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Atlantic Railroad Accounting
Practices in the Mid-19th Century

Justin Greenman
A Comparative Study of NYC and Philadelphia Politics

William Zimmermann
American Railroad Accounting Practices in the Mid-19th Century

Victoria Saeki-Serna
Mexico’s Cuban Connection: An Exception or Example of the United States’ Ardent Anti-Communism

Alan Clingan
Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration and the Weak State Problem
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ABOUT THE REVIEW
Founded in 1991, the *Penn History Review* is a journal for undergraduate historical research. Published twice a year through the Department of History, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the *Review* is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration. For more information about submissions, please contact us at phrsubmissions@gmail.com.

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Letter from the Editor

On behalf of the entire editorial board, I am honored to present the newest issue of the Penn History Review. Since 1991, the Penn History Review has been dedicated to promoting the study of history amongst undergraduate students. Since its founding, PHR has published exceptional historical scholarship written by students at the University of Pennsylvania as well as schools across the United States. Our spring 2021 edition exemplifies the diversity of study within our field. It includes articles that explore dynamic topics such as municipal politics in Civil War America, nineteenth century American railroad accounting, Mexican foreign policy, and the Ptolemaic state. These pieces embody the core values of our publication: curiosity, critical thinking, a dedication to research, and most importantly, a passion for history. Our entire editorial team deeply enjoyed working with the authors and editing these papers. We hope that you will find them thought-provoking and enjoy reading them as much as we did!

Our first piece, “Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: a Comparative Study of NYC and Philadelphia Politics” is authored by Justin Greenman. Excerpted from a longer piece, he analyzes the municipal politics of the two cities during the American Civil War, particularly with regard to the two mayors: Fernando Wood and Alexander Henry.

In the next article “American Railroad Accounting Practices in the Nineteenth Century,” William Zimmermann analyzes the emergence of modern accounting practices in nineteenth century railroads. The author claims that the industry’s changing standards can be viewed as a proxy for and bellwether for American business writ large.

In the third paper, “Mexico’s Cuban Connection: An Exception or Example of the United States’ Ardent Anti Communism,” Victoria Saeki-Serna of Rice University
analyzes US-Mexico relations during the Cold War. The author claims that Mexico took a significantly softer line towards Havana than the US would have liked, but the US overlooked it in the interest of Mexican domestic stability.

Our final piece, “Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration and the Weak State Problem”, comes from Alan Clingan of the University of Maryland, College Park. The author, writing on a subject area rarely covered in this journal, discusses the relationship between the ruling, ethnically Greek, Ptolemaic dynasty and the native Egyptians in antiquity. The author argues that the early Ptolemaic state, in particular, revolved around a weak state that relied on native Egyptian collaborators.

Additionally, this issue includes a sample of abstracts submitted by seniors at Penn who undertook the challenge of writing honors theses for the History Department. In doing so, PHR hopes to promote additional research and scholarship in the field of history by offering its readership a preview of this fascinating variety of topics. Congratulations to all of the senior honors students who achieved this impressive accomplishment. We encourage other history students to also embark on this incredibly rewarding endeavour.

The editorial board would also like to thank a number of people without whom this edition of the PHR would not have been possible. Our publication only exists thanks to the generous support of the Penn History Department who continues to support and fund us each year. In particular, we are extremely grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate Chair of the department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies. They have both offered invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout the editing and publishing processes. The dedication they have for both their students and field of study is an inspiration. In addition, we would like to thank the faculty members at Penn and other universities who promoted our publication, as well as all of the students who submitted papers for consideration.
This edition would not exist without your support. Thank you as well to our contributing authors, who worked patiently and diligently to refine their articles for publication.

Finally, I would like to thank our editors for their exceptionally hard work on this issue of the Penn History Review. I would especially like to recognize the contributions of our three graduating seniors: Lorenza Colagrossi, Logan Nantais, and Spencer Swanson. Their passion for history and dedication over the years have continued to make the PHR a platform for remarkable scholarship. It has been a truly enjoyable experience to work with each of them throughout my time on the board. We will miss having them in our editorial family but are confident that they will go on to do great things.

In particular, I would like to thank Lorenza Colagrossi, our incredible Editor-in-Chief Emeritus. I am deeply indebted to her and have had the great privilege of learning from her and studying alongside her. She is brilliant, hard-working, and kind. Lorenza, thank you for the constant guidance, support, and dedication to everything you do. Now that you are moving on, I have no doubt that you will bring these attributes with you to your next great endeavor. It has truly been an honor to work with you. PHR will eternally be a stronger publication because it had you as a leader, particularly through these trying times. Last year, when campus closed down and we were forced online, you did not miss a beat and PHR continued to publish. At the same time, I would like to recognize three new editors we were especially fortunate to have added to the board this semester, Nicholas Williams, Hannah De Oliveira and Keyvan Farmanfarmaian. They have already made a positive impact on our journal.

This year marks PHR’s 30th anniversary as a publication. I am honored to be the Editor-in-Chief during this milestone year and deeply grateful to all those who have kept PHR going into its fourth decade and who I am sure will keeping it going for many more: the Penn
Letter from the Editor

History Department for providing funding and support, the countless authors and editors who have worked on past editions and, of course, my predecessors as Editor-in-Chief. Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors who participated in this edition of the Penn History Review!

Eden Vance
Editor-in-Chief
Introduction:

The decades before the American Civil War would be a period of great change for America’s two largest cities, New York City and Philadelphia. At the turn of the 19th century, New York City was still socially homogenous, with few immigrants and a uniform, simple economy. But, as its economic and social power grew with the development of new industries and the growth of interstate commerce, immigration to the city skyrocketed. Immigrants flooded the physically expanding city from New England, from the countryside of upstate New York, and from overseas, to the point where by 1860 it had 813,660 residents. Thus, by 1860 New York City was America’s financial and social capital, the “capital of capital” as historian John Strausbaugh put it. 1 1860 Philadelphia had a population of 565,529, behind only London, Paris, and New York City. Like New York City and most northern metropolises, its immigrants were primarily Irish and German (16.7 and 7.5 percent in Philadelphia, respectively.) However, unlike New York City, it had a vibrant native-born citizenry, whether anti-slavery heirs of the City of Brotherly Love’s Quaker founders, members of its 400 churches and nearly one thousand organized lodges, clubs, and benefit associations, or Southern businessmen moving North for greater economic opportunities. 2 For these long-time Philadelphia residents, the Civil War, and the resulting political and social changes to their city, would be a time of reckoning for their long-held beliefs.

As national centers of commerce and society, New York City and Philadelphia are crucial to understanding the national
political and ideological changes and movements that occurred during the Civil War. Throughout the war, both cities would serve as microcosms for the political and ideological changes that befell the rest of the Union. In the historical memory and common knowledge of New York City and Philadelphia during the war, the two cities have acquired contrasting perceptions. New York City, in large part thanks to its well-documented draft riots, is perceived as a disloyal, racist city. Philadelphia, in large part thanks to its colonial legacy and lack of similar riots or anti-Lincoln actions, is perceived as a loyal and pro-war city. In reality, however, the truth about each city’s loyalty and disloyalty is somewhere between the reputations given to them by the passage of time. Neither New York City nor Philadelphia fit into the perfect picture of the “loyal city” or “disloyal city” that they have been placed into by popular memory. Both cities faced pitched electoral clashes that could have easily taken their cities in different political directions, and no political outcome in either city was preordained.

Comparatively studying New York City and Philadelphia revealed the fascinating differences with which politically active citizens, especially elected officials and party leaders, positioned themselves in relation to the war effort. Yet, one facet that united political actors divided by different viewpoints and residing in different cities was their use of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty. Analyzing either city through definitions of loyalty and disloyalty is a rare historiographical occurrence; nevertheless, conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty are crucial for this study. In a conflict as divisive as the Civil War, both cities were split between many vocal factions that argued they were the only ones truly loyal to the nation while their opponents were just disloyal agitators. They also sought to control and alter situations when the disloyalty label was directed at them. Thus, this work will be a critical reinterpretation of how we, now over 155 years since the end of the Civil War, see those who practiced politics in New
York City and Philadelphia during the conflict.

Even those actors already given some scholarly treatment deserve to be recontextualized within the framework of loyalty and disloyalty. The New York City or Philadelphia leader who receives the most scholarly treatment is Fernando Wood. Twice elected mayor of New York City, including serving as its first war-time mayor, and later a congressman, Wood is the focus of two well-researched books, various articles, and plays an integral role in most stories of New York City during the war. While most of the works repeat facts and arguments about his life story, there is a notable disagreement that this thesis will relitigate and seek to solve. Was Wood a disloyal, political opportunist masking or deploying his opposition to the war at different times when it was politically advantageous, or was he a loyal leader who stuck by his principles even forced to adapt to changing circumstances like everyone else? All in all, through Wood’s winding wartime career while there were shades of the latter, he was a politician first, willing to sacrifice his party and principles, and in one case his state’s safety, for political gain. Other political actors of different degrees of notoriety will also be recontextualized within this question, and while they all were political opportunists to varying degrees, none were as overtly duplicitous as Wood was.

Beyond Wood, both cities are also filled with partisan actors seeking to utilize the Civil War to push forward their vision for their city. While there are too many to cover in detail, this work will examine many based on their connections to the different intraparty factions of both cities. The politics of both cities were defined by constant party feuds that at times allowed for political and electoral success, but most often led to disaster. The New York City Democratic Party alone had three powerful factions, Tammany Hall, Mozart Hall, and the McKeon Democracy, all of whom will receive their due. New York City Republicans were divided between a more moderate faction led by New York Times editor Henry Raymond and a
more radical faction led by *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley. At different points in the war, these factions stood for different positions and achieved different levels of success. For instance, while Raymond’s faction originally opposed President Lincoln’s policies, by war’s end they were amongst his most powerful backers. Greeley’s faction helped deliver him the 1860 Republican nomination and then soured on him as the war progressed. The reason for this shift will be examined, occurring based on the evolving popularity of Lincoln and his wartime policies, and what they meant for this intraparty power struggle. Philadelphia, on the other hand, was less defined by interparty or intraparty feuds. Rather, it was characterized more by a divide between a bipartisan, pro-war consensus under Alexander Henry and out-of-power Democrats and Republicans who wanted a seat at the table but were never popular enough to receive one. The reason for this composition of Philadelphia politics will be examined. All in all, Henry’s desire for bipartisanship and consensus was successful, in large part due to a healthy use of police power, which allowed Philadelphia to avoid most of the divisiveness and bloodshed that befell New York City.

Besides political leaders, and their parties and coalitions, there are other key avenues to understand the intersections of the cities. For example, both cities had a rich heterogeneous mix of newspapers that were important for the politicization of those who led and were led alike. In 19th century America, newspapers were crucial prognosticators and disseminators of political thought, allowing everyday citizens, regardless of their education or political knowledge, to glean their own personal views from the opinions of their favorite newspaper. As Edward Dicey, a British journalist visiting America during the Civil War, put it, “In truth, the most remarkable feature about the American press is its quantity rather than its quality. The American might be defined as a newspaper-reading animal… Reading is so universal an acquirement here, that a far larger,
The papers, whether affiliated with politically independent or with a party or faction, still hoped to influence political parties and leaders. New York City especially was dominated by an ideological battle between its three most influential newspapers: Horace Greeley’s *New York Tribune*, Henry Raymond’s *New York Times*, and Fernando Wood’s *New York Daily News*. Their constant battle to define themselves as loyal, and their competitors (and thus their competitors’ readers) as disloyal would demonstrate the simmering tension between New York City’s ideological and ethnic communities. Due to their ties to a party faction, these newspapers successfully captured the views of their faction and its struggles, or outright refusal, to adjust as the national political circumstances changed. On the other hand, Philadelphia’s papers, while ideological, had few connections to organized politics, and thus politically evolved with much of the country as the war progressed.

This section, of a larger work encompassing the years 1859-1865, covers 1859-1861, examining how the quick rhetorical shifting, by both parties, from opposition to civil war to full-throated pro-war, anti-South oratory obscured real political divisions about loyalty. While in the end loyalty as constructed as supporting Lincoln and the war effort fully would win out in both cities over loyalty as constructed as supporting a party or a pre-war national construct, it was by no means an easy decision for either city and for those who led them. At times, the first construction would even be the most unpopular view of loyalty, especially during periods of Democratic control and when the Union war effort was struggling the most. By the end of the war, while many of the political leaders and factions evolved with their city’s residents towards the first definition of loyalty, others would refuse to evolve despite great pressure, to varying degrees of negative electoral and personal consequences. In that case, the differences
between the cities plays a deciding role, where in New York City those who sought bipartisanship failed completely, while their counterparts in Philadelphia succeeded. Likewise, while Democrats virtually disappeared from elected office in Philadelphia, in New York City they ruled for most of the war, even after a significant portion of their base rioted in the streets.

In truth, throughout the war there was no simple answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant. Many in both parties would vehemently resist any definition but their own. While I know that my work will not lead to a simple answer about the roles of loyalty and disloyalty in political action and discourse, I hope that my use of the best of the scholarship combined with primary sources to fill its gaping holes will help conclude that one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged by one’s partisan identification or political allies. It especially cannot be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by politics.

New York City and Philadelphia: The Early Days of the Split

For New York City and Philadelphia Democrats and Republicans leaders alike, April 12th, 1861 would mark a turning point from their pre-war attitudes towards the Union, secession, and other contentious issues. Democrats and Republicans, and their powerful political and media leaders, would immediately walk back much of the criticism they leveled at President Lincoln and the possibility of war. Both sides would go to great lengths to trumpet their loyalty to the war effort, seeking to outflank their opponents as the most loyal. It appeared that the coming of war would bring
an end to the discordant Northern politics of the 1850s and usher in a new era of bipartisan cooperation. But, these public demonstrations of agreement would be both short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at unity. By the end of the year, interparty and intraparty rivalries would resume, with efforts by politicians in both parties to denigrate others as disloyal to the war effort when it was still broadly popular and to highlight their own ideological principles to their supporters once it was not. These divisions in New York City and Philadelphia would be magnified by the contentious and divisive city elections in 1861, setting the stage for an even more contentious and divisive 1862.

However, to best understand where both parties and their heterogeneous factions would end up by 1862, it is necessary first to determine where they started. For both cities, the years immediately preceding the war were marked by political turbulence. Old political alliances and ideologies were chaotically rejected and replaced, as different groups and ideas jockeyed for power. The result would be the transformation of Philadelphia into a one-party city, a party defined by support for the Union over traditional party lines, though with a sizable minority of Democrats and Republicans opposing the consensus, and of New York City into a city politically partitioned into three nearly equal parts. Thus, even though both cities entered the war in relatively similar ideological positions, they would, thanks to these wartime dynamics, exit the year completely dissimilar.

For a city north of the Mason-Dixon line, pre-war Philadelphia was in many ways a Southern city. With its manufacturing capital greater than the combination of 11 states that would become the Confederacy, it received great economic investment from wealthy Southerners. These Southerners did not just send money to Philadelphia; in fact, many Southerners married into Philadelphia families and directed their manufacturing empires from within the city. They
then employed poor whites, often immigrants, and allied with them politically by focusing on a supposedly shared hatred for the city’s growing free black population. For decades before the war, these ties to the South manifested in clear voting preferences for Southern economic interests and led to massive Democratic electoral success in the city. In the city’s 1856 presidential election, Republican John C. Fremont received 11% of the vote, with the Democrats procuring a majority, and its burgeoning Know-Nothing Party forced to suppress many of its anti-slavery supporters. As Charles Godfrey Leland, a Philadelphia satirist, put it, “everything Southern was exalted and worshipped.”

One example of something Southern exalted in Philadelphia was fear and, in many, overt hatred towards the city’s free blacks. As previously established, some of the hatred felt by the city’s workers towards black residents was promoted by direct propaganda from the city’s Southern business leaders. Yet, most of the hatred felt by Philadelphians of all walks of life towards free blacks came from their unmistakable presence, constituting four percent of Philadelphia’s population. Though on the surface small, they were the largest black community in the North, and second only to Baltimore’s. Furthermore, they disproportionally lived in wards closest to the city’s major political and social institutions and often worked in economic sectors like menial labor and domestic work that kept them in poverty and near the city elite. Thus it is clear that in Philadelphia, the controversy over black rights in city society, or lack thereof, was more omnipresent than seemingly far-fetched fears of secession or unrelatable issues like Bleeding Kansas.

Yet in pre-war Philadelphia, free blacks were more than just a nuisance or something to fear; they were also a direct target of restrictive political measures. Blacks were stuck in low-level menial labor or domestic work because of economic restrictions passed by Southern-allied Democrats and supported by the white worker base. Employment in new factories built
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

by Southerners was closed to blacks, membership in trade groups was barred, and Democratic state legislatures mandated separate schools for blacks long before *Plessy vs. Ferguson*. While New York City has a more developed reputation for racism during the era, contemporary abolitionists actually thought Philadelphia was worse. The abolitionist William Wells Brown said that in Philadelphia, “Colorphobia is more rampant here than in the pro-slavery, negro-hating city of New York.” Frederick Douglass went even further, saying “There is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia...The whole aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible, and barbarous...” Unfortunately, even the war would not alter many of these obstructions and the city’s views of blacks would alter the rhetoric and policies of even more or less sympathetic political leadership.

