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ABOUT THE REVIEW
Founded in 1991, the Penn History Review is a journal for undergraduate historical research. Published twice a year through the Department of History, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the Review is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration. For more information about submissions, please contact us at phr-submissions@gmail.com.

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“The Monogrammist H. E.” Elizabeth I and the Three Goddesses. 1569. Oil on panel. Hampton Court Palace. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Joris_Hoefnagel_or_Hans_Eworth_-_Queen_Elizabeth_I_%26_the_Three_Goddesses,_ca_1569.jpg. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permissions in writing. The authors and artists who submit their works to Penn History Review retain all rights to their work.

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On behalf of the entire editorial board, I am honored to present the newest issue of the Penn History Review. Since 1991, the Penn History Review has been dedicated to promoting the study of history amongst undergraduate students. Since its founding, PHR has published exceptional historical scholarship written by students at the University of Pennsylvania as well as schools across the United States. Our spring 2022 edition exemplifies the diversity of study within our field. It includes articles that explore dynamic topics such as the reign of Elizabeth I of England, Orthodox Jewish responses to slavery, the 19th century American reform movement, and Jewish resettlement in China during World War II. These pieces embody the core values of our publication: curiosity, critical thinking, a dedication to research, and most importantly, a passion for history. Our entire editorial team deeply enjoyed working with the authors and editing these papers. We hope that you will find them thought-provoking and enjoy reading them as much as we did!


In the next article “Covenant in Crisis: Orthodox Reactions to Slavery in Antebellum America,” Samuel Strickberger analyzes the reactions of Orthodox Jewish rabbis to the institution of American slavery. In this chapter, he explores the silence of Orthodox leaders from 1848 to 1861, who were largely motivated by the self-preservation of their community.

In the third paper, “Poverty and Discipline: A Case Study of the Philadelphia House of Refuge,” Yoo Ra Do
engages in a thorough analysis of the Philadelphia House of Refuge, one of the many examples of institutions that appeared during the 19th century reform movement in America. She explores the negative ways in which the poor were perceived by society at large, and the preconceived need to discipline and manage them.

Our final piece, “Importing Development: The Chinese Nationalists’ Support of Jewish Settlement Plans During World War II,” comes from Harril Saunders of Princeton University. In a three part analysis of the Yunnan Plans, proposed resettlement plans which were not approved, he argues that Jewish and Chinese leaders’ economic and political ideologies played a key role in their support of resettlement.

Additionally, this issue includes abstracts submitted by seniors at Penn who undertook the challenge of writing honors theses for the History Department. In doing so, PHR hopes to promote additional research and scholarship in the field of history by offering its readership a preview of this fascinating variety of topics. Congratulations to all of the senior honors students who achieved this impressive accomplishment. We encourage other history students to also embark on this incredibly rewarding endeavor.

The editorial board would also like to thank a number of people without whom this edition of the PHR would not have been possible. Our publication only exists thanks to the generous support of the Penn History Department who continues to support and fund us each year. In particular, we are extremely grateful to Dr. Ramya Sreenivasan, the Undergraduate Chair of the department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies. They have both offered invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout the editing and publishing processes. The dedication they have for both their students and field of study is an inspiration. In addition, we would like to thank the faculty members at Penn
and other universities who promoted our publication, as well as all of the students who submitted papers for consideration. This edition would not exist without your support. Thank you as well to our contributing authors, who worked patiently and diligently to refine their articles for publication.

Finally, I would like to thank our editors for their exceptionally hard work on this issue of the Penn History Review. I would especially like to recognize the contributions of our six graduating seniors: Eden Vance, Adrian Brown, Vito Acosta, Mark Wang, Bianca Serbin, and Alfredo Praticò. Their passion for history and dedication over the years have continued to make the PHR a platform for remarkable scholarship. It has been a truly enjoyable experience to work with each of them throughout my time on the board. We will miss having them in our editorial family but are confident that they will go on to do great things.

In particular, I would like to thank Eden Vance, our incredible Editor-in-Chief Emeritus. I have greatly enjoyed learning alongside him and following in his footsteps. He is disciplined, committed, knowledgeable and kind. Thank you so much for your assistance throughout my time on board and for the guidance that you have provided myself and others in your time as Editor-in-Chief. I wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors, beginning with law school and extending to whatever else you chose to pursue. I am confident that you will excel at anything you set your mind to, and I know that you will continue to challenge yourself intellectually as you embark on this new chapter of your life. It has truly been an honor to work with you and I have no doubt that PHR will eternally be a stronger publication because of your leadership. At the same time, I would like to recognize three new editors that we were especially fortunate to have added to the board this semester, Raja Promige, Ava Dove, and Jake Leff. They have already made a positive impact on our journal.
This year marks PHR’s thirty-first anniversary as a publication, and I am honored to mark my first semester as Editor-in-Chief with this issue of our journal. I feel so lucky to hold this position as it allows me to express my love for history and expand my own knowledge, while also presenting wonderful pieces of writing to the world. I am endlessly grateful to everyone who has kept PHR going and who will continue supporting it for years to come: the Penn History Department for providing funding and support, the countless authors and editors who have worked on past editions and, of course, my predecessors as Editor-in-Chief.

Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors who participated in this edition of the Penn History Review!

Hannah De Oliveira
Editor-in-Chief
In 1570, Pope Pius V promulgated the bull *Regnans in Ex- celsis*, excommunicating Queen Elizabeth I of England (r. 1558-1603) and absolving her subjects of allegiance to her. Although this drastic course of action exacerbated preexisting tensions between recusant Catholics and the established regime, it was by no means the starting point of Catholic attempts to undermine the Tudor Dynasty, and was the result of a prolonged period of tension and brinkmanship between between the Holy See and England. In the period following the excommunication, various schemes such as the 1571 Ridolfi Plot and the attempted invasion of the Spanish Armada in 1588 were confected with the goal of overthrowing Elizabeth and restoring Catholicism in England. While this period has received much attention from historians, the preceding period, in which the Holy See was reacting to and trying to manage a rapidly changing political-religious situation in England, bears investigating. It is during this period, lasting from 1534-1570, that four successive monarchs introduced diverse religious reforms, each of which posed a unique challenge to the Catholic hierarchy. Before 1534, when Henry VIII’s (r. 1509-1547) Act of Supremacy was passed, devotion to the Catholic faith was profound enough to merit England the title of ‘Our Lady’s Dowry,’ in reference to the special place and veneration given by
English Catholics to the Virgin Mary. After 1534, and especially during Elizabeth’s reign, various popes strove to reverse the reforms and restore English devotion and loyalty to the Catholic Church.

As early as the reign of Henry VIII, Catholics were attempting to undermine the Protestant reforms of the newly established English church. In 1535, northern English Catholics rose up against Henry’s efforts to dissolve the Catholic religious houses. This revolt, the Pilgrimage of Grace, was eventually suppressed, but it foreshadowed the strife and dissension of the coming decades. During the reign of Henry’s son, the boy-king Edward VI (r. 1547-1553), Catholics again revolted. In 1549, the English Church, by this point wholly divorced from Roman authority, adopted the new, thoroughly Protestant Book of Common Prayer. The Prayer Book Rebellion in the same year was the result. Twenty years later, in 1569, Catholic noblemen launched the Rising of the North and attempted to depose Elizabeth I and replace her with her Catholic cousin Mary, Queen of Scots (r. 1542-1567, d. 1587). Although all these attempts to reverse the English Reformation were unsuccessful, they are evidence of the fact that the religious changes might not have been as welcome as has been written by some scholars.

It was not until the reign of Edward VI that English Catholics were truly faced with the specter of Protestantism. Henry’s break concerned matters of governance. He effectively retained the Catholic religion in England with the major difference of his assuming personal control over it in opposition to the Bishop of Rome via the 1534 Act of Supremacy. This seeming usurpation, directly contradicting the authority of the Roman Church in spiritual matters, left English Catholics torn between their king and their pope. When Edward acceded to the throne in 1547, the regent, Edward Seymour, 1st Duke of Somerset, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer, began to implement a
program of theological and liturgical reform. These reforms were expressed in, among other various ordinances, the Book of Common Prayer, which prompted the eponymous rebellion. Although Catholics were granted a brief respite during the reign of the Catholic Mary I (r. 1553-1558), her sobriquet, Bloody Mary, not so subtly indicates that her time on the throne, and the Tudor Period generally, was hardly free of discord.

The Tudor Period, specifically the interval lasting from 1534, when the first Act of Supremacy was passed, to 1609, when the Scottish James VI Stuart (r. 1603-1625) acceded the throne, was assuredly a time of political instability and religious conflict. This was especially true in 1558, when Elizabeth succeeded her brother Edward, and the line of succession and status of the Roman Church in England were both uncertain. In due time, Elizabeth would go on to successfully secure England’s Protestant royal succession and state church, a feat of great political skill given the numerous attempts to undermine her government. The tumultuous, and ultimately triumphal, nature of Elizabeth’s reign has prompted much scholarship, especially with regard to the cloak-and-dagger efforts to secure her life and position. It is these efforts, in which the actions of the Catholic Church played such a pivotal role, which this project seeks to investigate through a new lens, that of the popes and his curia.

Although it would be impractical to attempt to provide a detailed historiography of all Elizabethan histories to the present, there are a number of important works which typify the more recent literature on the period, and which will distinguish the novel approach of this project. In addition, there is one extremely influential 16th century work worth discussing in relation to the topic of this project. Protestant English historian John Foxe’s Actes and Monuments, commonly known as Foxe’s Book of Martyrs, was pivotal in establishing notions of Roman Catholicism as an oppressive, outdated, and
foreign force in England, responsible for deaths of thousands of Britons. Although it was only published five years into Elizabeth’s reign, in 1563, its influence on later Whig history, and its conceptions of post-Reformation English Catholicism as a negative current that corrupted English society, is unparalleled.

This strain of English history, which has survived to the present in a less virulent form, was significantly challenged by Eamon Duffy in his 1992 seminal work, *The Stripping of the Altars*. The late 20th century saw a rise in the number of Elizabethan histories published, but Duffy’s work stands apart as a serious challenge to the academic status quo regarding the nature of popular Catholicism in 16th century England. For example, the idea advanced by John Foxe that the Catholic Church was suppressing popular religious texts in a pathetic attempt to maintain its ecclesiastical hegemony was rebuked by Duffy’s arguing that “the enormous surge in numbers of publication after 1505 did not flood the reading public with reforming tracts or refutations of the real presence.” Rather, there was an abundance of liturgical, devotional, and catechetical tracts published alongside almanacs and grammar books. There was a lively popular Catholicism in England before the Reformation, Duffy argues, and it was only after decades of anti-Catholic polemics and propaganda that the English were able to forget the devotion of not half a century prior.

The ultimate goal of this project is to describe the early years of Elizabeth’s reign and her religious policy from the perspective of the Vatican. Henry VIII’s break with Rome and the Tudor Dynasty’s subsequent marginalization of English Catholics led to a sort of cold war between England and the Holy See. Various popes and curial officials in Rome reacted to the English reforms in wildly different ways, producing a unique geopolitical situation that has yet to be studied from
the perspective of the Holy See. Initial operations, during the years of Edward VI and Elizabeth I, were primarily focused on gathering intelligence and eventually ministering to the country’s recusant Catholics. Later efforts were more hostile and sought to depose Elizabeth and replace her with Mary, Queen of Scots. These efforts were opposed by the Elizabethan intelligence services and organized by Catholics located throughout Europe. This project studies Vatican involvement in the former, and how the domestic, theological, and diplomatic pressures exerted on the papacy throughout this period influenced this involvement.

This research, in studying Catholic subterfuge in England through the neglected lens of Vatican diplomacy, seeks to contribute to existing scholarship on the history of the English Reformation and the political history of the Papacy. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, however, access to relevant primary source material has been extremely limited. A variety of collections and document compilations that would have been extremely helpful in crafting an argument capable of contributing to the scholarship covering this period were inaccessible. These materials included the State Papers Foreign collection (particularly *State Papers Foreign, Elizabeth I, 1558-1577* and *Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Italian States and Rome*) held in the British National Archives. More importantly, the key materials regarding the Vatican perspective were also inaccessible. The archives of the Venerable English College in Rome, along with Vatican Secret Library and archives of the Society of Jesus would have allowed for much more comprehensive research. According to Maurice Whitehead, the director of the archives at the English College, there are numerous collections in Rome which contain materials directly relevant to this project. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these materials are un-digitized and so it was impossible to investigate them.

Fortunately, there was a primary source collection of
essential importance to this project that was digitized. The *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Vatican Archives* includes two volumes, covering from 1558 to 1578. This collection was originally published in 1916, and its editor, J.M. Rigg, included only a limited amount of source material (the majority of which is located in the Vatican Secret Archives). These calendars, assembled by William Henry Bliss (1835-1911), an Oxford-educated scholar and adult convert to Catholicism, include summaries and translated transcriptions of a number of important primary source documents which discuss Vatican relations with England during the Elizabethan era. In 1877, the British Public Record Office (now the National Archives) tasked Bliss with researching the history of diplomatic interactions between Great Britain and the Vatican. He spent the latter half of his life working nine months out of the year in Rome. The result was two volumes which included a significant number of documents treating the relations between England, Scotland, and Ireland, on the one hand, and the Holy See and her Catholic allies on the other. Included within these volumes are 1) drafts and copies of papal briefs preserved in the Vatican Archives, 2) correspondence between the Holy See and lay and ecclesiastical dignitaries, and 3) the correspondence of the papal Secretaries of State with apostolic nuncios.

Through the use of the *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Vatican Archives*, and other extensive secondary source materials, this project is able to adequately describe the Vatican diplomacy of Elizabeth’s reign. The material presented is divided into an introduction, two body chapters, and a conclusion, along with supplementary material. The introduction presents the context and ideas that influenced the formulation of this project and discusses the existing historiography and introduces the political-religious context. The first chapter covers the first year of Elizabeth’s reign and the dynamic between her and Pope Paul IV, which had tremendous consequences for the future of Catholicism.
in England. The second chapter covers the early portion of Elizabeth’s reign, in the 1560s, her excommunication by Pius V in 1570, and its consequences. Finally, the conclusion offers a general evaluation of the project and the claims it makes. Throughout this thesis, ideas and events are discussed which could merit book-length publications in their own right. This made deciding what to include and what to exclude a great challenge. Nevertheless, this project is able to provide a well-supported argument as to the motivations behind the different courses of action taken by various popes and a diplomatic history of English Reformation from the Vatican’s perspective.

III: LIKE FATHER, LIKE DAUGHTER: PAPAL REACTIONS TO THE ELIZABETHAN RELIGIOUS SETTLEMENT

During the years of Henry VIII and his two successors, Edward and Mary, the English Church was rocked by a series of major reforms. In less than three decades, it had been reorganized under the crown, reformed according to Protestant doctrine, and restored to Catholic liturgy and authority. Thus, when Elizabeth, Henry’s daughter by his second wife, Anne Boleyn, acceded the throne in 1558, the future of the English Church was very much uncertain. Catholic officials in Rome, previously content with Queen Mary’s religious policy, were now forced to come to terms with the possibility of a second, permanent schism. Elizabeth was opposed on multiple fronts, both by vehemently Protestant elements who wished to continue the reforms of the Edwardian period, and by Catholic functionaries who had served Mary I, such as the Catholic bishops in the House of Lords. Nevertheless, Elizabeth charted out a path between the various religious groups in England, which all advocated for a particular model of the English Church. This new religious status quo, known as the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, cemented many of her father
and half-brother’s reforms while maintaining select Catholic elements restored by Mary. Pope Paul IV’s response to this new settlement was perplexing, and scholars today still debate its purpose. Nevertheless, his actions, or rather, inaction, become more understandable when evaluated together with the political context and intelligence he received.

Queen Elizabeth’s early life was relatively lackluster; she was born in Greenwich Palace in 1533 to little fanfare. King Henry, her father, had divorced his first wife in order to marry Elizabeth’s mother, who was to produce for him his much-desired male heir. When the result was yet another daughter, Henry was less than pleased. Boleyn was executed before Elizabeth turned three, and the annulment of Henry and Boleyn’s marriage issued by Parliament meant that Elizabeth was illegitimate and could not inherit. She was raised by courtiers at Hatfield House and remained relatively uninvolved with political affairs. Since she had been reinstated to the line of succession in the final years of Henry’s reign, all Elizabeth had to do to become queen was wait. While she outwardly conformed to Catholic practices during the reign of her half-sister Mary, she also remained the focus of plots to overthrow the new government and restore the Edwardian reforms. She was viewed with heavy suspicion after Wyatt’s Rebellion in 1554 and was only narrowly able to escape execution. After 1554, Elizabeth publicly and openly confirmed her allegiance to her sister while adroitly avoiding the question of her religion. She obviously never dared oppose Mary, but also maintained a neutral public image. As a result, Protestants and Catholics alike speculated as to her true alignment, which became a serious matter when Mary died childless on November 17, 1558. 

Elizabeth’s accession following Mary’s untimely demise was met with widespread jubilation and accompanied by public parades, processions, and bonfires. A far cry from the instability following the death of King Edward, Elizabeth’s entrance into London captivated the people and captured their
hearts and minds. In her first public appearance as queen, Elizabeth offered spectators a glimpse into the future by first publicly kissing an English translation of the Bible (banned under Queen Mary) and subsequently dismissing the candle-wielding, conservative monks of Westminster Abbey who had come outside to meet her. Like her half-brother, Elizabeth was hailed as a type of legendary biblical figure, Deborah in this case. Numerous pageants celebrating her coronation framed Elizabeth as a harbinger of political stability and religious harmony. While it did seem as if a return to reformation was likely given her involvement with Wyatt’s Rebellion, in actuality things were not so clear. The question of Elizabeth’s true religious convictions continues to be debated and is beyond the scope of this project. It is clear, however, that Elizabeth was forced to reckon with a number of hostile forces, both internal and external, in order to secure her position. As a result, she asserted more authority in matters of state than any of her Tudor predecessors.

Queen Elizabeth I, circa 1585
Given the pivotal role Elizabeth was bound to play in settling the question of English religion, at least for the near future if not permanently, it is not surprising that both Catholic and Protestant forces sought to observe and influence the Queen. Entries in the papal diary dated December 1558 record the official papal reactions to Mary’s death and Elizabeth’s accession:

To-day came tidings of the death of the Queen of England, wife of the Catholic King. She had ever lived as became a Catholic, and had been the means of bringing England back to obedience of the Holy Roman Church.

And:

The French in view of the Queen of England’s death grew luke-warm about the peace and hopeful of detaching that kingdom from King Philip or uniting it with that of Scotland, and (among other means to that end) were instant with the Pope that he should declare Queen Elizabeth illegitimate, and, as it were, of incestuous birth, and consequently incapable of succeeding to the throne, whereby they pretended that the crown would belong to the Queen of Scotland.  

In emphasizing Mary’s role in bringing about the return of England to Catholicism, it is apparent that Pope Paul IV was concerned about whether these efforts would continue. In addition, Pope Paul was also forced to consider French geopolitical strategy, which sought to see England ruled by the Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots, husband of Francis, Dauphin of France. A letter from Sir Edward Carne, the English minister in Rome, where he writes that the French ambassador is pressuring Paul to excommunicate Elizabeth and establish Mary Stuart as the legitimate queen, also supports this idea. Although it has often been written that Paul caved into French
demands to declare Elizabeth illegitimate, there is no evidence that he ever did.\textsuperscript{13}

Pope Paul was by no means a tolerant figure; he was renowned for his anti-Protestant zeal and prodigious support of the Inquisition. In 1557 he introduced the Index of Prohibited Books (by which Catholics were forbidden, under pain of sin, to read any of the listed titles) and he also centralized his authority by suspending the Council of Trent and replacing it with a commission of bishops, prelates, and theologians.\textsuperscript{14} While Paul might have considered similar abrasive strategies in England following Elizabeth’s accession, it initially did not seem necessary. Catholicism in England was in fact very lively in the late 1550s and informed the life of both prince and pauper.\textsuperscript{15} The above excerpts from the papal diary establish that the Vatican was at least receptive to the news of Elizabeth’s accession, even if they were naturally uncertain about the extent to which the Catholic Church in England would be affected. Nevertheless, it was not likely that this diplomatic courtesy would persist if Elizabeth declared herself a Protestant and separated the Church in England yet again from Roman authority. In addition, the excerpts show that French diplomats, no doubt influenced by their own foreign policy objectives, were lobbying Paul for Elizabeth’s excommunication very soon into her reign. And yet, given this pressure, and Pope Paul’s own over-enthusiastic tendency to go on the offensive, he still did not act decisively at the outset, perhaps the only point at which papal condemnation could have effected a real change in English governance. Considering all these factors, it appears, then, that Pope Paul did not act because he did not think he needed to act—Elizabeth was likely going to remain Catholic, but if he acted against her, then she surely would not.

Upon initial observation, it would seem that maintaining Catholicism was the path of least resistance for Elizabeth. Since the Church had already been reestablished by Mary, Elizabeth would not have to pass any new legislation or make any drastic
structural changes. She had also already publicly conformed to Catholic teaching and even continued attending Mass during the first few months of her reign. Furthermore, an open affirmation of her allegiance to the Pope would have offered her protection from French claims to her throne grounded in accusations of heresy and illegitimacy. On the other hand, continuing Mary’s policies would likely have forced England into an alliance with Spain and possibly resulted in a marriage between Elizabeth and Mary’s widow, Philip. Elizabeth was intimately familiar with the opposition Mary experienced over her own pro-Spanish policy and was likely unwilling to take any course of action that could jeopardize her position. Elizabeth also faced potential opposition from the ever-important landed gentry and nobility, who had never altogether fallen in line behind Mary and whom Elizabeth needed now more than ever. For these and a number of other reasons, including parliamentary opposition and the likely alienation of skilled Protestant advisors, Elizabeth began to move England away from Catholicism.¹⁶

On December 1, 1558, Elizabeth’s advisors, led by her moderate Protestant principal secretary, Sir William Cecil, produced a document entitled “A Device for the Alteration of Religion,” which provided a framework for introducing new acts of supremacy and uniformity, and the likely diplomatic consequences of such a course of action (which included the excommunication of Elizabeth and the invasion of England by France).¹⁷ The “Device” is evidence of the fact that the Privy Council reasonably expected that a change in religion would bring a swift excommunication and, in keeping the plans secret until the last moment, the council’s belief that such an excommunication could have a deleterious effect on the planned reform. These ideas were not mistaken: an excommunication would make gathering support in the House of Commons significantly more difficult and entry in the papal diary from December 1558 details a French plan to unite...
England and Scotland under Mary Stuart, by war if necessary, if Elizabeth is excommunicated. King Henry II of France (r. 1547-1559) made no effort to disguise his true intentions, going as far as to display the French arms together with those of England and Scotland in his palace. Elizabeth’s position was still uncertain and an early excommunication along with a war with France would have spelled disaster.

