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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KING ALFRED THE GREAT AND CEOLWULF II OF MERCIA (874-c.879)

Brent Weisberg, University of Pennsylvania

Introduction

Studying King Ceolwulf II of Mercia presents one with a situation not unlike the one former US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s described concerning American intelligence work in Iraq in 2002: "there are known knowns… there are known unknowns… but there are also unknown unknowns."¹ The "known knowns" of Ceolwulf’s reign are few and far between. All we have to bear witness to the life and legacy of Ceolwulf, the last independent ruler of Mercia, are two charters of his, a few mentions in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle as well as two of its likely derivatives, and several dozen coins.² The few coins we have, particularly examples of Two Emperors type coins from the recent Watlington hoard find, provide material evidence of Ceolwulf’s reign that may be used to corroborate or contravene literary evidence.³ I shall seek to elucidate the history of Ceolwulf that I discern to be most plausible through the lens of his relationships with King Alfred of Wessex and the Vikings. My aim is to identify the shadowy figure of King Ceolwulf II of Mercia from the way he affected his contemporaries in the arena of late-ninth-century power politics.

An overview of the debate in the secondary literature regarding Alfred’s narrative sources is vital because these sources underpin any construction of Ceolwulf’s history. These sources grant a few choice glimpses into Ceolwulf’s reign that neither
documentary nor numismatic sources can transmit. An issue arises from the fact that these sources were almost certainly the work of agents within the kingdom of Ceolwulf’s contemporary, King Alfred of Wessex. As Davis wrote, a central issue the historian faces in working on the period of Alfred’s reign (871-99) is "the possibility that almost all the sources may have originated with either Alfred himself or his immediate entourage." By contrast, we have no equivalent narrative records from Ceolwulf’s kingdom to give us more direct insight into the Mercian king’s actions or attitudes toward either Alfred or the Vikings. This lack of sources forces us to examine the narrative of Ceolwulf’s reign through West Saxon eyes. We must attempt to determine the purposes behind the creation of the Chronicle and Asser’s Life for further discussion of the sources’ entries concerning Ceolwulf. A discussion of Æthelweard’s motivation for creating his own version of the Chronicle and the attempt to translate the Old English original into a Latin version about a century after the former’s publication would probably merit its own dissertation, but this will instead be touched on briefly in a subsequent section.

Davis, Whitelock, and Keynes espoused different views regarding the origins and purposes of the Alfredian narrative sources. I find a combination of Whitelock and Keynes’ arguments most convincing regarding the possible origins and purposes of the Chronicle and its derivatives. Davis wrote that Alfred probably had a direct hand in the production of the Chronicle and intended it to serve a propagandist purpose. He suggested that we should view Alfred’s narrative sources as items full of exaggerations of accomplishments and omissions of blunders toward a goal of inflating Alfred’s triumphs and mitigating his disasters. He argued that Alfred’s concurrent efforts to convince his contemporaries to work on his kingdom-wide projects of building fortresses and improving learning underscores this explanation’s probability. The upshot of this interpretation for the study of Ceolwulf would be to treat all mention of the
Mercian king with the utmost scepticism on the grounds that his own story may have been refashioned to fit the narrative Alfred sought to push. Toward a more holistic view in considering the Alfredian narrative sources’ origins, Whitelock countered Davis by arguing that the works served broader purposes more suited to their genre. After all, Alfred would have had other means, like the coins that proclaim his control of London, to issue propagandist messages. Whitelock further argued based on her assumption of the Chronicle’s intended audience that it would have been impractical for the compilers to introduce misleading content. She questioned how much Alfred "could get away with" when the work’s audience, the literate ecclesiastics and nobles of Alfred’s era of learning, would have lived through the events themselves. She also argued that there were significant grounds to believe the sources originated from Alfred’s court but differed from Davis in denying Alfred’s direct involvement. Thus, Whitelock argued, Alfred should be viewed not as "Alfred ‘the propagandist’" but rather as "Alfred veredicus ‘truth-teller’—an epithet given him by Asser, who knew him." Combined with Keynes’ argument that the Chronicle was possibly intended to promote a pan-Anglo-Saxon identity among the people under Alfred’s (as opposed to Danish) control in the 890s, Whitelock’s view of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle allows an interpretation of its contents as they relate to Ceolwulf as largely faithful to reality. If we believe that the work was composed in Alfred’s court and intended for a literate audience of Alfred’s officials, it appears too probable that they would have balked at outright falsehoods, at least barring negative characterisations of their perceived enemies in ways that would have accommodated willing suspension of disbelief. In summary, the view of the Alfredian narrative sources that I will use in this paper is that Alfred probably commissioned the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the work on which Æthelweard’s Chronicle and Asser’s Life are based, to be crafted by scholars in his court toward a goal of a unified narrative whose scope encompassed the newly conceived Anglo-Saxon kingdom. I also will argue
a case describing Ceolwulf’s relationships with Alfred and the Vikings from the standpoint that the contents of the *Chronicle* and its derivatives probably complied with their contemporary audience’s memory, even if they feature selective inclusion and omission as well as misleading characterizations such as reference to Ceolwulf as "a foolish king’s thegn."¹⁰