The rise to power of an opposition party after such a Democratic landslide in 1856 illustrated how quickly new alliances could be created, be successful, and then immediately face the possibility of dissolution. It may be surprising that out of this virulently pro-Democrat, pro-South, and anti-black political structure, the Democratic Party would be displaced just two years later by an upstart party that stood against most of its core tenets. But, in reality, this displacement marked a major political realignment that befell much of the North, but especially Philadelphia. In the wake of Bleeding Kansas in 1855 and the Dred Scott Supreme Court case in 1857, new political coalitions were formed across the North to oppose the Democratic Party and its increasing agreement with the Southern ideology on slavery. Compromised of disaffected Democrats, former Whigs, nativists, and Free Soilers, these coalitions often struggled to succeed because of disagreements over the extent to which growing anti-slavery and anti-immigration ideologies should be emphasized. Those in Philadelphia came together in 1857 to form a new political
party, the Peoples Party.

The Peoples Party avoided the fate that befell other anti-Democrat coalitions by promising to ignore both slavery and nativism. They would only support popular sovereignty, not even abolition in new territories, and nativists would have to be satisfied with a lip-service plank of “Protection of American Labor against the Pauper Labor of Europe.” Rather than focus on what divided them, they focused on what they agreed on: the party portrayed Democrats as the aggressors on the question of slavery in an appeal to those who may nominally be Democrats, but still worried that slavery was bringing the country to the brink of Civil War. The Democratic Party was still a strong force, castigating the Peoples Party as the “‘Mulatto’ Party, offspring of miscegenation between the Americans and ‘Black Republicans.’” One Democratic speaker at an 1858 rally even argued that if the Peoples Party won, the state should go with the South before Republicans destroyed the national confederacy. Yet, in 1858 the new party would notch its first major electoral success, defeating the incumbent Democratic mayor and replacing him with one of their own, Alexander Henry. Therefore, it is clear that while Philadelphia had many Southern inclinations, they would not remain fully intact as the Civil War approached.
Alexander Henry, a wealthy young lawyer, hoped his term could avoid controversy while using his power to focus on his main legislative priority: improving the city’s public transportation. That his main policy goal was completely divorced from national politics reveals the tightrope that the Peoples Party sought to walk. Despite his victory, however, Henry’s influence and power over the city was tenuous at best. At any moment, the fragile alliance that brought him to power could collapse over internal divisions, allowing the Democratic Party to regain its usual power. Furthermore, the Peoples Party cannot be equated with the Republican Party; a separate political organization used the Republican name to push Henry and his allies towards a more candid antislavery position.\textsuperscript{13} His balancing act became more difficult after John Brown’s raid the next year. The raid would greatly polarize Philadelphia, convincing the city’s previously quiet abolitionists to schedule a public meeting at Independence Hall on the day of his execution. The audience at the meeting was divided between
abolitionists, black residents, and Southern sympathizers, and order was only ensured by the 120 policemen sent by Mayor Henry to attend the event. He would later use the police again to bar abolitionists from meeting Brown’s body when it passed through the city after his death and to stop Democrats from attacking New York abolitionist George Curtis as he lectured at the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Fair.¹⁴

Henry’s use of the city’s police force to maintain calm between divided factions would later become a hallmark of his administration and of the power of the Philadelphia mayoralty. The roots of this power actually came from a recent development in Philadelphia’s political and geographic evolution. In 1854, Philadelphia consolidated its outlying communities. Primarily intended to enlarge Philadelphia’s tax base, this consolidation also realigned political power around its executive and away from its city council. One key example of the increased power of the Philadelphia mayoralty was regarding the police. Now, each ward had its own police station under the supervision of a central station at City Hall, which the mayor controlled. Henry’s predecessors had already tested out the new police powers, first with the nativist and prohibitionist Robert Conrad suppressing Sunday newspapers and liquor sales.¹⁵ Out of this recent expansion would come Henry’s key mechanism for guiding his city through its darkest hours. The fact that wartime New York City had no such power vested in its mayor would one day restrain the leadership efforts of its non-Democratic leadership.

Despite trying to evenly utilize force against and on behalf of all political factions, Henry’s measures were wildly unpopular with much of the city in 1859 and into 1860. Democratic opponents saw him as a closet abolitionist who should have instead suppressed the anti-slavery meetings. Henry seemingly supported this argument by joining Curtis on stage at his lecture as a symbol of municipal authority and fairness. He was quickly rebuked in a 16-5 vote by the city’s Select Council,
and about a third of the city’s medical students from the South withdrew from their schools in protest. His political allies were not much better at supporting him, with many joining the city’s Republican Party rather than continue suppressing their views on issues surrounding slavery.16 Pushed in from both parties, Henry’s power nearly evaporated. Based on precinct returns from the May 1860 election for the mayoral race, A.K. McClure, a prominent Philadelphia Republican politician during the war and an ally of Henry, admitted years later that Henry was only re-elected because of falsified election returns, though there is no direct evidence of voter fraud or of Henry’s knowledge of any falsification.17 Perhaps to show he was still moderate, or out of legitimate ideological desires, Henry would end up supporting the Constitution Unionist, John Bell, over the Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860 presidential election. However, the latter’s large victory in the city, a sign of its continued drift away from the Democratic Party, would serve as a warning. For the mayor, his power as 1861 began was a far cry from the mandate he was seemingly given just three years earlier.

Democrats in the city also refused to give him or the Peoples Party room to reassure the city that they wanted reconciliation following Lincoln’s election and the secession of Southern states. On January 17th, Democrats held a mass meeting in which they supported Southern secession. One of the keynote speakers was William Bradford Reed, perhaps at the pinnacle of his power. Born into Philadelphia’s social elite, his grandfather served as Pennsylvania’s governor during the Revolutionary War, even as he was accused of directly communicating with King George III to betray his erstwhile friend George Washington. Originally an Anti-Mason and later a Whig, William Reed quickly irritated friend and foe alike. As historian Joanna Cowden put it in a very unsympathetic biography, “Attributing self-serving motives to those who opposed him, he measured their purity against his own
and found them wanting.” By 1856, he had abandoned the collapsing Whig Party, allying with many of his former friends and enemies by joining the Democratic Party.18

Before the switch, Reed was no Southern apologist like most in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. In his biography of his grandfather, Reed highlighted his grandfather’s support for Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition law as a proud accomplishment for his state.19 However, once he joined the Democratic Party, Reed abandoned such praise. Reed would reject congressional measures imposing limits on slave ownership in the territories. He would also align himself with a new home-state ally, the pro-Southern James Buchanan, for his presidential campaign. Reed would help Buchanan bring former Whigs like himself into the fold, portraying Buchanan as a moderate who would “save the country from the fanatical abolition which has always done wrong to us…”20 After his victory, Buchanan would reward Reed by making him Minister to China, a prestigious diplomatic post that solidified Reed’s prominence and power within the city’s Democratic establishment. Reed would serve in this position until returning home in 1859 to defend Buchanan’s policies.

Thus, his 1861 speech was a homecoming for Reed, and an opportunity for him to stake out an ideological vision for the Philadelphia Democratic Party. He and the other speakers, Reed claimed, were there to discuss “conciliation and none other.” Lincoln’s election had unleashed a “fierce and feverish spirit” that could only be prevented if the South was placated. To appease the South, he urged the city’s Democrats to adopt a course of neutrality to orchestrate a settlement between those “whose fanaticism has precipitated this misery upon us” and their “brethren in the South, whose wrongs we feel as our own.”21 Though Reed did not directly advocate for secession, his advocacy of neutrality and later support for the Confederate cause over the Union cause led to that distinction being forgotten in the years ahead. But at the time, his speech
provoked relatively little controversy, as most city residents also wanted conciliation.

Philadelphia was a city struggling with many competing impulses in the years before the war. In many ways, it was a Southern city on par with many below the Mason-Dixon line. Its economy was closely allied with that of the South, its political opinions, demonstrated by the overwhelming support for Democratic candidates and positions, mirrored those of the South, and its unfortunate attitudes and treatment towards its black residents, mirrored the economic and social restrictions free blacks faced in the South. At the same time, antipathy began to develop against the Democratic Party, culminating in the election of Alexander Henry as Mayor. Still, there was no clear break, and Henry struggled throughout his first term to politically coexist between Southern allies and the growing Republican Party wanting stricter opposition. Henry also struggled to utilize a new feature of his position, control of the police. Furthermore, Democrats still held sway in the city, as seen by the popular speech of William Reed. A break would come, but it would take an event as catastrophic as the attack on Fort Sumter for Henry and his allies to gain an edge politically over their opponents and for Henry’s police-heavy strategy to prove effective.

New York City was also greatly divided politically in the lead up to the Civil War, and, like Philadelphia, residents faced the question about how close to align their city to the South. Wealthy New Yorkers, predominantly Democrats after the collapse of the Whig Party, had a vested economic interest in the South. New York City, more so than Philadelphia, was a part of a global trading network, and the most common good it unloaded in the decades before the war was Southern cotton. Cotton, of course, required slaves, and as the price of slaves skyrocketed, New York City banks extended credit to Southern plantations in exchange for continued access to the cotton market. Thus, New York City, as opposed to Philadelphia, was
explicitly complicit in slavery.\textsuperscript{22} Plus, it was an open secret that despite its nationwide ban in 1808, New York City continued as a place to import slaves from Africa. In fact, a city newspaper estimated in 1865 that between 1859 and 1860 alone, 85 ships had arrived in New York from Africa.

The views of the city on slavery were not all on one side of the debate though; in reality, New York City was on two opposing tracks when it came to slavery. Slaves had been officially manumitted in the city in 1827, a day that saw parades throughout the city, though mostly with only black residents participating. It also was home to prominent abolitionists, like Lewis Tappan, who served as a part of the Underground Railroad, and was the birthplace of the first black newspaper in the United States, \textit{Freedom's Journal}. Yet even Tappan was a major Northern trader of Southern cotton. Thus, while New York City was likely, as one historian later called it, the North’s most pro-South, anti-abolition city, it had an undercurrent of dissent and contradictions that would be tested throughout the Civil War.\textsuperscript{23}

As part of a national party, New York Democrats were also asked to swallow any misgivings they had about Southern priorities like slavery and free trade because those in the North could only win and influence national policy by courting and winning in the Solid South.\textsuperscript{24} Thus began a divisive internal party debate about how accommodating to be, and three camps were formed. “Hards” were parrots of Southern rhetoric, arguing the Union had to fully accommodate Southern expansionist desires. “Softs” advocated for popular sovereignty, a system devised by Illinois’ Stephen Douglas that allowed territories to choose for themselves if they wanted to slavery. Those who refused most or any accommodations with the South or slavery were “Barnburners,” though most Barnburners eventually fled to other parties or swallowed their misgivings for the sake of electoral success and joined one of the other two factions. While other state and local Democratic parties across
the North combusted under the weight of the party’s divisive policies of the 1850s, New York City’s was unique in that all these cleavages would mostly last throughout the war, though the factions took different names.25

Though he was not the cause of the divisions, perhaps no one embodied these internal divisions better than Fernando Wood. At the start of the war, Wood was a veteran New York City politician in his third nonconsecutive term as mayor. He was also a local, state, and national Democratic power broker who tried to maintain influence as the city, and his party, careened through crisis after crisis. All in all, the one constant of Wood’s political power was that it was never constant. In part this was because Wood had generally chosen no ideological side in the great debate over accommodation to the South; he was neither a Hard nor a Soft. In 1849 he allied with the Softs in exchange for being the party’s nominee the next year, though he lost because he refused to endorse the Compromise of 1850 as most other Softs did.26 When he finally won the mayoralty in 1854, he quickly alienated his supporters within the party with his patronage choices and public desire to be named Vice President in 1856. After failing to achieve that position, Wood had his term shortened by a year by Democrats to allow for a new election as soon as possible, with the explicit goal of replacing him.27

All this hostility resulted in Wood being voted out of office in an 1857 landslide thanks to an unprecedented fusion of the Know-Nothing and Republican parties with the anti-Wood members of the Democratic Party behind one candidate.28 This anti-Wood coalition was primarily composed of members of Tammany Hall, the city’s Democratic machine for much of the century. Wood nominally controlled the machine during his two terms, but after his loss Tammany Hall replaced one of Wood’s close allies, Gideon Tucker, as a sachem and forced Wood out as Grand Sachem. Rather than try again to regain control of the city’s existing Democratic organization,
Wood decided to form his own political organization within the Democratic Party. Wood had been somewhat of a political kingmaker before by virtue of being Mayor, but most of his efforts were futile. For instance, his attempts in 1855 to form an alliance with Barnburner Democrats did not come to fruition as both they and Tammany Hall were happy to have them leave the party. Up until that point, even with the party’s internal divisions, patronage, platforms, and candidates were almost universally determined by unelected leaders of Tammany Hall and not by elected officials like Wood.

But Wood sought, even in defeat, to make himself the decider. He would form Mozart Hall in 1858 to directly challenge Tammany Hall “until it opened its doors” to his appointments. Wood’s first major success was not political, but in print. He and his brother bought a failing newspaper called the New York Daily News, and quickly turned it into a well-read mouthpiece for Mozart Hall. Throughout this time period, newspapers were often the chief mouthpiece for political parties and actors to present their ideas and positions to voters, to attack their opponents, and rally their supporters to their side. As will be discussed later, this allowed newspaper editors to possess a great deal of political leverage and wield great political capital; but, the same held true for elected officials too. Wood knew that a newspaper supporting Mozart Hall would greatly increase his reach and impact in city politics. As a supporter articulated in a letter shortly before the Woods bought the New York Daily News, “What strikes you of the project? In case of your approval I would undertake it at once & provide the necessary materials & force - editorially & otherwise - to make it worthy of democratic patronage & second to none of its contemporaries in point of spirit…” For Wood and his new backers, a newspaper was a crucial tool to regain their lost influence.

The problem for Wood, besides the trouble of trying to supplant an organization with a history and tradition of success
for decades, was that he had no ideological base of support. Wood likely underestimated how his constant evolutions had alienated most political allies and overestimated their willingness to defect from Tammany too. For instance veteran city naval leader Prosper Wetmore declined to ally with Wood in the 1860 elections, saying the offer Wood proffered was beneath his age and experience. Thus, Wood charted a new path towards being a kingmaker: identity politics among the city’s Irish. This was not the only strategy he employed though; for instance, he had used John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid that year to great effect as supposed evidence of the dangers of Republican rule.

Wood had always pandered to the city’s Irish community, somewhat ironic since he had joined a local nativist group in an attempt to coalesce more support for his 1854 run. Although their poverty in Ireland and desire for American prosperity may have led them towards Republican free labor ideology, they resented Republican alliances with nativists. Since the mass immigration of Irish began in the 1840s, the Democratic Party had been their political home. But, after forming Mozart Hall, Wood would especially echo their rhetoric. He was a vocal opponent of prohibition, seen by many Irish immigrants at the time as a nativist talking point. He repeatedly denigrated his opposition as beholden to “British stockjobbers,” a clear ploy for Anglophobic Irish sentiment. But perhaps most importantly, he played on Irish fears of free black people as the Southerners did in Philadelphia and throughout the North, convincing them of future economic and social turmoil from greater black rights. Wood’s appeals to the Irish would also serve to fill the ranks of leadership in Mozart Hall since most of the defecting Tammany leaders, like Charles Daly, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, were Irish themselves.

Tammany Hall made a concerted effort leading up to the 1859 mayoral election to court Wood’s Irish base, promising
them the share of patronage that had originally prompted Wood to form Mozart Hall. But Tammany Hall was still an imperfect messenger for Irish interests, choosing to nominate William Havemeyer, a German businessman, over the Irish community’s and Mozart Hall’s preferred candidate, William Kennedy, an Irish merchant. Havemeyer, and his candidate for the city’s Corporation Attorney, Samuel Tilden, called themselves “Fifth Avenue Democrats” based on their residence within the city’s upper economic echelon anchored at the city’s Fifth Avenue. They saw their wealth and social presence within the city as an asset, but most immigrants saw it as something else. Wood’s mouthpiece, the *New York Daily News*, repeatedly referred to Fifth Avenue Democrats “as a kid-glove, scented, silk stocking, poodle-headed, degenerate aristocracy.” They were also accused of not being Democrats, having supported the Free-Soil wing of the party in the prior decade.40

Displeased with Tammany Hall’s decision, Wood declared his candidacy, which he was not previously planning to do. Originally running against the coalition that had defeated him in 1857, his candidacy was aided by the Republican Party’s decision to nominate their own candidate. Their nominee, George Opdyke, hoped to appeal to independents and former Democrats upset by the Party’s pro-Southern stances. However, the Republicans were still too weak, and ended up siphoning enough votes from Havemeyer that Wood would shock many by winning the mayoralty again by a comfortable margin. Disgusted, Tilden would blame the “ignorant Irish” for their defeat, further driving the Irish away from Tammany Hall and that faction’s increasingly wealthy shift.41 All of a sudden, Wood was once again a power player in city party politics, and those who once attacked him and kicked him out were now singing his praises. A. Oakley Hall, a former Whig elected official and a decade later a Tammany Hall-backed mayor, wrote Wood that November to thank him for his “olive branch and to know that you bear no malice for the certainly objectionable language
displayed by me…which is now heartily withdrawn.”