It did not take long for Pope Paul, and King Philip of Spain, to learn of Elizabeth’s plans. On December 27, 1558, Elizabeth issued a decree prohibiting public preaching on any topic save for scripture and allowed for components of the liturgy to be said in English instead of Latin until Parliament could meet and implement new religious measures. Although it was not an explicit declaration of her Protestant intentions, it was enough to cause Pope Paul and Philip significant alarm. An entry in the papal diary dated January 1559 reads:

At last, this month, the Queen of England has declared herself a Lutheran, and made a decree that there is to be no preaching save of the Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul...She suffered all to live after their own fashion until she declared by decree of Parliament that they ought to live according to the true and pure faith, by which she meant the faith as the Lutherans understand it. King Philip has given the said Queen to understand that, since she will not live after the Catholic fashion, she shall have no more of his alliance, and that English affairs concern him no further.

Elizabeth, in issuing the decree, exerted authority in the ecclesial realm for only the second time in her reign (the first, after her accession, was ironically to forbid any religious changes). In compelling obedience on a minor but important matter like the topic of sermons, she was able to confirm clerical submission and prepare the English Church for
the coming of wider-reaching changes, such as another re-organization. The decree also had the added effect of preventing preaching on the changes Elizabeth was planning to implement. At this point Elizabeth was supported by neither the French nor the Spanish and had taken the first steps towards reestablishing an independent English Church. Still, Pope Paul vacillated and failed to take decisive action against the queen by either declaring her illegitimate or excommunicating her. It is likely that he was holding out in the hopes that Elizabeth would maintain Catholicism in England and not stray too far from Roman authority. Evidence of these hopes exists in a letter from John Francis Canobio, ostensibly a papal courier, where he writes that “the Queen is badly infected with heresy… and it will be no easy matter to cure her, but God is powerful.”

As the situation in London worsened, Pope Paul continued receiving intelligence reports. One of these reports, dated to March 1559, describes the dire parliamentary situation just one month before the new Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity were introduced. First, instead of adjourning for Holy Week, the Houses met through Thursday. The Catholic bishops in the House of Lords passed articles asserting the supremacy of the Catholic Church, which were poorly received by the lower House of Commons. Also, Queen Elizabeth attended Easter Mass celebrated in the way it would have been during the reign of her half-brother, King Edward, and received Communion under both species. Worst of all, the report asserts that “preachers from Germany” have been breaking into churches, stripping them of their ornaments, and desecrating the Sacred Host. The only possible silver lining, the report claims, is that Elizabeth will notice the strife and controversy caused by her plans and “resolve to have no more of it.” Unfortunately for Paul, Elizabeth resolved to do quite the opposite.

In April, Sir William Cecil introduced to the lower
house an Act of Supremacy to re-establish crown control of the English Church and an Act of Uniformity to return English worship to the Book of Common Prayer. The latter act chose the considerably Protestant 1552 Prayer Book and not the more moderate 1549 Prayer Book, which might have been acceptable to a greater part of the public. Although Cecil had introduced a reform bill as early as February 1559, it had been heavily amended and rendered inert by the Catholics in the House of Lords. Now, Cecil’s plan for preventing a similar outcome was to frame parliamentary debate in Protestant terms, thus discouraging the Catholic Bishops from participating. These bishops were by no means a majority in the upper house, but they wielded significant influence and led a faction of Catholic lay lords, who together formed a majority that could derail any potential reform. So, when debate began on Cecil’s new Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, and leading Bishops White and Watson walked out in protest, the government had sufficient justification to charge them with contempt and imprison them in the Tower of London. Without White and Watson, the Catholics in the Lords were very close to losing their majority.

In April 1559 the House of Commons passed the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity without issue. For Cecil, such an outcome was expected, but there was still no guarantee that the Lords would not yet again block the bills. Ultimately, there was opposition in the upper house but not enough to block the passage of the acts because, in addition to Watson and White, two other Catholic prelates were absent. The Supremacy Act passed with a minor amendment and without the support of a single bishop. The Uniformity Act passed with a narrower margin, eighteen against and twenty-one in favor, and was also opposed by every bishop present. For the first time in English history, substantial religious change was implemented in the legislature without the support of a single cleric. The new Supremacy Act bestowed upon Elizabeth the less controversial title of Supreme Governor, rather than Head, and restored
the Henrician protocol for appointing bishops, making it the sovereign’s prerogative. The Uniformity Act reimposed, with few changes, the 1552 Prayer Book, while still allowing for some Catholic vesture and ceremonial, and also required attendance at Church by all the people.

There was little widespread resistance to the Elizabethan Settlement. Under Mary, many thousands—the vast majority—of priests accepted the return to the Mass and to the Catholic hierarchy. Now, these same priests, with only a few hundred exceptions, willingly accepted the return to the 1552 Prayer Book and to national English authority. In April and May, Elizabeth re-dissolved the monasteries and religious houses that had been restored by Queen Mary. The new Supremacy Act was widely supported by owners of land that had been originally seized from religious orders during Henry’s dissolution of the monasteries. Although Pope Julius III had allowed Cardinal Pole to leave the land with its new owners, there was no guarantee that Pope Paul IV would continue this policy. Now that he lacked the ability to affect land ownership at all, the landowners’ title was secure. In addition to undoing the Marian restoration, the acts required explicit loyalty in the form of an oath from public officials and at least outward conformity from everyone else. The penalties imposed on those who refused were severe and ranged from a hefty fine to life imprisonment. Catholic priest and historian Philip Hughes best described the situation for Catholics in England when he wrote “the queen’s subjects may continue to be Catholics, so long as they pretend to be Protestants.”

It would not be an overestimation to claim that the majority of the country was Catholic at the time of the settlement, and that only a small minority were really committed Protestants intent on altering the religious framework of a nation. Nevertheless, it is impossible to know just how many Catholics were willing to risk imprisonment for the sake of papal authority. The Catholic bishops that did take a stand
were quickly replaced and Catholic aristocrats generally stayed out of the spotlight. The vast majority of priests conformed and thus left those Catholics who were willing to keep the faith without guidance or ministry until 1574, when the first seminary priests arrived in secret. Even then, the damage had been done. Rome failed tremendously in, first, not reacting to the situation rapidly and sending new priests to minister to recusant Catholics and, second, in not taking a firm stance against Catholics attending Protestant services for the sake of conformity (when the Council of Trent finally did in 1562, it was too late to effectively spread the information). Although there were still pockets of resistance, especially in Lancashire and Chichester, where Catholic priests continued to openly offer the Sacraments, the average Catholic had been placed in an impossible position. He was faced with significant penalties for breaking the new laws, and when his parish priest and local lord all followed the new Elizabethan program, who was he not to follow their example?  

With the passage of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, Pope Paul’s hopes that England would remain a Catholic nation should have been completely lost. The acts definitively rejected Catholic liturgy and authority. Yet in a letter to the pope, John Francis Canobio was not discouraged. He claimed that Elizabeth was in fact indecisive and was only being “pressed by her heresiarchs to accept the Augsburg confession and enjoin its observance.” Such a communication suggested that the matter was not final, and Canobio continued to say that the Count of Feria, an advisor of King Philip, was actively working to restrain Elizabeth and succeeded insofar as the queen delayed making her will regarding the Augsburg Confession clear. Nevertheless, such a radical shift would have been the furthest towards Protestantism the English Reformation had ever gone, but, yet again, Pope Paul refused to act. It is possible he truly believed that Elizabeth was merely under the influence of an unscrupulous clique of Protestant
ministers, as the letters he received seemed to suggest, and did not want to take action that could push her in the opposing direction. Instead, he merely considered a plan for establishing an official intelligence network to provide the pope with more consistent reports of English affairs. The network relied on organizing a communication network amongst exiled English courtiers, such as Sir Francis Englefield. Although the plan gives little indication as to whether or not it was adopted, it very likely was, given that numerous English Catholic exiles did go on to participate in the espionage efforts of the succeeding decades. If Pope Paul ever had a long-term plan to bring England back into the fold following the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, it was never implemented; he died shortly thereafter in August 1559.

On balance, Pope Paul IV managed English affairs poorly. He often quarreled with Queen Mary and Cardinal Pole and when the time came for yet another Act of Supremacy, Paul made it all too easy for Elizabeth and her advisors to yet again separate the English Church from papal authority. When he died in August 1559, Rome erupted into joy over the demise of the ruthless pope. A mob went as far as to attack the Inquisition’s headquarters, seize his statue, and lob its head into the Tiber.

His domestic legacy aside, Pope Paul set the stage for the hostile papal diplomacy of the late 16th century by failing to take decisive action against Elizabeth. His inaction was not the result of ignorance (as the state papers show) or cowardice (he excommunicated many other secular rulers). Rather, Pope Paul seemed to genuinely believe that Elizabeth could be persuaded to maintain the Marian status quo. This theory is supported by numerous communications between the pope and his advisors. Even as late as March 1559, a month before the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity were passed, papal communications were hopeful that Elizabeth would not go through with plans to reintroduce Protestantism. In addition,
the plan for establishing an intelligence network claims that:

considering also that the Queen, notwithstanding her perversity in religion, has not as yet shown any disposition to deal rigorously with the persons of those lay lords and churchmen who have refused to take the oath of obedience or deny the Catholic religion, but has merely deprived them of their offices and benefices, still suffering them to abide in the realm, and in some cases to live abroad in the enjoyment of their revenues: there is therefore reason to hope that in the course of time, and the chapter of accidents, the Queen will be compelled, or perchance inspired by God, to restore the obedience of the realm to the Apostolic See, and to return to the Catholic religion.\textsuperscript{34}

There was hope in the Vatican that, even following the new Religious Settlement, Elizabeth would return the English Church to Catholic administration. This, coupled with a report that King Philip of Spain was still considering a marriage to Elizabeth, gave Pope Paul all the reason he needed to hesitate. The same plan goes on to directly recommend against following French requests to excommunicate and declare Elizabeth illegitimate: “All this his Holiness is accordingly prayed to consider, piously and prudently cherishing, as far as may be, this hope, and not suffering Princes to induce him to make war upon the Queen, as he may well be solicited and besought to do.”\textsuperscript{35}

Pope Paul naturally trusted the information he received from his advisors, and also followed recommendations that he not act rashly against Elizabeth. The course of action Paul followed, namely, that of inaction, was undertaken with the hope that Elizabeth would not follow the advice of counselors like Sir William Cecil. Somewhat ironically, it was this inaction which allowed the Elizabethan Settlement to
take root in the English religious landscape. Elizabeth played a game of brinksmanship with the pope: swift action could spell victory or defeat for either of them. In keeping her intentions discreet, she was able to both mollify Pope Paul and keep him at a distance. The lull in hostilities enabled her to secure her own position. In April the Religious Settlement came into force and in May she made peace with France and Scotland, both of which would have been remarkably more difficult to achieve under the pall of papal excommunication. Such a penalty would have further emboldened France and Scotland against her, provided Spain and the Holy Roman Empire with an incentive to declare war, and set the stage for domestic instability and difficulties with dealing with Parliament. Thus, the interaction between Elizabeth and Pope Paul IV was of monumental consequence: it resulted in the secure establishment of her regime and set the stage for future Vatican espionage in England. Paul would surely have lamented such an outcome. Nevertheless, it was his adamant belief that Catholicism in England could be saved that allowed Protestantism to take hold again.

IV: POTENS EST DEUS: A NEW CHAPTER IN VATICAN DIPLOMACY

In the first years of Elizabeth’s reign, the Vatican was still trying to decipher what Elizabeth’s intentions were, and whether she could be brought to restore Catholicism in England. Throughout this period, lasting roughly from 1559 to 1570, Vatican diplomacy was unconfident and submissive. Pius IV, the pope succeeding Paul IV, also failed to excommunicate Elizabeth, a decision influenced both by his conciliatory foreign policy and his desire not to alienate Catholic Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, neither of which wanted papal action against England. On the other hand, Pius IV’s successor, Pius V, prioritized settling the matter of Elizabeth’s alignment once
and for all, even if it meant acting against the wishes of King Philip of Spain and Ferdinand of the Holy Roman Empire. Furthermore, the Vatican’s foreign policy was inconsistent, not only because it had to cope with a change in pope every decade or so, but also because there were two opposing strains of thought that different popes embodied. It is no surprise then, that it took the Vatican eleven years from the time the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity were passed in 1559 to finally declare Elizabeth excommunicate in 1570. Without the formal excommunication, papal relations with England were inconsistent and based more on the surrounding geopolitical context, rather than being influenced by a coherent program of objectives meant to restore Catholicism.

Following the death of Pope Paul IV, the cardinals gathered in Rome to elect his successor. They had to be cautious about whom they elected; another pope as uninhibited as Paul could spell disaster for the Catholic Church. Paul had not exactly engendered friendly relations with the monarchs of Europe. He despised the Spanish and King Philip II for their domination of his homeland, Naples, and had broken relations with Holy Roman Emperor Charles V over his concession of the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. He went as far as to ally himself with King Henry II of France and go to war with Spain, a war which he ultimately lost when the Duke of Alba invaded the Papal States from Naples and successfully conquered the port city of Ostia in 1557. Although the Spanish spared Rome, Paul made King Philip’s wife’s efforts to restore Catholicism in England difficult by attempting to prosecute the estimable Cardinal Pole. His last, and most consequential, failure was his inaction in the face of an English Protestant resurgence. Pope Paul might have done more damage had he not died in August 1559, a few months after Elizabeth’s mutiny.

The story of Paul IV is a genuinely tragic one; he was a man of great courage and integrity, but he was narrow-
minded at a time of great change and instability. He attempted to control matters far outside of his realm and likely made matters less favorable than if he had not intervened at all. The contrast between Paul IV and his predecessor, Paul III, could not be more drastic. The latter was a *bon vivant* who did the bare minimum to keep the Counter-Reformation machinery running while the former was a moralist who attempted to impose his harsh vision on all who surrounded him. Paul III’s papacy embodied the plurality of voices that had characterized the Renaissance: it had accommodated both the theological musings of the Catholic humanists, like Cardinal Pole, and the unyielding dogmatism of those like Carafa. It encouraged religious exploration and novel ideas on spirituality, within bounds, like those of Ignatius of Loyola and the Jesuits. On the other hand, Paul IV embodied a reactionary Church and diverted efforts from “the exploration of truth to the suppression of error,” as scholar Eamon Duffy put it. For the rest of the Counter-Reformation, the Church moved between these two poles, and the main concern of succeeding popes was to reconcile them.

In 1559, after four months of deadlock, the Conclave in Rome elected Giovanni Angelo Medici, a moderate figure who embodied the Renaissance tradition most recently promoted by Pope Paul III. Medici (whose relation to the great Florentine family is still debated) took the name Pius IV (r. 1559-1565). Unlike his predecessor, Pius was a lively pope who made no effort to conceal his three natural children. Moral failings aside, he undid many of Pope Paul IV’s unwise policies. First, he dissolved the commission Paul had established to perform the functions of the Council of Trent and reestablished the council itself. Second, he mended relations with King Philip of Spain and his brother, the new Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. Last, he restricted the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, reduced the size of the Index of Prohibited Books, and had Paul IV’s corrupt nephews, who had fallen from grace in
the final months of his papacy, executed. Pius also raised one of his own nephews, Carlo Borromeo, to the cardinalate and appointed him Archbishop of Milan. Unlike previous Cardinal nephews, however, Borromeo was reverent, dedicated to serving the poor, and an exceptional theologian and administrator—he was eventually canonized and remains widely venerated.

With regard to England, Pius did not deviate from the course charted out by Paul IV. By the time of his election, England was rapidly moving again towards Protestantism, but Pius did not attempt to excommunicate Elizabeth. A Vatican report from April 1560 suggests that like his predecessor, Pius believed that the Elizabethan Settlement was not final:

The Pope, having watched for some time the course of events in England with a view to finding means to bring that realm back to the Catholic religion, is now apprised that the English Catholics will persist in their opinion
not without hope that the Queen may yet be willing to listen to proposals for the reconciliation of herself and her kingdom to the Holy See. The Pope, therefore, yesterday determined to send an envoy to the Queen to sound her disposition in regard to the said matter, and has chosen the Abbot of San Saluto for the purpose, though it is not yet known when he will depart.\textsuperscript{44}

In March, both Borromeo, who was the Pope’s principal advisor, and Pius himself sent letters to King Philip and Emperor Ferdinand, requesting that they aid the efforts of the Abbot of San Saluto, Vincenzo Parpaglia.\textsuperscript{45} Although the mission was not successful (Parpaglia never made it past Brussels) the reasons behind its failure shed light on the role that Spanish and French foreign policy objectives played in the Vatican’s diplomacy.

The situation in the Catholic Kingdom of Scotland changed tremendously in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. The Queen of Scotland, Mary Stuart, was living in France with her husband, Francis, son and heir of King Henry II of France, and so her mother, Mary of Guise, was administering Scotland as regent. Mary of Guise’s regime, however, was largely unpopular, and with the Scottish Reformation beginning in earnest in 1559, she needed French soldiers to secure her position. Although the presence of a foreign army in Scotland did not bolster Mary of Guise’s popularity, they were able to effectively nullify the threat of a Protestant revolution. These Protestants, led by preacher John Knox, sought English assistance. As early as August 1559, requests for aid were met with deliveries of money and arms, but this was not enough to defeat the French. Elizabeth finally acquiesced in early 1560, when she added her own forces to the Siege of Leith. The French effort was not lost, however, until spring 1560, when they lost their fleet in a storm. This disaster was followed shortly by a domestic Huguenot conspiracy to take control of
the government in March and the death of Mary of Guise in June. With victory seeming less and less likely, the French sued for peace.\textsuperscript{46}

The Treaty of Edinburgh was negotiated in July 1560 by representatives of Queen Elizabeth, the Scottish Protestant Lords of the Congregation, and King Francis II of France (Mary Stuart’s husband, who succeeded his father, Henry II, in July 1559). The treaty guaranteed the removal of French forces from Scotland, installed the Lords of the Congregation as the new provisional government of Scotland, continued the Anglo-French peace originally established by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, and established a new Anglo-Scottish alliance. While France turned its attention inward to focus on the growing Huguenot threat, Mary Stuart was left in the gutter. First, Scotland was no longer a Catholic country. Second, the Franco-Scottish “Auld Alliance” was no more. Last, her husband, King Francis, died in 1560, and his mother, the new regent Catherine de’ Medici, excluded her completely from French governance. Eventually, in August 1561, Mary Stuart returned to Scotland and recognized the Reformation.\textsuperscript{47}

Although French endeavors in Scotland came to an end in July 1560, Parpaglia was dispatched in April, and King Philip of Spain had reason to suspect he was part of a French conspiracy to excommunicate Elizabeth and provide them with a justification for invasion, which could place England in the French sphere of influence. Parpaglia’s mission was anything but, and it had actually been conceived of independently by the pope. Philip nevertheless prevented the emissary from leaving the Low Countries and the mission was a failure.\textsuperscript{48}

As the situation unfolded in Scotland, the pope continued to receive regular intelligence reports. These reports, which include a description of the Siege of Leith, warn Pope Pius that an English fleet would soon set sail to block the arrival of French reinforcement (which does indeed happen). Another report describes in detail the terms of the Treaty
of Edinburgh.\textsuperscript{49} Now that the treaty had assuaged Philip’s anxieties regarding French hegemony, Pius resolved to send another emissary to Elizabeth, this time choosing Abbot Girolamo Martinengo. Martinengo’s mission was to re-establish relations with Queen Elizabeth and invite her to attend the re-opening of the Council of Trent.\textsuperscript{50} Unfortunately, the English Privy Council, led by Sir William Cecil, voted to refuse Martinengo entry into the country. A letter from John Francis Commendone, the Apostolic Nuncio to Lower Germany, to Hercules Gonzaga, Cardinal Archbishop of Mantua, describes the Privy Council’s reasoning:

\begin{quote}
The Queen, I understand, alleges three principal grounds for Martinengo’s exclusion: 1, that unlike other princes, she was not consulted as to the summoning of the Council; 2, that the Council is not free, pious and Christian, and that, had it been so, she would have sent to it men learned and pious in the name of the Anglican Church; 3, that the Pope likewise seeks to stir up the Catholics in her kingdom and raise sedition, and in that regard she complains that an Irishman was sent from Rome to Ireland for such a purpose.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Elizabeth, did not view the gesture as a one of goodwill, and took the opportunity to criticize the council and shore up the position of the English Church in opposing it.

When King Philip heard of the Martinengo’s rejection, he acted swiftly to prevent the likely outcome: excommunication. If Pope Pius was delaying in announcing such a penalty because of a hope that Elizabeth could still be convinced to return to Catholicism, such hopes would surely have been dashed following the spurning of his personal representative. King Philip nonetheless sought to prevent a bull of excommunication because such a bull might have prompted a French invasion of England. Philip wrote to
his ambassador in Rome to prevent any steps being taken towards excommunicating Elizabeth, to guarantee that, should the opportunity present itself, he would restore Catholicism in England by force, and to suggest that the pope offer the English crown to Philip if their efforts should be successful. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Pope Pius had not agreed to the last point, it is unlikely given that by 1561 the Vatican was beginning to regard Mary Stuart as the rightful Queen of England. What Philip’s communication to Rome does prove is that no longer was the papacy influenced in its inaction against England by a misperception that a peaceful return to the faith was possible. Rather, now the pope was under pressure to not excommunicate Elizabeth, which he otherwise would likely have done, because of Spanish concerns of French domination in England.  

