of the President’s actions without congressional approval.

Given the lack of data, no serious conclusions can be drawn without a more robust sample of magazine data. But since *Time* reviewed two weeks of news prior to printing this double-issue, the magazine’s choice to encapsulate two weeks of civil war in Iraq and Syria and a major American foreign policy shift in one article focusing on constitutional process is telling. The choice of this one article as the “core” of two weeks of news coverage suggests that the post-announcement findings from my examination of the *Post* and the *Times* may hold true in the weekly print media as well. Further research using a weekly magazine with better hard news coverage is necessary.

The Quantitative Experiment

The survey I fielded on Mechanical Turk provided robust data for statistical analysis. Since this controlled randomized survey experiment relies on internal validity, the skewed demographics of the sample population were not really an issue until I attempted to look at responses by ideology and education level, where some groups were too small for sound

analysis.⁸ That being said, the survey data revealed some compelling insights into how the public internalized the frames presented to them by different elites in the experimental stimuli.

On an aggregate level, priming respondents with different videos was shown to have a highly statistically significant relationship to the opinions reported on every question asked in the survey ($p < .01$). These highly significant relationships between treatment and question response indicate that the different elites influenced public opinion in noticeably different ways. However, not every question was affected in the same way.

All three experimental treatments demonstrated significant agenda setting affects, with an increase of anywhere from 7.9 to 14.9 percentage points in the number of respondents selecting foreign policy over environment, healthcare and civil rights as the most important issue of the options presented. Interestingly, the percentage of respondents selecting civil rights as most important fell in all three treatment groups as well, losing between 3.5 points and 5.9 points. In both opinion shifts, the presidential priming instrument was the most effective treatment.

The President was also the most effective at shifting opinion in favor of his handling of the ISIL. A majority of respondents (52%) who watched the Obama priming instrument reported that his handling of ISIL was “about right” when asked whether they believed that he was being “too tough, about right, or not tough enough in dealing with ISIS/ISIL,” a 14 point increase from the control group. Moreover, those who were primed with the Obama treatment were the least likely to select the most anti-interventionist option, “The US should not get too involved in the situation,” with 19.1% of respondents viewing the treatment choosing that option in comparison to 23.1% in the control group. In agenda setting, both Senator Reid and Prime Minister al-Abadi

⁸ For a demographic profile of this study and the rest of the survey data, please turn to Appendix C

seemed to be almost equally effective in raising the foreign affairs response, but the group that viewed the al-Abadi treatment were slightly more likely to believe that President Obama was “about right” in his handling of ISIL. Though the president seemed to be the most effective in raising the profile of foreign policy issues and rallying support for his endorsed policy solution, he was not the most effective in shifting opinion on every question.

Responses regarding President Obama’s job approval and his overall handling of international crises were a little more convoluted. Though all three treatment groups experienced a drop in respondents reporting that they had no confidence in the president’s handling of international crises, both the Reid and Obama treatment groups reported similar increases in the number of responses choosing “some” confidence. Though the al-Abadi treatment group had a slightly higher response rate of “none” and a smaller percentage of “some” responses in comparison to the other treatment groups, this group also reported the lowest percentage of “little” and the highest percentage of “a lot” responses for the same question. In the Reid treatment group, the percentage of respondents reporting “a lot” of confidence actually fell over 2 percentage points in comparison to the control group. The shifts in opinion concerning overall job approval are similarly convoluted, but it is important to note that all three treatment groups reported some sort of increase in both the percentage of respondents who said that they “approved” of the overall job that Barack Obama was doing as President and the percentage of respondents who said they had “some confidence” in him to handle an international crisis.

The treatments’ effects on the three questions concerning the details of President Obama’s intervention policy may demonstrate where foreign leaders can wield significant influence over American public opinion. When asked whether they favor or oppose sending

ground troops into combat operations against ISIL, all three treatment groups saw a rise in the percentage of “no opinion” answers coupled with a drop in respondents favoring the use of ground troops. However, the al-Abadi treatment group was the only group that saw a higher percentage of respondents answer that they opposed sending ground troops (which was actually a majority at 51.9%) than the control group. In contrast, the percentage of respondents who opposed sending ground troops fell in the Reid treatment group and even more drastically in the Obama treatment group. Moreover, though a vast majority of respondents across every group already believed that the President was right in asking for a new AUMF, the largest rise in support for the request was in the al-Abadi treatment group. Over 85% of this treatment group reported that the president was right to ask for a new AUMF, and it was also the only treatment group to see a rise, albeit only a small one, in support for the passage of that bill.

This distinct shift may have occurred in part due to a quote in the al-Abadi treatment video in which the Iraqi prime minister calls for much-needed international aid and reports that the “onslaught of Daesh... is being reversed” (See Appendix A). Though I originally expected domestic elites to have a greater influence over public opinion, the data indicate that a foreign leader may have greater influence over the specifics of policy decisions that specifically pertain to the country which they are from. Since the Prime Minister of Iraq confirmed that air strikes and aid had been effective in turning the tide against ISIL within his country, respondents may have felt more comfortable supporting the White House’s proposed aid and limitations on military force. With the terrorists on the back foot, US ground troops may have simply seemed unnecessary, and aid from the international community endorsed by al-Abadi may have been seen as the reasonable solution.