The topsy-turvy political odyssey of Fernando Wood leading up to his surprising re-election as Mayor of New York City is possibly the best encapsulation of how his political power and ideals fluctuated. Wood’s primary goal, clearly, was to acquire and maintain power. To do so, Wood had no qualms about allying himself with different sides of the intraparty feud that consumed Democrats in the 1840s and 1850s. When he alienated too many allies in a quixotic bid for the vice presidency and lost the mayoralty in 1857, Wood pressed on, forming a rival Democratic faction to compete against his long-standing benefactors. With this new faction, Mozart Hall, Wood sought to encapsulate the pro-Southern ideology within the Democratic Party and capture the Irish immigrant demographic that was gaining more political influence every year in the city. This electoral strategy proved successful, demonstrating the popularity of his opinions and power of his constituents; yet, it also represented severe miscalculations by his old allies in Tammany Hall, their first of many in the years of the Civil War.

But Wood wanted more than the political comeback he had surprisingly achieved; he still wanted to be a national power player. Defeated, Tammany Hall wanted their power back and control of their city again. In pursuit of their feud, Wood and Tammany Hall would foster great national conflict within the Democratic Party at their party convention in 1860. In their desires for party supremacy, they would refuse to compromise on a presidential nominee, driving the Democratic Party into geographic factions that ran two separate campaigns. United, the Democratic Party may have won the 1860 presidential election, especially since Lincoln was loathed by much of the country; divided, they stood no chance against an emboldened Republican Party. Therefore, while it may be too simple to say the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud was entirely responsible for the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, it
unavoidably played a devastating role.

Wood was what his biographer Jerome Mushkat would call New York City’s first “prototypical modern municipal leader, a professional politician seeking to get, keep, maintain, and expand power.” Already established as not content with the mayoralty, as his predecessors were, he initially hoped to be nominated for President at the 1860 Democratic National Convention in Charleston, a long-shot bid quickly quashed when the national party recognized Tammany Hall, not Mozart Hall, as the New York Democratic delegation. Yet Wood decided to travel to Charleston anyway, subsidizing the travel expenses of his allies if they protested Mozart Hall’s exclusion. Knowing that his Irish base had little national influence, Wood focused more on highlighting his shared political interests with the South. As previously established, Wood employed this strategy in his 1859 mayoral campaign with success, and in the leadup to the 1860 party convention he doubled down on that strategy. His public letters with Virginia Governor Henry Wise supporting his state’s execution of John Brown sought to demonstrate his allegiance to the South and its political wishes, and made him the Southern delegates’ favorite candidate for Vice President, with many willing to lobby on his behalf. For example, Fred Aiken, the secretary of the 1860 Democratic convention and another Northerner with Southern sympathies, pledged to “use my best ability to affect the public mind of the South still more favorably in your behalf” so Wood would become Vice President.

Wood now hoped to be nominated as Vice President for John C. Breckinridge, President Buchanan’s sitting Vice President, who Wood called “a live & ambitious man, with a clear excellent & geographic status” to advance his candidacy. But Breckinridge, and his alliance with Southern “ultras,” best known for their support for secession over the past decade, made him anathema to much of the North. Tammany Hall publicly backed Stephen Douglas, whose popular sovereignty
was increasingly anathema to much of the South. Wood, perhaps, could have helped convince his Southern allies to support Douglas as their standard-bearer. However, Wood refused, publicly calling Douglas the “bob-tailed pony from Illinois.” Tammany Hall would not compromise either, supporting a resolution to mandate two-thirds of the delegates endorse the nominee. The goal of the resolution was to prevent a Southern candidate from winning a simple majority without any Northern support, but the plan backfired when Stephen Douglas was unable to reach two-thirds as well.

After 57 failed ballots the convention was postponed, and a second convention was called for Baltimore. An attempt by Douglas to withdraw for a candidate capable of winning Northern and Southern delegates when the Democrats met again was rejected by Tammany Hall. With no hope of winning, Breckinridge allies left the convention and nominated him on a separate ticket, creating two rival Democratic campaigns for the 1860 presidential election. Wood tried to work with the two tickets to fuse in states where the Republicans would win otherwise, but his efforts mostly failed. Lincoln would be elected by a narrow plurality achieved by winning states that Democrats, if united, would have otherwise won. While Wood’s more sympathetic biographer would wholly blame Tammany, Wood’s other biographer, the generally unsympathetic Samuel Pleasants, would wholly blame Wood. This historiographical discrepancy shows how one’s view of Wood clouds assigning blame for the Democratic debacle. Nevertheless, both sides of the New York Democratic divide were principally responsible for the party’s split and loss because they chose candidates that had no chance of winning and refused to abandon them when this became clear.
Once Lincoln was elected, Wood faced new and political challenges more dire than his fading national fortunes. As mayor of New York City, his first major challenge in 1861 was deciding how to respond to the growing calls from his city’s business community to forge some compromise to preserve the Union and the city’s economic relationship with the South. New York City’s business community was generally supportive of Republican protectionist measures versus Democrat free trade, but they worried that President Lincoln would stifle trade with their biggest market, the South. Wood struggled to allay their concerns; this tension would manifest most clearly before the war in Fernando Wood’s infamous “Free City” speech. In this speech, Wood advocated that New York City secede from the state of New York and pledge neutrality in the inevitable upcoming war between North and South. This speech would share some similarities to William Reed’s previously discussed

speech from the same winter. First, Wood argued that New York City must stand “with our aggrieved brethren of the slaves states” who they owe “friendly relations and common sympathy.” Second, Wood argued that a free city status would finally sever New York City from the wrongs of the state leaders (who he claimed were more dangerous than Southern secessionists) and attain security and prosperity. Finally, Wood qualified his pronouncement, saying that no violence should be utilized to help the city secede, but it should be done peacefully once war began.  

What is most surprising about Wood’s speech is how little notice it received at the moment. Partially this was the result of few thinking a free city would be accomplished; in fact, other than reported discussions with “certain wise men” of the merchant community at Wood’s residence, no tangible legislative or executive actions occurred. Yet this lack of coverage may be due to a contemporary perception that the speech was not as dubious as it appeared. Many biographers of Wood, in fact, argue that his Free City speech was not a controversial political manifesto, like Reed’s, but simply either a “trial balloon” to see what rhetoric was permissible at that unique moment of history or a simple continuation of New York’s downstate-upstate feud. Feuds regarding “home rule” for New York City, how much control the city should have independent of state oversight, were constant. This intrastate tension flared every time new taxes were debated or new regulations were proposed, every time legislative reapportionment was necessary, and especially every time that political patronage was doled out. Wood’s three terms as mayor were defined by a rivalry between New York City and the rest of the state that, even today, often transcends party lines. Therefore, Wood’s speech is often described as little more than perhaps an ill-timed continuation of this conflict, and not an accurate reflection of his ideological attitudes. However, this argument is dubious since this would not
be the end of Wood’s questionable actions and rhetoric towards the South in the months before the war. His prior Thanksgiving proclamation urged citizens to pray that Republicans stop violating “the federal compact.”\textsuperscript{53} He issued a formal apology in January to the Governor of Georgia when New York state authorities found 25 muskets were heading south to aid the rebellion.\textsuperscript{54} His brother even demanded “total acquiescence in all Southern demands.”\textsuperscript{55} Some of Wood’s allies and base were even secession apologists. At a December 15th meeting, some Democrats passed a resolution extending “heartfelt sympathy” to Southerners “engaged in the holy cause of American liberty and trying to hold back the avalanche of Britishism…”\textsuperscript{56} It seemed that Wood and his allies would be a constant thorn in the side of Unionists until reconciliation was achieved.

As Wood ignited controversy and division, the city’s Republican Party sought to resolve its own internal divisions. For the decade before Wood’s controversial speech, parties in opposition to the Democratic majority in New York City would be too divided or controversial to reap the benefits of these divisions. By 1860, what had originally been a loose union of people united only by their opposition to Democrats was now a formalized Republican Party, but like Democrats, the Republicans had their own factions. The party was divided by a debate about whether to lean more towards its Whig Party roots or its Free-Soil Party roots. The former wanted a greater focus on economic issues like tariffs or infrastructure, hallmarks of the Whig ethos, and less on the South and slavery, the issues that destroyed the Whig Party. The latter, some of whom were once Democrats, wanted the focus on slavery and Southern expansionism.

This divide was often correlated with newspaper consumption. Whigs, who favored accommodation with Know-Nothings and former Democrats, read Horace Greeley’s \textit{New York Tribune}. Those who wanted the party wholly Whiggish read Henry Raymond’s \textit{New York Times}. What saved these
factions from destroying the national party as Democrats did was that they all agreed to work for Abraham Lincoln’s election, even though many had originally supported New York’s own, William Seward, especially the Raymond faction. Lincoln winning New York and defeating the Democratic candidates nationwide was more important to both than settling intraparty scores.\textsuperscript{57} That does not mean the Raymond faction was happy; in fact, in a bitter \textit{New York Times} article reflecting on the convention, the paper referred to Lincoln’s backers as “recusants” and thought so little of Lincoln that they referred to him as “Abram Lincoln.”\textsuperscript{58}

The rivalry between Raymond and Greeley was not just ideological, it was also personal. Raymond used to work under Greeley and for his \textit{New York Tribune} but left after he became fed up with Greeley’s public embrace of social experiments like utopian socialism. Not only did he start his own competing paper, the \textit{New York Times}, but he stole more than a dozen workers from Greeley, who for decades afterwards continuously referred to Raymond as “the Little Villain.” For the next two decades, their papers would bitterly compete for economic supremacy in the city, with Greeley’s high-strung editorial style and greater political radicalism keeping him ahead of Raymond for much of that time. Politically, however, Greeley was less successful against his nemesis. In 1854, both sought the Whig nomination for the lieutenant governorship of New York, with Raymond winning thanks to the backing of William Seward. Greeley, of course, would get the last pre-war laugh against Seward in that regard, though both Raymond and Greeley continued to jockey, as we will see unsuccessfully, in the years after.\textsuperscript{59}

The secession crisis brought the schism back as both party’s factions presented contrasting proposals for how to proceed, making it all but impossible to wholeheartedly attack Wood and his free city speech. Thurlow Weed, a close ally of Seward and Raymond, proposed that secession be averted by calling for a national convention that would constitutionally
enshrine the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850. While this proposal was seeming to limit some westward extension, it would have led to the unstated result of permanently protecting slavery in the Southern states. Horace Greeley and his allies vehemently rejected Weed’s proposal, saying that accommodation would delegitimize the entire antislavery stand. Greeley asked all New York City Republican Congressmen to go on record favoring “prompt and energetic enforcement of all the laws of the general government” as the way to ensure “the safety of the country” and “the preservation of the Union.” Though they rejected Greeley’s proclamation, none explicitly endorsed Weed’s proposals either. Once the war began, it would become common for New York City Republicans to paper over this resistance to aggression and their support for some accommodations. Yet in due time, desires for accommodation would return with a vengeance at the war’s climax.

Clearly, in the years before the Civil War internal disputes dominated both the Republican and Democratic parties of New York City. It has already been established that the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud even had national consequences, aiding in the election of Abraham Lincoln and weakening the influence of Mayor Wood. His actions after the election of Lincoln, especially his Free City speech, caused further damage to his power. Though the clash between Republican coalitions did not have the same negative national consequences, in part because both sides went out of their way to accommodate the nomination of Lincoln and work towards his election, that does not mean the divide was any less severe. Its Whiggish wing, embodied by Henry Raymond and the New York Times and its Free Soiler wing, embodied by Horace Greeley and the New York Tribune, disagreed mightily over the direction the party should take regarding what issues to prioritize, what policies to support, and what base of political support they should cultivate.

Both Philadelphia and New York, already established as,
despite their political diversity, broadly sympathetic to Southern attitudes and positions, changed their rhetoric dramatically with the attack on Fort Sumter April 12th, 1861. In Philadelphia, excited crowds began peacefully roaming the streets to debate the latest reports from the South and exclaim their glee at the prospect of war. Quickly however, these gatherings became more sinister in behavior. According to the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, originally an anti-slavery newspaper that under new ownership became virulently pro-Confederate until it was sold in 1864, “everyone who hinted any sympathy with the secession was made to make an unequivocal stand.” Some, like an intoxicated man who in a drunken stupor made the mistake of declaring himself a Southern sympathizer, went unharmed after leading “three cheers for the thirty United States.” After a local newspaper published the names and addresses of several wealthy Southerners, these crowds marched to their homes, demanding shows of patriotism. When one of the Southerners, Colonel Robert Patterson, refused, his windows were smashed. Others deemed disloyal took refuge in the Court House or fled to police protection. Those unable to flee in time were roughed up, with reports of one man having his clothes ripped off and another having his head put in a noose.

To stem the growing violence, Mayor Henry put his political fortunes on the line again with his use of his powers over the city police. On April 15th, a pro-Union mob “swelled to many hundreds” outside the office of a notoriously pro-Southern newspaper, the *Palmetto Flag*, seeking more violence against Southern sympathizers. Henry arrived with the chief of police and the Reserve Corps to restore order. As the crowd clamored for a speech, Henry deftly calmed the crowd with the following:

> Your devotion to the flag of your country satisfies me that you are equally devoted to the maintenance of the laws, and to the preservation of order. I see that there are no traitors among you, and I rejoice to know that
When the crowds dispersed but regathered the next day at the home of the infamous William Reed, Henry went one step farther to protect Southern allies. Reed of course was no friend of Henry and those who supported the Peoples Party, and afterwards Reed refused to thank the Mayor for his help. Yet in his remarks outside Reed’s home, Henry threatened the crowd, ordering the police to shoot to kill to maintain order if the crowd did not disperse. The next day, he issued an executive proclamation asking residents to identify any persons suspected of aiding the enemy. This order required “that all persons shall refrain from assembly…unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously, warning them that the same will be at their peril.” For Henry, order and loyalty were one and the same. Active secessionists in his city and rioting anti-secessionists were both disloyal to him, their city, and the new war effort. Rather than alienate Unionists with his executive crackdown, Henry’s popularity skyrocketed, and the city calmed. By April 18th, the streets were clear and Union flags adorned the homes of those of all political persuasions. While some Southerners left town, most retreated into silence, knowing that they were outnumbered, but protected if they kept quiet.

Philadelphia also decided to invest in its own military protection, creating a Philadelphia Home Guard. Philadelphia’s social elite worked with Mayor Henry to create a civil defense force under his control that would be independent of the city’s forces under the federal government which Lincoln was beginning to deploy against the Confederacy. As the founders of the Philadelphia Home Guard explained in a public proclamation from April 19th, just one week after Fort
Sumter, “those of our citizens whose ties prevent them from undertaking active service, should lose no time in organizing a ‘Home Guard’ to be in readiness to repel external aggression and to maintain internal order.” They would go on to say that the Home Guard would be created by the people: only city residents, not the state or the federal government, would be responsible for volunteering, training, finances, etc. The founders included prominent members of the city’s social and economic elite. For them, publicly, the Home Guard was simply a way for those too old for active service or unable to leave their businesses behind to help the war effort.

A depiction of the Volunteer Refreshment Saloon in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the American Civil War.

However, the Home Guard would also have two ulterior purposes that would serve the city and the Union war effort more than the older gentlemen ever would have militarily in case of an invasion. First and foremost, the Home Guard could be an extension of the Mayor’s police forces. Henry Charles
Lea intimated as much in a later private letter to Mayor Henry, saying that with his support the Home Guard will “hold themselves…to obey any orders you may give for service” within the city. Henry had already demonstrated that he was willing to use his police powers to maintain order in the city, and that police presence was effective. Now, he would have some of the city’s most recognizable and powerful leaders aiding in that effort. Second, the Home Guard would be a tangible mechanism for the city’s leaders, supportive of the Union but skeptical about the war effort, to have their voices heard and their impact felt. Many members of the Home Guard, including Lea, were initially skeptical of Henry and his policies, even publicly questioning his spending and infrastructure priorities in 1860. As powerful businessmen, most had close economic and social connections to the South, like their aforementioned New York City counterparts, and would therefore have some justification for neutrality towards the war effort. Instead, the Home Guard prevented neutrality, and would, until the creation of the Union League in the next year, be the primary mechanism for helping them stay supportive and loyal.

It is unmistakable that the coming of the Civil War was a blessing for Mayor Henry’s political prospects. Though Henry had originally hoped his term could avoid national debates, the war undeniably strengthened his control over Philadelphia and its politics. Before the war, he was severely weakened, arguably only winning re-election because of voter fraud. He had also proven unable to convince Philadelphia voters that his political vision, a party between that of the Democrats and Republicans, was a worthwhile course for the city. Yet thanks to the war, Henry had a new political mandate. His use of the police to foster order, reviled before the war, was appreciated by both sides for preventing violence and mayhem. Additionally, he worked diligently to foster political alliances.
with war supporters who may have disagreed with him on other political issues. By inviting them into his coalition, perhaps best embodied by the forming of the Home Guard, his new allies had a vested interest in supporting his administration and his policies. This support even extended once Henry started voicing some more controversial opinions, granting Henry a veneer of bipartisanship and moderation that would severely hamper his opponents’ political efforts.

Residents and attitudes in New York City also saw a sea change in sentiment after Fort Sumter. At a massive rally on April 20th, an estimated 50,000 packed Union Square for a public pro-war meeting carried out by a wide and bipartisan group of the city’s political and economic leaders. Organizers included all three mayoral candidates in 1859, Havemeyer, Opdyke, and Wood, and the dueling Republican newspapermen, Henry Raymond and Horace Greeley. Tammany Hall would soon take their own actions, formally adopting resolutions declaring they were “heartily united to uphold the constitution, enforce the laws, maintain the Union, defend the flag…the Union must and shall be preserved.”71 For the most part, Tammany Hall would publicly remain strong Unionists throughout the war, highlighting their views on the war to deflect later charges of disloyalty from both parties.