The secondary literature discussion of Ceolwulf’s reign itself locates mainly in the work of Haslam, Blackburn, and Keynes. Keynes provided a balanced and even set of arguments, and I use his findings in my analysis of the relationship between Ceolwulf and Alfred as well as between Ceolwulf and the Vikings. However, Keynes did not touch directly on the relationship between Ceolwulf and the Vikings. My use of Keynes will be modified by insights drawn from the recently discovered Watlington hoard, which fills in gaps in the corpus of numismatic evidence from the period and possibly supports his suspicions regarding the *Two Emperors* type coinage.¹¹ Blackburn provided a view of the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf through coinage, and his conclusions have been in part controverted by the Watlington hoard discovery, which has significantly augmented the corpus of coins from the period.¹² In modifying the numismatic conclusions both scholars make, I will pay particular attention to the expanded corpus of *Two Emperors* type coins. Writing after Keynes, Haslam built a detailed model of Ceolwulf’s reign through analysis of the events of the years 874-86. The primary sources it rested on, however, do not provide sufficient grounds to construct a sequence of events with as much conviction as Haslam did. The bottom line is that Haslam’s argument is too self-reinforcing and lacks enough convergently supportive sources to deem his chronology more than a possible sequence of events within the multiplicity of such sequences one could construct.¹³
Ceolwulf and Alfred

Given the nature of available sources regarding Ceolwulf, I shall present his relationship with Alfred as it evolved from c.874 to c.879 according to the three points of rupture that I have identified. Documentary and numismatic evidence shall serve to augment, temper, or link the accounts given by the *Chronicle* and its derivatives. The first point of rupture in the period was the Vikings’ 874 elevation of Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the second was the 877 division of Mercia between the Vikings and Ceolwulf, and the third was the battle of Edington and Ceolwulf’s subsequent disappearance from the historical record. I argue that there are grounds to consider the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf as one at least of somewhat positive relations in the period between c.874 and c.877 but that the relationship altered decisively in 877 as the sharing of Mercia forced Ceolwulf to affirm his role as a partner to the Vikings. Furthermore, I argue that there is insufficient information to determine Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship in the aftermath of the battle of Edington.

At first glance, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* and its derivatives’ characterisation of Ceolwulf suggests a consistently negative relationship between the two kings. However, viewed
alongside numismatic and documentary evidence, as well as the assumption that the sources' attestations of Ceolwulf's actions are consistent with reality, these sources suggest a dynamic relationship that possibly began as a somewhat positive one. The *Chronicle’s* 874 entry described Ceolwulf's appointment to the kingdom of the Mercians through an agreement with the Vikings and called him "a foolish king's thegn," giving the impression that Ceolwulf was beholden to his Viking superiors and ruled merely with their consent. However, documentary sources suggest that Alfred viewed him as a contemporary ruler while Ceolwulf was in power. To explain these conflicting views, one must examine the *Chronicle* in the context of the 890s, where the work appears to portray the events of the 870s through the lens of Alfred's goals and ambitions in the former decade. Pratt argued that Alfred's treatment of Ceolwulf in the *Chronicle* reflects Alfred's intention of furthering his projects of enhancing learning among his officials and constructing fortifications across his kingdom. Pratt pointed to Alfred's literary contributions in the form of his preface to St Gregory's *Pastoral Care*, among other works, to suggest that the 890s were a time in which the West Saxon king created "a distinctive Alfredian language of wealth and wisdom," in which Alfred engaged in a kind of "performance" as a king in the moulds of Solomon and the ideal ruler as described by St Gregory. Pratt argued that Ceolwulf, a king who had failed to secure a lasting rule, possibly made an effective foil within Alfred's new discourse "portraying wisdom as the sole criterion for office-holding." In addition, establishing Ceolwulf as an unqualified ruler who lost his throne as a result of his lack of wisdom may have reinforced the idea that Alfred's officials owed their positions of power to their connection to the projects of Alfred, from whom wealth and wisdom flowed. Pratt pointed to Asser's account of the king's offer of "a stark choice between loss of office and more attentive study" as a prime example of Alfred's possible use of a "language of wealth and wisdom" to shape his kingdom according to the Solomonic and Gregorian
archetypes. Additionally, Keynes wrote that the *Chronicle*’s denigration of Ceolwulf was probably designed to appease Ceolwulf’s successor, Ealdorman Æthelred, whom it is perhaps unlikely Ceolwulf was related to. Therefore, there are significant grounds to view the *Chronicle*’s characterization of Ceolwulf as a retroactive assessment of the Mercian king’s legacy to suit Alfredian purposes. This possible effort to smear Ceolwulf amid the political realities of the 890s, however, does not eliminate the possibility that the actions that the *Chronicle* ascribes Ceolwulf themselves had a basis in actual political developments.

