The German Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 1933 - 1938: Trends, Patterns, and Characteristics

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The German Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 1933 - 1938: Trends, Patterns, and Characteristics

Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to contextualize the immigration of German Jews to Palestine in the years leading up to World War II, as well as identify distinctive patterns specific to this migration as opposed to previous time periods.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

First Advisor
Isaiah Friedman

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Subject Categories
Cultural History | European History | History of Religion | Holocaust and Genocide Studies | Islamic World and Near East History

Comments
THE GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRATION
TO PALESTINE, 1933 - 1938
TRENDS, PATTERNS, and CHARACTERISTICS

by
HENRY URIEL SPIERER

A Dissertation
submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements
for the degree of Ph.D.

The Dropsie University
Broad and York Streets
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19132
APPROVAL

This dissertation, entitled
THE GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRATION
TO PALESTINE, 1933 - 1938
TRENDS, PATTERNS, and CHARACTERISTICS

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Date 4/4/76
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I. THE CHANGING SITUATION OF THE JEWS IN GERMANY

On January 30, 1933, Hitler accepted at the hands of Hindenburg the chancellorship of the Republic, and the situation of German Jewry became more precarious than ever. This turn of events did not come about overnight, and German Jewry could not have been caught completely by surprise.

In 1925, Marshal von Hindenburg, candidate of the Nationalists, was elected president of the Republic. With rightists in control of the Government, the National Socialists and other racist parties were free to grow and carry out their anti-Semitic activities. These were manifest in such actions as desecration of Jewish cemeteries, attacks on synagogues, introduction of anti-Semitic bills in the state and national legislatures and the publication of numerous anti-Semitic pamphlets and newspapers.

Jewish students were among the first to feel the pressures of anti-Semitism. University professors as well as students were among the earliest advocates of the philosophy of racial superiority.

Boycotts against Jewish employees and workers preceded Hitler's rise to power. The Berlin Jewish community even saw the need to establish a central employment bureau to reduce their impact.

The world depression of 1929 which also hit Germany
foreshadowed worse things to come for the German Republic and its Jews. In 1930, the German economy was crumbling as foreign loans and world trade, the main props of her economy, collapsed. The boycotts, which were widespread in the small towns before 1930, left many Jews in economic ruin. Now, as business failures mounted and unemployment rose, anti-Jewish activities increased in number and intensity. Jews were abused on the streets and in schools, they were molested in theaters and cafés. Religious services were disrupted and a number of Jews were murdered.

In the September 1930 elections, the Nazis made fresh gains, and in celebration committed new anti-Jewish outrages. With the depression worsening and Nazi influence and power growing, Jewish unemployment increased while discrimination and boycotts added to their economic plight. Jewish New Years day, September 12, 1931, witnessed yet another wave of such attacks.

LEGAL AND OTHER MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST GERMAN JEWRY IN 1933

Persecution intensified after January 30, 1933, but no legal action was taken immediately to realize the program of the party. The National Socialist leaders felt free to act only after the Reichstag (the deliberative and representative parliament of Germany) had been dissolved on March 23, 1933, and they had
assumed dictatorial power. Then a countrywide boycott of "non-Aryans" was announced by the government, and anti-Jewish decrees followed each other in rapid succession.

THE BOYCOTT

It was to begin on April 1, 1933. For days in advance press, radio, and mass meetings flooded Germany with protests and complaints that the atrocities committed against the Jews had been a lie manufactured by world Jewry. The German public was persuaded that it had to retaliate by boycotting the nation's Jews. On March 29, 1933, the party proclaimed a countrywide boycott of businesses conducted by Jews as well as of Jewish professional men. The numerous local branches of the party were advised to appoint Action Committees to propagandize the boycott.

Under the chairmanship and direction of Julius Streicher the committees drew up directories of "non-Aryan" merchants which were distributed to the public. At a later date commercial and professional directories were reedited, so as to either omit Jewish names or indicate their "non-Aryan" character. Non Jewish stores
were advised to display special German signs while "non-Aryan" enterprises were prohibited from doing so. Stores and offices owned by Jews were marked as such so as to forewarn potential customers who were branded as traitors if they failed to heed such warnings. Throughout the country, hotels, restaurants, and even food stores were compelled to bear signs announcing that Jews may not buy there.

CIVIL SERVICE

In the beginning of April 1933, a series of laws were passed which, before the year was over, had practically excluded the Jews from participation in the social and economic life of Germany.

The foundation of the entire structure of National Socialist legislative discrimination against the Jews consisted of section three of the law for the professional Civil Service, issued on April 7, 1933. It stipulated that officials of non-Aryan descent must be retired and honorary officials discharged from office.¹ A non-Aryan

was defined as anyone who was of non-Aryan descent, particularly one with Jewish parents or grandparents. This held true even if only one parent or grandparent and was particularly the case if one parent or grandparent was of the Jewish faith. This definition applied to many non-Jews and was later extended to include even more.

The Aryan laws were established to eliminate those defined as Jews by the National Socialists from participating in the life of the country. The first to be affected by the laws were the non-Aryans in the civil service. The only exception under the statutes were made for those who were already serving as officials on August 1, 1914, or who during the World War, had fought at the front for Germany or her allies, or whose fathers, sons, or husbands were killed in action in the war. 2

The intent of the law was to remove all Jews from government employ. The army remained unaffected by the legislation. This was a matter of expediency rather than a lack of concern for the racial purification of the army.

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2 Ibid., p. 124.
THE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS

The new legislation did not confine itself to the civil services. The liberal professions were also to be "Aryanized! As concerns lawyers, the new legislation decreed that the admission of non-Aryan lawyers into practice may be canceled. 1

Exceptions similar to those granted civil servants were applied to the professions, but the concessions were curtailed. A National Socialist Lawyers' Society was set up to replace the dissolved German Bar Association. "Non-Aryans," including those who were exceptions to the April 7th law, were barred from membership.

"Non-Aryan" physicians and dentists were expelled from their professions in a more gradual manner. "Non-Aryan" medical students were informed that they could not receive authorization to practice. As for a diploma, it would be granted to them only as foreign nationals. In other words, they were urged to renounce their German nationality. While practicing physicians could continue in their calling, their expulsion from the National and private Health Insurance service and the boycott deprived them of much of their clientele.

EDUCATION

In the field of education "non-Aryans" were expelled from their positions in schools, colleges, universities, and from professional and scientific schools. "Non-Aryan" professors exempt from dismissal faced organized efforts on the part of the Central Organization of German Students (Deutsche Studentenschaft), to prevent the carrying out of their teaching duties. Nor did "non-Aryan" students fare much better. Schools in which attendance was not compulsory, such as universities, were ordered to reduce their "non-Aryan" student bodies to a maximum of five percent, and new "non-Aryan" admissions were limited to 1.5 percent of the student body.¹

Thus by the onset of 1934, with some exceptions (mentioned above) no Jews, "half Jews" or "quarter Jews" could legally hold public office, receive or maintain a position in the civil service, practice law, serve as

¹ Warburg, op. cit., p. 130.
judge, notary, or juror. Teaching in the public schools, colleges, universities, or even technical institutes became virtually impossible, as well as attendance of any non-compulsory institute except within the framework of the aforementioned limitations.

Furthermore, Jews could not belong to German (Aryan) learned societies, sport clubs, art circles, nor could they work in any of the arts including the theater, opera, movies, music, radio or press. They were limited as well in the fields of architecture and authorship.

They were deprived of the right to practice medicine or dentistry in any public service hospital (encompassing most of the medical practice in Germany).

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

The fate of business was not much better than that of the other fields. It became increasingly difficult for Jews to secure national or local government contracts, which under National-Socialist "co-ordination" comprised a significant share of the nation's business. It was made clear to officials that in placing orders, preference was to be given to "Aryans" and particularly to

1 The American Jewish Committee, op. cit., p. 161.
loyal National-Socialists.

The stock and produce exchange were purged of "non-Aryans". The large industrial corporations and commercial unions introduced "Aryan" clauses concerning membership into their constitutions.

The drive to eliminate Jews from business was slower than the more comprehensive means employed in other fields. This relative leniency was due to fears of economic dislocation rather than concern for the welfare of the victims. The method of forcing Jews to take in "Aryan" partners and give them a majority of the shares in a corporation was one means employed to prevent dislocation or in some cases even complete collapse of the "Aryanized" enterprise.

MANUAL LABOUR

In the sphere of manual labour, the absence of legislation preventing Jews from continuing in their crafts has not spared them. The numerous state associations prohibited "non-Aryan" membership, thus effectively excluding Jews from membership in manual trade guilds, which were compulsory for the pursuit of artisanship and handicrafts.

AGRICULTURE
In order to exclude Jews from agriculture, the law of September 29, 1933 regulating peasant holdings, included a provision stating that only a person of German or related blood could be a peasant.¹

DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

As early as July 14, 1933, a law was passed depriving some Jews of German citizenship and nationality. It called for a withdrawal of these rights in a provision which applied in the case where naturalization had been granted between the 9th of November 1918, and the 30th of January, 1933 and was later considered undesirable.² It was added that Jews from Eastern European countries were especially undesirable as German nationals.

A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE

For a comprehensive picture of the predicament of German Jewry, it is necessary to consider not only the racial legislation but its application, as well as

¹ Ibid., p. 167.
² Ibid., p. 170.
National Socialist Party activity, such as the aforementioned organized boycott.

With the identification of party with state and the usurpation of governmental positions by party members, National Socialist policy was able to assert itself in the various organizations throughout the country.

In the courts the principle of equality before the law was replaced by the principle of racial inequality; the independence of the judiciary was replaced by a system whereby judges were agents of the party, whose position depended on adherence to party policy, and to whom great latitude was given in adjudicating and imposing a penalty even where a law may not have been violated.

This situation led to the imposition of disabilities on Jews long before statutes were enacted to support them. Thus for example, long before the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935, which prohibited marriage between "Aryans" and Jews, the German courts in numerous instances upheld and justified local officials who refused to perform such marriages or granted divorces to "Aryans" on the basis of racial principles.

A report from Nuremberg on Easter 1934 to the High Commissioner for Refugees was very revealing.

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1 Report from Nuremberg to the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) coming from Germany Easter 1934 (March April) James G. McDonald Papers, Columbia University New York, file No 356. (From now on to be cited as McDonald Papers)
While the German government continued to claim that no difference in the economic field was made between "Aryans" and "non-Aryans," the report pointed out that it has become very difficult for Jews to obtain positions in Christian concerns. When Jewish firms were taken over by "Aryans" their Jewish employees were dismissed. National Socialist newspapers no longer accepted advertisements by Jews. "Aryans" who bought in Jewish shops were photographed and had their pictures paraded through the streets. Posters appeared on the streets of Nuremberg which read "Tell me whom you buy from and I will tell you who you are," or "The German buys from German concerns." Non-Jewish concerns displayed posters in honour of German handicraft while "Aryan" lawyers and doctors added to their shields in black-white and red letters "German lawyer" or "German doctor." Jews who were prohibited from displaying such signs were easily distinguishable from their "Aryan" counterparts.

The government which provided matrimonial loans in the form of maintenance contribution receipts, only granted "Aryan" concerns the right to receive such receipts. By this and other means Jewish concerns were put at a disadvantage. For example: Jewish furniture concerns were forced out of business. Of the thirteen
existing concerns in Nuremberg, eleven had been taken over by "Aryans."

All this was taking place in an atmosphere of constant vituperation and vilification, often leading to excesses in which Jews were assaulted, and in some cases murdered.

Conditions varied throughout the Reich. Nuremberg, which was under the provincial leader Julius Streicher, was particularly hard hit.

POST 1933 LEGAL AND OTHER MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST GERMAN JEWS

CIVIL SERVICE

By June 1934, about 2,000 state or municipal officials with advanced training had lost their positions. Although some found employment in commerce and industry the majority remained jobless and desperate.¹

MEDICINE

Legally, "non-Aryan" physicians and dentists who

¹ Report to the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) Coming from Germany. June 5, 1934, p.10. McDonald Papers file No 356.
were admitted to practice before 1914, who fought at the front, served in a military hospital during the war, or who lost a father or husband in the war, could continue to serve as physicians under the Health Insurance Service. But by 1934, claims certified by "non-Aryans" for compensation or pensions under the Social Insurance regulations were no longer honored. This forced the parties concerned to seek other than Jewish physicians.

By June 1934 out of a total of 9,000 Jewish or "non-Aryan" medical doctors before the National Socialists came to power, only 5,000 were left in practice. Of the remaining 4,000 about 3,000 were prohibited from practicing within the framework of the National System of Medical Insurance, while 1,000 were dismissed from hospitals. Of these 4,000 physicians about 1,000 were able through private capital and private practice to carry on for a while. Another 1,000 found other employment or had a private practice still large enough to support them. Thus 2,000 were left in difficulty and many of them emigrated.¹

LAW

more serious than that of the physicians. Of the 5,000 Jewish lawyers in 1933, approximately 1,650 had been barred from practicing in court. Of those who were still admitted to the bench, only 1,500 had adequate incomes, leaving the remainder, approximately 1,850, with insufficient earnings.

One factor responsible for this situation was the 60 per cent decline in trials and transactions, both under civil and criminal law, in comparison to 1932. Of the remaining cases 50 per cent were conducted under the stipulation of the poor law (i.e. cases in which the state paid for the lawyer's services). Even among those Jewish lawyers who were still admitted to the bar very few were allowed to handle such cases. Thus, compared to 1932, only 20 per cent of all legal cases were open to Jewish attorneys. But from amidst these cases Jewish lawyers lost many, since corporations preferred to employ "Aryans".

To the 1,650 debarred lawyers and the 1,850 in need must be added another 500 who were completing their professional training at the time Hitler rose to power.  

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1 Ibid., pp. 7, 8. file No. 356.
The situation of Jewish teachers by June 1934, was comparatively satisfactory. Of a total of 1,200, 600 had jobs in Jewish schools before the Hitler era. The extension of the Jewish school system permitted the absorption of another 300, while further expansion was expected to provide for the rest.¹

The Jewish student population in Germany was shifting away from the German public schools and towards Jewish institutions. This was the case even with children unaffected by the quota and was rather a measure taken to protect them from abuses to which they were subjected in the non-Jewish schools.

The National Socialist Government, which gradually expelled Jewish children from state schools, gave subsidies to their segregated elementary schools and paid Jewish teachers pensions until 1939. Also in the early years the Jewish educators of these schools were allowed great latitude in setting up courses of study.

¹ Ibid., p. 10. file No. 356.
While National Socialist policy was to eliminate Jews from German cultural life, official permission was granted for the creation of a Jüdischer Kulturbund. The organization was able to employ numerous Jewish artists and was permitted complete autonomy for a while. But this was shortlived and soon everything had to be submitted to censorship.

With the demographic and economic decline of German-Jewry the Kulturbund faced dissolution but was ordered to renew its work after the November 1938 pogrom.

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

By 1935, the pressure on Jewish business had reached the point where nearly the only sphere of activity left Jews was to buy and sell amongst themselves.

National Socialist legislation, administrative actions, and party activities were instrumental in the segregation of German-Jewry. Numerous German towns excluded Jews from their jurisdiction, while individual "Aryans" were discouraged from having contact with them.
THE NUREMBERG LAWS AND AFTER

On September 15, 1935, at a National convention at Nuremberg, the Reichtag withdrew citizenship from all the Jews of Germany. In what became known as the Nuremberg Laws, a distinction was drawn between Staatsangehöriger (a state subject) and a Reich citizen. The former belonged to the protective association of the German Reich while the latter applied only to state subjects of German or cognate blood and who demonstrated by their conduct that they were willing and fit to serve the German people and Reich. The right of citizenship was acquired through the grant of a letter of patent of Reich citizenship.¹

¹ Warburg, op. cit., pp. 191-192.

See also Reichsgesetzblatt, 1935, p. 1146.
Thus the Jews, no longer citizens, were relegated to the status of subject (Staatsangehörige) and deprived of all political rights.

Additional laws passed at Nuremberg and the November 15, 1935, decree relative to the Reich Citizenship and Blood Protection Law, prohibited intermarriage as well as extra-marital relation between Jews and Germans.¹ These laws also forbade Jews to employ female domestic help of German or related blood under thirty-five years of age.

Separate schools for Jewish children were ordered and Jews were denied the right to display German flags, although they were permitted to display their own colors (blue and white). The same month saw legislation for the expulsion of the remaining Jewish civil servants.

A report delivered by the High Commissioner for refugees subsequent to the announcement of the Nuremberg Laws gave the following assessment of the situation in Germany:

"Since (the Nuremberg Laws) the situation has became very much worse. The decisive factor was the new legislation announced at Nuremberg during the Nazi Party Congress on September 15. Then the Jews were decreed to be no longer German citizens. That legislation, obviously designed to degrade those

to whom it applies, has opened the door for wholesale discrimination. In no field of activity can Jews in Germany now feel secure. The limitations heretofore imposed upon them in cultural and professional fields are now being extended, one after another, to their economic activities. Among the first to feel the rigors of these new restrictions are the Jewish businesses in the smaller towns. Already they and their families are beginning to flee to the cities, where they hope to gain, at least for a time, a measure of immunity. But in the cities, too, restrictions imposed by the law or threatened by Nazi organizations, are so undermining Jewish businesses and the confidence on which their success depends, that one must anticipate ruinous financial losses. This in turn increased the burdens on the Jewish communities and at the very time when it is officially decreed that German Jews are not to have the benefits of the winter relief program of the Government.

In short, all the information that comes to me, as well as my own observations during brief trips to Germany in August and September, convince me that life in Germany for large numbers of Jewish people, is becoming almost unbearable." 1

A report issued on January 1937 2 from Germany painted a grim picture. The open boycott was continuing mainly in the small towns. But there, even food delivery

1 Talk of James G. McDonald delivered over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company at 7:00 P.M. New York time October 11, 1935. McDonald Papers, file No 356.

to Jews was affected. With the increasing shortage of food and raw materials, only non-Jewish firms were considered, resulting in the closing down of Jewish firms. Jewish bookshops were ordered to deal only in Jewish books and Jewish literature, which would make survival impossible for most firms.

Jews who had been out of Germany for over three months were refused reentry into the country. This also applied to Jewish children sent to study abroad. Other Jews who had left Germany for only brief periods were summoned by the Gestapo, accused of having been out of the country for over three months, and given the choice of either departure or the concentration camp.

The winter help program may be used as another indicator of the plight of German Jewry. It was first introduced by the National Socialist government to help all in distress. In the winter of 1935-1936, Jews were excluded from the General Fund, but were permitted to carry on their own collection. In the winter of 1935-1936 they collected RM. 3,644,000 and in 1936-1937 RM. 3,630,000. These funds went to assist 83,761 persons in 1935-1936, and 82,818 the following year. The reduction in
the latter year must be seen in light of the fact that the Jewish population of Germany had declined by 20,000 persons in that period.

Besides financial assistance, food, coal, and clothing were distributed. In Wuerttemberg only 15 per cent of the Jewish population required help, while the figures in the Saar region were 38 per cent, in Prussia 34 per cent, in Pomerania, 30 per cent. In Berlin 30,000 or 20 per cent of the Jewish population was assisted.¹

As the year 1938 wore on, the situation of German Jewry progressively deteriorated. On June 9, the Great Synagogue of Munich was destroyed, then followed the destruction of the Synagogues in Nuremberg and Dortmund. On the 15th of June mass arrests of Jews took place. The victims were sent to concentration camps and were released only after submission of proof of possibility and intent to emigrate.

In its continuous effort to segregate the Jews of Germany the National Socialist government enacted a decree on August 17, 1938,² concerning itself with Jewish first names. It stipulated that every Jew, unless he had a name which was permissible, was required to add Israel or Sarah. Jews born after the enactment of the law could be given only such names as were provided for in the minister's ruling.

¹ Based on report submitted to the Council for German Jewry, October 19, 1937 p.2. Zionist Archives, New York
² Warburg, op. cit., p. 198.
On July 23, 1938, a ruling required Jews to apply for special identification papers. On October 5, 1938, a decree imposed special Jewish stamps on passports issued to Jews.  

THE TAKEOVER OF JEWISH PROPERTY

Total legislative exclusion of Jews from the economic life of Germany was initiated by a decree on April 26, 1938, which compelled all Jews to register their total domestic and foreign properties and prohibited them to establish any new business without a permit.

On July 6, 1938, a statute was passed which made Jews ineligible for licenses in a number of fields such as watchman, information and inquiry agents, real estate agents, real estate administrators, loan commission agents, marriage agents (with the exception of marriages among Jews), and guides.

A decree of November 12, 1938, forbade Jews to

1 Neumann, op. cit., p. 115.
3 Neumann, op. cit., p. 118.
4 Ibid., p. 119.
carry on handicraft, retail, or mail order business, or to sell their wares at markets and fairs. It requires the elimination of Jews from plant management, authorized employers to dismiss their more important Jewish employees, and co-operatives to expell their Jewish members.

A decree issued on November 23, 1938, provided that Jewish businesses forced into liquidation be turned over to appropriate groups in industry or trade for safekeeping, appraisal, and possible disposal.

This enactment, which only affected the retail and handicraft business, was supplemented by another decree on December 3, 1938, which struck at every Jewish industrial enterprise that could be forced into liquidation. The government reserved the right to appoint trustees to supervise the clearance of such enterprises. It also authorized the government to order any Jew to sell his agricultural or forest lands as well as real estate. It forbade Jews to acquire such holdings, or dispose of them without special consent; nor could they mortgage them. Jews were required to deposit all stocks and bonds in a recognized bank and to obtain permission of the federal minister of economics to dispose of them. An additional

1 Genschel, op. cit., p. 188.
A decree on February 21, 1939, required Jews to surrender their gold, platinum, silver, jewels, and similar possessions to special purchasing agencies established by the Reich.

A decree of October 31, 1938 stated that exemptions allowable for children did not apply if they were Jewish. On April 30, 1939, a decree was promulgated denying Jewish tenets any protection against notices from landlords.¹

By means of forced sales, Jewish enterprises passed into "Aryan" hands with little compensation to their owners. Pressure was applied to eliminate Jews from partnerships with Germans, resulting in the Aryanization of such enterprises. Jews were not only denied protection from abuses by Aryan competitors but in some cases were victimized by their official encouragement. Germans had the right to warn customers against buying from Jewish rivals. Courts granted "Aryans" the right to withdraw

¹ Neumann, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
from long term contracts with Jews. Protection of labor legislation gradually became inapplicable where Jews were concerned.

By 1938, Jews were completely eliminated from the civil service and the free professions, and the destruction of their economic position on a massive scale was at hand.

KRISTALLNACHT

On October 28, 1938, 15,000 Jews in Germany holding Polish passports were served deportation notices. Eventually 17,000 were rounded up and transported to Poland, which denied them entry. ¹

Herschel Grynspun, the son of one of these deportees was residing in Paris at the time. Possibly in reaction to the deportation and attendant cruelties, he assassinated Ernst Vom Rath, third secretary of the German embassy in Paris.

This served as an excuse for a pogrom against the Jews. The November 8, 9, and 10, riots that followed, became known as Kristallnacht. They were organized by the Party and resulted in the most massive destruction of property and murder of Jews undertaken by the National Socialists to date. It was accompanied by mass arrests of thousands of Jews who were then sent to concentration camps. The Reichsvertretung was shut

¹ Schleunes, op. cit., p. 238.
down on November 11th and occupied by the Gestapo. All Jewish political organizations were disbanded after November 10th, but the Reichsvertretung was later allowed to resume work. The emigration department of the Palestine office (a division of the Jewish Agency) and the Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden (German Jewish Relief Association), as part of the Reichsvertretung, were also allowed to continue; although the Nazis had arrested employees of the Hilfsverein.

Following the November riots, as punishment for alleged Jewish "hostility to the German people an Reich", a fine of 1,000,000,000 marks was levied on all Jews with property worth 5,000 marks or more. This was labeled an atonement payment (Stühneleistung). The levy was to be raised as a tax of 20 per cent on all property belonging to such Jews, and was made payable in four equal installments.

As further punishment a decree of the 12th of November 1938, compelled the Jews of Germany to pay for all the damages to Jewish businesses and houses incurred during the November riots. In order to pay these levies Jewish property had to be liquidated and numerous holdings were wiped out.

1 Neumann, op. cit., p. 120., also Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938, p. 1579.
The November riots were the last manifestation of mass anti-Jewish violence on the streets of Germany. The mass destruction of property was harmful to the economy of the Reich, reaction abroad was highly critical, and the boycott against German goods spread.

Future measures against the Jews were more professional, systematic, and orderly.
CHANGING ATTITUDE OF GERMAN JEWS

According to Eliezer Livneh (Livenstein) most German Jews thought that Hitler would not come to power. They also did not expect that he would be as severe with the Jews as he was. The Jewish press varied in its appraisal of the anti-Semitic element in the National Socialist program. The Zentralverein Zeitung, which presented the views of the majority of German Jewry thought before Hitler's rise to power to fight anti-Semitism in response to the National-Socialist threat. During the years immediately preceding the Nazi takeover it switched to a political fight against National-Socialism. The Jüdische Rundschau already before 1933 broached the idea that German Jewry would be in grave danger in case of a National Socialist take-over.

In the early stages of the Nazi rule most German Jews were against any strong action in opposition to Hitler. They did not take his threat at face value. Important German Jewish leaders did not

3 Taped Interview of Nahum Goldmann by Avraham Margaliot Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 4.
consider seriously a total Jewish evacuation of Germany. The concept of cultural autonomy for a Jewish minority was seen as a possible solution to the Jewish problem. This idea was brought up numerous times by Robert Weltsch during 1934 in the 

Even some anti-Zionist Jews adopted similar concepts, as was the case with the Deutscher Vortrupp Gefolgschaft deutscher Juden, headed by Hans Joachim Schoeps. This anti-Zionist group propounded the völkische idea that the Jews were just another German Volk, just as the Saxons were. Schoeps proposed that German Jewry be given the status of "legal entity" within the Third Reich. The Zentralverein Zeitung wrote in recognition of the new situation, after the passage of the first anti-Semitic legislation in April 1933, that the Nazi view of race and the Semites' unsuitability in the national life of Germany has become state law. It added that German Jewry, while denying the justice of this, must yield to this force. The Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland declared that the Jews must

1 Ibid.
3 Karl A. Schleune, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz, Nazi Policy towards German Jews 1933-1939 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 188.
take cognisance of their situation and muster the strength not only to bear their fate, but even more so, to rebuild their lives. And after the countrywide anti-Jewish boycott of April, 1933, an article by Robert Welth in the Jüdische Rundschau proclaimed "wear it with pride, that yellow badge." ¹ Thus was humiliation to be turned into a source of pride.

The Zionist leadership itself was not united on the question of what should be done. While Weizmann concerned himself only with emigration of German Jewry rather than having them fight for their rights, Nahum Goldmann advocated that they do both ². The Jewish assimilationist groups opposed both emigration and autonomy. This they believed would only serve to separate them from the German people. The Association of Jewish Veterans was opposed to emigration ³. Most German Jews were strongly attached to their country and its culture and lived with the hope that the Hitler era would soon pass.

¹ Ibid., p. 17.
² Taped interview of Nahum Goldmann by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 4.
Table I

JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM GERMANY 1933 - JUNE 30, 1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Jewish Emigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938 (up to June 30)</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As graph A and table I show after the first shock of 1933 subsided, emigration decreased (from 37,000 in 1933 to 23,000 in 1934). It is well known that in those early years there was even a return migration. The emigration trends of German Jewry follow the pattern of increased pressure and its subsidence as applied by the National Socialists against it. Thus the letup in pressure resulted in a corresponding decrease in emigration. This decrease continued into 1935. The Nuremberg Laws, promulgated in the last quarter of 1935 brought on a new wave of emigration, as the increase for 1936 would indicate. In 1936 there was a letup in persecution because the Olympic games were held in Berlin. This was again followed by a decrease in emigration.


** See table I and graph A.
Graph A, Total Jewish Emigration from Germany Compared to Emigration of German Jews into Palestine (figures in thousands)

1 Total Jewish Emigration from Germany.  
2 Emigration of German Jews into Palestine.

See table I
See table II in chapter titled Migration from Germany to Palestine.
The Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 convinced much of German Jewry that there was no future for them in that country, and that the only hope for the younger generation was to leave Germany. The National-Socialist persecution united all sections and parties of German Jewry in the work of relief, with the exception of the Socialists.

In a March 1934 report by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald the former described the increased activity within the Jewish community of Germany as follows:

"There is general admiration for the way in which the Jewish community is facing its trials and there is great intellectual activity. Lectures are given all over the country and the circulation of Jewish newspapers is going up by leaps and bounds and the concerts and performances given by the Jüdischer Kulturbund in Berlin are exceptionally well attended."

As Jewish children were forced out of German schools, their number attending Jewish schools increased, so that by August 1934, out of about 60,000 Jewish schoolchildren 18,000 attended Jewish schools, and this number was constantly growing.

1 Note of a Plan for the Emigration of German Jewry, January 2, 1936, McDonald Papers file No. 356.

2 A report of 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.

3 Report by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald, March 28, 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.

There was financial solidarity within the community as well, so that in the words of Giora Lotan (George Lubinsky): "no Jew had to go without the minimum."\(^1\)

German Jewry's attitude of looking down on East European Jews lessened after 1933, as they began to realize that they shared a common fate.\(^2\) Interest in Palestine and participation in Zionist activities increased markedly after the National Socialist takeover. The former is revealed by a survey of the activities of the Palestine Department (office) in Berlin during the period April to December 1933. Within a half year period the Berlin Advisory Board of the Palestine Department had been consulted by 25,000 persons. In the survey it estimated that this information must have reached at least 75,000\(^*\) or approximately half the Jewish population of Berlin. Conditions throughout the Reich resembled those in Berlin.\(^3\)

\(^*\)Zionist activist in Germany and former Director of the Israel National Insurance Institute.

\(^1\) Taped interview of Giora Lotan by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 7.

\(^2\) Taped interview of Reuven Eytan by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No 2.

\(^3\) Report from the Berlin Palestine Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the American Palestine Campaign, December 1, 1933, Survey of the activities of the Palestine Department since April 1, of this year (1933), Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.

\(*\) The assumption was that each individual reached at least two relatives.
The following description of the increased pace of activity at the Palestine Office in Berlin is revealing:

"In recent years the Palestine Department of the Berlin Office of the Jewish Agency consisted of a small volunteer staff whose sole task was the distribution of the small number of the Category C certificates which constituted Germany's share. At the same time this staff answered inquiries from the few people who were interested in emigration to Palestine. This situation changed immediately when, as a result of the nationalist revolution the legal position of Jewry in Germany underwent a fundamental change. The Palestine Department was suddenly stormed by a large number of Jews—indeed merchants, clerks and industrial employees, physicians, attorneys and members of other professions—who feared that the economic basis of their lives would be jeopardized or entirely destroyed, and who therefore became interested in building up a new life in Palestine."

An increasing number of Jewish youths in Germany chose vocations in agriculture, the various trades, and, in the case of women, domestic training. This was done with the intent of obtaining immigration certificates to Palestine based on their new skill.

German Jews helped in the training of young would-be emigrants by providing their agricultural holdings for Hachshara. According to Giora Lotan some sought by this means to save their agricultural property on the basis that it furthered emigration.

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
• Also see chapter titled Nazi Policy concerning Jewish Emigration from Germany to Palestine, (National Socialist policy was to support activities that promoted emigration)
Membership in Hechalutz jumped from 500 members at the beginning of 1933 to 13,000 by the end of the year. Subscriptions to the Zionist organ Jüdische Rundschau "grew enormously." Of 118 who replied in my questionnaire to the question "what Jewish newspaper did you read in Germany" 59 said the "Jüdische Rundschau," 7 stated the "Zentralvereinzeitung" 28 said "none," and the remainder read a variety of other Jewish newspapers, many of them local ones.

The Kameraden, a non-Zionist youth organization, became Zionist, although a part of the group remained communists. In Munich in the 1935-1936 period alone membership in the Zionist Party rose from 80 to 600 and continued to rise afterwards by another 100 to 200.

Contributions to Keren Kayemet increased greatly. According to Reuven Eytan East European Jews in Germany joined Zionist activities in reaction to National Socialism more readily than did German Jews.

This is confirmed to some extent by Giora Lotan, according to whom they were particularly strongly represented in the Hechalutz movement. On the other hand, at least in the early years, there were categories of people who were disinclined to join the Zionist movement or consider emigration to Palestine, as the following report of December, 1933, from the Artisans Aliyah Division of the Palestine Office in Berlin indicates:

"This division has discovered that Germany has many experienced Jewish artisans—such as masons, carpenters, mechanics, plumbers, joiners, locksmiths etc.—who know their trades so thoroughly and have practiced them for so many years that they would indubitably prove most valuable in Palestine. Though it must be conceded that hitherto these people have shown very little interest in Jewish and Zionist affairs." 2

Then there were cases like that of Leo Baeck* who had offers of good positions outside of Germany but who saw their function as that of continuing to serve the remaining German Jews.3

1 Taped interview of Giora Lotan by Avraham Margalioth, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No. 7.
2 Report from the Berlin Palestine Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the American Palestine Campaign, December 1, 1933, Survey of the Activities of the Palestine Department since April 1 (1933), Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.
3 Taped interview of Giora Lotan by Avraham Margalioth, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No. 7.
The Jewish immigration from Germany to Palestine was less erratic than the general emigration of German Jewry*. The peak in Jewish emigration from Germany reached in 1933 saw a sharp decline in 1934 and continued to decline in 1935, and then rose abruptly in 1936**. This was not paralleled by the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine. Graph A shows that this migration reached nearly 8,000 in 1933 and rose slightly in 1934 and maintained this general level through 1935 and 1936. The majority of Jews who left Germany in 1933 went to the neighboring European countries on a temporary basis only***. Those Jews who went to Palestine in most cases went there to settle. This would indicate that the migration to Palestine was a more planned one, requiring more elaborate preparation and arrangement. This view is supported by the answers to my questionnaire where I asked both "when did you decide to leave Germany" and "when did you leave Germany". Forty seven said that they decided to leave Germany in 1933, but only 31 actually did. For the years 1933 and 1934 combined 59 decided to leave and 49 actually did so, and if we add the year 1935 we have a total of 73 who decided to leave and only 61 who actually left 1. Another indicator of long range planning was the fact that parents sent their children to Palestine in advance of their own migration. Out of 117 who answered

* See graph A. * * See graph A.
** See chapter titled Alternate Places of Refuge.
*** See table II.
1 See table II.
my question "if you had children, did they precede you to Palestine?", 20 said "yes", 3 said that some of their children did and some did not, 34 said "no" or that their children were born in Israel and for the remainder this question did not apply.

The immigration of German Jews into Palestine amounted to a population transfer representing a cross-section of the social structure of German Jewry, which was predominantly middle class. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that we are actually dealing with a refugee population. With few exceptions, these people would not have left Germany, had it not been for their persecution by the National Socialists. Only 9 out of 113 who answered the question in my questionnaire: "What triggered your decision to leave Germany" said "Zionism", the rest indicated in one form or another that persecution by the National Socialists was the decisive factor.

Of those who came to Palestine, many had no other alternative. Of 113 who answered the question in my questionnaire: Did you have any alternative to Palestine", 47 replied in the negative and 14 others said that they did not consider any other alternative.
Before 1933 less than 5 per cent of the Jews in Germany belonged to Zionist organizations. Even among those who came to Palestine, the majority were never members of a Zionist organization. Fifty nine out of 116 who responded to my question: "Did you belong to a Zionist organization in Germany" said "no", and of the remainder 12 joined in 1933 or after.

This group of immigrants who, unlike their predecessors, were highly assimilated and had a very limited knowledge of Jewish culture, found the readjustment problem particularly difficult. Some did not remain in Palestine. Of those who did remain many found it very difficult to learn Hebrew. Not only their deficient background but also their reluctance to speak the language poorly, due to their perfectionist attitude contributed to this difficulty. Almost all continued to speak German in Israel. Only one out 117 who responded to my questionnaire: "Do you speak German in Israel?" said "no. The majority do speak some Hebrew, some speak the language well, but others still do not speak it at all.

Their children on the other hand, have done better. Those who went to school in Israel all speak Hebrew but even more significant in terms of integration into Israeli society is their marriage pattern. In the case of 63 out of 111 children whose parents answered my question in the questionnaire: "If your children have married in Israel did they marry persons of German origin" the response was negative.

The older generation has maintained a marked degree of unity, particularly in social matters. Friendship circles are still marked by a common German background and even old age homes are set up along these lines.
II. GERMAN-JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE BEFORE 1933

Up to 1933 the German-Jewish immigration to Palestine was of relatively little importance. It totaled only 2,048 for the years 1920 - 1932. As a percentage of the total immigration to Palestine for those years it represented a low of only 0.7 per cent for the years 1925 - 1928, and a high of only 3.0 per cent for the year 1929. By contrast in 1933, the year of Hitler's rise to power, their total number increased to 6,803 for that year alone, representing 24.8 per cent of that year's total immigration to Palestine. The available figures as to categories of immigrants indicate that between 1925 and 1932 only 241 persons were described as being of independent means or the Capitalist Category, while 408 entered on the Labour Schedule. Dependents of Palestine Residents accounted for a total of 750 immigrants. This contrasts sharply with the post 1932 immigration of German Jews where the Capitalist A-I category of immigrant represented 37.1 per cent for the years 1933 - March 1939, and Labour Category C was only 35.6 per cent of the total German-Jewish immigration for those years. These figures indi-

1 See Table I.
2 The Jewish Agency for Palestine Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress and to the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Geneva (Jerusalem: Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, August 1939), p. 75, table IV. (From now on to be cited as Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939.)
# Table I

## Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany

1920-1933

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
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<th>Persons</th>
<th>Depend-</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>917</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<td>1933</td>
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<td>1,053</td>
<td>6,803</td>
<td>3,150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,035</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>7,285</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>571</td>
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## Percentage of Immigrants from Germany in Relation to the Total Number of Jewish Immigrants from Other Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>1.4 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1928</td>
<td>0.7 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>3.0 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2.1 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1.8 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1.7 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>24.8 Per Cent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Based on Jewish Agency Figures.

2 Ibid.
* Particulars regarding the classification of immigrants according to citizenship are available only as of May 1925.
cate the pioneer makeup of the pre-1933 German-Jewish immigration, where there were 70 per cent more labour than capitalist immigrants, as opposed to the middle class composition of the post 1933 immigration, where the capitalist immigration actually outnumbered the labour category immigration.
Although, as indicated, the immigration of German Jews to Palestine before 1933 was small in numbers, their impact on the early Yishuv outstripped their numerical proportion. Among these immigrants were some very important personalities, both Zionists and non-Zionists, and their organizations which left their mark in Palestine.

On September 21, 1898, Paul Nathan wrote to the German Foreign Office proposing the establishment of a German school system for the Jews in the Middle East. Such a project required the consent of the German government. In the same year Max Bodenheimer accompanied Herzl on his trip to Jerusalem to meet with the German Kaiser. The Kaiser himself expressed interest in the role that German Jewry could play in Palestine. According to Bodenheimer, when the Kaiser traveled from Moza to Jerusalem, he noticed a building of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. This French-Jewish organization sought to spread French culture in the Middle East. The Kaiser thought this to be a very good idea and asked: "Why don't our Jews do the same thing?"