Addressing the Effects By Demographic

When the time came to analyze the data to address the sub-hypotheses based on schemas and demographics, there were some issues regarding the sample size of less educated respondents. None of my attempts to examine differences in primed opinions through the lens of respondents' level of education were found to be statistically significant, as there seemed to be simply too few respondents at each level to uncover meaningful relationships across treatment groups. In order to view the effects of one's education level on their shifts in opinion when primed, I believe that a simpler questionnaire or a larger sample size with a wider range of educational experiences may have helped.

With regards to ideology, there were a number of interesting findings, including which ideological groups did not show statistically significant differences between treatments at all. Respondents who self-identified as "somewhat liberal" or "very liberal" did not have any statistically significant differences in opinion by treatment. Furthermore, respondents who identified as Democrats did not have any statistically significant differences in opinion by treatment either.

The only ideological groups that had any sort of statistically significant relationship to how they processed the different priming instruments were "somewhat conservatives" and "independents" (there were not enough respondents who self-identified as "very conservative" to uncover any meaningful findings). When respondents self-identified as ideologically independent, the data show statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$) between the priming instrument and respondents' opinions on agenda setting, overall job approval, and the president's handling of ISIL. The data also reveal a statistically significant relationship between the priming

instrument and agenda-setting amongst self-identified conservatives. With ideological independents and conservatives demonstrating similar statistical relationships, it was unsurprising to see respondents who identified as Independents or affiliated themselves with the Republican Party demonstrated statistically significant relationships between their priming instruments and responses on the same question ($p < .05$). Yet the agenda-setting question was the only one that exhibited a distinct relationship between party affiliation of any kind, treatment group, and reported opinion.

Since these statistically significant relationships between ideology, treatment group, and opinion are not ubiquitous throughout the survey, I hesitate to draw specific conclusions on how ideological schemas affect the ways respondents process frames from different elites. That being said, the presence of some statistically significant relationships between ideology, treatment group, and opinion indicate that schemas like ideology may influence how individuals process communication from different elites. Since I attempted to hold the frame constant while varying the individual communicating that frame, the data indicate that both the partisan (i.e. liberal or conservative, Republican or Democrat) and the personal (i.e. Prime Minister of Iraq or President of the United States) identities of the individual communicating a frame may help determine the fate of their attempt to win the framing contest.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Identity and Influence

Both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of this study have demonstrated the importance of identity in the framing contest. Before the domestic framing debate over policy solutions began in earnest, foreign elites and transnational organizations made significant high-profile contributions to defining ISIL as a serious threat that required some level of intervention. By basically monopolizing the framing of problem definition, these international sources limited the range of acceptable policy solutions before most domestic elites could offer their own framing of events. As polls overwhelmingly demonstrated, a vast majority of Americans not only agreed with the problem definition that most foreign sources promoted, but they also agreed with the basic strategy of the policy solution that the Obama Administration would endorse just days later. With the President at the top of the media coverage cascade, the White House essentially won the struggle for framing dominance as soon as President Obama announced a position that was in line with foreign and transnational elites' problem definition. Due to this early influence on foreign policy problem definition, I believe that foreign leaders, NGOs, and transnational organizations should be given a place in the Cascading Activation model above domestic elites and below the White House.

Just as the identities of different sources affected how the media utilized them when crafting narratives, the identities of different leaders made significant differences in how primed individuals factored frames into their opinions. A foreign leader's influence on public opinion could, in certain cases, be greater than the influence of both a domestic elite and the President. Indicative of this potential influence, the al-Abadi treatment video was the most effective at

increasing support for the specifics of the current White House strategy against ISIL. The Iraqi prime minister report that ISIL's brutal advance was being reversed may have had greater legitimacy than any reassurance from a domestic leader. President Obama, however, seemed to be more effective at raising the profile of the issue through agenda-setting, and he was also more effective at shifting opinion to support his leadership specifically regarding the handling ISIL. Harry Reid was somewhere in the middle, demonstrating that my hypotheses comparing foreign and domestic elites on this issue was incorrect. Despite being brand-new to the world of international politics, Haider al-Abadi's public diplomacy efforts could be seen as better at influencing certain aspects of public opinion than Harry Reid's attempts to influence the framing competition.

The way that the general public understands each elite's identity may also be affected by each individual's own unique set of schemas. These schemas may include the use of ideological affiliation and political party to characterize an elite, which may then alter how an individual understands the framing choices made by that elite. For example, a person who self-identifies as a serious conservative may categorically deny any foreign policy a progressive president may propose simply due to the nature of that president's politics (though there was not enough data to examine this hypothetical). However, further research is necessary to establish this link.

“Identity Politics” and Public Diplomacy

Since understanding identity is critical to understanding how the press covers a specific elite and how the public internalizes that elite’s framing of events, there are a number of significant, practical, and positive applications of this research to public diplomacy under the Nonstate Transnational model. The three suggestions outlined below are useful not only in the field of public diplomacy, but also potentially useful for any area where public opinion exerts significant influence.