In the battle of the presses, Horace Greeley gained an edge, according to noted diarist George Templeton Strong, since “the Greeley wing of Republicanism” was the chief driver of war in the first place, leaving Raymond’s “conservative” wing looking like a follower. Greeley’s harsh rhetoric towards the South long before Fort Sumter was vindicated by the attack, while Raymond’s moderation, plus his ally Seward’s desire for political compromise, were now obsolete as the nation sought revenge against the “‘chivalric’ bullies and braggarts” of the South.72

Even Fernando Wood was swept up in the patriotic fervor. On April 15th, he issued a proclamation summoning citizens “irrespective of all other considerations and prejudices”
to obey the law, preserve order, and protect property. Attending the city’s first “Union Rally” the next day, he literally draped himself with the American flag while exhorting “every man, whatever had been his sympathies, to make one great phalanx in this controversy, to proceed to conquer a peace. I am with you in this contest. We have no party now.” He made similar remarks at the rally on the 20th and proposed a special million-dollar tax to support the war effort and create a “Mozart Regiment” under his command.\textsuperscript{73} To some, this sudden transformation was clearly a sham and a political ploy, with one unnamed critic growling “The cunning scoundrel sees which way the cat is jumping, and put himself right on the record in a vague, general way, giving the least offense to his allies of the Southern Democracy.” Wood, perhaps indicating this hedging, argued in that same flag-draped speech that whether the Union would be reunited “by fratricidal warfare or by concession, conciliation, and sacrifice” was still unanswered.\textsuperscript{74}

Regardless, Wood clearly hoped that his party and his base, like he was publicly trying to do, could support the war without having to support all of Lincoln’s policies. He also hoped they could do so within the new demands of loyalty to the Union. Yet, voices remained within the Democratic Party that rejected the entire legitimacy of the war and any bipartisan accommodations with it or Lincoln. Wood’s brother, Benjamin, was perhaps the loudest of these voices. Benjamin Wood directly opposed his brother’s transformation, using the \textit{Daily News}, of which he was now the sole editor due to his brother’s re-election, to scold Mozart Hall’s war platform, and maintaining that only “friends of Peace” were true Democrats.\textsuperscript{75}

In this battle between the Woods, the publisher would beat the politician. Mozart Hall formally endorsed Benjamin Wood’s sentiments, though they would agree to work with Tammany Hall on nominating a united slate in the fall elections if possible. This defeat by his own organization would send a chilling message for Fernando Wood about straying from his
new political base, a message he would long remember going forward.

The fact that such a vocal minority of Southern sympathizers persisted surely damaged New York City’s overall loyalty to the war effort. Yet perhaps most significantly, New York City would not have a similar institution or organization as effective as Philadelphia’s Home Guard. A bipartisan Union Defense Committee, of which Fernando Wood was initially an ex-officio member and active participant, was formed shortly after Fort Sumter by the city Chamber of Commerce. Their stated goal was to serve “in aid of the Government in the present crisis, to accelerate and facilitate the organization of forces, the transportation of troops and provisions, and the cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of the country.” But, its impact and the creation of a Union Party in September 1861 were only successful primarily upstate. Tammany Hall, despite agreeing with most of Lincoln’s war policies before emancipation, also never publicly considered allying with the city’s Republican Party.

Therefore, there was no formal infrastructure or alliance in place for much of the war to ensure that the city’s elite who were generally supportive of the war, but not of Lincoln and some of his policies, had buy-in to the war effort. There was nothing to ensure their loyalty and continued support. In those crucial early days, a bipartisan consensus like that of Philadelphia could have been achieved, but it was not. Wood also refused to use his executive authority in the same way as Henry did to silence dissent and maintain order. For instance, a June editorial by his brother claimed that Northerners had been tricked into supporting the war effort, and now they had to turn against the war and ensure conciliation.

Under Wood’s leadership in 1861, not only would the Democratic Party not unite in its role as “the loyal opposition,” but its anti-war voices were as loud, powerful, and effective at rallying their base as ever. It was at this point that New York
City and Philadelphia both began to irrevocably diverge on their journey through the war. Philadelphia came out of the first few months more united and peaceful than before, while New York City remained as divided as ever, if not more than before. The blame for the continued divisiveness of New York City politics is not solely Wood’s, but he played a crucial role. Though he had publicly backed much of the pro-war zeal that engulfed the city after the attack on Fort Sumter, he privately capitulated to his anti-war backers, especially his own brother. Furthermore, unlike his counterpart in Philadelphia, he did not seek to foster bipartisan loyalty to the war effort or allow his political coalition to grow with pro-war voices. By and large and in part thanks to Wood, New York City’s political situation looked little different in the fall of 1861 than it did in the winter of 1861.

New York City, additionally, had a crucial and divisive mayoral election to endure that year, another reason for its continued political divisions. The fact that Philadelphia had no major elections in the fall of 1861 is another major reason why it remained peaceful and united. Other than a congressional special election won by a Democrat, Charles Biddle, there were few opportunities for partisan electoral conflict that could break the bipartisanship. This gave Henry time and resources to realize his mayoral vision and find common ground with allies and enemies. He could show the people of Philadelphia why they wanted his moderate Unionism and strong police power. Additionally, without major elections, the city’s Democrats had few opportunities to advance its bench of potential elected officials. Thus, the Democratic Party continued to highlight politicians of yesteryear, like William Reed. Without constituents to serve, and thus their sentiments to consider, these party elders even championed recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation.79 As Philadelphians were beginning to send their sons and fathers off the war, these aging politicians seemed out-of-touch and elitist at best,
treasonous at worst. In response, city residents painted the entire city’s Democrats with a broad disloyal stroke that many Democrats sought to soften by allying with Henry. It would take another year for Philadelphia Democrats to elect new leaders, but by then they were more focused on national issues like emancipation and national forums like Congress, leaving the bipartisan leadership of the city and alliances with Henry intact.

As for New York City, Fernando Wood entered his re-election campaign in a precarious position. His “conversion” to Unionism caused distrust and defections from Mozart Hall without gaining him new allies. While his opponents once again refused a coalition, both Tammany Hall and the Republican Party were emboldened by the popularity of the war, and both called for its vigorous execution. Tammany Hall even declared at their state convention “the first and most sacred duty of every man” is to “devote his energies and his means, with all his heart and soul, to the earnest and resistless prosecution of the war, until the rebellion is utterly suppressed.” Furthermore, President Lincoln “is imperatively required...to take every step...which may be necessary to secure the triumph of our arms...and that his measures will be passed upon by a generous and patriotic people...without party spirit.” Boldly, every Tammany candidate statewide publicly endorsed these sentiments. Tammany Hall was also emboldened by a new interparty consensus. Unlike in 1859 when campaign attacks were primarily directed at Havemeyer and Opdyke, Tammany Hall and the GOP reached an unofficial détente, training their fire solely on Wood, his views on the war, and his policies.

Wood’s chances were further diminished when he was credibly accused of corruptly doling out city contracts to close allies, while also using city finances for electioneering and public election funds for personal gain. Severely weakened, Wood went to two tried and true methods when a political position may be popular, but the candidate is not. First, and
more successfully, he publicly decried his investigations as politically motivated. He zeroed in on accusations that the city’s Corporation Attorney investigated him to advance his candidacy for District Attorney, forcing him to publicly renounce his candidacy. Second, he nationalized his race. On November 29th, a week before Election Day, Wood changed the tenor of his campaign and his ultimate political destiny with a speech at Volks Garten. Casting off any prior support for the war effort, Wood charged the Lincoln administration with the intention of prolonging the war “as long as there is a dollar to be stolen from the National Treasury or a drop of Southern blood to be shed.” He also charged Lincoln and the Republican Party with being in favor of abolition so free black workers could compete with poor white laborers. To Wood, the Republican Party hoped for the destruction of immigrants, especially his base, since “They will get the Irishmen and Germans to fill up the regiments and go forth to defend the country…they will themselves remain at home to divide the plunder.”

In this speech, Wood publicly relitigated his favorite political talking points, especially support for the South and for immigrants, specifically Irish and German. Yet privately, Wood refused to wholly denounce his prior Unionism. In a curious development, the same day that he gave his Volks Garten speech he also fired off a defensive letter to Secretary of State and fellow New Yorker William Seward. Despite what others were saying about him, he was “for a vigorous prosecution of the war, for sustaining the administration by every power at our command and for the restoration of peace only if it can be done consistently with the safety, honor, and unity of the entire government.” Even with a Republican in the race, Wood claimed that he deserved their support for his campaign since he best articulated Unionist ideals.

There are two possible reasons for this letter. One is that Wood sincerely believed that, despite his history of
controversial comments, including his speech that very day, he was loyal to the Union and deserving of Lincoln’s support. That idea prompts another question, why this or the fairly pleasant reply from Seward’s son thanking Wood for his support for the Union, were not released to the public, which could have swayed enough skeptics to re-embrace him? Thus, the second reason is most likely: Wood was simply a shrewd politician, cynically hoping to utilize the Lincoln administration and its vast political resources, or at least keep them from being used against him. The fact that no evidence exists of Lincoln or Seward publicly bashing Wood during the campaign or diverting energy to helping elect the Republican indicates that Wood’s letter may have been effective. For example, Seward did not respond to entreaties from the New York Metropolitan Police, a force under state Republican control, to arrest Wood for the content of his speech. Furthermore, Thurlow Weed had privately requested a meeting with Wood the month before “if it would not make too much talk,” perhaps to discuss the race, though no record exists of if the meeting occurred.

However, the lack of effort may also indicate that the Lincoln administration had little confidence a Republican could be elected as Mayor of New York City; and, there was good reason to assume this. The Republicans had once again nominated George Opdyke. A wealthy clothing manufacturer, his primary pre-war income came from selling clothes to slaves down South, and his Whiggish politics inspired few allies. He did gain some Republican approval after his 1859 loss for working with loyal businessmen during the secession crisis to prevent the city’s businessmen from committing “a compromise of principle” to assuage the South. But, as a vocal Republican, he faced constant labeling by Democrats as a “black Republican” hoping to emancipate blacks and subjugate whites. Like Wood, he was also perceived as a politician first, civic leader second. George Templeton Strong, though a Republican, nonetheless described him as a “pushing, intriguing
man, fond of power and position.”

The enigma in the race was the Tammany Hall candidate, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Like Opdyke, he was a rich merchant. Thus, many assumed he would be closer in policy outlook and personality to the Fifth Avenue Democrats. However, Gunther was a prominent German activist and organizer. Though Wood was primarily concerned with the Irish, German immigrants made up a prominent part of his anti-war coalition, so it was assumed that Gunther could bring parts of Mozart Hall’s base back into Tammany Hall. As for Gunther’s appeal to pro-war Democrats, that was less clear. Civil War historian Ernest McKay claims that despite being a member of Tammany Hall, the “War Democrats,” on specific war policies Gunther differed little from the Woods. Thus, he too inspired little confidence amongst New Yorkers. In the end, many New Yorkers cared little about which anti-Wood faction won, so long as Wood was gone. As New York political historian Sidney Brummer put it, in the minds of many critics of Wood and his policies, “Whether to vote for Opdyke or for Gunther, was with many simply a question of which had a better chance of defeating Wood.”

Election Day finally came on December 3rd, 1861, and few intimated to guess who would win. Each candidates’ headquarters were packed well into the morning. Through the night, each group alternated between pessimism and optimism. As a potentially foreboding sign, when Opdyke arrived at his headquarters early the next morning, someone gave off an alarm that the floor was collapsing. Panic ensued, with some suffering bruises and torn clothes. Early returns indicated a Gunther victory, but by ten a.m. Opdyke was declared the winner with little more than six hundred votes over Gunther and 1200 over Wood. Opdyke won nine of the city’s wards, mostly dominated by Republicans, but he also embarrassingly won Wood’s home ward by one percent and did especially well in wards populated
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by former Know Nothings. Gunther, as expected, won the four German wards from Wood, but did not win all of the Irish wards, splitting them with Wood costing Tammany Hall the race. Without the Democratic split, especially over immigrant votes, it is safe to assume either Wood or Gunther would have easily won, but with the split New York City had just had its closest three-way race ever and elected its first Republican mayor. In what must have been an awkward transition, Wood and Opdyke civilly exchanged letters and agreed to meet at some point in December.

Perhaps real change could be imparted on the city’s policies and its relationships with the war effort and Albany. Some Republicans were optimistic, with Henry Bellows regarding Opdyke’s election as “an augury of national strength.” Some, like Strong, while happy that Wood lost, saw Opdyke as little more than the lesser of evils. But most were worried. Even with a Republican mayor, the Republicans who controlled Albany were unlikely to grant more power to the city, most remaining appointed and elected municipal officials were Tammany or Mozart allies, and there was still a hotbed of anti-war, anti-black, anti-Lincoln newspapers and activism throughout the city. To say that Opdyke’s tenure would be divisive and contested would be an understatement, though what happened would likely have been more tumultuous than most would have anticipated. If 1861 was a year for Republican gains and Democratic divisions, in both cities, then 1862 and 1863 would show the power Democrats could yield if they united, but also the dangers that unity posed and how fragile it would be.

This work has sought to compare and contrast New York City and Philadelphia politics by looking at how the cities, in similar positions demographically, politically, and socially before the war, reacted to the conflict. The primary framework for doing so has been examining how political actors in both cities, from elected officials and party leaders to
everyday voters, defined loyalty and disloyalty during an event so all-encompassing and divisive. It is without a doubt that in both cities, despite their differences by the end of the war, some of the same definitions were utilized. Additionally, some of the same ideological arguments were made in both cities, often by members of the same political party. Both cities also endured intraparty feuds that ensured that claims of loyalty and disloyalty were not just lobbed at partisan opponents, but intraparty ones as well. In writing on Philadelphia during the American Civil War period, one hundred years later, historian William Dusinberre framed Philadelphia as a city that entered the conflict weak and bitter. The city was “fiercely jealous of New York,” but also of other cities like Boston and New Orleans that had usurped its national and global economic output. Its only reliable trading partner was the South, and they were now leaving the Union. For decades, it had struggled to integrate its ethnically and racially diverse inhabitants into the city. These internal tensions led to nativist riots in the 1840s and a black population, the largest in the North, with few economic or social opportunities. It also had a fragile municipal government led by a weak mayor, even after it consolidated with its outlying counties in 1854. All in all, there were many reasons why many Philadelphia residents had an inferiority complex towards their Northern neighbors.  

The central question of this paper, therefore, has been why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play a role? Philadelphia’s success at avoiding much of the turmoil that befell New York City was due to the leadership of its wartime mayor, Alexander Henry. First and foremost, Henry took what was once considered a weakness of the municipal government of Philadelphia, that as mayor his primary means of influence was control over the police, and turned it into a positive. Philadelphia easily could have descended into the divisiveness and bloodshed of its northern neighbor, and nearly
did because it too possessed a loud and somewhat popular anti-war faction. But it did not, largely because Henry repeatedly, fairly, and unequivocally utilized his police powers to maintain order. He also ruled in a bipartisan manner, avoiding many of the contentious and divisive issues of the day. His party, first known as the People’s Party and then the Union Party, allowed members of different political persuasions to feel included and heard in city governance as elected officials, members of the Home Guard, and in unofficial capacities. At times, especially immediately before Fort Sumter, both of these political values made Henry unpopular with both sides, but as the war progressed his deft handling of the city granted him easy electoral success because more Philadelphians than not were invested in the well-being of their city. It is no wonder then that Dusinberre, writing a century after Henry retired in January of 1866 (mayoral terms had been extended to three years during his reign and elections moved to the fall), declared that “Alexander Henry’s conduct of the police force from 1858 to 1865 in itself shows him to have been the best mayor Philadelphia ever had.”

To conclude, this examination of the years 1859-1861 promised no easy answers about the types of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty employed during the Civil War, nor about the reasons why each city ended up on the trajectory it did. As I stated earlier, throughout the war there was no simple answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant, and therefore there is no simple reason for the fates of the actors and groups from Philadelphia and New York City that have been discussed. In the end, we must recognize that even if we treat the years around the Civil War as being on some clear arc destined to bend in a certain direction, there will always be bumps and always be outliers. All historians and readers of the era can do is try to pull back the curtain of time, reevaluate long standing historical assumptions, increase the prominence of forgotten leaders and groups of people, and try to understand it all to the
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best we can, as I have sought to do in this thesis.
Notes

1 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 13
4 William Dusinberre, *Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 1856-1865*, 42
5 Russell Weigley, “The Border City in Civil War 1854-1865,” 383
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid, 386.
9 *Douglass’ Monthly*, February 1862.
12 Ibid, 76-78.
18 Joanna Cowden, *Heaven Will Frown on Such a Cause as This: Six Democrats Who Opposed Lincoln’s War*, 97.
19 Ibid, 103.
21 *Philadelphia Pennsylvanian*, January 16, 1861.
22 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 14-17.
23 Ibid, 20.
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24 Jerome Mushkat, *The Reconstruction of the New York Democracy*, 16
26 Samuel August Pleasants, *Fernando Wood of New York*, 27.
27 Ibid, 66.
28 Ibid, 87-88.
29 Gideon Tucker to Fernando Wood, December 29, 1855, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
30 Samuel August Pleasants, *Fernando Wood of New York*, 90.
31 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 117.
32 Daniel F. McMahon to Fernando Wood, January 9, 1859, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
33 Prosper Wetmore to Fernando Wood, January 9, 1860, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
34 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 117.
36 Iwan Morgan and Philip John Davies, *Reconfiguring the Union: Civil War Transformations*, 145.
37 Ibid, 55.
39 Charles Daly to Fernando Wood, October 3, 1859, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
42 A. Oakley Hall to Fernando Wood, December 23, 1859, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
44 Fred Aiken to Fernando Wood, May 8, 1860, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public
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45 Fernando Wood to Robert Tyler, March 8, 1860, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library. Italics are Wood’s.