In 1901 the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden was founded. Ostensibly its purpose was to improve the social

1 Max Bodenheimer und Henrietta Hannah Bodenheimer, Die Zionisten und das Kaiserliche Deutschland (Bersberg: Schäuble Verlag, 1972), p. 110.
and political conditions of the Jews in Eastern Europe and the Orient. It established in Palestine a school system that extended from kindergarten to teachers' training college. In 1904 it began to found schools there, but did not stress the German language and culture to the extent that the Alliance schools did with French. The Hilfsverein devoted much attention to Hebrew along with German. Hebrew was selected as the language of instruction on the basis that subjects taught in Hebrew be those in which the teachers had experience and for which there existed an adequate terminology and a sufficient number of text books. Its intent was to extend the use of Hebrew to as many subjects as possible, while German was to become the chief foreign language. Hebrew was the only language used in its 11 kindergartens, and in its dozen or so schools and teachers' training colleges it was the primary language of instruction. 1

The German Zionists and non-Zionists (Hilfsverein) and the German government could find common grounds in the pursuit of their interests in Palestine. Bodenheimer wrote to the German Foreign Office in 1902 that development of the Zionist movement can be inseparably bound with the advance of the German civilization and culture in the Orient. From

1 Alex Bein, The Return to the Soil, A History of Jewish Settlement in Israel (Translated from the Hebrew by Israel Schen) (Jerusalem: The Youth and Hechalutz Department of the Zionist Organization, 1952), pp. 132-133
the start of its activities in Palestine, the Hilfsverein worked together with the Zionists. \(^1\) In 1907 Dr. Paul Nathan, the business manager of the Hilfsverein, came to Palestine. He recognized Haifa's key position and decided to purchase there a piece of land for a technical school. The Hilfsverein believed that Haifa would turn into a center of commerce and industry for the Middle East. \(^2\)

In 1910 Richard Lichtheim met Dr. Paul Nathan in Palestine and the latter tried to convince him of the impossibility of realizing his Zionist dream. In his arguments he pointed to the disinterest shown for it by the influential Jews of Western Europe, the difficulty involved in mobilizing the capital required for mass colonization, and the existing political obstacles. For how would it be possible to establish a Jewish community or state in a land inhabited by Arabs, and against the will of the Turkish authorities? \(^3\) In 1911 a divergence of interests began to develop. According to Elias Auerbach in that year the pressure of the German government to increase the use of German grew stronger. \(^4\) Thus in 1912 the trend to

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increase the use of Hebrew in the Hilfsverein schools was reversed, and some subjects that were heretofore taught in Hebrew were now handled in German. This policy was opposed by most of the Yishuv. The conflict came to a head when the question arose as to which language of instruction should be used in the new Technical Institute to be opened in Haifa. The project of opening a technical institute had its origin in a gift of L 10,000 by a Russian Jewish philanthropist and member of Chovevei Zion, Leon Wisotzky. His gift was entrusted to the Hilfsverein. The Zionist Organization was represented on the Board of Governors of the Technion by Achad Ha'am, Yechiel Tschlenow, and Schmaryahu Levin. Additional funds were raised through the Jewish National Fund.

The school was to be opened in the spring of 1914. With the Technion an affiliated secondary school (Reali) was to be built which was to provide a general education and prepare students for later studies in the Technion. At a meeting of the governing body in October, 1913, it was decided, at the suggestion of the management of the Hilfsverein, that German was to be the language of instruction. Schmaryahu Levin proposed a compromise whereby Hebrew would be the language of instruction in the Reali School, while German would serve as the major foreign language. In the Technion instruction was provisionally to be in German, with some scientific subjects to be taught in Hebrew. The board
rejected this compromise, prompting the Zionist representatives to withdraw in protest. The Sprachenkampf, as the so-called language dispute came to be known, initially concentrated on the Reali School since it was to be opened before the Technion. It soon spread to schools of the Hilfsverein throughout the country, encompassing not only the teachers, students and parents concerned with the Reali School, but the whole Yishuv. It became a question of Zionist policy being confronted by a major challenge. The argument put forward by those favoring German was that since Germany, at that time, was the leader in all technical fields, the students would have to learn German or be unable to read the most up-to-date technical literature. Hebrew, on the other hand, according to them, lacked the technical vocabulary, and this could not be developed fast enough. In reaction to this challenge the Zionist Organization established and financed the operation of numerous Hebrew schools throughout the country. Both students and teachers declared a strike on the Hilfsverein schools. There were protest meetings throughout Palestine. The opposition to the Hilfsverein was led by the Teachers' Association, formed in 1903 by Ussishkin, with the active support of the pupils of the upper classes. Richard Lichtheim described Ephraim Cohn-Reiss, the director of the Hilfsverein schools, as a competent administrator, but as an opponent of Zionism who showed himself to be an intriguer and a dangerous enemy during the Sprachenkampf. ¹

¹ Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 170.
In November, 1913, Paul Nathan came to Palestine. His attitude was uncompromising, and he refused to discuss the issues, unless the teachers first gave in unconditionally. Elias Auerbach, a member of the building commission of the Technion, met Dr. Paul Nathan in Port Said as he was on his way to Palestine. He found him angry, and the ensuing discussion gives a clear picture of his views on the subject. He asked if they really believed there that a few fanatics, by arousing the masses, could build a technical school in Palestine. He also questioned whether a technical school could be established without the introduction of a European language. Elias Auerbach who supported the Zionist side, informed him that it was not a matter of a few fanatics, but was the will of the whole Yishuv to defend the use of Hebrew. He added that at the moment it was a question of the Reali School and that he would be unable to find teachers for it. Dr. Nathan replied that he will put a quick end to this nationalistic outburst and that he will obtain as many teachers as he wished. He then accused Auerbach of taking part in the rebellion, to which Auerbach replied that he helped lead it and was now going to Berlin to warn the members of the Hilfsverein of their policy.

In Berlin Auerbach met James Simon, head of the Hilfsverein and a very wealthy and respected industrialist.

1 Bein, op. cit., p. 135.
Auerbach described him as being impressed by his (Auerbach's) views and informed him that the Hilfsverein's policy was influenced by pressures from the German Government. According to Elias Auerbach the institutions of the Hilfsverein in Palestine were placed under German protection. Even the agreement of the Sultan to the establishment of the Technion in Haifa was possible only through the political support of the German representation in Constantinople.

The Reali School was to be opened in 1913, and Dr. Arthur Biram was selected by the Hilfsverein as the first director. The conflict delayed the opening of the school, as well as Dr. Biram's departure from Germany. In February, 1914, the governing body of the Technion accepted a compromise solution by which Hebrew was to become the language of instruction within four years, while some subjects were to be taught in Hebrew immediately. Only at the beginning of 1920, after World War I, was the Reali School opened under the directorship of Dr. Biram. The school became a landmark in the Hebrew school system. It gained much esteem for its pedagogic ideas which, besides providing a high quality education, stressed the development of its students' character towards industriousness, precision in work, and honesty.

Of all the German Jews who settled in Palestine during the early pioneering days Arthur Ruppin made the greatest contribution to the development of the Yishuv.

1 Ibid., pp. 331-332
2 Ibid.; p. 325.
To discover what led this man to Zionism, and finally to Palestine, it is necessary to study his writings, particularly his memoirs, letters, and diaries. Ruppin, who grew up in poverty, was forced to leave school at the age of 15. He worked for nine years in the grain trade where he earned sufficient money to bring his family out of its financial difficulties. He then decided to continue with his studies. He passed the examination for a high school diploma as an external student, then enrolled in the University of Berlin, and later in the University of Halle. There he studied law and economics. Ruppin was introduced to Jewish national aspirations for the first time in February, 1892, when he heard a young business apprentice, named Boschwitz, give an account of these ideas to the Graetz Society. He himself remained undecided. In his diary he stated: "There may well be something in this fanciful idea of a Jewish State. In fact, I am extremely interested in it, but I am doing my utmost to banish the thought, as I feel completely German."\(^1\)

In other entries he repeatedly expressed the notion that anti-Semitism would one day make it impossible for him to remain in Germany, and also recorded anti-Semitic insults which he had experienced personally. In 1897 he wrote: "It is quite likely that anti-Semitism will one day oblige me to emigrate to a country where it does not exist, e.g. England". At the time when he wrote his book The Jews of Today his attitude to Zionism was still "ambivalent". Herzl's "diplomatic Zionism" seemed hopeless and unrealistic to him. He drew closer to Zionism after he came to Berlin in 1904 and was introduced to the circle of "practical Zionists", such as Berthold Feiwal, Martin Buber, David Trietsch, and Hans Gideon Heimann. In March 1905, Ruppin joined the Zionist Organization. In 1907 he traveled to Palestine on behalf of the Zionist Organization in order to study the situation there and investigate the possibilities of Zionist work in the country. Dr. Jacob Thon, whom Ruppin came to know at the Bureau for Jewish Statistics and Demography, was instrumental in arranging this trip. According to Richard Lichtheim he persuaded Professor Otto Warburg to recruit Ruppin for the Zionist Organization's work in Palestine. Ruppin himself acknowledged Thon's role in in-

1 Ibid., p. 62.
2 Ibid., p. 75.
* Otto Warburg was elected Chairman of the World Zionist Organization in 1911.
3 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 156.
fluencing him to make his first trip there. "Thon himself, with his enthusiasm for a Jewish National Home in Palestine was largely responsible for my decision in 1907 to make a journey to Palestine." Jacob Thon himself settled there at the end of 1907, while Ruppin's visit resulted in his decision to do the same: "The possibilities of the country attracted me. True, there were excellent prospects for me in Germany as an economist, or lawyer, or university lecturer. But I had a feeling that no matter how much I would achieve, I would continue to encounter hostility and be regarded as an outsider. I was hoping that in Palestine I would be able to work without friction as a member of the community." There were other factors as well that drove him to Palestine. These proved less practical and more idealistic and are revealed in his following entry: "From the age of 14, at least, I had cherished great ambitions, which grew during the next ten years. It seemed a waste of time to lead the life of a Philistine and be content with satisfying material needs alone. I wanted to accomplish higher things and be remembered by posterity." Palestine could offer him a chance to accomplish these higher things. After visiting Palestine for the first time he imagined large-scale settlement there and became "so enthusiastic about the possibilities that I accepted without hesitation the

1 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 74.
2 Ibid., p. 86.
3 Ibid., p. 44.
suggestion of the Zionist Action Committee to emigrate to Palestine as the representative of the Zionist Organization.¹ Ruppin, a practical man, saw Palestine as the place in which to make his contribution to the Zionist cause. As head of the Palestine office which he established in Jaffa in 1908, Ruppin was responsible for Zionist settlement in Palestine. In this new field, for which there was no model to follow, Ruppin was aided by his knowledge of economics and sociology. His character was not that of an adventurer or gambler. He was hardened by experiences of poverty during his youth which taught him self-discipline, as is evident from his diary in which he made entries concerning his future plans. Upon becoming fifteen he drew up a complete program for his life up to the age of thirty. He included in it the years he would work as an apprentice, the clubs he would join, the languages he would study, his service in the army, his income over the years, and especially the sums he would earn, spend, give to his parents, and save². Although his life did not proceed according to this plan, the fact that he formulated one is revealing of his character, attesting to the practical nature of the man and his suitability to the most difficult task undertaken by him. For it was left to him among

¹ Ibid., p. 76
² For more details Ibid., pp. 31-32.
Zionist leaders to make a reality of their dreams. Between 1908 and the outbreak of World War I Ruppin laid the foundations for Zionist settlement in Palestine. He began his work with very few means at his disposal, but worked relentlessly to raise funds for the purchase of land and the maintenance of new institutions in Palestine. Ruppin initiated the purchase of what later became known as Hadar HaCarmel, Haifa. When work began on the Technion building in 1909, the slopes of Mount Carmel were still uninhabited. Realizing that the area would become a new commercial center and wishing to avoid a situation where a Jewish institute would be surrounded by Arab land, Ruppin endeavored to acquire it as soon as possible. He suggested to professor Otto Warburg that a Palestine Real Estate Company be established for the purpose of purchasing land in Haifa and Tel-Aviv. Warburg and his advisor Abraham Avadirovits agreed to this proposal and raised the necessary capital for the purchase of the land around the Technion.

Ruppin was also instrumental in the purchase of large tracts of land in the Jesreel Valley, in the establishment of Tel-Aviv and in the acquisition of land in Jerusalem on which a significant part of the New City was built, e.g. the Rehaviya Quarter. He also helped raise money for the maintenance of the Bezalel School, founded by professor Boris Schatz, in Jerusalem.

* This included the purchase in 1910 of the grounds on which Merhaviya was established and the acquisitions after World War I of the land for Nahalal, Ginegar, Kfar Yehzkel, Geva, Ein Barod, Tel Yosef, and Beit Alfa.
In 1905, Dalaika (Kinneret) and Um Juni (Degania) were acquired for the Jewish National Fund. It was Ruppin's task to put these lands to use, for under Turkish law they could have been expropriated if left idle for a period of three years. In 1908 he established the first Zionist farm, Kinneret. Repeatedly Ruppin was called upon to mediate the quarrels between Kinneret's manager and its workers.

In 1909, on the occasion of the first workers' strike in Kinneret, Ruppin had a long conversation with them. They complained about the manager's high standard of living in comparison with theirs' and about his domineering personality. The workers expressed the desire to replace him by a committee selected from their midst. Ruppin refused to hand the whole Kinneret farm over to the workers, for it seemed to him too much of a risk. He agreed to let six select workers manage a farm independently in the area of Um Juni (Degania) and drew up a contract in German which he and the six workers signed. Thus was founded the first kvutzah. Ruppin followed the development of Degania with particular interest and became convinced that in many instances the conditions of the country made the kvutzah the most suitable means of cultivating the soil.

While the Jewish workers in Palestine supported the establishment of the kvutzot, the middle class Zionists who constituted a majority on Zionist boards and at Zionist congresses, regarded them as expensive experiments of a socialist and even communist character. Ruppin was

1 Ibid., pp. 98-103.
neither a socialist nor a communist. He established this type of settlement out of purely practical considerations. He believed that the kvutzah offered the best and cheapest way of making young Jews familiar with Palestinian agriculture.\(^1\) He and other supporters of the kvutzah had a hard struggle with its opponents. They successfully resisted the dissolution of the kvutzot founded in 1927. These developed into the prosperous settlements of Ramat David, Sarid, Gevat, and Mishmar ha'Emek.

On 2,000 dunam bought for the Yishuv in Huldah Ruppin decided to plant the Herzl Forest, for the lack of water made this area unsuitable for cultivation. Ruppin employed Jewish laborers for this task. He also decided to hire Jews to guard the forest, at a time when it was still the practice to hire Arab watchmen to guard Jewish property.\(^2\)

Ruppin's attempt to extend settlement activities was hampered by a lack of funds. As part of an effort to raise private capital for agricultural and urban settlements Ruppin wrote two pamphlets: "Land Purchase in Palestine" and "Establishing Plantations in Palestine". In these pamphlets he recommended the purchase of land to be planted with almonds, olives or oranges and suggested the formation of companies of planters for which the name Ahuzah was adopted. As a result of this proposal and two

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 106.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 99.
visits by Ruppin to Russia, one in 1913, and the other in the following year, several such companies were founded by wealthy Jews. The companies established plantations in Kfar Saba, Kerkur, Bir Adas, Kfar Uriah, Poriah, and Ruhamah. Although most failed, in some cases, such as Kerkur and Kfar Saba, new settlements came into existence out of the plantations.¹

While the farms Ruppin helped establish could employ hundreds of workers, the Second Aliyah brought thousands who were eager to find work. These workers sought employment on the plantations established by members of the First Aliyah which employed cheaper and more experienced Arab labour. A conflict arose between the young socialists of the Second Aliyah who wanted to take the place of the Arab workers, and the members of the First Aliyah who resisted such a move. Ruppin sought to solve this problem by providing inexpensive housing for the Jewish workers and thus make it easier for them to compete with Arab labour. He also proposed the formation of workers' groups to undertake jobs on a contractual basis. Finally he sought to attract Yemenite Jews who were used to a hot climate and a low standard of living. By 1913 the number of Jewish farm workers had risen from a few hundred to 1,000, and by 1938 to 10,000.²

¹ Ibid., p. 108.
² Ibid., p. 110.
Arthur Ruppin made good use of the fact that he was a German national. Already before World War I he had established very good relations with the German Consuls in Jerusalem and Jaffa. These relations continued after war broke out. Through the unofficial intervention of the German consulates with their Turkish allies Ruppin was successful in mitigating some of Jamal Pasha's excesses against the Jews of Palestine.¹ On occasions he also managed to solicit the assistance of high ranking German officers who came to Palestine in the service of the German or Turkish armies. In Jerusalem he met them in the German Consulate or the Hotel Fast. General Kress, then Jamal Pasha's chief of staff, was particularly helpful by modifying some of Jamal Pasha's harsh measures in favor of the Yishuv. Ruppin added that Jamal hesitated to take any direct measures against him, for he was a German citizen and Jamal knew of his good relations with the German authorities². After his expulsion from Palestine in 1916, he continued to obtain help from the German embassy in Constantinople in his efforts to thwart Jamal Pasha's anti-Jewish measures³. While still in Palestine he was assisted by the German embassy in his efforts to maintain contact with Richard Lichtheim, then operating, on behalf of the Zionist Organization, out of Constantinople.⁴

¹ Bein editor, op. cit., p. 158.
² Ibid., p. 159.
³ Ibid., p. 165.
⁴ Ibid., p. 155.
Ruppin served as a contact between the Jews in Palestine and the Zionist Executive in Berlin. When Ruppin and Lichtheim went to see the U.S. ambassador in Constantinople, the latter was accused by German counterespionage section IIIb* of consorting with the enemy and was called to Berlin. There he remained during the war years, although exonerated from any guilt. Ruppin thus took over Lichtheim's position as representative of the Zionist Organization in Constantinople and continued to serve the Zionist cause for the rest of his days. But his greatest contribution was in the period before World War I, during which time he worked in cooperation with the pioneers of the Second Aliyah who started arriving in the country in 1905, and laid the foundation for Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Another leading individual to settle in Palestine in the early days of the Yishuv was Dr. Elias Auerbach who came to Haifa with his young wife in 1909. Unlike Ruppin who went there on a specific mission with an assured income, Auerbach went to Palestine completely on his own. His interest in Zionism was awakened by another German Jew, Heinrich Loewe, who had studied Jewish history, Hebrew, and Arabic. This Zionist's stories about Palestine had their desired impact on Auerbach. In his youth Auerbach had joined the Turnverein (sports club) Bar Kochba.

* According to Lichtheim, who learned of this much later, the instigator of this was a Dr. Paul Weitz, the unofficial director of the German Information Bureau in Constantinople. Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 369.
but Zionism alone would not have been sufficient motivation for him to settle in Palestine, for this was not the case with most German Zionists. Auerbach was imbued with a spirit of romanticism. In a bazar in Tangier, while touring the Mediterranean, he came across a gentleman in a white suite who turned out to be a Jewish physician from Germany practicing in this Moroccan city. Auerbach entered in his autobiography: "I thought that I will look similarly some day". When he first visited Palestine in 1909, in preparation for settlement there, he was attracted to Haifa, partially, he admitted, by the romantic notion he had acquired about the city from reading Herzl's *Altneuland*. Dr. Auerbach became the first practicing Jewish physician in Haifa. In 1911, he opened the first Jewish hospital in the city. For his small hospital Auerbach received a yearly subvention 1,000 francs from the Frauenbund für jüdische Kulturarbeit in Palästina. Jacob Reich, a wealthy Zionist from Munich, sent him a large crate with the linen required for the hospital. His nurse he recruited from the Ernst Herrmann family which had come from Germany in 1910, and whose eldest daughter

1 Auerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
2 Ibid., p. 203.
* Actually Dr. Ester Ginsberg, a sister of Achad Ha'am settled there before him, but she worked very little, specializing in internal medicine.
** The writer himself was born in this hospital.
3 Ibid., p. 261.
had been trained as a nurse in Germany. Ernst was a friend from Berlin whom he knew from his days in the Bar Kochba group. An additional source of income since 1909 was a yearly grant of 400 francs from the Hilfsverein, to assure hygienic conditions in the Haifa kindergartens.

Various other German Jewish personalities were to be encountered in these early days of the Yishuv. Ruppin reported that in 1916 there were 45 families from Germany, numbering 166 individuals, in Jerusalem, and 35 persons in Jaffa. In the early 1920s a group from Germany, called Kwutzat Markenhoff, after receiving agricultural training in Germany, spent two years cultivating an area it had rented near Ein Ganim. In 1927 it moved to the Jordan Valley where it established the collective settlement of Bet Zera.* German Zionists visiting Palestine could always find old comrades and fellow members of students' societies. In 1910 Dr. Wilhelm Brünn, a German Jewish physician, also came to Palestine. Initially he settled in Hadera where he planted an orange grove. In 1911 Nathan Strauss, partner in the R.H. Macy and Company, visited Palestine. He became ill.

1 Ibid., p. 263.
2 Ibid., p. 235.

* In 1922, another group of pioneers, from Czechoslovakia and Germany, established themselves in the Jezreel Valley calling their settlement Cheftziba.
and asked Dr. Wilhelm Brünn, then still practicing in Ha-
dera, to accompany him to Europe. Brünn discussed with him his plan to combat malaria and trachoma, then prevalent in the country. Strauss proclaimed his readiness to establish an institute in Jerusalem for this purpose and to have Brünn take charge of it. This was the origin of the Nathan and Linda Strauss Health Center in Jerusalem. Siegfried Hoofien arrived in Palestine in the same year as Brünn. There he became Assistant Director, and later Director, of the Anglo-Palestine Bank.* In the 1930s he played a prominent role in the transfer negotiations with Germany.

Another German Jew, Joseph Treidel, came to Palestine as early as 1904. This agricultural expert was sent there by the Jewish Colonization Association to work as a surveyor. He was not a Zionist, but for his work in Palestine he may be counted among the early pioneers. Later he was joined by his mother and two younger brothers, Alfred and Oskar. Alfred Treidel settled in Kinneret as a farmer, and Oskar worked as a chemist with Aaron Aaronsohn first in Zichron Yaacov and later in the first experimental agricultural station in Atlit.

The Verband jüdischer Frauen für Kultur-
arbeit in Palästina in Berlin provided the funds for the establishment and maintenance of a school in Kinneret. In Jerusalem Dr. Moritz Wallach,

* Now known as Bank Leumi Le Israel.
who had come to Palestine in 1889, established and administered the most modern Jewish hospital in the city. This hospital, Shaare Zedek, was subsidized through the financial assistance of German and Dutch Jews. When Ruppin was ready to purchase land in the Jezreel Valley, a young agronomist, Elias Blumenfeld, came to his assistance by offering cash sufficient to purchase 1,000 dunam. In one instance Elias Auerbach relates how a non-Zionist friend of his from Germany was attracted to Palestine. Alex Baerwald, an architect, was hired by the Hilfsverein to build the Technion in Haifa. When offered the job he accepted immediately, since this gave him a chance to visit his friend Auerbach. Baerwald later became a Zionist, and in 1924 settled in Haifa, becoming a teacher of architecture at the Technion. In 1909, on his way to Rechovot, Auerbach came across a young German Jewish farmer by the name of Weiner, the brother of his Hebrew teacher in Berlin. In Haifa, another Weiner, Rivkah Weiner, ran a kindergarten founded by the Hilfsverein. She had received her training in Berlin.

In 1911 work began in Merchavia on a cooperative settlement according to the plans of Professor Franz Oppenheimer.* the work was administered by another Jew from Ger-

1 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 115.
2 Auerbach, op. cit., pp. 236-237.
3 Ibid., p. 229.

* Franz Oppenheimer was a well known Jewish economist and sociologist. His work on producers' cooperatives influenced the colonization forms in Palestine. This applied particularly to the middle class settlements established after 1933.
many, Solomon Dyk.

The relations between the German Zionists in Palestine and the German colonists (Templars), as well as with the German representatives in the Middle East is of interest. The early settlers established good relations with the Templars. Elias Auerbach formed intellectual companionships with some of these colonists in Haifa. Their common interest in the Bible was instrumental here, but the fact that they shared a common German culture also played a role. Richard Lichtheim, in describing his visit to Haifa in 1910, points out that the nicest part of the city was the German Colony. He described the Templar colony of Sarona as a model settlement with pretty houses and blooming gardens. A comparison of Sarona with Petach Tikva would put a Jewish traveler in a melancholic mood, he wrote. But he added that all beginnings are hard and that one could not expect the same achievement from Jews who had just come out of the Ghettos of Eastern Europe, as of people who have a thousand years of peasant tradition behind them.

Ruppin was also impressed by the German colonies in Palestine. At times he looked at them as models of what could be done there. He pointed out that these colonists were successful because both the man and woman of the household helped run the farms. This, he believed, would

1 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 174.
2 Ibid., p. 165.
have to be emulated by the Jewish pioneers. German Jewish Zionists visiting Palestine would very often select hotels run by Templars as most appealing and suitable to their taste. Products such as fresh milk or cheese were bought from the German colonists, for these were not handled in a sufficiently sanitary manner, for them, by the Arabs. Auerbach found these Germans to be competent, honest, and forthright. On the whole, the generation he met in Palestine when he came there in 1909, was not anti-Semitic. He added that in Haifa he knew all of them very well. There were only four in the whole colony which he suspected of harbouring anti-Semitic feelings, and he informs the reader that all four were well educated people. Those who later supported the Nazis were descendents of that generation.¹ This close affinity with the Germans, or at least their culture, is understandable, for Palestine and its population were strange to the German Zionists who often remained German citizens and retained an attachment to their former homeland. To Ruppin even the immigrants of the second Aliyah seemed strange. He wrote of them: "They were predominantly motivated by emotion, tended to hold endless discussions, were unreliable, unpunctual, and inaccurate in their work". On the other hand he gave recognition to their enthusiasm and to their "invaluable contribution" to the agricultural colonization of Palestine. He indicated

that he had developed friendly relations with many of these East European immigrants and noted with satisfaction that after living in poverty for many years a number of them came to hold leading positions in the Yishuv. The cultural gap between the German and East European Jews is exhibited most pointedly when we compare the former's favorable impressions of the Templar villages and Ruppin's description of the East European agricultural settlements. He was critical of the way they maintained their equipment and dwellings, which he found dirty and disorderly, and added: "It is also questionable if we will be able to infuse a greater sense of beauty into the present generation". He criticized these settlers as lacking a sense of beauty and "inner relations with material things", stating that, if they owned a house for example, they regarded it merely as an object of wealth and income and did not appreciate its beauty and charm. Ruppin attributed this to the continual instability and fear in the life of East European Jewry. German Jews who saw things as Ruppin did must have been disturbed, for having been raised under a more rigid German system, they found it difficult to adjust to conditions and outlooks alien to them. For the willingness to live and work under the most primitive conditions,

1 Bein editor, op cit., p. 94.
as was required of the Chalutzim, was much more apparent among the youth of Eastern Europe than that of Germany.

The German culture in men like Ruppin was a legacy they would carry for life. In a February, 1925, diary entry he stated that since the use of German had come to be viewed as in bad taste, he had become dumb. He added that this would always remain the case because even if he could still learn Hebrew, "it will never become the delicate instrument that the German language has been for me." When it came to choosing a name for his daughter, Ruppin had Agnon read him names from the Bible Concordance. He finally chose the name Aya, which he liked, adding "was this not the name of Goethe's mother?" Ruppin did not find easy the decision to give up his German citizenship. In November, 1926, after handing in his application for naturalization, he wrote: "I must admit that I find it rather difficult to give up my German nationality. After all, I was born in Germany, educated in German schools..." In March, 1927, he became a Palestinian citizen and his diary entry of that day shows that he was still unsure of his decision. "The future will show whether I have done the right thing in giving up my German passport, but I believe that I had to take this step as a Zionist and in the interest of my children who will not be half at home here and half in Germany."
Elias Auerbach relates that every January 27, he and Treidel would ride to the German Consul in a frock and high hat to celebrate Kaiser Wilhelm II's birthday. When World War I broke out a contingent of 36 German citizens left Haifa for service in the German army. Most were from the Templar colony, but there were three Jews among them, Elias Auerbach, Oskar Treidel, and David Tachauer (a mathematics teacher). These underwent great hardships on their way to Germany via Syria, Turkey, and numerous European countries. Elias Auerbach even earned the Iron Cross I for his part in the war on the German side. In explaining his decision to fight for Germany, Auerbach pointed out that he still had strong feelings of attachment to the country to which he owed the basis of his education, and which at the time did not persecute its Jews. But the decisive reasons were the fact that he was obligated to serve and would have had to report to the German authorities sooner or later. Finally he felt that it was his duty.

German Zionists played a predominant role in the management of the affairs of the Yishuv during World War I for as long as it remained under Turkish control. This was attributed to the contacts these had with the German governmental authorities, and in turn the latter's influence in Constantinople. Warburg and Hantke operated from Berlin, Richard Lichtheim from Constanti-

1 Auerbach, op. cit., pp. 353-355, 375.
nople, and Ruppin from Jaffa. When Ruppin was exiled from Palestine, he was replaced by the Austrian Dr. Jacob Thon.

Negotiations that began in Constantinople with the German authorities were resumed in Berlin and led to a promise by the German Government to protect the Jews in Palestine during the war years. This it did by intervening with the Turkish authorities on their behalf, and more specifically by persuading them to let the Russian Jews remain in Palestine.

On November, 1915, the German Consulate in Palestine received written orders to protect Jewish interests. According to Richard Lichtheim the survival of the Yishuv would have been doubtful had it not been for the German intervention on its behalf. And although Germany acted thus in order to win favor with world Jewry, Lichtheim believed this protection could not have been obtained had not the center of the world Zionist movement remained in Berlin, with German Zionists still holding key positions in the movement. According to him a non-German Jewish leadership would have been unable to obtain the same degree of help from the German authorities.

1 ריכאדה ליכטנשטיין, המלדונות הציוניות /^remium: דרשה
In the early years of the Zionist movement there was only a handful of German Jews in Palestine. Most of the early Zionists knew Palestine from books, pictures, and the description of others. Under Herzl's and later Wolffsohn's leadership the doctrine of political Zionism predominated. Herzl opposed settlement prior to the attainment of a charter, believing in the possibility of a massive and well organized immigration. Such an immigration could be realized, according to Herzl, only through an agreement with both the country in whose territory the Jews would settle, and the country from which they would emigrate. On the other hand he saw an unorganized and unplanned immigration of small groups as a potential obstacle to his larger plan. Wolffsohn, who succeeded Herzl in 1904, remained faithful to this doctrine.

Otto Warburg, a member of a wealthy assimilated German Jewish family, became active in the Zionist Organization as early as 1903, when he was elected Chairman of the Palestine Commission at the sixth Zionist Congress at Basle. The commission replaced the Colonization Committee which had been elected annually from the time of the second congress, but which in fact was ineffective. The new commission, headed by Warburg (botanist), included also Dr. Soskin (agronomist), and Dr. Franz Oppenheimer (economist). Its task was to carry out a scientific study. It became the organ most responsible for Zionist settlement work in Palestine.* With the tide rising in favor of the

* The Palestine Commission replaced the Colonization Committee at the instance of the German Zionists and was headed by German Jews. Dr. Soskin, although born in Russia, was educated in Germany and was a German citizen.
practical Zionists,* Otto Warburg was elected in 1911, to the Chairmanship of the World Zionist Organization.

Initially Warburg favored large-scale Jewish settlement not only in Palestine, but in the surrounding countries as well. This, he believed, would provide Palestine with a reservoir of political and economic strength. Although Warburg himself never settled in Palestine he promoted practical settlement work there up to the outbreak of World War I, after which this became impossible. During the war years his activities were concentrated on the political front, where he used his influence with the German Foreign Ministry to check Turkish persecution of the Jews in Palestine. After World War I Warburg dedicated himself to scientific work in Palestine directing the agricultural research station in Rechovot, and later heading the botany department of the Hebrew University. During these years he was a frequent visitor to Palestine, but according to Richard Lichtheim, his strong desire to settle there remained unfulfilled because of his wife's illness. He died in Germany in 1938.

Warburg made a marked contribution to the Jewish settlement of Palestine. Numerous institutions connected with practical work in Palestine came into being under his influence or with his financial assistance. These included

* These favored immediate settlement in Palestine in contrast to the political Zionists who opposed settlement prior to the attainment of a charter.

1 Ibid., p. 132.
in 1904 the Olive Tree Fund of the Jewish National Fund, in 1905 the Bezalel School in Jerusalem, in 1906 the Palestine Plantation Association, in 1907 the Palestine Industrial Syndicate, in 1908 the Palestine Land Development Company, in 1909 the Tiberias Plantation Company, and in 1911 the Experimental Agricultural Station in Atlit. He helped promote land purchases by the Jewish Colonization Association and the Jewish National Fund and encouraged private investment in Palestinian industry and commerce, as well as in agriculture.

In 1910, a group of leading German Zionists made a tour of Palestine. These included Dr. Franz Oppenheimer, Dr. Theodor Zlocisti, Richard Lichtheim, Ludwig Pinner, and Dr. Brünn. Of this group only Dr. Brünn remained there, settling in Hadera. More organized visits followed, but German Zionists did not feel a pressing need to move to Palestine. Anti-Semitism did exist in Germany, but seemed to present no immediate danger, and from an economic standpoint German Jewry was relatively well off. The view was commonly held among Zionists in Eastern as well as Western Europe that the Jewish National Home had to be established in the first place as a refuge for Eastern European Jewry which was impoverished and faced persecution. A number of leading German Zionists, among them Adolf Friedemann, Franz Oppenheimer, Max Bodenheimer and Herman Struck viewed Zionism not only as a political movement, but also as a philanthropic enterprise. They saw it as the duty of
the better off Jews of Western Europe to help their poorer East European Brothers. ¹ Oppenheimer expressed his view to Kurt Blumenfeld that Zionism is a movement in which the German Jews must be the leaders and the Jews of Eastern Europe must be the actors. ² Adolph Friedemann similarly believed that the German Zionists, and all together the West European Zionists, should be the officers of the movement and that the Polish and Russian Zionists should be led by them. ³ On the other hand there were German Zionists who held the view expressed by Kurt Blumenfeld in 1912 at the 13th meeting of the delegates of the German Zionist Organization, where he proposed that every Zionist should include within his life's program moving to Palestine and strive to establish economic interests there. This proposal received the enthusiastic support of most of the delegates and was adopted. ⁴

In those early years neither the Zionist leaders of Germany nor those of Eastern Europe saw an immediate need for them to settle in Palestine. There was more to be done among the masses in Europe and on the political front there and in Constantinople. Zionism made few converts in Germany. For here the Jews had been emancipated and believed themselves to be at home. Most of the German Zionists came from the

¹ Ibid., p. 108.
³ Ibid., p. 59.
⁴ Auerbach, op. cit., p. 317.
middle class, and a few from the upper class. Included among them was a large representation of university men who, according to Arthur Ruppin, formed the "very heart of the movement". It is clear that Palestine could have absorbed only a small number of such immigrants if they had intended to continue in their professions there.

After the publication of the Balfour Declaration the center of Zionist activity began shifting from Berlin to London. But an increasing number of leading German Jews had become more sympathetic to Zionist aspirations, some even becoming Zionists. Among them were Alfred Tietz (owner of a large Cologne department store) Oskar Wassermann (director of the Deutsche Bank), Dr. Leo Baeck, and Albert Einstein. Wassermann accepted the chairmanship of the Karen Hayesod in Germany, and Tietz served as chairman of the branch organization in the Rhineland. Einstein became a Zionist, and when Ruppin inquired as to why he did so, Einstein replied that he saw it as an idea which provided the Jews with the only possibility of remaining a dignified community. He explained that in this nationalistic world nationalism alone remained a binding force for the Jews. Many of the members of the Centralverein came to accept the idea of a Jewish National Home, some even becoming contributors and active supporters of Keren Hayesod, all this without

becoming Zionists themselves. According to Martin Rosenbluth, some of the younger members of the Centralverein even formed hachashara groups and underwent training in preparation for settlement in Palestine. In 1929 Max and Felix Warburg visited Palestine. Ruppin, reporting about the former, stated that although so far he had only seen little of Palestine, he was "extremely enthusiastic" with what he saw, adding that until then he had been considered a "pronounced anti-Zionist".

German Zionists still did not come to Palestine in large numbers. Some turned down positions offered there. In May, 22, 1923, Arthur Ruppin wrote that although he wished to resign he has found no one to fill his post. Schocken, who was considered as a replacement, refused to come to Palestine. At another instance Ruppin wrote about Dr. Elias Strauss whom he wanted in Palestine as manager of the Palestine Land Development Company. Ruppin complained that after having been in Palestine for six weeks, he was about to return to Germany without having decided whether to accept the offer. He added: "Our people are too cautious; they do not want to give up anything in Europe in exchange for something new in Palestine. This is frequently a mistake, for one must take the risk."

1 Rosenbluth, op. cit., p. 235.
2 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 224.
* Schlomo Zalmon Schocken (1877 - 1959), German businessman and publisher. He settled in Jerusalem in 1933.
3 Ibid., p. 208.
4 Ibid., p. 221.
German Jewish Zionists played a major role in the Brith Schalom movement which came into being in the 1920s. It sought to promote Arab-Jewish friendship and favored the creation of a bi-national state with Jews and Arabs having an equal share in the administration. Among the prominent German Zionists associated with this organization were Robert Weltch, Felix Rosenbluth, Radler Feldmann,* Arthur Ruppin, Professor Joseph Horowitz (Frankfurt), Zalman Schocken, Jacob Thon (Austria), Dr. Franz Oppenheimer, and Dr. Georg Landauer. Ruppin wanted it to be a research group for the Zionist leadership. Others urged that it formulate and attempt to implement its own political program. The German influence in the party was so overwhelming that when Ussishkin attacked the Brith Schalom, he also attacked "the Germans, whose special mentality expressed itself in the Brith Schalom"** and went on to call them "criminals".¹

The Brith Schalom was opposed by most of the Zionist parties and ceased to exist in the 1930s.

Some of the German Zionists who came to Palestine in 1933 and after may have eventually done so even without the pressure of the National Socialists. Others did not leave Germany for Palestine, but continued to serve the Zionist cause from other countries.

* Rabbi Benjamin Joshua Radler-Feldmann worked in the Palestine Office for a number of years. Later he became known as a writer under the name Rabbi Benjamin.

** The Brit Schalom had great ideological similarities with the Aliyah Chadasha, formed in 1942 by German Jews in Palestine.

¹ Bein editor, op. cit., p. 250.
Martin Rosenblüth and his brother Felix were born to an orthodox Jewish family that was also thoroughly imbued with the German culture. His parents saw to it that every new-born member of the family was given both a Jewish name and a cognate German one. Martin relates that the awakening of Messingwerk, (where he and his family lived) to Zionism was a gradual process. He stated that "like other German Jews we considered ourselves Germans of Jewish faith. We thought of ourselves as citizens who enjoyed equal rights with all other citizens, in nearly all cases". When Zionism reached the Rosenblüth family, his brother Felix (Pinchas Rosen) was the first to be won over, next were his parents, but Martin himself was not convinced. What finally persuaded him was his contact with East European Jews fleeing pogroms and passing in 1906 through Germany on their way to the United States. In his work aiding East European Jews he said: "I began to feel for the first time the truth of the Zionist doctrine of the unity of the Jewish people".

What finally prompted him to join the Zionist Organization was a lecture by Professor Eugen Taeubler who spoke of the relationship between Zionism and German culture, emphasizing that the German Zionists need not regret the influence of their education and upbringing. He suggested that they build their new ideas on the "solid basis" of their background. Many of the Rosenblüth family had moved to Palestine before 1933. By the time his parents visited the country in 1924, three of their children had already settled

1 Rosenblüth, op. cit., p. 116.
2 Ibid., p. 134.
there. His sister Mali who, with her husband Dr. Felix Danziger had come to Palestine in 1923, founded a hospital in Jerusalem together with Dr. Albert Sachs*. Another brother, Leo, was a physician in Rishon le Zion, and Felix had preceded his parents to Palestine, having gone there for a year to learn Hebrew and prepare for settlement. Martin served as Executive Vice-President of the German Zionist Federation until April 1, 1929. He then became Executive Director of Keren Hayesod in Germany under the joint chairmanship of Blumenfeld and Oskar Wassermann, an office which he retained until he left Germany in April, 1933. The German Zionist Federation sent him to London as an accredited representative where he worked with the Jewish Agency on matters relative to the emigration of Jews from Germany. His particular task was to see to it that funds raised for the relief of German Jewish refugees be directed towards their settlement in Palestine. Among his family members Felix Rosenblüth attained the greatest prominence in the Zionist movement and in Israel. He played a major role in the Zionist students movement and in 1911 was a co-founder of the youth movement Blau-Weiss. From 1920 to 1923, he served as chairman of the Zionist Organization of Germany. Between 1926 and 1931, he served as a member of the Zionist Executive in London and returned to Palestine in 1931. In the same year his wi-

* Albert Sachs, who moved to Palestine in 1923 was responsible, with a few friends, for the initiation and foundation in 1933 of the Jüdischer Wanderbund Blau-Weiss (Jewish Blue-Whit Hiking Club). At its height this organization had a membership of over three thousand Jewish youths who combined Sunday hikes with Zionist education.
dowed mother had moved to Tel-Aviv. By 1933 all the Rosen­
bluths, with the exception of Martin and his family, had settled in Palestine. There were German Zionists like Max Bodenheimer who did not move to Palestine until 1935, but whose son Frederick was there already in 1922 as an ento­
mologist in the new agricultural experimental station in Tel-Aviv.