The addition of documentary and numismatic sources provides a clearer picture of Ceolwulf’s reign and may help to put the contents of the *Chronicle* and its derivatives into perspective. The few charters that survive from Ceolwulf’s reign augment the narrative sources in a meaningful way by granting choice glances into how Ceolwulf probably chose to portray himself and his rule to his subjects and contemporaries. An 875 charter, where Ceolwulf absolved the diocese of Worcester "from feeding the king’s horses and those who lead them" made no mention of King Alfred nor the Vikings in its witness list. Additionally, Ceolwulf referred to himself as "king of the Mercians" in the body of the charter as well as at the top of the witness list. These aspects of the charter suggest that Ceolwulf presented himself as a king in his own right and did not acknowledge requirement on his part of Viking permission to grant land and privileges. In other Anglo-Saxon charters, non-kings who wished to grant land or privileges had to do so with the express permission of the king. Additionally, as Blackburn pointed out, this charter’s witness list includes many of the same bishops and temporal office-holders of western Mercia who had attested the charters of Ceolwulf’s predecessor, King Burgred of Mercia. This apparent continuity in office-holders’ support from Burgred to Ceolwulf makes it appear likely that Ceolwulf’s contemporaries, notably Alfred, viewed Ceolwulf as a king in his own right in the wake of his accession to the Mercian throne.
Numismatic evidence that probably dates from the period after Ceolwulf’s 874 accession and before his sharing of Mercia with the Vikings in 877 suggests that he enjoyed at least neutral and possibly friendly relations with Alfred in this period. Whereas Blackburn and Keynes argued that the available numismatic evidence supported the view that London recognized Alfred as its ruler in the first few years after King Burgred’s deposition and Ceolwulf’s ascension, new evidence from the Watlington hoard suggests Alfred and Ceolwulf jointly issued coinage like the *Two Emperors* type earlier than previously estimated. By extension, the nature of Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship in this first period possibly developed toward one of neutrality or at least some kind of cooperation earlier than previously considered. Precisely dating the coin types involved in this analysis is impossible, but it is possible to estimate when each type was issued. The *Lunettes* type, which Alfred issued jointly with King Burgred through the London mint, was probably discontinued shortly after Burgred’s deposition, as Blackburn suggested. He also pointed to the corpus of *Cross-and-Lozenge* type coins as indicative of a possible shift in the control of London from Alfred to Ceolwulf around the 877 sharing of Mercia. The progression of styles in the corpus of *Cross-and-Lozenge* types that he had access to, he argued, suggested that the same moneyers struck coins for Alfred and then Ceolwulf but did not do so concurrently. Additionally, Blackburn dated the restoration of fineness observed in the *Cross-and-Lozenge* type to c.875-6 because, without hindsight, it appeared "between 875 and 877… the Danes had been bought off and Alfred might reasonably have thought that his worst troubles were behind him." For his part, Blackburn did not make a case for the political implications of the *Two Emperors* type. The first portion of Blackburn’s argument, that the *Cross-and-Lozenge* type may indicate that London was in Alfred’s sole possession until c.877, does not hold up in the light of newer Watlington hoard evidence that increases the corpus of *Two Emperors* type coins from just two examples to fifteen. The discovery of these coins
allows for ascribing the kind of importance neither Keynes nor Blackburn dared grant the two coins that they were aware of. This coinage type predates the *Cross-and-Lozenge* type because it is of a lesser fineness than the rebased *Cross-and-Lozenge* type and, like the rebased type, features each king on separate coins from the same London moneyers.\(^{28}\) Here I agree with Blackburn’s argument that it is possible that Alfred’s rebasement of the coinage happened c.875-6 during what may have appeared to the West Saxons as a period of long respite from Viking attack.\(^{29}\) Keynes agreed, again with only the two then-known examples of the *Two Emperors* type to go on, with the more conservative period of c.875-c.878.\(^{30}\) This possible date of rebasement would then place the *Two Emperors* type in the period between the c.874 deposition of Burgred and the c.875-6 issuance of the first *Cross-and-Lozenge* type coins. Thus, it is possible that Alfred shared control of London with Ceolwulf until at least c.875-6. The picture of the period c.874 to c.877 that the current numismatic evidence appears to point to is that the monetary union that almost certainly existed between Alfred and Burgred, evidenced in the *Lunettes* type, continued in the form of the *Two Emperors* and *Cross-and-Lozenge* types once Ceolwulf was secure enough in his position as king of Mercia to exert influence over London’s moneyers. This union was probably strong to implement a reform as large as the rebasement of the joint coinage type in the form of the *Cross-and-Lozenge* type, suggesting a certain level of accommodation and cooperation between the two kings in the period. The nature of the two kings’ working relationship in this period may have been one of a greater and lesser partner, as Keynes suggested, pointing to coins from the types the kings jointly minted on which Alfred is styled "rex A" and "rex S M," which Keynes argued should be interpreted as "rex A(nglorum)" and "rex S(axonum et) M(erciorum)."\(^{31}\) These suggestions are compelling, and it does appear possible that the kings at least nominally observed a relationship that portrayed Alfred as the superior partner and Ceolwulf the inferior partner.
Narrative and numismatic evidence provide grounds to support the view that the aftermath of the 877 peace at Exeter and the ensuing sharing of Mercia led to a realignment in the political structure of southern England and, consequently, represented an inflection point in Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship. The 877 sharing of Mercia between Ceolwulf and the Vikings may have entailed a change in Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship in that the Viking demand to divide the kingdom probably forced Ceolwulf to pick a side between Alfred and his Danish overlords. This side-selection may be reflected in numismatic evidence that points to the possibility that Ceolwulf was the sole ruler of London, having excluded Alfred, after 877 and at least up to the battle of Edington. For his part, Ceolwulf may have felt he had no choice, as the 874 entry in the *Chronicle* relates: when the Vikings elevated Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the new king "swore oaths to them and gave hostages, that [the kingdom] should be ready for them on whatever day they wished to have it, and he would be ready, himself and all who would follow him, at the enemy’s service."32