The first practical application of this research involves problem definition in press coverage. As foreign elites and transnational organizations are relied upon significantly by the press to define the nature of international crises, public diplomacy efforts must naturally begin with problem definition. As the process of problem definition often occurs before the White House actively pursues any kind of solution, foreign leaders and NGO members seeking can shape the range of acceptable policy solutions in an international crisis by defining the problem appropriately in the media before any other group has a chance to define it. In a sense, foreign leaders and transnational organizations can pre-empt the White House in the cascade, though the administration’s frame will likely still get preferential treatment in the media. One op-ed in the *New York Times* acknowledged the particular power of problem definition when the author wrote that the “ISIS *narrative* is so vicious and so brutal that it (ISIS) has virtually no external allies” (parenthesis and emphasis added). Those who were able to win the framing contest and define ISIL as a serious and brutal problem helped prevent the terrorist group from making any powerful new friends.

This activist use of problem definition in public diplomacy factors in both the particular powers and limitations of political communications. Though the media may rely on elite opinion for content, there are specific ways that the media choose to use elite opinion to craft their own narratives. This partnership in forming news content means that the foreign nations and transnational actors who engage in public diplomacy are uniquely situated to help craft the narratives relevant to their own specific issues. These actors can be the first people in the cascade to quickly identify a problem and publicize it, but it may be incredibly difficult to dislodge a certain problem definition once serious debate about solutions to the wrong problem begins.

The second way that this research can be applied is a more tangible operationalization of the use of quantitative methodology to understand political identity and influence. Just as domestic politicians run polls to test how to best market their previous work and leadership experience, leaders in foreign governments or transnational organizations could field experiments to help understand how the public understands their identity, how they can most effectively influence opinion towards their desired policy outcomes, and how potential surrogates could do a better job of influencing opinion on certain issues. If this research can be expanded to nations beyond the United States, it could potentially have serious diplomatic implications. Imagine using polling and experimentation to establish a list of international leaders who Israelis and Palestinians mutually hold in the highest regard. Mobilizing a public diplomacy campaign utilizing these true opinion makers could have a significant impact on the effort to reach a two-state solution. Survey research like this can help distinguish exactly which elites one might want to utilize as surrogates in public diplomacy, and I believe it can do so both effectively and economically.

Finally, understanding how identity factors into public diplomacy and the outcomes of the foreign policy framing contest is critical to good democratic leadership. As public diplomacy often involves debate over policies that can quite literally save the lives of thousands, if not millions, of people, democratically-elected leaders of needy, unstable nations are regularly involved in public diplomacy efforts. Thus, understanding the merits of one's own position in the cascade of influence is one way to address the question of how to be a good democratic leader in foreign policy posed by Elizabeth Saunders in Kane and Patapan's aptly titled *Good Democratic Leadership* (2014). Though Saunders incorrectly posits that public opinion has little effect over foreign policy, she offers a compelling puzzle for democratic leadership when she asks, "How can leaders be empowered to choose good policies that protect the state's interests, simultaneously remaining true to democratic principles and operating without undue constraints from electoral or other short-term political concerns?" (Saunders in Kane and Patapan, 2014). By understanding one's own ability to influence both foreign and domestic public opinion and using that knowledge to mobilize opinion, democratic leaders can maximize their capacity to influence policy outcomes within the constraints of a democratic system. Instead of being limited by the "undue constraints of electoral or other short-term political concerns," they are empowered by them.

Appendix A: Treatment Video Scripts

Treatment 1: Barack Obama

“Now make no mistake this is a difficult mission. And it will remain difficult for some time. But our coalition is on the offensive, ISIL is on the defensive, and ISIL is going to lose. With vile groups like this there is only one option. With our allies and partners, we are going to degrade and ultimately destroy this terrorist group. When I announced our strategy against ISIL in September, I said that we are strongest as a nation when the president and Congress work together. Today, my administration submitted a draft resolution to Congress to authorize the use of force against ISIL. This resolution reflects our core objective to destroy ISIL. It supports the comprehensive strategy that we have been pursuing with our allies and our partners: a systemic and sustained campaign of airstrikes against ISIL and Iraq and Syria. Support and training for local forces on the ground, including the moderate Syrian opposition. Preventing ISIL attacks in the region and beyond, including by foreign terrorist fighters who try to threaten our countries. Regional and international support for an inclusive Iraqi government that unites the Iraqi people and strengthens Iraqi forces against ISIL.”

Treatment 2: Harry Reid

“Last night President Obama outlined a strategy for eradicating ISIS without repeating the mistakes of the past. President made it clear that we will not rush into another ground war in the Middle East and we will not go at it alone. Instead America will lead a coalition that includes European and Arab nations in a targeted, strategic mission to destroy ISIS. American airstrikes will be supported by local forces fighting on the ground to protect their own countries, their own

families, their own homes, their own communities. But now it is up to Congress to rally behind President Obama and his decisive strategy. The proposal that the President has given to the American people requires immediate congressional action in granting the administration the authority to equip and train Syrian rebels under Title 10 to fight ISIS. Now is the time for us to come together to speak with one voice and tell the terrorists: you cannot hide, you've committed horrific accidents, threatened the security of the United States and our allies, and we will find you and we will destroy you."