Kurt Blumenfeld was born to an assimilated Ger­
man Jewish family. His father was a judge in Insterberg 
and most of his parents' friends were non-Jews. In school 
he had non-Jewish colleagues and never experienced any anti­
Semitic incidents. In his youth he remained unaware of the 
existence of a special Jewish question. As a small boy he 
was taken aback by the words of a Catholic maid who told 
him that she went to confess to her priest about her sins. 
Upon inquiring as to what these were she informed him that 
she was employed by Jews. Upon further inquiry as to why 
this was a sin, she answered that the Jews after all had 
crucified Christ.¹

In 1904, Kurt Blumenfeld went to Berlin for his 
studies and the same year he joined the Zionist movement. 
He came to the conclusion that in addition to a religious 
there was also a national cohesion to the Jewish people. 
According to him Zionism was necessary not only for Jews 
without a homeland, but even for those born on Germany.²

¹ Blumenfeld, op.cit., p. 27. 
² Ibid., p. 36.
Felix Rosenblüth, who was raised in an orthodox Jewish family, he was introduced to another aspect of Judaism. Through conversations with Felix it became clear to him that he could only be a Jew as Zionist. Blumenfeld became known for his "Post-Assimilationist Zionism" which he evolved to appeal to already assimilated Jews. When called upon to serve as an official in the Zionist party he gave a positive response, although just then he was preparing for the bar exam. He decided to give up law, stating that he did not want to become a lawyer in a "small East Prussian Nest" and to remain in a world in which he felt he could not breathe. From 1910 to 1914, he served as director of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Executive. Nahum Sokolow proposed to Blumenfeld that he become the editor of the Welt, then the central organ of the Zionist Organization. This post Blumenfeld accepted and held from 1913 to 1914. In April of the latter year he undertook his first journey to Palestine, going there as part of a Zionist commission. He was impressed by the natural beauty of the land and was particularly struck by the old city of Jerusalem and the site of the Temple. The latter determined for all times his conviction that the Jewish question and Zionism were inseparably bound to Israel and Zion.

From 1923 to 1933, he was president of the German Zionist Federation. Among the founders of Keren Haysod in 1920, he became a member of its directorate in 1933, the year he settled in Palestine.

1 Ibid., p. 39.
2 Ibid., p. 49.
3 Ibid., p. 107.
Richard Lichtheim was born in Berlin to an assimilated family, which according to him believed assimilation to the German Volk to be a necessity or even an obligation. In 1904, at the age of 19, he became aware of the Zionist movement and soon thereafter, as a student, joined the Zionist fraternity Hasmonēa. Lichtheim became convinced of the fact that anti-Semitism was a much stronger and more deeply rooted force than his parents' generation had understood it to be. He was particularly aroused by the attitude of such respected Germans as the philosopher Eduard Hartmann and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke who took the Jews to task for not assimilating into German society quickly enough. Lichtheim was also influenced by Julius Longbehn's, Rembrand als Erzieher, von einem Deutschen (Rembrand as Educator, by a German), which stated that a Jew could never become a German. A few months later he was introduced to Houston Stewart Chamberlain's, Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, which was written in a similar vain. While all spoke in the name of German nationalism Treitschke and Hartmann insisted that the Jews be nothing but Germans while Longbehn proclaimed that they could never become Germans.

Although he personally did not suffer from anti-Semitism Lichtheim's observations convinced him that German Jewry was deluding itself about its situation. 1

1 Lichtheim, Rückkehr, op. cit., p. 17.
3 Ibid. p. 42.
4 Ibid. p. 43.
the Zionist Organization's Palestine Department which was established in 1907. In 1911, he became the editor of the Welt, a post he held until 1913. In that year he was sent to Constantinople as representative of the Zionist Executive where he remained until his aforementioned recall in 1917. From Constantinople Lichtheim was able to render invaluable service to the Yishuv by using his contacts with both the German and American representatives there. The German Foreign Office in Berlin was instrumental in arranging for the transfer of money from Germany to Palestine, and it also made possible Lichtheim's trip to Constantinople.\footnote{Ibid., p. 271.}

Through his connection with the United States Ambassador Henry Morgenthau (himself a Jew born in Germany) he was able to curb the physical persecution of the Jews in Palestine and provide economic assistance to the Yishuv. When the Turkish authorities decided to terminate the activities of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Lichtheim abtained Ambassador Morgethau's promise to intercede on behalf of the Yishuv. The latter persuaded the Turkish government to permit the reopening of the bank.\footnote{Ibid., p. 268.}

In the spring of 1914, Morgenthau visted Palestine and upon Lichtheim's recommendation he sought out Ruppin as soon as he landed. This enabled Ruppin to show Morgenthau some of the Jewish settlements,
and thus make a favorable impression on him. In September 1914, Morgenthau informed Ruppin that an American warship would arrive with much needed aid for the Yishuv. On the 6th of October 1914, the North Carolina arrived with 250,000 Francs (L 10,000) in gold. Aid continued to arrive, and once an entire ship, the S.S. Vulcan, was sent with provisions for the famine stricken Yishuv.

On December 18, 1914, Lichtheim received a telegram from Ruppin stating that Jamal Pasha was about to deport all the Russian Jews in Palestine. For Jamal Pasha had issued an order that enemy aliens in Palestine, who were mostly Russian Jews, would either have to become Ottoman subjects or leave the country. Many feared to renounce their nationality for according to the laws of their country, they would be committing high treason. Lichtheim went to the German Ambassador (Wangenheim) who promised to intercede with the Turkish authorities on behalf of the Yishuv. The German Ambassador kept his word and the order was rescinded. But Jamal Pasha had already deported 500 Jews who were rounded up on December 17th.

1 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 150.
2 Ibid., p. 151.
3 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 268.
4 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 152.
5 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 278.
Jamal Pasha placed obstacles in the way of Palestinian Jews who wished to become Turkish citizens and did not abide by the rule exempting naturalized citizens from the draft for one year. Morgenthau intervened with Talaat Bey* prompting him to make a favorable declaration. It stated that the Jews were no longer required to reside in Turkey for five years before becoming Ottoman citizens; that the fee for naturalization should no longer be 37 Frs. per person but per family; that those without means should be able to obtain citizenship without payment; that those who were newly naturalized would be free from military service for one year; and finally that women and children were to remain undisturbed. 1

In the beginning of 1915, Jamal Pasha sent a demand to the German embassy in Constantinople to have Ruppin recalled. Richard Lichtheim heard of this measure and managed to thwart it. 2 In Hans Wangenheim, the German Ambassador in Constantinople, Lichtheim found a sympathetic attitude towards the Zionists. Besides helping mitigate Jamal Pasha's anti-Jewish activities

* The Minister of the Interior and Acting Minister of Finance.
1 Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 282.
2 Bein editor, op. cit., p. 159.
the German authorities placed at Lichtheim's disposal their telegraphic code and their diplomatic courrier service. During the war years only the German embassy was permitted to send coded telegrams to its consulates in Turkey. The American embassy could send such telegrams to Washington, but not to its consulates in Palestine. Abraham Elkus, who replaced Morgenthau in 1916, continued the cooperation established between his predecessor and Lichtheim.

From 1921 to 1923, Lichtheim was a member of the Zionist Executive and head of its Organization Department. He left the Zionist Executive in protest against Weizmann's policy and joined the Revisionist movement in 1925 and in 1933 the Jewish State Party. In 1934 he settled in Palestine.

Georg Landauer, Director of the Palestine Office and of the Zionist Federation in Germany (1929-1933), settled in Palestine during the same year; after two earlier visits there. George Herlitz, archivist of the Zionist Organization, moved to Jerusalem in 1933, managing the rescue of the archival material from the Nazis* and its transfer to Palestine.

Robert Weltsch, born in Prague in 1891, joined

Lichtheim, op. cit., p. 283. * For a vivid account of how Herlitz managed to bring the 154 crates in which the material from the archives was packed, see his autobiography George Herlitz, Mein Weg nach Jerusalem; Erinnerungen eines zionistischen Beamten (Jerusalem: Verlag Rubin Mass, 1964).
the Zionist Bar Kochba society as a student. In 1921 he was elected by the 12th Zionist Congress at Carlsbad as alternate member of the Zionist Executive representing Hitahadut. He became editor of the *Jüdische Rundschau* in 1920 and continued in this post until 1938, when he left Germany to settle in Palestine. He thus remained to serve the German Zionist cause until it was no longer possible, for in that year his paper was forced to cease publication. His articles in the *Jüdische Rundschau* after Hitler's rise to power, raised the morale of German Jewry at a time when this was sorely needed.
III. MIGRATION FROM GERMANY TO PALESTINE AFTER 1933

In response to the crisis faced by German Jewry after Hitler's rise to power the leadership of the Yishuv began work on plans which they hoped would provide a practical solution to the problem. As early as the spring of 1933, Chaim Arlosoroff, then political head of the Jerusalem Department of the Jewish Agency, went to Germany to study the situation first hand. His conclusions were that the only solution to the plight of German Jewry lay in a mass emigration extended over a number of years in which Palestine would play a central role. He emphasized that Palestine would not be a temporary solution and thought in terms of a three or four year plan for the evacuation of German Jewry. Arlosoroff also made a distinction between an organized and planned migration to Palestine as opposed to an unplanned emigration of individuals to other countries. He also came to the conclusion that the liquidation and transfer of German Jewry's property would require an agreement with the German Government.1

Dr. Hantke of Keren Hayesod drafted a proposal for the settlement of German Jews in Palestine as early as June of 1933. He prefaced this proposal with a warning.

that his proposal will be subject to modification since there was no reliable information as to the number and categories of immigrants or as to the means they will bring out of Germany.

In the proposal itself Hantke estimated that 20,000 Jews will emigrate from Germany to Palestine during 1933 and 1934, approximately 1,000 persons a month. His impression, based on conversations with recent arrivals from Germany, was that 1,000 per month would probably represent a minimum estimate. Dr. Hantke added that if more than 20,000 German Jews would desire to come to Palestine, the Mandatory Government would have to grant more Labour Certificates, for he estimated that even out of 20,000 would be immigrants 60 per cent would have to come on a basis other than Labour Certificates. He added, that while in agriculture and industry large numbers of immigrants could be accommodated, this would not be the case with the academic professions and business. Hantke assumed that 20,000 German Jews, a group which heretofore provided few immigrants to Palestine, will be bound to attract further Jewish immigration from Germany. 1

In August, 1933, at the 18th Zionist Congress which was held in Prague, Arthur Ruppin expressed the hope that Palestine would be able to absorb 10,000 Jewish immigrants yearly from Germany.\(^1\) Chaim Weizmann recalled that after the Jewish catastrophe in Germany he expressed his opinion that the Jewish National Home in Palestine would have to play a major role in dealing with this problem.\(^2\) In May of 1934, he expressed an even stronger conviction as to the role of Palestine in this matter by stating that it alone was in a position to make a substantial contribution to the constructive solution of the German-Jewish problem.\(^3\)

On December 5, 1933, at the opening session of the Governing Board of the High Commission in Lausanne, James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees, gave recognition to the role that Palestine would have to play in solving the problem of German Jewry. He stated that it must have a role in the solution of that problem and that funds be


appropriated to the extent that Palestine is able to absorb Jews from Germany. ¹

As early as summer of 1933, a letter was sent out by the newly formed Vaad Meuchad le Yishuv Yehude Germania b’Erez Israel* (United Committee for the Settlement of German Jews in Israel) addressed to all Committees for the relief of German Jews. Its object was to "link up the Yishuv with every individual committee, so as to avoid the drawing up of conflicting schemes." It asked them to inform the Vaad Meuchad of their intentions and plans for assisting German Jews in Palestine. This circular also stated that four commissions were set up to aid in the settlement of Jews from Germany, e.g. one each for Agricultural Settlement headed by Dr. A. Ruppin, for Urban Settlement presided over by Mr. S. Hoofien, for Educational Purposes with Dr. Joseph Lurie as chairman, and an immigrant Committee, headed by Dr. E. Levy to help immigrants on arrival. ²

¹ Statement by James G. McDonald at the opening session of the Governing Board of the High Commission in Lausanne, December 5, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
² It was formed in 1933 in response to events in Germany. All the large organizations in the Yishuv took part in it. The Vaad Leumi took charge of directing its work. The work of the Vaad Meuchad was taken over by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

### Table II

**Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany during 1933 - March 1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigration from Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>6,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>8,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>4,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January - March 1939</td>
<td>3,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,395</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Travelers authorized to settle in Palestine 1933 - 1938**

3,077

**Estimate of immigrants entering through other places**

1,800

**Grand Total**

46,272

---

A. Graph of Jewish Immigration from Germany to Palestine 1933-1938 (figures based on table II)
B. Graph of Jewish Immigration from Germany to Palestine 1933-1938 by Four Major Categories (figures in 100s)

A-I Capitalist
B-III Students
D Dependents of Palestine Residents
C Labour Schedule

(Figures based on table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine)
Table II and graph A show that the immigration of Jews from Germany reached its peak year in 1934 and remained relatively high for the whole time period 1933-1936. A sharp decline occurred for the year 1937, and only a slight rise is shown for 1938. Graph B indicates a drop in immigration for 1937 in all four major categories. In 1938 all four categories show a rise, but only category B-III, students, reaches and surpasses its former level.

By mid 1935 the distribution of German Jews in Palestine between town and country was as follows:\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Settlements</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1939 the distribution of German Jews in Palestine was as follows:\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>approximately 16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Towns</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonies and Settlements</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures indicate that between 1935 and 1939 the German Jewish population of Tel-Aviv increased from 10,000 to 16,000, but less than doubled; that of Haifa

* The reasons for these changes are discussed in chapters IV and VI.

more than doubled by increasing from 5,000 to 11,000, and that of Jerusalem tripled, increasing from 2,000 to 6,000 during the same time period. The figures for Haifa, although indicating a somewhat more than 100 per cent increase, amounting to 6,000 persons, equalled in total the increase for the city with the largest population from Germany, namely Tel-Aviv. Jerusalem saw an increase of only 4,000, but this was a greater increase in relation to the prior size of its German Jewish population. In comparing Haifa and Jerusalem in this regard it must be noted that, as a port of entry, Haifa would tend to have a larger concentration of new immigrants than a city like Jerusalem which is located in the interior of the country. This would also help explain the relatively sharp rise in the German Jewish population of Jerusalem during the latter half of the 1930s, as German immigrants moved away from their ports of entry to other areas of the country.

German Jewish immigrants created new settlements in Palestine, among them: Ramot Hashavim, Gan Herzl, Kfar Shomaryahu ¹, Warburg, Shavei Zion **, Moledet, Shara-rah, Kvutzat Ein Gev, Kvutzat Tirat Zvi, Kvutzat Massad, Kvutzat Arich, Geulim, Kvutzat Ramifneh, Kvutzat Alonim,


**It was composed entirely of Jewish farmers from a village in Württemberg (Rexingen). In Germany they became a cooperative group. Based on a report The German Settlement in Palestine, 1938, Council for German Jewry, Zionist Archives, New York, p. 1.
Kvutzat Maayan, Ramat Hadar, and Hasorim.

Numerous German-Jewish immigrants were absorbed in Kvutzot. By March 31, 1939, 88 Kvutzot had absorbed 3,525 such newcomers. These included the following which received relatively large numbers of settlers from Germany: ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Kvutzah</th>
<th>Number of Settlers from Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Givat Brenner</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Rodges - Tirat Zwi</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaar Hanegev</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Hasorea</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Yagur</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Hugim, Shatta</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Harod</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Gesher</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Naana</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Haim</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Hugim, Maos-Raanah</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Bachrut</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Hakovesh</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Massad</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Bateleem, Ein Gev</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By March 1939, 1,200 German Jewish immigrants had settled in Moshavim. These included the settlements of: Moledet, Shaarah, Geulim, Hasorim, Ein Vered, Ein Iron, and Rishpon. ²

Two other areas in which a heavy concentration of German Jews settled were Kiryat Bialik and Naharia. The former is in the Haifa Bay area and the settlers for the most part worked in the different industries and offices in Haifa. Naharia was almost entirely settled by German smallholders who came to Palestine on a capitalist

¹Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 31.
²Ibid., p. 32.
visa. In February 1937, 150 families had settled there as farmers. In Germany most of the settlers had been engaged in the professions or in commerce. ¹

HAAVARA TRANSFERS AND PALESTINE

The Jewish Agency for Palestine, acting as a quasi-government, endeavored to convince governments and public bodies that in Palestine lay the solution to the refugee problem. It was also responsible for the Haavara agreement with the German Government. But even before the Jewish Agency undertook this task, a Palestinian Jewish businessman by the name of Sam Cohen was already negotiating with the German authorities. He represented the Hanotea Company which dealt with the planting and operation of orange groves. Cohen expressed his interest in importing to Palestine German goods which were to be paid for with blocked marks.

Meanwhile in June 1933 Arlosoroff was assassinated and on the Jewish side the initiative in transfer matters remained in the hands of private businessmen. As early as May 1933, an agreement was reached between the Reich Ministry of Economics and Hanotea on an account of up to one million marks ².

After the arrangement between Hanotea and German authorities became a fact the Zionist leadership in Germany decided to include itself in these dealings. They were reluctant to leave such important matters as the transfer of German Jewish capital to Palestine in the hands of a private company. After some difficult negotiations the German authorities increased the transferable capital to three million marks. 

As the Zionist leadership took charge of the transfer question, more far reaching arrangements were made. On August 7, 1933, a meeting took place at the Reich Ministry of Economics. There the Jewish representation consisted of Dr. Siegfried Moses and Dr. Georg Landauer, representing the Zionistischen Vereinigungen für Deutschland, S. Hoofien, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Sam Cohen and Machines, Hanotea. The purpose of the meeting was to work out a more comprehensive transfer agreement between Germany and Palestine. It was agreed upon that the Anglo-Palestine Bank, M.M. Warburg and Company, Hamburg, and A.E. Wassermann, Berlin, will form a company that will act in an advisory capacity only and will

not partake in the transfer and export transactions. This company was named Palästina Treuhandstelle zur Be-
ratung deutscher Juden G.m.b.H. or Paltreu. This company was based in Berlin with the purpose of advising German Jews about capital transfers to Palestine. It was further agreed that emigrants who received permission from the Auswanderungsberatungsstelle to transfer savings over and above the LI 1,000 required to obtain a capitalist visa, had to deposit them in a special account. Two special accounts were opened by Paltreu with the Reichsbank in the name of the Bank der Tempelgesellschaft 1. Special Account I was used in connection with the transfer of capital belonging to German Jews, including to immigrants to Palestine in the immediate future. Special Account II for the use of German Jews who, for the time being, remained in Germany, but who wished to transfer the whole or part of their capital to Palestine in order to ensure the possibility of immigration at a more distant future.

In November, 1933, the Trust and Transfer Office Haavara Ltd. was established. German Jews wishing to transfer their capital to Palestine through this agency deposited their money in one of the two accounts in the

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* The Reich Economic Ministry succeeded in this way to include in the agreement the Templer Bank of the German colonists in Palestine.
name of the Haavara. This money was then utilized by the Haavara agency in payment for goods ordered in Germany by Palestinian importers and traders. The equivalent of the sums thus expended, which the Haavara received from the Palestinian merchants in Palestine Pounds was then credited in Palestine to its German depositors.¹

The Haavara Ltd., Tel Aviv, became the official trust company for the transfer of capital by German Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The shares of Haavara belonged to the Anglo-Palestine Bank until 1935, and afterwards to the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Dr. Theodor Zlocisti, president of the Hitachdut Olej Germania headed its Board of Directors and Heinrich Margulies represented the directorate of the Anglo-Palestine Bank on the Board. The management of the Haavara was up to 1935 in charge of Leo David and Dr. Robert Weiss-Liwni. Dr. Werner Senator, who headed the Immigration Department as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, served as Chairman of the Board of Directors from 1935 on, and up to the outbreak of World War II.

The 19th Zionist Congress that met in the summer of 1935, decided that, in order to stimulate the emigration of German Jews to Palestine, the Executive

of the Jewish Agency should take over supervisory control over the operation of the Haavara. The Board of Haavara was reconstituted as follows: Two representatives of the Jewish Agency and one representative each of the Vaad Leumi, the German Zionist Federation, the German Immigrants Association and the Anglo-Palestine Bank. Besides Dr. Werner Senator, the Chairman, other members of the Board of Directors were: Dr. Georg Landauer, head of the German division of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Siegfried Saalheimer, representing the directorate of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, J. Brudney, head of the Workers' Bank as representative of the Vaad Leumi, Dr. Ludwig Pinner as representative of the Hitachdut Olej Germania and his stand-by Dr. Max Kreuzberger, and Dr. Sally Hirsch. Dr. Siegfried Moses, who was part of the Generaldirektorat, became a member of the Board of Directors in 1938.

TABLE III
The distribution of the total sums transferred up to June 30, 1939, was as follows:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A in cash direct to clients</td>
<td>LP 4,960.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Regular cash payments to recipients of pensions and dividends, and to pupils</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 45.

* The total amount includes sums paid directly in cash to the transfer clients, sums transferred for the national funds, sums invested by transfer clients in public and private, agricultural and industrial undertakings.
C National funds and institutions (transfer of contributions etc) 590.000

D Investment in the form of debentures and shares in colonizing companies (JNF, PASA, NIR, Mekorot etc.) 890.000

E Loans to middle-class settlement companies (Rasco, Naharia, Ramat Hachavim, etc.) 290.000

F Investments in industrial and commercial undertakings and in second mortgages 910.000

| Sum Total | 8,000.000 |

The sum of LP 8,000.000 does not present a true picture of the value of the transfers. From the total sum transferred up to the termination of the agreement (8.1 million), Werner Feilchenfeld calculated that the true value of the transfer was only LP 5.5 million. The difference was accounted for by the transfer disagio. The bulk of this discrepancy was due to the over-price charged for German exports bought through the transfer system.

In table III categories D and E applied to a form of transfer which was very closely connected to the upbuilding of Palestine. The companies would acquire Reichmark assets through Haavara for building and irrigation projects and would issue shares or debentures for this capital.


* For more details about the cost of transfer see chapter titled "Nazi Policy Concerning Jewish Emigration from Germany to Palestine".
These shares would then go to the individual transferors, RASSCO (Rural and Suburban Settlement Company Ltd.), Mekorot (Water Supply Ltd.), HANOTEA (Colonizers and Orange Grove Planters), PASA (Palestine Agricultural Settlement Association Ltd.) and NIR (The Jewish Agricultural Cooperative Labour Association Ltd.), are among the well known companies that were beneficiaries of this type of arrangement with Haavara.

Other forms of transfer involved the use by individual immigrants of their transfer assets for the purchase of machines and other goods in Germany for businesses to be established in Palestine. Other forms of transfer transactions involved a merchant who took over the Reichmark assets of German immigrants to purchase goods in Germany and paid the immigrant in Palestine with local currency. This was done within the range of goods purchaseable through the Haavara.

A wide range of Palestinian firms acquired Reichmark assets in return for shares or debentures for transferors. These include such undertakings as Lodzia Textiles Ltd., Ahrayut Ltd., Printing on Tin Lewin-Epstein, Nehustan Palestine Copper Industries Ltd., Palestine Levant Quarries Ltd., Atid Navigation Company Ltd., Paldag Ltd., Kallia Seaside and Health Resort Ltd.,

* For more details on contribution of German Jews in this regard see chapter titled "Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish immigration".
Table IV

Areas of Transfer

A Goods transfer to Palestine (through Haavara) RM 92,887,084

B Exploitation of part of German exports to neighbouring countries (through Haavara's sister company NEMICO) 5,150,392

C Transfer of Support Marks (through the sister company INTRIA 4,057,419

D Sundry transfer activities 1,822,222

Sum Total RM 103,917,117

As Table IV shows the most important element in the Haavara activities was the transfer of goods to Palestine, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of the total. Category B in Table IV, dealing with NEMICO, (Near and Middle East Commercial Corporation Ltd.) was a way of supplementing the turnover of Haavara. This was done by encouraging the import of German goods to Middle East countries through the transfer system. These could be purchased, in part, through the Reichmark.

1 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, P. 45.
assets of German Jews who immigrated or intended to immigrate to Palestine. The Middle Eastern purchasers would pay the Haavara Agency which in turn transmitted the payments (minus transfer costs) to the immigrants.

Category C in table IV, dealing with Support Work, was a way of clearing foreign relief contributions for the Jews in Germany by such organizations as Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and Council for German Jewry. This was carried out through the INTRIA (International Trade and Investment Agency Ltd.). Individual remittances to German Jews were handled in a similar way.

According to Werner Feilchenfeld* goods purchased through Haavara did not produce an increase in Palestine's balance of trade and payment deficit, but on the contrary it improved it. He also contended that in order to protect Palestinian industries Haavara refrained from importing products which could be manufactured locally.

* Dr. Werner Feilchenfeld was General Manager of the Trust and Transfer Office Haavara Ltd.
2 Ibid., p. 27.
THE HAHAVARA CONTROVERSY

As early as August 23, 1933, news of a transfer agreement between Palestine and Germany appeared in "The Palestine Post". This news led to controversy in Prague where the 18th Zionist Congress was in session. Mr. Meer Grossmann, leader of the Revisionists, protested that this agreement would undermine the Jewish boycott of German goods and demanded to know whether the Zionist Executive knew of the negotiations which had preceded the agreement and whether this agreement was concluded with its knowledge. On behalf of the Revisionists he stated: "We consider this agreement as harmful, and contrary to the moral and economic interest of the Jewish nation." Replying on behalf of the Zionist Executive Berl Locker said that it had nothing to do with the agreement. Jabotinsky denounced this agreement as an "undignified and humiliating compromise" and added that the Jews of Palestine would not support it and would boycott German goods imported on the basis of this agreement. Arthur Ruppin revealed at the Congress that Sam Cohen was responsible for concluding this agreement. This still left open the question of what, if any, role the Jewish Agency

2 "The General Debate Opens, Revisionists Oppose Emigration Agreement" Jewish Chronicle September 1, 1933, p. 21.
3 The Palestine Post, August 28, 1933, p. 1.
4 "Mr. Jabotinsky's Statement", Jewish Chronicle, Sept. 1, 1933, p. 25.
5 The Palestine Post, September 1, 1933, p. 1.
had in the matter. Mr. Hoofien, the manager of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, explained that all his bank did in connection with the Transfer Agreement was to collect money for the goods sent to Palestine from Germany. This money was then held until the German Jews to whom it was due arrived in Palestine. Professor Herbert Speyer, presiding in the absence of the chairman d'Avigdor Goldsmid, vacated the chair at the Jewish Agency Council meeting in Prague to enable him to speak in the debate. He demanded that the details of the agreement be submitted to the Executive. Mr. Berl Locker repeated his former assurances that the Executive had neither negotiated nor concluded the agreement, but insisted that the details could not be made public. A committee of five was then appointed by the Council of the Jewish Agency to whom the details were to be revealed.

At the Congress Meer Grossmann put forward a resolution stating that no body affiliated with the Zionist Organization be permitted to negotiate with Germany, or have anything to do with her until the German Government permits German Jews to leave unconditionally and without restrictions on the export of their capital and belongings. The chair overruled this resolution by stating that the primary concern of the Zionist Organization was to save German Jews and settle them in Palestine. A resolution was agreed upon with regard to the Transfer Pact instructing the Action Committee at its next session to reinvestigate the question.

1 "The Three Million Mark Agreement", Jewish Chronicle, September 1, 1933, P.26.
2 "Jewish Agency Council Meeting Continuance of the Status Quo", Jewish Chronicle, September 8, 1933, p. 22.
"with the understanding that nothing is to be permitted which is in contradiction with the attitude adopted by Congress in its resolution dealing with the situation in Germany.

The controversy over this Transfer Agreement did not die down with the conclusion of the 18th Zionist Congress, and more details about the agreement were revealed. On September 20, 1933, the commercial correspondent of "The Palestine Post" reported that the Anglo-Palestine Bank, in consultation with the Zionist Organization of Germany, took the place of Hanotea in the negotiations. The reason given for this action was that an "arrangement of this nature should not be left in the hands of a company of the necessarily limited scope of Hanotea. The correspondent viewed the agreement with sympathy for according to him it saved what remained of these German Jews' fortune and enabled them to start productive lives in Palestine, this in spite of the fact that it was done at the cost of purchasing the equivalent in German goods.

Rothenberg and Lipsky, after returning from the Congress in Prague, spoke out in defense of the agreement. They claimed that it was not a breach of the boycott of German goods. "The products released would never return to Germany either in the form of value or in exchange goods.

1 "Congress Concluding Sessions and Resolutions", Jewish Chronicle, September 8, 1933, 9. 22.
2 "The German-Palestine Trade Agreement, an Unholy Alliance" The Palestine Post, September 20, 1933, p. 15.
It would in effect provide a diminution of the total economic wealth of Germany". They claimed that, although it might appear as a favorable balance for German trade, the transactions really mean a depletion of German resources\(^1\).

In the November 9, 1934 issue of "The New Palestine" there appeared a more critical article about the Transfer Agreement. It stated that it was generally accepted as an unavoidable procedure to enable German Jews to come to Palestine with some means of their own. On the other hand it was stated that these transfers were a breach of the boycott\(^2\). Meanwhile a clear picture of a Jewish Agency's role in the agreement had yet to emerge.

An editorial in the October 13, 1933 issue of the "Jewish Chronicle" complained that the Jewish Agency stated in "somewhat cryptic language that it does not participate" in the carrying out of this pact. This answer, according to the "Chronicle", left the question begging. But it added that Sam Cohen who conducted the negotiations for the agreement left no doubt as to Zionist cooperation in this matter. He stated that Hanotea conducted its negotiations in "full accord with the responsible bodies in Palestine" and added that both the Zionist Federation in Germany and the Palestine Office in Berlin had begun similar negotiations with the Germans Ministry of Economic Affairs. The

1 "Rothenberg and Lipsky back from Prague Tell of Zionist Congress and German Situation", The New Palestine, September 20, 1933, p. 1.
"Jewish Chronicle" added: "We leave it to others to square Mr. Cohen's words with the categorical denials of Zionist participation recently heard in Prague". It then came out strongly against the agreement, regardless of who conducted the negotiations, finding no justification in the plea that it promoted the building of the National Home. "Jews do not wish their National Home to be made in Germany". It ended with the argument "Nazidom has chosen to declare a war of extermination on German Jewry. The situation must not be handled weakly. Half a boycott won't save the German Jews"! In an editorial of its November 16, 1934 issue "The New Palestine" came out in support of the agreement otherwise, it claimed, the German Jews would come penniless to Palestine and become a burden upon the national fund.

The 19th Zionist Congress which met during August-September 1935 in Lucerne was again witness to the Haavara controversy. Mr. Kaplansky (Labour) attacked it, claiming that it would damage the Yishuv economically and politically. He asserted that German imports were exported to to Palestine under conditions of dumping and were thus endangering the infant industries of the Yishuv and expressed the fear that Germany may overtake Britain as the number one importer to Palestine. He complained that the agreement was breaking the solidarity of world Jewry. Kaplansky found the

1 The New Palestine, November 16, 1934, p.4.
Transfer Account No. 2 arrangement particularly objectionable, for it provided for the transfer of capital to Palestine that belonged to Jews who still remained in Germany\(^1\). Meer Grossmann, leader of the Jewish State party\(^*\), also attacked the agreement\(^2\). On the other hand Berl Kantznelson who was the editor of Davar and a member of the Palestine Labour Delegation, defended the agreement for enabling "tens of thousands of Jews to take their property from Germany and invest their capital in the development of Palestine\(^3\).

Inspite of opposition the following resolution on the subject of the Transfer Agreement was adopted: "In order to encourage the continued immigration of Jews into Palestine from Germany, the Executive is instructed to take under its control all the work of the Haavara\(^4\). This resolution received the overwhelming support of the Congress with a vote of 169 to 12, but only after the delegates of the Jewish State party had left it in protest\(^5\). Speaking out for the resolution, Dr. Hillel Silver asserted that the fact that the Executive of the Jewish Agency took control over the agreement, would ensure against abuses. Mrs. Golda Meyerson (Meir) also spoke out in its favor, stating "that

\(^*\) Dissident revisionist Group.
\(^{2}\) The Chicago Jewish Chronicle, August 30, 1935, p. 2.
\(^{4}\) "The Transfer Agreement", Jewish Chronicle, September 6, 1935, p.25.
\(^{5}\) "The Transfer Agreement", The Chicago Jewish Chronicle, September 6, 1935, p. 2.
in no circumstances could they stop using every means at their disposal to take out as many German Jewish men, women and children from the Gehinnom in which they found themselves". Meer Grossmann, in opposition, proposed an amendment to the resolution which called on all Zionist institutions to abstain from any dealings with Germany and withdraw from the Transfer Agreement. This amendment was defeated with only 35 voting in its favor and 177 against.

In its September 6th edition the "Jewish Chronicle" came out with an editorial condemning the resolution adopted by the 19th Zionist Congress. It described it as an exchange of Jewish hostages in return for the purchase of German goods. It added that the agreement depicted the Jews as presenting two faces to the world, one condemning the Germans for their atrocities, and the other content at promoting trade with Germany.

In the September 13, 1935 issue "The New Palestine" presented Moshe Shertock's views in support of the Haavara, stating that its opponents could not expect extensive colonization, a large immigration, and the rescue of Jewish capital while opposing the agreement. He also expressed his doubts about the boycott, claiming that it was an expression of force possessed by other people, a force which the Zionist movement still had to create for itself.

1 "The Transfer Agreement", Jewish Chronicle, September 6, 1935, p. 25.
2 Jewish Chronicle, September 6, 1935, p. 9.
After the close of the 19th Zionist Congress other serious charges were leveled at the Haavara Agency. S.Y. Jacobi, a member of the executive of the New Zionist Organization, claimed that it gave back the Jews from Germany only 39 per cent of all the goods imported through its offices. He pointed to the Jewish National Fund, the Labour Cooperative Nir, and the Hanotea corporation as its beneficiaries and claimed that there was little difference between the privileges provided the German immigrants under the agreement and conditions before it came into being. The "Chronicle" also attacked the Yishuv for trading with Germany. It claimed that a large number of Jewish merchants had concluded transactions with German concerns which increased German exports to a level exceeding pre-Nazi days.

In an editorial of its October 25, 1935 issue the "Chronicle" came out with its sharpest attack on the Haavara to date, labeling it as blackmail arrangement. A letter by Lt. Colonel F.H.Kisch, and published in the same edition, outlined the major objections to the Haavara: It aided the German economy, reduced unemployment and thus helped prolong the Nazi regime; it was detrimental to a united Jewish front; it hurt young industries in Palestine which had to compete with subsidized German exports; it created a bad impression with the British who saw Nazi persecution rewarded with in-

1 "The Transfer Agreement; Serious Charges Against Haavara" Jewish Chronicle, September 20, 1935, p. 20.
2 "The Transfer Agreement Problem; Attitude of the Yishuv to the Boycott" Jewish Chronicle, October 13, 1935, p. 31.
3 "Scrap the Transfer Agreement" Jewish Chronicle, October 25, 1935, p. 9.
creased trade; it undermined those seeking England's and other countries' intervention against the Nazis; it was debasing the life of the Yishuv by forcing Jewish businessmen to either deal in German goods, or face financial ruin.1

The Vaad Leumi and the board of Deputies in London outlined the following points in support of the Haavara:

Great Britain remained the largest exporter to Palestine; importers from Germany through the Haavara needed special certificates; Haavara payments were made in German marks instead of sterling payments; Haavara protected Palestine from German dumping by cooperating with the Jewish Manufacturers Association in protecting local industries from imports of the type of goods manufactured locally; the transferred capital was used to build up the country.2

1 Lt. Colonel F.H. Kisch to the editor of the Jewish Chronicle, "The Transfer Agreement" Jewish Chronicle, October 25, 1935, p. 27.
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 1933-1938 MIGRATION

THE CENTRAL BUREAU FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN JEWS IN PALESTINE

The organization that played the most important role in the settlement of German Jews in Palestine was the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. This organization, an organ of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, was established at the XVIIIth Zionist Congress held at Prague from August 21, to September 4, 1933. The relevant resolution reads:

"The Congress resolves to create a Central Bureau for the purpose of organizing the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine, which shall be in control, in agreement with the Executive, of all matters appertaining to this question." 1

Dr. Chaim Weizmann was elected Chairman of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, with headquarters in London. The Palestine section of the Bureau, with headquarters in Jerusalem, was put under the leadership of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, with Dr. Werner Senator as his deputy. The management of the London Bureau was entrusted to Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth, and of the Jerusalem Bureau to Dr. Georg Landauer. Henrietta Szold was entrusted with the direction of youth-immigration and social work among the German immigrants.

The Central Bureau established an Advisory Council consisting of five members: Dr. Ernst Lewi, Dr. Pinner, Kurt Ruppin, Dr. Preuss, and two deputy members: Dr. Löwenstein and Dr. Zlocisti.

The Jewish Agency, as a division of whose Executive it has been operating, placed at the disposal of the Bureau certain of its departments, particularly the colonization and technical departments. The Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau worked closely with the *Hitachdut Olej Germania*\(^1\). Both departments of the Central Bureau worked in cooperation with the German Zionist Federation and the *Palästina-Amt*\(^2\) in Berlin, as well as with the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder- und Jugendalijah* in Berlin.\(^3\)

In a letter of October 4, 1934, to Louis Lipsky and Morris Rothenberg, representing the American Palestine Campaign for the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Chaim Weizmann outlined the functions of the Central Bureau as follows:

"a) Acceptance and training of agricultural and urban workers,

b) Settlement of agricultural laborers' groups",

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\(^2\) *The organization of German immigrants in Palestine. In 1938 it became the Hitachdut Olej Germania v’Austria.*

\(^3\) *Palestina Office*
c) Colonization of middle class settlers,
d) Granting of loans to manufacturers, artisans, and small tradespeople,
e) Giving information and advice in all branches of economic adjustment,
f) Transportation of children from Germany, and their settlement in Palestine (Children's Aliyah),
g) Support of scientific institutions in Palestine for the appointment of Jewish scientists from Germany,
h) First aid and social care for the immigrants*,
i) Obtaining and distribution of Palestine Immigration certificates for refugees from Germany

The London Bureau began its work in October, 1933, and the Jerusalem Department a few weeks later. Dr. Senator went to Berlin as early as December 1933, in order to coordinate the activities of the German Jewish organizations with those of the Central Bureau. The principal functions of the London Bureau were fund raising to finance the work of the Central Bureau, to provide advice and assistance to German Jewish refugees outside of Palestine, and to distribute immigration certificates to the refugees. In addition the London office also represented the Jewish Agency in a number of committees that handled relief work for the Jews in Germany and for those

* With the exception of (i) which was a function of the London Department of the Central Bureau, all were functions of the Jerusalem Department of the Bureau. An additional task of the Jerusalem Bureau was the construction of dwellings for German Jewish immigrants.

1 Letter by Chaim Weizmann, October 4, 1934, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.

who had become refugees.

The activities of the London Bureau did not involve the organization in its own fund raising drives, but rather the attainment of funds raised through various relief committees.\(^1\) Funds thus obtained by the Central Bureau were often earmarked in advance for certain projects favored by the committees.\(^2\) The Executive of the Jewish Agency would determine the number of immigration certificates out of the total received by it from the Mandatary Government that would be allotted to the Central Bureau for the distribution to German Jewish immigrants. The applicants for such certificates had to address their requests to the Palestine Office in the countries in which they happened to reside. All applications accepted by these offices were then forwarded to the Palestine Office in Berlin. The Central Bureau would finally decide how the Palestine certificates were to be distributed among the various countries for German Jews who had taken refuge there. This decision was based on the endorsement of the Palestine Office in Berlin on the one hand, and

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 15.
on the number of certificates* provided by the Executive of the Jewish Agency on the other.