49 Tyler Anbinder, “Fernando Wood and New York City’s Secession from the Union: A Political Reappraisal,” 85.

50 Samuel August Pleasants, *Fernando Wood of New York*, 113-114.


52 *Ibid*; Tyler Anbinder’s work is the best example of this ideologically neutral vein in the historiography.


54 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 139.


57 Mary Hodnett, *Civil War Issues in New York State Politics*, 7-12.


59 John Strausbaugh, *City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War*, 54.

60 Mary Hodnett, *Civil War Issues in New York State Politics*, 15.


62 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, April 15, 1861.


64 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, April 16, 1861.

65 Joanna Cowden, *Heaven Will Frown on Such a Cause as This: Six Democrats Who Opposed Lincoln’s War*, 108.

66 *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, April 17, 1861.


68 “Home Guard of the 24th Ward,” Henry Charles Lea papers, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.
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69 Henry Charles Lea to Alexander Henry, May 17, 1861, Henry Charles Lea papers, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.

70 Henry Charles Lea to Alexander Henry, July 16, 1861, Henry Charles Lea papers, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.

71 New York Tribune, April 27, 1861.

72 George Templeton Strong, Diary of the Civil War 1860-1865, March 11, 1861.

73 Jerome Mushkat, Fernando Wood: A Political Biography, 116-117.

74 New York Sun, April 16, 1861.


76 New York Times, April 24, 1861.


80 Resolutions printed in the New York Herald, September 10, 1861.

81 Ibid, November 5, 1861.

82 Sidney David Brummer, Political History of New York State during the Period of the Civil War, 77.


84 Richard O’Gorman to Fernando Wood, October 16, 1861, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

85 “Address of Mayor Wood delivered at Volks Garten,” November 27, 1861.

86 Fernando Wood to Seward, November 27, 1861, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

87 Samuel August Pleasants, Fernando Wood of New York, 127-130.

88 Thurlow Weed to Wood, October 29, 1861, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

89 Philip Foner, Business and Slavery: The New York City Merchants & The Irrepressible Conflict, 233.

90 John Strausbaugh, City of Sedition: The History of New York City During the Civil War, 205.
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91 George Templeton Strong, *Diary of the Civil War 1860-1865*, July 17, 1861.
93 Sidney David Brummer, *Political History of New York State during the Period of the Civil War*, 177.
96 George Opdyke to Fernando Wood, December 13, 1861, Fernando Wood Letters and Documents, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.
98 George Templeton Strong, *Diary of the Civil War 1860-1865*, December 14, 1861.

**Images (in order of appearance):**


American railroad accounting practices in the mid-nineteenth century

William Zimmermann

Introduction

The nineteenth century was a significant time for the United States and for American business. The United States emerged as a world power in this century, evolving from a fledgling coastal state into a continental giant. Much of this geopolitical expansion was fueled through the rapid growth of the American economy. In order to understand how the American economy was transformed, it is first helpful to understand how American business was transformed. This research paper seeks to answer this question by analyzing the accounting practices of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. Accounting is the language of business and can be used to analyze the dynamics of mid-nineteenth century business. Contemporarily, managers, investors, and regulators use accounting-based financial reports to try to better understand a firm’s operations and economic situation. Therefore, financial reports and commentary on them from the period will yield critical knowledge on how different economic agents (managers, investors, creditors, regulators, and others) interacted and communicated with each other in the adolescent phase of both American capitalism and corporate culture.

The railroad industry was chosen because it was the most significant industry of the mid-nineteenth century and perhaps the most significant industry of the whole period. Railroads were the first to adopt a corporate business organization that would later mature to the corporate organization recognizable today. The reason the railroad industry adopted large corporate structures was its need to raise large amounts of capital. Railroads needed to construct and maintain hundreds
of miles of track, purchase expensive engines, and build stations to operate the tracks. Railroad managers turned to the public to find both investors and creditors in order to afford the massive initial costs required to start railroad. Since the investors were the actual owners of the railroad, managers needed to integrate investors into the administration of the firm. This was done almost exclusively through forming a corporation, with investors electing a board of directors to appoint managers. The number of investors and size of railroads made them massive organizations, and the capital needs and scope of railroads led to further development of the corporate form of business organization. A critically important feature of the American economy’s growth in the nineteenth century was the maturation and widespread adoption of corporations in the United States. Since railroads were the most influential corporations of the mid-nineteenth century, it is logical to focus on them to understand the wider economy. Finally, focusing on the mid-nineteenth century will be insightful because it was the period where annual reports became truly sophisticated while also remaining unstandardized by national legislation. Railroads weren’t universally regulated by the federal government until the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and annual reports weren’t standardized until 1906 with the passage of the Hepburn Act, although the federal government did have some reporting requirements for railroads that received federal money. Instead, individual states had a wide variety of regulations and requirements for financial reporting. Since an important theme of the nineteenth-century American economy was the early development of modern business, understanding how firms acted without strict guidelines or standards will be especially valuable.

Financial reporting developed significantly in this period, prompted by the demands of corporations such as railroads. While financial information had been considered proprietary during most of the First Industrial Revolution, it was necessary for railroads to report this information publicly to their owners
– the shareholders. This rapid development in the sophistication of financial reporting was driven both by the legal requirements of the federal and state governments and by the demands of investors. During this period, the novelty of financial reporting and the lack of standardization meant that managers were able to experiment greatly with how reports were made. Occasionally, this allowed unscrupulous managers to create misleading or fraudulent reports. For the most part, however, financial reports of this period were impressively informative and enlightening. Accounting theory also reached high levels of sophistication, although it was inhibited by a lack of standardization. This lack of standardization incentivized managers to choose the accounting methods that reflected well on the firm over methods that reflected the real economic situation. Much like today, financial reports were primarily focused on the status of the company and its profitability. Annual reports usually contained only information on the balance sheet and income statement. Since railroads usually used a cash basis, the income statement somewhat mirrored the cash flows from operating activities, which could be used to evaluate the firm’s ability to pay debt and distribute dividends. Managers also used accounting to better understand their operations and gather detailed statistical summaries. Similar to how investors used accounting to evaluate a firm, managers often used these figures to aid in strategic decision making. Overall, railroad accounting in this period was impressively sophisticated.

Federal and State Requirements for Financial Reports

In contemporary America, anyone familiar with business has some familiarity with a Form 10-K. In the United States and most modern economies, financial reporting for public companies is a strictly regulated and standardized practice. Governments and standard setting authorities have created detailed methods on how a firm should assemble and present
its books to regulators and investors. Beyond government authorities, groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have created detailed rules on how to prepare financial statements. These rules, US GAAP from FASB and IFRS from IASB, have been made by regulators to be the standard method for accounting in public companies. However ubiquitous now, this state of affairs should not be taken for granted. Rigorous and detailed accounting standards did not exist in the mid-nineteenth century.

Since their inception, railroads have been closely connected to the federal and state governments. The federal and state governments were very interested in the development and success of railroad companies, because populating and connecting America’s quickly expanding territory required an extensive infrastructural network. Furthermore, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a state charter was usually required or desired for incorporation, so most railroads wanted some level of state recognition. Therefore, both the federal and state governments were very involved in the establishment and funding of railroads; meanwhile, other investors welcomed government participation as a means to receive a favorable charter and continued state support. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or ‘the B&O,’ provides an excellent example of how this close relationship between state governments and railroads was reflected in railroad accounting. When the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or the B&O, was created, “civic pride rather than profits made the B&O from its origin a ‘community enterprise’.”¹ Beyond civic pride, the B&O almost functioned as a state company and “in granting the charter for incorporating the B&O, the Maryland legislature retained the authority to set rates… [and] exempted the railroad from tax.”² The railroad’s charter played a very significant role in developing financial reporting in railroads and beyond. When B&O was incorporated, “the B&O Charter… required that stockholders be issued an annual ‘Statement
of Affairs.’” However, that was the limit of the detail in the statutory requirement. Impressively, this ‘Statement of Affairs’ evolved from “a five-page letter from the president to the investors” in 1827 into an impressively sophisticated annual report that included “the first modern example of a private corporation reporting revenues and expenses to stockholders” in 1832. Therefore, the business environment in which railroads developed not only legally required some form of financial reporting, but also encouraged the development of sophisticated accounting and reports.

The federal government also fostered the development of financial reporting through statutes and requirements. Similar to the states, the widespread and generous use of federal funds in supplying capital to railroads prompted the federal government to legally require railroads to provide vital information regarding their operations and status. In 1862, Congress passed the renowned Pacific Railroad Act, which enabled the Treasury to issue bonds to railroads for the construction of a transcontinental railroad. In Section 20 of the legislation, the government required railroads to

[submit to] the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report wherein shall be … First. The names of the stockholders… Second. The names and residences of the directors… Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the amount thereof actually paid in… Fourth. A description of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of such surveys; Fifth. The amount received from passengers on the road; Sixth. The amount received for freight thereon; Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road and its fixtures; Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof.

The complex and detailed requirements of this legislation demonstrates that the annual reports were, indeed, becoming more and more sophisticated. Further, the evolution of
the required information from the annual reports of the B&O charter to the requirements here reveals that governments were becoming more exacting in the reports they received, acting as both investors and regulators. Outlined in the legislation, regulators were requiring the railroads to report on their capital structure, their revenue and expenses, and the current lines they were developing or operating.

By 20 years later, railroads had already become the largest business in the world. Pursuant to statutory reporting requirements, the Auditor of Railroad Accounts sent the Secretary of the Interior an annual report containing information on all railroads that had received some form of federal aid. This report contained vital information on what financial reports really consisted of in the mid-nineteenth century. In Appendix E of the report, there were three forms the railroads were required to submit. These were Form No. 8-001, essentially the balance sheet, Form No. 8-002, a report on the financial and statistical status of the railroad, and Form No. 8-003, essentially the income statement. Remarkably, annual reports had evolved in the span of just a few decades from brief letters to complex logs analogous with modern reports. Contained in the 1880 Annual Report of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts, many railroads’ financials were displayed in such a way that even modern readers can have some grasp of their business’ operations and status. That ability is the power of financial reports.

Both the federal and state governments mandated the creation of financial reports for several reasons. Governments’ financial stakes in many railroads is an obvious reason. Much like other shareholders, governments hoped to ensure that their investments, grants, or other forms of aid were being used wisely by management to promote the development and success of the firm. Another reason for governments to observe railroads’ businesses through financial reporting was due to the use of railroads as a quasi-state agency. As previously discussed, the government often had the authority to decide the rates railroads
could charge or limit the profit margins of a firm. This was done purposefully because governments saw the railroad as a means of promoting commerce and economic activity in the region. This was the tradeoff that firms faced when they accepted governmental investments. The state vigorously promoted the expansion of railroads but did this in order to pursue additional economic and political objectives. Managers, who were content with receiving government aid, also had to accept this level of oversight.

The development of financial reports is an important piece of evidence in revealing this relationship. This is a very significant observation about the origins of American corporations. The government participated in an intimate way with the creation and funding of the first American corporations. This differs greatly from the free-market ideology or politics associated with American corporate culture today. Early railroads were often created and incorporated by legislatures and later railroads received significant funding from the federal and state governments in order to achieve government goals, which were partially aligned with private investors. Therefore, from its beginning financial reporting was not only just a method to remedy information asymmetries between managers and investors but was also a mechanism allowing the government to watch over and control industries it identified as nationally significant.

Management – Goals and Uses for Financial Reports

Although the practice of reporting was required under legal statutes, managers had a great deal of flexibility in how they created their annual reports, as comprehensive industry standards like US GAAP or IFRS had yet to be introduced. Since managers had such a high degree of agency over their reports, studying the various reporting methods used by managers can reveal their differentiated prerogatives with financial reporting. Managers had to report the status of the business to
regulators and investors, but they were often at the liberty of adjusting their accounting methods to make their firm look more attractive. Perhaps most interestingly, it seems that managers also used the creation of annual reports and detailed accounting to inform themselves about their firm’s financial situation. In a time before the internet and data science, managers could often be unaware of many of the details of the railroad’s operations. Therefore, managers often created detailed microeconomic analyses of their business while making their financials. Much like investors, managers were able to use detailed information on their earnings and operations for strategic decision making.

Early railroad managers’ chief difficulty in creating annual reports lies in the lack of precedents in business. Unlike contemporary CEO’s and CFO’s, they were never exposed to a Form 10-K in a business school class. Instead, many railroad executives chose to mimic existing firms’ annual reports. Since the B&O was the oldest railroad in the United States, it “was known as ‘the B&O University’ and its annual reports were viewed as textbooks about railroading, and engineering and financial developments disclosed were closely followed by other railroads.” Again, the influence of regulators can be seen, for the Maryland legislature’s reporting requirements impacted the practices of railroads far outside of the state. This mimicking highlights that while there was great variety in annual reporting, managers were not operating in a bubble and industry standards did exist within a range of acceptability.

The formal arrangement of three primary statements (the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows) did not yet exist but reports generally contained substantial information for all three categories. Firms seem to have almost universally presented a balance sheet (listing assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity) and an income statement with revenues and expenses. The combination of the balance sheet and income statement captured some of the information typically found in a statement of cash flows since “initially most
railroad accounting records were kept on a cash basis.” The primary focus of managers seems to have been reporting and analyzing their revenues and expenses. Similar to contemporary managerial focuses on ‘free cash flow’ and EBITDA, railroad managers of the mid-nineteenth century were deeply interested in their ability to generate cash to fund expansions and pay dividends and “as a result their reports primarily dealt with the sources and disposition of cash and with statistical measure of the flow of traffic.” How firms measured their revenues and expenses, which was an approximation of cash flow, had significant implications for their reported profitability. All of these reports together (the balance sheet, income statement, and statistical analysis) gave both managers and investors an incredible view into the operations and health of the railroad.

The creation of annual reports led to many challenges for accountants, because they often had to develop accounting theory ad hoc. One of the major challenges of this sort for railroads was accounting for long-lived fixed assets. Valuing the many miles of railroad tracks was difficult for accountants, but critically important for managers, since a huge portion of the total assets of a railroad were in fixed assets like tracks. Even contemporarily, there are many methods of accounting for long-lived assets and reporting methods in the United States that don’t match with the methods employed by taxing authorities. US GAAP allows for straight-line depreciation, sum-of-the-year’s-digits, and several other methods. Meanwhile, the IRS uses a system called MACRS.

Going back over a century, managers had even less precedent or theory to work with. As explained by James Boockhodlt, there were several popular methods, each with their own pros and cons. It bears to keep in mind that despite the relative youth of annual reporting, some of these methods were surprisingly sophisticated and resemble modern accounting standards. Three quasi-popular methods included: “periodic revaluation,” which was similar to mark-to-market valuation with pretty
frequent upward adjustments; an annuity method, which paid the annuity in order to create a future fund to pay for the replacement of the assets; finally, there was the ‘renewal method,’ which was similar to accumulated depreciation and expensed the decline of an asset’s value over time. All of these methods had advantages and disadvantages, but they achieved something significant: expensing the costs of capitalized assets. Overall, the development of these methods was evidence of the impressive improvements in accounting theory during this period. Admittedly, mid-nineteenth century managers had a level of discretion over the creation of their reports that today would be deeply unsettling. Despite that, some managers and railroads did produce high quality reports that attempted to give investors a pretty objective view of their property.

However, some managers were not as noble because these expenses could have such a major impact on the bottom line of a railroad. Many wanted to be slyer in their expensing of capital assets and, in the absence of strict accounting standards, they could get away with what is today euphemistically called “creative accounting”. While some of the methods tried to periodically expense some part of their capital assets, most firms used “the retirement method of accounting for fixed assets… under this method, the expense due to the exhaustion of property was recognized at the time of the retirement of a unit of the property.” This method ultimately replaced the other three as the most popular among managers. The justification for this method was that “as long as the property was maintained in good repair then no decrease in the value of the asset had occurred.” In contemporary business, this accounting theory would not be accepted. Depreciation has many definitions, but economic depreciation is usually characterized as the decline in the future benefits (or cash flows) from the asset due to its use that year. These assets had a limited lifespan and would eventually need to be replaced, regardless of what amount of repair the railroad companies conducted on tracks, engines,
and other capital equipment. Therefore, firms should have accounted for this decline with some sort of record of the implied expense. For shareholders, this was really dubious accounting; the intrinsic value of their equity was the net of assets and liabilities. With the retirement method, a railroad track would be worth its capitalized costs until the day it was to be retired and replaced with new track. Instead of gradual depreciation, on the day of retirement investors would be faced with a massive loss in the value of their equity in the firm caused by a sudden drop in the net value of assets. So, while the accounting justification of the method was not very firm, there was another justification for its use: retirement accounting was very beneficial for management. Through the use of this method, managers could boost their bottom line significantly. Furthermore, many states set the rates railroads could charge customers, which was often done by placing a cap on the railroad’s profit as a percentage of its assets. Therefore, a railroad could set higher rates and earn a larger profit with a higher asset valuation. In that situation, the interests of managers and investors were closely aligned against regulators.