Throughout the 1560s, English domestic politics were focused primarily on the questions of succession and marriage. Elizabeth fell deeply ill in 1562 and in 1564, which made the question of an heir ever more pressing. The strongest claimant to the throne was Mary Stuart (who was the granddaughter of Henry VIII’s sister, Margaret, and King James IV of Scotland), followed by her aunt, the Countess of Lenox (Margaret’s daughter by her second husband). Legally, however, Elizabeth’s heir presumptive was Lady Katherine Grey (Jane Grey’s younger sister), who was given precedence by Henry VIII’s 1544 Act of Succession. Elizabeth did not explicitly recognize anyone’s claim as legitimate, and actually had Lady Katherine imprisoned for contracting a marriage without her permission (she died under house arrest in 1568). Mary was open to the possibility of succession but did not wish to be seen as Elizabeth’s pawn, so in 1565 she married the Countess of Lenox’s son, Lord Darnley, thus uniting the two strongest claims to the throne in the person of her son, James, who was born in 1566. Elizabeth was understandably incensed by Mary’s unilateral marriage, but her upper hand did not last long. Lord Darnley was murdered in 1567, and Mary was forced to flee to
England after her marriage to Darnley’s alleged murderer, the Earl of Bothwell, provoked the nobility to force her to abdicate in favor of her son.53

The Council of Trent, which had recently reconvened, soon became involved in the question of how to respond to Elizabeth. There was only one English bishop at the council, Thomas Goldwell, as the rest had been imprisoned by Elizabeth. In 1563, as the council began to draft its decrees, Pope Pius sent a communication to his legates:

His Holiness says that as the Decrees of the Council involve the condemnation of the Queen of England, the Protestants and the Huguenots, you will do well to begin considering what will be the proper procedure on your own and his Holiness’ part, and to send his Holiness your opinion in writing, especially in regard to the Queen of England, as soon as possible.54

At this point, the intention of the Pope to excommunicate Elizabeth is clear, and English Catholic exiles, like Nicholas Sanders, proposed a radical course of action. They advocated for not only excommunicating Elizabeth, but also for absolving her subjects of allegiance to her, confirming Mary Stuart as the rightful queen, and sending a delegation of English Catholics to offer her the crown. The papal legates directing the council entertained the proposals and summoned French, Spanish, and German representatives to consider them. The reactions were not positive. The Germans and Spanish condemned the proposals for different reasons: the Germans were concerned about the possibility of domestic Protestant uprisings and the Spanish were still cautious of French foreign policy objectives in England.55

When Pope Pius IV was informed of the adverse reactions, he quickly backtracked, and revoked the letter he sent requesting a condemnation of Elizabeth in some form:
I wrote to you on the 7th to the effect that his Holiness, giving more weight to the judgment of the Emperor than to that of any other person, was content that you should walk warily and take no proceedings as yet against the Queen of England. This I am now for the same reason bidden by his Holiness to repeat, with the addition that in regard to this and all other matters of policy that might affect the peace of Germany and other countries in which there is a danger of violent action being taken on account of religion, his Holiness will be well pleased that you should be guided by the advice and opinion of the Emperor, in whose judgment and goodness his Holiness has reason to confide, knowing him to be most prudent and abounding in Christian zeal.\textsuperscript{56}

The Council instead pronounced a general excommunication on all who rejected its decrees but did not single out Elizabeth or any other Protestants. Although a particular excommunication of Elizabeth might seem inevitable, the constant debate surrounding the question shows that it was anything but. On the one hand, Church officials and the English Catholic exiles supported a hardline policy, while the Catholic statesmen viewed such a policy as a hindrance. The pope was forced to grapple with these two currents, but ultimately gave in to the politicians over his own advisors. If he could not excommunicate Elizabeth, he could at least begin to exert some sort of pressure upon her regime.\textsuperscript{57} So, Pope Paul requested that the Holy Roman Empire and Spain press Elizabeth to release the many Catholic bishops she had imprisoned (who, unlike the bishops during Henry VIII’s reign, staunchly refused to submit to the crown’s arrogation of ecclesiastical authority). Emperor Ferdinand wrote and petitioned for a release of bishops, along with a degree of toleration towards Catholics, as was then the case for the
Huguenots in France. In her response, Elizabeth of course refused his request, and assumed the mantle of ‘Catholic Church’ for her own English Church.\footnote{58}

In December 1563, the Council of Trent met for the final time. The council, which had been first opened by Pope Paul III in 1545, had done a great deal to equip the Church with the tools necessary to combat Protestantism. In 1564, Pope Pius issued the papal bull \textit{Benedictus Deus}, which ratified all the decrees of the council and declared them as binding upon all Catholics under pain of excommunication. These decrees covered the most controversial theological topics of the period, such as the nature of justification, the seven Sacraments, saints and relics, and, of course, indulgences. Pius continued the council’s mission by producing a catechism to teach the decrees of the council and by beginning the process of codifying the Catholic liturgical books.\footnote{59} After Trent, the pope took no action against Elizabeth. In a consistory in June 1565, he addressed Elizabeth with affection and declared that a policy of reconciliation ought to be the way forward for the Church. Unlike his predecessor, Pius was unwilling to act unilaterally or decisively, but they both refrained from directly attacking Elizabeth or the re-established English Church. He died in December 1565.\footnote{60}

Along with his numerous political accomplishments, Pope Pius was a great patron of the Renaissance tradition. In Rome and Papal States, he supported artists and philosophers, founded schools and universities, and sponsored the construction of public works (improving Rome’s water supply) and new churches. Even as the English situation continued to deteriorate, Pope Pius had, on balance, left the Church in a better position than that in which he had found it upon his accession to the papacy.\footnote{61} In 1566, the Conclave gathered in Rome to elect Pius’s successor. His nephew, the admirable Carlo Borromeo was the preferred candidate, but he made
clear that he would not accept the office if elected, and instead recommended the austere Michele Ghislieri. Ghislieri, who had served as Inquisitor General under Paul IV, was elected in 1566 and took the name Pius V (r. 1566-1572). Just as the pendulum had swung one in one direction during the papacy of Pius IV, it swung back in the other during the reign of Pius V. He, among other things, reinvigorated the Inquisition and also adopted Pope Paul IV’s mistrust of the Spanish.  

Pius V had humble origins; he was a shepherd in his youth who had responded to a vocation with the Dominicans. Underneath his papal robes he wore the abrasive habit of his order and he consumed mostly vegetable broth and shellfish. He expected similar ascetism and devotion from those around him and worked to root out prostitution and blasphemy from everyday Roman society. Throughout his papacy, Pius had one goal: to keep Protestantism out of where it was not already and to actively fight against it where it was. While his methods and reliance on the Inquisition could be characterized as harsh at times, they were no doubt effective in Italy, which he managed to keep Catholic as the rest of Europe was plunged into religious wars. One of Pope Pius’s first orders of business was to reiterate the Council of Trent’s condemnation of the Catholic practice of attending Protestant services for the sake of conformity. Laurence Vaux, an English Catholic clergyman, attempted to spread this message personally now that the pope’s usual channels of communication were no longer an option, but he was mostly unsuccessful.  

Pius was brazen and much more willing to create enemies than his predecessor. He sent Bishop Vincent Lauri to help Mary in Scotland maintain her throne, but when she married the Earl of Bothwell in a Protestant ceremony, he condemned her with extremely forceful language. In another break from his predecessor, Pius sought to act decisively in the matter of Elizabeth’s excommunication. He had not, however,
begun his papacy with a hostile attitude. In a 1566 letter to Bernard Ferrario, a former confidante of Elizabeth who offered to try to persuade Elizabeth to return to Catholicism, one of the pope’s advisors writes:

We have shown the Pope the information containing your offer of your services for bringing Queen Elizabeth back to the obedience of Holy Church at the risk, if need be, of your own life; and, marking the just solicitude which is and has ever been yours for the exaltation of the holy faith, his Holiness is much gratified, and says that he desires you to send him a succinct account of the means which you would use to bring her Majesty back to the true faith; and if they should seem to him meet and expedient for the salvation of those people and the exaltation of Holy Church, he entirely approves their adoption, even though it were necessary to stake his own life upon the venture. Wherefore, desirous as We well know that you are to accomplish so good and holy a work, you will not fail to send a brief information of the method you purpose to employ for bringing that kingdom back to Holy Church, to which undertaking We doubt not that God will shew Himself favourable and propitious.66

Although these efforts were obviously not successful, Pius still did not seek to act alone. He communicated with the Spanish Duke of Alba for months, but ultimately made no progress as the Spanish were concerned primarily with French domination, and the excommunication of Elizabeth could very much engender such an outcome. The failure of the pope’s allies to seriously consider excommunication showed Pius that he needed to act alone, if at all.67
Concurrently with the deliberations regarding the excommunication, Catholic landowners in the north of England were considering yet another uprising. The Elizabethan Religious Settlement was not as widely accepted in the north where, in the Dioceses of Carlisle, Durham, and York, the Catholic Mass was said openly. Elizabeth dealt with the situation by removing the northern aristocrats from their posts and replacing them with loyal southerners. For leading northern peers, the Earl of Northumberland and the Earl of Westmorland, the queen had gone too far. Their response to Elizabeth’s action was to plan a coup that would see Elizabeth replaced by Mary Stuart, and see Mary married to the Duke of Norfolk, premier peer of the realm. Both Northumberland and Westmorland had more personal reasons for plotting to revolt as well: the latter was the Duke of Norfolk’s brother-in-law, and the former was an especially devout convert to Catholicism.68

Elizabeth eventually caught on to the scheme and imprisoned Norfolk. Northumberland and Westmorland were subsequently abandoned by other nobles who had initially allied themselves with them for purely pragmatic reasons (curtailing the overreaches of Cecil and the Privy Council), such as the Earls of Arundel and Pembroke. Northumberland and Westmorland looked outwards and requested aid from both the Spanish and from Pope Pius V. They did not wait for a response before they raised a force of several thousand in November 1569 and took over Durham, Ripon, and Hartlepool. When the revolt failed to secure the person of Mary Stuart, support began to crumble. Elizabeth’s forces routed the so-called Rising in the North and captured and executed Westmorland. Northumberland was barely able to escape and lived out the rest of his days in the Netherlands. The papal support they required came a month too late.69

In February of 1570, just one month after the suppression of the Rising in the North, Pope Pius began the formal process for pronouncing a sentence of
excommunication upon Elizabeth. The commission for pronouncing an indictment was led by Alexander Riario, the Auditor General of Causes in the Pontifical Court. On February 5, Riario produced an indictment that accused Queen Elizabeth of heresy, mistreatment of Catholics, and the promotion of unacceptable liturgical forms. Over the next several days, twelve English witnesses testified as to the truth of the charges. As the trial was proceeding, Pope Pius received a letter from the leaders of the by-now suppressed Rising in the North and responded positively:

We have lost no time in replying to your letters of Nov. 8 received by Us on Feb. 16; whereby, apprehending more clearly and intimately the woes and calamities not wholly unknown to Us before, We are afflicted with that distress of mind which the unmerited character of these evils, which We in your persons suffer, and our fatherly love towards you and the rest of the Catholics in that kingdom ought to excite in Us; for, besides that by virtue of our common office of pastoral charity We are bound to rejoice or grieve in the weal or woe of all the faithful in Christ, and of every province in which the Christian name is held sacred…. For think not, dear sons in Christ, that they whom you name, Catholic bishops or nobles of that realm, who rather than swerve from the confession of the Catholic faith were either cast into prison or otherwise subjected to unmerited suffering, have fared ill; for their constancy even now, as We deem, confirmed by the recent example of Blessed Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury, none can praise as it deserves.  

Shortly after responding to the letter, the trial concluded, and Elizabeth was unsurprisingly found guilty. On February 25th,
Pius pronounced a formal bull of excommunication against Elizabeth I:

We declare the said Elizabeth heretic and fautress of heretics, and her adherents, to have fallen under sentence of anathema, and to be cut off from the unity of the Body of Christ, and her, Elizabeth, to be deprived of her pretended right to the said realm and of all and every dominion, dignity and privilege; and also the nobles, subjects and peoples of the said realm, and all else who in any manner have made oath to her, to be for ever absolved from such oath, and all duty of liege-fealty and obedience, as by the authority of these presents We absolve them, and deprive the said Elizabeth of her pretended right to the realm and of all else aforesaid, and lay upon all and singular the nobles, subjects and peoples, and others aforesaid, our injunction and interdict, that they presume not to yield obedience to her, or her admonitions, mandates and laws; otherwise We involve them in the like sentence of anathema.”

The papal bull, *Regnans in Excelsis*, was forceful and direct; Pius did not mince words. In addition to excommunicating her, Pius also deprived Elizabeth of her sovereign rights and absolved her subjects of allegiance to her (this single principle would go on to form the bedrock of later attempts to depose or assassinate Elizabeth and replace her with Mary Stuart). After such a long period of inaction, the bull must have come as a shock to Elizabeth, and although it arrived too late to help the Rising in the North succeed, it would nonetheless set the tone of Anglo-Vatican relations for centuries to come.

Elizabeth’s rise to power ushered in a new, more uncertain period in the continuing diplomatic, political, and theological struggle between the Catholic Church and the
Kingdom of England. *Regnans in Excelsis*, however, occupies a special place in organizing and characterizing the history of the Church’s diplomacy. It serves as a clear dividing line between the efforts of 1534 to 1570 and those of 1570 onwards. Before the excommunication, Vatican diplomacy with England changed wildly from pope to pope and was also influenced by the constantly shifting religious status quo. On the other hand, after 1570, the Elizabethan Religious Settlement was firmly established, and so was the Vatican’s method of combating it. Whereas popes like Paul IV and Pius IV, who both embodied different strains of the post-Reformation Church, were magnanimous in their conduct with England, after *Regnans in Excelsis* and Pope Pius V, Vatican diplomacy was hostile, aggressive, and uncompromising. Numerous conspiracies arose with the goal of overthrowing Elizabeth and restoring Catholicism. The first of these, the Ridolfi Plot, came in 1571 and was followed by the Throckmorton Plot in 1583 and the Babington Plot in 1586. The culmination of these efforts was the Spanish armada’s attempted invasion of England in 1588. These plots, of course, all failed. As a result, Catholics in England returned their focus to covert sacramental ministry, which coexisted with the Elizabethan status quo for decades.\(^72\)

**V: BONES IN THE ATTIC: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES IN A TIME OF TURMOIL**

Welsh Jesuit Philip Evans was playing tennis on the grounds of Cardiff Gaol on July 21, 1679, when he received word that he was to be executed the following day. Evans, born in nearby Monmouthshire, had not lived in Wales his whole life; in 1665, at age twenty, he entered the English Jesuit College at St Omer in Flanders, where he was educated and ordained a Catholic priest. In 1675 he was dispatched to his native land, where he served as a missionary along with other Jesuits, like John Lloyd, his eventual cellmate. Evans and Philips
were not the first Catholic priests to be executed in England. In 1679 Charles II was king, but his government was merely carrying on the religious status quo that been established over a century prior, by Tudor monarchs Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Elizabeth I. On the eve of Evans’ death, he wrote a letter to his sister, a nun in Paris. He writes, “Dear Sister, I know that you are so well versed in the principles of Christian courage as not to be at all startled when you understand that your loving brother writes this as his last letter unto you, being in a few hours hence to suffer as a priest and consequently for God’s sake. What greater happiness can befall a Christian man?”

The following day Evans was hanged, drawn, and quartered. As the first priest of the day, his execution was particularly brutal in a failed attempt to motivate those after him to recant—both Evans and Lloyd held the faith to their last. Almost two hundred years later, in 1878, a wooden box was discovered in the attic of a home in Holywell, Wales. The box held the remains of two men wrapped in a linen shirt. One of the skulls in the box had a vertical hole through it and many of the individual bones seemed to have been cut with a knife, suggesting that the body had been dismembered and head impaled on a pike. The bones remained unidentified until just a few months ago, when Maurice Whitehead and Hannah Thomas, scholars of the Welsh martyrdoms, suggested that the bones might belong to Evans and Lloyd. When the identification was confirmed, the bones were included in an exhibition memorializing the Catholic martyrs of England and Wales, including Thomas More, John Fisher, Edmund Campion, Robert Southwell, and Edward Oldcorne, among many others.

The story of Evans and Lloyd, both captured and imprisoned by professional ‘priest hunters,’ shows that the history of centuries ago is still very much with us at present. The bones of these priests, and the struggle to identify them, are a testament to the complicated and even perhaps
contemporary nature of the religious conflict that took place in England during the 16th, 17th, 18th, and, finally, 19th centuries, when full Catholic emancipation was achieved. Much like the bones, however, Catholic perspectives have too often been relegated to the attic of historical analysis, with significant attention paid instead to the perspectives of those defending the religious status quo, like Elizabeth’s spymaster Sir Francis Walsingham. In prioritizing such perspectives, historians have painted a picture that depicts Catholics in England and the Pope in Rome as a foreign, fundamentally non-English, force.

As has been mentioned, much of the existing historiography has focused on important personalities like Walsingham and a few others, like Sir William Cecil, and imbued their efforts with an almost mythic quality. This literature describes how Sir Francis and his men ‘saved England’ from Catholic corruption. It has even become a prevalent trend in recent years to characterize Catholic Counter-Reformation efforts as terrorism. For example, Derek Wilson’s *Sir Francis Walsingham: A Courtier in an Age of Terror* describes the Pope as a “religious leader in Rome urging state-sponsored terrorism and dispatching his mullahs into England to deflect Elizabeth’s subjects from their loyalty.” This project’s primary aim is to show that such conclusions are utterly baseless. In reality, Catholics in England were a much less menacing threat than meets the eye. During Henry, Edward, and Elizabeth’s reign, they were on the defensive and during Mary’s reign they, perhaps in an excessive manner, were only reacting to what they saw as decades of damage dealt to the Church.

This paper’s method for countering this current is twofold: first to shed light upon the neglected perspective of the Vatican with regard to the English Reformation and second to argue that the Vatican was not acting in a fanatical or deluded manner. Throughout the Tudor Period, the Vatican’s efforts to support Catholicism in England were sober and restrained. It was only after decades of giving English monarchs the benefit
of the doubt that the Church finally went on the offensive and began to sponsor efforts to effect religious change by force. These efforts were not purely foreign. From the earliest days of Henry’s reign until the last days of Elizabeth’s, English Catholics were rising to oppose the religious changes that were being implemented. The 1537 Pilgrimage of Grace, 1549 Prayer Book Rebellion, and 1569 Rising in the North stand out as the most significant uprisings, and their formation was neither supported nor even encouraged by the Vatican. This alone ought to be enough to dismiss claims that the Vatican was acting against the interests of the English people to preserve its own prestige.

The Vatican’s objectives in England were not self-interested, rather they were intended to be a way of supporting the English population, which not fifty years earlier had been nearly entirely Roman Catholic. Granted there were surely political factors behind the actions taken by various popes, especially Pius IV, but were these factors as conspicuous or influential as those behind Henry or Elizabeth’s actions? They were not. One need only look at any biography of Henry VIII to learn that he was no committed Protestant. Rather, he foisted a new hierarchy upon the English people, without their consent, for the purpose of securing his own dynastic legacy. Elizabeth’s religious flip-flopping, before finally settling on Protestantism in 1559, does her no favors either. Although just how much these two monarchs relied on religion as a tool for political security is debatable, what is not debatable is that the religious turmoil of middle to late 16th century England was deeply scarring for the average subject.

The English Reformation, and particularly the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, was no patriotic revival received by the masses with open arms. On the contrary, as Eamon Duffy, and numerous scholars after him, have shown, popular Catholicism in England was alive and well, even in the early years of Elizabeth’s reign. It was assuredly not, as has
been claimed elsewhere, a decrepit and byzantine force from which the English population desired release. During Henry and Edward’s reign Catholicism persisted and when Elizabeth implemented her changes, few bishops were willing to go along with it. Although they were eventually replaced, Elizabeth still managed to keep the Vatican on its toes when it came to divining her true affiliation. If the Vatican was as extreme as the literature would have us believe, then it would surely not have taken two successive popes a total of ten years to finally excommunicate Elizabeth. Even the uncompromising Pius V, who wasted no time prosecuting heresy within his borders and reportedly ordered papal armies in France to execute Huguenot prisoners, did not speak an ill word against Elizabeth until the excommunication of 1570 (the same cannot even be said for Mary Stuart, whom Pius denounced for being married in a Protestant ceremony to a divorced earl). The record of papal diplomacy with England does not evoke images of a vindictive and delusional pope, constantly condemning a government and people that dared to defy his edicts. Indeed, even the most extreme, most dogmatic popes were, at the very least, courteous in their dealings with a monarch who had explicitly rejected their authority and imprisoned those who dared disagree with her.

The story of Vatican diplomacy and espionage in England did not come to a close with the excommunication of Elizabeth. In fact, it could be said that the real Catholic espionage efforts did not begin in earnest until after 1570. Yet the crucial moments that set the tone for the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Kingdom of England all have their origins in the period lasting from Henry VIII’s original break with the Church in 1534 to the excommunication. The attention-grabbing, cloak-and-dagger stories that are still made into films and television series today would never have occurred had it not been for the thirty-year
long period during which time the Church was still apprising itself of the situation in England and deciding how to respond to it. It is this period, however, which does most to show just what motivated the Church to act in the manner that it did and would in decades following. After 1570, the religious situation in England was mostly consistent, and so were the covert efforts of the Church to minister to recusant Catholics. Before 1570, however, the situation was constantly in flux, and so the various popes had to respond to unique challenges, thus setting the stage for the antagonism that would last at least until 1829, when full Catholic emancipation was achieved.
Notes:
5 Duffy, *The Stripping*, p. 593.
8 Deborah was a prophetess and judge (more akin to a military leader) during part of Israel’s pre-monarchic period. She led an army against the Canaanites and after achieving victory, led the Israelites for forty years.
11 Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots is not to be confused with her cousin Mary Tudor, Queen of England and Elizabeth’s predecessor. Both were Catholic and married to foreign figures, Francis and Philip, respectively. In this paper, Mary Tudor is referred to as just “Mary”, while Mary, Queen of Scots, will be referred to as Mary Stuart.
13 The first to erroneously claim that Paul IV declared Elizabeth illegitimate was 17th century historian Paolo Sarpi. For more discussion on this claim see F.W. Maitland, “Elizabethan Gleanings.”
15 For a more thorough discussion of this recently established claim, see Christopher Haigh’s *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors*, J.J. Scarisbrick’s *Reformation and the English People*, and Eamon Duffy’s *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580*. 
All the Pope’s Men

18 “Rome: 1558, December” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 2.
19 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 3.
21 Traditional Catholic practice was to receive Communion under one species, that of the bread, alone. Communion under both species, that of bread and wine, was reintroduced by Protestant reformers.
22 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 16.
30 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 18.
31 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 27.
33 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 16.
34 “Rome: 1559” in *Calendar of State Papers*, no. 27.
38 Meaning “whose realm, their religion” this principle established that the religion of the ruler, including Protestants, would be the religion of the realm.
40 Duffy, “Protest and Division,” 170.
42 Duffy, “Protest and Division,” 170.
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45 “Rome: 1560” in Calendar of State Papers, nos. 44, 45.
46 Guy, Tudor England, 265-266.
47 Guy, Tudor England, 266.
49 “Rome: 1560” in Calendar of State Papers, nos. 53, 57.
50 “Rome: 1561, January-June” in Calendar of State Papers, nos. 67, 74.
51 “Rome: 1561, January-June” in Calendar of State Papers, no. 81.
52 Pollen, The English Catholics, 71-72.
54 “Rome: 1563, April-June” in Calendar of State Papers, no. 240.
55 Pollen, The English Catholics, 76-78.
56 “Rome: 1563, July-September” in Calendar of State Papers, no. 255
57 Pollen, The English Catholics, 78-79.
58 “Rome: 1563, October-December” in Calendar of State Papers, no. 287.
60 Pollen, The English Catholics, 79-83.
61 Norwich, The Popes, 308.
62 Duffy, “Protest and Division,” 170.
63 Norwich, The Popes, 308-309.
64 Pollen, The English Catholics, 104-105.
67 Pollen, The English Catholics, 142-146.
68 Guy, Tudor England, 272-274.
70 “Rome: 1570, January-March” in Calendar of State Papers, no. 647.
72 Duffy, “Protest and Division,” 170.
Images (listed in order of appearance):


All the Pope’s Men
Covenant in Crisis

COVENANT IN CRISIS: ORTHODOX REACTIONS TO SLAVERY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, 1848-1861

Samuel Strickberger (University of Pennsylvania)

Silence: The Orthodox and Slavery, 1848-1861

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“Let the proud oppressor of the poor, and the hard-hearted avaricious man, who both look upon the distresses of their fellow-beings with indifference; let them, I say, reflect that retribution will come...for He who punished Pharaoh, and the guilty Egyptians, can even now smite the sinner...no matter how much he may have fortified himself by silencing his conscience.” Isaac Leeser, Passover 1843, Philadelphia (emphasis, added).