Up to July 1934, one third of all the certificates granted by the Government to the Jewish Agency were allocated to German Jews 1. During the time period April 1, 1935 to March 31, 1937, the Palestine Government granted the Jewish Agency 39,250 certificates, out of which 10,457 or 26 per cent were allocated by the Agency to German Jews 2.

The granting of certificates to individual applicants involved a series of procedures and a variety of considerations. All applications of German Jews accepted by the various Palestine offices required the approval of the Palestine Office in Berlin, which could reject an application on either political or moral grounds. The Berlin office was also authorized to temporarily refuse the endorsement of an application if there was doubt about the national qualification of the applicant. In case of a dispute the Immigration Depart-

* The certificates referred to above were Category C (labour Schedule) certificates allotted by the Mandatory Government to the Jewish Agency for distribution. These included also the so-called Refugee Certificates which were provided for German Jews who had left Germany, but had no certificates with which to enter Palestine.


2 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 11.
ment of the Executive of the Jewish Agency would have the final word. At the outset decisions on applications were made by the Palestine Office Commission, often with the assistance of representatives of local relief committees. 1

By 1935, the specifications concerning the granting of immigration certificates as set forth by the Jewish Agency, and carried out by the Palestine Office in Berlin became very strict. The general instructions were that the distribution of certificates based on sentimental considerations had to be phased out. Only in exceptional cases should expulsion from Germany and loss of employment be considered in the granting of certificates, the primary consideration being whether the individual can be integrated productively into the Palestine economy. The most desirable categories of immigrants were specified as trained agriculturists or skilled artisans, with preference given to the former. * Special


* General Zionist policy was also to encourage the immigration of well-to-do people who could provide for their own absorption through use of their capital. This according to David Yisraeli, "The Third Reich and the Transfer Agreement" Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 6, Number 2, 1971. (London: Wiedenfield and Nicholson, 1971), p. 129.
consideration was to be given Chalutzim, for whom between 60 and 70 per cent of the certificates would be reserved. Such who were granted a certificate were required to obligate themselves to work for one year in an assigned location.¹

Special consideration was given to the timing at which certificates were granted where children were concerned. Consequently families with young children were not to be provided with certificates enabling them to emigrate to Palestine during the summer months. The policy was instituted in response to the high occurrence of summer diseases among such children.²

In cases of mixed marriages documents had to be produced to prove that the wife had converted to Judaism.³

As for age specifications, the policy was to reject applications by males who were 46 or older, barring exceptional cases, and by women 36 or over.

In cases where the applicant was known to have had an anti-Zionist or Communist affiliation, an investigation was called for to determine whether the individual's newly acclaimed Zionism was due to conviction or was an act of opportunism. Certificates were granted without

regard to the applicants past Zionist affiliation. The stricter regulations as applied by the Palästina-Amt Berlin were in response to complaints by the Jewish Agency that the quality of immigrants fell short of the specified requirements. The three major complaints were:

a) That immigrants often did not meet the established physical fitness requirements, and that physicians had prepared false reports about their health.
b) That immigrants were sent to Palestine, who lacked sufficient preparation in Zionist ideology, and who rejected any sacrifice demanded by Zion.
c) A significant number of immigrants did not live up to the obligations they had assumed to work on the land.

The policy outlined was applied in practice in the following manner: Out of a block of 500 certificates granted by the Jewish Agency in the fall of 1935 for distribution to German Jews, 450 went to Chalutzim, and 50 to artisans. Out of these 500 certificates 490 were granted to individuals under 35 years of age, and 10 to applicants who were between the ages of 35 and 45.

The policies described above were generally adhered to up to and into 1938, with the exception that Zionists of singular merit received special consideration. Criticism did arise on the part of organizations dealing with German Jewish immigration as to the selection of candidates who were to receive immigration certificates and the number allotted to German Jews in general. One particular incident involved Mr. Davidson, a member of the German Refugee Committee in London, and also a member of the Anglo-Hicem Immigration Committee. On the occasion of a trip to Palestine, Mr. Davidson tried to arrive at the truth about complaints that the distribution of certificates by the Jewish Agency had not been handled fairly and that, in order to obtain a certificate, one had to be a member of the Zionist Party in Germany. He was of the opinion that the Jewish Agency made unjustifiable demands by requiring a knowledge of


* Otto Schiff was a Member of the Allocation Committee of the Central British Fund.

** Professor Selig Brodetsky was a Member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and of the World Zionist Organization and a Member of the Allocation Committee of the Central British Fund.

(Above information from McDonald Papers file No. 356. List of Jewish personalities p. 2.)
Hebrew of the would-be immigrants. Mr. Davidson also took it upon himself to meet with Mr. Hyamson, the Director of the Immigration Department of the Palestine Government, and then address a communication to him. In it he requested that 100 immigration certificates be given to the German refugee committee. Mr. Davidson pointed out that he did not wish to "apply to the Jewish Agency, as from his experience of the previous year he assumed that within three months he may perhaps receive three permits from the Agency. This matter was of great concern to the Jewish Agency which wanted the letter withdrawn, as it did constitute a communiqué with the Palestine Government and which Mr. Hyamson treated as an official communication. The Jewish Agency defended the "desirability" of an applicant having at least a minimum knowledge of the Hebrew language and its culture, but denied that applicants had to be Zionists and pointing out the fact that through an

arrangement with the Agudah, an anti-Zionist organization, certificates were made available to its members by the Jewish Agency.

The policy line laid down by the Jewish Agency with regard to the distribution of certificates was related to mandatory specifications in this matter. In 1935 the Palestine Government laid down detailed regulations governing the distribution of certificates. A certain number of these certificates were allotted specifically for married individuals, and a particularly small number for unmarried applicants. A large number of certificates was assigned for relatives of Palestine residents, and another portion was reserved for artisans with a minimum of four years experience who were required to be married as well.

The crisis that has overtaken Austrian Jewry after that country's occupation by Germany in 1938 led to a fundamental change of policy. Younger, able bodied immigrants no longer received preference over others as in earlier years. Many came to Palestine destitute and without the benefit of vocational preparation.

1 Ibid.

3 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, Report to the XX1st Zionist Congress and the Council of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in Geneva (Jerusalem: Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, August 1939), p. 15.
The activities of the Jerusalem Bureau included, among others the establishment of RASSCO (The Rural and Suburban Settlement Company) whose task was promotion of the Settlement of members of the Jewish middle-class. RASSCO, established in the summer of 1934, was designed for German Jewish families who were not prepared to develop new land from its initial stages, but had sufficient means to acquire holdings which had already been prepared for them. It was geared specifically for agricultural and suburban colonization. The land parcelled out to the settlers was acquired either by Keren Kayemet or by RASSCO itself. The company took on the responsibility of organizing the settlement and providing instructors in agriculture for their members. By 1939 RASSCO was responsible for the establishment of the agricultural settlements of Kfar Shmaryahu, S'deh Warburg, and Shavei Zion. It also established an auxiliary farming settlement in Kiryat Bialik and a suburban settlement in Kiryat Bialik B. In addition, RASSCO set up a residential quarter on Mount Carmel. This in-


* The Jewish National Fund
volved the settlement of 600 people and a combined investment by the settlers and RASSGO of LF 180,000.¹

The Central Bureau also created the Palestine Water Supply Company for irrigation work and for the expansion of land areas suitable for intensive cultivation.² This company which was registered in the spring of 1935, later bought shares in the newly founded Mekorot Water Company.³ Besides the establishment of middle-class settlements and providing aid to individual settlers of this category, the Central Bureau also assisted in the absorption of Chalutzim in labour settlements. It went into an agreement with NIR (the Jewish Agricultural Cooperative Labour Association Ltd.) whereby it would buy shares in the company and in return the company would invest in Kvutzot and Kibbutzim in which German Jewish immigrants were absorbed.⁴

Occupational training in industry and trades was another aspect of the Central Bureau's work. It helped

¹ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, *Chevrah Lehaspakat Hayim*
³ Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 25.
in cooperation with the Labour Savings Banks, to set up funds in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa for the training of apprentices. The Central Bureau also organized vocational training courses with the help of the Hitachduth Olej Germania. By 1939 it helped in the training of individuals in the following institutions:

Wizo
Moazath Hapoaloth
Batei Halutsoth
Conservatoire, Jerusalem
Technicum, Haifa
Children's Home "Ahavah"
Trade School "Ludwig Tietz", Yagur
Agricultural Research Station of the Keren Kayemeth, Kiryath Anavim
Girl's Farm of Hapoel Hamizrachi
Gan Meged
Art School Jacob Steinhard, Jerusalem
"Aviron" Palestine Aviation Company, Haifa
Palestine Fishing Company, Haifa
New Bezalel, School of Arts and Crafts, Jerusalem
Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Yeshivoth of Misrahi
Yeshivoth of Agudath Yirael
School for Nurses, Shaare Zedek Hospital

Several thousand German Jewish immigrants received agricultural training in the various settlements. Here the Central Bureau provided the financial means for the purchase of equipment and erection of the build-

* Kupat Milve V'Chisachon Shel Haovdim.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 25.
 needed to house and school the immigrants 1.

The central Bureau provided loans for undertakings in industry and in manual trades. This it did through existing banks and other credit agencies, involving such institutions as the Bank L'Ataassiah and the Bank of the Credit Cooperatives Zerubabel. In 1934, through the initiative of the Hitachduth Olej Germania, a Loan Fund of Immigrants from Germany was founded 2. Funds intended for urban credits were distributed by the Central Bureau through this institution.

During the period April 1935 to March 1937, the joint activities of the Central Bureau and the Labour Cooperative Credit Societies, the Zerubabel Bank and the Industrial Bank, ceased. Instead there was cooperation with cooperative credit societies of German immigrants and the direct granting of credit by the Central Bureau. 3. By 1939

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 27.
2 Kupat Milve shel Olej Germania.
4 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 30.
the Kupat Milve had 2,500 members with a capital formation of LP 9,000. Kupat Eser was founded to provide small loans for immigrants who lacked sufficient credit to receive loans from a bank. 1

The Central Bureau helped finance Hebrew language courses organized by the Hitachduth Olej Germania and the Culture Department of the Vaad Leumi.* Another task undertaken by the Central Bureau was the provision of fellowships to academic immigrants from Germany. Grants were also given to certain institutions on behalf of such scholars. These institutions included the Agricultural Experimental Station at Rechovot, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Haifa Technical Institute, and the Daniel Sieff Institute. 2

The accommodations constructed by the Jewish Agency for pioneer immigrants were not particularly suited for the German Jewish immigration, which included a comparatively large number of families with

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 43.
* National Council.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 53.
children. The Central Bureau provided for the erection of a modern immigration hostel in Haifa. In cooperation with the Vaad Leumi it organized a Social Service in the immigration hostels. The Bureau also provided aid for provisional housing in camps, barracks and rented flats. The Social Department of the Vaad Leumi, under the direction of Henrietta Szold, received monthly subventions from the Central Bureau and operated in cooperation with the Hitachdut Olej Germania. Besides the aforementioned difficulties in the housing situation the German Jewish immigrants often suffered maladies due to the change of climate.

Seventy eight per cent of all expenditures incurred up to April 1, 1939, were related to absorption of German Jews in agriculture. This was in line with


2 Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress, July 1935.

3 Memorandum from Dr. Martin Rosenblith to Mr. Henry Montor, Subject: Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, October 9, 1941, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York, p. 2.
Table V.

Funds allotted by the Central Bureau from 1933 to April 1, 1939 for the German Jewish Immigration into Palestine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
<th>LP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>245,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>241,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>226,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>106,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,110</td>
<td>28,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46,340</td>
<td>994,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the principle laid down by the Jewish Agency, that as many German Jews as possible be settled on the land. It is clear from the figures in table V that the Central Bureau concentrated on a constructive absorption process, allocating only LP 60,000, or approximately 6 per cent of its total outlay for social welfare, the remainder being used for their integration into the economy of the

1 Ibid.
Yishuv. The bulk of the funds available to the Central Bureau was supplied by the Jewish Agency, the British Council for German Jewry, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Jewish Colonization Association.

The figures in table V show that the Central Bureau administered nearly LP 1 million (about LP 21.5 per cent per capita) for the immigrants from Germany. This is a small sum and attests to the fact that the German Jewish immigrants relied on their own means. The answers to my questionnaire tend to confirm this. Out of 115 who answered the question: "By whose help did you emigrate, privately or through an organization", 89 answered privately and only 26 stated that they had received help from an organization. Further, to the question "did you settle privately at first or in a camp", out of 116 who answered, 95 said privately, 10 said in a camp or Beit Olim, and 11 settled in kibbutzim. Finally out of 110 who answered the question in my questionnaire, "did you have any private means or relatives in Israel who helped you", 73 stated that they had private means or relatives or friends who helped them. 37 had neither private means nor help from relatives or friends.

* The financial assets of the German Jewish immigration are discussed in connection with the Haavara agreement and in the chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration.

** Some did not apply, e.g. those who came with Youth Aliya.
The Hitachduth Olej Germania was formed in February 1932 by Zionists from Germany who had settled in Palestine before the Hitler era. Among its founders it counted Dr. Ernst Lewy and Dr. Theodor Zlocisti. It was a self-help organization which recruited volunteer workers, and whose task it was to integrate an Aliyah of a non-Chaluz character into the Yishuv. Already before the establishment of the Central Bureau it provided a reception and information service for new immigrants from Germany. Initially it received financial assistance from the Vaad Mauchad (United Committee) and from the Central Bureau. The various branches of the Hitachduth Olej Germania advised the new immigrants on obtaining employment, settlement on the land, legal matters, housing, choice of occupation, investment and transfer of money through the Haavara agency, questions on securing loans, schooling, and social matters. It had established a special service at the ports of Jaffa and Haifa for the reception of immigrants from Germany. In 1933 - 1934, the Hitachduth Olej Germania set up tent camps for immigrants without means who could not be put up in Batei Olim of the Jewish Agency. Later special immigrant

1 Die Tätigkeit der Hitachduth Olej Germania, Merkas und Snif Tel-Aviv 1933 - 1934, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S 7/26
houses for refugees from Germany were established in Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem. The Hitachduth Olej Germania also set up special labour exchanges which cooperated with the General Federation of Labour.

Of particular importance were its efforts to facilitate the cultural absorption of the immigrants. The Central Cultural Committee of the Hitachduth Olej Germania, with headquarters in Tel-Aviv, carried out the organizational and planning work for the whole country, while its branches in Haifa, Jerusalem and the larger settlements retained a limited degree of independent action. Hebrew language and culture courses were provided for the German immigrants. This work of the Hitachduth Olej Germania was directed, up to 1939, by Nahum Lewin and Jacob Sanobank who themselves were not German Jews.

In 1936 the Cultural Department of the Vaad Leumi took over primary responsibility for Hebrew instruction, but the Hitachduth Olej Germania continued its work in that field, so that in 1937 900 students attended its Hebrew courses in 15 settlements, and an additional 1,200 were doing so in the cities. Its adult education courses were geared not only towards the dissemination of the Hebrew language, but also towards familiarizing the immigrants

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with the country, its people (both Jews and Arabs), Jewish religion and history. The Hitachduth Olej Germania, as part of this effort, organized lectures throughout the country in which these subjects were dealt with. Its Cultural Committee also provided students and their parents with advice on the continuation of education and the choice of schools.

As a consequence of the increased immigration of Austrian Jews after the Anschluss the already existing Hitachduth Olej Austria united with the Hitachduth Olej Germania to form the Hitachduth Olej Germania we Austria.

By 1939 this combined organization had 6,000 paying members in 26 local groups.

THE CENTRAL BRITISH FUND FOR GERMAN JEWRY AND THE COUNCIL FOR GERMAN JEWRY

The Central British Fund for German Jewry was formed in the summer of 1933 after an agreement had been reached between the English Zionist Federation and the non-Zionist leaders of British Jewry to form a joint campaign for the benefit of German Jews. In 1933 it raised L 202,000, in 1934 L 175,000, and by the middle of 1935 L 92,000. The distribution of the sums raised was decided upon by an Allocations Committee comprised of Zionists and non-Zionists in equal numbers, and Sir Osmond d'Avigdor Goldsmid served as neutral Chairman. Of

1 Ibid.
the total raised during the time period described above L 71,000 went to Keren Hayasod and over L 42,000 to Keren Kayamet. The latter was earmarked for the purchase of land for the settlement of Jews from Germany. This was done with the agreement of the Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau. A further L 82,500 were allocated for construction of houses, training in agricultural and manual occupations and for the settlement of immigrants without means of their own. The Central Bureau was entrusted to carry out these programs, receiving for that purpose L 58,000 up to mid 1935. The Central British Fund also allocated L 27,000 to the Hebrew University, the Haifa Technical Institute, and for Wizo for the benefit of German Jewish immigrants. Under its auspices the Women's Appeal Committee was formed which, by May 1935, had provided L 9,000 for the transfer of youth from Germany to Palestine. 1

The Council for German Jewry was established in 1936. This was in response to the grave situation of German Jewry after the passage of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935. In January 1936, Sir Herbert Samuel, Lord Bearsted and Mr. Simon Marks (all leaders of British Jewry) went to the United States to establish personal contact with the leaders of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal. When the delegation returned from the United States, the Council for German Jewry commenced operations, replacing the Central British

1 Ibid.
Fund for German Jewry. The Council's aim was to organize a more comprehensive and more coordinated effort on the part of the Jewish organizations in Great Britain, the United States, and continental Europe, in order to help German Jewry, with emphasis on emigration and training for emigration. The Council drew up a program for the emigration of 100,000 Jews from Germany over a period of four years. It estimated that £3,000,000 would be required for that endeavour, of which one million should be contributed by British Jewry. During its first two years it raised £750,000 in England.¹ This was to be used over a seven year period, but by the end of 1937 its funds were almost exhausted. In 1938 the Council also provided aid for Austrian Jewry, raising £170,000 for that purpose. After the November 1938 pogrom, a new appeal was issued in which over a half million pounds were raised.²

The Council worked through Jewish organizations in Germany and Austria, and as regards settlement of the refugees, it operated through the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) and the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. In England it operated through

² Ibid. p. 2.
the German Jewish Aid Committee which dealt with the needs of the refugees in that country. The Council did not set up its own machinery for the work of emigration training and relief.

Originally the council's main objectives were:

1. To assist in an orderly and planned emigration from Germany.
2. To assist in settlement on the land, both in Palestine and in overseas countries.
3. To organize and expand training facilities for agriculture and manual occupations.
4. To provide funds for the relief, training, and emigration of Jewish refugees in England.
5. To assist national refugee committees in European states.
6. To assist in any emergency for refugees from Germany.

After the severe deterioration in the situation of German and Austrian Jewry in 1938, the Council was forced to change its objectives and set up the following priorities:

1. To arrange a rapid emigration from Germany.
2. To transfer the training activities to centers outside of Germany.
3. To prepare temporary refuge for a large number of refugees in England and on the European continent.

Although envisaged to represent both US. and British Jewry, the Council for German Jewry was of importance only in Great Britain. The major organization in the United States, as regards matters of assistance and fund raising was the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

1 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
2 Ibid. p. 4.
Out of the first collection of the Council for German Jewry L 243,000 were allotted to the Central Bureau, about L 95,000 to Keren Kayemet, and L 112,000 to Keren Hayesod. Out of the proceeds of the second and third fund raising campaign the Council for German Jewry allocated only L 134,000 to the Central Bureau, and only L 43,000 to Keren Kayemet. The reason for this was that the funds raised by the Council had to be used in England for the increasing number of refugees from Germany and Austria who had arrived there in 1938 and after. The expenditures of the German Jewish Aid Committee * in England had correspondingly jumped from L 40,000 in 1937 to L 100,000 in 1938. The sums raised in England by the Central British Fund (1933-1935) and the Council for German Jewry (1936-1939) amounted to approximately L 2,000,000 out of which a total of L 700,000¹ had been allotted for the settlement

¹ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 11.

* The German Jewish Aid Committee was formed by the Central British Fund for German Jewry, predecessor to the Council for German Jewry.
of German Jews in Palestine.

Between 1933 and 1939 the Women's Appeal Committee in England allotted L 52,000 \(^1\) to Youth Aliya.

AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE.

Its most important work was for Jewish refugees in countries other than Palestine. In 1934-1935 it participated in a joint drive with the American Palestine Campaign. Out of the net proceeds each received half a million dollars \(^2\), and out of the remaining 800,000 dollars 250,000 dollars were allocated to projects proposed by the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. Out of the 500,000 dollars allotted to American Palestine Campaign half went to the Central Bureau. \(^3\)

A joint campaign was again conducted in 1935 and the Central Bureau was allotted by the Jewish Agency LF 24,000 out of the share of United Palestine Appeal. \(^4\)

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^2\) Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress, July, 1935, p. 16.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 17.
\(^4\) Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 3.
In 1936 and 1937, the Joint Distribution Committee and United Palestine Appeal held separate campaigns. The proceeds of the latter were divided equally between Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemet. The Jewish Agency allotted LF 50,000 in 1936, and the same amount again in 1937 to the Central Bureau, to which both funds made equal contributions.¹

REICHSVERTRETUNG DER JUDEN IN DEUTSCHLAND

German Jewry has been organized under this group since 1933. Its main tasks were social help, training and emigration. The Reichsvertretung included a Committee for Relief and Reconstruction (Zentralausschuss für Hilfe und Aufbau) which was responsible for education, vocational training, and retraining for prospective emigrants. It set up centers for the training of youths between the ages of 14 and 17, and for the retraining of individuals between the ages of 17 and 30.

Vocational training was both in agriculture and in the manual trades. In Germany approximately 5,000 persons a year were receiving training and retraining under the auspices of the Reichsvertretung.²

The Reichsvertretung comprised three emigration agencies: a) the Hilfsverein der Juden in Deutschland, which assisted in emigration to all countries.

¹ Ibid., p. 4.
overseas with the exception of Palestine. b) The Palästina-Amt which, as part of the Jewish Agency dealt exclusively with emigration to Palestine. c) the emigration office of the committee which dealt with the repatriation of Jews who were not German nationals *. The annual budget of the Reichsvertretung was approximately RM 4,000,000 a year, of which about half was raised inside Germany, and the remainder outside 1**

The Palestine Office, Berlin (Palästina-Amt Berlin) was responsible for directing the flow of refugees from Germany to Palestine. It not only distributed the Labour Certificates and procured the Capitalist category entry permits, but also arranged for transportation to Palestine and helped finance the trips of the needy. The Palestine Office also supervised the training of prospective emigrants to Palestine, including the Hachshara work of the Hechalutz.

In January 1939, the question about the position of the staff of the Reichsvertretung was raised. The question was whether they should use the opportunity available to them to leave Germany or whether they should continue with their important work. Norman Bentwich urged that they be given a promise of permits so that their emigration should be assured in the future. He also proposed that a sum be put at their disposal

* Hauptstelle für jüdische Wanderförsorge.
1 Ibid.
**The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the Council for German Jewry were the Largest external Contributors.
outside of Germany to assist them when they finally do emigrate. He suggested a sum of £10 a month for each month served in Germany during 1939. The decision of the Council for Germany was that "no special grant could be made for that purpose, but it was stated that arrangements had been made for the granting of visas to England for the principal members of this country (Germany), they would receive special treatment with regard to maintenance and ultimate emigration".

HIGH COMMISSIONS FOR GERMAN REFUGEES

The High Commission for the refugees from Germany was created by a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 11, 1933. The states supporting the Commission intended that it should be an integral part of the League, or at least an autonomous organization attached to it, whose administration costs the League would underwrite. German opposition at the assembly resulted in a compromise, whereby the League appointed the High Commissioner and named the Governing Body, but the commission was to be detached from the League, not responsible to the Council, and would not receive financial support from Germany.

1 Officials of the Reichsvertretung, Note of the officers, by Norman Bentwich, January 4, 1939, Council for the German Jewry, Zionist Archives, New York.
2 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive held January 5, 1939, Council for German Jewry, Zionist Archives, New York, p. 2.

* Germany was then still a member of the League of Nations.
the League. The resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on October 11, 1933, read as follows:

"...requests the Council of the League of Nations to invite States and, if it thinks advisable, private organizations best able to assist these refugees to be represented on a Governing Body of which the duty will be to aid the High Commissioner in his work, the High Commissioner having to submit periodical reports on the development and fulfilment of his task to the said Governing Body, which would forward them to the States likely to be able to assist in the action contemplated, Suggests further that the expenses of this collaboration and of the High Commissioner's office should be defrayed by funds contributed voluntarily from private or other sources; The council is requested to invite States and, if it thinks it advisable, private organizations best able to assist the refugees in question, to be represented on a Governing Body of which the duty will be to aid the High Commissioner in his work" 2

On October 12, 1933, James G. McDonald was invited to accept the position of High Commissioner for refugees (Jewish and other) coming from Germany.*

The following countries were invited to be represented on the Governing Body: The Netherlands, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, United States United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 3. Of these all but Argentina,

1 Ibid.
2 League of Nations, Organization on an International Basis of Assistance for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, October 12, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356, pp. 1-2.
* Former US President Herbert Hoover was also considered for this post. This according to a letter of Mildred S. Wertheimer, August 11, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
3 League of Nations, Organization on an International Basis of Assistance for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, October 12, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356, p. 2.
Brazil, and Spain accepted. These twelve countries, with the addition of Yougoslavia as the thirteenth member, became the Governing Body of the High Commission.

The first meeting of the Governing Body, held in December 1933, decided that the Body be composed exclusively of representatives of states. The representatives of the organizations were to form an advisory Council which could make recommendations to the Governing Body but whose members could be included in organs that made recommendations to the State. James McDonald did face pressure from some private organizations to be recognized as more of an integral part of the High Commission. His attitude on this subject is revealed in his following correspondence with Miss Esther G. Ogden of the Foreign Policy Association:

"In my talks with Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann, which were very friendly throughout, I have been quite definite in my statement that the private organizations can only have an advisory relationship to the Governing Body. Both Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann assented to this and even agreed that I would be stronger as the representative of

1 Progress of the work of the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, September 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356, p. 2.

2 Report by Norman Bentwich on High Commissions for German Refugees, November 8, 1937, McDonald Papers file No. 356, p. 2.

3 Letter of James G. McDonald to Miss Esther G. Ogden, November 15, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
fifteen* governments than as representative of a private organization." 1

The Advisory Council consisted of representatives of private organizations both Jewish and non-Jewish. Among the Jewish organizations represented on the Council were: the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Paris), the Council for German Jewry (London), HISS-ICA Emigration Association (HICEM) (Paris), the Jewish Agency for Palestine (London), the Jewish Colonization Association (Paris), the Jewish Refugee Committee (London), the World Jewish Congress (Paris), Agudat Israel World Organization (London). 2

In the first meeting of the Governing Body in December 1933, James G. McDonald pointed out that it was undesirable that his office should undertake direct work of relief. To do so, according to him, would necessitate the building up of a large staff and would result in overlapping with private organization already occupied with this task. 3 The functions of the Governing Body were outlined as follows:

* Actually it turned out to be thirteen governments.

1 Ibid.


3 Progress of the Work of the High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, September, 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356, p. 2.
a) To conduct negotiations with Governments.

b) To coordinate the work of the private relief and emigration organizations.

c) For the High Commissioner to personally participate in the efforts of the larger private organizations to secure funds.

James G. McDonald was successful in assisting Jewish organizations raise funds, particularly in the United States (of which he was a citizen). He was also able to bring about the coordination of the voluntary efforts of the various bodies in Europe and the United States. The High Commissioner was not successful as regards the settlement of refugees in overseas countries. According to Norman Bentwich he "supplemented with some little effect the approaches of the British Government, and the Palestine Administration for settlement in Palestine." 2

On December 27, 1935, James G. McDonald resigned from his post, two years after he had assumed office. In his letter of resignation he expressed his dissatisfaction with the results of commissions activities. He thought it insufficient to continue work only on behalf of those who fled Germany, but stated that efforts had to be undertaken to "mitigate the causes which created

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* Negotiations with the Government were to involve technical matters such as passports, identification papers, residence and work permits, and admission of refugees to various countries. Ibid., pp. 3-8.

1 Ibid., p. 3.

2 Report by Norman Bentwich on High Commissions for German refugees, November 8, 1937, McDonald Papers file No. 356, p. 5.
German refugees." He concluded that the matter was a political function which had to be handled by the League itself and that this could not have been part of the work of the High Commissioner's Office, which was weakened from its start by its separation from the League. 1

In February 1936, Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm was appointed the New High Commissioner for German refugees. His tasks were confined to dealing with the question of legal status for the refugees and to negotiate with governments of countries of refuge, while the provision of material assistance to the refugees was relegated to the private organizations. 2

In the winter of 1938, the Office of the High Commissioner for German refugees and the Nansen International Office for refugees merged to form the Office of High Commissioner of the League of Nations for Refugees. The activities of this new office applied to all refugees, not just those coming from Germany. Sir Herbert Samuel was appointed its first High Commissioner.

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1 Letter of resignation of James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, December 27, 1935, McDonald Papers file No. 356, pp. V-VI.


* This organization was founded in 1921 under the name The Nansen Organization for Help to Refugees and was called after 1930 The Nansen International Office for Refugees. It dealt with Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from Russia, and with Armenian and Turkish refugees.
IV. YOUTH ALIYAH

PRECURSOR TO YOUTH ALIYAH

In the latter part of the 19th century Carl Netter, founder of Mikveh Israel Agricultural College, brought youngsters from Galicia to Palestine. Next to come on the scene was Israel Belkin whose work contributed greatly towards the foundation in 1892, of the children's village of Meir Shefeya. In 1923, the Jewish community of Durban in South Africa sponsored the immigration of orphans from the Ukraine to the village of Giv'at Hamoreh.

After World War I, Dr. Siegfried Lehmann (a children's doctor) was invited by Kovno's Jewish communal leaders to take over direction of the Department of Child Welfare of the Jewish National Council. This included an institute for the care of orphan
children and youth (Kinderheim). In his work he had the backing of the Berlin Jewish community and the Joint Distribution Committee of America. The Kinderheim of Kovno was run on the principle that the youths should have self government. They were trained for manual labor in agriculture, carpentry, and other trades. Politically they were free to adhere to the group of their choice, whether it be Hashomer Hatzair, The Zionist Socialist Union, the Marxist Yiddishist Bund, or the Hechalutz.

The 200 members of the home were divided into groups of from 30 to 40 each on the basis of religious, social, and political views.\(^1\) This situation applied for the years 1921-1925. In 1925 it was realized by most participants that Jews who fitted themselves for physical work would have little opportunity there, and that emigration was necessary. The Marxists in the home were not

\(^1\) Norman Bentwich, Ben-Shemen A Children's Village in Israel (Jerusalem: Printed under the supervision of the Publishing Department of the Jewish Agency at the Jerusalem Post Press, 1958), p. 23.
of this opinion, but others saw Palestine as their destination.

The situation of the Jewish youths in Kovno in 1925 was in many ways similar to that of their counterparts in Germany of the 1930's. Seeing no future in their native country many were eager to build a future somewhere else.

Lehmann sought a future for these children in Ben-Shemen. The land and buildings were provided by the Jewish National Fund. Other aid came from the Jüdische Waisenhilfe (Orphan's Fund), of Berlin which helped maintain the Kovno Kinderheim until 1930, and the Children's Village Ben-Shemen in Palestine. The children who began coming to the village in 1926 were mainly from Eastern Europe, but this situation changed in the 1930's.

During the years 1932-1933 Recha Freier, a dedicated social worker and wife of a Berlin Rabbi, laid the foundations of Youth Aliyah. She gave birth to the idea of sending Jewish youngsters to the Land of Israel, where they would be educated in agricultural settlements. This is recorded in one of her letters to Henrietta Szold which reads as follows:
"One February morning in 1932, a few sixteen year old boys came to me for advice. Pale and shaken, unemployed and hungry, they had no prospects for the future. Should they leave Berlin? Go to the Rhineland? What was my opinion?

After restless days and sleepless nights I hit upon an idea; these young people should be sent to Eretz Israel to live and to work. Jewish youth could not be permitted to go to seed living purposelessly; the Land of Israel exists for them, to be upbuilt by them."\(^1\)

In this matter she found little support among Zionists in Germany who thought the educational facilities in Palestine to be inadequate.

Lehmann, who happened to be visiting Berlin at the time, agreed to take them to Ben-Shemen, thus inaugurating a process by which many thousands of children would find their way to Palestine. Before Youth Aliyah was launched another group was sent to the Technicum in Haifa. Other parents had sent their children to attend the Reali school in Haifa. Under Henrietta Szold, who founded Hadassah in 1912, this movement grew into an organized education and rescue operation.

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YOUTH ALIYAH AT ITS INCEPTION

After Hitler's rise to power the situation of German Jewish youth became critical. In a letter of August 21, 1933, to the president of the XVIIIth Zionist Congress Georg Landauer stated that every year between 6,000 and 7,000 Jewish youth left schools in Germany and sought occupations. They had no opportunities in either business or academic fields, and their opportunities in agriculture, in industry, and in craftsmanship were limited, as was the number of those who could be sent abroad for Hachsharah. Palestine was seen by him as the best alternative for dealing with the problem and he estimated that already in 1933, 3,000 young people could be absorbed as trainees in Palestinian industries, in kibbutzim, and in other settlements.¹

In this letter Landauer also proposed the creation of an office in Germany whose function it would be to select and prepare prospective youthful emigrants. He pointed out that a special division for Hachsharah-Aliyah, which should serve that purpose, had been established within the Palästine—

* Georg Landauer was entrusted with the management of the Jerusalem Department of the newly created Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.
Amt Berlin. He added that also in Palestine an office had to be established, whose task it would be to provide for the material necessities, work and professional training for the youths.

Already in the summer of 1933, a meeting of the representatives of the agricultural collectives took place in Ein Harod. These spoke for kvutzot, kibbutzim, and moshavim of various political and religious standings. The question before them was how to organize the immigration of boys and girls from Germany to Palestine, and what role the agricultural collectives would play in this enterprise. This meeting dealt with the need to raise funds for the undertaking and concluded that for the first year LP 3.00 per child monthly would be needed, and only LP 2.50 during the second year.¹

In Palestine matters of organizing youth immigration were dealt with by a subcommittee of the United Committee (Vaad Hameuchad) for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

In Germany itself action was also taken on this matter. The Joint Committee for the Settlement

¹ Five Years of Youth Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, Zionist Archives, New York.
of German Jews in Palestine was organized and had its Sub-Committee on Education and Culture examine the educational needs of the emigrants and the possibilities for their fulfillment in Palestine.

This investigation was prompted by the representatives of various Jewish institutions in Germany. These included the aforementioned Jüdische Waisenhilfe (Orphan Fund); the organization which founded Ahava* in Berlin in the early 1920's, and the Jüdische Jugendhilfe. The last was a federation of the Jewish youth organizations of Germany. It included all the various groups with a Zionist and pioneer ideology. By November 1933, the Jüdische Jugendhilfe had made arrangements with Ein Harod, Rodges, and with the Girls' Farm in Talpiot.

Racha Freier was largely responsible for this arrangement.

Late in 1933 the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugendalijah (Association for Child and Youth Immigration) was organized. It was composed of three agencies: The Jüdische Jugendhilfe, the Children's Village of Ben-Shemen, and Ahava which was ready to be transferred to Palestine.

* Ahava was a home for the protection and care of neglected and abandoned children of refugees from Eastern Europe.
The Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugendaliyah raised funds in Germany and other countries and conducted propaganda. It coordinated its activities with the Jewish Agency in Palestine and in this way Youth Aliyah became part of Zionist activities.

The Arbeitsgemeinschaft cooperated with the Zentralausschuss der deutschen Juden für Hilfe und Aufbau (Central Committee of German Jews for aid and Development) which was recognized by the German Government.

The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, created in the summer of 1933 at the Zionist Congress in Prague, took over the task of the Joint Committee for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. Henrietta Szold was put in charge of Youth Immigration and Social Welfare within the Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

YOUTH ALIYAH BEGINS

The Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, with the Youth Immigration Department under its wings, negotiated with the mandatory government to secure immigration certificates for boys and girls between the ages
of fifteen and seventeen. In matters concerning youth immigration, the Central Bureau coordinated its activities with the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugend-Alijah in Berlin, which provided funds for the maintenance and transfer of the youths. It also brought the plans before German parents, educators, and leaders of the Jewish community.

A group of propagandists was assigned to carry the project to the United States, England, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and South Africa. The collection of funds was carried out mostly by women's committees. In the United States, the United Jewish Appeal relegated funds for Youth Aliyah from its contribution to the Department of the Jewish Agency for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

The distribution of the refugee certificates placed at the disposal of the Central Bureau was the task of the Palestine offices of the respective countries in cooperation with the London office of the Central Bureau.¹

In October 1933, the Palestine government

¹ The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews, Palestine Office. Report from October 1, 1933 to June 30, 1934, Zionist Archives, New York, pp. 1, 2.
placed at the disposal of the Jewish Agency 350 certificates for youths from Germany of the ages 15 to 17. The Jewish Agency guaranteed to the government the maintenance of these youths to the age of 18,\(^1\) so that they would not become a public burden.

In a January 14, 1934, press conference called by the Central Office for the Settlement of German Jews of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, Miss Szold gave the following report on the subject of child and youth immigration:

"At the moment we are expecting an immigration of 350 young folk (and not two thousand, which would have been the case had we a million pounds at our disposal). With the number of permits given us by the government, and the 100-150 certificates received by Kfar Hanoar Ben-Shemen, there will be an immigration of 450 to 500 children from 15-17 years of age until October.\(^2\)

She added that the first group was expected to arrive at Ein Herod at the end of January. The second, comprising youths from orthodox families, was intended to go to Kibbutz Rodgers, whose members

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1 Ibid., p. 13.
were also orthodox. The third group consisted of pupils from the Ahava home in Berlin, which at the time was contemplating the transfer of its 100 pupils to Palestine in stages. The fourth group, of girls between the ages of 14 and 17, was expected to arrive at the Girl's Farm near Talpioth which was conducted by Mrs. Ben-Zvi. A fifth group, comprised of orthodox girls, was to go the Household and Trade School established by the Mizrahi Women's Organization of America, and located in Jerusalem.

The last two institutions had by then already taken in a number of girls who had come from Germany with their parents.

At this time other centers and other means of absorbing immigrant youths were sought, among them private homes in which children could be accommodated.

These youths were to be placed in agricultural settlements and in various youth institutions. A special commission determined the places to which these youngsters would be sent.

The first group arrived in 1934. Henrietta Szold described the event as follows:

"On Monday February 19, 1934, on the
steamship Martha Washington the first group of boys and girls organized for settlement in Palestine by the Juedische Jugendhilfe arrived at the recently opened port of Haifa. The group was destined for Ein Harod.

The luggage heaped upon the dock was a formidable pile. Among the suitcases of every conceivable shape, size, and material, there stuck up flagpoles, cellos and mandolins, and first and foremost, bicycles. Some of the boys and girls had chunky rucksacks strapped to their backs. On their arrival at Ein Harod the travelers were hurried into the dining room where they sang out lustily one Hebrew song after another, their hosts joining in with a will. After the meal came the inevitable Morah, which at once integrated the new arrivals into the company of the old residents."

In the first half of 1934 different youth groups from Germany had settled on the land. Fifty nine were placed in Ein Harod, 25 on Girls' Farm Jerusalem, 30 at Youth-Home Ahava* in Haifa, and

1 Greenberg, op. cit., pp. 2,3.

* After its transfer from Berlin, Ahava established itself in rented buildings at Neve Shaanan, near Haifa, until its building on a plot in the Mifratz Haifa area was to be completed.
15 at kibbutz Rodges at Fetach Tikwah.¹

These groups were accompanied by their own leaders, and were under the supervision of the Central Bureau.