Treatment 3: Haider al-Abadi

"Yes I think so. I think the reverses of Daesh or the onslaught of Daesh has been reversed. Not fully but is being reversed, is in the opposite direction now, that is very important. I think we have made a change in the political atmosphere, in the social atmosphere of the country. I have to be very blunt about this. We need the support. The support is essential. The fact that the whole world is standing with us is very important for our own public, for our own soldiers. We are the only country who have soldiers on the ground who are fighting Daesh and is important to the moral support of our soldiers. There has been an increase of this bombing of Daesh locations. There has been a very well liaison and coordination between our ground forces and the air cover which is provided for our own forces. I think now that this cooperation is very good. So for this war to continue and we have to continue this war, we need a lot of support from the international community. I mean one of the reasons I am here is to gather this support from the international coalition to support Iraq, to keep its fight and to keep its people. The minimum services must be there."

Appendix B- Press Coverage Content Analysis

Overall Press Coverage

Washington Post Coverage

Type of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Supportive News	Before 9/10	35	26.9%
	After 9/10	29	22.3%
	Total	64	49.2%
Supportive Editorials	Before 9/10	10	7.7%
	After 9/10	15	11.5%
	Total	25	19.2%
Critical News	Before 9/10	5	3.8%
	After 9/10	12	9.2%
	Total	17	13.1%
Critical Editorials	Before 9/10	14	10.8%
	After 9/10	10	7.7%
	Total	24	18.5%

New York Times Coverage

Type of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Supportive News	Before 9/10	34	30.35%
	After 9/10	34	30.35%
	Total	68	60.7%
Supportive Editorials	Before 9/10	9	8%
	After 9/10	4	3.6%
	Total	13	11.6%
Critical News	Before 9/10	7	6.3%
	After 9/10	11	9.8%
	Total	18	16.1%
Critical Editorials	Before 9/10	3	2.7%
	After 9/10	10	8.9%
	Total	13	11.6%

Aggregate Newspaper Coverage

Type of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Supportive News	Before 9/10	69	28.5%
	After 9/10	63	26%
	Total	132	54.5%
Supportive Editorials	Before 9/10	19	7.85%
	After 9/10	19	7.85%
	Total	38	15.7%
Critical News	Before 9/10	12	5%
	After 9/10	23	9.5%
	Total	35	14.5%
Critical Editorials	Before 9/10	17	7%
	After 9/10	20	8.3%
	Total	37	15.3%

Framing of Washington Post Coverage

Main Frame of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive	Before 9/10	45	34.6%
	After 9/10	39	30%
	Total	84	64.6%
Policy Negative	Before 9/10	13	10%
	After 9/10	16	12.3%
	Total	29	22.3%
Leadership Positive	Before 9/10	1	0.8%
	After 9/10	4	3.1%
	Total	5	3.9%
Leadership Negative	Before 9/10	6	4.6%
	After 9/10	6	4.6%
	Total	12	9.2%

Framing of New York Times Coverage

Main Frame of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive	Before 9/10	42	37.5%
	After 9/10	35	31.25%
	Total	77	68.75%
Policy Negative	Before 9/10	5	4.5%
	After 9/10	16	14.25%
	Total	21	18.75%
Leadership Positive	Before 9/10	1	0.9%
	After 9/10	4	3.6%
	Total	5	4.5%
Leadership Negative	Before 9/10	5	4.5%
	After 9/10	4	3.5%
	Total	9	8%

Aggregate Newspaper Framing

Main Frame of Article	Data Collection Period	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy Positive	Before 9/10	87	36%
	After 9/10	74	30.5%
	Total	161	66.6%
Policy Negative	Before 9/10	18	7.4%
	After 9/10	32	13.2%
	Total	50	20.7%
Leadership Positive	Before 9/10	2	0.8%
	After 9/10	8	3.3%
	Total	10	4.1%
Leadership Negative	Before 9/10	11	4.5%
	After 9/10	10	4.1%
	Total	21	8.6%

Washington Post Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles		
Press Treatment	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy	6	30%
Politics	12	60%
Total	20	

New York Times Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles		
Press Treatment	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy	8	26.7%
Politics	13	43.3%
Total	30	

Aggregate Treatment of Criticism in Featured Articles		
Press Treatment	Number of Articles	Percentage of Articles
Policy	14	28%
Politics	25	50%
Total	50	

Frame Sources in Press Coverage

Washington Post Frame Sources by Sample Period

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	111	48.3%	15.7%
	Domestic	63	27.4%	8.9%
	Foreign and Transnational	56	24.3%	7.9%
	Total	230		32.5%
September 11-17	Administration	166	34.7%	23.4%
	Domestic Elites	193	40.4%	27.3%
	Foreign and Transnational	119	24.9%	16.8%
	Total	478		67.5%

New York Times Frame Sources by Sample Period

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	117	31.8%	12.6%
	Domestic	120	32.6%	12.9%
	Foreign and Transnational	131	35.6%	14.1%
	Total	368		39.6%
September 11-17	Administration	206	36.6%	22.2%
	Domestic Elites	174	31%	18.7%
	Foreign and Transnational	182	32.4%	19.5%
	Total	562		60.4%

Aggregate Frame Sources by Sample Period

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	228	38.2%	13.9%
	Domestic	183	30.65%	11.2%
	Foreign and Transnational	186	31.15%	11.4%
	Total	597		36.5%
September 11-17	Administration	372	35.8%	22.7%
	Domestic Elites	367	35.3%	22.4%
	Foreign and Transnational	301	28.9%	18.4%
	Total	1,040		63.5%