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Silence is sin. This was the message of Isaac Leeser’s 1843 Passover sermon. Leeser employed the ancient Israelite freedom narrative to critique present-day bystanders, who were “indifferent” to oppression. To silence one’s “conscience” means so support the perpetrator. As Leeser explained to the Orthodox congregants of Mikveh Israel in downtown Philadelphia, God “punished Pharaoh” and “can even now smite the [silent] sinner.”

The irony, however, was profound. Leeser was intentionally silent about his era’s most contentious human rights issue. “We do not mean to...take sides with either of the parties who are now engaged in discussion of the lawfulness [of slavery],” he stated in 1857.1 Leeser’s sermon did not mention America’s “Peculiar Institution,” nor make the connection be-
tween Jewish freedom and Black emancipation. This sentiment was striking since Philadelphia was an abolition stronghold.

Leeser’s understanding of Passover further accentuates his silence. “[The Exodus] was the dawning of freedom for every member of the human family, since it is the first on record of the unjust power of tyranny broken,” he told his congregation in the 1830s. Jewish tradition has a second name for Passover: The Festival of Freedom. The narrative affords an obvious religious and Biblical allegory, a launching point to discuss liberation and oppression. Black evangelicals, among other Black and abolitionist Christian groups, recognized the connection. The Exodus story was central to their liberation theology.

While Leeser vocalized the through-line, he did not realize it through action.

Leeser’s silence was typical of the American Orthodox leadership. I demonstrate in this chapter that the emerging Orthodox leadership replicated his stance. I focus on the years between 1848 and January 1861, the period bookended by a major wave of Jewish immigration began and South Carolina’s secession from the union, which intensified a nationwide religious reckoning on the morality of slavery. I argue that Orthodox silence stemmed from fear. Orthodox leaders were fearful of anti-Semitism, locally and globally. They also emphasized preserving ritual observance within the United States in contrast to the fast-growing Reform Movement, which sought to abandon ancient rituals for universal values more in accordance with “modern” life. These fears muffled Orthodox debates over enslavement. They also bolstered pro-slavery attitudes among Orthodox Jews, a theme that pervades this chapter. Strengthening Jewish security and preserving Jewish tradition led to defending the status quo, whether deriding anti-slavery sentiments in the political realm or opposing abolitionist interpretations of scripture in the religious one. Silence protected Orthodoxy.
An Overview of Antebellum Silence

Antebellum Jews largely maintained silence on the issue of slavery. “Their European experiences and religious traditions, their lowly economic and educational backgrounds, and the fear of antisemitic backlash,” argues historian Jayme Sokolow, “made them politically conservative and detached from controversial causes outside the scope of Judaism.” As an immigrant community and religious minority, American Jews were vulnerable politically, economically, and culturally. Conservative politics – or silence on contentious issues – seemed to promise safety.4

Leading Orthodox Rabbis rarely, if ever, addressed Black enslavement in recorded sermons, lectures, and editorials before January 1861. Morris Raphall of New York, Bernard Illowy of Baltimore, and Isaac Leeser of Philadelphia – were silent on the issue through much of the 1850s. Samuel Isaacs of New York and Sabato Morais of Philadelphia, the only Orthodox rabbis to express anti-slavery sentiments before the Civil War, were no different. Abraham Rice of Baltimore did not say anything, before or after 1861. His historical record is generally more scant than the others, yet it is unlikely that any statement on slavery would have escaped press coverage.5

The Hebrew Bible is replete with stories of enslaved people. Genesis features the concubines of the forefathers. Joseph’s brothers sold him to Ishmaelites. Exodus chronicles the enslaved Jewish nation’s quest for freedom. Given the centrality of enslavement through the 1850s, these passages should have been resources for rabbis and their congregations. Yet, silence was the default – even during the Civil War.6

Leading Orthodox newspapers, the Occident and Jewish Messenger, followed suit. Editors Leeser and Isaacs had two primary personal and professional mandates: preserve traditional Judaism and counter anti-Semitism. Isaac and Leeser published the work of Orthodox rabbis, including Illowy, Morais, Rice,
and Raphall. Subscribers included Jews across the United States and – in the case of the Occident – Australia, New Zealand, and the Caribbean. The Jewish Messenger was dubbed the “organ” of Orthodoxy.\footnote{The Occident occasionally reported on American slavery, but of over 7,000 pages of articles published in the Occident between 1848 and 1861, the word “slavery” appeared 59 times and the word “slave” occurred 58 times.\footnote{Moreover, this term rarely referred to Black enslavement. The main subjects fell into three categories: Biblical themes of enslavement, such as God’s redemption of the Israelites from Egypt; global anti-Semitism, from Roman oppression at the turn of the common era to the contemporary Mortara Affair, when Vatican officials kidnapped a baptized Jewish baby; and religious degradation related to idolatry and atheism, termed “spiritual slavery.” About 75% of the articles found with the term “slave” or “slavery” fit within these categories. Mentions of American slavery were limited to less than 5% of cases, the majority were mere references and did not offer a religious ruling or moral judgement. Prior to 1861, the Occident published one article that offered an in-depth, religious treatment of enslavement in the United States. It promoted a pro-slavery viewpoint. The Jewish Messenger mirrored the Occident’s near silence despite its slight anti-slavery leanings. Between its founding in 1857 and 1861, it published over 1,630 articles.\footnote{The word “slavery” appeared in only 67 instances. Half of all instances including the word “slavery” related to contemporary issues of anti-Semitism, including the Jews of Kurdistan, Russian Jewish Emancipation, oppression in Persia, or other historical explanations. The Jewish Messenger’s greater focus on anti-Semitism was not surprising because Isaacs dedicated himself, more so than Leeser, to defending Jews around the world from anti-Semitism. Like the Occident, many of the instances also related to Biblical references, such as the Exodus from Egypt, and moral corruption, including references such as “slave of passion.” In total,}
there were seven articles that tackled US slavery head on, many of them anti-slavery. There were also two minor but sympathetic references to abolition, discussed further in Chapter 3. Thus, while the Jewish Messenger did speak on the issue of enslavement with slightly more frequency than the Occident and most leading Orthodox Rabbis, it also predominantly opted for silence.

Isaac Leeser

Examining Scholarly Responses

Historians offer various explanations for this silence. Scholars David M. Cobin, Earl Schwartz and Dorothy Roberts provide two. Ignorance is their first explanation. Orthodox leaders may not have “foreseen” the imminence of the Civil War and slavery as its root cause. The rabbis did not grasp the gravity of the moment and thus did not respond to it. These rabbis were too conversant in American politics, however, to have been ignorant of the moment’s intensity and critical im-
importance of enslavement, especially in the months leading up to January 1861 when debates over slavery were white hot. Raphall and Morais were part of New York’s political elite. Leeser and Isaacs edited national newspapers. Their silence was not based on lack of knowledge.

The scholars’ second explanation is that the rabbis’ economic insecurity allowed their congregations the power to silence political statements. In the 1850s, American rabbis received modest salaries and had limited job security. Synagogue presidents and lay boards, historian Jonathan Sarna argues, had significant power in determining the direction of the community and the actions of their rabbi.\textsuperscript{12} Four of our six main rabbis, Isaacs, Raphall, Leeser and Morais, were either fired or hired following a congregational dispute.\textsuperscript{13} These rabbis understood that controversial conversations carried significant economic risk.

Cobin, Schwartz, and Roberts argue that Morais must have “felt constrained” by “political forces” in his congregation. Congregants, many of whom were recent immigrants, sought to fit in and avoid controversial topics.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, because Philadelphia (Morais and Leeser) and New York (Raphall and Isaacs) were all port towns, congregants maintained ties and interests that transcended sectional norms. Influential members of Philadelphia and New York synagogues had pro-slavery leanings. Morais was aware of the pro-slavery constituency within his congregation, which would later prevent Morais from preaching for three months in 1864.\textsuperscript{15} Morais’s offense was a Thanksgiving Day sermon; he brazenly asked his congregants: “What is the Union with human degradation? Who would again affix his seal to the bond that consigned millions to [slavery?]”\textsuperscript{16} Leading New York rabbis faced similar constraints from their congregations. Isaacs limited his pulpit discussions on slavery in deference to his synagogue’s board.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, any position on slavery would alienate a portion of the congregation. Silence was safer.
We need additional, and perhaps more thoughtful, explanations of Orthodoxy’s silence. All six rabbis were trailblazers and nation builders. Some founded congregations, Jewish hospitals, Jewish relief organizations. Isaacs and Leeser had relatively stable financial situations, too. They maintained additional incomes from their publishing services. I argue that fear dictated silence. Orthodox leaders decided to compartmentalize external issues, which they considered to be political – such as geopolitical divisions over slavery.\textsuperscript{18} As Leeser explained in 1863, “our magazine is not a political one, and we shall carefully avoid all matters having such a tendency, unless they have a bearing on religion.”\textsuperscript{19} Instead, they focused on defending religious and social goals critical to this young, vulnerable, and growing community.

Passover sermons offer a case study to better understand Orthodox silence. There were dozens of published and recorded Orthodox Passover sermons from 1848 to 1861. None connected Israelite freedom to Black freedom, nor did a single Passover themed article in the \textit{Jewish Messenger} or \textit{Occident}. In this regard, there was no distinction between the anti-slavery of Morais and Isaacs and the pro-slavery of Raphall, Leeser, and Illowy. They all made the same choice. A quantitative analysis of the newspapers’ content highlight how two fears, relentless anti-Semitism and the rise of the Reform Movement, eclipsed an Orthodox focus on slavery.

\textbf{The Socio-Political Fear: Anti-Semitism}

There were several high-profile, global incidents of anti-Semitism at the end of the 1850s. Two in particular gained attention within the United States Orthodox press and community. First was the Mortara Affair in 1858. The Papal States abducted a Jewish baby, Edgardo Mortara, after a housemaid secretly baptized him. The local laws at the time, said that anyone baptized was a Christian, and a Christian child could not
be raised by a Jewish family. This led state officials to kidnap the child and place him in a Catholic convent to be raised. The event horrified Italian Jews and alarmed Jewish communities elsewhere. Morais, Isaacs, and other prominent rabbis spoke out about the event and lobbied elected officials to take action. Despite widespread sympathy, even beyond the Jewish community, the United States took no official stand. Second was the forced conversion of Jews in Tangier, Morocco in 1859. These Jews were “most distressingly situated” because local authorities coerced them to “pronounce a profession of the Mahomedian faith,” reported the Occident in June and December 1859. Spanish diplomats ultimately offered protection to these Moroccan Jews, but their plight also highlighted the intense insecurity of Jewish communities abroad, in stark contrast to the Jewish life in America.

These events captured the attention of the Orthodox leadership much more often than issues of enslavement. For example, Passover 1860 fell between the Republican National Convention in mid-May and the Democratic National Convention in mid-April. Both featured a heated debate on enslavement. Yet, an April 6, 1860 Passover sermon published in the Jewish Messenger avoided the issue entirely. It chose instead to focus on Jewish emancipation, noting “the kidnapping of Edgar Mortara” and “the expatriating of our brethren from Tangiers.” The sermon ultimately the ancient Israelites’ celebration of freedom to the fight for Jewish liberty in the present day, adding that this Passover “our subscribers…will be engaged celebrating the anniversary of our Exodus from Egyptian bondage” (emphasis added). “Our” is the key modifier. It narrows the implications of the Biblical Exodus from a universal story about liberation to a commemoration of the Jewish quest for freedom.

Leeser articulated a moving call for action following the Mortara Affair that evoked similarly tribal tones. “We Israelites should not stand idle, but appeal, as becomes freemen,
to our civil rulers, to urge them to aid those who are with us of the same descent and faith,” he wrote in February 1859. To him, American Jews must fight against the oppression of Jews abroad because they shared the “same descent and faith.” Global anti-Semitism preoccupied the author of this sermon – and other *Jewish Messenger* Passover sermons.

On March 23, 1861, the Shabbat that preceded Passover, Morais spoke powerfully on the Mortara Affair. “Pharaohs of all ages, those tyrants, whose iron rods scourged our fathers, will present themselves before our vision.” He particularly deemed Pope Pius IX a “pharaoh” as he ultimately directed the kidnapping. Morais added that “not only one has arisen against us, in all ages men have risen against us to exterminate us,” quoting from the Passover Haggadah.

Morais set the affair within a long history of Jewish oppression. He felt that the Jewish community was continuously threatened existentially, from ancient days until the present.

This fear of eradication sidelined his discussions of slavery. Nonetheless, his silence is striking. Earlier that month, on March 4, 1861, Lincoln delivered his inaugural address, saying “One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended,” he explained, “while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to be.” Tensions over slavery monopolized the national discourse.

Many Orthodox leaders also feared that discussing slavery would promote local anti-Semitism. Samuel Isaacs consistently referred to the debate over slavery as a “controversy.” For example, when Jews began publicly discussing the issue in 1861, he wrote: “we have been called upon to publish [a] reply... but must decline...as we have no desire to take part in a controversy of this nature.” Controversy implied danger. For a religious minority and immigrant community, which was already caricatured in the mainstream press and culture, intense socio-political positions would only breed more stereotypes. These fears did, in fact, materialize. When Jewish leaders ultimately did
weigh in on the issue of slavery, the *New York Tribune* “unsuitably [held] the Jewish community responsible for the opinions of individuals,” wrote Leeser. He added, “Israelites, as Israelites, have no politics.”

The Theological Fear: Rise of Reform Movement

The Orthodox had a second fear. The Reform Movement was gaining influence and followers in America. Orthodox leaders fought back. They derided Reform’s disregard for tradition and called reformers arrogant. “Shall we continue to worship God, as our fathers have worshipped him,” asked Morais, “or shall we follow the bend of our minds, and introduce into the Synagogues customs foreign to its origin and purposes?” He believed that Reform leaders did not respect the generations of Jews who worshiped, ate, studied, and lived according to traditional Jewish law. “The reform element…is always actively at work to undermine the principles of Judaism,” Morais argued. Raphall agreed. He called Reform leaders and laypeople “innovators” who endangered Jewish tradition. Isaacs and Raphall wrote a letter “to the Jewish public,” calling innovators “destroyers of all that is sacred.” Illowy argued that Reform Rabbi Isaac Meyer Wise had “sinned” in the “sight of Israel” with his book *History of the Israelitish Nation*. Wise rejected the importance of traditional rituals and prophecy. Leeser published Illowy’s critique in May 1854 in the *Occident*. He did the same for many other anti-reform writings.

These leaders were often on the defensive. “There is no doubt that in the next generation Reform Judaism will gain the upper hand and that Judaism will be transformed,” predicted European-Jewish reporter I. J. Benjamin in 1862 – a correct prediction. Rabbi Abraham Rice of Baltimore lived through this transformation first-hand. His son-in-law, Joseph Leucht, went from being Rice’s cantor at Orthodox Congregation Nidhe Israel to directing Congregation Bnai Jeshurun in Newark,
New Jersey towards the Reform Movement. In 1872, just ten years after Rice’s death, Nideche Israel became a Reform temple, and in 1878, Raphall’s synagogue, Bnei Jeshurun, also affiliated with the Reform Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Samuel Isaacs’s *Jewish Messenger*, once the organ of Orthodoxy, switched to supporting Reform Judaism by the turn of the twentieth century. The Orthodox leadership’s concentration on this trend prevented attention on other timely matters, including slavery.

A study of the *Occident* and *Jewish Messenger* provides a quantitative substantiation of this preoccupation. The *Occident* spoke of the Reform Movement 329 times between 1848-1861. The *Jewish Messenger* mentioned the Reform Movement 126 times during the time period. The dominant tone of both papers was similar: articles derided the Reform Movement as a danger to Judaism.

Antebellum Passover sermons exemplified this trend of fear. Isaac’s 1857 sermon included an overview of different
forms of Passover observances, arguing that “real orthodoxy [must be] distinguished from that spurious article, which is passed off as current, but is in reality but a miserable counterfeit.” Isaacs did not simply critique what he saw as mistakes in ritual observance. To Isaacs, Reform Judaism was a threat to the preservation of true Jewish observance. He followed a similar script during in 1860, once again demonstrating how defense against Reform Judaism displaced discussions of slavery.36

Leeser made comparable remarks in 1843. He, too, focused on explaining and defending the ceremonial aspects of the holiday. The sermon started by recounting the Biblical command to relate the events of the exodus to children. He explained the importance of the rituals: “To keep this event fresh in the memory of all, particular ceremonies were instituted.” Their “peculiarity” aims “to arrest the attention of the young” and induce inquiry regarding the “meaning of what they see.” Leeser argued that idiosyncratic rituals made the past “fresh.” In fact, Leeser contended, without ancient rites, there would be no collective Jewish memory, nationhood, or theology. The ceremonial rituals, “link Israel together in all…of their dispersion” and “perseveres” the “doctrines of the revelation on Sinai.”37 Defense of the rituals left no room to discuss modern instances of slavery and how ancient Jewish memory may (or may not) demand a response. The word “slavery” itself did not appear in this Passover sermon. The threat of the Reform Movement was everything.

Morris Raphall of New York followed suit with his own Passover sermon on the topic. He cast American religious freedom as a double-edged sword, a blessing and a curse for traditional Judaism. In contrast to many severe religious restrictions across Europe, the “modernity” and liberalism of the United States opened up space for Orthodoxy to flourish. “Here we can keep the Passover…as it was instituted.” Yet, this openness bred assimilation. “Let us not be carried away from the land-marks of our faith, and adopt every new road that may be
pointed out to us as leading to Heaven.” Raphall worried that the freedoms of this “modern” society threatened to modernize Judaism.

Abraham Rice: The Epitome of Orthodox Silence

Abraham Rice never spoke publicly about slavery. Born in Bavaria, Rice (1802-1862) studied in leading Orthodox academies and received rabbinical ordination from Abraham Hamburger and Abraham Bing. Impoverished and without university credentials, Rice emigrated in America in 1840 to “establish a pure Orthodox belief in this land.” Rice represented the “fervent Orthodoxy” end of America’s spectrum of Jewish life, contends historian Jonathan Sarna. His focus was decidedly blinkered. He was a warrior against Reform Judaism. He railed against Jews who violated Sabbath rules, dietary restrictions, prohibitions against intermarriage, and more. Obstinacy against assimilation and new ideologies demanded the majority of his professional energy. For instance, he resigned from his Baltimore pulpit in 1849 because his congregation rejected his strict adherence to traditional Jewish law, and he would not compromise his beliefs. It was his “rabbinic responsibility,” he argued, “to teach the right path of our religion, regardless of the consequences.” He continued to stay active in the city’s Jewish life, albeit, in a private fashion. His resignation demonstrated the limits of economic and congregational pressures. When Rice disagreed with certain positions, he spoke against them. The threat of losing his pulpit, apparently, did not intimidate Rice from advancing his anti-Reform mission and his inflexible traditionalism. In fact, Rice gained respect and renown for these actions.

So why did Rice omit slavery, the most pressing moral issue of his day? Fear. Preoccupations with assimilation and anti-Semitism are the keys to his insular approach, which underlay his silence on Black enslavement.
Notes:
4 Sokolow, 126.
5 Moshe Davis argues a similar point in *The Emergence of Conservative Judaism*, a study that includes many from our cast of characters, including Raphall, Illowy, Leeser, Isaacs, and Morais. He argues that not a single “ordained Jewish clergyman” offered a pro-slavery argument before Morris Raphall on January 4, 1861, when President Buchanan declared a national fast day. According to Davis, Raphall was an exception among an otherwise largely anti-slavery Jewish landscape. This is not supported by a closer historical analysis, especially of newspaper archives. Clergymen did convey pro-slavery sympathies, albeit in abbreviated form, before 1861. Leeser’s *Occident* published a few, as we will explore in *Chapter 2*. More broadly, the statement unfairly skews the reader’s historical perception. Raphall did not simply break the pro-slavery silence. He pierced the Jewish silence – and Orthodox silence – on enslavement. See: Davis, 110.
6 Orthodox leaders only broke their silence on a few occasions. January 1861 was one of those times. Raphall, Illowy, Isaacs, Leeser, and Morais all broke
their silence after President Buchanan called for a National Fast Day on January 4, 1861.

7 “Second Obituary of Rev. Samuel M. Isaacs,” May 1878, Myer S. Isaacs, P-22, Box 1, Folder 1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.


9 I administered a keyword search on ProQuest for the word “slavery.” See: https://www.proquest.com/results/7A1C45B1E15F4E34PQ/1?account id=14707.

10 The scholars focused on Morais’s silence, in particular, but the findings also apply to Isaacs, Leeser, Illowy, Raphall, and Rice.


12 Jonathan Sarna, American Judaism, 94.

13 In 1847, Samuel Isaacs sided with a minority faction of Congregation B’nai Jeshurun during a community disagreement. The majority fired him, replacing Isaacs with Morris Raphall. 1851, Congregation Mikveh Israel denied Isaac Leeser’s request for life-tenure as hazzan. As debate ensued, they replaced him with Sabato Morais. See: “First Obituary of Rev. Samuel M. Isaacs,” May 1878, Myer S. Isaacs, P-22, Box 1, Folder 1, Collection of the American Jewish Historical Society, New York, NY.

14 Sokolow, 126.

15 Morais once termed this portion of his congregation, “copperheads,” a derogatory word that referred to Peace Democrats during the antebellum and Civil War era. David M. Cobin, Earl Schwartz, and Dorothy Roberts, “The Encrypted Sermons of Sabato Morais,” 167. See also: ibid., 159.

16 Cobin, 159; Davis, 111.

17 Davis, 110.

18 It must be noted that the decision to divide religion and politics was a common pro-slavery strategy. Thus, regardless of the Orthodox leadership’s underlying fears, this move likely indicated latent pro-slavery attitudes, which would manifest explicitly in January 1861. This pro-slavery tactic was evident as early as the late-eighteenth century. See: Sarah Barringer Gordon, “The First Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Slavery and Disestab-


23 Cobin, 168.


29 “Having thus explained the cause which prevented the literature of the Hebrews from being generally known, we owe it to ourselves to declare that we are neither innovators nor reformers. We do not presume to guide the opinions of our readers, or to arrogate to ourselves any right of dictation; but, as the humble interpreters of the great lights of Israel, our duty is to interpret truly; to give their very words whenever the idiom of the language permits and in no case to obtrude our own opinions under the cloak and cover of theirs.” See: Morris Raphall, “Introduction,” The Hebrew Review and Magazine of Rabbinical Literature (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1834), 3.