After granting the first batch of 350 certificates for Youth Aliyah the government permitted the inclusion of younger and older children than heretofore agreed upon. Ahava was permitted to bring in very young children, and in special cases the Jewish Agency was allowed to use Labour-Certificates for young people between the ages of 17 and 18.²

These provisions raised the number of youthful immigrants for 1934 to 363, with additional arrivals coming as beneficiaries of the Jugendhilfe, and others on certificates received directly by institutions such as Ben-Shemen. The latter two categories raised the total of Youth Aliyah immigrants in that year to 396.³

After the exhaustion of the first series

² Central Bureau Report to the XIXth Zionist Congress, July 1935, p. 45.
³ Ibid.
of certificates the mandatory government provided a second batch of 350.1

By July 1, 1935, 612 young people had settled in Palestine with the help of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft. Of these 588 were placed in institutions and kvutzot and were distributed thus:

Table I2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben-Shemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahava</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beth Zeirot Mizrahi, Jerusalem</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls' Training Farm Talpiot</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzot:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Harod</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Joseph</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Brenner</td>
<td>58</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagania B</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzot Kinneret</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashomer Hatzair Kinneret</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gvat</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Yagur</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>Tel Hai</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade School of the Haifa Technical Institute</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices of the Kremener Iron Foundry, Haifa</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodges</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
Table II 1
Youth Aliyah from its Inception in 1934 to April 1, 1939

Now in Training ........................................... 3,119
Left Youth Aliyah .......................................... 1,516

Grant, 1933-1934 ........................................... 363
" 1934-1935 ................................................. 350
" 1935 ......................................................... 200
" 1936 (100 Labour Schedule) ......................... 250
All Categories until August 1937 ................. 497
Stud. Cert. August 1937-March 1938 ............ 504
Dep. Cert. August 1937-March 1938 ............ 21
Stud. Cert. April-October 1938 .................. 884
Dep. Cert. April-October 1938 .................. 28
Stud. Cert. October 1938-March 1939 .......... 1,503
Dep. Cert. October 1938-March 1939 ........ 35

4,635

Table III 2
Youth Aliyah from its Inception in 1934 to April 1, 1939 According to Country of Origin

Germany ............................................... 3,229
Austria ................................................ 935
Poland .................................................. 139
C.S.R .................................................... 270
Rumania ............................................... 29
Refugees (Italy, England, Holland, Denmark etc.) ............... 33

4,635

Girls ...... 40 per cent
Boys ...... 60 per cent

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 60.

2 Five Years of Youth Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, 1939, Zionist Archives, New York, p. 44.
Table II reveals that 1935 and 1936 saw a decline in the number of certificates for youths granted by the mandatory government. In 1936 a batch of 100 certificates was granted for Youth Aliyah out of the Labour Schedule allotment. While the government refused to grant additional certificates in that year, direct allocations to closed institutions, such as Ahava, Ben-Shemen, and the Ludwig Teitz School in Yagur, continued. When students completed their two years' training program, vacancies were created for additional groups of youths. To circumvent the restrictions imposed on immigration certificates, some of the settlements applied for recognition of their schools as being of secondary rank. Degania A, after obtaining such recognition from the government, applied to the Migration Department for 100 certificates. These were granted. This procedure was subsequently followed by other settlements.

Table III shows that the overwhelming majority of Youth Aliyah immigrants up to 1939 came from Germany (approximately 70 per cent). The only other sector with a large representation for that time period was Austria, with 935, or about

* See table II.
\[1\] Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 45.
** See table III.
20 per cent. The latter became a factor only after the 1938 Anschluss. The mandatory government granted certificates not on the basis of nationality but place of domicile. Thus certificates were not granted for Austrian children until Germany occupied the country.  

Although total German Jewish immigration into Palestine in each of the years 1937, 1938, and 1939, was smaller in each instance than in preceding years, this situation did not apply to Youth Aliyah which saw a marked increase during these years.  

The mandatory government, in response to the Arab riots of 1936-1937 in opposition to Jewish immigration and land sales, delayed and reduced immigration schedules. This policy did not have as marked an effect on Youth Aliyah. The aforementioned student-school arrangements permitted an increased flow of young immigrants.

The situation may be gauged from the following account in a letter written by Henrietta Szold:

"On March 16, (1938) the daily press carried the immigration regulations

* See table II chapter titled "Migration from Germany to Palestine."

** See table II.

1 Taped interview of Mrs. Eva Michaelis by Rivka Banitt, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, April 28, 1965, No. 361."
for the period April 1 to September 30, 1938. You know how disappointing they were on the whole. Nothing for the Labour Schedule at present, with a maximum of a thousand at the discretion of the High Commissioner if the economic situation improved to such an extent as to warrant it before September 30. On the other hand we could hardly believe our own senses when we read the generous provision in category BIII,* the students' category, our Youth Aliyah category. 'Unrestricted! On second thought restricted, not by government, but by our limitations. What were our limitations: available places and available funds!'

Table II shows how predominant a role Student Certificates played compared with Dependent Certificates for Youth Aliyah. Out of 2,975 certificates granted for this immigration between August 1937 and March 1939, 2,891 were Student Certificates, while only 84 were Dependent Certificates.

The years 1937 to 1939 were years in which the situation of German Jewry deteriorated considerably. In these years persecution was intensified and the territories, from which Jewish youth flocked to Palestine, increased. To Germany proper were added Czechoslovakia, Austria, Danzig, Memel, and the No Man's-Lands between Germany and Poland. The last was crammed with Polish Jews who had been

* For figures on this category see table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

expelled from Germany.

The mandatory government of Palestine ruled that certificates granted to the various agricultural settlements were to be used only for the youth of Greater Germany, the Altreich the Ostmark, Czechia and Slovakia. Later Italy was also added to this list.

German Jewish Youths were also entering Palestine from the various transit countries which harbored them on a temporary basis, and which after the November 10, 1938, events were flooded by them. The November events also forced the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugendalijah to transfer its office from Berlin to London.
PREPARED WORK IN EUROPE

The first candidates for Aliyah were for the most part members of youth organizations. They were put through a lengthy process of elimination which included a number of weeks' training under the observation of teachers and youth leaders. The latter two would help evaluate the candidates as to their suitability for emigration, for physical labour, for independence from parents, for collective living, and for their knowledge of Hebrew. During this time period the candidates underwent a thorough medical examination as required by the Jerusalem office. In the camp the youths spent half their day working, and the other half studying. Finally a selection was made of the most suitable applicants, which was more numerous than the available places in Palestine.

When the camp period was over, an agreement was drawn up with the parents in which they entrusted their children to Youth Aliyah for a period of two years. Financial arrangements were also included in the contract. Sufficient clothing was provided for the time period in question, and the names of the future immigrants were mailed to Palestine. There certificates were prepared and
forwarded to the British Consul in Berlin, who, upon approval, sent them to the Palästina-Amt. Only at that point could the candidates proceed to Palestine.

HACHSHARAH

The Jüdishe Jugendhilfe was in charge of preparation for immigration to Palestine (Hachsharah). The Reichsvertretung was responsible for the financial and administrative aspect of the Hachsharah as long as the trainees stayed in Germany.

As it became increasingly more difficult for Jewish youth to enter higher schools in Germany, the concept of "Mittlere Hachsharah" developed. The idea was to keep students instead of the usual eight years for nine years in the regular school. The additional year was to prepare them for manual work. For those children who were destined to emigrate to Palestine this stage became known as the "Mittlere Hachsharah" (intermediary Hachsharah). These youngsters were approximately 14 years of age and thus too young for regular Hachsharah.

Besides training in Germany there was also an "Auslands-Hachsharah" (Hachsharah outside of Germany) which had its origins in the Hechalutz.
Here were included youths at times as young as 15 and as old as 28.

The transfer of boys and girls to European countries neighboring on Germany was dictated by the limited possibilities of training them in that country, and later by considerations of safety. This is confirmed in the following words of Mrs. Eva Michaelis who was head of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugendaliyah.

"With the acceleration of Nazi persecution the number of applications by far exceeded the number of certificates which were at our disposal. We had therefore, to look for ways and means how we could bring youngsters to safety during their waiting time for certificates, and that was the main reason for dividing the work in a way that all those eligible for Youth Aliyah Certificates either went straight to Palestine, as soon as certificates were available, or for those who had to wait we tried to find places in neighboring countries, like Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, and Belgium."1

The term "Auslands-Hachsharah" was born in 1933, but already in the 1920's boys from Germany were sent by Hechalutz to train in Holland. Holland

became very important in this respect. One of the largest Auslands-Hachsharah institutions was established in Werkdorp at the Vieringen Polder. Holland was considered as a new site for the Berlin based Arbeitgemeinschaft before London was finally chosen.¹

Youths were selected for Auslads-Hachsharah only after having gone through one year of training in Germany. This was to minimize the chances of failure, for they could not be sent back to Germany.

One of the conditions of the host countries was that the person must emigrate immediately after completion of Hachsharah. The usual time permitted for such stays was eighteen months. A problem soon arose whereby the number of youths who completed Hachsharah in certain countries was larger than the number of certificates available. For such cases Mr. Adler-Rudel* devised a system whereby a youth who, for example, completed his Hachsharah in Denmark but did not have a certificate, was sent to Sweden, and one in a similar situation in Sweden was sent to Denmark. Thus both would actually have an eighteen month extension.² Of course this limited

¹ Ibid.

* In 1933 he was the director of the Department of Productive Welfare of the Jewish Community in Berlin. In 1934 he became the Secretary General of the Reichsvertretung, succeeding Dr. Kreutzberger.
the number of children who could be taken out of Germany.

Hachsharah centers were established in the various countries with the aid of leading Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists. These established small committees who helped finance the projects in cooperation with the Central Jewish Organizations (the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Central British Fund, and the Jewish Colonization Association). The agreement as to how much each group was to pay was "more or less in the way of a gentleman's agreement."

Besides to Holland, refugee children were sent to various other European countries including, England, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and No Man's-Land between Poland and Germany.

In Denmark there were no training centers, but the youths could be placed with individual Danish farmers.

In Belgium and France Hachsharah activities were of limited success. Adler-Rudel attributed this to a lack of organizational ability on the part of their Jewish communities. In the case of

1 Ibid.
the former the conflict between orthodox and non-orthodox played a role, and in the case of the latter there was opposition on the part of French Jewry to the influx of German Jewish refugees.1

After the 1938 pogrom England became a very important Hachsharah center.

Although in the earlier years, and up to 1937, applicants were accepted on the basis of performance in preparation camps, later, when the pressure increased, other considerations had to be taken into account. These included the situation of the family, its social background, and the nationality (since Polish Jews residing in Germany were the first to be expelled).

The age of the youngster was also a factor. The mandatory government would grant Youth Aliyah certificates only for boys and girls under the age of 17. There was always an urgent need in such cases to obtain certificates for youths who were about to turn 17.

The distribution of certificates was more complicated than this. The various settlements wanted only groups affiliated with their movements.

1 Ibid.
Thus, if a Ha-Shomer Hatzair kibbutz just absorbed a group, then Mapai would demand that the next batch come from among its adherents. The organizations in Germany were instructed to send at certain times groups belonging to particular movements which did not always mean that they represented the most urgent cases. This created friction among certain ideological groups, as is evident from letters by the presidency of the New Zionist Organization (Revisionists) on the one hand, and Arthur Lourie on behalf of the Jewish Agency on the other.

The former had the following complaints:

"Despite the fact that Herzlia is intensely Zionist, it has suffered immitigated discrimination in the matter of Palestine immigration certificates and in the allocation of Relief Funds raised abroad. The Brit Trumpeldor (now known as "Herzlia") has not received a single one of the immigration certificates or a single penny from the Relief Fund. This is due to the fact that the Old Zionist Organization is dominated by the Socialist wing which imposes a political test in the matter of funds and certificates.

After the organization of the Youth Emigration from Germany in accordance with the Samuel System, the Brit Trumpeldor, both in Berlin and in Palestine, made official demands for allocations to the needs of the Brit Trumpeldor. In Palestine negotiations have proceeded for about 2 years,
and although Miss H. Szold has frequently promised to satisfy the Brit Trumpeldor's demands, nothing has been done in the matter."

Arthur Lurie's reply was that each organization was allotted certificates based on its relative strength. This formerly also applied to Betar. Allocation was based upon recognition as a Machsharah body. When the Revisionists and Betar withdrew from the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, they lost their status as a Halutz organization, and also the right to an allotment of certificates. This did not affect the right of individual members of Betar to receive immigration certificates.

1 Council for German Jewry, Memorandum on discrimination against the youth organizations of the New Zionist Organization in the matter of the German and Austrian relief, submitted by the presidency of the New Zionist Organization. April 1938, Zionist Archives, New York.

The primary objective of the Youth Aliyah movement was to attach the young people to the soil and to agricultural occupations. But technical education was not ignored either. In the Meshakim themselves there were some opportunities for training in carpentry and metal work. This was expanded by providing training for young immigrants with inclinations to technical pursuits in such places as The Trade School of the Haifa Technical Institute,
and the Kremener Iron Foundry in the Mifratz Haifa area. In 1937, the Ludwig Teitz Trade School for Boys, attached to kibbutz Yagur, was opened. It provided a three year course in carpentry, forge, lock and tin smithing. In Tel-Aviv young immigrants were sent to the Max Pine School for courses in iron work. For girls, the Mizrahi Women's institutions, the Bet Zeirot in Jerusalem, the Bet Halutzot in Tel-Aviv, and the Wizo Hostel at Nahalat Yizhak, provided the training in the household arts, and also introduction in poultry-raising and in gardening.

The general program for the education and training of Youth Aliyah was twofold, work and study. Four hours in the field or workshop were succeeded by four hours of study. Their curriculum included Hebrew, Bible, history, and science.

The twelve collective settlements accommodating youth in July 1935 were expanded to 29 by 1937.1

When it became evident that the kibbutzim could not take in the growing number of young arrivals, negotiations were started with the

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1 Central Bureau Report to the XXth Zionist Congress, August, 1937, p. 38.
smallholders' settlements (Moshav Ovdim). In April 1936, the first group, numbering 50 from Germany and from among German refugees in France, were assigned to Nahalal.\(^1\) In that year out of 672 youths placed in all settlements, 180 went to four moshavim.\(^2\)

The difference in structure presented by moshav life as opposed to kibbutz life required a change in the education supervision of the new charges. While in the kibbutzim the youths remained in groups, in the moshav they lived each in the home of a farmer.

The policy was to place youths within groups similar in ideology to those that they were associated with in Germany. Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, Kibbutz Ha-Meuchad, and Hever Ha-Kwutzot were able to accommodate their followers. This was not always the case with disciples of other groups, such as the Revisionists and General Zionists. After the Anschluss of Austria and the consequent increased pressure for emigration, some groups were constituted of youths with diverse ideological backgrounds. This led to reduced discipline due to the interference

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1 Ibid., p. 39.
2 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 5.
of political groups.

Of particular difficulty was the placement of orthodox youths, a problem which troubled Henrietta Szold as is revealed in her writing of the time.

"The Youth Aliyah became possible in its present form only because the kvutzot gave us the opportunity of maintaining, educating, and adjusting young people to agricultural pursuits at a minimum expenditure of funds. Our aim must be to parallel for the orthodox the 30 or more cooperative settlements which Labor Palestine has created in the course of time without dreaming that they would enable us to meet the emergency. Unfortunately, it was not possible to charm, as with an Aladdin's Lamp, into existence a series of institutions which the religious community failed to erect all these years."¹

In 1934, the only suitable place for the orthodox youth was kibbutz Rodges. The institutions of Ahava and Children's Village Meir Shefeya conformed to religious requirements, but did not put stress on education in the Law, as demanded by orthodox Jews.

Expedients were employed at the expense of the Youth Aliyah principle of putting agricultural education ahead of all else. Two technical groups,

¹ Ibid., pp. 4,5.
Rambam and Nehemia, were constituted in the Haifa area to provide facilities for orthodox youths. At the same time religious girls were enrolled in the Household School of Mizrachi Women.

The lack of places for religious boys and girls prompted some parents and their children to conceal their desire for a religious way of life, for fear they might lose the chance of coming to Palestine.

These did not prove to be viable solutions, and new institutions had to be developed in addition to the expansion of the old ones. By 1939 the number of places suitable for religious youths had multiplied tenfold. Besides Rodges, places were available at S'deh Jacob, Kfar Saba, Ramat Ha-Sharon, the household schools of Mizrachi women in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, Mikveh Israel, and Kfar Noar Dati. A group of youth from the Frankfurt Boys' Orphanage was transferred to the latter.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XX1st Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 51.
**Table IV**¹

Youth Aliyah Groups in Palestine  
April 1, 1939

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Ahava Home</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>Ben-Shemen</td>
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<td>Bet Zeirot Mizrahi, Jerusalem</td>
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<td>Bet Hachaluzot, Tel-Aviv</td>
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<td>Girl's Agricultural Farm, Jerusalem I</td>
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<td>Kfar Noar Dati I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kfar Noar Dati II</td>
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<td>Kfar Noar Dati Orphanage I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max Fine School I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meshek Poalot Ajanot I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikweh Israel I</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mishmar HaEmek School I</td>
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<td>Meir Shefaya I</td>
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<td>Nachalat Jehuda I</td>
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<td>Nachalat Jizchak I</td>
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<td>Nahalal Girls' Farm I</td>
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<td>Pardess Hannah I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petach Tikvah I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathan School I</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technion, Haifa I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meshek Yeladim Weismersheimer I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yagur Trade School I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yagur Trade School II</td>
<td>62</td>
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**Agricultural Settlements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Kwutzot</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afikim II</td>
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<td>Afikim III</td>
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<td>Ein Harod III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ashdod Yaacob II</td>
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<td>Ashdod Yaadob III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Givat Brenner II</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Haim I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Givat Hashloshah II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gvat II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwutzat Kinneret II</td>
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<td>Naan II</td>
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¹ Five Years of Youth Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, 1939, Zionist Archives, New York, pp. 42, 43.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ramat Hakowesh I</td>
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<td>Tel Hai II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tel Joseph III</td>
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<td>Ramat David, Ajanot II</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramat David, Hasharon II</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degania A II</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degania B II</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geva II</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ginagar II</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulda I</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Anavim II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwutzat Schiller II</td>
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<td>Mishmar Hasharon I</td>
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<td>Mishmarot I</td>
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<td>Bet Sera II</td>
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<td>Ein Shemer I</td>
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<td>Ein Hachoresch I</td>
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<td>Gan Shmuel II</td>
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<td>Mizra II</td>
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<td>Sarid II</td>
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<td>Shaar Haamakim I</td>
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<td>Rodges III</td>
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<td>Ramat Hashomron I</td>
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<td>Kfar Saba I</td>
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<td>Rosh Finah I</td>
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<td>B. Moshavim</td>
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<td>Beer Tuvia I</td>
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<td>Balfouria I</td>
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<td>Kfar Yehezkel I</td>
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<td>Kfar Yehoshua I</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Kfar Vitkin I</td>
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<td>Tel Adashim I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merhavyah I</td>
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<td>Nahalal II</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>Sde Yaacov II</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

- Now in Training ............................................ 3,119
- Left Youth Aliyah ............................................. 1,516
- Total Number .................................................. 4,635
The purpose of training these youths was their introduction to agricultural pursuits. The first group to come to Palestine completed its training in Ein Harod. After graduation it decided to remain as a unit, and together with young Palestinians founded the settlement of Alonim. This group then became host to other young immigrants. Other groups, upon completion of their training, joined labour groups (Plugot Avodah). These, while preferring agricultural pursuits, at times of need turned to other occupations, such as road building, construction, quarrying, and work as stevedores.

By mid 1939, 76 per cent of the graduates continued in Agriculture, 8.0 per cent became artisans, while 14.0 per cent entered a variety of other fields or joined relatives in Palestine.* A significant number did go to the cities, and this was contrary to the original plan. But cognizance had to be taken of this fact, and a process of rethinking had to take place. This may be deduced from Henrietta Szold's words which read as follow:

"Formerly we took the position that

* See table V.
such individuals must shift for themselves; today we are not prepared to run the risk of having our boys and girls lose their hold upon a well ordered life."1

And later she came out with the following statement:

"The figure confirms the opinion that I have held almost from the beginning of our undertaking that we are not justified in putting all our candidates into agricultural life. A number had acquired skills abroad which we have no right to disregard in continuing their education."2

Table V 3
Occupation of Former Members of Youth Aliyah Groups
April 1, 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Agricultural Settlements</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Towns as Artisans and Workers</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care of Children</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Occupations</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending Police School</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined Relatives in Palestine</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Country</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 9.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 60.
Problems did arise. Many of the youngsters had a very limited knowledge of Hebrew and of Jewish life. These were adolescents with the usual problems of that age group, compounded by the separation from their parents.

The Youth Aliyah Madrichim had to play the role of leaders, counselors, pedagogues, and friends. They were aided by youth leaders and house mothers, the organizers of work, and representatives from the agricultural settlements. Although the first group came with their own madrichim from Germany, this became less the case as the years progressed.

Some problems arose from the insufficient schooling that some of the settlements could offer. Other cases involved students who had ambitions beyond what Youth Aliyah could offer.

There were instances where parents abused the system by registering their children in Youth Aliyah out of financial need, but with the intention of withdrawing them at the earliest convenience. During 1938 and 1939, more parents came to Palestine, a factor which did threaten discipline among the youths in cases where visiting privileges were demanded. Also, the worsening situation in Germany served to create anxiety among those boys and girls whose families were still there.

1 Five Years of Youth Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1939, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, 1939, Zionist Archives, New York, P. 32.
FINANCING OF YOUTH ALIYAH

When the Youth Aliyah program started parents were able and willing to pay for a fair portion of the expenses involved. By May 31, 1935, the fees paid by parents of children of the Jüdische Jugendhilfe helped cover the costs of training and education in Palestine amounting to LP 5,627. This accounted for close to 10 per cent of the amount (LP 48,321) allocated for running expenses by various institutions. ¹

The provisions of the contract between the Jugendhilfe and the kwutzot required a monthly payment of LP 3.00 per child during the first year, and LP 2.50 during the second. The closed institutions, such as Beit Zeirot Mizrachi, received a larger sum, and Ben-Shemen and Ahava were allotted a lump sum. ²

This contract provided the youths with training, housing, furnishing, board, repair of clothing and linen, educational material, medical care, and medical insurance.

² Ibid., pp. 46, 47.
Table VI 1

General Youth Aliyah Account for the Period
17th October 1933-31st March 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>LP.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadassah, The Women's Zionist Organization of America</td>
<td>192,707.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddie Cantor Fund for Graduates</td>
<td>9,926.215*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry Donations</td>
<td>816.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>46,818.142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eddie Cantor Fund</td>
<td>10,986.250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18,570.125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>16,273.040</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>25,544.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9,697.894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7,676.806</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17,244.511*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>5,343.850</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,117.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,791.864</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,632.096</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>832.730</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1,013.789</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>680.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>278.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>147.945</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>210.833</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>213.083</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Distribution Committee</td>
<td>798.500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sundry Donations</td>
<td>43,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>56,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Income</strong></td>
<td>376,421.730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This sum does not include LP 2,514.197 paid to the Jewish National Fund Ltd. for the purchase of land.

** Includes LP 11,711.575 through Keren Hayesod.

1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 91.
Table VII 1

General Youth Aliyah Account for the Period 17th October 1933-31st March 1939

| Expenditure                                                                 | LP.            |
|                                                                            | 194,494.000    |
| Union for the Immigration of Jewish Youth (Agudah l'Aliyat Hanoar)         |                |
| Ben-Shemen (including LP 1,300 received from Hadassah for building for Polish Youth) | 42,142.625    |
| Ahava Home, Haifa                                                          | 34,915.000     |
| Settlements of Graduates                                                   | 7,375.983      |
| Subsidies                                                                  | 1,109.105      |
| Social Work                                                                | 1,910.194      |
| Group leaders (Madrichim) (including Seminary)                             | 814.399        |
| Propaganda in various countries (From 1938-39 including expenses of London Office) | 11,347.913    |
| Administrative expenses                                                    | 7,898.372      |

Total 302,007.591

Less: Expenses on a/c of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews 21,989.310

Amount allocated to the Union of for the Immigration of Jewish Youth 194,494.000

Amount allocated for the Settlement of Graduates 7,375.983

Total Expenditure 223,859.293

78,148.298

1 Ibid., p. 92.
As may be seen from table VI Hadassah was by far the largest contributor to Youth Aliyah during the time period in question. In 1935, Rose Jacobs, then president of Hadassah, signed an agreement with Youth Aliyah which made the organization its principal agent in the United States. This development came about as a result of the application of a not inconsiderable amount of pressure by the president of Hadassah, as is evident from her following correspondence with Dr. Georg Landauer:

"... In seeking a project Hadassah is only interested in an undertaking which can be considered a Hadassah project. On that basis our organization has grown and flourished and has developed its methods and technique. Experience has taught us that only along these lines can Hadassah serve as an effective instrument for the upbuilding of Palestine. There is therefore no reason for abandoning its procedure now, all the more so because the other organizations have not proven as effective."

* Georg Landauer was manager of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine (Jerusalem Office).

1 The Georg Landauer Collection, Leo Baeck Institute, New York.
This development came about to the chagrin of other organizations as is evident from the following remarks in a letter from Robert Silverman to Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth:

"... We were all very much astonished when we were informed very circuitously that the Central Bureau had entered into an exclusive arrangement with Hadassah. .... an agreement was being entered into between the Arbeitsgemeinschaft and Hadassah whereby the latter would undertake to raise funds for the Arbeitsgemeinschaft, it being understood that Hadassah is to have exclusive right and that all communication between the Arbeitsgemeinschaft and the American Palestine Campaign would be discontinued, .... we offered Hadassah an opportunity of proceeding with the children and Youth Aliyah work as part of its program, but asked them not to insist on the exclusive right in the matter, so that we too could use the children's work in our campaign publicity, etc. They would hear of no arrangement other than the one which they think they have concluded with Dr. Landauer."1

* Martin Rosenbleuth was manager of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine (London Office).

1 Ibid.
CHILDREN'S ALIYAH

After the November 1938 pogroms the Yishuv began preparations for a mass immigration of Jewish children. The Children's Aliyah was put under the control of a central office in the Department of Social Service of the Vaad Leumi. An arrangement was concluded with Youth Aliyah whereby it undertook to handle all dealings with organizations and families abroad, and also accepted responsibility for the care of children who were put in the settlements or were otherwise kept in groups. The Department of Social Service of the Vaad Leumi was responsible for handling the negotiations with the mandatory authorities, investigating the families which offered to adopt children, and managing their distribution. The Bureau registered the names of the families in Palestine that were ready to adopt children, and the children in Germany whom they proposed to adopt. The list grew to include thousands of families, a preponderant number being relatives of the children they offered to care for.

The British authorities permitted a broad interpretation of the institutional principle
for the admission of children, who were between 13 and 14 years old. Urban as well as rural institutions qualified under this arrangement.

In April 1939, the first batch of 50 Children's Aliyah certificates were granted and were supplemented in June of that year by an additional 500.¹

By 1941, about 900 children within that category had arrived in Palestine.²

¹ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 62.
² Greenberg, op. cit., p. 9.
In 1933 a new Immigration Ordinance was introduced. Although it retained the main features of the preceding Ordinance, its interpretation was somewhat stricter. Its categories were as follows:

**A. Persons of independent means,**

which term includes:

(i) Persons in bona fide possession and freely disposing of a capital of not less than L 1,000;
(ii) Members of liberal professions in possession of a capital of not less than L 500, provided that the Director, Department of Migration, is satisfied that the capital of such persons is sufficient to secure them reasonable prospects of success in the pursuit they intend to enter, that they are qualified and physically fit to follow their proposed pursuits, and that their settlement in Palestine will not lead to the creation of undue competition in the proposed pursuit;

B. (i) Orphans whose maintenance in or by public institutions in Palestine is assured until such time as they are able to support themselves;

(ii) Persons of religious occupations whose maintenance is assured;

(iii) Students whose admission to an educational institution in Palestine and maintenance are assured until such time as they are able to support themselves;

C. Persons who have a definite prospect of employment in Palestine;

D. Dependents of permanent residents or of
immigrants belonging to category A, B, and C.¹

Generally, individuals meeting the requirements of categories A, B, and C were readily admitted. The economic absorptive capacity principle was most important in determining the number of immigrants admitted under category C. Most certificates of this category continued to be consigned to the Jewish Agency for distribution through its offices in various countries.

Thus were established the foundations of British immigration policy as they stood on the eve of the mass influx of Jews from Germany during the 1930s.

1930 was another period of economic depression for Palestine, and in 1931 Jewish immigration declined to 4,075, from a figure of 5,249 in 1929, and 4,944 in 1930.²

In 1931 the Mandatory Government attempted to regularize unauthorized immigration. An amnesty was issued and several thousand Jewish immigrants were granted normal residence status.³

As more travelers remained in Palestine, the Government stipulated that such whose qualification for

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immigration certificates were in doubt had to make a deposit of L 25 for a visa. This figure proved ineffective and was raised to L 60. In 1934 the practice was introduced of counting against the Labour Schedule cases of those who remained in the country even though they made the L 60 deposit.¹

Immigration in 1932 rose to 9,552,² and in 1933 jumped to 27,289.³

THE PERIOD 1933 - 1936

During these years Palestine experienced unprecedented economic development. The capital and know-how which German Jewish immigrants brought to Palestine contributed significantly to this development. The immigration figures for 1934 were 36,619; and for 1935 (the peak year) they were 55,407. Immigrants from Germany accounted for approximately 20 per cent of the total for the years 1933 through 1935.⁴ The aforementioned immigration figures were supplemented by illegal immigration.

¹ Ibid., p. 65.
² Janowsky, op. cit., p. 145.
³ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 68.
⁴ Ibid. (calculations based on figures in table)
The new arrivals in the time period in question not only contributed to the general prosperity, but actually increased the economic absorptive capacity of the country. This was particularly the case since many of these immigrants did not go into agricultural pursuits, but went rather to urban industries. This served to restrain the pressure on the limited land available.

The Arab population actually shared in the prosperity, but agitation against Jewish immigration increased. As early as 1933, in response to the sudden sharp rise in Jewish immigration, the Arab leadership announced a policy of non-cooperation and a boycott of British and Zionist goods.

Until 1936 the principle of economic absorptive capacity was generally adhered to, and this in spite of the fact that the request of the Jewish Agency for immigration certificates were never met. The granting of immigration certificates under the Labour Schedule was based on this principle.

From October 1934 to March 1935 the Jewish Agency requested 18,600, and the Government granted 7,500; for the period April - September 1935 it
requested 19,160, and received 8,000. The distribution of the Labour Certificates between German Jews and others was largely in the hands of the Jewish Agency, but consideration had to be taken that the recipient fit the requirements of the category.

THE PERIOD 1936 - 1939

Although during this period economic conditions remained good and economic absorptive capacity of Palestine increased, the Government, in response to the Arab riots of 1936 and 1937, curtailed immigration. Now the economic absorptive capacity principle was superseded by political considerations. The Royal Commission, sent to Palestine in 1936, published its report in July 1937. Besides recommending the Partition of Palestine it proposed the abandonment of the economic absorptive capacity principle and its replacement by the principle of "Political High Level". It proposed that this high level be fixed at 12,000 immigrants annually for the next five years, including all categories, and provided for a reduction in this number if economic conditions so required.

3 Ibid., p. 829.
On April 27, 1938 a commission headed by Sir John Woodhead arrived in Palestine. Its task was to devise a plan for the partition of Palestine, as was recommended by the Royal Commission. It found the idea impractical. The Palestine Gazette published an immigration ordinance on April 12, 1939 which authorized the High Commissioner to impose at his own discretion a limit for the number of each category of immigrant certificate to be granted 1.

On May 17, 1939 the British Government issued a White Paper which came to be known as the McDonald White Paper of 1939. It stipulated that Jewish immigration into Palestine be fixed at a maximum of 75,000 in the following five year period. Thereafter the number of Jewish immigrants was to depend on Arab consent. Immigration would be subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity. A Yearly quota of 10,000 immigrants was to be allowed. In addition 25,000 refugees were to be admitted as soon as adequate provision for their maintenance was ensured, with special consideration to be given refugee children and dependents.2

The period between 1936 and 1939 saw great restrictions placed on immigration. For 1936 the figure declined to 26,974 3 from the 1935 peak year; in 1937 it

3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 68.
declined to 9,441, and in 1938 it was only 11,222. Immigration from Germany accounted for approximately 30 per cent of the total for these years. * For 1938 and 1939 alone this figure rose even higher. ¹

That the decline in immigration was due to deliberate British policy is evident from the reduction in the number of labour certificates granted. For the period October 1935 to March 1936 the Jewish Agency requested 10,900 category C certificates and received only 3,250. For April to September 1936 the Jewish Agency requested 11,000 and received only 4,500; for October 1936 to March 1937, it requested 10,695 and received only 1,800, and from April to September 1937 the request was for 11,250, and just 775 certificates were granted. ²

From 1934 to 1936 32,516 individuals came in on the Labour Schedule, and 15,695 as person of "Independent Means", indicating that the heads of workers' families outnumbered the heads of middle class families by two to one. Between 1937 and 1939 16,642 family mem-

¹ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 68.
bers entered under category C, and 11,968, under category A. This drastic change in proportion was due to curtailment of the Labour Schedule.

In 1938 the Colonial Office ordered the restriction of category A immigration. On the other hand for the period April 1 to September 30 of that same year, as described in chapter on Youth Aliyah, category B III, students category, was unrestricted. In this category German Jews accounted for 66 per cent of the total immigration in 1938, and 86 per cent of the total immigration for the period January to March 1939. This contrasts sharply with the figures for the period 1933 to 1937, when a peak of only 43 per cent was reached in 1933, but the average percentage was in the low 20s. In absolute figures this amounted to 1,659 in 1938, and 1,202 for the period January to March 1939.

3 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
4 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
5 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
6 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
7 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.
This also contrasts sharply with the absolute figures for the period 1933 to 1937, where the low figure was 89 for 1933 and the high figure was 662 for 1936, the other two years being both below 400.

As a percentage of the total yearly German-Jewish immigration, category BIII accounted for 27.1\(^1\) per cent in 1938, and for 27.0\(^2\) per cent for January to March 1939. This contrasts sharply with the figures for the years 1933 to 1937 where they represented only 1.3\(^3\) per cent in 1933, and a high of only 8.4\(^4\) per cent in 1936. For the years 1938 to March 1939 the aforementioned figures would indicate that Great Britain gave specially favorable consideration to immigration of Jews from Germany falling under category BIII, both as compared to other categories for these immigrants and as compared to immigrants from other areas in previous years. The British authorities gave

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1 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.
3 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
special consideration to Jewish youths from Germany between the ages of 15 and 16, but in 1936 no special certificates were granted for this group, a situation which caused the Jewish Agency to complain.

In category AI German Jews accounted for 78 per cent of the total immigration in 1938, and for 72 per cent of the total for the period January to March 1939. This represents an increase over the figures for the period 1933 to 1937, where the peak was 68 per cent for 1937, and the low point 29 per cent for 1935, the remaining years averaging a percentage in the low 50s. In absolute figures this amounted to 2,036 for 1938 and 1,558 for the period January to March 1939.

2 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
4 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration.
5 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration.
6 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.
March 1939. Although the last figure is high for the three months involved, on the whole this period does not contrast sharply with earlier years, in which the years 1933 to 1936 each witnessed a higher immigration in category AI among German Jews than either the years 1937 or 1938. As a percentage of the total German-Jewish immigration category AI did not show a significant change during all the years in question.¹ For the years 1938 to March 1939 these figures would indicate that Great Britain gave Jews from the Greater Reich under category AI more favorable consideration than in previous years, as compared to Jews coming from other countries, but did not give category AI a more favored status among immigrants from Germany as compared to other years.

From August 1937 and on, each member of the family was required to hold an immigrant certificate which was counted against the total quota of AI certificates.² This was unlike the previous arrangement.

¹ See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

whereby only the head of the family needed such a certificate. The granting of certificates in categories AII and AIII was discontinued altogether, the former in 1936 and the latter in 1938.

In category D, dependents of Palestine residents, German Jews accounted for 47 per cent of the total immigration in 1938, and for 64 per cent of the total for the period January to March 1939. This represents an increase over the figures for 1933 to 1937, with a low of 9 per cent for 1935, and a high of 20 per cent for 1933, the remaining years being 13 per cent in 1934 and 19 per cent for both 1936 and 1937. In absolute

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1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIth Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
2 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
4 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
figures this amounted to 1,038 ¹ for 1938, and 771 ² for the period January to March 1939. Although the last figure is high for 3 months, on the whole it does not contrast sharply with the figures for the previous years with a high of 1,643 ³ for 1936 and a low of 524 * for 1933. As a percentage of the total German-Jewish immigration category D did not show a marked difference for the years in question, ³** with the exception of the first two years for the aforementioned reasons. For the years 1938 to March 1939 these figures would indicate that Jews from Greater Germany under

1 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.

³ See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

* The low figures for 1933 and 1934 (758) must be viewed in light of the fact that the German-Jewish immigration had only started in these years and therefore there could not be as many dependents of Palestine residents as in later years. (Figure is based on table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

** For the period January to March 1939 the figure was 17.3 per cent.
Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.
category D received more favorable consideration when compared to the previous years, than Jews from other countries, but not more favorable when compared to Jews coming from Germany in earlier years. On the whole, close relatives of German Jews received special consideration from the British authorities 1.

In category C, Labour Schedule, German Jews accounted for 34 per cent 2 of the total immigration from all countries in 1937, 36 per cent for 1938, and 55 per cent 3 of the total for the period January to March 1939. This represents a sharp increase over the figures for the period 1933 to 1936, with a low of 11 per cent.

1 Strauss, op. cit., p. 74.
2 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration in Palestine.
3 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
in 1935 and a high of only 24 per cent in 1936, the remainder being 17 per cent and 20 per cent for the years 1933 and 1934. In absolute figures this amounted to 980 in 1937, 1,389\(^1\) in 1938, and 829\(^2\) for the period January to March 1939. Excluding the figures for the three months in 1939, this represents a severe reduction from the figures of 1933 to 1936, where the low was 2,605\(^3\) in 1936, and the high 4,082 in 1934.

As a percentage of the total German-Jewish immigration those in category C accounted for 29.9 per cent of the total in 1937, 22.6 per cent of the total in 1938, and 18.6 per cent\(^4\) for the period January to March 1939. This contrasts with the figures for

1 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.

3 See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

4 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 73.
the period 1933 to 1936 where the high was 48.0 per cent in 1934, and the low 33.0 per cent \(^1\) for 1936.

The absolute decline in the figures for category C German-Jewish immigration was due to the new and more severe restrictions imposed by the Mandatory Government on all immigration in that category. On the other hand, in the distribution of these category C certificates, a task of the Jewish Agency and not of the British authorities, German Jews consistently received a smaller percentage of certificates than their representation in the total immigration warranted. This despite the fact that the British authorities, before surrendering the category C certificates, took out a portion specifically for German Jewry. \(^2\) In 1933 the difference was 8 per cent when C category immigrants from Germany accounted for 17 per cent of the total immigration of that category, while the total German-Jewish immigration represented 25 per cent of the total from all countries. The discrepancy continued in the same direction for the year 1934 (3 per cent),

\(^1\) See table I in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.

1935 (2 per cent), 1936 (5 per cent), 1937 (1 per cent), and rose to 19 per cent\(^1\) for 1938 and 15 per cent\(^2\) for the period January to March 1939. This would indicate that the Jews coming from Greater Germany were favored more by the British authorities when compared to immigrants from other areas, than by the Jewish Agency.

Jews coming from Greater Germany, as opposed to Germany proper, accounted for 55 per cent\(^3\) of the total immigration in 1938, and for 70 per cent\(^4\) of the total immigration for the period January to March 1939.

The Mandatory Government was favorably disposed to the transfer of Jewish children from Europe, and this in consideration of the situation created by the Nazis and in view of the fact that Arab objections were less

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1 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
3 See table II in chapter titled Socio-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine.
4 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 74.
severe in this case, and also in consideration of the pressing situation in which German Jewry found itself shortly after the Nazi takeover in Germany, conditions under which dependents were admitted to Palestine were amended. While originally only relatives were expected to take responsibility for such immigrants, later kibbutzim were also given that right when relatives of members were concerned. 