Washington Post Frame Sources in Featured Articles

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	14	22.6%	7.7%
	Domestic	30	48.4%	16.7%
	Foreign and Transnational	18	29%	10%
	Total	62		34.4%
September 11-17	Administration	63	53.4%	35%
	Domestic	48	40.7%	26.7%
	Foreign and Transnational	7	5.9%	3.9%
	Total	118		65.6%

New York Times Frame Sources in Featured Articles

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	35	26.5%	8.9%
	Domestic	37	28%	9.4%
	Foreign and Transnational	60	45.5%	15.2%
	Total	132		33.6%
September 11-17	Administration	82	31.4%	20.9%
	Domestic	81	31%	20.6%
	Foreign and Transnational	98	37.5%	24.9%
	Total	261		66.4%

Aggregate Frame Sources in Featured Articles

Collection Period	Frame Sources	Number of References	Percentage within Sample Period	Percentage of Total References
September 3-10	Administration	49	25.3%	8.6%
	Domestic	67	32.5%	11.7%
	Foreign and Transnational	78	40.2%	13.6%
	Total	194		33.9%
September 11-17	Administration	145	38.3%	25.3%
	Domestic	129	34%	22.5%
	Foreign and Transnational	105	27.7%	18.3%
	Total	379		66.1%

Framing from Foreign and Transnational Sources

Washington Post Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources

	Number of References	Percentage of References
Support Administration	132	75.4%
Pro-Intervention Critical	26	14.9%
Anti-intervention Critical	17	9.7%
Total	175	

New York Times Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources

	Number of References	Percentage of References
Support Administration	209	66.8%
Pro-Intervention Critical	40	12.8%
Anti-intervention Critical	64	20.4%
Total	313	

Aggregate Frames from Foreign and Transnational Sources

	Number of References	Percentage of References
Support Administration	341	69.9%
Pro-Intervention Critical	66	13.5%
Anti-intervention Critical	81	16.6%
Total	488	

Appendix C: Quantitative Experiment Data

Demographics:

Are you:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	582	62.2	62.6	62.6
	Female	348	37.2	37.4	100.0
	Total	930	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.5		
Total		935	100.0		

Are you:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	582	62.2	62.6	62.6
	Female	348	37.2	37.4	100.0
	Total	930	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.5		
Total		935	100.0		

Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	73	7.8	7.8	7.8
	No	858	91.8	92.2	100.0
	Total	931	99.6	100.0	
Missing	System	4	.4		
Total		935	100.0		

What is the last grade of school you completed?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No high school diploma	9	1.0	1.0	1.0
	High school graduate	105	11.2	11.3	12.2
	Some college/associate degree	336	35.9	36.1	48.3
	College graduate	379	40.5	40.7	88.9
	Postgraduate study	103	11.0	11.1	100.0
	Total	932	99.7	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.3		
Total		935	100.0		

What is your age?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-24	195	20.9	20.9	20.9
	25-29	254	27.2	27.3	48.2
	30-39	257	27.5	27.6	75.8
	40-44	69	7.4	7.4	83.2
	45-49	43	4.6	4.6	87.8
	50-59	75	8.0	8.0	95.8
	60-64	23	2.5	2.5	98.3
	65 and older	16	1.7	1.7	100.0
	Total	932	99.7	100.0	
Missing	System	3	.3		
Total		935	100.0		

Are you registered to vote?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	809	86.5	87.2	87.2
	No	119	12.7	12.8	100.0
	Total	928	99.3	100.0	
Missing	System	7	.7		
Total		935	100.0		

Thinking about your general approach to issues, do you consider yourself to be liberal, moderate, or conservative?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very liberal	179	19.1	19.2	19.2
	Somewhat liberal	339	36.3	36.5	55.7
	Moderate	230	24.6	24.7	80.4
	Somewhat conservative	141	15.1	15.2	95.6
	Very conservative	41	4.4	4.4	100.0
	Total	930	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	5	.5		
Total		935	100.0		

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Democrat	418	44.7	44.8	44.8
	Republican	146	15.6	15.6	60.5
	Independent	317	33.9	34.0	94.4
	Something else	52	5.6	5.6	100.0
	Total	933	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		935	100.0		

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Democrat	189	20.2	45.2	45.2
	Not very strong Democrat	229	24.5	54.8	100.0
	Total	418	44.7	100.0	
Missing	System	517	55.3		
Total		935	100.0		

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strong Republican	45	4.8	31.0	31.0
	Not very strong Republican	100	10.7	69.0	100.0
	Total	145	15.5	100.0	
Missing	System	790	84.5		
Total		935	100.0		

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party, closer to the Democratic Party, or do you think of yourself as strictly Independent?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Republican Party	51	5.5	16.1	16.1
	Democratic Party	119	12.7	37.7	53.8
	Strictly Independent	146	15.6	46.2	100.0
	Total	316	33.8	100.0	
Missing	System	619	66.2		
Total		935	100.0		