31 newspapers/occ/1854/05/01/01/article/3/?e=--1850---1861--en-20-occ-1-byDA-img-txIN%7ctxTI-passover---------1

32 101, Sarna.

33 Ibid.

34 I administered a key word search of “Reform” on the National Library of Israel’s online archive of The Occident. https://www.nli.org.il/en/newspaper
34 s/?a=q&hs=1&r=1&results=1&txq=reform&dadyq=1848&dazymq=&daty
34 q=1861&datmqs=&req=&dlaq=&puq=occ&ssnip=img&oa=1&c=-------en-20-occ-1-byDA-img-txIN%7ctxTI-reform----------1

35 I administered a key word search of “Reform” on the National Library of Israel’s online archive of The Jewish Messenger. https://www.proquest.com/results/69B7B37A628449BAPQ/1?accountid=14707.

Covenant in Crisis


39 Jonathan Sarna, American Judaism, 91-94.

40 The modern-day slogan “silence is violence” provides a critical framework for understanding rabbinical silence. The framework draws from popular refrains, including those by Elie Wiesel (e.g., “Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented”) and Martin Luther King, Jr. (e.g., “In the End, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”) It echoes Leeser’s sentiments in the epigraph. All contend that silence is active. This framework collapses pro-slavery, anti-slavery, and silence into two categories: pro-slavery and anti-slavery. The decision to remain quiet on the antebellum era’s most contentious issue was itself a pro-slavery stance. This framework yields a harsh assessment of Orthodoxy’s silence. In this view, Raphall’s sermon did not signify a change within the community, from silence to pro-slavery, but a continuation of the same.

Images (listed in order of appearance):

Goldman, I. English: German-Born American Rabbi Isaac Leeser (1806-1868). circa 1868. This image is available from the United States Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs division under the digital ID /ppmsca.05659. This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons: Licensing for more information. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Isaac_Leeser.jpg.

Introduction

“If the question lies between a jail and such an institution as the House of Refuge, it should be remembered that those who begin their days in a jail, most commonly become a burden for life, subsisted by the public while in, and by plunder when out; whereas the Refuge, working a reform, enables them to support themselves, and to contribute something to the general expenses of society.”

On February 7th, 1826, the Philadelphia House of Refuge was founded as a youth reformatory as part of a larger effort to separate juvenile delinquents and vagrants from their adult counterparts. As the project of a wealthy and politically powerful Board of Managers, the House garnered over twenty thousand dollars in government grants and more than eight thousand dollars in private donations. Composed of thirty-one men appointed by both public authorities and private contributors, the Board of Managers was responsible for reviewing applications for admission into the House, as well as exercising guardianship and discipline over the admitted youth. At the core of the philosophy behind the nineteenth-century reform movement inspiring these charities was an assumed link between poverty and criminality; likewise, the managers of the House viewed pauperism not in terms of its relationship to socio-economic conditions, but as a moral problem that necessitated change in the poor themselves.
New York House of Refuge on Randall’s Island, one example of the various Houses of Refuge that were established in the 19th century

In this paper, with particular focus on the Philadelphia House of Refuge, I argue that the logic of punishment and rehabilitation in reformatories and the conditions and ideology of the contemporaneous economy reinforced each other. I examine how the economy of the early nineteenth century gave rise to a particular carceral sentiment that specifically targeted poor children (as an extension of the approach to incarcerate the poor that had existed since the seventeenth century). In turn, I also assess how the reformatory legitimized the carceral-capitalist ideology at the time by analyzing how the treatment of children in the House became increasingly penal and rigorous.
Historical Context

The Long History of Incarcerating the Poor

The incarceration of the poor is not an unprecedented phenomenon new to the nineteenth century. Rather, it was an established tradition that was practiced since the early sixteenth century. For instance, *Concerning the Relief of the Poor* (1526)—a highly influential essay by Juan-Luis Vivès from which the Senate of Bruges modeled its system of welfare—declares “if the hospitals cannot accommodate all the incapacitated poor, a home should be built, or several...There let them be confined.” Describing the advantages of the confinement, Vivès argues that “fewer thefts, acts of violence, robberies, murders, capital offences will be committed; seeing that poverty will be alleviated, which drives men first into vices and bad habits,” that “it will be safer and more pleasanter to dwell in the city,” and that “there will be just so many citizens made more virtuous, more law-abiding, more useful to the country; nor will they participate in revolutions or seditions.” These justifications reveal that the poor and vagrant, by their mere presence on the streets, were seen as disturbances to the public order and threats to social stability. Incarceration, then, was an effort by authorities to at once minimize the visibility of the poor in public and quell the rising tide of violence that widespread poverty at this time was brewing.

This trend continues in the seventeenth century, most prominently exemplified by the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law, in which providing relief for the poor was established as a public responsibility, and the poor were classified into two categories: the worthy (orphans, widows, the elderly, the disabled, etc) and the unworthy (the idle, for instance). Colonial legislatures in America also adopted laws that mirrored the same values as their English predecessors, often resorting to confining the
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poor in poorhouses and coercing them to labor. The reformatory, then, is an extension of a long history of placing the destitute in total institutions that isolated them from the rest of society.

Economic Conditions of the Early Nineteenth Century in Philadelphia

The economic conditions of Philadelphia in the early nineteenth century were turbulent. While Philadelphia had primarily been a center for transoceanic shipping in the 1700s, by the 1820s, it became a manufacturing center whose economy revolved mainly around factory production. According to the sixth U.S. census, the capital invested in manufacturing in Pennsylvania increased from $6,323,077 in 1820 to $31,815,105 in 1840, while the number of people employed in manufacturing leaped from 8,875 to 87,722.

At the same time, between 1800 and 1830, impoverished immigrants from abroad contributed greatly to the number of unemployed people, as seen by the city’s expenditure of one million dollars on poor relief between 1816 and 1827. Urban areas were doubly burdened by the influx of European immigrants and rural migrants, who accounted for the majority of the cities’ relief bills. Between 1800 and 1830, the population of Philadelphia grew from 67,811 to 161,410. Such rapid growth of population and industry, economic fluctuations, and the resulting strain on the city’s budget for public welfare created such a massive population of the needy that traditional forms of charity such as almsgiving could not suffice. These conditions ultimately played a significant role in garnering public acceptance for the institutional care of the needy.

In addition, these conditions led to changes in how poor children, in particular, were managed by society. Philadelphia witnessed the emergence of industrial childhood labor at this time, which signified a break from the traditional system of
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apprenticeship that children engaged in prior to the early nineteenth century. Prominent politicians such as Alexander Hamilton claimed that factory production was advantageous because new factories would employ otherwise idle children, promoting habits of order and industry while saving money in poor relief. Between 1837 and 1838, one fifth of all factory operatives in Pennsylvania were children under twelve. The absence of apprenticeship as a provider of food, shelter, moral training, and intellectual and spiritual guidance gave rise to complaints that children received no education and were prone to become reckless vagrants. Rules regarding moral conduct existed in factories, but their chief concern was to ensure that the factory operated at a high level of efficiency, not to instill moral values into the children.

The responsibility of guiding children, therefore, was left to the community and its traditional agencies of socialization, such as schools and churches—most of which were insufficiently addressing the issue of juvenile delinquency. Meanwhile in the 1820s, the number of juvenile delinquency cases became alarming in Philadelphia. An investigation conducted on November 13th, 1828 showed that there were sixty boys in the prison of Philadelphia, most of whom were homeless children. The economic instability of the early 1800s and the decline of apprenticeship as a stable source of guidance for children contributed to steadily rising crime. As Glazier (1985) puts it, the House of Refuge arose out of the “conjunction of the need to socialize prospective young laborers to the demand of a new workplace with the absence of agencies of socialization capable of preparing the young for changing adult roles.”

The Early Nineteenth Century Economy’s Engendering of a Progressive Carceral Sentiment Toward Children

By the end of the eighteenth century, public attitudes
toward penal policy were changing. Led by Beccaria and his Enlightenment ideals, physical torture was increasingly seen as illegitimate. This gave way to changes in punishments that strike the “soul rather than the body, leading to the invention of the penitentiary.” Between the 1790s and 1810s, social reformers including the Quakers publicly supported penitentiaries, hoping that the proper environment (characterized by isolation, silence, and labor) would awaken the inmates’ minds to proper conduct. This was, of course, underwritten by the principle that inmates in the penitentiaries would not be left to sit idle, but would instead actively engage in the process of rehabilitation through labor. Benjamin Franklin, for example, warned against the possibility of public welfare engendering slothfulness in the poor: “If we provide arrangement for laziness, and support for folly, may we not be found fighting against the order of God and nature, which perhaps has appointed want and misery as the proper punishments for, and cautions against, as well as necessary consequences of, idleness and extravagance?”

However, despite the popularity of the prison as the new default form of punishment, riots, violence, suicide, and chronic overcrowding undermined the penitentiaries’ fundamental vision of moral reform, giving rise to a new reform movement that sought to differentiate those with and without the potential for rehabilitation. In 1787, the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons was founded by Thomas Eddy, one of the pioneers of the prison reform movement. He believed that rehabilitation ought to be the chief end of punishment, seeking to eradicate crime through work, religion, and education. The first public recommendation of the Society was for “more private or even solitary labor” and the separation of the depraved from the less depraved.

In particular, the separation between the depraved and less depraved came to symbolize the distinction of juvenile delinquents from their adult counterparts. Indeed, the progres-
sive movement was supported by popular Lockean notions of the malleability of youthful character (as opposed to the hardened character of adults). Ben Franklin’s activities as president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery (founded in 1775) reveal how political leaders at the time emphasized early forms of crime prevention: the purpose of the organization was “to instruct, to advise, to qualify those, who have been restored to freedom, to promote in them habits of industry, to furnish them with employments suited to their age, sex, talents, and to procure for their children an education.”

Although his organization focused on instructing newly freed men, the idea that it is crucial to “train” those (1) at risk of poverty and criminality and (2) whose characters are malleable and have not yet adjusted to a rigid form of life early on became widespread.

In sum, the economic turbulence at the turn of the century, changing modes of collectively rearing and employing children, and evolving beliefs of progressive reformists ultimately gave rise to the philosophy of charities such as the House of Refuge, which sought to extend a progressive carceral logic toward poor children.

The Philosophy of the House of Refuge

The House of Refuge delineated its principles as the following: “employment of the idle; instruction of the ignorant; reformation of the depraved; relief of the wretched; a general diffusion of good morals; enlargement of virtuous society; the universal protection of property and life.” These were a direct reflection of the contemporaneous socioeconomic conditions discussed in the previous section. One of the core tenets of the House of Refuge was a firm belief in the possibility of rehabilitation for children, which was necessary for justifying a separate institution for reforming children that would replace
traditional agencies of socialization and reduce crime. In *The Design and Advantages of the House of Refuge*, the managers of the House called it a “matter of astonishment” that “until within a few years, no measures have been taken to... adopt some plan which shall lessen, if not cure the enormous evil of punishing juvenile offenders, without any prospect of reforming them.”

Detailing how the confinement of children into jails without means of instruction would increase recidivism, the managers made it clear that “the institution we want is neither a prison nor an almshouse, but a school of discipline and instruction.”

The notion that moral instruction could deter crime and instability allowed the House to successfully argue before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1838 that it could hold delinquent children without a criminal trial or conviction. The court justified its decision by holding that “the infant has been snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity; and not only is the restraint of her person lawful, but it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her from it.”

In other words, the court ruled that the confinement of vagrant children with no criminal offenses was acceptable because of their criminal potential, and thus justified the House of Refuge as a preventive measure conducive to the infant’s welfare. The alleged connection between the poverty of these children and their criminality in the future was a crucial component in rationalizing the logic of the House and the policies that allowed the arbitrary incarceration of vagrant children who disrupted the public order. In this way, reformatories such as the House of Refuge were an ideal solution to reconcile the need to combat instability by incarcerating poor vagrant children with the growing progressive concern that jails were inhumane for children. Vagrant children could now be detained without having committed criminal offenses under the assumption that the House would provide for their welfare.

In addition, the emphasis on preventing idleness re-
flects the contemporaneous economy’s distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor and its concern for maintaining social stability amidst turmoil. Throughout the *The Design and Advantages of the House of Refuge*, the managers consistently discuss how the “House of Refuge is designed to be a palace of never ceasing occupation.” They express the hope that “when the pupil leaves the institution… instead of being a weight on the community, supported either in our jails or almshouses, he will be enabled to bear his part of the public burdens.” In the fifty-first annual report of the House of Refuge, the managers emphasize the benefits that the House brings to the public by emphasizing how “pauperism is diminished by the inmates… being enabled to gain a respectable living by their honest industry, and thus adding to the general welfare;” the lessening of crime, and the enlargement of public security—in other words, providing reassurance that the House plays its role in maintaining social stability.

Lastly, the managers of the House of Refuge appealed to the early nineteenth century economy’s focus on productivity and economic efficiency by highlighting that their charity saved taxpayers’ money. The managers appealed not only to the moral imperative to help guide delinquents in the right direction, but also to its economic benefits: “when viewed as a means by which the perpetration of crimes will be prevented, it is believed that a regard to economy alone would require support of this institution.” In order to maximize economic efficiency, the House also imposed strict standards for who to admit into the institution. The principal of the House claimed “if one is deformed in body, deficient in mind, and not likely to succeed in acquiring the knowledge of a trade, or unfitted to bear the proper discipline, he has higher claims on some other form of public charity. A house of refuge is not meant for him, nor is it likely to benefit him.” In this sense, the House, like other forms of charity navigating through limited resources at
this time, drew a precarious line between who was worthy and unworthy to access such special types of assistance.

In short, the Philadelphia House of Refuge was (1) a mechanism for social control that arose out of the turbulent economic conditions of the early nineteenth century and (2) an extension of the history of applying carceral logic toward the poor. By situating itself as a progressive institution with faith in the unique rehabilitative abilities of children, the House effectively addressed socioeconomic concerns in a fashion that was compatible with reformist movements that demanded efficient yet humane solutions to juvenile poverty and delinquency.

The Legitimization of Carceral-Capitalist Ideology in Reformatories

Just as how the economic conditions of the early nineteenth century shaped the logic of reformatories, the reformatories themselves—in their practices—also legitimized the economy’s carceral-capitalist ideology.

The Structure and Organization of the House of Refuge

The House of Refuge was structured in a way that reflected and reinforced the ideology of the contemporaneous economy. The founders of the House were prominent, affluent Philadelphians who were politically active and often involved with other charitable projects. For example, the first president John Sergeant was a financially well-off lawyer who believed that the wealthy had a duty to serve the public. Naturally, the status of the Board of Managers led the managers to be primarily concerned with preserving the social and economic values that enabled them to occupy such positions of privilege to begin with.
Founder of the Philadelphia House of Refuge, John Sergeant

Thus, the House was structured in a way that reinforced the narratives of the capitalist economy, namely that one must reap the fruits of his own labor and obey one’s superiors or employers. The children followed a strict schedule in which they were required to labor an average of eight hours per day; recreation and play was only allowed for half an hour if the day’s work had all been completed. In the first year, the boys engaged in bookbinding, basket-making, wicker-weaving… etc., while the girls sewed, mended, cooked, and practiced general housework.

The classification of inmates into four classes according to their level of obedience was also an integral aspect of the reformatory’s mission to indoctrinate docility. The inmates that “behave well, are orderly in their conduct, and attentive to their studies” were rewarded monthly by the Superintendent and Matron in the presence of other inmates, and those who behaved well for a consecutive three months formed a class of honor.
and wore badges of distinction. This tradition reflects what Foucault termed the gratification-punishment system, in which “the definition of performance [is] on the basis of the two opposed values of good and evil” and the lazy are encouraged by the desire to be rewarded in the same way as the diligent.

The children also received schooling in spelling, reading, writing, arithmetic, etc., as religious, moral, and intellectual education was viewed as an integral part of the House’s mission. The term punishment was claimed to be “unknown, except in the necessary correction of idleness or disorder within the house,” demonstrating how the managers wished to sever themselves from the label of ‘punitive.’

The Internalization of Capitalist Messages by the House of Refuge

The House of Refuge reproduced the ideology that idleness is a sin by transforming children into wage-earners. The possibility of rehabilitation for children enabled the effort to orient them toward becoming obedient workers in the future. Viewed as valuable potential additions to the labor force, the children were trained to adopt habits of industry and self-reliance, and the ultimate goal was for the managers to place the children into apprenticeships. Indeed, seventy years after its founding, the American Academy of Political and Social Science summarized the work of the House of Refuge as “twice blessed for its benefits not only the immediate recipients of its training, but does incalculable good in changing them from being an expense to the public into wage earners.” The administrators of the House also consistently identified obedience as the chief trait it aims to instill in the children. The principal of the House in its founding years described how “a boy, who has been accustomed to disobey his parents or superiors, and has been allowed to spend most of his time in idleness before he is brought to the refuge, if kept regularly at work and compelled
to obey those who have the care of him, will become so ac-
customed to labor, that he will even, in some cases, prefer it to
idleness, and obedience will also become habitual.”

Certain structural features of the House itself, such as the strict time-table that the children had to follow, repro-
duced the normality of discipline and cycles of repetition that
schools, workshops, and hospitals imposed. It reflected the rig-
ors of the industrial period and legitimized the “working day”
that the capitalist system required in exchange for sustenance.
As Foucault puts it, the principle that underlay the time-table
was essentially non-idleness, under which wasting time was a
moral offence and economic dishonesty. At least in a retroac-
tive point of view, penal labor in the House of Refuge (much
like eighteenth-century disciplinary institutions that Foucault
describes) served less to generate profit or form useful skills,
but more to construct “a power relation, an empty economic
form, a schema of individual submission and of adjustment to
a production apparatus.”

Such internalization of the value of work is also re-
vealed by the consistent inclusion of a certain section in the
annual reports of the House: testimonies by the employers to
whom the children were apprenticed. The end of each report
includes quotes by the employers praising the children’s obe-
dience and industry: “William’s conduct, honesty, industry,
and general habits are good and well-inclined,” “Elizabeth
continues to be perfectly honest, very industrious, and toler-
ably obedient.” Out of all respectable traits, the emphasis on
obedience and industriousness reveals that qualities associated
with docile labor were valued the most. The inclusion of the
employers’ appreciation and validation of the House’s work
demonstrate that the achievement of economic productivity
served as one of its most important sources of legitimacy and
values.

This philosophy is also found when examining which
behaviors were punished and rewarded in the House. The offenses which were punished included escapes, rioting, quarreling, stealing, fighting, defying authority, and refusing to work\textsuperscript{41}—all acts associated with disobedience to one’s superior. While it was true that children’s homes in general tend to discourage disobedience, the administrators of the House were notable in that they explicitly measured success by levels of obedience and marketed this in their annual reports. In the fifty-first annual report, the managers boasted that none of the children attempted to escape when they were taken to the Zoological Gardens and other exhibitions for recreational purposes, highlighting that “most of [their] youth soon learn to value aright the privileges of freedom accorded to them.”\textsuperscript{42} In outlining the benefits of the House, the managers emphasized that the House would replace the “dreaded tramp” with the “quiet and orderly citizen.”\textsuperscript{43} It is telling that these reports praised docility as the most significant asset of the children, instead of other aspects of their character such as creativity, collaboration skills, and happiness that one would typically expect a children’s home to develop. The deliberate appeals to future employers, the numerous accounts of the children’s lack of rebellious spirit, and the endorsement of this phenomenon as a sign of success further legitimized the carceral-capitalist nature of the charity.

\textit{Point of View of the Children}

Although there is a lack of available first-hand testimonies from the children themselves, it is still possible to infer their attitudes towards the House via reports by third-party entities. For example, observations from the Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy (a revolutionary research project on prisoner welfare at the time) stated that during the parents’ monthly visits to the reformatory, “the children are constantly urging their parents to have them released, and the parents are
equally constantly promising to do so,” which “excites uneasi-
ess in the former and neutralizes what would otherwise be the
useful discipline of the house.” These remarks imply that chil-
dren felt a widespread sense of restlessness and intense desire
for release, suggesting that the House was perceived more as a
typical prison than a warm rehabilitative center as portrayed by
its administrators.

Evidence of the children’s lives after discharge also
suggests that the House was not as effective in accomplishing
its mission as it set out to be. The discussion between Gus-
tave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville (both scholars of
American prison systems) and the superintendent of the House
in 1831 read that “almost all young persons who have passed
[fifteen or sixteen years of age] when they entered the Refuge
have conducted themselves badly after leaving it.” The su-
perintendent confessed that about one-third of those who had
been released returned to a life of criminality, with the worst
vice among boys being theft and that among girls being prosti-
tution.

Change Over Time

  The intensifying adoption of carceral-capitalist prin-
ciples by the reformatory is displayed in the managers’ increas-
ingly penal and rigorous approach in managing the children.
While in its founding years, the reformatory operated under the
belief that youths who lived in poverty pursued delinquency
because they had insufficient knowledge to make correct deci-
sions, a sense that moral guidance is not enough because the
poor are inherently vicious and must be controlled through
rigid discipline became widespread in the later years.

  An 1826 address by the Board of managers read that
“few are depraved to err, who enjoy the opportunity of delib-
erate choice. To make free the will by enlightening the under-
standing is the leading purpose of the present scheme." In essence, the managers initially believed that the delinquency of poor children is not a manifestation of an inherent flaw, but the result of a lack of education and spiritual guidance. The House focused heavily on environmental factors, portraying itself as an organization that successfully produced environments conducive to well-being. In contrast, the fifty-eighth annual report, when discussing the issue of children escaping, read: “I think this tendency to abscond arises more from a roving, vagrant disposition...than from any dissatisfaction with the home itself, which, in most cases, is better than that in which they were brought up.” To defend themselves against the failings of the reformatory and the continued delinquency of the children, the managers contradicted their original philosophy that moral guidance can mitigate delinquency. Instead of maintaining that the House will guide the children in the right direction, the managers identified an inherent vagrant disposition in them that has little to do with the environment they were placed in.

The need to punish every day also threatened to undermine the initial principle of reform and rehabilitation; this is reflected in the changing character of the annual reports from being philosophical to pragmatic. The third and fourth annual reports, for instance, mainly spoke of developing the morals and education of destitute youth. On the other hand, most later reports discussed not their goals and plans, but mostly specific problems and successes that the Refuge encountered in practice. The managers sought to address the practical problems of disobedience by adopting the conviction that younger subjects were more receptive to reform; in other words, they identified the source of the problem to be the old age of its current inmates. In the third annual report, it is argued that if there was any disappointment in the work of the House of Refuge, it was because subjects had been “permitted to run a career of iniquity so long that habits of vice have become mature.”

