



May 2021

Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration

Alan Clingan

University of Maryland-College Park, baciocco@upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://repository.upenn.edu/phr>

Recommended Citation

Clingan, Alan (2021) "Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration," *Penn History Review*: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: <https://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol28/iss1/6>

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. <https://repository.upenn.edu/phr/vol28/iss1/6>
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

PTOLEMAIC - EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION
AND THE WEAK STATE PROBLEM

*Alan Clingan (University of Maryland -- College
Park)*

Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE, appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt's leader was a foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander's empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305 BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states. The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty had to exercise control through all the levels of administration down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them, but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies' grasp undid their strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level administrators.

PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS

Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,] Succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore, a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became inevitable.”¹ She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warrior-pharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continual drunkenness.”² These descriptors thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of individuals.

This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity, and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule. It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayed their welcome. Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power. Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state. These claims function, however, only under the assumption that the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion, yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle

was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt. As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time, but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed to obey orders.”³ The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed, dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in 2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the post-Raphia rebellion].”⁴ These interpretations rely on the belief that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed, took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.

Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove

this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians.

PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION

The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement officers as having Egyptian names.⁵ These local officers themselves relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the local officer would call upon the local populace to help track down those evading justice and stolen property.⁶ This utilization of the local population as the arm of the law under official sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later legal traditions would call a *Posse comitatus*, or in more common parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their law enforcement duties.⁷ This broad purview left a substantial portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law upon local administrators' request, as if the Egyptians refused to assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce

the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies. Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration between the two parties.

The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure, functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the Ptolemies carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations even in 126 BCE.⁸ Even the language used at the lowest levels remained Egyptian.⁹ In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal appeal.¹⁰ Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition.¹¹ This continued and expanded under the Ptolemies. Voluminous letters and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemies, the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt relief.¹² Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of command.¹³ A tax collector's Greek assistant received petitions for the release of a criminal.¹⁴ Examples such as these abound in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemies tried to display themselves as just. Despite Polybius's claim that Ptolemy IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his emphasis on justice and mercy commendable.¹⁵ This concept that the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemies.

Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards

the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied on land and routed the payments through the temples up through the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was kept intact by the Ptolemies.¹⁶ Tax breaks were granted to soldiers to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of taxes.¹⁷ The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were exempt from taxes.¹⁸ Broad swaths of the population faced lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.¹⁹ Information about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect, did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy, but from the lower levels of administration upwards.²⁰ Given the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military by promises of substantial pay.²¹ The ability of the Ptolemies to grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on world-conquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander's empire as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule. Ptolemy I's conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not translate his success in battle into further conquests.²² Plundering and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered in the Siege of Sardis.²³ Through plunder, the Ptolemies were able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.²⁴ Perhaps the Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at

all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if they wanted to conquer.²⁵

The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine, had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple's bureaucracy.²⁶ This they did through actions, performed in rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.²⁷ The temple priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state, also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.²⁸ Around 15% of Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30% of those directly held priestly offices.²⁹ An unknown number of Ptolemaic Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.³⁰ Given the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottom-up fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic dynasty.³¹ Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of their occupation.



Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian symbolism and traditions.

Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other attributes more often associated with Greek divinities.³² Many attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the Egyptians and Greeks.³³ Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians.³⁴ Among the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity in the Greek and later Roman worlds.³⁵ This opened up new temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed new temples for him.³⁶ Through these temples both Greeks and Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single identity.

Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper reaches of the bureaucracy.³⁷ The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian.³⁸ The lack of effort on part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly

constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach up.³⁹ Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge of Greek was limited.⁴⁰ Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity.⁴¹ This adoption of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy, where Greek names predominate.⁴² While it certainly may be true that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians.

The Ptolemies actively used their founder's connection with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies. The capture of Alexander's body by Ptolemy I and its burial in Alexandria can be seen in this light.⁴³ If the Egyptians could be made to feel as if they were part of Alexander's empire, then the threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced. Even Ptolemy I's original claim only to the title of satrap aligns with this reconfiguration of history.⁴⁴ Egypt was portrayed as the Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostriis, a warrior pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostriis myth was "used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after]

a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to buttress their sagging national self-confidence and...national identity."⁴⁵ The myth is a reversal of Alexander's conquests and by extension the Ptolemies', but it emphasizes Egypt as the conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander's empire, or what remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia.⁴⁶ This repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign. By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.

The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt.⁴⁷ Seeing the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians.⁴⁸ Drawing racial distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian

pharaoh continued.⁴⁹ If the Ptolemies had actively racialized the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen. Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves this conundrum.



A coin of the unlucky Ptolemy IV, a ruler who faced the first of many major uprisings which the Ptolemaic state were unable to suppress.

EXPLAINING THE FALL

Despite all these attempts and quite substantial collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious rebellions, this slowly changed.⁵⁰ By the time of Ptolemy IV, who reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke out.⁵¹ These rebellions became more common and more difficult to suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on.⁵² But these uprisings were closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic policies.⁵³ When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts.⁵⁴ Even the uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of

Raphia coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations.⁵⁵ While the role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity.⁵⁶ These and other examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt. The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was littered with similar examples.⁵⁷ Yet since these uprisings were a continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.

The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized. Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic dynasty's ability to exert control when uprisings occurred. Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a weak state they lost their rule.

CONCLUSION

The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers. Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent, but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples, possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness in their reign.