Last year, what was the total income before taxes of all the people in your household or apartment?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Under \$30,000	292	31.2	31.3	31.3
	\$30,000 to \$49,999	226	24.2	24.2	55.5
	\$50,000 to \$99,999	330	35.3	35.4	90.9
	\$100,000 to \$199,999	79	8.4	8.5	99.4
	\$200,000 to \$249,999	3	.3	.3	99.7
	\$250,000 or more	3	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	933	99.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2	.2		
Total		935	100.0		

Issue Rank By Treatment

Trtmt * IssueRank Crosstabulation

			IssueRank					Total
			0	1	2	3	4	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	40	122	58	26	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	16.3%	49.6%	23.6%	10.6%	100.0%
2	Count		0	33	101	76	27	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	13.9%	42.6%	32.1%	11.4%	100.0%
3	Count		0	40	89	52	27	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	19.2%	42.8%	25.0%	13.0%	100.0%
4	Count		0	44	84	74	40	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	18.2%	34.7%	30.6%	16.5%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	157	396	260	120	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	16.8%	42.4%	27.8%	12.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	951.941 ^a	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	45.495	16	.000
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign Affairs; 3- Healthcare; 4-Civil Rights

Favor Sending Ground Troops by Treatment

Trtmt * Q38 Crosstabulation

			Q38				Total
			0	1	2	3	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	91	110	45	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	37.0%	44.7%	18.3%	100.0%
2	Count		0	90	109	38	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	38.0%	46.0%	16.0%	100.0%
3	Count		0	65	108	35	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	31.3%	51.9%	16.8%	100.0%
4	Count		1	97	116	28	242
	% within Trtmt		0.4%	40.1%	47.9%	11.6%	100.0%
Total	Count		3	343	443	146	935
	% within Trtmt		0.3%	36.7%	47.4%	15.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	631.439 ^a	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	35.519	12	.000
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Favor; 2- Oppose; 3- No Opinion

Confidence In Barack Obama's Handling of International Crises by Treatment

Trtmt * ObamaConf Crosstabulation

			ObamaConf					Total
			0	1	2	3	4	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	50	116	50	30	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	20.3%	47.2%	20.3%	12.2%	100.0%
2	Count		0	43	113	54	27	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	18.1%	47.7%	22.8%	11.4%	100.0%
3	Count		0	52	88	39	29	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	25.0%	42.3%	18.8%	13.9%	100.0%
4	Count		0	50	100	45	47	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	20.7%	41.3%	18.6%	19.4%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	195	417	188	133	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	20.9%	44.6%	20.1%	14.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	947.246 ^a	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	40.404	16	.001
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- A Lot; 2- Some; 3- Little; 4- None

Approval of Barack Obama's Job as President by Treatment

Trtmt * ObamaJob Crosstabulation

			ObamaJob					Total	
			0	1	2	3	4		5
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	35	37	53	102	19	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	14.2%	15.0%	21.5%	41.5%	7.7%	100.0%
2	Count		0	34	35	51	93	24	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	14.3%	14.8%	21.5%	39.2%	10.1%	100.0%
3	Count		0	24	38	37	86	23	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	11.5%	18.3%	17.8%	41.3%	11.1%	100.0%
4	Count		0	46	42	45	89	20	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	19.0%	17.4%	18.6%	36.8%	8.3%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	139	152	186	370	86	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	14.9%	16.3%	19.9%	39.6%	9.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	944.701 ^a	20	.000
Likelihood Ratio	38.179	20	.008
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Strongly Disapprove; 2- Disapprove;
3- Neutral; 4- Approve; 5- Strongly Approve

Barack Obama's Handling of ISIL by Treatment

Trtmt * USDisc Crosstabulation

			USDisc					Total
			0	1	2	3	4	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	4	129	66	47	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	1.6%	52.4%	26.8%	19.1%	100.0%
2	Count		0	3	109	77	48	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	1.3%	46.0%	32.5%	20.3%	100.0%
3	Count		0	4	101	58	45	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	1.9%	48.6%	27.9%	21.6%	100.0%
4	Count		0	3	93	90	56	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	1.2%	38.4%	37.2%	23.1%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	14	432	291	196	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	1.5%	46.2%	31.1%	21.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	947.170 ^a	16	.000
Likelihood Ratio	40.769	16	.001
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 13 cells (52.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Too Tough; 2- About Right;
3- Not Tough Enough; 4-The US should not get too involved in the situation

Barack Obama's Request For New AUMF by Treatment

Trtmt * Q36 Crosstabulation

			Q36				Total
			0	1	2	3	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	198	23	25	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	80.5%	9.3%	10.2%	100.0%
2	Count		0	193	14	30	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	81.4%	5.9%	12.7%	100.0%
3	Count		0	177	15	16	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	85.1%	7.2%	7.7%	100.0%
4	Count		0	188	21	33	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	77.7%	8.7%	13.6%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	756	73	104	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	80.9%	7.8%	11.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	942.229 ^a	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	36.022	12	.000
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- He was right to ask for the authority to continue using military force; 2- He should have continued the use of military force without asking for authorization; 3- No opinion