Over
time, the records of the House of Refuge reveal that admission of older children declines. In 1828 and 1829, 28% of the subjects admitted into the Refuge were over sixteen, as compared with 16% in 1830. The increasing emphasis that candidates for the House be youngsters who have not yet hardened into delinquent habits, and the continuously decreasing threshold of what age constitutes “young,” speaks to the weakening belief of the rehabilitative potential of all juveniles.

Evolving Language in the Annual Reports and Other Documents

There is a clear deviation from the original principles of the Refuge that can be detected in the language of the Board of Managers over time. In the beginning, the Report of a Committee of the Legislature in 1835 reported that “the buildings are substantial, and their arrangements judicious. The inmates present a healthy appearance; their clothing is comfortable… Their labor is suited to their age and capacity—regular, but not severe. Their government, so far as the nature of the case will allow, is parental. They have their regular hours of labor and instruction… The greatest possible care is had for their intellectual improvement.” The fourth annual report also mainly feature positive reports, outlining that “recreation is provided as regularly and as freely in due proportion as work. Exercise [and gymnastic plays] is encouraged and promoted.”

The hopeful and parental ambience of the earlier years contrasts starkly with the significantly more penal and severe ambience of the later years. In the fifty-first annual report, the first instance of suicide is mentioned, in which an inmate named William Sollenburg took his life by hanging himself in his room. The report also mentions the separation of the dormitories of younger, more innocent children from the rowdier ones, and making the occupancy of the first floor of the Boys’
Sleeping Hall the “exclusive privilege of moral conduct,” demonstrating how authorities restricted disobedient inmates from accessing basic, formerly universal amenities as a means of punishment. When discussing the necessity of walls around the reformatory, the report mentions instances where the children abused the manager’s confidence (i.e. escaped) as a justification to keep the House enclosed. One section of the report reads:

“Humanity in the largeness of its sympathies and kindness of its heart asks, Why the necessity of lock and key on the dormitory? Would it not be better to throw open every door? Would not this remove from the minds of the inmates the idea of prison life?... If every subject committed to us were a youth of ordinary moral rectitude, or had been accustomed to the mild restraints of a well-regulated family, then it would be an undoubted cruelty to subject such a one to the restraints of ‘bolts and bars.’ Our experience, however, is, that but a moiety of those we receive are thus moral, or have been thus accustomed. In our discipline and economy, we have to deal with facts, and not fancies. The very young, not hardened in vicious conduct, might, in fact ought to be lodged in an open dormitory. But, for the older in years and in vice, the lock and key at night—or a corresponding police force—are absolute necessities. The protection of the comparatively innocent, as well as the preservation of property, is not to be lightly set aside.”

The increasing distinction between the “comparatively innocent” and the guilty who have a fixed character signifies the managers’ decreasing hope in rehabilitation. In contrast to their original philosophy that preaches lofty ideas of reformation, the language in the later reports are realistic, pragmatic, and
harsh. It dismisses the original principles of the House as “fancies,” not facts, maintaining that punitive discipline is necessary while using age as a category to justify this changing approach. The “humanity [with] the largeness of its sympathies and kindness of its heart” that the managers repudiate here represents, in effect, the initial spirit reflected in their mission statement.

Instances of Abuse

In addition to subtle changes in the nuances of the managers’ tones, there are instances of outright abuse that occur in the later years. In 1876, a nine-day investigation by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives found that the board “punished children by banning play, sending them to bed without supper, placing them in solitary confinement, and even imposing lashings. The board forced children to labor in institutional workshops six days a week without pay.”57 Below are a few excerpts from the Report of the Evidence taken before the Committee of the House of Representatives appointed to Investigate the Management of the House of Refuge:

Regarding Ernest, a boy who attempted to escape:

“He was taken into Mr. Bulkley’s office and requested to lay over. He did so. Mr. Bulkley took out a rattan from the closet, and commenced to administer the punishment on him pretty heavy at first, and gradually increasing as he got warmed up. While in the process of punishment this boy was taken with a spasm, and the boy fell on to the floor. He immediately proceeded to his medicine closet, and got some medicine out and administered it to the boy, and then requested me to take him and lock him up in the iron front, on bread and water.”58
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“I have had boys in my division locked up on bread and water for sixteen days–bread and water three times a day. One boy was locked up in an iron cell that we had at that time–a dark cell.”

Regarding the rule that boys ought to be allowed to go outside for recreation, several watchmen testified that the Superintendent grants this luxury only to the boys in the Class of Honor. In addition, the report contains an account of a boy that was subject to punishment and confinement because he was temporarily unable to work due to a sore hand. The testimony reads: “it used to be that boys with sore hands should be allowed to stay in the reading-rooms and have books; but under the present Superintendent’s administration it has been the rule that boys with sore hands, or trifling causes, should be in confinement, [sometimes for weeks at a time].”

The explicit instances of abuse, unwarranted and violent punishments, and complete neglect of the children in the reformatory bear little resemblance to the parental and loving image of the Refuge portrayed in the House’s founding documents and first few annual reports. The House evidently became a less playful and rehabilitative environment, arguably not much different from the original prison model that the House intended to distinguish itself from. The abusive administration of the House, however, was largely normalized and tolerated by the watchmen:

“I don’t think [the managers] have been cruel. [The manager] never gave them a great deal [of punishment]. But what he did give them he generally gave it to them to show that he meant business.”

“There are some boys, I think, you can get along with without thrashing, and there are others, I do think it is a very hard matter to govern without it. If we had them isolated by themselves, I think you might do it. In the
general discipline of an institution of this kind among boys, I think it is a hard matter to do without a rattan, or something of that kind. I have had very few boys punished. I try to avoid it. I will put a boy on line or march him, and conquer him in that way. Generally afterwards I have very little trouble. If a boy does his duty and what is right, I am kind to him, or try to be.”62

The language above implies that physical punishment was avoided yet also seen as inevitable or necessary to properly shape young people and govern the house; such is the only concern expressed in these passages as there is no mention of how such punishment could psychologically impact the children. In addition, the act of physical abuse is portrayed to be “made up for” by displaying kindness to them afterwards. The administrators, too, seemed to share an understanding that corporal punishment was a necessary and natural reaction to disobedience. On May 19, 1829, an administrative report reads:

“Eliza Philips was this day chastised in consequence of most flagrant and outrageous conduct. Her behavior for several weeks has been marked with insubordination and insolent language. All milder means had been used, but so far from producing good they made her worse… Her language was so horrible and polluted and expressed in so vociferous a manner as to destroy all hopes of any good from means less severe than corporal punishment… This brought matters to a point and a most severe flagellation was necessary to bring her to submission.”63

Here, it is clear that physical punishment was perceived to be on the extreme end of the spectrum of punishment, but
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was nevertheless an option that must be taken if all milder means fail. The harshness of corporal punishment was indeed acknowledged by the administrators, but it seems that in no way was it understood as “off-limits” or abusive in the way that current generations would. Indeed, the House committee eventually ruled that the board’s actions were not abusive, revealing the increasingly carceral nature of public opinion.64

The slowly evolving character of the Refuge and its eventual embracing of the principles of carceralogy were normalized as a kind of inevitable evolution by the administrators. Punishment that was no different from that occurring in a regular jail was depicted as an unavoidable act stemming from a place of love and kindness; in actuality, the institution of reformatories was not a radical movement against, but rather a manifestation of the carceral ideology that the contemporaneous economy propagated. It represented the fusing of capitalist and carceral cultures, strengthening the conception of punishment as not outright torture of the body, but economically and morally productive rehabilitation. This ideology ultimately served to conceal the fundamentally punitive nature of integrating children into a violent capitalist ethos.

Conclusion

The House of Refuge was originally founded as a revolutionary institution that sought to deviate from carceral ideology toward the poor and emphasize the malleable character of children; it was, nevertheless, a product of the economic conditions of its times. While it was envisioned as a new agency of socialization that would address juvenile delinquency in a progressive manner, the history of the House demonstrates how general concerns about the unruliness of vagrants and the social instability they caused dominated its original focus on rehabilitation.
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The legitimization of the carceral-capitalist ideology of the time intensified over time and eventually inspired new reform movements that demanded institutions such as the juvenile court that would serve as an intermediate form of control between institutionalization and no supervision at all. These new forms of control were, again, portrayed as more lenient forms of punishment, but nevertheless consisted of the same thread of penal philosophy toward poverty. The assumption that the poor are bound to delinquency and thus must be forcibly controlled continued, and the ensuing “progressive” versions of the prison, reformatory, and juvenile court still operated under the framework of carceral capitalism. The House of Refuge, like its past models such as the prison, attempted to revolutionize the approach toward the poor with a seemingly newfound access to humanity, but it did not fundamentally alter the oppressive character of policing: namely, the authority to arrest, punish, and isolate those that threatened the property order. As time passed, the activities of the House grew in opposition to the progressivism on which it was founded. As part of a historic chain of reformism that advocated for more ‘humane’ structures veiled as “charity” yet contained the same disciplinary and punitive logic, the House ultimately served to reproduce discussions about the mechanisms of the detention of the poor, instead of the legitimacy of such detention itself.

At large, the House of Refuge of Philadelphia demonstrates how charity has continuously adapted its moral messages and principles to economic conditions throughout history. It reflects the transition from traditional forms of almsgiving to institutional care as resources became increasingly strained—specifically, the continuation of the long tradition of incarceration as a means of poor relief. It also reflects the transformation of the character of charity from selfless acts of giving by individuals into an exclusive public social service that is (1) afforded only to a special group of worthy recipients (children deemed to have the potential for rehabilitation) and (2) practiced in specific ways that are in line with capitalist values, such
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as conformity to the working day, productivity, and obedience.
Notes:


2 “Carceral capitalism” is a term popularized by Jackie Wang, that describes how the system of capitalism is perpetuated by (1) imposing punitive measures on those who threaten its propertied order (i.e. are in debt), and (2) transforming punitive institutions into debt-collecting, labor-imposing, and profit-producing facilities.


4 Ibid.


7 Ibid, p. 17.

8 Ibid, p. 16.

9 Ibid, p. 27.

10 Ibid, p. 34.


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21 Ibid, p. 9.
23 Ibid, p. 16.
28 Ibid, p. 91.
29 Ibid.
38 Ibid, p. 453.
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43 Ibid, p. 54.


46 Ibid.


50 Ibid, p. 203.

51 Ibid, p. 203.


55 Ibid, p. 46.

56 Ibid, p. 45.


58 House of Representatives., Evidence taken by the Committee of the
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House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appointed (February, 1876) to investigate the management of the House of Refuge § (1876), p. 29. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000018432206.

59 Ibid, p. 25.
60 Ibid, p. 32.
61 Ibid, p. 262.
62 Ibid, p. 263.

Images (listed in order of appearance):


On Christmas Eve, 1938, Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) Secretary G. Godfrey Phillips sent an urgent cable to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJJDC):

**MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT SHANGHAI IS GRAVELY PERTURBED BY ABNORMAL INFLUX OF JEWISH REFUGEES SHANGHAI IS ALREADY FACING MOST SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEM DUE TO SINOJAPANESE HOSTILITIES IT IS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO ABSORB ANY LARGE NUMBER OF FOREIGN REFUGEES.**¹

December 1938 marked the high tide of Jewish refugees flooding into Shanghai. A year after Japanese generals ordered the Rape of Nanjing, and a month after Kristallnacht confirmed German Jews’ worst fears of the Nazi regime, hundreds of refugees poured into Shanghai every week.² But as Phillips’ cable shows, Shanghai’s run as the world’s most welcoming port for Jewish refugees was coming to an end.

Shanghai enjoyed an unusual political status in the early days of World War II. Japan occupied most of the city from August 1937, but left control of the International Settlement, the longtime cosmopolitan legal haven of European and American businessmen, in the hands of the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC), the Settlement’s multinational government established in the wake of China’s defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). Under the SMC’s purview, Shanghai remained one
of the few ports in the world that would allow stateless persons entry. From August 1937 to August 1939, when the SMC began tightly restricting entry, over 20,000 Jewish refugees, mostly from central Europe, flooded into the city.3

Soon after Phillips sent his cable, Sun Ke, leader of the Nationalist (Guomindang or Kuomintang) government’s legislative branch and Republic of China founder Sun Yat-sen’s only son, learned that SMC officials planned to restrict the flow of refugees to Shanghai. He began drafting a plan to settle Jewish refugees in southwest China on a massive scale. On February 17th, 1939, Sun made his proposal to the National Defense Supreme Council in Chongqing, the southwestern city where the Nationalists had made their headquarters since December 1937. He emphasized the humanitarian contribution the government would be making, as well as potential benefits to the Chinese war effort. If the Nationalists could win favor among prominent Jews, who they assumed held considerable sway in British and American politics, then those countries would be more likely to support them in the war against the Japanese.4 In June, Jewish German industrialist Jacob Berglas announced his own plan for a refugee settlement in Yunnan, China’s most southwestern province.5 New York dentist Maurice William, who had written back in 1934 that “China is the one great hope for Hitler’s victims,” soon approached the Nationalist government with his own plan for a settlement.6 Both Berglas and William’s proposals garnered significant interest from different groups within the Nationalist government. Though the proposal ultimately failed because of a lack of funding, there is no doubting the sincerity of all three parties’ efforts to make the settlement a reality.

Despite a rich literature of historical studies on both plans for Jewish settlements outside of Palestine and the Shanghai Jewish community in particular, scholars have largely ignored the resettlement plans hatched by Sun, Berglas, and
The plans’ ultimate failures contribute to this dearth of scholarship. Indeed, it is difficult to find a single mention of the proposals in either Chinese or Western records after 1940. Furthermore, China’s current regime has made it exceedingly difficult to research the Republican Period (1912-49), only allowing foreign scholars to make thirty photocopies per year at China’s Second Historical Archives in Nanjing. However, the publication of numerous sourcebooks in both Chinese and English in recent years has offered Western scholars a renewed opportunity to understand the historical significance of the Yunnan Plans.

Sun Ke, son of Sun Yat-sen, circa 1928

Historian of East Asia, Gao Bei, remains the only Western scholar who has thoroughly studied the Yunnan Plans. Gao understands the Nationalists’ support for the Yunnan Plans as part of their war strategy against the Japanese, as well as an attempt to boost China’s international stature more broadly. Gao’s analysis illuminates one of the central themes of the Yunnan Plans’ history from the Chinese perspective, while
making a significant contribution to our understanding of how Republican China sought to establish its place in the interwar world order. Yet several questions remain: Why did a Jewish settlement in southwest China so strongly capture the imaginations of William and Berglas? Why were the Nationalists, long skeptical of Western influence, suddenly comfortable with the mass immigration of a religious group to the interior of their country? And how did both groups envision the future of the settlement in a post-war world?

To answer these questions, my approach will differ from Gao’s in two important ways. First, lacking access to physical archives located in Taiwan, Nanjing, and Jerusalem, I have not assembled the source material necessary to trace causal links between William’s creation of the Yunnan settlement idea in 1933, Sun’s adoption of the idea in 1939, and Sun and Berglas’ promotion of their own plans later that year. I will instead analyze the underlying political assumptions of the plans themselves to understand how two groups as seemingly different as Western Jews and Nationalist Chinese could coalesce around such an ambitious project. Second, while Gao has analyzed the Yunnan Plans in the Chinese political context, I will place them in the Jewish political context as well, revealing how William and Berglas’ Yunnan Plans fit into the larger tradition of plans for Jewish settlements outside of Palestine. Despite the significant body of scholarship on the Uganda Scheme, Theodor Herzl’s plan to settle European Jews in British East Africa, as well as subsequent Jewish settlement plans, historians have yet to place the Yunnan Plans in the context of this tradition.

My analysis of the Yunnan Plans’ broader intellectual context will reveal that both Jewish and Chinese leaders’ notions of economic and political development were critical to their support of resettlement. The argument will proceed in three parts. First, I will analyze the earliest version of Jewish resettlement in China, which William began exploring in
1933. Second, I will show that the Chinese government had their doubts about Sun co-opting William’s idea in 1939, but ultimately embraced the Jewish settlement project as a way of importing the industrial knowledge that they deemed necessary for building the state.\textsuperscript{11} Third, I will show that the mentality that motivated William and Berglas’ dogged pursuit of a Yunnan settlement was part of a broader shift in the history of Jewish Territorialism, which Gur Alroey defines as “the call to establish an autonomous entity or state for the Jews in a land that is not the Land of Israel.”\textsuperscript{12} From the joint crises of Hitler’s rise to power and the Japanese invasion of China emerged a brief synergy between these two disparate intellectual traditions—Jewish Territorialism and Chinese Nationalist state-building—in a truly audacious political project.

Part I: Maurice William’s Big Idea

Following the World’s Zionist Conference’s rejection of the Uganda Scheme in 1903, British author and playwright, Israel Zangwill, led fifty prominent Zionists in establishing a rival institution: the Jewish Territorial Organization. Like Zionists, Territorialists believed that in the face of growing anti-Semitism, Jews should establish a permanent settlement outside of Europe to ensure the long-term security of their people. Unlike Zionists, Territorialists did not believe that this settlement needed to be in Palestine. But after the initial surge in energy following the Sixth World Zionist Conference, the Territorialist movement slowly lost momentum, and by 1925 Zangwill had disbanded the organization. The rise of Nazi Germany in the early 1930s and the founding of the Freeland League for Jewish Territorial Colonization in 1934 brought new life to the movement.\textsuperscript{13} That same year, Maurice William, a little-known New Yorker with no ties to institutional Territorialism, conceived of a plan to apply the Territorialist cause to the unlikeliest of
places: southwest China.

Chinese Nationalists first encountered the ideas of Maurice William by chance. Though a devoted Marxist in his early years, William, who made his living as a dentist in Brooklyn, became disillusioned with Communism during the First World War. The result of his search for a new belief system was a book, which he published in 1921 with the title, *The Social Interpretation of History: A Refutation of the Marxian Economic Interpretation of History*. Though only a few hundred copies were printed, by 1924 the book found its way to the southeastern Chinese port city of Guangzhou and ended up in the hands of Sun Yat-Sen, founding father of the Chinese republic and leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party.

When Sun began reading William’s book, he had been delivering a series of lectures laying out his vision for China’s political future. Sun had already outlined the first two of his “Three Principles of the People,” his articulation of which “had been communistic in tone.” But after a three month adjournment during which he made William’s book his “constant companion,” Sun had developed a new understanding of his third principle, (best translated as “People’s Livelihood”). According to journalist Katharine Roberts, who published an article about William in the *American Mercury* in 1939, “[Sun] explained that he no longer believed in the class struggle but that, along with Dr. William, he thought better conditions could be obtained through co-operation of business and labor.” From the moment he received word of his book’s influence on Chinese politics, William felt a responsibility to help cultivate the Republic of China as a liberal democracy. Indeed, by the early 1930s, William had come up with a new idea that promised to reshape China’s development once again.

William’s idea for resettling central European Jewish refugees in China did not emerge in a vacuum. A network of Jewish scholars and American Sinologists had close ties to the
Chinese Nationalist government long before the outbreak of the Second World War. Some of these connections, like the one between Sun and William, occurred by chance. But the presence of Chinese students at universities like Columbia and Cornell in the early 20th century also facilitated intellectual exchange. Celebrated Chinese essayist and May 4th Movement leader Hu Shih is one notable example. After studying under John Dewey at Columbia University, Hu adopted Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy and began to apply it to the Chinese context. Hu later helped organize Dewey’s lecture tour of China from 1919-21, which further cemented Dewey’s influence on China’s growing community of young intellectuals.18

Beginning in 1933, William leveraged his connections to this network of prominent Jews and intellectuals to seek advice and support for his resettlement proposal. William wrote a letter to Albert Einstein on January 30th, 1934, “to send some information about the possibilities of finding a new home in China for German Jews.”19 William’s correspondence with Einstein survives as a record of his early efforts to find backing for the Jewish resettlement project. As William told Einstein in their initial exchange, *The Social Interpretation of History*’s legacy in China would provide Jewish leaders the basis for pursuing such an ambitious project:

> Since a fortunate combination of circumstances made it possible for me to be of service to the Chinese government and the Chinese people and has won me the good-will of that nation, I should be happy to use this good-will in the service of our co-religionists of Germany. What practical form this service should take is the immediate question which I should like to discuss with you and other Jewish leaders.20

Upon receiving William’s letter, Einstein wrote back declaring
his enthusiasm for the project. “Your plan,” he wrote, “seems to me to be very hopeful and rational and its realization must be pursued energetically.”

By the time Einstein praised William’s plan, it had already won the endorsement of several prominent American intellectuals. “During a visit at the summer home of Judge Brandeis last September we naturally discussed the plight of German Jews,” William told Einstein. “He too feels that China is the one great hope for Hitler’s victims.”

William had also consulted with Dewey and his Columbia colleague James T. Shotwell. “I have gone into this subject in personal interviews with Professor John Dewey and Professor James T. Shotwell,” William told Einstein, “and find that they agree that we should make the most of our opportunities in China.” Though William certainly never lacked the confidence to advocate for his own political beliefs, Dewey’s approval must have bolstered his belief that a plan for Jewish resettlement was achievable.

Einstein never became directly involved in the resettlement project, but his brief correspondence with William in 1934 anticipated many of the ideas that would come to define the debates surrounding the Yunnan Plans. The world-renowned physicist was quick to point out the cultural resemblance between Jews and the Chinese. To Einstein, cooperation between the Jewish community and the Chinese was a natural match given the two groups’ long histories:

The Chinese and Jewish peoples, in spite of any apparent differences in their traditions, have this in common: both possess a mentality that is the product of cultures that go back to antiquity. This happy circumstance is a guarantee of mutual understanding and successful cooperation.

The idea that Jews and the Chinese were like-minded cultures,
temporarily left behind by the sprint to modernization yet still due for a 20th century rejuvenation, would later become one of the Chinese Nationalists’ central justifications for promoting Jewish settlement.

Another theme that emerges from Einstein’s letters to William is the belief that resettling Jews in China would help the Chinese nation at least as much as it helped the refugees themselves. While ensuring the survival of thousands of Hitler’s potential victims, William’s resettlement plan could also provide China with valuable business and industrial expertise, as Einstein put it in one of his letters to William:

I feel with all my heart that while your efforts will in no wise impair the invaluable moral and spiritual heritage of the Chinese people, which has withstood the test of thousands of years, it will place at the service of China the beneficent aid of Western skill, knowledge and science.25

Chinese Nationalists advocating for Jewish resettlement echoed Einstein’s 1934 portrayal of German Jewish refugees in their discussions of the matter five years later. Even those who dissented from Sun Ke’s promotion of a massive Jewish settlement agreed that China’s government should make use of highly qualified central European Jews, believing that they were paragons of Western expertise and rationality.26

Attached to Einstein’s endorsement of William’s plan was an important caveat. If German Jews could not find suitable employment in China, then the plan could not succeed. William agreed with Einstein that “ascertaining what opportunities China can offer for the profitable employment of German Jews” was the first step in testing the feasibility of his plan.27 Einstein promised to help attract prominent sponsors for William’s plan, but only after he was convinced that Ger-
man Jews traveling to China would not be stripped of their middle-class dignity. “I can help finding suitable individuals,” he wrote to William, “once I am satisfied that the German Jews can really find an existence in China.”