Management’s uses for accounting didn’t end at the creation of annual reports for investors and regulators. Accounting could also enable management to get an analytical and objective look at the numbers of their operations. An 1879 treatise written by Marshall Kirkman in *The Railroad Gazette* captures many of the managerial uses for accounting and reports. Kirkman was a unique authority on the development and codification of railroad accounting. He served as the General Accountant and later Vice President of the Chicago and North Western Railway, and he was also one of the founders of the Accounting Division of the American Association of Railroads. In the treatise, Kirkman lays out modern accounting theory and practices for other managers and accountants in the industry. He confirms the prevailing standard of two statement accounting, saying both “a general balance sheet, then, should embrace a clear, concise summary
of the liabilities of the company, including its capital stock, also
the property and assets owned by it” and “the income account”
which should embrace “the earnings and incidental expense
accounts of the company” with earnings appearing “upon the
ledger as a credit balance” and expenses appearing “as debit bal-
ances upon the general ledger” with “the difference or balance
between the credit and debit” constituting “the Undivided In-
come of the property.” More interestingly, he points out that
accountants and their reports served as vitally important sources
of information for management in this period, since “to the ig-
norant and unthinking, the various sub-divisions of railway ser-
vice have apparently little or no relation to each other… [but] the accountant should possess an intimate knowledge of the mi-
nutiae of the different classes of accounts.” His approach is de-
centralized, and he suggests “the returns from agents and others
are, so far as practicable, allowed to reach the general account-
ing officer through the hands of the department officers and
division superintendents of the company.” He maintained that
decentralization ensures that middle management becomes far
more familiar with their operations since “[the] plan enables the
officers to acquaint themselves generally with the details of their
several branches of business without requiring special reports.”
This use of accounting was significant and valuable to manage-
ment. Managers who were neither able to look into databases
to see revenue numbers nor access client information were now
able to view detailed reports of their receipts and operations and
have an objective view of their true situation.

Marshall Kirkman was not the only manager who saw
the potential of detailed annual reports for managerial analysis.
Albert Fink, the Vice President and General Superintendent of
the Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, also
wrote a treatise on railroad accounting. In his work, Fink clearly
lays out the importance of detailed and accurate accounting,
saying:
If the percentage of operating expenses to net earnings, or the cost of one ton of freight or one passenger transported one mile, can not be used as an absolute measure of economy, or even as a measure of comparison, and we have seen it can not, the question arises, what is the proper course to pursue in ascertaining whether a railroad is economically operated or not? To this the answer must be given that the only mode of ascertaining this fact thoroughly is to make an examination of each item of expenditure incurred in the operation of a railroad, and see whether this has been reduced to a minimum and the service rendered to a maximum... but even that knowledge would be of little avail unless the accounts of the operating expenditures of railroads are kept in such a manner as to exhibit in detail not only the expenditures, but also the amount of work performed for each item of expenditures.  

Here, Fink touches on very deep ideas. Fink is coming close to writing microeconomic theory, approaching railroad management as an in-depth exercise in cost minimization and profit maximization. Accounting is central to this managerial approach and therefore becomes a powerful manager tool for analysis and informed decision making. One of Fink's annual reports composed between the years 1873 and 1874 was even included as one of the course readings, which includes some of his statistical measures. Fink and other managers developed and produced many tables of data and statistics for use by investors and managers alike. Similar to the statistics used in the nascent art of sabermetrics during this period, managers created all sorts of interesting ratios and measures. One such statistic was a ‘movement expenses per ton-mile’ which is equal to the movement expenses per train mile (sourced from their own data table) over the average number of tons of freight in each train. Combining this with three other measures (station expenses per ton-mile, maintenance of road per ton-mile, and interest per ton-mile) added up to find the total cost per ton-mile. Like a baseball manager analyzing a player's batting average and field-
ing percentage, railroad managers could use these measures to closely analyze their cost structure. The work of these two writers, each important and influential managers of the time, highlight just how sophisticated and powerful accounting had become. Quickly rising from short memos to investors, annual reports eventually became sophisticated and detailed enough to enable managers to use them in order to make strategic decisions.

Shareholders’ Expectations and Frustrations with Financial Reports

Just like the federal and state governments, private investors were very interested in railroads. Similar to the tech stocks of the 1990’s into the present, railroads were the exciting and disruptive industry of the future during the mid-nineteenth century. However, the motivations of private investors obviously differed from those of the government. While the government sought to promote railroads in order to develop the economy of the country and build infrastructure to connect its distant regions together, private investors were interested in making money from their investment. With this motivation for investment, private shareholders were deeply interested in the annual financial reports of the railroads. These reports were used by shareholders to assess the position of the firm and the value of their property; a dependable and trustworthy report was the only way a shareholder could measure the value of his ownership objectively. Financial reports existed because of government requirements and investor demand for them, however, their lack of standardization was a source of aggravation. Many managers were incentivized, as they still are, to fudge or outright manipulate numbers in their annual report to make their firm look like a better investment. The variety in methods of reporting and the desire of some managers to make inaccurate or fraudulent reports meant that the quality of annual reports differed greatly
from one report to the next. This was a major issue for investors, and one that caused a good deal of frustration and fear.

In an 1879 edition of the *North American Review*, an article entitled “The Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” captured many of the contemporary issues that investors had with railroad securities. The article zeros in on the lax and perhaps fraudulent accounting standards of the New York Central Railroad, one of the premier railroads at this time. Investors could have forgiven the industry if the managers of some fringe regional railroad were making questionable decisions with their accounting. Yet, the New York Central, on the other hand, was one of the country’s premier railroads. If there were serious issues with this railroad, that would have represented an indictment of the whole industry.

The author alleges many issues with the company, starting with a failure of the New York State regulating authorities. As the author makes clear, “the laws of New York, which, as they now stand, render possible, either the rendering of no account whatever of their financial condition, by companies whose stocks may constitute the sole means of subsistence of otherwise helpless families, or the publishing of such statements, or reports, as are a mockery of the law, and an insult to the common sense of every business man.” Without proper enforcement of some level of quality in financial reporting, the state of business in New York would enter into a bad state. Honest and objective reporting was critical since “every well-regulated State very properly undertakes to control many of its public corporation, so that, through a perfect knowledge of their financial condition, only to be ascertained through complete and enforced reports, the public at large may know to what extent it is safe to trust their promises to pay, losses, interest, or dividends, as the case may be.” Because of their business, railroads were dependent on the public as a source of capital.

The erosion of public trust and faith in the honesty of
financial reports could threaten the legitimacy of state authorities and honest businesses in New York. However, at the writing of the article, the demand for New York Central stock was healthy as the railroad was able to consistently pay a dividend on the stock. The author makes this clear, saying, “for some ten years, no perfect “general balance-sheet” has been published by the company… instead of awakening the suspicions of brokers and investors, [this] seems to have been entirely ignored. The market price of the stock has been governed by the fact that it has paid eight per cent dividends, regardless of the absence of any proof of its intrinsic value, as indicated by the existence of a due proportion of assets to liabilities.” Just like contemporary bubbles and accounting scandals, investors were either uninterested in any problems with annual reports, despite their objective importance, or were unaware of these issues with New York Central’s accounting. This yields a significant observation: regulation was critically important, for the public often did not review annual reports closely as long as superficial indicators of success like dividends were present.

Despite some investors’ ignorance about dubious reporting, railroads companies were still very sensitive to public doubts about their securities. The impact of the *New York Review* article was damning on the railroad industry as a whole, and it certainly was not the only place such opinions could have been found. Enough public doubt in the industry could have led to a severe drop in the share prices of firms across the nation. Yet beyond the dubious or potentially fraudulent annual reports of the New York Central, the accounting methods used in formulating such annual reports of many other railroads could also easily lead to public distrust. As discussed earlier, conventions such as the retirement method for valuing long-lived fixed assets produced annual reports that kept in mind only the interests of the management, rather than those of the stockholders. The management of an individual firm was often deeply interested in dispelling any doubts about the value of the property behind their own firm’s stocks, especially if these
In response to the fear of shareholders in their firm, the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company launched a committee, headed by William Stokely, the Mayor of Philadelphia, to investigate its accounts and perform a full audit of their balance sheet. Made in response to complaints from stockholders, its explicit goal was to “meeting to examine all the property of the Company… to make an appraisement of the value of the roads, shops, machinery, real estate, depots, bonds, stocks, and all other assets of the Company; also, to examine into the liabilities and obligations of the Company.”

Similar to the use of annual reports to generate insightful statistics for management, this committee also attempted to investigate “the wisdom of the past policy of your Company, and to make any suggestions that we may deem likely to conduce to its greater prosperity in the future.” Therefore management could use the report along with shareholders in order to better understand the realities of their operations. As always, accurate reporting could benefit both groups, since objective measurements of the operation allows both investors and managers to make strategic decisions regarding the company.

The committee quickly proved itself to be much more than a public relations stunt from the board through the clear repudiation of several decisions of the firm. For instance, the committee removed a several million-dollar investment in the United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company from their balance sheet because it was a “mythical account” which was neither “part of the assets or liabilities of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.” Apparently, this investment was really the property of a New Jersey railroad from which the Pennsylvania Railroad Company leased railroad lines. Whether this mistake was intentional or unintentional is unclear and the committee doesn’t make a great effort to investigate this, preferring correction over investigation.

The committee also specifically mentions several costly mistakes made by management over the years. The report zeros
in on a group of investments on railroad lines south of Baltimore. The Pennsylvania Railroad focused its operations mainly in the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, so expansion southwards was a move out of the norm for the firm. This expansion resulted in failure, with the revenues from the lines barely breaking past the operating expenses incurred. The committee held nothing back in their criticism of the management’s decision to expand, stating that “in making investments south of Baltimore without your consent, by which nearly $5,000,000 have been lost to your Company.”\textsuperscript{25} However, the committee immediately sought to rebuild the confidence of its shareholders, pointing out that this loss “illustrates the dangers against which we endeavor to guard, as explained in other parts of this report.”\textsuperscript{26} Through open admission of the mistakes and an effort in the report to explain methods to avoid another mistake like this in the future, the committee attempted to win back stockholder confidence not just in their reports but also their operations. Overall, it is impressive to see the committee attempting to win back stockholder confidence by cleaning up past mistakes and proposing methods to avoid future mistakes. Many other firms would have not had the same integrity to correct for past mistakes. The zealous efforts of the committee demonstrates the Board of Directors’ devotion to its fiduciary duty. Any past mistakes made by management could be corrected by the committee, with shareholders associating the governance of the firm more with the committee than with the management.

It is apparent that investor confidence in the veracity and accuracy of annual reports was shaky at best. Especially for more business savvy investors, the methods of assembling annual reports could often be seen as unsatisfactory as it could be difficult to divine the true value of an investment in a firm from their financial reports. While many firms attempted to remedy this through investigation committees like that of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, these efforts were perhaps unnecessary. Overall, it seems that the regular payment of dividends was
the most important factor in winning investors over, regardless of whether such dividends were sustainable. The author of “The Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” was an accountant, or at least anonymously claimed to be one, so naturally as a professional he was able to zero in on issues in the New York Central’s financial reports. Laymen investors who were less able to interpret annual reports, let alone tease out discrepancies, would have been less sensitive about their quality so long as such issues were not directly brought to their attention. This highlights both the importance of honest management and firm regulators, both then and now. Through a combination of the two, business would remain in high repute, and people of all stripes could participate in corporate ownership.

Conclusion

The accounting practices of the railroad industry in the mid-nineteenth century were truly remarkable in both for their sophistication and rapid development. Prior to the railroads, businesses were never expected to release any sort of substantial reports. The business of railroads required not only large numbers of investors and creditors but also an unprecedented amount of equity and debt. The demand of the investors eventually led to the demand for annual reports. Furthermore, the federal and state governments, heavily invested in the railroad business and interested in overseeing their operations, required annual reports to be made to supervise over the railroads’ status and operations. Thus, both the state and private investors demanded annual reports as evidence of the value of their property. Coincidentally, the development of railroads as large and sophisticated corporations was mirrored by the evolution of their annual reports from brief letters to comprehensive and sophisticated documents. Beyond the demand from governments and private investors, managers also used accounting and annual reports as an opportunity to analyze their operations and gain a better strategic understanding of their firm’s positions.
Although railroads declined in national importance with the rise of cars, trucks, and planes, they had lasting impacts on American business. Other corporations adopted and expanded on the model of railroads, and their corporate organizations and practices were highly influenced by them. With that in mind, these annual reports are especially significant. They not only offer critical insights into the relationships of firms, investors, and regulators in the 1870’s, but they also have significant implications on how those relationships are formed even today.
Notes


2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, 66.

4 Ibid.

5 United States Congress, “An Act to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean: And to Secure to the Government the Use of the Same for Postal, Military, and Other Purposes,” July 1, 1862, National Archives.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, 10-11.

11 Ibid, 13.

12 Ibid.


14 Ibid, 385.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, 136.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 9.
26 Ibid.
Introduction

The “fundamental design” of the international communist movement and the goal of Soviet leaders, according to George Kennan in NSC-68, was “to retain and solidify their absolute power” through “the dynamic extension of their authority” and “the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world.”1 Such strategy threatened the power of the United States; consequently, Washington policy makers believed they had to exercise whatever extent of economic, political, or military influence necessary to counter the communist expansion inherently tied to the USSR. This belief lay at the core of the United States’ foreign policy for decades - from the execution of the Marshall Plan to involvement in the Vietnam War, Washington bureaucrats willingly intervened in the domestic affairs of other nations in the name of halting the infectious spread of communism.

Mexico, notwithstanding the close bond it shared with the dominant anticommunist power, endorsed an outlook almost antithetical to that of the United States. During the Cold War, Mexico maintained its adherence to the Estrada Doctrine. First established by Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada in 1930, the doctrine advocated for each country’s right to self-determination and emphasized the importance of nonintervention. This doctrine, alongside a concern for its own independence, informed Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of noninterventionist principles in the Charter for the Organization of American States.
The world views of the United States and Mexico collided when Fidel Castro successfully led the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and established the first openly socialist state in Latin America. The United States, after identifying the communist threat on its doorstep, responded swiftly and sought to lead the Western Hemisphere’s response, serving as an example for the other Latin American countries to follow. After imposing its own sanctions on Cuba, American delegates to the OAS attempted to persuade Latin American member nations to act as anticommmunist crusaders and chastise Cuba with harsh economic and political retaliations. In their view, OAS members had to recognize the existing expansionist threat of communists and cease relations with Cuba to prevent its efforts to spark revolutions in other countries. While the American delegates could not achieve their ultimate goal of having the OAS swiftly assail Cuba, they succeeded in forcing them to impose sanctions against the island at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1964. The resolution of this meeting concluded that Cuba had sponsored “terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerilla warfare” in Venezuela. More importantly, it resolved that in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance “the governments of the American states [should] not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba” and required that they suspend all their trade and sea transportation with Cuba.

Mexico, defying the expectations of the Washington delegation, “steadfastly opposed any obligatory sanctions against Cuba” on behalf of the OAS even before the conference began. Even after Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil (the last OAS members to hold out on severing relations with Cuba) adopted the resolution, Mexico still refused to follow suit. Instead, it chose to maintain economic and political interaction with the island. Because of this, Mexico transformed into a “window” from the mainland Americas into Cuba and served (OAS) and its willingness to interact with communist countries. The world views of the United States and Mexico collided when Fidel Castro successfully led the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and established the first openly socialist state in Latin America. The United States, after identifying the communist threat on its doorstep, responded swiftly and sought to lead the Western Hemisphere’s response, serving as an example for the other Latin American countries to follow. After imposing its own sanctions on Cuba, American delegates to the OAS attempted to persuade Latin American member nations to act as anticommmunist crusaders and chastise Cuba with harsh economic and political retaliations. In their view, OAS members had to recognize the existing expansionist threat of communists and cease relations with Cuba to prevent its efforts to spark revolutions in other countries. While the American delegates could not achieve their ultimate goal of having the OAS swiftly assail Cuba, they succeeded in forcing them to impose sanctions against the island at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1964. The resolution of this meeting concluded that Cuba had sponsored “terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerilla warfare” in Venezuela. More importantly, it resolved that in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance “the governments of the American states [should] not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba” and required that they suspend all their trade and sea transportation with Cuba.

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as the only entry point into the island from the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{7} Mexico’s decision to retain its relationship with Cuba posed a threat to the anticommunist agenda of the United States on primarily two fronts: firstly, in Mexico’s domestic arena and secondly, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, through its consistent contact with Mexico, could catalyze a communist uprising in the country, or use it as a base to export Cuban subversives to spark insurgencies in neighboring Latin American nations. Considering the United States’ determination to suppress any communist entity, the significance of Cuba as the only socialist nation which penetrated the anticommunist sanctuary that the U.S. had sought to establish in the Western Hemisphere, and the geographical proximity of Mexico, the predictable course of action for the United States would have been to explosively retaliate against its neighbor. Despite all of this, the United States government did not punish Mexico in any way. The relationship between Mexico and the United States during this time suffered no significant harm and continued cordially.\textsuperscript{8} Why then, did the staunchest advocate of anti-communism not excoriate its neighbor when it continued to interact with a communist country on both of their doorsteps?