After the November 1938 pogroms in Germany the Vaad Leumi demanded that the Yishuv be permitted to accept 10,000 Jewish children from Germany. The Government made only small concessions, granting 20 certificates for this purpose once, and 500 on another occasion.

In March 1938 Austria was annexed by Germany, in September the Sudetenland was incorporated to the Reich, and in the spring of that same year Chechoslovakia was partially occupied; Memel was annexed and the Jews were expelled from Danzig. The number of Jews under German rule or as refugees in European countries reached

2 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 17.
650,000.

In recognition of the drastic needs of these Jews the White Paper of 1939 provided for the admission of 25,000 refugees. On the whole British authorities were inclined to favor immigrants from Germany and Western Europe in general, to those from other areas. This is evident from the following remarks of Albert M. Hyamson, head of the Mandatory Government Department of Immigration until 1934:

"One was tempted to strain the law in favor of prospective immigrants from German lands, not only on account of the danger in which they stood, but also because, if one is permitted to generalize, they constituted the best element among the immigrants. The history of Palestine under the Mandate would have been different and probably far happier if Western Jews, especially those of a German, Dutch and British upbringing, had from the beginning had an adequate share in it".2

In the Lower House of Parliament Colonel Wedgewood described the immigrants from Germany as "the best immigration that country has ever had" 3.

1 Ibid., p. 14.
2 Hyamson, op. cit., p. 59.
3 Strauss, op. cit., p. 74.
The Mandatory authorities gave special consideration to the plight of German Jewry as early as March 1933 when they authorized an advance of 1,000 Labour Schedule certificates on account of the schedule for the coming half year. They also sent 200 certificates for capitalist immigrants directly to the British Passport Office for distribution to German Jews.

General Sir Arthur Wauchope, High Commissioner for the period 1932 - 1938, was described as having a personally favorable attitude towards the matter of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. He saw Palestine as a principle refuge for German Jewry when the National Socialist persecution started.

3 This according to Norman Bentwich who knew him personally.

Captain F. Foley, head of the passport division of the British Consulate in Berlin, was responsible for the issuing of all certificates for Palestine, a function which he administered "most sympathetically." Dr. Franz Meyer described him as very helpful, "he (Foley) often shut his eyes and let pass cases where people requested capitalist certificates, but could not show sufficient means." In a letter to Dr. Werner Senator he reveals himself in the following manner:

"I am glad we have 450 Labour Schedule certificates and hope that you will have a very large and generous heart for Germany and send us many more. You will be pleased to know I am working in close cooperation with your friends in the Palestine-Amt. I value their assistance very much indeed. I wish I could do more for the innumerable victims of Nazi persecution."


* Franz Meyer is member of the Leo Beck Institute Council and one of the leaders of the Central European Immigrants Association.

2 Taped interview of Franz Meyer by Avraham Margoliot Oral History Division The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

* Dr. Werner Senator was Deputy to the Director of the Jerusalem Department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

The White Paper provisions concerning immigration were applied by the British in a very strict manner. Even when the situation of European Jewry was in some of its most critical stages the British refused to grant certificates, claiming that illegal immigration had filled the time period in question.

With the outbreak of World War II the British decreed that immigration of residents from enemy country was prohibited. Only after a year of protestations were these regulation lifted sufficiently to permit the immigration of wives and children of Palestinian residents, of children up to the age of 15 and of immigrants whom the Jewish Agency designated as old Zionist. Also famous authors and rabbis were allowed to come to Palestine. These restrictions were reimposed when Italy joined the war.
On February 12, 1935 James G. McDonald stated that the bulk of German-Jewish refugees who went from Germany to Palestine, did so directly. 1 According to my questionnaire which covered people who left Germany between 1933 and 1940 and who came to Palestine, 76 out of 118 who answered the question "did you go directly from Germany to Palestine" said "yes". Of the remainder 3 went to France first, 1 to Lithuania, 2 to Rumania, 2 to Lebanon, 3 to Switzerland, 1 to Holland and Belgium, 1 to Meran, Tirol, 1 to Argentina, 2 to Shanghai, 1 to France and Tunisia, 1 to England and Australia, 1 to Sweden, 1 to Holland, Switzerland and Italy, 1 to Latvia, 1 to Czechoslovakia, 1 to Switzerland and Italy, 1 to Bulgaria, 1 to France and Luxembourg, 1 to Poland, 3 to England, 1 to Persia, 2 to Belgium, 4 to Italy, 1 to Thailand, 2 to Cuba, Belgium and France, 2 to Holland, and 1 to Lithuania, Poland, Austria and Italy.

A comparison between the years the immigrants left Germany and the question whether they went directly to Palestine is revealing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Went directly to Palestine</th>
<th>Did not go directly to Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 77**

2 I went directly to Palestine in 1932. ** 2 just passed through other countries.
These figures indicate that the percentage of German Jews who went directly to Palestine was higher in the earlier than in the later years, particularly in 1938 and 1939. This may have been due to the severer restrictions imposed by the Mandatory Authorities or to the fact that the German Jews who left late were of a group that was less inclined to settle in Palestine.

In the closing years of the 1930, Jews were organized into groups and put on trains or Danubian steamers. When they traveled by train they would usually go to Athens, and from there continue in small vessels to Palestine. Those who went by way of the Danube headed for the Black Sea, whereupon they would embark from such ports as Constanza and Sulina in Rumania, and Verna in Bulgaria. On the route hotels were set up to lodge and feed these refugees. These were generally illegal immigrants who were often aided, and in some cases organized, by the National Socialist authorities.

1 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 66.
2 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
3 See chapter titled National Socialist Policy concerning The Jewish Immigration To Palestine.

* For a list of the various vessels which attempted to land illegal immigrants in Palestine during 1939 - 1940 see Tartakower, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
VI. ALTERNATE PLACES OF REFUGE

The beginning of National Socialist persecution in April 1933 resulted in an unorganized Jewish emigration. This emigration was largely voluntary, and many of those who left Germany did not know where they should finally settle. These emigrants were able to bring some of their capital with them.

Dr. Ruppin proposed that the High Commissioner for refugees (Jewish and other) coming from Germany plan for a regularized yearly emigration of 20,000 young Jews from Germany over a ten year period. He thought that half of this number could go to Palestine, and that the other half should be directed towards the United States and South America. He was strongly opposed to large group settlements in the less developed countries.¹ By November 1934 German Jews who had left their country were distributed as follows:²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar and Luxemburg</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (1933-1934)</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ James G. McDonald writing of September 28, 1934. McDonald Papers file No. 356.
² McDonald Papers file No. 356.
³ Tartakower, op. cit., p. 321.
As the figures indicate the stream of emigrants initially flowed to the countries bordering on Germany, with France receiving the largest number. These countries were still suffering from the effects of economic depression and were not prepared to absorb the majority of refugees. In the early years there were even cases of people returning to Germany from these countries.

In February 1935 the distribution of the German-Jewish Refugees was as follows:

| Settled Overseas* | 
|------------------|---|
| Palestine        | 20,000 |
| USA              | 5,000  |
| South American Countries | 2,500 |
| South Africa     | 200    |
| Elsewhere        | 500    |

Absorbed in European Countries: 6,000

Repatriated to Countries of Central or Eastern Countries: 18,000

Unabsorbed in European Countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar Territory</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian Countries</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere in Europe</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25,000

1 McDonald Papers file No. 356.

* A substantial number of those who settled overseas went directly from Germany to the overseas countries. They never became part of the refugee problem in Europe.
These figures show that by 1935 more refugees had been settled overseas than remained in the European countries around Germany. By June 15, 1935 James McDonald estimated that France alone had been host to 30,000 refugees, 20,000 of whom had been sent to other countries. Also by that date 36,800 refugees had gone overseas, especially to Palestine, the United States, South America and South Africa. After the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 it became clear that organized mass emigration of Jews would be necessary. Jewish organizations in Germany in cooperation, especially with Jewish organizations of Palestine, Great Britain and the United States undertook to evacuate German Jewry in an organized manner. This situation prevailed until the November 1938 pogrom, after which organized emigration became impossible.

Besides in Palestine German Jews took refuge in the following countries and areas of the world:

THE UNITED STATES

Until 1921 there were few restrictions governing the entrance of European immigrants into the United States. The Quota Act of 1921 placed the first numerical restrictions on such immigrants. It provided for an annual immigration limited to 3 per cent of each European nationality residing in the United States in 1910.2

1 James G. McDonald, letter of resignation Of James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and other) Coming from Germany, addressed to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, London, December 27, 1936. p. 34.

Also a maximum quota of 355,000 immigrants was established. The quota for Germany turned out to be 26,000 immigrants annually.\footnote{Morse, op. cit., p. 135.}

The 1929 crash prompted President Hoover to issue a White House Statement on September 8, 1930. It provided that consular officers "will, before issuing a visa, have to pass judgement with particular care on whether the applicant may become a public charge, and if the applicant cannot convince the officer that it is not probable, the visa will be refused."\footnote{Ibid.}

Cecilia Rosansky, Field Counselor of the National Council of Jewish Women gave the following description of the effects of this legislation:

"...under our restrictive immigration law Germany has an annual quota of over 25,000 persons who are permitted to enter this country. This number was of course greatly reduced by the executive order of President Hoover, so that in 1932 only about 1,500 German immigrants came to join relatives in the United States. Estimating that the same number of regular immigrants were admitted during the past year, we find that there were in addition about 2,000 Germans here who are actually refugees. Everyone knows how rigid the tests are of the American Consuls abroad, so that these 2,000 refugees were admitted only after they had established to the complete satisfaction of the American Consuls, either that the resources of their American relatives, their own financial resources, or their special eminence in the professions or in the arts were sufficient..."
to guarantee against their becoming public charges". 1

These regulations were in effect in 1933 when Jews began to emigrate from Germany in large numbers, and applied to refugees as well as to other categories of immigrants.

Section 7(c) of the Immigration Act of 1924 presented a particular problem for German Jews. It provided that applicants furnish police certificates of good character for the previous five years, a record of military service, two certified copies of his birth certificate and two copies of all other available records. The law stated that these must be presented only "if available", but the consuls were often stricter than this provision called for2.

The American Consul in Holland was particularly strict, as the following report of December 20, 1933 indicates:

"It is practically impossible for any refugee to receive here in Holland a visa for emigration to the States, whereas we hear that the consuls in Germany are at present much more obliging in this respect"3.

1 Broadcast over WEAF, Monday July 9, 1934 3:30 P.M. by Cecilia Rosansky. McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Morse, op. cit., p. 137.
3 Report to James G. McDonald December 20, 1933. McDonald Papers file No. 356.
A report of July 2, 1934 indicates that this situation has not changed:

"The Dutch Committee have again been complaining very bitterly of the anti-Jewish attitude of the U.S.A. consul in Rotterdam" 1.

The strict regulations of September 1930 were applied until the issuance of new visa instructions on January 12, 1937. These called for a more generous interpretation of the public charge provision, so that probability be substituted for possibility in determining whether an applicant should be denied a visa on the grounds that he may become a public charge 2.

Jewish Refugees from Germany admitted to the United States 1933 to 1940 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933-1934</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1935</td>
<td>1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1936</td>
<td>3,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1937</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-1938</td>
<td>11,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-1939</td>
<td>30,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-1940</td>
<td>19,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>75,396</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1938 President Roosevelt ordered that 12,000 to 15,000 German refugees who had come to the United States on visitors visas should not be forced to leave at their expiration. Their visas were to be extended for as long as necessary 3. On the other hand, a proposal to admit 20,000 German Jewish children above the

1 Report to James G. McDonald, July 2, 1934. McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Morse, op. cit., p. 197.
3 Ibid., p. 234.
limits of the existing quota did not come to fruition. Only in 1938 were the full German and Austrian quotas utilized.

GREAT BRITAIN

Already before World War I England had a restrictive immigration policy. After the war, faced with serious problems of unemployment, England clamped down on immigration more tightly. This policy continued past 1933. The requirements for refugees and other aliens continued to be the same. Up to 1938 the only immigrants admitted to England were those who could prove that they either had sufficient means, or an invitation from a prominent Briton or a domestic service permit.

The number of refugees admitted was so limited that in 1935 Norman Bentwich could write that the sums collected by the Central British Fund of the Jewish Organizations for the years 1933 through 1935 "largely exceeded" the needs of the refugees in the country. Most of the funds collected were allocated for the settlement in Palestine and other countries and for training in Germany, France and Denmark. On December 19,

1 Ibid. p. 268

1933 Mr. d'Avigdor Goldsmid, the president of the Central Migration Committee, appointed by the London Conference, reported that the refugees were arriving in England at the rate of about 350 a month, and that they were being settled in other countries from England at the rate of about 80 to 100 a month. ¹

Up to 1938 the number of refugees who remained in England was relatively small. According to Norman Bentwich they reached 15,000 at the most. Many of those who stayed in England on a temporary basis emigrated overseas to the United States, Palestine, and other countries. ² A report of March 7, 1934 about the refugee situation in England presents the following picture:

"The figures about the refugees in England are interesting, and indicate that the problem is being appreciably reduced, anyhow in this country. Roughly they are as follows: 3,500 refugees have been registered with the Refugee Committee. Of these no less than 750 have been placed in England, either in employment or as students. The number of students or professional persons retraining is over 300.... Over 900 have moved on to other countries, about half back to Germany, and the other half to all parts of the world. There is a floating population of 1,000 whose addresses are not known, and it is believed that half must have gone back or found their way to other countries. About 100 are

¹ Report of December 19, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
receiving relief regularly from the Committee. That leaves a residue of 900 to 1,000 who are not placed or accounted for. 1

In 1934 the British Government decided to issue a special Home Office document of identity and travel to refugees from Germany who could not obtain a national passport. 2

A more liberal admission policy was adopted by Great Britain in 1938. This policy was based on humanitarian considerations which recognized the special problems of the refugees. For others immigration into England remained very difficult. Between November 1938 and September 1939 England permitted the immigration of more than 9,000 German children, of whom 90 per cent were Jewish. 3

According to Adler-Rudel * non-Jewish people responded "quicker and more numerously" than Jews in answering the call for homes to place these youngsters. He also added that poor Jews responded in greater numbers than rich Jews. 4

2 Letter of James G. McDonald to Under Secretary of State of Great Britain of November 14, 1934 and in reference to a letter of March 26, 1934 No C. 1748/23/18, received by James G. McDonald from His Majesty's Government. McDonald Papers file No. 356.
3 Morse, op. cit., p. 166.
4 In 1933 he was the Director of the Department of Product-Welfare of the Jewish Community in Berlin. In 1934 he became the Secretary General of the Reichsvertretung, succeeding Dr. Kreutzberger.

The Movement for the Care of Children took responsibility for 10,000 youngsters under sixteen and placed them in private homes and in hostels. These youths were permitted to continue their education in English schools. According to Adler-Rudel some public schools offered free places for these children, but after a year a number asked that they be taken away, not because they did not behave well or did poorly in their work, but rather because they did so well that they became a source of envy to the other children which created friction disturbing the harmony of the school.

Thousands of young people between the ages of thirteen and thirty five were admitted to England for training in industry and agriculture, and thousands of men and women entered England under guarantee of local citizens. Some were allowed into the country in transit, others were old and had guarantees of maintenance for life. Three thousand five hundred men

between the ages of eighteen and forty five were housed at the Kitchner Camp at Richborough, Kent. It was to serve as a transit and training center for those who had prospects of emigrating overseas and who had been taken out of Germany in order that they not continue to be incarcerated in concentration camps.

After the outbreak of war Norman Bentwich estimated that only a few were likely to be in transit for the United States, Palestine or South America. These men were engaged in manual work within the camp or on the land around which was leased for horticulture. While the census of 1931 showed about 18,000 German and Austrian residents in England at the outbreak of war, they numbered nearly 90,000. 71,000 German and Austrian refugees were brought before Alien Tribunals. Approximately ten per cent of them were non-Jews.

At the outbreak of war of the 15,000 women who had by then entered England as domestic servants

1 Letter by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald September 21, 1939. McDonald Papers file No. 356.


4 Letter by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald October 12, 1939. McDonald Papers file No. 356.


6 Ibid., p. 3.
approximately half lost their employment. Men who had worked as trade agents also lost their posts. Those who had come to England in transit were held indefinitely. The plans of the Intergovernmental Committee * to settle many of these refugees in Australia, Rhodesia, British Guinea and other countries had to be suspended. ¹ After the outbreak of war the refugees as well as other aliens were required to obtain a special permit before they could qualify for civil employment. Such permits were granted in cases where the work could not be done by any British subjects or because there was a demand for the type of work for which the refugee qualified. While between November 1939 and May 1940 the government was more liberal in its granting of work permits this situation changed after the invasion of Belgium, Holland and France. The reports about the role played by Nazi agents in these countries caused a change of policy towards the refugees. Reports circulated that some persons posing as refugees had actually helped the Nazis in their invasion of Holland.² A policy of internment was initiated by the authorities. It encompassed all male refugees between the ages of sixteen and seventy and included some women refugees as well. After a short time many were released, but 20,000 remained interned.³

² Ibid., p. 8.
* Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was established as a byproduct of the 1938 Evian Conference to help deal with the refugee problem.
³ Ibid., p. 9.
FRANCE

Although France faced both economic and political difficulties it welcomed more refugees from Nazi Germany during the 1930s than any other European country. Of the 50,000 officially admitted from Germany and 4,000 from the Saar the vast majority were Jews. On December 23, 1933 James G. McDonald described France as the temporary home of by far the largest number of refugees. He added the following:

"The French Government, priding itself on its tradition of hospitality to the oppressed, put no obstacles in the way to the stream of refugees that crossed the Belgian frontier or passed through the Saar into France."

In 1933 French citizens, acting chiefly through Le Comité National de Secours aux Réfugiés Allemands have raised and expended ten million French francs for the care of the refugees. As long as funds were available it housed thousands of refugees in hotels and restaurants in Paris. It also provided advice on employment and on procedures for obtaining identity and working Papers. When the committee ran out of funds the French

1 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 133.
3 Bentwich, op. cit., p. 39.
Government provided barracks and military buildings on the outskirts of Paris. At one time close to 2,000 persons were accommodated in them.

There was some opposition to the influx of Jewish refugees to France even among French Jews, as the following report shows:

"Monsieur L. Dreyfus wrote, stating his point of view, that he was strongly opposed to encouraging refugees to come to France, both because it tended to arouse anti-Semitism in France and because it reflected on the patriotism of those Jews who remained in Germany. But he and his friends, he said, were prepared to contribute to a fund for assisting the Jews in Germany."  

Due to the worsening economic situation in France refugees entering the country after November 1933 were required to possess regular documents of admission from the French Government. Without such documents an individual could be refused entry, and if he entered illegally he would be liable to eviction. It was very difficult to obtain a residence permit, and even more difficult to obtain working papers.

For approximately two years refugees were free to take up handicrafts as an occupation. Norman Bentwich could report in May 1934 that the Federation of Jewish Societies was "most helpful in finding work for artisans.

1 Ibid., p. 40.
3 Ibid.
and small businessmen.\(^1\)

The Laval law-decree of April 8, 1935\(^2\) was designed to protect French artisans from alien competition and put an end to that venue of employment for the refugees. Refugees who could set up their own businesses could be actively engaged in commerce and industry. Decrees of June 17, 1938, and one of November 12, 1938 put an end to this possibility of employment as well.\(^3\)

The Decree of May 2, 1938 made an alien who entered the country illegally liable to a fine of 100 to 1,000 francs and to imprisonment of one month to one year. This applied as well to aliens who were found in France after having been denied identity cards, or to those who without a valid excuse failed to apply for such a card. Failure to adhere to an expulsion order issued by the Minister of Interior carried with it a penalty of from six months to three years imprisonment. The latter regulation was mitigated by the provision for a plea of "impossibility" of leaving France. In such cases, if it could be shown that the alien could not leave France, he would

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2 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 136.
3 Ibid., p. 137.
not be subject to the proscribed penalty, but would be allotted a place of residence from where he had to report to the police regularly. ¹

The aforementioned provisions indicate that France was ready to accept refugees on a provisional basis only.

After the outbreak of war all male aliens from enemy countries were interned. This included the refugees.

SWITZERLAND

Switzerland received many refugees in transit. ² Approximately 5,000 Jews found a refuge in Switzerland between 1933 and 1939. That most were in transit is evident from the fact that in the short period between April and September 1933 10,000 Jewish refugees passed one Swiss frontierpost alone.³ When she feared that the refugees might remain in the country, she did refuse them entry in some cases. This is evident from the following report to James G. McDonald:

"Tickets to the Swiss frontier were not sufficient, as the Swiss authorities had in several cases refused admission to Polish citizens, refugees from Germany who were not able to show tickets to the Swiss frontier station at the other end of Switzerland." ⁴

¹ Ibid., pp.139-140.
² Bentwich, op. cit. p. 49.
³ Tartakower, op. cit., p. 291.
After the annexation of the Sudetenland by the Reich the Swiss Government actually introduced visas for non-Aryan German citizens who were now entering the country illegally, 1

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OF REFUGE

In the early years of Nazi rule Belgium, Holland, Checoslovakia, like Switzerland and France, opened their frontiers to the refugees. 2 During the years 1933 - 1939 Belgium admitted 40,000, of whom 25,000 remained at the outbreak of the war. 3 Holland was sheltering 30,000 refugees when the war broke. In both Holland and Belgium refugees were sheltered in camps, with the expectation that they would soon leave. In these countries efforts were made to restrict immigration only when it became clear that the stream of arrivals continued, while the departure of refugees was slower than expected. 4 By 1938 there were 5,000 5 German and Austrian refugees in Checoslovakia and an equal number in Italy. 6 Smaller groups of German-Jewish refugees found their way to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and a number of other European countries.

1 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 288.
McDonald Papers file No. 356.
3 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 308.
4 Ibid., p. 305.
5 Ibid., p. 304.
6 Ibid., p. 311.
The South and Central American countries varied in their attitude towards the immigration of German Jews. Brazil and Argentina had large Jewish communities and seemed to be relatively desirable places of refuge. Argentina, which in the early years of the refugee movement took a liberal stand on the question of immigration, later discontinued this policy. National Socialist propaganda had its effect there and anti-Semitic organizations pressed upon the Government to restrict immigration. This is apparent from the following letter of Rigoberto A. Merai, Commander in Chief of the "Argentine Banner" to Viscount Cecil in connection with his work on behalf of the refugees from Germany:

"Learning that in the session of the 6th December the Argentine Republique has been mentioned as a refuge for Hebrews, I have the honor to let you know that you can discount my country as a propitious country for Jewish colonization. We shall not tolerate that our country, where the Jew is an oppressor, strangler and extortioner of our society, be taken as refuge by the lowest of all races, the refuse of humanity. If, for reasons of diplomacy or weakness, our honorable Government should offer our country as refuge, we should open an offensive based on terror until we have destroyed the dens in which they find shelter." 1

After a visit to sixteen different South and Cen-

* A nationalist group in Argentine.
1 Letter of Rigoberto A. Merai to Viscount Cecil December 9, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
tral American countries Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, personal assistant to James G. McDonald, reported that despite excessive nationalism in those countries Argentina was the only country where he found opposition in intellectual circles to immigration of a limited number of scholars.¹

The rising anti-Semitism resulted in increased restrictions being placed on Jewish immigration to that country. A decree issued in 1938 provided that applications of immigrants visas to Argentina must be referred to an interministerial board in Buenos Aires. The general policy was that immigrants who left their country of origin for political, racial or religious reasons were considered undesirable.²

The Brazilian constitution imposed rigorous limitations on immigration, while emphasis was put on the admission of only agricultural immigrants. This is evident from the following statement of the Brazilian Minister of Labor:

"None except agricultural immigrants can be considered; the Constitution limiting the immigration to definite quotas cannot be exceeded; the German quota has tentatively been fixed at 3,090 a year; of this proportion only 10 per cent could be Jews or refugees - that is 309 a year; the constitutional limitation of 2 per cent of the immigrants who have come to the country during the past 50 years, is a mistake and should not have been included in the fundamental law, but there it is and it cannot be ignored or circumvented; if an attempt

² Tartakower, op. cit., p. 316.
were made to get around it I would at once be attacked by the friends of Alberto de Torres (the nationalistic society which had most to do with writing the immigration restriction into the constitution, because of their intense opposition to the continuation of Japanese immigration on a large scale). 1

He added that nothing beyond the 309 agriculturists a year was possible; that even Poles and stateless among the refugees would have to be included in the German quota, since they came from Germany. 2

By the end of 1937 there were approximately 8,000 German Jews in Brazil, indicating that the constitutional restrictions were not enforced too strictly. After 1937 immigration to Brazil became more difficult and only capitalists and visitors were admitted under very strict conditions. 3

In Mexico immigration restrictions were strict. In general the smaller Central and South American countries could not absorb very large numbers of refugees. The Ecuadorian Government endorsed a scheme to bring in 50,000 Jews to the country for settlement on the land. This scheme was impractical since most of the refugees were not suited for the rough tropical country life. It was also feared that such a large group would arouse the local population. 4

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1 Report concerning immigration to Brazil, March 15, 1935, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Ibid.
3 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 316.
The Dominican Republic offered a similar plan for the
settlement of up to 100,000 Jews.¹

Latin America was prepared for the settlement
of farmers but not businessmen and members of the libe­
ral professions. Despite the various problems involved
Latin America ranked with the United States and Palestine
as refuge for German Jews.

OTHER CENTERS OF REFUGE

Other centers of refuge for German Jews were South
Africa which admitted 7,000, until anti-Jewish agitation
put a halt to it,² Australia admitted only 8,500 Jewish
refugees, including non-Germans, up to the outbreak of
war in the Pacific,³ while Canada admitted only 6,000
German Jewish refugees.⁴ By 1939 10,000 German Jewish re­
ugees found their way to Shanghai.⁵

As early as December of 1933, consideration was
given to the settlement of Jewish refugees in the USSR,
and more specifically in Birobijan,*. Lord Morley, at the
House of Lords, thought that 3 persons, one appointed by
ORT, one by the American Agro-Joint Committee, and one by

¹ Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine, A Study
of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, Vol. II (New Ha­
² Tartakower, op. cit., p. 325.
³ Ibid., p. 326.
⁴ Ibid., p. 328.
⁵ Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress,
August, 1939, p. 7.

* A Jewish National Autonomous Region in the USSR.
the High Commissioner ought to investigate the possibilities of settlement there. 1

In the United States a new Committee was formed calling itself the "American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in the USSR." Lord Morley said that they hoped to raise ten million dollars amongst some rich Jews for the purpose of settling Jews in various parts of the USSR, and especially in Birobijan. Wurfbain added that the report of Dr. Rones who went to the USSR for the Agro-Joint seemed to be very favorable for such settlement possibilities, particularly in the industrial field. 2

The consideration of this whole endeavour caused an outcry in the Yiddish Press in Europe which published violent articles against the High Commissioner and Mr. Warburg, because of a report that they were proposing to put pressure on the refugees to go to Birobijan in Siberia. Norman Bentwich told the press that the story was an "absolute invention," and that there was no intention of pressing any refugee to go to Russia. 3

James G. McDonald

1 Report to the High Commissioner for Refugees, December 21, 1933, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
2 Wurfbain (Assistant to the High Commissioner for Refugees) to James G. McDonald December 3, 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
3 Letter by Norman Bentwich to James G. McDonald, March 6, 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
justified Bentwich's denial of the report and added that he had always been skeptical about the whole project.  

**EVIAN CONFERENCE OF 1938**

The Evian Conference was called at the initiative of President Roosevelt. Thirty-two Governments had accepted the invitation to be represented at this refugee conference, an invitation that specified that no country "would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of emigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation," The conference attempted to organize a planned migration for the refugees in response to the chaotic situation that developed after Austrian Jewry fell under National Socialist rule. Of all the countries only the Dominican Republic offered to take in large numbers of Jews. According to Arthur D. Morse the origins of the Evian Conference lay in the increased demand for action by the State Department on behalf of the refugees after the Austrian Anschluss. To counteract this pressure Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Wells and two other associates had decided "that it was preferable for the department to get out in front and attempt to guide the pressure, primarily with a view toward forestalling attempts to have the immigration laws

1 Letter by James G. McDonald to Norman Bentwich March 16, 1934, McDonald Papers file No. 356.
liberalized" Summer Wells came up with the idea of "an international conference. It would be months in planning, would silence the critics of apathy, and if all worked well, would divert refugees from the United States to other co-operating nations."  

This he based on an internal State Department memorandum prepared late in 1938 by an official of the Division of European Affairs (formerly known as the Division of Western European Affairs).

1 Morse, op. cit., p. 203.

2 Ibid., pp. 203 - 204.
VII. NAZI POLICY CONCERNING JEWISH EMMIGRATION FROM GERMANY TO PALESTINE

In 1933 the National Socialist conception of the Jewish problem, and hence its solution, were based on Hitler's polemics. In "Mein Kampf" he describes them as a "race of parasites" and a "state within a state", set on subjugating the world.

As for the Palestine question he states:

"While the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the national consciousness of the Jew finds its satisfaction in the creation of a Palestinian state, the Jews again slyly dupe the dumb Goyim. It doesn't even enter their heads to build up a Jewish state in Palestine for the purpose of living there; all they want is a central organization for their international world swindle, endowed with its own sovereign rights and removed from the intervention of other states: a haven for convicted scoundrels and a university for budding crooks."

2 Ibid., p. 150.
3 Ibid., p. 452.
4 Ibid., pp. 324-325.
Even in his last will and testament Hitler persisted in this attitude, blaming the Jews for Germany's defeat.¹

Still in 1933 there was no long-range Jewish policy. The anti-Jewish boycotts, the Aryанизation of Jewish property, and the anti-Jewish legislation were no ends in themselves. Jews did leave Germany, but many more remained, and in the early years some of the emigrants even returned.

A struggle soon developed within the German hierarchy over the handling of Jewish policy. It involved mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Propaganda, the S.S. (Schutzstaffeln der N.S.D.A.P.), the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichführers S.S.) and the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei).

Propagandists such as Goebbels, Frank, and Rosenberg could not compete with the S.S. or other organizations which had paramilitary forces at their disposal.

In 1931, Himmler, who was chief of the S.S. appointed Reinhard Heydrich to organize a secret security branch (S.D.) within his organization.

During the June, 1934, purges the S.S. gained primacy over the larger but less disciplined S.A.. In that year Himmler also became head of the political police of all the states, except Prussia, which was under Goering's jurisdiction. The Gestapo, created in 1933, was also put under Himmler's direction. By a decree of the Führer in June 1936 he became the chief of the Reich Police and of all its branches, including the political and criminal police. Heydrich headed the S.D. and the Gestapo.

In 1936 the S.D. accorded Jewish affairs their own department, Section II 112, under the command of Leopold von Mildenstein. Adolph Eichmann was placed second in command. Upon the replacement of Mildenstein, Herbert Hagen became the new section chief, while Eichmann was made specialist in matters of Zionism. In 1937 the role of Section II 112, was expanded to deal with all aspects of the Jewish question.

In the early years of the Reich the S.S. had little authority over emigration. The Reichsinnenministerium (Reich Ministry of the Interior), and especially its Reichwanderungsamt (Reich Office of Migration), was the competent authority for Jewish emigration.
According to Arthur Prinz, member of the Jewish Hilfsverein,* these responsible German organizations were until 1939 staffed by officials who had previously belonged to the Zentrum Party or other non-Socialist parties. He added that its leading officials were "extremely accommodating and did everything they could to make our work easier."\(^1\)

Under the jurisdiction of the Reichswanderungsamt Jewish emigration proceeded on a strictly legal bases. All the documents had to be in order and conform to the legal requirements of the immigrant's country of destination.\(^2\)

The fact that in the early years of the Reich the S.S. had little authority over Jewish emigration did prevent it from exerting its influence in this matter.

While the early boycott activities and excesses of the less disciplined S.A. took no cognizance of any difference between Jews, the more sophisticated S.S. recognized them and their value

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* Hilfsverein des deutschen Juden - German Jewish Relief Association was devoted to helping Jews emigrate from Germany. It did not handle emigration to Palestine, which was the task of the Palestine Office.


2 Ibid., p. 207.
in furthering its goal of making Germany judenrein (free of Jews). In recognition of this fact on March 20, 1934, the earlier ban on the activities of all Jewish organizations was lifted. Those groups which strengthened the concept of Jewish identity were permitted to resume their activities. This included the Zionist organizations which were accorded more favored treatment in recognition of the fact that they were promoting emigration. Although cautious at first by the beginning of 1935, the S.S. and hence the Gestapo were clearly encouraging Zionist activity. According to Dr. Reuven Eytan, secretary of the Zionist branch office in Munich, Zionist activity in Germany was resumed in 1935. The Gestapo favored the Zionists since they sought emigration. "Their attitude towards the Zionists was correct. They sent their men to Zionist meetings, who behaved very properly." He adds that in the same year a Palestine week was organized in Munich which was attended by 1,500 Jews out of about 5,000 left in the city.¹ When Zionist

¹ Taped Interview of Reuven Eytan by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, No. 2.
policy paralleled that of the Gestapo it was
couraged although their activities were kept
under constant surveillance.

The Zionists avoided all relations with
the Jewish communist youth movement for fear it may
harm them.¹

On May 15, 1935, the S.S. made its
position public in an article entitled "The Visible
Enemy" and published in "Das Schwarze Korps", its
official journal.

"The Jews in Germany fall into two
groups: the Zionists, and those who
favor being assimilated. The Zionists
adhere to a strict racial position,
and by emigrating to Palestine they
are helping to build their own Jewish
state. The assimilation-minded Jews
deny their race and insist on their
loyalty to Germany or claim to be
Christians, because they have been
baptized, in order to overthrow
National Socialist principles."²

¹ Taped interview of Eliezer Livneh (Livneinstein)
by Avraham Margaliot, Oral History Division of
the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, No. 6.
² Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz;
Nazi Policy toward German Jews 1933-1939 (Chicago:
The cooperation of the S.S. with the Zionists went as far as agreeing to the admission to Germany of Hechalutz teachers and instructors.¹

In 1937, with Eichmann in charge of Jewish affairs for both the S.D. through Section II 112 and the Gestapo, it was thought that Jewish policy could be better coordinated.

Eichmann, the self-styled expert on Jews and Zionism, and most of his cohorts in the S.D. and S.S. were still interested in the Zionists and emigration to Palestine. As a matter of fact, Eichmann planned a visit to Palestine that same year. Contact was made with a Haganah commander in Palestine whose name was Feival Folkes, in Hebrew Feival Poles. Folkes came to Berlin where he had several meetings with Eichmann. Eichmann was informed of the Haganah's

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¹ Revealed in a letter from F. Foley, head of the passport division of the British consulate in Berlin, to Dr. Werner Senator, deputy to Dr. Ruppin who was director of the Jerusalem department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S7/281.
eagerness for Jewish immigration and was quite impressed with this Palestinian. His impression of him is revealing in terms of Eichmann's attitude towards the Zionists and his concept of their strength, ability, and potential usefulness. His report is as follows:

"In spite of his race, he is a true National Socialist in his soul. The Haganah is the most efficient intelligence service in the circles of world Jewry, particularly of Jewry in the Middle East. The Haganah often cooperates with French and British intelligence services, but works against them when a conflict of interest arises."

Eichmann together with his section chief Herbert Hagen did finally make his trip to Palestine. But a meeting with Folkes was then arranged in Cairo. The discussions were not very successful. While Eichmann and Hagen wanted to learn about assassination plots against Nazi officials, Folkes was interested in

increased emigration to Palestine. He suggested that, if currency restrictions were eased, the British would permit a large number of capitalist immigrants.

Eichmann made his view on that proposal clear. He was not interested that Jewish capital be taken abroad but was first of all anxious to be rid of "Penniless Jews".

At this stage Eichmann also rejected the proposal on grounds that the 50,000 immigrants a year envisaged by Polkes would greatly strengthen the Jewish position in Palestine, while the Reich policy was to hinder the creation of a Jewish state.¹

Germany's foreign policy as regards Palestine and the Jewish question was very reserved until 1936. In that year, as a consequence of the Arab riots against further Jewish immigration, the British government sent to Palestine, late in 1936, a royal commission to investigate the situation and make recommendations. Concern grew in German circles that creation of a Jewish state was contemplated. On July 7, 1937, the Peel Commission Report (as it was called) recommended the partition of Palestine

¹ Schleunes, op. cit., p. 211.
into three parts, one Jewish, one Arab, and one under permanent British mandate. This development stirred great interest and apprehension in Germany’s foreign policy departments.

When Hitler rose to power the Palestine Desk* in the Wilhelmstrasse was held by Legationsrat (Counsellor) Schmidt-Roelke. The German Consul-General in Jerusalem was Dr. Wolff, an ardent opponent of the National Socialist Party¹ who was replaced only at the end of 1935. In 1936 Dr. Doehle took over that post. Wolff’s cooperation was very important in the promotion of German Jewish emigration to Palestine. His expert opinion reports and bureaucratic powers were used to further rather than obstruct this emigration.²

Legationsrat Schmidt-Roelke was succeeded to the Palestine Desk by Geheimrat Pilger who played a very reserved role. He was in turn replaced by Minister Werner Otto von Renting who held the post during the crucial years of 1938 and 1939. Dr. Ernst Marcus** described him as a known critic of the Hitler

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* Also known as Political Division VII.
2 Ibid., p. 184.
** Jewish Agent of Haavara and Petlreu transfer companies and representative of the interest of the Palestine Office.
regime and a very competent person.¹

Up to 1937, there was no public statement by Hitler which would indicate Germany's attitude towards the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. But in that year, British consideration and later proposal of such a plan prompted Germany to take a stand on this matter. A telegram dispatched by Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, on June 1, 1937, to his embassy in Great Britain, the consulate General at Jerusalem, and the legation in Iraq included the following instructions as to the position to be taken by the German representatives:

"The formation of a Jewish state or a Jewish-led political structure under British mandate is not in Germany's interest, since a Palestinian state would not absorb world Jewry but would create an additional position of power under international law for international Jewry, somewhat like the Vatican State for political Catholicism or Moscow for the Comintern."

A supplement for the London embassy added:

"Although Germany has hitherto aided the emigration of Jews of German citizenship to Palestine as much as possible, it is incorrect to assume that Germany would also welcome the formation of a political structure more or less under Jewish leadership in Palestine."²

¹ Ibid., p. 188.
This position is part and parcel of the National Socialist view of world Jewry and the threat it represented. Even with the elimination of all Jews from German soil the Jewish question would not be solved for Germany. "International Jewry" was seen as a permanent ideological and political enemy of National Socialist Germany. This position was propounded in a June 22, 1937, circular of the German Foreign Ministry. It added that it was in Germany's interest to keep the Jews dispersed and Palestine which could not absorb all of world Jewry anyway would only become a power base against Germany.

There were other factors underlying Germany's opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. One was the question of the Templers. Most were settled in areas that would fall within the Jewish state.

Dr. Doehle wrote on July 13, 1937, to Berlin that the existence of German settlements in a Jewish state would in the long run be impossible. Even if in view of the large number of Jews remaining in Germany the Jewish state would not adopt discriminatory measures against the German settlers in Palestine, the Jewish population would force them

1 Ibid., Document 7055/E524081-90 p. 752.
* A group of German religionists organized in 1854 and settled in Palestine in 1868 to await the end of the world.
out by means of a boycott and other measures. It was added by Renting that the existence of a German minority in a Jewish state might hinder Germany's freedom of action with respect to the Jews.

Another factor was Germany's relations with the Arabs which she sought to improve. An August 7, 1937, memorandum of Political Division VII from Berlin points out Iraqi Minister President Hikmet Sulyman's violent opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In a letter of July 15, 1937, to the Foreign Ministry, Doehle describes a meeting with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husyni who asked him whether Germany was prepared to take a stand against the Jews and the plan for the creation of a Jewish state — either in the press or in some other way. Doehle adds that he agreed to forward the request and expressed the opinion that it could be fulfilled.