The Alfred-Guthrum treaty, which Keynes estimated to c.880-90, after Ceolwulf’s potential 879 demise and before Guthrum’s death in 890, may provide indirect evidence of the aftermath of the 877 sharing of Mercia.33 That is, the terms of the treaty dividing southern England between Alfred and Guthrum’s Vikings roughly cut Mercia in half, granting to Guthrum the territory the Vikings probably settled in 877 and granting to Alfred the territory Ceolwulf probably had retained from 877 onward.34 Taking together the terms of the treaty and the 877 Chronicle entry points to a separation of Mercia into two discrete parts: one in the southwest including London ruled by Ceolwulf and one in the northeast ruled by the Vikings. Æthelweard’s account of 877 may provide insight into why Ceolwulf chose to go along with the Vikings in the sharing of Mercia and exclusion of Alfred from London. He reported that the Vikings
"ravaged the kingdom of the Mercians" in 877. The Vikings possibly conducted this ravaging of Ceolwulf’s lands to maintain overlordship over the king in the aftermath of a series of Viking reverses at Alfred’s hands over the course of 876 and 877. The possibility that Æthelweard may have conflated Viking ravaging, or mistaken ravaging in Mercia with Viking ravaging elsewhere should be dismissed. Æthelweard almost certainly had access to sources that we do not have the privilege of interacting with today, wrote just a generation or two beyond the reach of living memory of the events of Ceolwulf’s reign, and created his own Chronicle as a scholarly exercise to translate the original Anglo-Saxon Chronicle into Latin. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that he would have embellished the truth about the events of 877. However, Æthelweard’s placement of the single instance of land-sharing in his Chronicle in 875 was probably a chronological mistake. It is likely that the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, with its own singular instance of Viking land-sharing during Ceolwulf’s reign, is more consistent with reality. Thus, there are grounds to conclude that Ceolwulf sided with the Vikings in 877 and exerted power over London to Alfred’s exclusion. Here, the second part of Blackburn’s chronology is compatible with the Cross-and-Lozenge evidence: stylistic analysis of the two kings’ coinage of this type, led him to conclude that the perceived latest examples in the collection, feature only Ceolwulf. Therefore, he argued, there are grounds to conclude that a political shift occurred in the late 870s that led to London’s moneyers’ no longer minting coins for Alfred. This conclusion also corroborates my argument that Ceolwulf chose in c.877 (or rather was coerced into choosing) a side in the ongoing confrontation between Alfred and the Vikings because, if the relationship between the two kings soured, their monetary union, particularly their sharing of London moneyers, would have become untenable. Unfortunately, Watlington hoard evidence cannot yet be used to modify this conclusion, as similar stylistic analysis of the much-expanded corpus of Cross-and-Lozenge type coins is required.
The battle of Edington and its aftermath represent the opaquest point of rupture in Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship. There is no mention of Ceolwulf in literary sources after this date; we can only conjecture based on evidence from coinage and conclusions concerning Ceolwulf’s trajectory up to this point. Coinage evidence is difficult to pin down. The Watlington hoard may be dated, as Williams and Naylor do, to c.879-80 based on the presence of a single coin of the *Two-Line* type which itself was probably first issued c.879-80—and a lack of later coins in the hoard. Even if this date of deposition is accurate, it is unknown why the hoard’s contents were deposited and by whom. The method of basing conclusions on what may have happened in the years before Edington is decidedly unsatisfactory because the late ninth century was a time in which all manner of misfortune might befall a ruler. As Asser described, King Alfred was himself wracked from the day of his wedding with a strange and painful illness. Moreover, there is no record of Ceolwulf’s age or health during his reign, and his sudden departure from the historical record may conceivably reflect a development beyond the agency of Alfred or the Vikings.

The above analysis entails a summary of the sequence of developments in the relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf from c. 874 to c. 879. Based on numismatic evidence in the form of the *Two Emperors* type, Ceolwulf probably managed to consolidate power in 874 in the aftermath of Burgred’s deposition and his own accession to the Mercian throne to reassert a significant degree of control over London, which he probably shared to some extent with King Alfred. Ceolwulf was most likely recognized as a king by most people from c.874 to c.877, as Ceolwulf’s surviving charters seem to demonstrate, particularly the 875 charter for the diocese of Worcester. It is difficult to argue that this recognition of Ceolwulf as a king in his own right continued after 877, when, based on the *Chronicle*’s 877 entry, the Vikings probably forced him to divide the kingdom of Mercia between themselves. Numismatic evidence suggests
that Ceolwulf ruled London to Alfred’s exclusion after 877 while continuing to style himself as king of Mercia on the coinage he issued.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, there are grounds to conclude that Alfred and Ceolwulf enjoyed somewhat positive relations as superior and inferior rulers, respectively, while they jointly issued coins in London up to the 877 sharing of Mercia. After the sharing, however, when Ceolwulf established himself as the sole ruler of London, it appears this monetary union, and possibly any sense of goodwill that existed between them, had ended. Finally, what transpired between the two kings following the battle of Edington is at present impossible to establish, as insufficient evidence exists regarding Ceolwulf from c.877-80.

The argument that I have posited, that there are grounds to believe Ceolwulf’s neighbours recognized him as a king prior to the 877 sharing of Mercia, aligns with Keynes’s conclusion that Alfred and Ceolwulf enjoyed "mutual (if unequal) respect as rulers of ‘English’ England" in the mid-870s.\textsuperscript{46} Keynes reached this conclusion mainly based on the Cross-and-Lozenge type coins available to him, though his inferences based on the two Two Emperors coins available to him were probably accurate.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, as evidenced by the number of Two Emperors coins in the Watlington hoard, the two kings probably jointly issued the type until c.875-6, when they also issued the rebased Cross-and-Lozenge coinage. This joint production probably continued until 877, the year Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s exclusion and became the sole issuer of Cross-and-Lozenge coins.\textsuperscript{48} The conclusions Blackburn drew from his stylistic analysis of Cross-and-Lozenge coins inform my own conclusions regarding Ceolwulf’s 877 alignment with the Vikings. However, my pre-877 chronology, which argues for a relationship between Alfred and Ceolwulf in this period that was possibly characterized by cooperation, opposes the first part of Blackburn’s own chronology.\textsuperscript{49} Based on pre-Watlington numismatic evidence, he concluded that London was under Alfred’s sole control from Ceolwulf’s 874 accession until 877, when Ceolwulf assumed
control of the city with Viking help. I argue that Blackburn was mistaken about the kings’ relationship in this period because he largely disregarded both Two Emperors coins of which he was aware and based his findings on the Cross-and-Lozenge type coins to which he had access. However, I find the second part of Blackburn’s chronology convincing: that the Cross-and-Lozenge evidence points to a shift in the control of London toward Ceolwulf as the sole ruler of the city following Alfred’s 876-7 confrontation with the Vikings. I argue that the 877 treaty of Exeter and subsequent sharing of Mercia probably precipitated this shift, although knowing whether Ceolwulf excluded Alfred from London for reasons germane to his own exercise of power or that he did so at the behest of the Vikings is impossible.