\textbf{Cold War Historiography: The United States, Mexico, and Holes in the Literature}

For decades American scholars have studied the Cold War, and the already expansive literature continues to evolve. Historians have debated for decades on the origins of the Cold War, offering political, economic, and ideological reasonings for its inevitability. They have increasingly focused on the inseparable nature of foreign and domestic policy, leading to the upsurge in social history analyses that take the international context of the Cold War into account. This has produced studies that examine the effect that the war’s rhetoric had on the Civil Rights Movement, blue collar workers, women, and other societal
groups. As scholars explore the dynamics of social history and its international context in more depth, political history has largely taken a secondary role in historians’ studies of the Cold War.

The attention of Mexican political historians, on the other hand, has only recently begun to transition from the revolutionary era to the post-revolutionary period. Popular themes for analysis include the formation and limits of the modern Mexican state, the nature of political representation, the creation of political parties, the character of local and national elections, and the correlation between dissent and violence. In the context of the Cold War, the literature has centered on the presence of communists in Mexico, the nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union, how the international context influenced domestic policies, and how the United States’ foreign policy objectives limited the Mexican presidents’ power.⁹

Neither group of scholars, however, has extensively examined why Mexico’s unwillingness to match Washington’s anticommunist fervor did not cause significant conflict between the two nations - especially given their geopolitical and economic proximity. In an effort to fill the aforementioned holes in the historiography, this paper utilizes a collection of declassified documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alongside archives from the State Department to investigate why the United States did not chastise Mexico for sustaining relations with Cuba after the OAS Resolution of 1964. More broadly, this paper seeks to shift scholars’ attention towards the relationship between the United States and Mexico, and how the Cold War impacted it. It first examines Mexico’s domestic front, analyzing how the factious nature of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the personal interest of individual politicians shaped Washington policy makers’ understanding of Mexico’s relationship with Cuba. Afterwards, it evaluates the hemispheric impact of Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba, noting the United States’ concern with Cuba’s utilization of Mexico as a base to export subversives to the Latin American mainland.
Ultimately, I argue, the United States decided to not reprimand Mexico for its decision to retain economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba because the bilateral relationship did not threaten to spread communism – not to Mexico or to other nations in Latin America. Washington bureaucrats recognized that Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution originated from considerations on party stability and prioritization of personal interests. They understood Mexico’s decision not as a direct affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda but as a continuance of traditional political behaviors. In understanding Mexico’s characteristic political behaviors and respecting their deviation from the hemispheric foreign policy, the United States was able to strengthen the country’s ability to combat communism within its borders. Mexico’s relationship with Cuba not only posed a minimal threat of spreading communism, but it could actually have the power to prevent its dissemination. The United States, therefore, had minimal reason to chastise its neighbor, and rather had every reason to quietly support its decision.

Mexico’s Domestic Front: The Protection of the PRI

Paradoxically, in allowing Mexico to retain its relationship with Cuba the United States strengthened Mexico’s primary political party and its ability to resist communism. By 1964, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had monopolized the political system of Mexico for nearly four decades. The CIA recognized that the party’s subsumption of “groups ranging from the far left to the extreme right” allowed it to control “almost all elements of Mexican society” and break “the power of those it could not absorb.” They identified the PRI’s broad coalition building, in other words, as the key electoral mechanism that allowed the political party to preserve its monopolistic power. To build stability between the ranging sectors within the party system, the outgoing president always chose his heir to prevent internal fights over succession, thus maintaining the party unity neces-
sary to emerge victorious at the polls. Additionally, the PRI did not tolerate any external challenge to its rule and quickly moved to suppress any opposition—from communists or otherwise. 11

An overview of the PRI clearly indicates why a neighbor with a stable one party dictatorship provided great convenience for the United States. Not only did Washington not have to worry about an imminent communist threat on its border, but it also rested at ease knowing that one of the most influential countries in Latin America would not easily fall prey to communism. Hence, so long as the PRI retained their monopolistic power, the United States could trust that Mexico’s foreign policy decisions would not result in an internal collapse to communism. When the end of his term approached in 1964, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos had to reconcile conflicting factions when selecting his successor, like all previous PRI presidents had done. Unlike his predecessors, however, Lopez Mateos had to cater to an additional interest - the United States and the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Earlier in the year, Johnson had pressured the outgoing president to align Mexico more closely with American foreign policy, creating tension between the two nations. In a conversation between the two presidents in February of 1964, Lopez Mateos admitted that “a number of recent events had led his country to adopt certain international policies which had been interpreted by some people as anti-American.”12 Johnson, subtly pressuring Mexico into compliance, responded that “he was sure that when the chips were down Mexico would be on the side of the United States.”13
The primary goal of United States foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War lay in impeding the expansion of communism. In the Western Hemisphere, American bureaucrats believed they would achieve this through the isolation of Cuba with OAS initiatives.\textsuperscript{14} Utilizing the OAS to advance their goals had dominated the United States’ hemispheric policy even before the Johnson Administration. Since 1960, before Castro had declared himself a communist, the State Department actively sought to “impress upon Latin American the nature and seriousness of Communist penetration of Cuba.”\textsuperscript{15} The United States repeatedly emphasized that the dangerous problem required preventative hemispheric action in the form of every member’s severance of relations with the island.

The United States first formally attempted to achieve this objective by expelling Cuba from the OAS. But key nations - such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – opposed the measure. Consequently, the American delegation resorted to the bribing of right wing Central American dictators to secure the passage of the resolution. Washington officials, therefore, viewed the vote as an insincere and indifferent notion from Latin American countries to espouse its concerns with communism.\textsuperscript{16}
To remedy this, Washington policy makers sought to use Venezuela’s condemnation of Cuba’s support for communist uprisings in its territory to emphasize the danger that Cuba’s communist interventions posed. In doing so, they hoped to arouse the animosity needed to pass an OAS resolution that would force Latin American nations to suspend relations with Cuba. Shortly before Johnson’s meeting with Lopez Mateos, internal deliberations in the State Department between Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, OAS Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Special Coordinator for Cuban Affairs John Crimmins, and others concluded that “while the Venezuelans should publicly lead the fight, we will have to give them plenty of support [through] an intensive selling job in Latin America.”\(^{17}\) Part of this “selling job,” would include “making noise” about Cuba’s intervention in Venezuela. But more importantly, the United States had to aid in the drafting of Venezuela’s resolution. This resolution would condemn Cuba’s interventionism and recommend that OAS members sever relations with the nation. By taking such an intimate role in the process, the United States aimed to ensure that the vote on the OAS resolution would result in the accomplishment of its most pressing objective in the Western Hemisphere - containing the spread of communism.\(^{18}\) In light of these circumstances, Johnson - in his meeting with Lopez Mateos - alluded to the upcoming OAS vote. He characterized it as a time when the metaphorical chips would be put down, and made it clear the United States expected Mexico’s loyal support in this critical time.

Mexico’s Domestic Front: Factionalism in the PRI

As this unfolded on the international stage, Lopez Mateos selected Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, his Minister of the Interior, as his successor. Described as “severe in dealing with communist agitation during his tenure” by the Washington Daily
News, and as farther to the right than his predecessor by the CIA, the choice pleased the Johnson administration. Fulton Freeman, the American ambassador to Mexico, spoke approvingly of the reports that Diaz Ordaz would win.\textsuperscript{19} When internal PRI opposition commented on this statement, upset at the prospect that the United States would aid their disfavored candidate, neither Secretary Mann nor President Johnson chastised Freeman for supporting the wrong candidate but rather advised him on how to manage the backlash from Mexican press.\textsuperscript{20} The United States government, clearly approved of Lopez Mateos’ selection and viewed Diaz Ordaz as a candidate who would continue the PRI’s monopoly on Mexican politics. More importantly, Diaz Ordaz could potentially act more decisively against communist groups than his predecessor because of his political standing, which further ruled out any significant communist challenge in Mexico. \textsuperscript{21}

This choice, however, did not please all factions of the PRI – the left wing members of the party, led by former president Lazaro Cardenas, opposed the nomination of Diaz Ordaz. In addition to their disapproval of Diaz Ordaz’s stance on domestic policy issues, they also took issue with his endorsement of the OAS resolution, as they assumed the incoming administration would follow its predecessor’s example.\textsuperscript{22} Shortly before Mexico’s presidential elections and the vote on the OAS resolution, Secretary Mann described his trouble with securing Mexico’s vote in support for the resolution as stemming from this factious dispute. Mann informed Johnson that while Mexico’s OAS ambassador Vincente Sanchez Gavito stood on their side, he was working arduously to “trying to keep the party from splitting” over the language of the OAS resolution right before the election.

As Sanchez Gavito participated in deliberations where he fiddled “with words that everybody [could] live with,” members of the Johnson administration, including Assistant
for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, acknowledged that the factious bickering could prevent the US from securing Mexico’s vote.\textsuperscript{23} The Johnson administration, in short, understood how the PRI’s internal disputes affected Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in the OAS and decided to not force Mexico to vote in favor of the resolution. In doing so, the Johnson administration chose to give Lopez Mateos the room he needed to work on keeping his party united – a decision that in the long term would benefit the United States as it would allow the PRI to retain its dominance.

The elections in Mexico resulted with Diaz Ordaz’s victory, but they did not end the factious tensions in the PRI. The newly elected president had to take care to appease the leftist faction in order to keep the party intact. The Diaz Ordaz administration consequently chose to maintain Mexico’s disapproval of the OAS resolution, specifically voicing objection to the resolution’s “mandatory language” which obligated member countries dissolve their relations with Cuba.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, when put into context, Mexico’s disapproval of the resolution indicates that one of the following two scenarios played out. Either inner party conflicts persisted in plaguing the PRI and Diaz Ordaz continued to negotiate with the leftist faction that initially opposed the resolution, or Diaz Ordaz sacrificed his own position on the resolution and opposed it to appease the leftist faction and keep the party united.
In an attempt to secure Mexico’s vote and help the PRI leaders unite the party, the United States rewrote the language of the resolution on multiple occasions. But in the end, it did not come as a surprise to the American delegation when Mexico voted against the resolution. As alluded to previously, Washington bureaucrats’ restraint in exercising retaliatory measures against Mexico for its vote against the OAS resolution reflected their understanding of the internal conflicts of the PRI as well as the United States’ own priorities in hemispheric policy. The Johnson administration primarily helped orchestrate the passage of the 1964 OAS resolution as a preventative measure to limit Cuba’s ability to catalyze communist revolutions in the mainland of Latin America. When it came to achieving this goal in Mexico, however, the nation’s affirmative vote on the resolution only supplied symbolic significance, whereas the continued control of the PRI provided practical protection. If Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution, thus, was the cost of precluding factious disputes in the PRI from splitting the party and ending its monopoly, the United States was
willing to pay it in the name of the same goal that motivated it to support the OAS resolution in the first place: suppressing all potential for communist expansion in Latin America.

**Mexico’s Domestic Front:**
**Personal Interests as the Ulterior Motive**

The trajectory of corruption in Mexican politics in the decades leading up to the OAS vote in 1964 demonstrated that in addition to factious disputes, personal agendas also significantly shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Public statements made by Mexican politicians on the OAS resolution offer a glimpse into this pattern. For instance, Sanchez Gavito reportedly “startled the New World diplomatic corps” at the OAS in arguing that “the Mexican government may fall’ if Mexico abandons its pro-Cuba policy.” Such an exaggerated statement undoubtedly served as a rhetorical strategy to justify Mexico’s position and possibly garner sympathy from the other OAS ambassadors, as the economic policies of Mexico at the time clearly disprove the veracity of the statement. Mexico would significantly suffer from severing relations with Cuba if ending the relationship signified the loss of a significant source of critical imports or revenue from exports. Yet since the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho in 1940, Mexico had adhered to the Import Substitution Industrialization Model (ISI). At the time of the presidency of Lopez Mateos, Mexico remained in the second phase of this plan; this second phase required the implementation of harsh tariffs to protect local industry from foreign competition and allowed domestic development to burgeon. Put simply, this meant that Mexico did not rely on Cuban imports. Cuba, similarly, did not serve as a primary destination for Mexico’s exports.

Despite the lack of veracity of Sanchez Gavito’s claims, the official actions of the Mexican government sup-
port the ambassador’s suggestion that the Mexican government valued trade with the island. On two occasions, Mexico ignored the OAS’s sanctions on Cuba – it first rejected the OAS resolution of June 1964 cutting all economic ties with the island and afterwards, it refused to sign the OAS sanctions adopted in July of 1964.\textsuperscript{29} Mexico’s reluctance to adopt the measures ratified by the OAS allowed the country, as a Mexican diplomat put it, to serve “as a window” to the state of Cuba.\textsuperscript{30} As more accurately articulated by the \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, Mexico served as a “gateway to Cuba – the only entry point through which people and cargo [could] get into Cuba from the Western Hemisphere on a regular basis.”\textsuperscript{31} Through this “gateway” role, Mexico facilitated the smuggling of contraband, serving as “a chief avenue through which machinery parts and other supplies desperately needed by Cuba” were smuggled from the United States. Mexico, moreover, served as a passageway for Soviet aid to reach the island. A Mexican company, for instance, reportedly “sold to the Soviet Union a million tons of sulphur which will be transferred to Cuba for use in that country’s sugar refining industry.”\textsuperscript{32}

When taken together, these factors - Mexico’s limited national economic exchanges with Cuba, the high rhetorical value Mexican officials placed on maintaining this relationship, the regular embezzlement of funds and the smuggling of goods to the island - suggest that PRI politicians potentially kept economic relations with Cuba to personally benefit from the profits generated by the illicit trade with the island. The high value Mexican politicians placed on trade with Cuba also insinuates that the commodities smuggled went beyond the machinery and sulphur mentioned by the newspaper articles. Smugglers likely transported other supplies critical to Cuba’s survival sourced from within Mexico, such as oil, given the lucrative profits available. These profits would have substantially increased given that the OAS resolution hindered the is-
land’s economic survival by demanding that the other members cut off economic ties with Cuba – the smugglers, therefore, would have held a near monopoly over trade with the island.

The relationship between PRI politicians of the late 20th century and smugglers parallels the relationship shared by the modern PRI and drug cartels. In both eras, politicians demonstrated a willingness to create political conditions favorable to the smugglers’ transfers in return for a share of the profits. Greed and a desire for personal wealth, in other words, could have shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in regard to Cuba. One could argue that the close relationship between the PRI and smugglers does not parallel, but rather served as a precedent for the modern dynamic between the PRI and drug cartels. In allowing contrabandists to move goods through Mexico while disregarding international agreements, the administration of López Mateos paved the way for future PRI politicians and technocrats to accept agreements with drug cartels if it meant personal gain. The manipulation of the political context surrounding Cuba by PRI politicians adds yet another example of the enduring political party’s corruption.

Even if individual PRI politicians did not have direct contact with smugglers, politicians did not need intimate connections to obtain profits from illicit commerce with Cuba. Corrupt PRI technocrats could have easily used their business connections at the time to obtain a share of the revenue made by Mexican companies, such as the ones that illegally sold sulphur to the island. These new opportunities for revenue that Mexican companies found through their country’s unique trading position with the island multiplied the opportunities for Mexican politicians to skim off the revenue that the government made from tariffs. PRI politicians, in short, had a vested personal interest in maintaining a source of revenue which was uncontested by the rest of the hemisphere and did not hesitate to use their governmental power to protect it.
The United States government recognized the personalist motivations of Mexican politicians and accepted this corruption as a mechanism that helped maintain the PRI’s power. Though no State Department memorandum explicitly articulated it, the foreign policy team of President Johnson could have arrived at this same conclusion from their familiarity with the inner workings of Mexican politics. Washington policy makers, in other words, inherently framed their reaction to Mexico’s retainment of relations with Cuba with the knowledge of how personal interests influenced Mexican policy. In understanding this dynamic, Mexico’s refusal to accept the OAS resolution played out not as intransigence against the United States’ anticommunist agenda, but as a continuation of long standing relationships between politicians, Mexican companies, and smugglers. Therefore, the preservation of the bilateral relations between Mexico and Cuba presented no immediate affront to the United States’ objective of preventing communist insurrections. Washington, consequently, had no pressing reason to reproach Mexico for its decision.

Hemispheric Scale: Securing the Mainland through Preventative Measures

While the Johnson administration worried about Mexico’s internal collapse to communism, it fretted more over Cuba’s potential to utilize Mexico as a base to launch its efforts to support communist uprisings in Latin America. The regular efforts of Cuban diplomats in Mexico to stimulate revolutionaries in Nicaragua in the years leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis made this threat seem more imminent. Acknowledgement of these activities affected the way in which members of the National Security Council participated in the drafting of Venezuela’s OAS resolution. They emphasized the importance of cutting transportation between Cuba and mainland Latin
America to prevent Cuba from further instigating revolutionary efforts in the continent. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Chase, for instance, supported the OAS resolution calling “for the suspension of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries,” noting that such a measure would cut “the Cuba/Mexico airlink” and significantly hinder Cuba’s ability to export subversives. Mexico, as mentioned, did not vote in favor of this resolution, nor did it cut its air link to Cuba, which meant it could still act as a launch pad for Cuban subversives into the mainland of Latin America.