Support for Congressional Approval of New AUMF by Treatment

Trtmt * Q37 Crosstabulation

			Q37				Total
			0	1	2	3	
Trtmt 0	Count		2	0	0	0	2
	% within Trtmt		100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
1	Count		0	151	51	44	246
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	61.4%	20.7%	17.9%	100.0%
2	Count		0	146	48	43	237
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	61.6%	20.3%	18.1%	100.0%
3	Count		0	132	40	36	208
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	63.5%	19.2%	17.3%	100.0%
4	Count		0	151	52	39	242
	% within Trtmt		0.0%	62.4%	21.5%	16.1%	100.0%
Total	Count		2	580	191	162	935
	% within Trtmt		0.2%	62.0%	20.4%	17.3%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	935.727 ^a	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	29.316	12	.004
N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Treatment:

1- Obama; 2- Reid; 3- al-Abadi; 4- Control

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Should; 2- Should not;
3- No opinion

Differences Between Ideologies on Issue Rank by Treatment

Trtmt * IssueRank * Q47 Crosstabulation									
Q47				IssueRank					
				0	1	2	3	4	Total
3	Trtmt	1	Count		7	40	15	4	66
			% within Trtmt		10.6%	60.6%	22.7%	6.1%	100.0%
		2	Count		5	27	21	5	58
			% within Trtmt		8.6%	46.6%	36.2%	8.6%	100.0%
		3	Count		14	23	8	5	50
			% within Trtmt		28.0%	46.0%	16.0%	10.0%	100.0%
		4	Count		8	19	17	12	56
			% within Trtmt		14.3%	33.9%	30.4%	21.4%	100.0%
	Total		Count		34	109	61	26	230
			% within Trtmt		14.8%	47.4%	26.5%	11.3%	100.0%
4	Trtmt	1	Count		0	34	10	2	46
			% within Trtmt		0.0%	73.9%	21.7%	4.3%	100.0%
		2	Count		2	22	9	2	35
			% within Trtmt		5.7%	62.9%	25.7%	5.7%	100.0%
		3	Count		2	17	8	2	29
			% within Trtmt		6.9%	58.6%	27.6%	6.9%	100.0%
		4	Count		8	16	5	2	31
			% within Trtmt		25.8%	51.6%	16.1%	6.5%	100.0%

Ideology:

0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal;
3- Independent; 4- Conservative; 5- Very
Conservative

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign
Affairs; 3- Healthcare; 4-Civil Rights

Chi-Square Tests

Q47		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0	Pearson Chi-Square	10.000 ^b	6	.125
	Likelihood Ratio	10.549	6	.103
	N of Valid Cases	5		
1	Pearson Chi-Square	10.089 ^c	9	.343
	Likelihood Ratio	9.909	9	.358
	N of Valid Cases	179		
2	Pearson Chi-Square	8.929 ^d	9	.444
	Likelihood Ratio	9.078	9	.430
	N of Valid Cases	339		
3	Pearson Chi-Square	24.725 ^e	9	.003
	Likelihood Ratio	23.312	9	.006
	N of Valid Cases	230		
4	Pearson Chi-Square	18.120 ^f	9	.034
	Likelihood Ratio	18.262	9	.032
	N of Valid Cases	141		
5	Pearson Chi-Square	4.878 ^g	9	.845
	Likelihood Ratio	6.139	9	.726
	N of Valid Cases	41		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	951.941 ^a	16	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	45.495	16	.000
	N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

b. 12 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.84.

d. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.90.

e. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.65.

f. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.65.

g. 14 cells (87.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .07.

Differences Between Ideologies on Job Approval by Treatment

Trtmt * ObamaJob * Q47 Crosstabulation

Q47				ObamaJob					Total	
				0	1	2	3	4		5
3	Trt	1	Count		6	12	25	18	5	66
			% within Trtmt		9.1%	18.2%	37.9%	27.3%	7.6%	100.0%
		2	Count		6	9	24	18	1	58
			% within Trtmt		10.3%	15.5%	41.4%	31.0%	1.7%	100.0%
		3	Count		9	18	8	11	4	50
			% within Trtmt		18.0%	36.0%	16.0%	22.0%	8.0%	100.0%
		4	Count		13	16	15	9	3	56
			% within Trtmt		23.2%	28.6%	26.8%	16.1%	5.4%	100.0%
Total			Count		34	55	72	56	13	230
			% within Trtmt		14.8%	23.9%	31.3%	24.3%	5.7%	100.0%

Ideology:

0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal; 3- Independent; 4- Conservative; 5- Very Conservative

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Strongly Disapprove; 2- Disapprove; 3- Neutral; 4- Approve; 5- Strongly Approve

Chi-Square Tests

Q47		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0	Pearson Chi-Square	10.000 ^b	6	.125
	Likelihood Ratio	10.549	6	.103
	N of Valid Cases	5		
1	Pearson Chi-Square	19.163 ^c	12	.085
	Likelihood Ratio	23.013	12	.028
	N of Valid Cases	179		
2	Pearson Chi-Square	7.972 ^d	12	.787
	Likelihood Ratio	7.962	12	.788
	N of Valid Cases	339		
3	Pearson Chi-Square	23.837 ^e	12	.021
	Likelihood Ratio	24.857	12	.016
	N of Valid Cases	230		
4	Pearson Chi-Square	7.757 ^f	12	.804
	Likelihood Ratio	7.893	12	.793
	N of Valid Cases	141		
5	Pearson Chi-Square	18.740 ^g	9	.027
	Likelihood Ratio	18.617	9	.029
	N of Valid Cases	41		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	944.701 ^a	20	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	38.179	20	.008
	N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 10 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

b. 12 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

c. 9 cells (45.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.53.

d. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.82.

e. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.83.

f. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .21.

g. 14 cells (87.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .15.