My conclusions contradict Haslam’s model for Ceolwulf’s reign. As stated above, I find Haslam’s comprehensive view of Ceolwulf’s reign inappropriate given the available sources. For example, I diverge from Haslam in my analysis of Alfred and Ceolwulf’s relationship after the 877 sharing of Mercia. Haslam offered a detailed sequence of events in which Ceolwulf’s alignment to Viking interests and disregard for those of Alfred facilitated a Viking occupation of London as part of a broader Viking settlement of Mercia that supposedly began in c. 875 and continued through 877. Haslam’s claim that Viking sharings occurred in both 875 and 877 rests solely on an interpretation of Æthelweard’s Chronicle and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s individual accounts of sharing as two separate instances of land allotment. As argued above, these supposedly separate
accounts probably describe the same sharing event. Æthelweard was probably mistaken regarding the sharing’s placement within the grander chronology of events, so it appears unlikely that the Vikings engaged in the two-part sharing which Haslam argues.

Similarly, Nelson’s argument that the West Saxons and Mercians possibly cooperated at the battle of Edington does not depend on enough information to be convincing. She bases her conclusion on a charter from Edward the Elder’s reign that references the forfeiture of land by a West Saxon ealdorman, Wulfhere, in which "all the councillors of the [West Saxons] and of the Mercians" judged him guilty for desertion. Whitelock attests this charter’s genuineness but adds that it is contained in only one cartulary. Nelson argues that the "obvious explanation is that a West Saxon/Mercian alliance held good… surely, in 878" based on a reading of the post-Exeter events of 877, namely the sharing of Mercia, as developments to the expense of Ceolwulf’s position resulting from his "alliance" with Alfred. This argument, including the notion that in 878 Ceolwulf was still Alfred’s ally, elides the fact that Ceolwulf appears to have excluded Alfred from London after 877. Moreover, it seems unlikely Ceolwulf would have turned against the Vikings had they retained hostages from c.874 that Ceolwulf would not have been willing to part with—on top of the oaths he had made to the Vikings and which, if we are to judge the charter Nelson cites as authentic, Ceolwulf’s contemporaries took very seriously.

Ceolwulf and the Vikings

I aim to describe Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings along the three points of rupture I identified as the 874 accession of Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne, the 877 sharing of Mercia, and the 878 battle of Edington. The challenge that arises in this endeavour is that accounts of interactions between Ceolwulf and the Vikings are entirely contained in sources that probably originated in Alfred’s court. Once again, the issue of
the retrospective nature of Alfred’s sources must be considered, as should Pratt’s addition that the Alfredian milieu that probably composed the sources was itself inimical to positive portrayals of Ceolwulf.\textsuperscript{57} It is important also to remember that the \textit{Chronicle} and its derivatives mention Ceolwulf in conjunction only with the 874 and 877 points of rupture that I have identified and not with the 878 battle of Edington nor the events that followed.

Both the \textit{Chronicle} and Asser’s \textit{Life} describe Ceolwulf’s nomination as Mercian king by the same Vikings who evicted King Burgred. Each source describes the supposed terms of Ceolwulf’s oath to the Vikings; Asser wrote, “[Ceolwulf] gave hostages to them under the terms of this arrangement, and he swore that in no way would he wish to countermand their intentions, but would be obedient in all respects.”\textsuperscript{58} The \textit{Chronicle} adds that Ceolwulf also swore to hand over as much of Mercia as the Vikings wished whenever they wished, suggesting that the new king was a puppet of his Viking overlords.\textsuperscript{59} This view of Ceolwulf is softened somewhat by the king’s 875 charter discussed above as well as Æthelweard’s account of 874.\textsuperscript{60} As stated above, I have interpreted this charter’s lack of Viking and West Saxon witnesses as a sign that Ceolwulf’s contemporaries in southern England possibly viewed him as a fellow, if inferior, ruler. That Ceolwulf felt confident providing rights in perpetuity to entities such as the diocese of Worcester suggests he did not consider it likely that his Viking overlords would ask him to give them his entire kingdom at a moment’s notice. A regnal list from Worcester that Keynes highlighted and that allotted Ceolwulf a five-year reign (874-9) opens the possibility that Ceolwulf may have owed his legitimacy to more than the Vikings’ support.\textsuperscript{61} Instead, as Abels has suggested, Ceolwulf may have been a member of the same dynasty as the first king of his name, Ceolwulf I (821-3) and his predecessor Cenwulf (796-821).\textsuperscript{62} Thus, Ceolwulf may have been more than a pliant noble whom the Vikings elevated. Consequently, there are grounds to view Ceolwulf’s elevation as a continuation of established royal norms with the probable
precedent-breaking additions that the Vikings presided in large part over his accession and secured his loyalty through the taking of hostages and the swearing of certain oaths.