Despite American politicians’ concern over Cuba’s potential utilization of Mexico as a base to export communist guerillas, the political and diplomatic developments ensured that this threat was unlikely to materialize. Though Washington knew that the PRI would swiftly suppress any challenge to its rule, the more conservative character of the new Diaz Ordaz administration added additional assurance that any communist challenge would be quashed. William Raborn, Director of the CIA, in a memorandum on the security conditions in Mexico described the political course of Diaz Ordaz as “to the right of his predecessor,” as he catered to the “moderate and conservative elements in the PRI [who] were exerting pressure to restrict the influence of Castroites, Communists, and other extremists.” Moreover, the same CIA memorandum on security conditions in Mexico noted that the administration had successfully “sharply limited pro-Castroite and other anti-US activities.” Mexico, in other words, would not serve as a fruitful base for Fidel Castro’s efforts to export communist uprisings to the mainland of Latin America. The Diaz Ordaz administration – more than any of its predecessors – would subdue communist guerillas within Mexico’s borders before they had a chance to spread their influence elsewhere in the mainland.

Aside from the heightened dedication of the Mexican government to crack down on any domestic or Cuban commu-
nist activities in its territory, the United States ensured that no Cuban effort to export revolutionaries would succeed by reinforcing the defenses of the rest of the continent. Not only did the United States succeed in limiting the possibility of Castro sending subversives to the mainland by orchestrating the ratification of the OAS resolution - it went a step further by increasing military and economic aid to the countries most vulnerable to a communist attack. After the Johnson administration realized that Mexico would not suspend its relations with Cuba after the ratification of the resolution, it shifted its focus to protecting the governments of Central America. While anticommunist dictators and parties controlled the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with aid from the United States, their rule was considerably less stable than that of the PRI’s.39 This fragility, alongside their geographical proximity to Mexico, made these countries more vulnerable targets if a Cuban communist excursion established itself in Mexico. Accordingly, the Johnson administration increased both military and economic aid to these countries to reinforce their ability to repress communist insurrections. From 1964 to 1965, individual aid increased by $3,297,000 to El Salvador, $2,732,000 to Guatemala, $3,742,000 to Honduras, and $17,982,000 to Nicaragua.40 Additionally, less than a year after the OAS voted on requiring member nations to cease relations with Cuba, the United States helped to establish the Central American Defense Council, otherwise known as CONDECA. A mutual defense alliance, CONDECA ensured countries would come to the aid of any member troubled by communist insurgencies in their territory. Washington officials also provided anti-guerilla training to the militaries of these Central American countries with the goal of better preparing them to suppress any communist uprisings – especially those which sprouted from Cuban support.41

The United States, in other words, took preventative measures in Central America to minimize the influence
of Cuban communism through both stick and carrot measures. Increasing economic aid to these countries served as a carrot, allowing Washington to curb a rise in sympathy for communism among Central Americans by ameliorating the economic conditions of these countries. Fortifying the militaries of Central America with a larger budget and improved military training against communist insurgencies served as a stick, ensuring that the extant governments stood a better chance of defeating Cuban sympathizing subversives if they attempted to foment an uprising. Should Cuban subversives even succeed in leaving Mexico, the geographic areas most likely to become targets of their operations now stood better prepared to withstand their challenge. Because of the implementation of these safeguards, the United States did not overly concern itself with the prospect of a communist revolution carried out by Cuban subversives in Central America. Therefore, the Mexico-Cuba relationship posed a minimal threat of spreading communism to Latin America as a whole.

Conclusion

The United States did not reprimand Mexico for retaining its relationship with Cuba because their connection, contrary to initial appearances, furthered the United States’ primary foreign policy goal: containing the spread of communism. In fact, the Mexico-Cuba relationship reduced factionalist debates, ensured the continued dominance of the PRI, and reduced the possibility that Mexico would fall to communism. Moreover, Washington diplomats likely considered the influence of the personal interests of politicians as a source of Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Mexico’s relationship with Cuba provided lucrative opportunities that gave technocrats an incentive to remain in power. Taking these factors into consideration, the United States construed Mexico’s connection with
Cuba not as an affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda, but rather as an indicator of the continued influence of individual interests within the Mexican system. Both Mexican and American policy makers, moreover, swiftly moved to preclude communist insurrections catalyzed by Cuban subversives – through harsher internal crack downs and the allocation of additional aid to Latin American countries with more vulnerable political systems, respectively. Any attempts from Cuba to utilize Mexico as a base to export communist revolutions into mainland Latin America, consequently, stood little chance of success. An analysis between the relationship between Mexico and Cuba, in conclusion, reveals that this connection would not spread communism to Mexico or any country in the Latin American mainland. Instead, it strengthened Mexico’s ability to fight communism within its borders, which in turn prevented the spread of communism into the rest of Latin America. Requiring Mexico to abide by the OAS resolution would at best serve as a symbolic measure, and at worst, would damage Mexico’s ability to fight communism. Allowing for Mexico to carry out an independent foreign policy decision, on the other hand, served as a practical measure which achieved the primary objective of Washington’s foreign policy – preventing Cuba’s communist agenda from contaminating the rest of the hemisphere. For these reasons, the United States had no reason to retaliate against its neighbor for sustaining relations with Cuba; rather, it had every reason to support its decision. On its own, Mexico fulfilled the guarantees that the United States sought from every other OAS member through the ratification of Venezuela’s resolution. Through the steadfast domination of the PRI, Mexico proved to Washington that it would neither collapse to communism nor stimulate its surge in neighboring countries. In satisfying the principal goal of the United States – the suppression of all communist expansion – prior to the resolution, Mexico did not have to abide by
the course of action that Washington diplomats dictated. This enabled Mexico to retain a higher level of autonomy over its foreign policy than the rest of the OAS member nations. Indeed, as President Johnson expected, when all the chips were down Mexico was on the United States’ side - but this did not occur primarily from a premeditated choice. Ultimately, both Mexico’s trustworthiness and higher degree of international autonomy were unintended side effects of the one party dictatorship built around the PRI’s greed and desire for power.
Notes


4 Ibid.


7 Ibid.

8 Washington did reduce economic and military aid to Mexico from $52,752,000 in 1964 when the OAS vote was in progress to $36,584,000 in 1965 after the vote. While the decrease in aid could have been a way for the United States to signal its discontent for Mexico’s vote against the resolution, it is more likely that the United States adapted the amount of aid it gave to Mexico to its electoral panorama. Now that the elections had ended, the United States likely thought the Mexican government did not need as much money to secure its power. The aid given to Mexico in 1965 is even higher than, the $23,700,000 it received in 1963, the previous nonelection year. The rough comparability of these two amounts, therefore, suggests that the decrease in aid did not serve as a retaliatory measure.


13 Ibid.


18 U.S. Department of State, *Memorandum for the Record*, by Gordon


Swift action mattered now more than ever as the United States worried about the communists “growing up in Mexicali” which according to Assistant Secretary Mann presented “a serious problem for us.” U.S. Department of State, Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Washington D.C.: June 11, 1964), p. 42, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d16.


Mexico’s Cuban Connection


28 Smith, “Mexico since 1946.”


31 Ibid., p. 1


33 Pervasive embezzlement, however, did characterize the Mexican economy at this time. Throughout the implementation of the ISI model, PRI politicians did not hesitate to embezzle from the government’s revenue – whether to pay for political favors or add to their personal wealth. Politicians also regularly exploited their business connections, using their positions of political power to create conditions that would favor the businesses with which they had a personal affiliation in exchange for a larger share of their profits. Source: Smith, “Mexico since 1946,” pp. 325-340.
Mexico’s Cuban Connection


38 Ibid, p. 3.


41 Coatsworth, The Clients and the Colossus, pp. 107,188.

Images (in order of appearance):

National Park Service-US Department of the Interior, Picture Shows Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson (Center), Former U.S. President Harry S. Truman (Left) and the President of Mexico Adolfo López Mateos (Right), in 1959., 1959, National Park Service [1], https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mateos.jpg.
Mexico’s Cuban Connection

Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE, appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt’s leader was a foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander’s empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305 BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states. The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty had to exercise control through all the levels of administration down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them, but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies’ grasp undid their strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level administrators.

PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,] succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore, a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became inevitable.”¹ She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warrior-pharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continual drunkenness.”² These descriptors thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of individuals.

This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity, and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule. It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayd their welcome. Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power. Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state. These claims function, however, only under the assumption that the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion, yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle
was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt. As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time, but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed to obey orders.” The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed, dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in 2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the post-Raphia rebellion].” These interpretations rely on the belief that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed, took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.

Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove
this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians.

PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION

The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement officers as having Egyptian names. These local officers themselves relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the local officer would call upon the local populace to help track down those evading justice and stolen property. This utilization of the local population as the arm of the law under official sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later legal traditions would call a *Posse comitatus*, or in more common parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their law enforcement duties. This broad purview left a substantial portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law upon local administrators’ request, as if the Egyptians refused to assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce
the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies. Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration between the two parties.

The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure, functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the Ptolemites carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations even in 126 BCE. Even the language used at the lowest levels remained Egyptian. In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal appeal. Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition. This continued and expanded under the Ptolemites. Voluminous letters and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemites, the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt relief. Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of command. A tax collector’s Greek assistant received petitions for the release of a criminal. Examples such as these abound in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemites tried to display themselves as just. Despite Polybius’s claim that Ptolemy IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his emphasis on justice and mercy commendable. This concept that the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemites.

Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards
the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied on land and routed the payments though the temples up through the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was kept intact by the Ptolemies.\textsuperscript{16} Tax breaks were granted to soldiers to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of taxes.\textsuperscript{17} The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were exempt from taxes.\textsuperscript{18} Broad swaths of the population faced lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.\textsuperscript{19} Information about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect, did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy, but from the lower levels of administration upwards.\textsuperscript{20} Given the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military by promises of substantial pay.\textsuperscript{21} The ability of the Ptolemies to grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on world-conquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander’s empire as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule. Ptolemy I’s conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not translate his success in battle into further conquests.\textsuperscript{22} Plundering and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered in the Siege of Sardis.\textsuperscript{23} Through plunder, the Ptolemies were able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps the Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at
all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if they wanted to conquer.\textsuperscript{25}

The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine, had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple’s bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{26} This they did through actions, performed in rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.\textsuperscript{27} The temple priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state, also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.\textsuperscript{28} Around 15\% of Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30\% of those directly held priestly offices.\textsuperscript{29} An unknown number of Ptolemaic Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.\textsuperscript{30} Given the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottom-up fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic dynasty.\textsuperscript{31} Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of their occupation.

Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian symbolism and traditions.
Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other attributes more often associated with Greek divinities. Many attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the Egyptians and Greeks. Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians. Among the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity in the Greek and later Roman worlds. This opened up new temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed new temples for him. Through these temples both Greeks and Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single identity.

Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian. The lack of effort on part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly
constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach up. Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge of Greek was limited. Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity. This adoption of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy, where Greek names predominate. While it certainly may be true that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians.

The Ptolemies actively used their founder’s connection with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies. The capture of Alexander’s body by Ptolemy I and its burial in Alexandria can be seen in this light. If the Egyptians could be made to feel as if they were part of Alexander’s empire, then the threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced. Even Ptolemy I’s original claim only to the title of satrap aligns with this reconfiguration of history. Egypt was portrayed as the Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostris, a warrior pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostris myth was “used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after]
a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to buttress their sagging national self-confidence and...national identity.”

The myth is a reversal of Alexander’s conquests and by extension the Ptolemies’, but it emphasizes Egypt as the conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander’s empire, or what remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia. This repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign. By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.

The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt. Seeing the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians. Drawing racial distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian
pharaoh continued. If the Ptolemies had actively racialized the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen. Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves this conundrum.

**EXPLAINING THE FALL**

Despite all these attempts and quite substantial collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious rebellions, this slowly changed. By the time of Ptolemy IV, who reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke out. These rebellions became more common and more difficult to suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on. But these uprisings were closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic policies. When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts. Even the uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of...
Raphia coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations. While the role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity. These and other examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt. The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was littered with similar examples. Yet since these uprisings were a continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.

The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized. Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic dynasty’s ability to exert control when uprisings occurred. Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a weak state they lost their rule.
CONCLUSION

The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers. Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent, but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples, possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness in their reign.
Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration
Notes

2 J. P. Mahaffy, The Empire of the Ptolemies, (London: Macmillian & Co., 1895), 244.
6 Ibid, 57.
7 Ibid, 280.
9 Ibid.
11 Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 1.70.
13 Bauschatz, Law and Enforcement, 191.
15 Polybius, The Histories, 39.7.4-5.
17 Herodotus, The Histories, 2.168.1; “Decrees of King Ptolemy VIII.”
18 Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 1.73.4-7.

22 Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, 19.79.5; Justinus, Epitome, 30.1.7.

23 Herodotus, The Histories, 1.88.

24 Fischer-Bovet, Army and Society, 70.

25 Justinus, Epitome, 30.1.7.

26 Herodotus, The Histories, 2.65.


28 Fisher-Bovet, Army and Society, 301.

29 Ibid, 304.

30 Ibid, 310, 312.


33 Ibid, 392.

34 Ibid, 391.


36 Ibid, 397-8.


38 Hazzard, Imagination of a Monarchy, 87.


40 Janet H. Jackson, “Ptolemaic Bureaucracy from an Egyptian Point of View,” in Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient


46 Herodotus, The Histories, 2.103.


48 Ibid 34.

49 Ibid.

50 Anemi, “Politics of the Ptolemaic Dynasty,” 151.

51 Justinus, Epitome, 27.1.9; Adler, “Governance in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 29.

52 Anemi, “Politics of the Ptolemaic Dynasty,” 166.


54 Ibid; Justinus, Epitome, 27.1.9.

55 Adler, “Governance in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 28; Manning, The Open Sea, 163.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid, 150.

Images (in order of appearance):


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Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration

Anna Lisa Lowenstein

The Vietnam War resulted in a military loss that forced Americans to reassess their notions of nationalism. The pacifist anti-war movement evoked deep emotional responses from both the political right and political left. These responses, compounded by the tense economic and social pressures of the 1960s and 1970s, motivated the left to reject nationalism. In contrast, the right embraced American pride and villainized the anti-war movement. Using documents, news and popular media, and literature from 1962 to 1986, this thesis argues that nationalism was essential in binding together three disparate groups of American conservatives in order to create a political coalition. These groups—the white working class, intellectuals, and far-right extremists—coalesced despite their varying social and economic needs and different visions of nationhood. The result was increased success for Republican politicians and a legitimization of conservatism in the public eye.

The Unity of the Roses: How the Marriage of Henry VII and Elizabeth of York Created the Foundation of the Tudor Political Identity
Lorenza Colagrossi

This thesis examines how Henry VII utilized his marriage to Elizabeth of York to create the foundation of the Tudor political identity. It will focus on the use of visual imagery to create national unity and justify his place on the throne. Henry’s reign was marked by a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, he sought to celebrate his wife’s Yorkist lineage and the legitimacy it
provided for his rule. On the other hand, he wanted to emphasize that he was king in his own right. Through his propaganda and symbolism, a new image of kingship was born. The use of visual imagery to depict Henry extended beyond the crown and into the nobility. Henry ascended to power following a turbulent period of civil war. The conflict left no member of the nobility unscarred. Through visual imagery such as genealogical scrolls and stained-glass windows, they expressed their sentiments about Henry. These images demonstrate how their allegiances during the Wars of the Roses impacted how they saw their new king. This thesis compares and contrasts how Henry VII and his son, Henry VIII, depicted themselves and their reigns. Unlike his father, Henry VIII had a legitimate claim to the throne and did not rely on symbolism and other means to justify his position as king. This important distinction between the two monarchs was reflected in the unique ways they depicted themselves.

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: A Comparative Study of New York City and Philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman

This thesis examines the similarities and differences between the politics of New York City and Philadelphia during the American Civil War. As the war progressed, both cities diverged, with Philadelphia existing throughout politically stable and relatively politically united, while New York City for much of the war was divided and prone to violence and political extremism. The central question of this thesis, therefore, has been why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play a role? My thesis is unique in focusing on how the politics of each city were defined by a conflict over defining loyalty to the Union and the war effort, definitions that evolved as the war progressed. In the end, one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged by one’s religion, partisan identification, or even political allies. It
especially could not be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by the politics of each city.

‘A Warmth of Feeling that the Lies of our Enemies Will Never Eradicate:’ The Battle of Cable Street and the Evolving Memory of Anti-Fascism in Britain, 1931-1949

Sam Orloff

Whereas the function of nostalgia in right-wing politics is readily apparent in contemporary society, nostalgia on the political left is less self-evident. To explore the role of nostalgia in left-wing politics, this thesis considers the evolving memory and meaning of the Battle of Cable Street, a 1936 clash in which anti-fascists descended on the streets of London’s East End to block Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) from provocatively marching through the heavily Jewish district. The events at Cable Street are further contextualized by charting the trajectory of the broader anti-fascist discourse in Britain from the rise of the BUF in the early 1930s to Britain’s postwar reconstruction under Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In doing so, it is also possible to identify the tension between the left-wing internationalism and the demands of domestic politics, as well as the nature of the relationship between Britain’s Labour Party and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in the 1930s and 1940s.