The fear among Westerners that German Jews would be unable to maintain in China what they deemed to be an adequate standard of living persisted throughout discussions of Jewish resettlement. For men like Einstein and William, these concerns were practical rather than colonialist: ensuring that refugees would have employment opportunities commensurate with their previous careers in central Europe was critical for attracting American financial support for William’s project.

As European Jews’ desperation intensified in the late 1930s, however, criticisms from Westerners skeptical of resettlement in China took on a far more racialized tone. At the height of central European Jewish flight to Shanghai in 1939, China expert Nathaniel Peffer expressed fears that the refugees would risk stooping to the level of colonized subjects. “China always has been hopeless as an area for the absorption of large numbers of Occidentals,” he wrote in an April memorandum to his Columbia University colleague Joseph P. Chamberlain. “One does not like to think of the prospect of middle-class Europeans sinking to the status of coolies and beachcombers, which is, I myself think, the prospect for three out of every four Jews who go to China.”

Einstein’s preoccupation with the quality of German Jews’ employment opportunities in China in his 1934 letters to William was indicative of a pre-Holocaust ignorance of the extermination facing Jews who remained in Europe. Peffer’s dismissive assessment of Jews’ opportunities in China, on the other hand, exemplified the kind of colonialist world view that continued to hamper efforts to resettle Jews in China. Inherent to Peffer’s way of thinking was the belief that, even five months after Krystallnacht and five months before the German
invasion of Poland, no reality facing Jews in Europe could be worse than the cultural insult of working alongside the “coolies and beachcombers” of the Orient.\textsuperscript{30}

Unlike Peffer, who focused his analysis on the overcrowded conditions of 1939 Shanghai, William looked at sites all across China as he began his survey in 1934. “Many of our co-religionists . . .” he told Einstein in the final letter which survives from their correspondence that year, “insist that the best results could be expected only if I personally were to go to China in the interest of our cause.”\textsuperscript{31} But to invest in such an expedition, William would need some system of criteria for assessing potential sites for Jewish settlement. “If I were to go to China,” he told Einstein, “I would want to do everything possible to insure the success of our common objective. Since no one person can hope to think of everything that ought to be investigated, I shall need the help and advice of our best thinkers.”\textsuperscript{32}

Though Einstein restated his support for William’s project in his final response in March 1934, there is no record of him giving William the advice he desired. William himself never ended up making a trip to China, and records of any discussions between William and the Chinese government about a Jewish settlement plan are nonexistent. Gao has concluded that Nationalist leaders were likely exposed to William’s Jewish settlement proposal before 1939 but rejected it out of concern for their relations with the Nazis, with whom China maintained diplomatic relations until 1941.\textsuperscript{33} It was not until Sun got word of the SMC’s plans to cut off Jewish immigration to Shanghai in 1939 that he revisited the idea.

Part 2: Sun Ke’s Yunnan Plan

Sun’s original proposal to the National Defense Supreme Council, which he filed in February of 1939, revealed
a leader preoccupied with enhancing China’s relationship with Britain and America. Sun outlined four main justifications for his settlement plan: first, to offer humanitarian assistance to a destitute people; second, to win the sympathy of the British; third, to win the sympathy of the U.S.; and fourth, to harness the talents of Jewish people for the future of China. At first glance, only the second and third reasons seemed to directly relate to attracting British and American support for the war against Japan, but there were common threads that underpin the logic of each of Sun’s four points.

The first common thread was that the plan’s main strength lay not in its effectiveness as a project of humanitarian relief, but as a tool of propaganda. Sun’s first point did reference his father’s belief that China should “unite and support weak nations,” but these idealistic considerations were quickly subsumed by the more practical arguments that followed. It seems that to the Nationalists, the impact that the plan could have on the Jewish people was second in importance to the impact it could have on the view of the British and American public. “With regard to Britain, the support of the Jewish people would enhance the sympathy of the ordinary British people toward us,” Sun argued. His analysis of the plan’s impact on America struck similar notes, suggesting that the plan “could shift the focus of Americans from the Jews toward support of China. In terms of propaganda,” Sun continued, “there would certainly be much to gain.”

Far from demonstrating a belief that both China and the Jewish people would benefit from a settlement project, Sun’s language revealed a view of humanitarian, political, and military assistance as a zero-sum game in which Americans’ concern for the plight of European Jews could only take away from their willingness to help China. Sun’s proposal’s emphasis on propaganda value can also help to explain why parts of the Chinese Nationalist government were so quick to embrace such
an ambitious project. From Sun’s point of view, the project would not necessarily need to go into effect for it to serve its purpose. The plan’s announcement alone could be enough to rally British and American support for China.

The second common thread in Sun’s logic was the influence of Jewish stereotypes on the Chinese government’s assessment of the plan. While it is true that many of the most successful British merchants in the Far East during the nineteenth century, such as the Kadoorie and Sassoon families, were Baghdadi Jews, Sun’s portrayal of Jews as the financial puppeteers of the West was built more on stereotype than reality:

Furthermore, the British Far Eastern policy actually hinges on the large merchants and bankers in the Far East. So the initial obstruction and most recent realization of British economic support <for China> was in truth manipulated by these large merchants and bankers, and since many of these large merchants and bankers are Jewish, therefore this proposal would influence the British to have an even more favorable attitude toward us.39

Sun’s description of the Jewish financiers’ “manipulation” of British economic policy suggests that members of the Chinese elite, especially the increasingly cosmopolitan and western-educated Nationalists, had internalized the western trope of Jews as financial puppeteers.40

Jewish stereotypes emerged again in the Chinese foreign ministry’s analysis of Sun’s proposal. In response to Sun’s claim that publicizing the settlement plan would have great propaganda value, the foreign ministry wrote:

The enemy and fascist countries are constantly alleging that we are a communist state, and at this time to take
in a large number of Jews will make it difficult to avoid giving the enemy a pretext for propaganda. In general, in fascist theory, communism and the Jews are frequently mentioned in the same breath.\textsuperscript{41} 

The Chinese Nationalists themselves clearly did not subscribe to what historian Paul Hanebrink has called “the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism,” yet that did not stop fascist governments’ promotion of this anti-Semitic trope from influencing Chinese Nationalists’ decision making.\textsuperscript{42} The Chinese Nationalists’ relationship with these stereotypes also illuminates the paradoxical nature of anti-Semitic ideology itself: they had to consider Jews’ potential portrayal as both manipulative financiers and communist sympathizers. In the Eurocentric world system in which Sun hoped their Jewish settlement plan would help them play a part, the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not consider itself to be in a position to critique the Judeo-Bolshevist ideology. If much of Europe was sympathetic to the idea of Judeo-Bolshevism, then the Nationalists felt they must consider its impact in their propaganda war.

The Nationalists ultimately believed that the status of the Jews was both an asset and a liability in their efforts to garner war support from Britain and the United States. The Jews’ financial leverage could help them influence Western leaders, yet helping Jews could also reinforce Japanese claims about the Chinese Communists. Gao has argued that the Chinese government’s policy toward Jewish refugees centers around these wartime considerations.\textsuperscript{43} But taken as a whole, the text of the government’s discussions of Sun’s proposed settlement plan suggested that not all Chinese officials were thinking merely in the short term.

Sun’s original proposal found the legislative leader in two minds about whether the Jewish settlement would be temporary. Sun wrote: “Now, we propose to designate a temporary
residence area for Jews in the southwest border region...”44
This language seemed clear enough, yet in his list of reasons for the plan, Sun elaborated:

With regard to the future building up <of China>, the Jewish people have a strong financial background and many talents. Should we be able to obtain a favorable impression from them and obtain their support and assistance, it would be of an enormous help to us.45

Sun’s argument seemed to reiterate the same themes present in the sections analyzed above. There was another mention of gaining “a favorable impression,” and another reference to the Jews’ “strong financial background.”46 Yet there were also two key differences. The first was that in this document, Sun conceived of the Jewish peoples’ value not in terms of their ability to attract sympathy and military support, but in terms of their ability to contribute directly to “the future building up of China.”47 Here, their “strong financial background and many talents” were not considered useful because of their influence on British and American foreign policy, but as expertise that would be necessary for China’s economic development.48 Though much of Sun’s proposal focused on Jewish elites, when he wrote “the Jewish people” in this passage, he referred not to the Sassoons or the Kadoories of Shanghai and Hong Kong, but to the ordinary Jews of central Europe who would populate the settlement.49

To gain an understanding of the thinking behind Sun’s words, we need to take note of the government procedures through which he presented and then disseminated his proposal. As president of the Legislative Yuan, Sun also sat on the National Defense Supreme Council. It was at a meeting of this council that he first proposed his Jewish settlement plan. Past analyses of the deliberations have emphasized the role military
considerations played in the Nationalists’ support for the proposal without considering the implications of the fact that the proposal’s original audience was the National Defense Supreme Council. It is not clear that Sun’s choice to first present the plan to the Defense Council was evidence that he viewed its military implications as most important, but Sun would have considered how to frame his presentation of the plan to best persuade his audience. Sun emphasizes the potential military impact in his original proposal, but we cannot be sure that this emphasis reflects only his way of thinking and not also the circumstances in which he presented the plan.

After receiving a copy of the proposal, the Civil Affairs Office of Nationalist Government forwarded it to the Executive Yuan, ordering them to consider the proposal and report their findings. Kong Xiangxi, President of the Executive Yuan, then directed the ministries of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Treasury and Transportation, to write up their opinions of the proposal. Unlike Sun, for whom the Defense Council was originally his primary audience, the various ministries considered the international propaganda value and potential military benefits of the plan as one factor among many, alongside the legality, feasibility, and long-term territorial impacts of the project. Their opinions showed significant skepticism from officials in a variety of Nationalist government roles. Kong wrote in his summary prefacing the document that Sun’s plan “would be ill-advised on many accounts.” Despite Sun’s original proposal’s description of the plan as a “temporary” settlement, the various ministries’ concerns about the plan demonstrate that they understood the proposal as a long-term, or even permanent, project.

There was little agreement about where to place the Jewish refugees: locations close to international borders could lead to collaboration between the refugees and outsiders, while a settlement in the far west of the country, a region over which
China historically had held an inconsistent grasp, brought its own concerns of ethnic separatism. All told, four of the five ministries expressed concerns about the effects of a Jewish settlement on China’s territorial integrity. The Ministry of War rejected the idea of a permanent settlement altogether. “As for allowing the stateless Jews to settle,” they wrote, “one ought not to grant permanent residence or a special area in order to emphasize territorial sovereignty.”

Suggestions that the Jewish should settle next to one of China’s borders, though in line with the precedent of southeastern treaty ports, only intensified the ministries’ concerns. “If the area designated for settlement is adjacent to international borders,” the Finance Ministry wrote, “we fear that one cannot avoid the emergence of abuses.”

While the government’s territorial concerns were indicative of the mindset of a country under siege from the Japanese, Nationalist officials’ conception of Jews as political agitators also colored their responses to Sun’s proposal. Kong expressed concerns about the Jews political activities,
underscoring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ reference to Judeo-Bolshevism, mentioned above. “After entering China,” Kong wrote, “they would not engage in any political activity or disseminate any ideology . . . if they violate these conditions, they should be expelled.”57 And though they expressed it with a distinctly Chinese indirectness, the Ministry of Interior believed the Jewish refugees could turn out to be spies for a foreign country. “If a large number of long-term foreigners live on international routes,” they wrote, “one cannot avoid having our secrets concerning international and defence matters leaking, and if by chance we are not completely alert, this could result in some unfortunate incident.”58 The Foreign Affairs Ministry echoed these concerns:

Jews have suffered distress and endure hardships, and are excellent at managing affairs. If the designated area is too broad, while at first they will be easy to govern, after they dwell together for some time, if by chance there develops ethnic self-determination coming to the point of a demand for autonomy, it will not be easy to control, and further, if that area is adjacent to the treaty ports or to international routes, they will easily receive enticements from outside forces which will not be to our advantage.59

Officials did not believe placing Jews far from territorial borders was sufficient to ensure their political reliability. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that a large group of Jewish refugees would be difficult to govern no matter their location. The Ministry of Interior agreed, writing: “As for the management of the said area, its organization ought to be strengthened with the police organization as its core.”60

The various ministries of the Nationalist government’s executive branch agreed with Sun’s characterization of the Jews as a people possessing special characteristics, but they believed these talents were as much a liability as they were an asset to the
interests of the Chinese state. Indeed, the ministries’ concerns were largely based on their view of the Jewish refugees not as meek vagabonds, but as administratively skilled and politically active cosmopolitans.

Both Sun and the executive ministries had territorial concerns at the top of their minds, but they conceived of them differently. To Sun, the war with Japan was the central crisis facing the Nationalist government, and the potential for assistance from Britain and the United States presented such an appealing military opportunity that radical measures like a Jewish settlement had to be considered. To Kong and his colleagues, the war with Japan was just one issue in a long line of challenges to Chinese sovereignty which had plagued the country since China’s defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). Their repeated mention of the dangers of treaty ports and international routes showed that the legacies of colonialism maintained significant purchase on Chinese strategic thinking.

The officials’ preoccupation with the Jewish refugees as potential communist sympathizers revealed a different territorial anxiety. Following the split between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Northern Expedition in 1927, the Nationalist government had waged an unsuccessful decade-long campaign to exterminate the CCP. Though the Japanese invasion forced the two groups to form a tenuous alliance in 1937, hostilities between the two parties never ceased, and the conflict again devolved into all-out civil war soon after the conclusion of World War II. Officials’ concerns about communist Jewish refugees were thus not only about giving fascists propaganda fodder, but also reflected their own insecurities about Chinese unification.

Despite the Executive Yuan’s unfavorable review of Sun’s proposal, they did endorse the idea that Jewish refugees’ technical expertise could help the Nationalists in their state-building efforts. In his summary of the ministries’ opinions,
Kong wrote:

We are in the process of building the nation and we need many specialists of all sorts, such as scientists, engineers, doctors, mechanics, and so forth. The government agencies should survey what they need in the areas of responsibility, write out a detailed account, giving clear indication of what personnel they require and salaries.\(^{61}\)

Kong’s suggestion seems reminiscent of Sun’s belief that the Jewish people’s “strong financial background and many talents” would be beneficial to “the future building up of China,” but there is a key difference.\(^{62}\) In Sun’s proposal, Chinese officials would assess the “specialized abilities” of Jewish refugees after they had already been settled in the country’s interior.\(^{63}\) For Kong, their expertise was a condition for their admittance into the country. Sun and Kong’s disagreement on this point revealed a fundamental difference in how they conceived of Jewish refugees’ roles in China’s development. Kong advocated recruiting a small number of Jews to fill specific roles within the Nationalist government. But Sun’s idea was far more ambitious. Settle enough Jewish refugees in the sparsely populated areas of the country’s interior, Sun believed, and they would begin to organically contribute to China’s larger economic development. Whereas Kong imagined the Jews filling gaps in Chinese expertise at the government level, Sun saw them filling geographic holes in the country’s economy.

The differences between Kong and Sun’s ideas could have major implications on where the refugees physically ended up. As government experts, the relatively small number of Jews that could be admitted under Kong’s plan would most likely have ended up living in large cities like Chongqing, where the Nationalist headquarters were housed at the time. By contrast, Sun’s proposal specified that Jewish refugees should “be utilized
by various departments for construction in our rear areas.”

These “rear areas” refer to the rural agricultural areas in the country’s southwest region. In response to Sun’s proposal, the Ministry of Interior wrote that “the settlement area need only be in a relatively open place in the southwest, and any will do.”

While the executive ministries expressed a variety of political concerns about the location of the settlement, the economic criterion was simple: any sparsely populated and underdeveloped place would suffice.

Sun and Kong’s openness to using foreign expertise in the name of modernization was nothing new for the Nationalist government, which had previously invited League of Nations experts to consult on the administration and development of the rural economy in the early 1930s. Margherita Zanasi has shown that Nationalist officials did not always fully embrace the recommendations of League experts. Still, Minister of Finance Song Ziwen’s decision to invite them in the first place was indicative of the Nationalists’ top-down model of development in the 1930s. Kong Xiangxi’s conception of how Jewish refugees could assist the Nationalist government was in line with how experts from the League had assisted them in the past. Just as League experts William Kenneth Hunter Campbell, Mario Dragoni, and Max Brauer had consulted with Nationalists on the issue of agricultural development starting in 1933, Kong imagined that German Jewish refugees’ expertise with respect to finance, management, and industrialization could be harnessed for Chinese state building. But nowhere in the written record of his response to Sun’s proposal did Kong support the idea of a true Jewish settlement project, through which refugees would be allowed to integrate into Chinese society, regardless of their ability to directly assist the government.

Sun’s proposal represented a significant deviation from Song Ziwen and Kong Xiangxi’s preferred method of utilizing foreign expertise. Sun emphasized the benefits China might reap economically in the long term from populating its interior with thousands of formerly middle-class Jewish refugees, rather than simply choosing a few
experts to work in the Nationalist administration.

Given the unprecedented scale of the Jewish settlement proposal in a country that had long been wary of foreigners, not to mention the resemblance between Sun’s 1939 plan and the plan William discussed with Einstein in 1934, it is hard to imagine that Sun’s proposal emerged entirely independently of William’s proposal. In his 1934 letters to Einstein, William mentions discussing his settlement plan with Alfred Saoke Sze, the current Chinese ambassador to the United States. As Gao outlines in her article on the Nationalists’ policy toward Jewish refugees, in 1938 Sze’s successor Chenting Thomas Wang proposed that the Nationalist government assist German Jews, but leaders rejected the idea out of concern that it would harm China’s relationship with the Nazi government. But just a year later, with the relative importance of China’s diplomatic relations with Germany quickly diminishing, Sun Ke fully embraced the idea. It is impossible to prove whether William’s original efforts to promote the Jewish settlement plan directly or indirectly inspired Sun’s proposal. But if Sun did encounter the idea for a Jewish settlement in China prior to 1939, his positive reception of the proposal could only have been enhanced by the knowledge that Maurice William, the American dentist who influenced his father’s politics, was its originator.

The economic transformations set in motion by the Nationalists’ retreat to west China also played a role in Sun’s new way of thinking about development. In 1937, as Japan occupied Nanjing, the southwestern city of Chongqing became the wartime capital of China. Because China’s economic and governmental resources had always been concentrated in the eastern part of the country, the shift in capital brought new life to the economically backwards southwestern regions of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guangxi. George A. Fitch, a Protestant missionary who recorded his experiences traveling through southwest China in early 1939, documented the economic impact of China’s mass western migration:
The impact of this trained, modern, progressive mass from the East on the conservative, underdeveloped West is already startling in its results. More conservative changes are being made in a year than would perhaps have been made in fifty years had it not been for this great migration from the East. Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek rightly says: “Here our country will make up for more than it has lost, for we shall build faster and surer open the foundations already laid, and erect the edifice of a rejuvenated nation – a new, strong, and robust China.”

By the time Sun made his proposal in March 1939, the realities of Japanese invasion were showing Nationalist leaders like Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, the most powerful person in China, whose wife, Soong May-ling, Fitch quotes in his letter, that transplanting large numbers of people with industrial training to sparsely populated rural provinces could have a miraculous impact on development. Once again, it is difficult to show whether the flurry of economic activity in southwest China directly inspired Sun to put his proposal in writing. But Fitch’s account suggests that wartime conditions were making top leaders like Chiang more open to a development model that embraced the contributions of all kinds of outsiders, rather than a narrow group of technical experts.

Part 3: The Berglas and William Yunnan Plans

News of Sun’s proposal quickly spread throughout Europe and America, in large part due to the Nationalist government’s promotion of the plan. It was not long before prominent members of the Jewish community sought to capitalize on the opportunity. In May 1939, Jacob Berglas submitted a “Plan for the immigration of Central European Immigrants into China” to the Chinese League of Nations Union, which then relayed it to the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party. A successful banker in Berlin whose family had owned
woolen and textile factories prior to the war, Berglas had fled Germany in 1938 and settled in Shanghai at the invitation of the Nationalists, who planned to hire him as a financial advisor to the Chinese government.\(^\text{72}\) While Berglas’ own path to China exemplified the model of selectively consulting foreign expertise that the Nationalists had embraced in the early 1930s, his settlement proposal called for 100,000 Jewish refugees to form a permanent settlement in southwest China, an idea which was more in line with Sun’s new perspective on development.

In June, Berglas held a press conference at the Cathay Hotel in Shanghai to publicize his settlement plan. An English language Shanghai newspaper reported that under the plan, refugees from all over would fully integrate into Chinese society:

The plan, which for the time being is in its infancy, would call for settling of certain parts of China, particularly Yunnan province, by emigrants of the whole world, irrespective of nationality, creed or political affiliations who, carefully selected as to their abilities and provided that they can furnish amounts sufficient for feeding and shelter over a period of one year approximately, would enjoy the same rights of residence and work as the Chinese, enjoying governmental protection with the same rights and responsibilities as Chinese citizens.\(^\text{73}\)

The newspaper report of his press conference suggests that in promoting the plan, Berglas framed the settlement in universalist terms, rather than one that would specifically serve Jews. It is clear, however, from his correspondence with Bernard Kahn, who was European director of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee at the time, that Berglas conceived of the plan as a Jewish settlement. In a memorandum on his conversations with Berglas in November 1939, Kahn reported: “I had several conversations with Mr. Berglas concerning his plan to bring 100,000 Jews to China.”\(^\text{74}\) The settlement which Berglas envisioned contained specifically Jewish refugees.
The fact that Berglas declared that his settlement would be populated “by emigrants of the whole word, irrespective of nationality, creed or political affiliations” in a statement to the Chinese press but then framed it as a Jewish settlement in conversations with Jewish relief organizations might seem a shrewd bit of salesmanship. As discussed in my analysis of the Nationalists’ internal discussion of Sun’s Yunnan Plan, the Chinese government sought to emphasize the proposal’s humanitarian aspects when publicizing it, even when military and economic considerations motivated them to support it in the first place. Berglas, no doubt having read reports of Sun’s plan that were born out of this propaganda strategy, focused on universal, humanitarian concerns when promoting his own plan in China. In reality, selling the Yunnan Plans as a settlement designed for Jewish refugees in particular was crucial to the Nationalists’ goal of attracting military support from American and British leaders, whom they thought were at the mercy of influential Jews when it came to East Asia policy.