For his part, Æthelweard makes no mention of oaths by Ceolwulf. All he says about the king in his translation of a lost version of the original *Chronicle* is that "At that time [in 874 following Burgred’s departure] Ceolwulf held the kingdom of the Mercians." Moreover, it is useful to reiterate my stance that Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ 875 sharing of "the kingdom for themselves into two shares" did not, as Haslam argued, possibly indicate a sharing of Mercia itself but rather was a mistaken attribution of the event to 875 instead of 877. Æthelweard’s account therefore did not claim that Ceolwulf made agreements with the Vikings involving oaths or hostages to secure the Mercian throne. I advocate for a middle path concerning these oaths and hostages between the extremes of Æthelweard on the one hand and the *Chronicle* and Asser on the other: Ceolwulf did perhaps owe his position to the Vikings in some way, though his agreement with them was not as extensive as Asser and the *Chronicle* made it appear. The possible shifts in the control of London around 877 that Blackburn observed in the corpus of *Cross-and-Lozenge* type coinage from c.875-c.878 may indicate some aspects of Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings around 877. As I have said, the possible cessation of production of Alfred’s *Cross-and-Lozenge* coinage points to the possibility that, after the 877 sharing of Mercia, Ceolwulf had to choose a side in the confrontation between Alfred and the Vikings. He chose the Vikings to whom he apparently owed his throne, who possibly threatened and/or carried out violence against his eventual share of the kingdom, and who probably still held hostages of his.

Additionally, Æthelweard’s account of 877 in Mercia provides grounds that the Vikings did not enjoy the full authority over Mercian lands which the *Chronicle* claims Ceolwulf had sworn to them in 874. It also bolsters the case that Ceolwulf
viewed himself and was viewed by his contemporaries as a king in his own right.Æthelweard’s description of the Vikings’ ravaging Mercia in 877 may be interpreted as follows: after having agreed to a treaty at Exeter with Alfred, the Vikings were forced to leave empty-handed, and the army’s leaders needed some way to appease their probably disgruntled followers. Appeasement in the form of Mercian land may have been the next logical step for the Viking leadership, though some coercion was required to convince Ceolwulf to hand over the north-eastern half of his domain. The results of this coercion in the form of "ravag[ing] the kingdom of the Mercians" would have probably been movable wealth in the hands of the Viking rank-and-file, the promise of Mercian tribute, and an agreement providing for the Vikings’ settlement of north-eastern Mercia. Moreover, Ceolwulf would probably have been left in a weakened position following the Viking ravaging, making his possible decision to become an accessory to further Viking operations a pragmatic one. This scenario represents a useful construction of a possible sequence of events because it shows how the rupture of 877 may have taken place without the Vikings’ initially having installed Ceolwulf as a plenipotentiary who served at their whim. Instead, Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings and away from Alfred while ceding the north-eastern half of his kingdom to the Vikings. At any rate, the combination of primary sources points to c.877 as a time when Ceolwulf began to act more to the benefit of Viking interests and to the exclusion of Alfred’s.

Because Ceolwulf is not mentioned in written sources following the 877 sharing of Mercia, it is impossible to convincingly discuss the Mercian king’s relationship with the Vikings after the battle of Edington, the third point of rupture in this period. Any number of misfortunes may have befallen Ceolwulf after the 877 sharing of his kingdom. The appearance of a Viking army in 879 at Fulham, the city upriver of London that Ceolwulf possibly continued to hold up to around the battle of Edington, provides grounds to consider the possibility
that Ceolwulf was no longer in control of London and, by extension, no longer ruled Mercia.\textsuperscript{71} Then again, there is also the possibility that this army sought to work in concert with the Viking army that had lately been defeated. Thus, Ceolwulf, an ally of the Vikings-at-large, allowed the Fulham army to travel safely upriver of London. It also seems possible that the Fulham army and the incumbent Vikings whom Alfred had defeated were hostile because the \textit{Chronicle} reports that the latter’s 880 movement to settle East Anglia coincided with the former’s departure for Francia.\textsuperscript{72} Keynes suggests that the incumbent Vikings’ encampment for a year at Cirencester may have had something to do with Ceolwulf’s "apparent demise" c.879.\textsuperscript{73}

Williams and Naylor concur, arguing that the deposition of the Watlington hoard was probably connected to Viking ravaging conducted while based at Cirencester.\textsuperscript{74} However, to conclude that the Vikings, to whom Ceolwulf had sworn oaths and who may have still held hostages from him, liquidated their possible ally after losing to Alfred means deriving a significant conclusion from the narrative sources’ silence. Moreover, the scholars’ assumption that the Vikings deposited the Watlington hoard is one that should not be considered as firmly as the authors present it.\textsuperscript{75} Again, the hoard might well have been left by locals.
who wished to protect their possessions from nearby raiders for a variety of reasons; soldiers, even ones with friendly leaders, are still capable of stealing from the locals, a fact that may not have been lost on said locals. As unsatisfactory as it sounds, there simply does not appear to be enough evidence to piece together a coherent narrative following the battle of Edington or in locating the causes of Ceolwulf’s departure from the scene.

In summary, the nature of Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings around the three points of rupture I have identified possibly proceeded in a way that accorded with the development of his relationship with King Alfred. That is, there are grounds to conclude that, in 874, the Vikings helped elevate Ceolwulf to the Mercian throne and established him as a supporter of theirs by taking hostages and having the new king swear oaths. The nature of these oaths and hostages is difficult to ascertain because of discrepancies between the narrative sources, which either detail in full the kinds of oaths that Ceolwulf may have made along with the importance of the hostages—or fail to mention anything of the sort. A compromise between the narrative sources’ accounts and surviving documentary sources in the form of an 875 charter points to the possibility that from c.874 to c.877, Ceolwulf’s peers in southern England probably viewed him as a ruler of equivalent standing. Furthermore, the 877 sharing of Mercia possibly signals a new order in southern England in which Ceolwulf aligned with the Vikings to Alfred’s exclusion. The possible cessation of Alfred’s minting in London suggests that Ceolwulf assumed sole control of the city in connection to his alignment with the Vikings. The root of this possible decision is difficult to parse from the lack of consensus among the Chronicle and its derivatives, which either state that the Viking devastation of Mercia took place in the same year as the sharing of the kingdom or make no mention whatsoever of such violence. Numismatic evidence and some compromise among the Chronicle and its derivatives do appear to be convincing that Ceolwulf possibly assumed sole control of London c.877,
signalling a turn toward the Vikings and away from the West Saxon king. As for the nature of Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings in the aftermath of their loss at the battle of Edington, nothing can be said with certainty. The 879 context of southern England in which the Fulham army and the incumbent Vikings camped astride an ascendant Wessex is too vague to determine the motivations of the parties involved and the ways in which they affected Ceolwulf.