On August 10, 1937, the Consulate-General in Jerusalem wrote to the Foreign Ministry that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem let it know of his "joy" and "satisfaction" with the German press comments against

1 Ibid., Document 1526/373516-19 p. 754.
2 Ibid., Document 1526/373535-38 p. 760.
3 Ibid., Document 1542/375514; 3496/E019907-10 p. 763.
the partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish state.\footnote{Document 1526/373550-54 p. 766.}

Political Division VII saw some advantages to the establishment of a Jewish state, as is revealed in its memorandum of August 7, 1937.\footnote{Document 1542/375514; 3496/E019907-10 p. 764.} It would relieve the Reich of a large number of Jews. It would make it possible to deal with official representatives, when "attacked by Jewry", in contrast to "anonymous and therefore irresponsible elements".

When the Peel Commission plan became public and the question of a Jewish state came to the fore, a dark cloud set over the question of German Jewish emigration to Palestine. Transfer negotiations were held up as were decisions on emigration to Palestine. In that year Jewish immigration from Germany dropped to 3,280, less then half the figure of any year since 1933.\footnote{Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 68.} The \textit{Führer} himself had taken an interest 

\begin{itemize}
  \item British restrictions on immigration in 1937 also affected the German Jews. But, since the restrictions were applied in the category C (Labour Schedule), which accounted for only 37.5 per cent of the total German Jewish immigration during 1933-1938 and still accounted for 29.9 of their total in 1937, the German policy change was responsible for much of the rest of the decline. (For figures see table I in chapter titled Soci-Economic and Demographic Description of the German Jewish Immigration to Palestine).
\end{itemize}
in the matter. Other officials became reluctant to take positions on the question of Palestine until Hitler made his position known. This situation continued until 1938 and meanwhile Zionist work inside Germany was obstructed by the Gestapo. A case in point was that of Mrs. Eva Michaelis, head of the Arbeits-Gemeinschaft* in Berlin, who described her harassment by that organization. She reported that after her return from a Youth Aliyah conference that had taken place in Holland, she was summoned by the Gestapo and accused of making anti-German propaganda. She was later instructed by Eichmann not to go abroad again or maintain contact with any youth Aliyah committee abroad, to cease all her work, and hand in her passport the next day. She was able to leave Germany in the beginning of 1938, and upon arrival in Palestine reported that she "did not believe that any organized work in Germany, even Aliyah work or Hachshara work,...., could be much longer continued from Berlin under the pressure of the Gestapo."¹ Consequently in that same year the office was transferred to London.

* Full and proper name was Arbeits-Gemeinschaft für Kinder und Jugendaliyah.
On January 27, 1938, Karl Clodius, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department issued a memorandum which stated that the Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry as well as the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation are of the opinion that the Führer's general directive to facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany by all means cannot be fulfilled if Palestine is excluded. It adds that according to the Ausserpolitisches Amt, the Führer had recently decided again after another report by Reichleiter Rosenberg, that Jewish emigration from Germany shall continue to be promoted by all available means. "Any question which might have existed up to now as to whether in the Führer's opinion such emigration is to be directed primarily to Palestine has thereby been answered in the affirmative." Clodius indicated that chances of the creation of a Jewish state have diminished and the question of immigration can be separated from the fight against the creation of such a state.

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 1542/375533-37 p. 784.
The view was held, particularly by the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry, that Jewish emigration outside of Palestine, especially in centers of international trade, can harm Germany much more economically and through propaganda and press, than in Palestine.¹

The end of 1937, and the beginning of 1938, saw a marked change in the Third Reich. Neurath, Schacht, Blomberg, and Fritsch were removed and replaced by more firm supporters of the National Socialist cause.

When Joachim von Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister in 1938, the Auslandsorganisation, which was competing with the foreign office, was integrated with it.

This change also had its impact on matters concerning Jewish emigration. In 1936 and 1937, while the officials of the Reichswanderungsamt still felt themselves in control of matters within their own sphere of activity, they insisted that if emigration had to be forced on the Jews, it should be carried out "in a manner befitting a civilized nation".²

Up to the so-called "Juniaktion" (June operation) of June 1938, it was possible to pursue a productive and efficiently directed Jewish emigration policy.³ The situation changed radically thereafter

¹ Ibid.
² Prinz, op. cit., p. 207.
³ Ibid.
as matters were falling into the hands of the more radical elements.

According to Arthur Prinz when in December 1938, officers of the Hilfsverein and the Reichsvertretung* called at the Reichswanderungsamt with the purpose of mitigating the terms for the release of 30,000 Jews who had been interned in concentration camps, they discovered that the entire action had been staged without their knowledge. The Gestapo set emigration within a few weeks as a condition for their release.¹

In this year it became clear that the Gestapo and other radicals has taken over authority over Jewish matters. This development marked the end to an orderly and strictly legal Jewish emigration policy.

The failure of the July 1938, Evian Conference to find a solution for Germany's Jewish problem contributed to this development.² This intergovernmental conference was called by president Roosevelt to consider efforts which might alleviate the plight of the victims of National Socialism. Thirty two countries sent delegates to the conference. The German government allowed representatives of

* The Reichsvertretung was founded in 1933 by the Zionist Federation and Central Union of German Jews to represent the collective interests of all Jewish organizations in Germany.
¹ Ibid., p. 203.
² For more details on Evian Conference see chapter titled Alternate Places of Refuge.
Austrian and German Jewry to attend the conference and present their plans for facilitating emigration.

The conference was a failure from the National Socialists' point of view for it neither answered the question of how emigration was to be organized and financed nor where the emigration was to be directed.¹

The year 1938 saw an acceleration and intensification of anti-Jewish activities. These included boycotts, Aryanization of Jewish property, anti-Jewish legislation, and deportations, and was culminated in November by the Kristallnacht.

Still the goal of a judenrein Germany was not attained, and the impulsive approach, as represented by the Kristallnacht pogrom, was discredited in favor of a more realistic and methodical approach.

Jewish emigration from Germany was impeded by a number of factors. Most countries placed severe restrictions on immigration. The socio-economic structure of German Jewry was another barrier since most countries did not seek a large influx of middle class businessmen and professionals.²

The fact that the Jewish agencies had to spread their resources to meet the needs of even

¹ The anti-Semitic propaganda of the National Socialists made their acceptance even more difficult.

² Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 1520/373206-19 p. 928.
poorer Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe also impeded this process. Additionally the large percentage of older people in Germany's Jewish population made emigration a particularly difficult prospect for many. These even if welcomed in another country, were hardly prepared to start a new life there.

The impoverishment of German Jewry was also recognized by the National Socialists as an impediment to their emigration. A memorandum of December 7, 1937, sent by the Reich Foreign Exchange Control Office to the Foreign Ministry is revealing. It states that as the well-to-do Jews leave Germany the impoverishment of the Jewish community, which had been proceeding rapidly, will reach a point where it no longer will be able to assist the unemployed and destitute Jews. Out of 360,000 Jews remaining in Germany 90,000 were receiving assistance. More Jews were expected to fall into that category within a short time, and for whom emigration opportunities, with the exception of the young, would be very limited.

Then there were many German Jews who still hoped for better times. They considered themselves Germans and thought that the Hitler era would pass.

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 1542/375521-29 p. 774.
Those Jews who entertained any hopes that their situation in Germany would improve, were persuaded otherwise by the events of 1938.

The March Anschluss of Austria only served to compound the problem, for now another 200,000 Jews fell under the rule of the National Socialists, a greater number than the 130,000 who had emigrated from Germany between 1933 and the end of 1937.

A January 25, 1939, circular of the Foreign Ministry speaks of the necessity of a radical solution to the Jewish question as a result of the augmentation of Austrian Jewry to that of the old Reich. It continues as follows:

"The ultimate aim of Germany's Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living on German territory. It is to be anticipated that the incisive economic measures, which have obliged the Jews to live from "savings instead of profits," will in themselves enhance their willingness to emigrate."

3 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 1520/373206-19 p. 927.
In reviewing the past 5 years since the seizure of power, however, it must be admitted that neither the law for the restoration for the civil service, nor the Nuremberg Jewish legislation with the regulations for its application, which halted any assimilatory tendencies of the Jews, have substantially contributed to the emigration of the German Jews. On the contrary, in every period of domestic tranquillity such a return stream of Jewish emigrants set in that the Gestapo found it necessary first to place Jewish returnees with German passports in a training camp* for political screening.  

The new situation called for the application of more rigorous and less time consuming methods in an attempt to speed up emigration. The man to show the way was Adolph Eichmann. He suggested to Heydrich, who was in charge of the Gestapo bureau in Vienna, that the various bureaus concerned with emigration be consolidated into a single Gestapo department. Heydrich accepted the proposal and put him in charge of the so-called Central Office for Jewish Emigration, which was established in August 1938. Working from the former Rothchild mansion in

* Concentration camp is meant.
1 Ibid., pp. 927-928.
Vienna, Eichmann put his "conveyor belt system" into practice. By that system the Jewish emigrant entered the office and within one day, after going through various procedures, he would leave with all the papers needed for leaving Austria. If he had any property, by the time he left the office he was dispossessed of it. This was all within line of Eichmann's principle that the rich Jews must pay for the emigration of the poor. By this method Eichmann managed to effect the emigration of 100,000 Jews, or about half of Austria's Jewish population by February 1939.¹

The Foreign Office in Berlin as well as the economic authorities of the Reich objected to the extension of this system to the "Altreich" (the former area of the German Reich), as desired by the Gestapo.

After the Kristallnacht, the handling of Jewish emigration became chaotic. The Eichmann operation in Vienna became the model for the Gestapo also in the old Reich. No cognizance was taken of the fact that Jews needed some means by which to exist while waiting for visas and certificates. Jews were

¹ Ibid., Document 7051/E 523699-704 p. 935.
given impossible deadlines for emigration, forcing them to flee across borders and leading thousands to move to Shanghai or South American countries, whereas otherwise they would have waited for their visas for the U.S. or Palestine.

It still took until the end of 1938 before a Central Authority for Jewish Emigration, on the Vienna model was established in Berlin under the leadership of the Gestapo.

The first working session of the Committee of the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration took place on February 11, 1939, in the office of the Secret State Police. The session was conducted by the chief of the Security Police, S.S. Gruppenführer Heydrich, whom Fieldmarshal Göring had commissioned to direct the Central Reich Office for Jewish Emigration. At this meeting Heydrich laid down the following policy lines in regard to Jewish emigration: The emigration of Jews of very limited financial means was to be encouraged by providing the necessary assistance. In this context Heydrich mentioned that the special tax imposed on rich Jews by the Police President in Berlin should be used for this purpose.

The Jews, having been organized into a Reich association of all racial Jews, through which they were themselves to prepare for emigration, and to which
all Jewish education and welfare work was to be transferred, could themselves be utilized to solve the emigration problem. Contact was to be established with foreign Jewish organizations to further that goal.

Heydrich also brought up the question of illegal emigration to Palestine. The policy line on that issue was as follows:

"Illegal emigration should be opposed on principle, to be sure. In the case of Palestine, however, matters were such that illegal transports were already going there at the present time from many other European countries, which were themselves only transit countries, and in these circumstances this opportunity could also be utilized by Germany, though without any official participation."

It was added that Senior Counselor Hinrichs and Minister Eisenlohr from the Foreign Ministry had no objection to this and expressed the viewpoint that every possibility for getting a Jew out of Germany ought to be taken advantage of. To this Ministerialdirector Wohlthat added that he had heard in London that Palestine could still absorb about 800,000 to 1,000,000 Jews, and that this quota would be filled from other countries in
case no Jews from Germany went to Palestine.\textsuperscript{1}

A January 25, 1939, circular of the German Foreign Ministry addressed to all German Diplomatic missions and consulates stressed that there was no reason for cooperation with countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Rumania who were themselves striving for the emigration of their Jewish populations. This would only compete with Germany's claim to the admission of her Jews to other countries. Palestine was not seen as a solution due to the restrictions on immigration placed by the British Mandatory Government. The emigration to Palestine of well-to-do Jews, which the British permitted, would contribute to the development of a Jewish state and was opposed on those grounds. It added that Germany had a major interest in seeing that the Jews continue to be dispersed. Thus rejecting the theory that anti-German centers and boycott hubs would be created in all parts of the world, but rather concluding that the influx of Jews aroused anti-Semitism and thus provided the best propaganda for Germany's Jewish policy.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., Document 7051/E523699-704 pp. 935-936.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., Document 1520/373206-19 pp. 930-931.
This policy statement points out a contradiction in the National Socialist's Jewish policy. On the one hand the stated goal was to make Germany judenrein through forced emigration, and on the other hand Goebbels's Ministry of Propaganda and Bohles Overseas organization did what they could to spread anti-Semitism abroad and thus stiffen foreign resistance to Jewish immigration, with the possible exception of Palestine.

Another contradiction in this policy is evident from the November 10, 1938, arrest of officers of the Hilfsverein, of the Reichsvertretung, and of the Jewish communities. Many were kept under arrest for a number of weeks thus obstructing the emigration process.

When Jewish emigration became haphazard, based on false documents, and on tourist visas, other countries reacted by further restricting Jewish immigration. Eichmann's policy of forcing a mass emigration of Jews, regardless of consequences, created a refugee problem for the rest of the world.

He continued to take an interest in Jewish emigration to Palestine. One case in point involved Moshe Auerbach, a youth instructor in a Palestinian kibbutz who arrived in Vienna in 1938 under the name of Bravman. He informed Eichmann that the Chalutz movement was interested in preparing a
thousand Jewish youth in Austria for agricultural work in order to bring them to Palestine. Eichmann agreed and with Gestapo cooperation in issuing exit visas Bravman managed to bring many of his people to Palestine.¹

Another case involved Moshe Galili who, with the help of Eichmann, organized the famous "youth train". Eichmann arranged for a train to transport a thousand young men and women to Athens. He even provided S.S. troops to protect the youth on boarding the train. These were then brought to Palestine illegally.²

There were other cases where Eichmann and the Gestapo cooperated in promoting illegal emigration to Palestine. This policy was still pursued as late as October 1939, when a transport with Czechoslovakian Jews left for Palestine.³ Meanwhile in Germany proper the Hamburg American Line openly advertised "illegale Auswanderung" (illegal emigration), to Palestine.⁴

After the invasion of Poland in September 1, 1939, and the resultant addition of 3,000,000 Jews under Nazi rule emigration alone could no longer be considered as a solution for the Jewish question.

¹ Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
² Ibid., pp 85-86.
³ Ibid., p. 94.
⁴ Tartakower, op. cit., p. 67.
The exodus of Jews from Germany, which the National Socialists encouraged from the time of Hitler's advent to power, faced great difficulties on account of the currency restriction laws in force in Germany which prohibited the export of capital in foreign currency.

In order to facilitate the emigration of Jews and their immigration to Palestine the German authorities agreed to allow Jews to export their capital to Palestine in the form of merchandise.

As early as the spring of 1933 an agreement was reached between Hanotea* and the German authorities for the transfer of funds to Palestine. This agreement was strongly supported by Wolff, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem.¹ Wolff's arguments in favor of such an agreement pointed to the fact that increased German exports to Palestine would help alleviate the German unemployment problem, which was severe at the time. Later Wolff also argued that a transfer agreement could serve as a weapon against a world-wide Jewish

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* Hanotea dealt with the planting and operation of orange groves in Palestine.

boycott against German goods. The latter view is supported in a letter of August 10, 1933, from the Minister of Economics to the Foreign Office and dealing with the Hanotea Ltd. agreement. It reads as follows:

"It seems to me that this way really affords the best guarantee of the strongest possible effect on the Jewish boycott measures and of payment of the money to emigrants without loss. As I hear this view is also confirmed by a letter telegram of the German consulate in Jerusalem." 1

Wolff was in a position to expedite or obstruct the workings of the transfer agreement. This was particularly the case with transfer money of Special Account II,* as is evident from a letter

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1 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 36005/33 p. 733.

* Special Account II was for the use of those German Jews who for the time being remained in Germany, but who wished to transfer the whole or part of their capital to Palestine in order to ensure the possibility of immigration at a more distant future. RM 50,000 was set as the highest individual payment possible into Special Account II.
of August 25, 1933, from the Reich Minister of Economics to S. Hoofien* in which he states that permission to deposit capital on Special Account II could only be granted upon the approval of the project for which it was intended by the German Consul-General in Jerusalem.¹

The use of the Special Account II was restricted to German "citizens of Jewish nationality" as is stipulated by the Reich Minister of Economics in a letter to S. Hoofien of August 10, 1933.² This restriction applied until July 1934, when it was expanded to include all Jews residing in Germany. In the same letter the Reich Minister of Economics mentions the extension of the transfer agreement with Hanotea to RM 3 million and adds that he is willing to make provisions for an additional sum after the RM 3 million had been used up, but a small part of any additional purchases will have to be paid for in foreign currency.³

The Trust and Transfer Office "Haavara" Ltd., registered with the Palestinian government on November 5, 1933, was entrusted with the transfer

* Representative of the Anglo-Palestine Bank.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
of capital from Germany to Palestine. On the German side this agreement had been negotiated by the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Exchange control office.

In the letter of acceptance of the Reich Ministry of Economics the provision was made that the three million Reichmark could be transferred through a Palestinian trust company. 1

The major factors leading to Germany's consent to the transfer agreement are stated in a letter of August 28, 1933, from the German Minister of Economics to the various branches of the Foreign Exchange Control Agencies. It reads as follows:

"This agreement has been reached in order to further the emigration of German Jews to Palestine without overburdening the foreign currency reserves of the Reichbank, and at the same time to increase the export of German goods to Palestine." 2

The emigration of German Jews to countries other than Palestine often cost Germany more foreign currency than emigration to Palestine which could be financed by the export of German products through

the Haavara transfer system. Evidence of an immigrant's ability to support himself was a requirement of almost all countries, while Germany's foreign currency problems made the transfer of such capital very difficult. An individual leaving Germany in 1933 was entitled to take with him only RM 200 in foreign currency, a figure that by 1937 had been reduced to RM 10.¹

Other economic considerations were also involved, including Germany's desire to expand her exports. This is evident from her special arrangements with the Haavara Agency for the establishment of the "Near and Middle East Commercial Corporation" (NEMICO) whose function it was to facilitate the export of German products to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In this connection, the fact that Jews played a major role in the importation of German products to these countries did not escape the German policy makers.²

The boycott of German goods in Palestine and the Englo-Saxon countries in reaction to the National Socialists' early Jewish policies were taken very seriously by the German authorities. It was their hope that an arrangement, such as the Haavara agreement, would counteract it.

¹ Schleunes, op. cit., p. 195.
To relieve Germany's unemployment problem which had reached 6 million in 1932, increased exports, and hence increased production was sought. The situation was particularly acute in the years 1933-1934 but lost its urgency after Germany's rearmament program went into full swing in 1936 and unemployment was reduced to less than one million.\(^1\) The resultant increased need for foreign currency and raw materials and the consequent decline of these reserves prompted Germany to reduce the selection of transferable items. Starting in 1936, a list of items was introduced for which foreign currency had to be paid by Palestinian importers in amounts sufficient to cover such outlays by Germany. First the export of iron, then, in the beginning of 1937, iron ware, tubes, and sheet metal, and in mid 1937 a further series of goods with an appreciable portion of foreign raw materials, were prohibited. In February 1938, a further limitation was introduced which, instead of expanding the list of prohibitions, introduced a list of items importable through the transfer system.\(^2\)

The increased restrictions on importable items through the Haavara Agency were partially

\(^1\) Shirer, *op. cit.*, p. 258.  
circumvented with the aid of German industrialists. These forwarned the agency of pending restrictions on certain items so that contracts could be drawn for large quantities of such items in time. The industrialists recognized Haavara as a large and good customer that would pay for a whole order upon placing it.  

Table I

The Transfer of Capital from Germany to Palestine through the Haavara

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reichmarks</th>
<th>Value in LP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,254,955</td>
<td>96,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>8,895,038</td>
<td>657,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>17,103,153</td>
<td>1,082,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>19,958,645</td>
<td>1,095,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>31,407,501</td>
<td>1,461,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>18,853,911</td>
<td>795,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939 (first 6 month)</td>
<td>6,443,912</td>
<td>225,582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Ibid., p. 53.
2 Central Bureau Report on the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 44.

*The great increase in the mark transfer figures during 1935, 1936, and 1937 did not produce any corresponding increase in the total of pounds transferred, since in the meantime the prices of German goods had risen perceptibly as compared with those of goods imported from other countries. Haavara had to return this difference to the Palestinian importers in order to make transfer activities possible.
The full effect of these restrictions on the Haavara became apparent since 1938, as the figures in table I show.

Between the years 1933 and 1938 Germany was able to increase her exports to Palestine significantly above what they were during the years of the Weimar Republic. While the value of German exports between 1928 and 1932 averaged annually around LP 700,000, their annual average between 1933 and 1938 was around LP 2,000,000. The price of German imports to Palestine was particularly high, since the export premium which the German government payed German exporters was not applied in this case and the increased prices were in compensation to these exporters.

During the 1935/1936 and 1936/1937 citrus seasons Haavara took over the citrus barter, and an agreement was reached between the Jewish, Arab, and German colonist citrus exporters on the one hand and the Haavara Agency and the German government on the other. The German government refused to continue this arrangement for the 1937/1938 season for political reasons.

Almost all of Palestine's imports from Germany went through the Haavara Agency. The remainder

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1 Werner Feilchenfeld, Jewish Trade Policy on the Bases of Transfer Agreements with Central and East European Countries (Tel Aviv: Haaretz Press, 1938), p. 14. (figures based on table)
was accounted for by the purchases of Arab and German colonist importers. In 1937, for example, these accounted for only 0.3 per cent of all German imports. ¹

Table II ²
Share of Capital that German Jews could take to Palestine Compared with the Share they could take to other Lands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average percentage of Reichmark holdings received by immigrants to Palestine</th>
<th>Average percentage of blocked marks (Sperrmark) holdings received by emigrants who went to other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>20.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938 (1st half)</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>10.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938 (2nd half)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939 (1st half)</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

German Jewish emigrants to Palestine received more for the same Reichmark holdings than Jews who emigrated to other lands. This may be seen

¹ Ibid., p. 15.
² Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 46. (table based on figures)
from table II which shows that in 1935 Jews who emigrated to Palestine received over twice as much for the same Reichmark capital as Jews emigrating to other countries. This figure increased as the years passed to over three times as much in 1937, over five times as much in 1938 and even more than that in 1939.  

Administrative charges of the Peltreu were 2 per cent, administrative charges of Haavara were 2.5 per cent and the bank commission was 0.5 per cent, the remainder representing price bonuses to importers. These bonuses consisted of payments to the importers of German goods to compensate for the difference between the over-price asked by the German supplier and the competitive price. Higher prices were charged for exports to Palestine because German exporters did not receive export bonuses in such cases where payment was made in Reichmark rather than in foreign currency. These bonus payments to importers accounted for the bulk of the discounts charged those who transferred their capital to Palestine. Jews who emigrated to countries other than Palestine could take their capital only from blocked marks (Sperrmark) and were at a disadvantage in terms of the percentage of their capital that they could take out of Germany.

1 See table II.
The encouragement of German exports to Palestine became less meaningful from an economic standpoint, as the need to create jobs for unemployed German workers diminished. This was particularly so in this instance since exports to Palestine through the Haavara Agency did not bring foreign currency. ¹

Continued German cooperation with the Haavara agency was due to the fact that it furthered the cause of emigration, as is evident from the various activities and conditions for which she permitted the transfer of money. These included:

a. The provision of the sum of LP 500 as required for emigrants of the liberal professions, and LP 250 as required of immigrants classified as artisans;

b. The provision of the sum of LP 1,000 required to obtain a capitalist visa, for immigrants of that category;

c. The transfer of funds contributed to organizations promoting emigration, such as Youth Aliyah;

d. The transfer of pensions to former German civil servants or officials who settled in Palestine;

e. The transfer of school fees by parents in Germany to their children in Palestine.

The German authorities even permitted the transfer of capital where emigration prospects were in the more distant future. This is evident from their

¹ Feilchenfeld, Michaelis, Pinner, op. cit., p. 29.
agreement to the provision of Special Account II whereby capital was transferred by German Jews who were not contemplating immediate emigration. The transfer of expense money for German-Jewish tourists in Palestine, in order that they may prepare themselves for future emigration, is also indicative of this policy.

The continued operation of the Haavara Agency was possible, to no small extent, due to the cooperative attitude shown by some German officials in key positions. Wolff, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem was already cited in this connection. Schmidt-Roelke, head of the Palestine Desk in Berlin, was considered to have had a positive influence on the attitude of the German Foreign Office in the years 1933 and 1934; this according to Ernst Marcus who had personal dealings with him.\(^1\) Otto von Henting, a successor to Schmidt-Roelke was described by Ernst Marcus, who had extensive contacts with him, as being most cooperative, an anti-Nazi, and a man with an "understanding for the Zionist cause."\(^2\)

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2 Ibid., pp. 188, 204.
Timotheus Wurst, director of the Bank of the Temple Society, was largely responsible for the frictionless manner in which the business of the bank, concerning the transfer of Jewish money to Palestine, was carried out.¹

Hans Hartenstein, head of the Foreign Exchange Control Office, played a major role in the development and operation of the transfer agreement. This he did in the face of continued opposition from various National Socialist circles. As the official responsible for the Haavara Transfer Agency on the German side until the departure of Hjalmar Schacht as Reich Minister of Economics in September 1937, he worked relentlessly for an orderly emigration of German Jews.²

It must be added that there were other German officials with attitudes quite the opposite of those described above. These included Geheimrat Pilger, who succeeded Schmidt-Roelke at the Palestine Desk and served in that capacity until he was replaced by Otto von Henting. Both Pilger and Doehle, the new Consul-General at Jerusalem (replacing Wolff), were considered to be allies on this matter by

¹ Ibid., pp. 184-185.
² Feilchenfeld, Michaelis, Pinner, op. cit., p. 30.
opponents of the Haavara agreement. ¹ In a letter of January 14, 1938, to the Foreign Ministry, Doeble makes his strong opposition to the transfer agreement quite clear, adding that a delayed decision or a renewed confirmation of this policy would only serve to alienate the Arabs.²

The publication of the recommendations of the Peel Commission on July 7, 1937, had its repercussions in Berlin, where suddenly transfer negotiations in progress were held up in the Reich Ministry of Economics. Even before the report was made public, concern about the possible establishment of a Jewish state, and opposition to the Haavara agreement, in this connection, was expressed in certain German circles.

In a memorandum of the Auslandsorganisation of June 5, 1937, the following objections were raised against the Haavara agreement: First that it drained off economic goods from Germany without a quid pro quo in goods or foreign exchange; second it compelled the non-Jewish elements in Palestine to finance Jewish immigration; third it facilitated the formation of a Jewish state with German capital.

¹ Documents on German Foreign Policy 1913-1945 Series D Volume V, Document 1495/370143-44, p. 748.
² Ibid., Document 1542/375530-32, pp. 780-781. *Since they were forced to buy through the Haavara as well.
The same memorandum points out that the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation has been fighting for an amendment of the Haavara agreement for over two years.\textsuperscript{1} The Chief of Protocol\textsuperscript{*} concurred with this view, as is evident from a memorandum of June 11, 1937 and added the following suggestions as to how to deal with the Jewish emigration question:

"... a considerably increased emigration of Jews out of Germany is to be obtained not through any administrative "promotion" on the part of Germany - possibly even entailing sacrifices of foreign exchange (Haavara) - but by encouraging the Jews' own urge to emigrate. In my opinion this goal could be reached through sharpening of domestic legislation regarding the Jews (for example, special taxes on Jewish income) to an extent which would automatically result in the emigration of the Jews on their own initiative."\textsuperscript{2}

The German Foreign Ministry also came to question the Haavara agreement as is evident from its circular of June 22, 1937, to its various offices of the State and Party.

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., Document 1495/370143-44, p. 748.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., Document 1495/370139-40, p. 749.
\textsuperscript{*} The Chief of Protocol was at this time the director of the Referat Deutschland which was concerned with liaison between the Foreign Ministry and other offices of the State and Party.
diplomatic missions around the world. It stated that this agreement promoted the consolidation of Jewry in Palestine and thereby accelerated the trend towards establishment of a Jewish state there. This was contrary to Germany's foreign policy. But her attitude on this question had been largely dictated by domestic considerations, namely the promotion of Jewish emigration.\footnote{Ibid., Document 7055/E524081-90, pp. 751-752.}

With the publication of the Peel Commission report the likelihood of a Jewish state being established in Palestine increased, and the need for Germany to take countermeasures became more urgent.

A memorandum of Political Division VII (Palestine Desk) of August 7, 1937, points to measures that could be taken by Germany to help check this development. In the diplomatic sphere, other European countries who opposed such a state could be brought into a common front with Germany. Support could be provided to movements opposing the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine (i.e. support of the Arabs with arms and money). Domestic measures as the blocking of emigration to Palestine; directing emigration to other countries; and renunciation of the Haavara agreement were also contemplated. But the memorandum adds that the last proposal was opposed
in German quarters concerned with economic policy.¹

In a December 7, 1937, communiqué to Henting of Political Division VII the Reich Foreign Exchange Control Office of the Foreign Ministry, strongly defended the continuation of the activities of Haavara. It pointed out that since 1933 about one third of all Jewish emigrants from Germany had gone to Palestine, representing approximately one half of all Jews who had emigrated overseas. This emigration was paid for by foreign exchange earned through a supplementary German export of goods, which would have been boycotted were it not for the transfer agreement. Furthermore, those Jews who emigrated to Palestine as capitalists brought over more German Jews. Also, the allotment of worker certificates was connected with the capitalist immigration.²

Evidence of a change in attitude on the part of the Foreign Exchange Control Office and the Ministry of Economics is discernable from a January 27, 1937, memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department. It stated that both organizations now favored the amendment of the Haavara agreement. The Ministry of Economics,

¹ Ibid., Document 1542/375514; 3496/E019907-10, pp. 764-765.
² Ibid., Document 1542/375521-29, pp. 775-776.
after further conversations on the subject, took a stand closer to that of the Auslandsorganisation by supporting not just an amendment of the Haavara agreement but its abolition and replacement by another system. While the agencies were of one mind on the matter of terminating the Haavara agreement, the Ministry of Economics and representatives of the Foreign Trade Office of the Auslandsorganisation believed that another system had to take its place. The two aforementioned ministries and the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry were of the opinion that the Führer's general directive to "facilitate Jewish emigration from Germany by all available means" could not be fulfilled if Palestine were to be excluded in this connection. It was added that there was no chance to promote the emigration of Jews to any other country on economic conditions equally favorable.¹

Continued discussions about this subject had to be postponed since the Ministry of Economics was being reorganized at that time.

A particularly sharp attack against the Haavara was presented by a March 10, 1938, memorandum of Referat Deutschland. It points out

¹ Ibid., Document 1542/375533-37, pp. 783-784.
that the controversy over continuation of this agreement is one between the political and economic offices in and outside the Foreign Ministry. It, the Auslandsorganisation, and other agencies, especially the Party agencies, with exception of the Ministry of Economics and Foreign Exchange Control Office, wanted to terminate the agreement.

The Referat Deutschland stated that the Ministry of Interior intended to submit a memorandum to the Führer and Reich Chancellor pointing out that: a. Emigration of rich Jews to Palestine contributed to the building of a Jewish state and that it would be better to scatter the Jews, and thus promote anti-Semitic sentiment in the world.*

b. The Referat Deutschland and the Auslandsorganisation were of the opinion that German export firms were interested in the continuation of the agreement because they realized considerable profits, even though they earned no foreign exchange for Germany.1

The controversy within National Socialist circles continued on this issue until the outbreak of World War II, at which time the Haavara activities were terminated.

* An added notation states that "The Auslandsorganisation and Referat Deutschland consider the latter the right solution."

1 Ibid., Document 2029/444544-46, pp. 785-787.
VIII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF
THE GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO PALESTINE

The four major categories of immigrants were: AI (Capitalist), B III (Student), C (Labour) and D (Dependent).* These accounted for 98 per cent* of all German Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and for a similar percentage of the total Jewish immigration of that period.

Total Jewish immigration into Palestine from January 1933 to March 1939 was 194,055 of which 46,272 came from Germany.¹

Table I²
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany During 1933-1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>BIII</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total 1933</td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1934</td>
<td>3,128</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>4,082</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1935</td>
<td>2,666</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>1,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1936</td>
<td>2,790</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>1,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1937</td>
<td>1,368</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1938</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>1,659</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1933-1938 14,972 3,396 15,056 5,859
Percentage 37.3 8.5 37.5 14.7

* For more details on immigrant categories see chapter titled British Immigration Policy.
** See table I.
1 Central Bureau Report to the XXIst Zionist Congress, August, 1939, p. 68.
2 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
Table II
Percentage of German Immigration to the Total Immigration into Palestine within Each Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>AI</th>
<th>BIII</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAPITALIST IMMIGRATION

Of this category German Jews accounted for 48 percent, twice their share of the total immigration.*

The relative decline shown for the years 1934 and 1935 (table II) was the result of an increase during that period in the total number of capitalist immigrants from other areas of the world, making the German share proportionally smaller. The subsequent sharp increase, particularly in 1937, was due to the relative decline of the number of immigrants of that category from other countries, and not to any increase in the number of AI category immigrants from Germany. Their number actually reached a low point in that year.

* See table II.
The German Jewish immigrants included a considerable number of capitalists. These brought into Palestine through the Haavara agency, together with the sum placed at their disposal by the German Reichbank RM139,568,110 or LF8,101,491. If we include capital brought in outside the Haavara, we arrive at a considerably larger total.

Table III shows that over half the German Jewish immigrants fell under the category of industry, trade, or commerce. Many of these were self-employed and possessed a considerable amount of capital. Upon arrival in Palestine they sought to reestablish themselves in their former occupations. Their fortunes were generally limited so that they could not live off them. Consequently numerous industrial plants were set up by these newcomers. They also became partners in existing establishments, helping in their expansion by providing capital, more modern equipment, and technical knowhow.

A study of the factories established in Palestine in the time period January to August 1934 is revealing. Out of a total of 49 enterprises 32 were

1 Feilchenfeld, Michaelis, Pinner, op. cit., p. 75.
2 Ibid., p. 95.
* Exact figures are not known.
established by German Jews. Out of 20 in the process of establishment 12 were owned by German Jews.¹

LABOUR IMMIGRATION

This group of immigrants, designated category C (Labour Schedule), was subject to a bi-annual quota set by the mandatory government. These quotas were worked out in negotiations with the Jewish Agency which distributed the worker certificates through its offices in Europe. Immigrants of this category were young people, without means, many of whom belonged to Hechalutz and received special training before their arrival in Palestine.

German Jews of this designation were underrepresented in the immigration of that period, accounting for only 19 per cent of the total.* Their sharp increase in the years 1937 and 1938 to 43 and 36 per cent of the total ** respectively, is misleading. From 1937 on the mandatory government severely restricted the number of immigrants of this category. In 1937 and 1938 German Jews comprised, respectively 35 and 55 per cent*** of the total immigrant population.

* See table II
** See table II
*** See table II
Thus German immigrants on a labour schedule were still underrepresented when compared to their share of the total immigration. Table I shows that in 1937 only 980 German Jews arrived under category C, and only 1,389 did so in 1938. Both figures indicate a sharp drop from the previous years. In these years they represented only 29.9 and 22.6 per cent of the total German Jewish immigration, both figures being significantly below those of earlier years.

IMMIGRATION OF STUDENTS

Immigration of students came under category BIII.

It was not uncommon for parents to have their children precede them to Palestine. This was the case with youngsters in the age group 12 to 18 who were brought in organized groups.

The first group of Youth Aliyah children landed in Haifa in February 1934. This accounts for the rise in this category of German immigrants after that year.* Also as is shown in table II these German Jewish immigrants had a larger share of the total immigration in this category (32 per cent) than their representation in the total Jewish immigration (24 per cent) would warrant.

* See table I.
IMMIGRATION OF DEPENDENTS

This type of immigration came under category D and comprised dependents of Palestine residents.

It represented only 14.7 per cent of the total German Jewish immigration in the years in question,* accounting for a smaller percentage of the total immigration in this category (14 per cent) than they did of the total Jewish immigration into Palestine.

THE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

A most striking aspect of the German Jewish immigrants' occupational structure is the fact that 17.4 per cent were registered as agriculturists.** In contrast, the figures of a census of the Jewish population of Germany taken in 1933 showed only 1 per cent to be in that category.¹ This discrepancy is to be explained by the fact that many young people who had no vocation, received agricultural training through the Chalutz movement and then registered as farmers.

* See table I.
** See table III.
Table III also shows that the German-Jewish immigrants of this category were represented almost twice as strongly as their share of the total immigration would warrant.

When compared with the general Jewish population in Germany, members of the liberal professions were overrepresented among the German immigrants, their number accounting for 20.9 per cent* of their immigrant group, while in the aforementioned census they represented only 10.7 per cent. The explanation for this disproportionately large number of professionals among the immigrants is to be found in the fact that this group comprised the first victims of the anti-Jewish legislation and thus were forced to leave Germany earlier and in greater proportions than others. This trend is confirmed by the figures in table IV which show that more than three times as many immigrants in that category arrived in Palestine within the first three years than in the three subsequent years.

This group of German Jews was overrepresented when we consider the German Jews' share of the total immigration (i.e.) 41 per cent of all immigrants in that category.**

The figures for unskilled labor among the German Jewish immigrants is strikingly low. Only 5.3 per cent were registered under that designation,

* See table III.
** See table III.
### Table III
Occupations Abroad of Jewish Immigrants from Germany to Palestine During 1933-1938

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry and Trades</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total German Immigration</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Immigration from All Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leatherworks</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodwork</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalworks</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3,402</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Labour</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Active</td>
<td>13,037</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils (adult)</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified: Men</td>
<td>3,791</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>12,125</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>8,945</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>315</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Travelers authorised to settle in Palestine and immigrants entering through other places: 5,028

Grand total: 45,089
Table IV²
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany as Applied to the Liberal Professions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Professions</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1933-1935     1,969
Total 1936-1938     650

accounting for only 13 per cent of the total immigration.*

The figures discussed above showed a marked increase in the number of farmers among German Jews entering Palestine. This change in occupations became even more pronounced when the immigrants sought gainful employment. In my questionnaire out of 111 who answered the question: "did you continue in your field within the first two years after your arrival in Palestine," only 38 answered in the affirmative while 73 answered in the negative. Large numbers of refugees, besides becoming farmers, also concentrated on the building and metals industries or found occupations as drivers. In these fields there was a demand for workers.

2 Ibid., p. 8.
* See table III.
THE GERMAN JEWS WHO SETTLED ON THE LAND

Of those who settled on the land the largest group went to kibbutzim, and the remainder to moshavim. Most joined already existing settlements, but some established new ones.

By 1939 German Jews who settled on the land or found occupation in rural areas were distributed as follows: ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective Settlements and Youth Aliyah Groups</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class Settlements</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Holdings</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labourers in the Plantations and Colonies</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Engaged in Various Occupations in Rural Districts</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

German Jews, in some cases, formed settlements that were quite unique in their makeup. These consisted of middle-aged settlers who had no previous experience in farming, but were rather professionals from metropolitan areas in Germany who invested their whole fortune in farming. They did not become gentlemen farmers living on plantations, but were mostly smallholders practicing mixed farming based on self-labor.

A report by a visitor to one such settlement is instructive:

¹ Keren Hayesod, "Palestine and Jewish Emigration from Germany" (Jerusalem: Keren Hayesod, 1939) p. 19.
"On three hills near Kfar Malal 38 German families settled and called the place Rammoth Hashavim (Hills of the Returning). Among the 38 settlers are 14 doctors, one university professor, 2 pharmacists, 2 lawyers, 1 economist, 1 actor and 3 industrialists who decided to give up their professions and start a new happy life on the land. With the exception of one doctor and one dentist all of them are working their own holdings themselves with the help of their families."

A journalist's report on some new immigrants in Ramoth Hashavim provides a characteristic account of one such settler. Frau Hilse, the wife of a former captain of industry, was behind a shop counter seated in a big leather armchair she had brought from her home in Germany. The counter was divided into two sections, one serving the store, while the other was a home. These were only temporary accommodations while they were building themselves a home. The wife intended to continue in her new occupation, while the husband would be occupied with egg production.