Difference Between Ideologies on Barack Obama's Handling of ISIL by Treatment

Trtmt * USDisc * Q47 Crosstabulation

Q47				USDisc					Total
				0	1	2	3	4	
3	Trtmt	1	Count		0	35	19	12	66
			% within Trtmt		0.0%	53.0%	28.8%	18.2%	100.0%
		2	Count		0	26	23	9	58
			% within Trtmt		0.0%	44.8%	39.7%	15.5%	100.0%
		3	Count		0	12	20	18	50
			% within Trtmt		0.0%	24.0%	40.0%	36.0%	100.0%
		4	Count		1	15	21	19	56
			% within Trtmt		1.8%	26.8%	37.5%	33.9%	100.0%
Total			Count		1	88	83	58	230
			% within Trtmt		0.4%	38.3%	36.1%	25.2%	100.0%

Ideology:

0- No Response; 1- Very Liberal; 2- Liberal; 3- Independent; 4- Conservative; 5- Very Conservative

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Too Tough; 2- About Right; 3- Not Tough Enough; 4-The US should not get too involved in the situation

Chi-Square Tests

Q47		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0	Pearson Chi-Square	15.000 ^b	9	.091
	Likelihood Ratio	13.322	9	.149
	N of Valid Cases	5		
1	Pearson Chi-Square	16.468 ^c	9	.058
	Likelihood Ratio	17.023	9	.048
	N of Valid Cases	179		
2	Pearson Chi-Square	11.361 ^d	9	.252
	Likelihood Ratio	12.047	9	.211
	N of Valid Cases	339		
3	Pearson Chi-Square	20.981 ^e	9	.013
	Likelihood Ratio	21.004	9	.013
	N of Valid Cases	230		
4	Pearson Chi-Square	6.250 ^f	6	.396
	Likelihood Ratio	6.383	6	.382
	N of Valid Cases	141		
5	Pearson Chi-Square	5.223 ^g	6	.516
	Likelihood Ratio	5.027	6	.540
	N of Valid Cases	41		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	947.170 ^a	16	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	40.769	16	.001
	N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 13 cells (52.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

b. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

c. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.74.

d. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .91.

e. 4 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.

f. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.91.

g. 9 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .22.

Differences Between Party Affiliations in Issue Rank By Treatment

Trtmt * IssueRank * Q48 Crosstabulation

Q48				IssueRank					Total
				0	1	2	3	4	
2	Trtmt	1	Count	0	34	9	0	43	
			% within Trtmt	0.0%	79.1%	20.9%	0.0%	100.0%	
		2	Count	1	21	5	4	31	
			% within Trtmt	3.2%	67.7%	16.1%	12.9%	100.0%	
		3	Count	2	20	10	0	32	
			% within Trtmt	6.3%	62.5%	31.3%	0.0%	100.0%	
		4	Count	5	24	8	3	40	
			% within Trtmt	12.5%	60.0%	20.0%	7.5%	100.0%	
	Total		Count	8	99	32	7	146	
			% within Trtmt	5.5%	67.8%	21.9%	4.8%	100.0%	
3	Trtmt	1	Count	16	45	22	10	93	
			% within Trtmt	17.2%	48.4%	23.7%	10.8%	100.0%	
		2	Count	11	32	26	5	74	
			% within Trtmt	14.9%	43.2%	35.1%	6.8%	100.0%	
		3	Count	14	25	9	13	61	
			% within Trtmt	23.0%	41.0%	14.8%	21.3%	100.0%	
		4	Count	19	25	30	15	89	
			% within Trtmt	21.3%	28.1%	33.7%	16.9%	100.0%	
	Total		Count	60	127	87	43	317	
			% within Trtmt	18.9%	40.1%	27.4%	13.6%	100.0%	

Party Affiliation:

0- No Response; 1- Democrat; 2- Republican; 3- Independent; 4- Something Else

Responses:

0- No Response; 1- Environment; 2- Foreign Affairs; 3- Healthcare; 4- Civil Rights

Chi-Square Tests

Q48		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
0	Pearson Chi-Square	. ^b		
	N of Valid Cases	2		
1	Pearson Chi-Square	6.932 ^c	9	.644
	Likelihood Ratio	6.860	9	.652
	N of Valid Cases	418		
2	Pearson Chi-Square	17.863 ^d	9	.037
	Likelihood Ratio	21.325	9	.011
	N of Valid Cases	146		
3	Pearson Chi-Square	19.993 ^e	9	.018
	Likelihood Ratio	20.977	9	.013
	N of Valid Cases	317		
4	Pearson Chi-Square	16.061 ^f	9	.066
	Likelihood Ratio	21.070	9	.012
	N of Valid Cases	52		
Total	Pearson Chi-Square	951.941 ^a	16	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	45.495	16	.000
	N of Valid Cases	935		

a. 9 cells (36.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

b. No statistics are computed because Trtmt and IssueRank are constants.

c. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.77.

d. 8 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.49.

e. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.27.

f. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.48.

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