Secondary literature makes little mention of Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings except for the suggestion by some that the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester contributed to Ceolwulf’s downfall. For its part, the Chronicle reports that, after making peace with Alfred in 878, Guthrum’s army travelled to Cirencester, where it stayed a year before leaving for East Anglia. Williams and Naylor argue that perhaps the deposition of the Watlington hoard coincided with the move to East Anglia and further argue the hoard is of Viking origin, implying that the hoard probably represents a part of the Vikings’ loot from conflict with Ceolwulf during the stay at Cirencester. It is perhaps more likely, however, that locals instead deposited this hoard. Moreover, there is little ground to support the authors’ conclusion that Guthrum’s yearlong 879 stay at Cirencester "must have been devastating for Ceolwulf’s position" because we know almost nothing about the political context of southwestern Mercia by the time of the battle of Edington, much less over a year later. The simultaneous presence of another Viking army upriver of London at Fulham suggests that Ceolwulf was either in dire straits, receiving friendly Viking reinforcements, or perhaps out of the picture. Therefore, the authors’ conclusions regarding the Vikings’ 879 stay at Cirencester need not be considered likely.

My assessment of Ceolwulf’s status among Alfred and the Vikings as a fellow ruler of southern England between c.874 and c.877 agrees with Nelson’s conclusion that Ceolwulf was "far more than the mere Danish puppet-ruler implied by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle." However, my conclusions regarding the state
of Ceolwulf’s relationship with the Vikings diverge from her argument that Ceolwulf and the Mercians over whom he ruled by 878 possibly fought alongside Alfred against the Vikings. Nelson based this argument on a 901 charter from Edward the Elder’s reign that references a council at which both West Saxon and Mercian officials witnessed the official forfeiture of a certain Wulfhere’s land. Even if one ignores the probable nature of Ceolwulf’s accession to the Mercian throne as at least under Viking auspices, it does not appear possible that the Mercian king restored the "West Saxon/Mercian alliance." It appears instead that his reasons for siding with the Vikings in c.877 probably included the oaths that he had sworn to them, the hostages of his they held, and their ravaging of his land. This last point had possibly left him too weak to continue ruling without allying with one of his more powerful neighbours. That Ceolwulf appears to have excluded Alfred from London as a possible consequence of the sharing of Mercia indicates that he probably picked the Viking side in 877. Furthermore, since Ceolwulf received negative treatment in the Chronicle, a source probably created in Alfred’s court based on Whitelock and Keynes’ conclusions, it does not appear at all likely that Ceolwulf disappeared from historical view c. 879 as a friend of the West Saxons. Additionally, I agree with Whitelock that the Chronicle’s intended audience probably would have been aware of the events of the 870s. This audience would thus have been surprised beyond the bounds of their willing suspension of disbelief to see Ceolwulf maligned as a "foolish king’s thegn" had he not turned his back in 877 on any friendly agreements he may have had with Alfred.

My model of Ceolwulf’s reign contradicts Haslam’s far more intricate model of the fate of London during the period. Haslam argues that there are significant grounds to conclude that the Vikings occupied London after the 877 sharing of Mercia. He argues based on a reading of Æthelweard’s 875 account of the sharing of the Viking kingdom to explain Blackburn’s finding that London’s moneyers ceased to produce coins for
Alfred after 877. Haslam builds this case on assumptions that do not stand on solid ground. Haslam considers Æthelweard’s 875 sharing a separate event from the Chronicle’s 877 sharing, an assumption I argue above should be replaced by considering the supposedly dual sharings as a single event. I argue that the discrepancy of dating between the sources can probably be chalked up to a chronological mistake by Æthelweard. Haslam also assumed that the intentions and interests of the three sides, Alfredian, Ceolwulfian, and Viking, could be considered almost as primary sources of their own. The issues with driving one’s analysis of events during Ceolwulf’s reign with musings on each ruler’s view of the purported activities of the others are twofold: first, the lens through which we view such intentions is, in all probability, ultimately one of Alfred’s construction; second, it is misleading and rash to try to piece together the motivations of people who lived nearly 1150 years before our time and whose context, individual quirks, and goals are lost to us. We may, as Pratt does, conclude something approaching Alfred’s goals and motivations through examination of the considerable body of literary sources left from his reign which were probably composed by him and his court, but the same cannot be said either for Ceolwulf or the Vikings who probably put him in power.

Conclusion

The picture of King Ceolwulf II of Mercia that emerges from my analysis is one of a king who initially managed to take advantage of the lull in conflict between his two greater neighbours in order to cultivate positive relationships with them and secure his status as a fellow king. The changing political circumstances of southern England in 876-7 then probably forced Ceolwulf to side with his initial sponsors, the Vikings, who took the opportunity in c.877 to share Mercia between themselves and him. Then Ceolwulf’s story trails off unsatisfactorily: the 878 battle of Edington may have led to myriad outcomes in terms of
both Ceolwulf’s fate and his relationships with his neighbours. For all we know, Ceolwulf may have stepped down as his predecessor had and then lived in obscurity long after 878.