In his June press conference, Berglas also sought to portray his settlement as egalitarian. The Jewish refugees, once settled, would not be considered a class above local Chinese people, but “would enjoy the same rights of residence and work as the Chinese, enjoying governmental protection with the same rights and responsibilities as Chinese citizens.” Once again, Kahn’s record of his discussions with Berglas contradicted this framing. “His plan is that 100,000 people should be brought to China,” Kahn wrote, “to be established there in hundreds of industries of all kinds and in commercial enterprises. They should be the entrepreneurs and technical experts, the workers to be Chinese.”

Though Berglas’ promotion of an egalitarian settlement based on the principle of universal equality might appeal to 21st century sensibilities, neither Chinese Nationalist leaders nor prominent Jewish philanthropists had completely moved beyond a colonialist world view. To men like Bernard Kahn and Albert Einstein, it was clear that middle-class Jews from Europe should
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not have to stoop to the level of rural peasants as they populated western China.

Nationalist leaders, many of them Western-educated, would not have openly advocated a policy of elevating foreigners over Chinese citizens, but they too clung to a colonialist outlook with respect to different regions within their own country. Chiang Kai-Shek’s wife observed the rapid economic development of western provinces like Guizhou and Sichuan with great enthusiasm. But it was only through the migration “of this trained, modern, progressive mass from the East” to the undeveloped hinterlands that such progress was possible. The same mindset that allowed her to celebrate the migration of China’s Westernized coastal elite allowed Sun and others to fully embrace the importation of a similar class of Jews from central Europe.

Berglas’ framing and promotion of his settlement plan were indicative of a less-than-intimate knowledge of Nationalist party politics. Berglas had no dealings with the Chinese government prior to 1938, and without knowing any better, seemed to have taken the Nationalists’ emphasis on humanitarian concerns in their promotion of Sun’s plan at face value. Though Berglas won verbal agreement from Yunnan’s provincial government, his plan did not win significant support at the top levels of the Nationalist government.

Later that month, Maurice William got word of Sun’s proposal and proposed his own settlement plan, appealing directly by letter to high-level officials like Wang Zhengting, Kong Xiangxi, and Sun Ke himself. William sought to explicitly distinguish his proposal from Berglas’ plan by emphasizing the assistance that Jewish refugees could offer China. “Instead of asking China for help,” William wrote, “I propose that we concentrate on China’s problem and use the help of German Jews to solve those problems. A home and employment in China awaits [sic] German Jews only as a by-product of their services in promoting China’s welfare.” The economic specifics of
William’s plan did not differ significantly from Berglas’. Indeed, since he first began exploring the idea of a Jewish settlement in China back in 1933, William had believed that the business expertise of Germany’s Jewish middle class would benefit China’s economic development.

The 1939 iteration of William’s plan also made explicit reference to Nationalist war aims. According to William, China was “locked in a life and death struggle . . . and should not be expected to assume additional burdens.” As Gao has shown in her analysis of correspondence between William and Nationalist leaders in 1939, William sought to reassure Chinese leaders that Jewish refugees would “carry with them the good-will of the Jews of every nation.” His language seemed like a clear reference to Sun’s argument that a Jewish settlement could help China attract Western support for its war with Japan. Former Chinese ambassador to the United States Wang Zhenting was immediately convinced, telling a colleague that adopting the plan would help China “win support from the Jews all over the world, particularly from those in America and England where the Jews exercise great influence not only in the financial field but also in the political field.”

By foregrounding the technical expertise middle-class German Jews could bring to the Chinese economy while referencing the potential benefits for the Chinese war effort, William’s framing of his Jewish settlement plan appealed to the existing Chinese Nationalist outlook with uncanny precision. In fact, William’s correct reading of Nationalist leaders’ mindsets was no coincidence. William had been in contact with Wang Zhengting’s successor, Hu Shih, who kept him abreast of the Chinese government’s internal discussions. That William’s plan received greater support from the Chinese government than Berglas’ therefore had more to do with William’s connections within the Chinese government than it did with any substantive difference between the two plans.
Conclusion: The Territorialist Dream

Despite the Nationalist government’s enthusiastic acceptance of the Yunnan Plans, both William and Berglas found it difficult to attract the support of the Western community. Berglas was turned down by Jewish philanthropists in Europe, who felt that his plan was far-fetched. Bernard Kahn “told him that the settlement of 100,000 persons within one year, as he proposes, would seem a technical impossibility quite apart from other difficulties.” Kahn and his colleagues at the Joint Distribution Committee had been exploring options for a Jewish settlement in China, but on a much smaller scale. “We were of the opinion,” he wrote at the time, “based on expert’s findings, that possibilities for such settlements existed for groups of not more than 1000 or 2000 people and this included workingmen which are excluded in the Berglas plan.” William had also failed to attract American sponsors for his Yunnan Plan, as a preoccupation with the war in Europe and growing anti-immigrant sentiment at home discouraged the Roosevelt Administration from getting involved in international settlement schemes.

Despite the Yunnan Plans’ failures, it is still worth considering why William and Berglas remained so consumed by the dream of a Jewish settlement in China. With William’s influence on Sun Yat-Sen, and Berglas’ immigration to China in 1938, both men felt a personal connection to the country. Both men also felt sincere concern for the fate of their co-religionists in Germany, but these emotional considerations alone cannot fully explain William and Berglas’ devotion to their Yunnan Plans.

According to historian Laura Almagor, the Jewish Territorialism underwent a transformation during World War II:

In this new world order the Freelanders continued to believe in the Territorialist cause: Jewish life, of infinite value to the betterment of humankind, could only be
truly rebuilt outside Europe, where antisemitism had not yet polluted the general public opinion. This new life would work in a relatively unpopulated area, through concentrated colonization with cooperative methods, but without achieving statehood.\textsuperscript{87}

Both William and Berglas found such a place in Yunnan province. After traveling to Yunnan’s provincial capital, Kunming, in the summer of 1939, Berglas recalled that “the city of Kunming has nearly 300,000 inhabitants, eternal spring, beautiful landscape, [and] rich mineral resources.”\textsuperscript{88} Here was a place where anti-Semitism did not run rampant, which remained sparsely peopled despite the immense Chinese population, and where Jewish life could be truly rebuilt through concentrated colonization.

In her study of the relationship between Jewish Territorialism and mid-20th century geopolitics, Almagor argues that Territorialists “relied on accepted notions and practices such as colonialism and colonization, ‘whiteness’, race, biopolitics and agro-industrial science, as well as (empty) spaces and un(der)developed territories.”\textsuperscript{89} William and Berglas built their settlement plans around these same notions, with a particular focus on the contrast between the expertise of the Jewish race and underdeveloped territories of west China. By the late 1930s, the Nationalist government began to accept these Western notions of development, not as an imposition, but a means of building the state and asserting themselves internationally. Their embrace of the Yunnan Plans is perhaps the best evidence of this strategy. But the story of the Yunnan Plans also shows that in their efforts to build a new Chinese state, Nationalist leaders were no more immune than the Jewish Territorialists from the intellectual legacies of the Old World.
Notes:


3 Ibid, 12.


6 The Maurice William Archive (henceforth MWA), Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934, A7.001, UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, Los Angeles.


8 Margaret M Tillman, ‘Re: China’s Second Historical Archives Access’, email to the author, October 3, 2021.


11 My understanding of Chinese state building is based on: Margherita Zanasi, “Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China,”
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12 Alroey, “Zionism without Zion?,” 2.


15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


19 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934, A7.001.

20 Ibid.


22 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934, A7.001.

23 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934, A7.001.

24 MWA, Albert Einstein to Maurice Willliam, March 28, 1934, A7.007.

25 Ibid.

26 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in *Jewish Refugees* ed. Irene Eber, 131.

27 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, February 19, 1934, A7.004.


29 Nathaniel Peffer to Joseph P. Chamberlain, Typewritten Memorandum, April 1939 in *Jewish Refugees* ed. Irene Eber, 74-5.

30 Ibid.

31 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, February 19, 1934, A7.004.

32 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, February 19, 1934, A7.004.


34 Official Dispatch from the National Defense Supreme Council to the National Government’s Civil Affairs Office, March 7, 1939, in *Jewish Refugees*, ed. Irene Eber, 123.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid, 125.

38 Ibid.


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40 Ibid, 125.
41 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 131.
45 Official Dispatch from the National Defense Supreme Council to the National Government’s Civil Affairs Office, March 7, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 125.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
51 The Executive Branch of the Republic of China.
52 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 131.
53 Ibid, 127.
54 Official Dispatch from the National Defense Supreme Council to the National Government’s Civil Affairs Office, March 7, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 124.
55 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 131.
56 Ibid, 131.
57 Ibid, 132.
58 Ibid, 128.
59 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 129.
60 Ibid, 130-1.
61 Ibid, 130.
62 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 128.
63 Official Dispatch from the National Defense Supreme Council to the National Government’s Civil Affairs Office, March 7, 1939, in Jewish Refugees,
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ed. Irene Eber, 125.

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 129.
67 Zanasi, “Exporting Development.”
68 A Statement from Kong Xiangxi to the National Government, April 22, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 126-7.
69 MWA, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934, A7.001.
71 MWA, George A. Fitch to Geraldine T. Fitch, February 12, 1939, D1.011.
72 Bernhard Kahn, Memorandum on Conversations with Mr. Jacob Berglas of China, November 15, 1939 in Jewish Refugees ed. Irene Eber, 136.
73 “100,000 Emigrants to Settle in Yunnan Province,” June 21, 1939, North-China Daily News in Jewish Refugees ed. Irene Eber, 139.
74 Kahn, Memorandum, 136.
75 “100,000 Emigrants,” 139.
76 Kahn, Memorandum, 136.
77 MWA, George A. Fitch to Geraldine T. Fitch, February 12, 1939, D1.011.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Kahn, Memorandum, 136.
85 Kahn, Memorandum, 136.
88 Jacob Berglas to Morris Troper, June 15, 1939, in Jewish Refugees, ed. Irene Eber, 134.
89 Almagor, “Zeitgeist,” 351.

Images (listed in order of appearance):

Importing Development
On the Tails of the Trade: Enslaved Women, Slave Traders, and the Households they Shared

Zarina Iman

Throughout the antebellum period, enslaved women engaged in intimate relationships with white men, some of whom were actually slave traders, upholding the institution that kept them in bondage. While each individual’s experience varied, the origins and subsequent circumstances of these women emerged from white notions of enslaved and black women’s sexuality and the widespread sexual exploitation of enslaved women, particularly through the “fancy trade,” the trade of enslaved women specifically for their sexual labor. As the companions of slave traders, these women dealt intimately with the quintessential facets of the slave trade firsthand, living and even working around slave pens, auctions, and more. Though these women often resented the slave trade, they were likely compelled by two realities – that they lacked the agency to reject traders’ advances and a relationship could result in some stability and power. Indeed, for many women, it did, as these women’s partners gave them access to expanded resources and enabled them to build lives without fearing sale.


Eden Vance

This thesis examines the impact of the Second Boer War on the United Kingdom. Focusing mostly on policy and parliamentary inquiry, the piece explores how British military
shortcomings during the war led to a major reorganization of the military and a dramatic expansion of the social safety net. Additionally, the thesis touches upon how the war caused the government to begin more systematically collecting data and led to private-sector efforts to improve the physical condition of the British public.


Summer T. Thomas

This thesis explores the social and operational expansion of the Nassau County Police Department on Long Island, New York from the years 1954 to 1971, illustrating the different articulated goals of the department during transitions such as police professionalization, the War on Crime, desegregation, and the Civil Rights Movement. It shows how the Department accumulated social and economic capital in Nassau County, especially during the 1960s, and earned its reputation as an essential institution during and after the Civil Rights Movement. This thesis also provides some social history of Black suburbanization and the how Black Nassau County residents understood and expressed their desires for political, social, and economic enfranchisement within the boundaries of suburban space during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.

Covenant in Crisis: Orthodox Reactions to Slavery in Antebellum America, 1848-1861

Samuel Strickberger

This thesis provides an intellectual history of Orthodox reactions to slavery in the antebellum United States. It situ-
ates the Orthodox discourse within a dynamic mid-nineteenth century, including Judaism’s schism in Europe, Jewish migration to the United States, and the Protestant American religious debates about slavery. This paper highlights a key but underexamined moment in the development of American and post-Enlightenment Jewish thought.

**A Friendship Betrayed: The Jonathan Pollard Spy Case and American-Israeli Relations**

*Julie Sohnen*

This thesis explores the mysterious Pollard affair, a tense episode of espionage and diplomatic crisis that transpired during the mid-1980s, toward the tail end of the Cold War. The spying and subsequent capture of Jonathan Pollard, an American Jew, to benefit Israel led to a reckoning in the relationship between the American and Israeli governments, between the American Jewish community and Israel, and between the American Jewish community and the U.S. government. Although Israel and the United States had a close and enduring working relationship at the time, Pollard received a life sentence. He was released on parole in 2015, and his parole restrictions were lifted in 2020, after which he immigrated to Israel. This paper will argue that the greatest damage caused by the lengthy Pollard affair was that which was inflicted upon the American Jewish community’s relationship with Israel. The effects of the scandal on the government-to-government relationship, on the other hand, were not as profound. The espionage episode exacerbated a slowly growing willingness among American Jewry to openly criticize Israeli policies, something that the community had previously been quite reluctant to do. Understanding the ripple effects of the Pollard affair — both within the two governments, as well as among American Jews and Israelis — can shed light on the nature of the long-standing, close, and multifaceted relationship between the two countries.
Despite the passing of the 1968 Fair Housing Act and other federal policies which made racial discrimination in housing illegal, residential segregation persisted in more covert ways in the 1970s and beyond. Neighboring the nation’s capital and home to many of its elites, Montgomery County, Maryland, was at the epicenter of debates about the future of fair housing in American suburbs. Housing activists in Montgomery County recognized that in order to expand access to mortgage markets and make housing available to low-income and minority Americans, it was necessary to create affordable housing. A coalition of suburban liberals, led by the local chapter of the League of Women Voters (LWV) and an organization called Suburban Maryland Fair Housing (SMFH), lobbied for, drafted, and passed the moderately priced dwelling unit (MPDU) law, which mandated that affordable housing be developed and dispersed throughout the county. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the destabilizing effects of inflation and government deregulation of federal housing programs hindered the progressive potential of Montgomery County’s affordable housing policy. This thesis traces the social, economic, and political factors that complicated the task of creating affordable housing. Ultimately, this thesis reveals how local liberalism contended with and evolved in response to county- and national-level pressures.
reigned throughout the period by historians up to the present day and by its focus on studying the period from the perspective of the Holy See. Although access to primary source material was limited, this project ultimately found that the Catholic approach to dealing with the English Reformation was much more generous and much less sinister than historians have written throughout the past several centuries.

**Building the Battle, Losing the War: The Defense Economy, Industrial Capitalism, and the Cold War's Fallout in Alabama’s ‘Model City’**

*Denali E. Sagner*

Throughout the early twentieth century, Anniston, Alabama was a stronghold of military-industrial power in the United States. Due to its beginnings as a planned, industrial city, Anniston easily attracted formidable capital in the soil pipe, textile, and chemical industries, sparking economic and infrastructural development. Concurrently, the establishment of Fort McClellan and the Anniston Army Depot by the United States Army fused the manufacturing powers of the region with the Army’s military conquests. Throughout WWI, WWII, and the Cold War years, military brigades such as the Women’s Army Corps, Military Police Corps, and Army Chemical Corps trained at McClellan, infusing the local economy with capital through job creation, contracts to local companies, and money spent off-base. Confounding phenomena of U.S. military deescalation in the late Cold War era, deindustrialization in the American manufacturing sector, and the increasingly technological orientation of global warmaking rendered much of Anniston’s economy obsolete by the early 1970s. Despite wide-ranging activism from local boosters and politicians, the end of the twentieth century in Anniston would be marked by factory closings and military downsizing, culminating in the shuttering of Fort McClellan by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.
(BRAC) in 1995. This thesis seeks to follow how the military, private corporations, governing bodies, and everyday Americans in Anniston interacted in a political economy driven by capitalist profit incentives and a military industrialism. It seeks, ultimately, to trace Anniston’s tumultuous history in order to understand the impacts of the military-industrial complex on everyday American life in the twentieth century.

The Legacy of Sectarianism in the Imagination and Self-formation of the Rabbis

Ayelet Rubenstein

Prior to the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 CE, Jewish social organization and ritual leadership in ancient Palestine was defined by sectarianism, in which coherent Jewish groups maintained competing beliefs about theology and practice. The centuries following the destruction saw the rise of the rabbinic movement, which produced extensive literary corpuses that occasionally make reference to the rabbis’ sectarian predecessors. This thesis explores the historical nature of the relationship between the rabbis and sects as well as the rabbinic literary construction of the sects and sectarian past. In the first chapter, I argue that the sects largely faded from the Judean landscape before the rabbinic movement emerged, even as Jewish sectarianism lived on in rabbinic memory. The subsequent chapters investigate the evolving rabbinic literary portrayal of the sects. I suggest that the rabbis’ depiction of the sectarian past shifted in response to the rabbis’ growing authority and relationship to emerging Christianity. Seeking to chart a new approach in a world in which they were largely unknown, the early rabbis (c. 70-220 CE) displayed little tolerance for both past and present outsiders and therefore avoided identification with the sects. However, as the rabbinic project grew increasingly established and distinct from competing movements, the later rabbis (c. 220-700 CE) began to link themselves to certain
sects in order to bolster their historical legitimacy. This analysis seeks to capture fundamental aspects of the process of rabbinic identity-formation, shedding light on the self-definition and origination of the movement that remains the basis of Jewish practice to this day.

The Reconstruction Crusade: Rebuilding France’s Catholic Churches after World War I, 1914-1939
Leo M. Gearin

Between 1918 and 1939, France rebuilt the nearly 4,000 Catholic churches of the Western Front that had been destroyed during the First World War. This thesis presents a cultural history of that process. While it examines technical and financial aspects of reconstruction, the thesis is primarily interested in how Catholics understood the cultural significance of church reconstruction through the shifting and porous contexts of war and peace during the interwar years. It considers how church reconstruction operated at multiple levels: material, conceptual, rhetorical, and ritual. In tracing the evolution of reconstruction efforts across the period—from wartime discourses about reconstruction to the final church reconstructions of the late 1930s—this thesis argues for a trajectory of radicalization. It finds that church reconstruction was initially part of a program for pragmatic post-war reconstruction and modest religious revival in France, but later became the centerpiece of a Catholic crusade for social conquest of domestic political opponents. The history of the reconstruction crusade reveals the persistence of wartime mentalities in French Catholic culture of the interwar period. This thesis ultimately presents the post-war reconstruction of Catholic heritage sites as a fraught process and suggests that conflict can paradoxically persist through the reconstruction of religious sites previously implicated in conflict.
The Law of the Other: Converts and Gentiles in the Eyes of Seventeenth-Century Istanbul Rabbis

Elyakim Engelmann-Suissa

The Jewish communities of seventeenth-century Istanbul comprised coherent societies featuring religious and judicial structures apart from Ottoman administration. Members of these Jewish enclaves typically interacted with members of the surrounding Ottoman society in their everyday lives. Using the available responsa literature, documents comprising anonymous questions to which notable rabbis would issue responses rooted in Jewish law, this paper explores financial, legal, and ethical conflicts between Jews and Muslims, including new Muslims who had converted from Judaism. The paper argues for a conceptualization of Jewish society in the Ottoman world as fluid and open to exchange with neighboring Ottoman and Muslim identities. Furthermore, the paper also argues for the conceptualization of Jewish communities in the Ottoman Empire as a network of smaller enclaves with nuanced differences that maintained interaction with each other, rather than as a singular, monolithic community. The conclusions and conjectures found in the paper, based on this argument, produce material for further research on the relationship between a governing society and a network of communities within the Ottoman Empire and the broader early modern world.

The Role of IMF Austerity Policy in Causing the Jamaican Financial Crisis of the 1990s

Adrian J. Brown

This thesis examines the Jamaican financial crisis which began in the mid-1990s and lasted until approximately the turn of the 21st century. It explores the role of Jamaica’s longer-term economic trajectory in causing the crisis – specifically, its relationship with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. After experiencing a balance of payments crisis
in 1977, Jamaica sought financial assistance from the IMF. The policies implemented as part of this assistance program wreaked economic havoc in Jamaica and led the government to implement policies that ultimately resulted in the collapse of Jamaica’s financial sector. Scholars over time have focused on shorter-term causes of the crisis such as insufficient financial regulation, poor macroeconomic policymaking by politicians, and mismanagement of financial institutions. From the examination of newspaper archives, government documents, IMF publications, and secondary sources, it is evident that the financial crisis of the 1990s was driven in large part by the longer-term trajectory of the Jamaican economy. This longer-term period was characterized primarily by the policies implemented by the IMF throughout the late 1970s, the 1980s, and the early 1990s. This thesis finds that the IMF’s policies led to a shift in the focus of the government’s economic policies from earning foreign exchange to accessing foreign exchange. This inappropriate focus ultimately resulted in the liberalization of the foreign exchange regime in 1991, which caused the crisis of the mid-1990s.

Memories of Captivity in the Great East Asian War (1592-1598)
Junyoung Baik

This thesis studies how the piroin, or enslaved Koreans, during the Great East Asian War (1592-1598) remembered and understood their experiences of captivity. It further explores how these findings help us understand Korean society during the late-16th and early 17th centuries as it underwent rapid social change in the aftermath of the devastating war. This is accomplished by exploring the various writings that emerged in the postwar period regarding experiences of the war as well as captivity, and comparing the various normative language and rhetoric within them. A close reading of the Korean royal
court’s interpretation of Neo-Confucianism was compared with experiences of the piroin from both elite and popular perspectives. This thesis adds a new understanding of the Great East Asian War by bringing to light the varied social responses to it, and how these stories of captivity fit into the larger landscape of diverse opinions and perspectives within a dynamic postbellum Korea.

SOUTHERN HARM: THE UDC’S EDUCATIONAL CRUSADE PROMOTING LOST CAUSE IDEOLOGY IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA SOUTH

Zoey Weisman

In the decades following the American Civil War, descendants of Confederate veterans in the South launched a crusade in American public schools in an effort to promote Lost Cause mythology in the classroom. The Lost Cause interprets the Civil War through a Confederate lens that romanticizes the Old South and venerates the Confederacy. This thesis initially traces the emergence of one of the most influential Confederate heritage groups, the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) from their founding to the early 1920s as they quickly amassed significant social and political influence in the South. It details the UDC’s early campaign to influence textbooks and analyzes how the textbooks evolved. Finally, the thesis discusses how the UDC transitioned from the textbook to the classroom, chronicling how they shaped the classroom and implemented progressive education reforms to improve education while simultaneously promoting Confederate culture in schools. It emphasizes the practical and symbolic influence the UDC held in developing the future generation of white Southerners.