Notes

- ¹ Monica Omoyw Anemi, "Politics of the Ptolemaic Dynasty," *OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies* 12 (2016): 154.
- ² J. P. Mahaffy, *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, (London: Macmillian & Co., 1895), 244.
- ³ Polybius, *The Histories*, 5.107.1.
- ⁴ Hans Hauben, "Army and Society in Ptolemaic Egypt: From Invasion to Integration," *The Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 53 (2016): 401.
- ⁵ John Bauschatz, *Law and Enforcement in Ptolemaic Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 67.
- ⁶ *Ibid*, 57.
- ⁷ *Ibid*, 280.
- ⁸ "Decrees of King Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, 28th April 118 BCE," *Attalus*, accessed March 25, 2020, trans. by David Lorton, http://www.attalus.org/egypt/ptolemy_viii_decrees.html.
- ⁹ *Ibid*.
- ¹⁰ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 2.109.1-2.109.2.
- ¹¹ Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, 1.70.
- ¹² Zenon, "Zenon Petitions the King," in *The Hellenistic Period Historical Sources in Translation*, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and Peter Derow, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 152.
- ¹³ Bauschatz, *Law and Enforcement*, 191.
- ¹⁴ Epharmostos, "Release on the King's Birthday," in *The Hellenistic Period Historical Sources in Translation*, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and Peter Derow, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 264.
- ¹⁵ Polybius, *The Histories*, 39.7.4-5.
- ¹⁶ J. G. Manning, "Property Rights and Contracting in Ptolemaic Egypt," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 160, no.4 (December 2004): 759.
- ¹⁷ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 2.168.1; "Decrees of King Ptolemy VIII."
- ¹⁸ Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, 1.73.4-7.
- ¹⁹ J. G. Manning, *Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt: The Structure of Land Tenure*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 131.
- ²⁰ Manning, *Land and Power*, 141, 156-157.

- ²¹ Justinus, *Epitome*, 30.1.6.; “Second Philae Decree,” Attalus, accessed March 25, 2020, trans. by L. Török and W. Müller, https://www.attalus.org/docs/other/inscr_260.html.; Christelle Fischer-Bovet, *Army and Society in Ptolemaic Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 54.
- ²² Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, 19.79.5; Justinus, *Epitome*, 30.1.7.
- ²³ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 1.88.
- ²⁴ Fischer-Bovet, *Army and Society*, 70.
- ²⁵ Justinus, *Epitome*, 30.1.7.
- ²⁶ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 2.65.
- ²⁷ “History of the Temple of Horus at Edfu,” Attalus, accessed March 25, 2020, trans. by D. Kurth, http://www.attalus.org/egypt/horus_edfu.html; “The Great Mendes Stela,” Attalus, accessed March 25, 2020, trans. by S. Birch, http://www.attalus.org/egypt/great_mendes_stela.html.
- ²⁸ Fisher-Bovet, *Army and Society*, 301.
- ²⁹ *Ibid*, 304.
- ³⁰ *Ibid*, 310, 312.
- ³¹ R. A. Hazzard, *Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 40.
- ³² Stefan Pfeiffer, “The God Serapis, His Cult and the Beginnings of the Ruler Cult in Ptolemaic Egypt,” in *Ptolemy II Philadelphus and his World*, ed. Paul McKechnie and Philippe Guillaume, (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 391.
- ³³ *Ibid*, 392.
- ³⁴ *Ibid*, 391.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*, 382.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*, 397-8.
- ³⁷ Alan B. Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda in Ptolemaic Egypt,” *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 31, no. 1 (1st Quarter, 1982): 36.
- ³⁸ Hazzard, *Imagination of a Monarchy*, 87.
- ³⁹ “Bilingualism,” in *The Hellenistic Period Historical Sources in Translation*, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and Peter Derow, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 229.
- ⁴⁰ Janet H. Jackson, “Ptolemaic Bureaucracy from an Egyptian Point of View,” in *Organization of Power: Aspects of Bureaucracy in the Ancient*

Near East, eds. McGuire Gibson and Robert D. Briggs, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 126.

⁴¹ James L. O’Neil, “Places and Origin of the Officials of Ptolemaic Egypt,” *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 55, no. 1 (2006): 18; Manning, “Property Rights,” 763.

⁴² Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda,” 36.

⁴³ Arrianus, *Events after Alexander*, 10.1.; Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda,” 48.

⁴⁴ “Decree of the Satrap Ptolemy Lagides,” Attalus, accessed March 25, 2020, trans. by S. M. Drach, <http://www.attalus.org/egypt/lagides.html>.

⁴⁵ Lloyd, “Nationalist Propaganda,” 39.

⁴⁶ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 2.103.

⁴⁷ J. Adler, “Governance in Ptolemaic Egypt: From Raphia to Cleopatra VII (217 - 31 B.C.), Class-Based ‘Colonialism’?,” *Akroterion: Journal for the Classics in South Africa* 50, (2005): 29.

⁴⁸ *Ibid* 34.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

⁵⁰ Anemi, “Politics of the Ptolemaic Dynasty,” 151.

⁵¹ Justinus, *Epitome*, 27.1.9; Adler, “Governance in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 29.

⁵² Anemi, “Politics of the Ptolemaic Dynasty,” 166.

⁵³ J. G. Manning, *The Open Sea: The Economic Life of the Ancient Mediterranean World from the Iron Age to the Rise of Rome*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 162.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*; Justinus, *Epitome*, 27.1.9.

⁵⁵ Adler, “Governance in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 28; Manning, *The Open Sea*, 163.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 150.

Images (in order of appearance):

Aidan McRae Thomson, *Ptolemy before Hathor, Philae*, image, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Ptolemy_before_Hathor%2C_Philae.jpg. Creative Commons Licence.

Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration

Classic Numismatics Group, *Silver tetradrachm, Ptolemy IV Philopator, 221-205 BC*. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/Silver_tetradrachm%2C_Ptolemy_IV_PhilPhilop%2C_221-205_BC.jpg.
Creative Commons License.