New evidence, such as the Watlington hoard find, helps to contest prior conclusions regarding the changing state of London during Ceolwulf’s reign and thus provides a window into his relationships with his neighbours. It appears likely that, from 874 to 877, Ceolwulf and Alfred continued the monetary union which Ceolwulf’s predecessor Burgred had with Alfred. This finding provides reasons to view Alfred’s relationship with Ceolwulf as positive and may itself corroborate the notion that Ceolwulf acted, viewed himself, and was viewed as a king in his own right during this period. This conclusion should be tempered by accounts in the Chronicle and Asser’s Life, however, which claim that Ceolwulf swore oaths to the Vikings and gave them hostages in exchange for his throne.\footnote{Yet, as Æthelweard rarely appears to have been mistaken in his translation of a lost version of the Chronicle, his lack of mention of oaths and hostages erodes the certainty that the Vikings had the kind of leverage on Ceolwulf from 874 onward that would have placed him under their control before 877.} After 877, the year Ceolwulf apparently consented to the sharing of Mercia, it appears possible that a mixture of the ravaging that Æthelweard described as well as oaths and hostages that Asser and the Chronicle described led to Ceolwulf aligning with the Vikings. Numismatic evidence may indicate that Ceolwulf excluded Alfred from London as part of with his alignment with the Vikings.\footnote{I have assumed, in the lineage of Whitelock and Keynes, that the Chronicle and Asser’s Life were probably composed in Alfred’s court and probably remained consistent with the West Saxons’ memory of the events of Ceolwulf’s reign.} In all likelihood, Alfred and his officials viewed Ceolwulf negatively by the 890s and recorded him that way because of his later alignment with the Vikings and, as Pratt suggests, his narrative expediency as a foil to Alfred’s "language of wealth and wisdom."\footnote{Ceolwulf appears to have}
been a figure who straddled two eras: one in which the Vikings ran rampant through England, slowly conquering it from north to south, and one in which the House of Wessex reconquered those lands. Unfortunately, this king of ambiguous allegiance, origin, and demise left a mere glimmer of his story to us, and our accounts of him pertain to the latter era, when the writers of history could categorize their protagonists into winners and foolish king’s thegns.
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Notes

6 Davis, 179.
8 Whitelock, 2.
9 Ibid, 1.
16 Pratt, 166.
17 Ibid, 172.
18 Ibid, 171-176. Pratt translated the phrase as "the unwise king’s thegn," whereas Whitelock had translated it as "the foolish king’s thegn" in her version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.
19 Keynes, "King Alfred and the Mercians," 35.
20 "Privilege of Ceolwulf II of Mercia, freeing the diocese of Worcester from the charge of feeding the king’s horses, in return for spiritual benefits and the lease for four lives of land at Daylesford, Worcestershire (875)," in English Historical Documents c.500-1042, ed. Dorothy Whitelock (London: Eyre
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Methuen, 1955).


25 Ibid.


27 Williams and Naylor, 7.

28 Ibid.

29 Blackburn, "The London Mint," 119-120.

30 Keynes, "King Alfred and the Mercians," 17.

31 Ibid., 15.


33 Keynes, "King Alfred and the Mercians," 31-34.


35 Campbell, 42.

36 Ibid.


38 Blackburn, "The London Mint," 120.

39 Williams and Naylor.

40 Ibid., 29.


42 Williams and Naylor, 7.

43 "Privilege of Ceolwulf II of Mercia."


45 Blackburn, "The London Mint," 120.

46 Keynes, "King Alfred and the Mercians," 17.

47 Ibid.

48 Williams and Naylor, 7.

49 Blackburn, "The London Mint," 120.

50 Ibid., 119-120.

51 Ibid, 120.
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52 Haslam, 122-123.
53 Haslam, 123.; Campbell, 41.
55 "Grant by King Edward the Elder of land in Wylye to Æthelwulf, with a vernacular agreement made by the latter (901)," in *English Historical Documents c.500-1042*, ed. Dorothy Whitelock (London: Eyre Methuen, 1955).
56 Nelson, 60.
57 Pratt, 171-176.
58 Campbell, 42; Keynes and Lapidge, 82.
60 "Privilege of Ceolwulf II of Mercia."
63 Campbell, 41.
64 Campbell, 41.; Haslam, 122-123.
65 Campbell, 41.; Whitelock, Douglas, and Tucker (eds.), 48.; Keynes and Lapidge, 82.
66 Blackburn, "The London Mint," 120.
67 Ibid.
69 Campbell, 42.
70 Ibid.
71 Whitelock, Douglas, and Tucker (eds.), 50.
72 Ibid.
74 Williams and Naylor, 29.
75 Ibid.
76 "Privilege of Ceolwulf II of Mercia."
77 Whitelock, Douglas, and Tucker (eds.), 50.
78 Williams and Naylor, 30.
79 Ibid, 29.
80 Whitelock, Douglas, and Tucker (eds.), 50.
81 Nelson, 59-60.
82 Ibid.
83 "Grant by King Edward the Elder of land in Wylye to Æthelwulf."; Nelson, 59-60.
84 Nelson, 59-60.
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Whitelock.
86 Whitelock, 2.
87 Haslam, 122.
89 Haslam.
90 Pratt.
92 Campbell, 42.
93 Keynes and Lapidge, 82.; Whitelock, Douglas, and Tucker (eds.), 48.;
Campbell, 42.
94 Keynes, "A Tale of Two Kings."; Whitelock.
95 Pratt, 171-176.

Images