While citrus plantations were of major importance for these farms, other crops, characteristic of mixed farming, were introduced. In order to maximize production from their limited plots of land they introduced poultry raising and vegetable growing. The latter was aided through the installation of irrigation systems. Dairy farming, based on

1Report on a visit to Ramoth Hashavim on July 11, 1934 by Heinrich Cohn, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S7/133
their own fodder production also became a characteristic feature of these villages. The yields of these farms were substantial, accounting for at least 25 per cent of the total vegetable production of the Yishuv, and 46 per cent of the eggs\(^1\). Ramoth Hashavim, for example, specialized in egg production. Every settler had 600 hens which provided him with approximately 90,000 eggs a year. These were marketed cooperatively in Tel-Aviv and yielded their owners between LF 15 and LF 20 a year. Each family also grew its own vegetables\(^2\).

A number of factors drove this category of settlers to the land. One was the fact that the transfer conditions of the Haavura agency were favorable for those who established themselves in agricultural settlements. Many found it impossible to continue in their profession and thought that investing their limited capital on a farm would be relatively safe. The spiritual motives of return to the soil and the religion of labour, as well as zionist conviction, played their role too.

Those who established themselves in the middle class settlements did not arrive there as part of an organized group\(^*\). These settlements consisted of a collection

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1 Karen Hayesod, op. cit., p. 21.
2 Gottgetreu, op. cit., p. 55.
* Shave Zion, as cited before, was an exception, since its first settlers came from the village of Rexingen.
of individuals who came here from various parts of Germany. These had different political views, including Zionists and non-Zionists, socialists and capitalists. In the question of religion they varied just as much, counting among themselves traditionalists, liberals and atheists.

In a study Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner attempted to provide a picture of the age distribution of the settlers. Out of 19 who established themselves in 1934, 3 were less than 30 years old, 6 over 50. Of 69 who settled in Beth Yizchak, only 4 were less than 30, but 23 were over 50. The same study pointed out that the age of the married women was on the average between 5 and 6 years lower than that of their husbands. This was typical of the German Jewish middle class where men would marry in their late 20s and early 30s, only after they had established themselves in their occupations. Most of these middle class settlers were married and some had children. The fact that they were founded on the basis of personal labour, though in principle not excluding it, made necessary the employment of both husband and wife in farm work. Settlers in their 50s were largely dependent on their children for heavy labor. As was characteristic of the German Jewish middle class, these settlers had few children, on the average approximately one per couple.

This is shown in a sample study by Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner. In 1938, out of 94 families in Naharia she counted 1 Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner, "Die Zweite Generation Mittel-europäischer Siedler in Israel." (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1962) p. 8.

2 Ibid., p. 9.
94 children, out of 60 families in Ramoth Hashavim 68, and out of the 24 families in Sdeh Warburg 22. During the first difficult years the settlers refrained from having children since all energy and all hands were required for the task of establishing themselves.

Those immigrants who went to the middle class settlements, if they received any hachshara training at all, it was in Palestine itself. In most cases their training was on the job as they settled and began building their homes and was facilitated through the aid of hired instructores. Some of these settlers faced the additional handicap of having to stand guard against Arab attack. This was the case, particularly, in such areas as Shave Zion and Naharia which were surrounded by Arab villages. The fact that these settlers relied on their own financial resources reduced the influence of the Jewish Agency in matters such as preparation for settlement on the land and its use afterwards. This led to difficulties as described by a German Jewish journalist who visited Palestine\(^1\).

The land in Pardess Chana belonged to the Palestine Colonization Association (Pica). The 250 families from Germany who settled on it, received 6 dunam each. The plan was that out the individual allotments 5 dunam would be assigned to the cultivation of oranges

\(^1\) Alfred Kupferberg, Deutsche Juden im Jüdischen Land, Palästinaberichte eines Jüdischen Journalisten(Hamburg: M. Lessmann, Verlag, 1934) p. 95.
and the remaining dunam was to be used for mixed farming, such as poultry raising and vegetable growing. But, in this instance, the settlers decided to use all 6 dunam for orange groves, in the expectation that the sale of these extra oranges would provide them with a greater return than the mixed farming system would. As a result they were forced to purchase their vegetables from Arab villages. They became totally reliant on one crop, oranges, which depended on export possibilities and consequently involved greater risks. Because these settlers were financially independent they could shun outside advise.

In the middle class settlements German continued to be the language of the community*: The first generation of settlers remained in relative isolation from the rest of the Yishuv. Although they did take up the study of Hebrew, Jewish history and religion, they wanted to preserve their European heritage as well.

The Cultural Commission of the Hitachduth Olej Germania sent speakers to these settlements, and plans for lectures and seminars were arranged. These were usually conducted in German. In Ramoth Hashavim the settlers built a

* This may have been another factor influencing German Jews to settle on the land. For here their inability to speak Hebrew was of lesser importance than would have been the case with most urban pursuits.
cultural center to which they brought entertainers from the outside as an addition to their own. Usually only they and friends of their children attended these performances. The children, where they went to school outside the villages, had greater opportunity to learn Hebrew and to assimilate in the Yishuv.

The German settlers found it difficult to adjust to new conditions. Men who had worn suits as lawyers, businessmen or bank directors now had to discard their former formal attire in favor of simple khaki dress. Their wives had to make a similar adjustment. Such changes took time. A description of conditions in Ramoth Hashavim is enlightening on this subject. The students from Ramoth Hashavim went to school in Kfar Molal. They came dressed in short pants with suspenders, typical Bavarian style, and with book cases from Germany. They must have been a curious sight for the other students. On the whole they got along well with the other students and did better than average in school. This is not surprising considering the background of their parents who, as educated professionals, valued learning and encouraged them in their studies. These children were economically advantaged in comparison to their schoolmates. Many had bicycles which they rode to school, much to the envy of the others, for it was a luxury that not many children in Palestine enjoyed. The adults in Ramoth Hashavim used to water

* Based on conversation with and interview of an individual from Kfar Malal who knows Ramoth Hashavim Well.
the unpaved paths so that they would not have to walk through
dust the next morning. Such peculiarities were viewed with
amusement by veterans of the Yishuv.

The earliest middle class settlers often built
their homes with a view to accommodating their furniture
brought with them from Europe. These were often too large
in relation to their small land holdings and consumed too
much of their limited capital. In the later years RASSCO
introduced a more practical standard house for such settle-
ments. It included 2 rooms and a combination kitchen-dining
room and hallway entrance. The settlers invested on the average
LP 1,700 per family in Naharia and Gan Hashomron, approximate-
ly LP 1,500 in Kfar Schmaryahu, LP 1440 in Ramoth Hashavim,
LP 850 in Shave Zion, and 600 in Kfar Yedidiya.

A payment of LP 1,200 to Fica and a reserve of an
additional LP 300 - LP 500 were required of those who wished
to settle in Fardess Chana. Those who planned to settle in
the Haifa Bay area needed LP 800, in Eyn Chai LP 900, and
in Karkur LP 1,200 - LP 1,650.

Of the area under cultivation in these settlements
48 per cent was privately owned, and 52 per cent was the
property of the Jewish National Fund.

1 Turnowsky-Pinner, op. cit., p. 13.
2 Bericht der Landwirtschaftlichen Abteilung der HOG
Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Pales-
tine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem Document
No. S7/31.
3 Keren Hayesod, op. cit., p. 21.
The settlers bought and sold their goods through cooperatives.

Some of the settlements did hire outside workers. In the case of Ramoth Hashavim these were required to pay taxes to the community. No one was permitted to employ anyone without first submitting to this regulation. On the other hand, they paid their workers well*.

Those who settled in the kibbutzim adhered to a variety of ideologies and degrees of religious convictions, and consequently joined different kibbutz movements. These included the Kibbutz Meuchad, Ichud Hakvutzot ve Hakibbutzim, the Kibbutz Arzi of Hashomer Hatzair, as well as those affiliated with the Agudath Yisrael (religious), HaPoel Hamizrachi and the Oved Zioni.

Of special interest in this report is the settlement of a particular group from Germany in Palestine. The Werkleute was founded in 1932 when the Kameraden, Deutschjüdischer Wanderbund** split into three separate organizations.

* Based on conversation with previously cited informant.
** The Kameraden, Deutschjüdischer Wanderbund was a Jewish Youth organization. It was to be a movement according to the ideals of the German Jugendbewegung. Its members were mostly assimilated Jews who were brought up as Germans and for whom religion played a minor role. They established a Jewish youth movement for social reasons (social anti-semitism) and not due to differences of ideology. Its first group was organized in Breslau in 1916. For further details see Eliyahu Maoz (Moshacher) "The Werkleute" Leo Baeck Institute, Yearbook IV (London: East and West Library, 1959), pp. 165 - 182.
One was the **Schwarzes Fähnlein** (a right wing scout movement), another the **Freie Deutschjüdische Jugend** (a left wing scout movement), and the rest founded the **Werkleute**. The Werkleute believed in revolutionary socialism, but refused to join the communist party. They favored religion in the movement, but stressed its ethical humanitarian side while opposing orthodoxy. They saw themselves as part of the Jewish nation but did not join the Zionist movement\(^1\).

The events of 1933 were a turning point for the movement. They became Zionists, decided to settle in Palestine, join the kibbutz movement, and found their own kibbutz. They could not identify totally with any of the existing movements, and so decided to establish a **Werkleute Kibbutz**. In the summer of 1933 the members went on hachshara and in the fall of the same year some members were sent to Palestine. There they trained in two kibbutzim, one belonging to the **Kibbutz Arzi** movement, and the other to the **Kibbutz Hameuchad**. By April 1934, each group had grown to 20 members, and at this point Kibbutz Hazorea was founded\(^2\). For three years these pioneers lived in **Hadera** until in 1936 they settled in the Jesrael Valley. This small group soon grew as the rest of the Werkleute members left Germany after its establishment. In later years they were joined by non-Germans, including two groups, one from Bulgaria and one from Tripolitania\(^3\). For years the

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members could not decide which kibbutz movement to join. The choice narrowed down to one between Kibbutz Hameuchad and Kibbutz Arzi. In 1939 they finally opted for the latter. Eliyahu Maoz (Mozbacher), a member of the Werkleute, explained the reasons for this choice. According to him the Werkleute and Hashomer Hatzair had much in common. Both originated in the youth movement. "The typical member of its kibbutzim was similar to the Werkleute". The members of the Werkleute were also attracted by the ideological basis of Hashomer Hatzair where an adherence to common ideology on matters pertaining to economics, politics, education and culture were required. Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner added two other reasons, namely: The kibbutz's proximity to Mishmar Haemek (also belonging to Hashomer Hatzair), and its inclination towards the small-kibbutz-concept with a more rigid selection process for new members.

Another kibbutz with a significant group of settlers from Germany was Givat Brenner. As early as 1928 a small group of pioneers from Lithuania, Italy, and Germany under the leadership of Enzo Sereni settled on the land. But the kibbutz was still in its beginnings at the start of the

1 Ibid., p. 126.
2 Maoz, op. cit., p. 181.
3 Turnowsky-Pinner, op. cit., p. 126.
mass exodus from Germany, so that in 1934 a reporter could describe them as still living in tents. He recounts his visit to one tent belonging to the daughter of an acquaintance of his from Northern Germany. Upon entering the tent he discovered a clean and neatly furnished area that had even a touch of elegance to it, including a small table that was also a vanity, a cabinet, and vases with flowers. In that same year the population of Givat Brenner numbered 285 adults and 50 children. More than half of the adults and 60 per cent of the children were from Germany. Practically all the settlers at Givat Brenner were young and belonged to Zionist youth movements. Those who came from Germany belonged to the Jung-Jüdischer Wanderbund, Brith Haolim, Hechalutz, and Habonim. Givat Brenner joined the Kibbutz Meuchad movement. It grew into one of the largest kibbutzim in the country, a growth which necessitated the introduction of industry, as the land at its disposal was limited. In 1942 Central European immigrants were still the majority, accounting for 286 (almost all from Germany) out of a total of 527 members. By 1958, only 200 out of its 800 members were of that aliyah, but being the veterans in the kibbutz, their influence was still great.

1 Kupferberg, op. cit., p. 85.
2 Ibid., p. 83.
3 Turnowsky-Pinner, op. cit., p. 120.
4 Ibid., p. 121.
In 1952 a group of approximately 100 members of Givat Brenner, the vast majority of them from Germany, left the kibbutz to join a new collective settlement, Netzer Sereni. The latter belonged to the Ichud Hakvutzot ve Hakibbutzim. According to Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner this change was due both to ideological reasons and to the fact that these members wanted to have their children sleep in the same home with them.

Other German Jewish immigrants worked on the land as day laborers, mostly on citrus plantations. Their jobs were temporary in nature and the pay was low.

1 Ibid., p. 128.
2 The practice in most kibbutzim was to have the children and parents live separately.
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

The figures in table V reveal a marked contrast between the age distribution of the Jewish population of Germany and that of the German Jewish immigrants to Palestine.

Table V
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany During 1933-1938 According to Age Groups and Population in Germany in 1933 According to Age Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of Total German Jewish Immigration</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Jewish Population in Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-9 years</td>
<td>4,016</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 &quot;</td>
<td>8,566</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 &quot;</td>
<td>10,828</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 &quot;</td>
<td>7,012</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 &quot;</td>
<td>2,922</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 &quot;</td>
<td>3,167</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70 &quot;</td>
<td>1,712</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 &amp; over</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40,061</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Travelers authorized to settle in Palestine 3,228

Estimate of immigrants entering through other places 1,800

Grand total 45,089


Most striking are the differences for the age groups 21-30 and 61 and over. The former category represented only 14.2 per cent of the Jewish population in Germany, while among the immigrants its share was almost twice as large. For the age group 61 and over the contrast was even greater. This category accounted for 16.3 per cent of the Jewish population in Germany, almost three times the ratio among the immigrants, where it represented only 5.6 per cent.

Even more revealing is a comparison of the age groups 1-30 and 51 and over. The former represented only 35.7 per cent of the German Jewish population as a whole, but 58.5 per cent of the immigrants. For the older group the contrast is even more striking. Those 51 years or older accounted for 31.6 per cent of the Jewish population of Germany, in contrast to only 13.4 per cent of the immigrants.

These contrasts show that there was a greater tendency for the young to immigrate to Palestine, over half the German immigrants being of that category.

As for the older group, the tendency was quite the opposite. Although representing a percentage figure close to that of the younger group, in regard to the Jewish population in Germany, it accounted for less than 15 per cent of the German immigrants.

This discrepancy can be explained by a combination of factors. First, those of the young age groups are more likely to uproot themselves and start
anew, the reverse applying to the older age groups. Also the policy of the British government and the Jewish Agency favored the young who were viewed as an economic asset by the former, and a national asset by the latter.

The older groups in numerous cases depended on pensions and their properties for income, a factor which made them less likely to emigrate. These people were affected in a less immediate way than were other Jews by the National Socialist persecution.

The age distribution of the immigrants further reduced the percentage of young Jews among those who remained in Germany, while increasing the share of the older group. It must be noted that already before the ascendance of Hitler the Jews of Germany had a relatively larger population of old people, due to a declining birth rate, than other Jewish communities. Between the June, 1933, census in Germany and December 1937 there was an excess of death over birth, within the Jewish population in Germany, of no less than 25,000.¹

SEX AND MARITAL STATUS

The figures in table VI show that more males than females immigrated from Germany, and that there were 62 per cent more bachelors than spinsters. This majority of males is attributable to the Chalutz movement, where the men greatly outnumbered the women.

Table VI
Jewish Immigration into Palestine from Germany During 1933-1938, Sex and Family Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Bachelors</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Children under 17</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Children under 17</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors</td>
<td>6,624</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>4,176</td>
<td>4,176</td>
<td>18,960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>9,424</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 17</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>284</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelers authorised to settle in Palestine</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of immigrants entering through other places</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>45,089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the figures in table VII the bachelors and spinsters in the German Jewish immigration were overrepresented when viewed in terms of the total immigration of that category from all countries. The German Jews were underrepresented in terms of the number of married people, and accounted for their exact share in the total immigration from all countries, in their number of children. This does not mean that the German Jewish immigrants had the same

Table VII
Proportion of Immigration from Germany to Palestine to the Total Jewish Immigration from all Countries in Terms of Family Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Status</th>
<th>Percentage Relation of German Jewish Distribution of Immigration to Total German Jewish Immigration in Each Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors and Spinsters</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

fertility rate as other immigrants, but rather the contrary, since we know that many children came without parents.

The German Jews maintained a low fertility rate in Israel. The 118 people asked in my questionnaire had a sum total of 199 children. Since 19 were bachelors or spinsters that means that 217 persons produced only 119 offsprings; a figure insufficient to replace their own number.

OCCUPATIONAL READJUSTMENT

The problem of training the youth and preparing them for hard physical work and endurance, was a relatively easy one to solve. This group was absorbed into the working class of Palestine without great difficulty. This was not the case with people approaching 40. In terms of occupational readjustment, immigrants of the middle class and of middle age presented a grave problem. This group included numerous people who derived their incomes in the more developed German economy as middlemen. These newcomers found themselves in a very serious, and even tragic, situation.

* Figure derived at thus: Number married
99x2=198+19 bachelors and spinsters = 217
A letter sent by Dr. Martin Rosenbleuth* to Dr. Ruppin** is very instructive. It concerns the following report from the Jewish Telegraphic Association:

"The Jewish press here reports an epidemic of suicides among the German immigrants in Haifa and Tel-Aviv. Almost every day a case of suicide among the German immigrants is announced in the press. Most of the suicides concern people of the age of 40."

Dr. Rosenbleuth does not doubt the validity of the report. His concern is with the effect it may have on his negotiations with the Council for German Jewry. He states that there are enough members there who are waiting for the chance to prove that the Zionists exaggerate the importance of Palestine as a solution to the problems of German Jewry.¹

* Martin Rosenbleuth managed the London department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.
** Dr. Ruppin was director of the Jerusalem department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.
The policy was to suppress such reports 1.

Large numbers of professional people, particularly lawyers and physicians, were forced to change their occupations. The law examinations requiring Hebrew and English presented a great problem for German lawyers. Even upon successful completion of the examination there was little chance of establishing a practice. As for physicians, their profession was overfilled.

The problem of retraining was a particularly difficult one in the towns. Here there was a shortage of the needed institutions and many had no means by which to maintain their families during the requisite training period 2.

The fact that the vast majority of German Jewish immigrants came from large urban centers compounded their adjustment difficulties in Palestine. Here even the largest cities did not provide the opportunities that were available to them in pre-Hitler Germany. On the other hand, between 1933 and 1938 they were able to bring a part of their capital with them, making their situation somewhat more tolerable.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

Occupational readjustment means not only a lowering of the standard of living, but also a social setback, particularly in the eyes of refugees. This applied especially to the German Jewish refugees, where social position and titles played such an important role.

1 Ibid.
The possibility of occupational readjustment for national ideological reasons, and the fact that one's colleagues were of the same social position, helped ease the torment. Still, mentally these immigrants found it difficult to accept their new realities. This is pointedly revealed in a report to the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine. This report conveys the idea that the German Jews have not learned from their experience. Almost the majority of these immigrant families are still of the opinion that the pursuit of an academic career is still a worthwhile goal and are continuing to send their children to the academies of higher learning, in numbers far greater than Palestine can absorb. By 1940 German-Jewish students accounted for approximately one third of the total enrollment at the Hebrew University.

1 The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine, The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Document S7/100.
2 Tartakower, op. cit., p. 74.
The number of German Jews who settled in Palestine before 1933 was insignificant; the overwhelming majority came from Eastern Europe, mainly Russia and Poland. The newcomers from Germany had no relatives of fellow countrymen to help them through the transitional stages. Thus the sudden influx of a large number of immigrants with a particular culture of their own, the majority of whom were very far from Jewish tradition, culture, and thought of Palestine, created a serious readjustment problem. To start with they had to overcome the language problem. In the majority of cases the German Jews had no functional knowledge of Hebrew. In my questionnaire, of 118 who answered the question: "What languages did you speak upon arrival in Palestine" only 40 included Hebrew among the languages and of these 35 answered "some Hebrew" leaving only five who presumably were fluent in the language.

This linguistic shortcoming acted as both an economic and social barrier. The Jewish community in Palestine concerned with the Hebraization of the country, resented the fact that these immigrants continued to speak and read in German. Also certain positions required a knowledge of Hebrew.

The mentality of the German Jews created difficulties for them. They were accustomed to an exaggerated sense of exactitude, order, and discipline, completely different from that of the rest of Palestinian Jewry. This was interpreted as a lack of
mental flexibility on their part.* Their lack of Jewish education also stood against them. For their part the German Jews often considered the East European Jews to be lacking in culture.

This attitude at times went to extremes. A letter written by Jewish dentist from Germany to a colleague abroad was replete with anti-Semitic remarks against the Jews of the *Yishuv* in general and the Polish Jews in particular. He expressed a Nazi-like philosophy which included the quoting of Goebbels.¹

Somehow this letter fell into the hands of the *Hitachduth Olej Germania* office in Haifa, resulting in a dispatch to that organization's office in Tel-Aviv, giving it full authority to induce the man to leave Palestine. This communiqué also expressed concern that such a person might put the German-Jewish immigrants in a bad light.²

* "Jecke", a term used for the German Jewish immigrant, is derived from the German word for jacket "Jacke", which many of them wore. This contrasted sharply with pioneer attire of most of the rest of the population. But this term was also interpreted to stand for "Yehudi Kashe Havana" meaning a Jew hard of understanding.

A letter written in 1933 by a Dr. Bodenheimer to Dr. Landauer reveals some of the feelings expressed against the German settlers in Haifa.

"In Haifa there is a great animosity against the German Jewish immigrants. The argument is this: The Germans are spoiling the prices, they are at fault that everything is becoming more expensive. They live too luxuriously. Why shouldn't they live in tents as we had done before them? Why can't they walk instead of pay for a car?"

He then adds that all the bad will shown by German Jewry to Eastern European Jewry is now being returned.

* Dr. George Landauer managed the Jerusalem department of the Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.

Many of the German Jews were accustomed to look down on the Jews of Eastern Europe. They were ashamed of their East European brothers and often tried to pass for Germans. A large portion of them, having had no Zionist background or Jewish education, seemed more German than Jewish. This resentment, affecting many sections of the Yishuv, was compounded by the fact that many Palestinian Jews at that time identified everything German with Hitler. This included the German language. Conflicts erupted and acts of terror were perpetrated against German language meetings and newspapers. Some known writers came to the defence of the German Jews. Asher Beilin called it a brand of "Jewish anti-Semitism" against immigrants from Germany. Agnon and Shazar took similar positions. A reporter who interviewed Bialik at his home received the following response to the question "How do you like the German Jews who are presently (1934) coming to Israel?": "Well, we have no other Jews! God gave us these; we must take them as they are." A. Kupferberg makes it clear that Bialik was not speaking of the economic difficulties involved in integrating the German Aliyah when talking with such a reserved and ironic-critical fashion, but was rather more concerned with intellectual and cultural problems. In Bialik's view these immigrants

1 Curt D. Worrmann, "German Jews in Israel: Their Cultural Situations since 1933" Leo Baeck Yearbook XV (London: East and West Library 1970) p. 83.
2 Kupferberg, op. cit., p. 60.
came with exaggerated expectations in matters of civility. They left a country which had reached the highest level of technology and were used to comfort and pampering in their daily lives. This they now missed in Palestine. Bialik pointed out that they were now in a land of pioneers and that such expectations were unrealistic in a developing country, while the German Jews continued to overrate these niceties. Bialik saw an even more serious problem. He thought that the practices and mannerisms of the German Jews were of such importance to them that they could hardly change; that the German culture was so deeply ingrained in them that even simple farmers and workers were totally inundated with them. These Jews were convinced that their German culture had reached a zenith and were consequently closed to new ideas. Bialik believed that German Jewry's move from the ghetto into the German culture had resulted in a tragic confusion so that the most talented German Jews had tragic lives. Here, he believed, lay the problem which he feared they could not overcome, namely, their strong admiration for the German culture, while at the same time being Jews. The problem, as Bialik perceived it, was whether these German Jews would be able to assimilate into the Jewish culture and identify themselves with Israel.

The following excerpt from a conversation between newly arrived German immigrants and a veteran settler, as captured by a reporter, is indicative of some of the

* He cited Heinrich Heine and Jacob Wassermann in this connection.

1 Ibid., pp. 60-62.
formers' characteristics and the latter's attitude: "...She was grieved by the plight of the Germans and, of course, when God punished, one ought to remain silent, but then—wasn't it—after all, a just nemesis? If they had been so willing to give everything for the privilege of assimilation..... Tell me, she laughed into the room, and do you think like the other Germans? Do you expect to find a Berlin in Jerusalem? They looked at her blankly. Please say again. I do not understand. Most Germans think that Jerusalem is not good enough because it is not like Berlin. They want this to be a little Germany".

The German Jews with their peculiarities at times became object of humor. The Matatex theater group portrayed a German pioneer in one scene as standing in the middle of the workshop brushing his knickerbockers.

A humorous anecdote poignantly points out the German immigrant's inability or unwillingness to integrate and assimilate into the Yishuv. The story went that when the question of partition arose the mayor of Naharia, which was settled by German Jews, came out with the declaration: "I don't know whether Naharia will become part of the Jewish or the Arab sector, but I know that Naharia will remain German."

2 Kupferberg, op. cit., p. 21.
The steamers bringing German immigrants to Palestine sailed the Mediterranean on their way to Haifa or Jaffa where their passengers disembarked. Many of these newcomers from Germany were attracted to Tel-Aviv*. A reporter's impression of Tel-Aviv in 1933, after the first wave of German immigrants had arrived, provides a vivid picture of the newly transformed city. Shops were suddenly displaying strings of red sausages of various sizes and shapes. Schnitzel became a very popular dish. In the cafés and restaurants "one is always conscious of the solidarity which goes hand in hand with tweed caps and shorn heads; and of the substantiality which distinguishes the German Frau from her more frilly sister." Merchants started stocking their shelves with a variety of German books. One could no longer walk down the streets without running into new German arrivals. Jaffa harbor was filled with large packing crates in which these immigrants brought their belongings, including furniture. In 1934 another reporter described the coffee shops and restaurants established in the city by these immigrants** as having become the mee-

* See chapter II.
1 Dorothy Kohn, "The Germans come to Tel-Aviv", The New Palestine November 14, 1933, p. 3.
**They were reproached for having opened to many such shops.
2 Gottgetreu, op. cit., p. 60.
ting places for these newcomers. Since many had not yet established themselves they frequented coffee shops to a much greater extent than the rest of the Yishuv. Thus, if one went about the streets of Tel-Aviv during the spring of 1934, he would get the impression that half the city's population consisted of German Jews. The impression that Tel-Aviv was being swamped by Germans was compounded by the fact that the transplantation of things German went so far as to include Berlin street names. A certain Tel-Aviv traffic center was dubbed Fotsdamer Platz, another Alexander Platz, and the Bilu Street area Steglitz. Incidents were recounted of people boarding buses and referring to such areas by their newly given names.

In Haifa the German influence was as apparent as in Tel-Aviv. A striking feature of Jewish Haifa were doctors and lawyers from Germany whose shields, according to a reporter, one could see practically on every street corner. In this city, as in some of the others, German Jewish women set up numerous kindergartens, often in partnership with veteran residents who knew Hebrew. Numerous Ger-

1 Kupferberg, op. cit., p. 48.
2 Gottgetreu, op. cit., p. 58.
3 Kupferberg, op. cit., p. 57.
4 Ibid., p. 18.
man youngster went to the Reali School which operated along German pedagogic principles\(^1\).

The enormous crates, known as "lifts", were as numerous in Haifa as in Jaffa. These were often left in the streets for weeks or even months, while their owners searched for living quarters\(^2\).

The story of Jerusalem was similar to that of Tel-Aviv and Haifa. Eighteen months after the first large wave of German Jewish immigration to Palestine, parts of Jerusalem were transformed. A reporter's account of the changes in Jaffa Street are instructive. He described new shop windows of a type not seen before in the city and added the difference was not only in the wares but also in the strikingly modern display. He was intrigued to find an area with things only for men, and a perfumery section with everything for women.

Physicians and dentists who had come to the city also left their mark, as the reporter claimed "Going to a dentist (they say) is today a pleasure; yesterday a torture". A radiologist from Germany who came with a supply of radium was treating patients in Jerusalem. Previously such treatment required a trip to Europe.

This city was also inundated with German books and magazines, and sausage shops\(^3\). The latter were often

started by persons who were unable to continue in their former professions, as is illustrated in the following case of a doctor Berger. He was a famous children's doctor in Berlin who, after being dismissed from his clinic, left Germany and settled in Jerusalem. He was to be found by a reporter, as she described it: "Just off Jaffa Road, in Ben Yehuda Street, I walked into a tiny shop – a mere cubby-hole. There, surrounded by his "all kinds of salads and sausages" was Dr. Berger labouriously slicing Wurst and apologizing to his customers for the unevenness of his slices".

The new arrivals from Germany, as long as they could, brought with them everything, in the words of Maurice Samuel, "from the soft, sleep inducing parlor rockers to the last polishing rag". This was quite unlike other immigrants who came to Palestine with few possessions. The country was not really ready for the type of luxury and comfort that these immigrants attempted to import. This luxury was also apparent from the fashionable clothes worn by their women, prompting one to comment in this connection that "the Germans bring Paris and Berlin to Jerusalem and Haifa". These immigrants were recognizable not only from the way they dressed or spoke, but also from their

1 Bradley, op. cit., p. 17.
3 Goitein, op. cit., p. 6.
numerous habits, likes and dislikes they had brought with them from Germany. This went so far as to include their facial features which, at times, seemed to portray a cultivated lack of expression typical to the lawyers and physicians from some of the larger German cities.

The German Jewish immigrants introduced a new lifestyle to Palestine, especially in the cities. They established Western European style hotels and vacation resorts, restaurants and coffee shops. Their stores were more specialized and enhanced by the use of decorated displaycases.

These Jews built their homes in accordance with their accustomed tastes, but with regard to the different climatic conditions and their more limited financial means. In this task they had the assistance of architects who also came from Germany. Their house-gardens, which may still be seen on Mount Carmel in Haifa, attest to their attempt at maintaining this aspect of their former lifestyle.

The interior of their homes resembled their former dwellings even more closely, their furniture, librairies, and other belongings having been brought to Palestine with them. In social services they helped upgrade the level of welfare work. Perhaps the great diversity of new industries introduced by these immigrants represented their most important contribution.

This group differed greatly from the pioneers

who preceded it, with the other immigrants from Central Europe eliminated the pioneer lifestyle from the major cities.

The anti-Jewish measures of the National Socialist regime were initially directed against scientists, academicians, and artists. Although many found refuge in other countries, a large number came to Palestine. The numerous physicians among these immigrants helped make Palestine a first rate medical center.*

As for the arts, here they left their greatest mark in the field of music. The Palestine orchestra, inspired by Bronislaw Huberman, consisted at its inception in 1936, almost entirely of immigrants from Germany. It was of such high calibre that Arturo Toscanini consented to conduct its opening concert. The sector of the public attending these concerts and helping sustain the orchestra had a high ratio of German Jewish immigrants in it.

A considerable number of painters and sculptors also came to Palestine in this immigration. Due to the language barrier the role of the German speaking immigrants in the theater was more limited, but not inconsiderable. In sports they also made their contribution, especially in gymnastics and aquatics.

* For a detailed list of such personalities see Tartakower, op. cit., p. 74.
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE YISHUV

The contribution of the German Jewish immigration to the economic development of the Yishuv could not be measured only in terms of the capital brought into the country by them. The way this capital was invested is also of considerable importance. While the middle class immigrants of the fourth Alijah invested 80 per cent of their capital in real estate (landpurchases, housing construction, and citrus groves), and only 5 per cent each for industry and commerce, this was not the case with the immigrants from Germany. These invested, according to a study by the Jewish Agency for the years 1933-1934, 26 per cent in industry and handicraft, and 17 per cent in commerce. Although investment in housing was a major factor for all immigrants, it played a relatively less important role for those who came from Germany. The German Jewish immigrants helped raise the standards of industrial production through their familiarity with modern western European techniques.

1 Feilchenfeld, Michaelis, Pinner, op. cit., p. 98.
POST SCRIPT

The German Jewish immigrants who came to Palestine in the 1930s brought with them a very large number of people well educated in a large variety of fields. Palestine was then unable to utilize them all, and many were resentful that they could not play the role which they felt their training and ability entitled them to. With the growth of modern Israel more found opportunities to engage in their professions and became important factors in the development of the State. This has earned them increased recognition, while at the same time they have learned to appreciate the contributions of other groups in the Yishuv. They have been, and are, leaving their mark in Israel's institutes of higher learning and research. Some have been appointed to high governmental posts, playing a particularly important role in the Israeli Department of Justice. Pinchas Rosen (Felix Rosenblüth) served as minister of justice while the membership of the supreme court includes or included former Chief Justice Benjamin Halevi, Chaim Cohen, and Moshe Landau. Israel's first two State Comptrollers, Siegfried Moses and Ernst Nebenzahl, were both German immigrants. Herbert Förder was a member of the Knesset, and later Chairman of the Bank Leumi. German Jews held or hold ministerial posts in the Cabinet, Bernstein Minister of Commerce, Joseph Burg Minister of Welfare and later Minister of the Interior, Josephthal Housing Minister, and Naphtali Minister of Agriculture.
Members of this Aliyah also played a major role in the formation of historical and other archives in Israel. This applies especially to the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem whose first Director was Georg Herlitz, succeeded by Alexander Bein, and in turn followed by Michael Hayman. Some German Jews have attained great wealth in the business world, particularly Xavier and Samuel Federman who own the Dan Hotels in Tel-Aviv, Ceasarea and on Mount Carmel in Haifa, the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and the Accadia in Herzliyah. On the other hand German Jews did not penetrate the top leadership circles of Israel.

German Jewish writers whose medium of expression was the German language found it most difficult to adjust to Palestine. For many years their language of expression was despised and the bigger publishers in the country were not prepared to publish works in German. The lack of response and their inability to live with their new situation were often tragic episodes in the lives of such men and women. On the other hand there were those who succeeded in surmounting great difficulties and were even able to continue their creative work in both German and Hebrew, as was the poet Ludwig Strauss. Martin Buber, who knew Hebrew well already before he settled in Palestine, found opportunity to express himself in his new home. Others struggled.

1 Curt D. Wormann, "German Jews in Israel: Their Cultural Situation since 1933" Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XV (London; East and West Library, 1970), p. 86.
2 Ibid., p. 88.
led with the Hebrew language but continued their work in German, as was the case with Max Brod. A sad story was that of Arnold Zweig who, unable to adjust to his new homeland, left in 1948 to settle in East Berlin.

Up to October 1938, when it ceased publication, the *Jüdische Rundschau* was imported to Palestine. Thereafter an attempt was made to distribute the *Jüdische Weltrundschau* which was published for a short time only in 1939 under the editorship of Robert Weltsch and Gunter Krojonker. It failed according to Curt Wassermann due to "unofficial but widely backed opposition to German language publications"¹. Two German language daylies *Yedioth Hayom* and *Yedioth Chadashot* were able to maintain themselves, the latter and larger of the two still appearing today. The *Hitachduth Olej Germania*, starting in 1935, published books in German on a variety of subjects².

* For a more detailed account of various German Jewish writers who settled in Palestine see Wormann, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-103.


² For a listing of such books see Wormann, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
In 1945, largely at the initiative of prominent German Jews in Israel the Council of Jews from Germany was formed as a roof organization of Jews from Central Europe in- and outside of Israel. In 1955 it set up the Leo Baeck Institute whose Jerusalem Center continues the Cultural work of the Irgun Olej Merkas Europa.

* This organization succeeded both the Hitachduth Olej Germany and the Hitachduth Olej Germania ve Austria.
ALIYAH CHADASHA

In 1942 the Aliyah Chadasha* was founded as an outgrowth of the Hitachduth Olej Germania we Olej Austria. It encompassed a substantial proportion of the German Aliyah, and a majority of its leadership consisted of Zionists from Germany. These factors prompted criticism and led to the accusation that it was an association of people of a particular regional background (Landsmannschaft) who were mobilized into a political movement and party. It did in fact adopt a political program. Georg Landauer replied to such criticism in a 1944 political pamphlet of the Aliyah Chadasha. Here he pointed out that other Zionist parties were originally also based on groupings with common regional backgrounds. He also drew attention to the fact that members of the Hitachduth Olej Germania we Olej Austria who disapproved of its program did not join it, while Zionists of other backgrounds who favored its political stand evinced their support of the new group.¹

The Aliyah Chadasha presented itself as a political group or movement, but not as a party in the traditional

* Felix Rosenblüth (Pinchas Rosen) was the head of the Aliyah Chadasha
Zionist sense. While the former included members of various economic, social, and cultural background, as well as religious views, the latter were divided between middle class, labour, and religious parties. The Aliyah Chadasha strove for a progressive, liberal society, the issues of Zionist policy and reform of the Yishuv. The questions of education and culture occupied a prominent position in its program. It opposed the 1942 Biltmore Program as being too uncompromising and incompatible with the reality of Jewish economic and political existence in Palestine and in the world. Furthermore, the program was seen as isolationist and as an impediment to the promotion of cooperation and understanding. It was argued that it was based on an overestimation of the security and freedom that the establishment of a state would provide. Such a state, according to the Aliyah Chadasha, would guarantee neither military and political security, nor economic development. Self-reliance was negated in favor of collective security, for which the powers ruling Palestine

* The Biltmore Program was the product of an Extraordinary Zionist Conference held at the Hotel Biltmor in New York, and attended by Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and other leading Zionists. It urged that the gates of Palestine be opened, that the Jewish Agency be vested with the control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth.
would be responsible. Under this arrangement the \textit{Yishuv} was expected to receive autonomy with both the Arab and Jewish nations having equal rights'.

In 1944 the \textit{Aliyah Chadasha} enunciated its position on a number of key issues. On the question of Palestine it proposed that Britain continue to rule it and so fulfill the role of a strong international power which it deemed necessary for the maintenance of order and security. At the same time it insisted on the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper. The only restrictions on Jewish immigration it would countenance were to be based on the economic possibilities of the country and "considerations which had to be shown the Arab people". It did not approve any proposal for the proclamation of a Jewish State and made no such demands of Britain or the Arabs. The \textit{Aliyah Chadasha} advocated cooperation with Britain, insisting that "we cannot develop any power of our own alongside her, and certainly not against her". It opposed the resolution of the Zionist General Council which declared non-cooperation with the Government'.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Landauer, "Aliyah Chadasha", \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 7-8.
\item \textit{Tbid.}, p. 11.
\item \textit{Tbid.}, pp. 9-11.
\end{enumerate}
question of World War II played a major role in its platform. It proposed that the Zionist position be one of total war requiring the unconditional mobilization of all Jewish forces with the single aim of fighting the National Socialists. All considerations of Zionist policy were to be subordinated to this goal.

The Aliyah Chadasha opposed terrorism for "it poisons the soul and makes men blind", and also because it would lose for Zionism the sympathies of the enlightened world. This philosophy of reliance on moral rather than physical force was to be introduced into the educational system which it sought to reform.

In 1947 Landauer submitted a proposal to the Merkas of the Aliyah Chadasha which included the following policy provisions: The immediate immigration of Jewish refugees from Europe; recognition of the Jews' right to continued immigration thereafter; it proclaimed the final goal to be complete independence, but insisted that, in order to realize this program, there was need for a transitional period, at which time the country should be under United Nations' supervision. This was then to lead to a federated Jewish-Arab state. The Merkas opted for a program favoring par-

1 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
2 Ibid., p. 24 by Felix Rosenbluth.
3 Ibid. pp 16-17.
tition. Not having forseen Britain's new readiness to reduce her foreign commitments, and thus her role in Palestine as well, they were caught by surprise. The adoption of a new program by the Aliyah Chadasha which favored partition represented a move closer to the mainstream of Zionist policy. The movement, cast in the role of the opposition, weakened in this role, as a major part of its leadership abandoned their former position. This started the split within the Aliyah Chadasha.

In a September, 1948, essay Georg Landauer described the events which led to the split within the movement. To his dismay the majority of the leadership of the Aliyah Chadasha submitted at its National Conference a program of unification with the Oved Zioni party and with a splinter of the General Zionist Party. Both, according to Landauer, could not compare in strength with the Aliyah Chadasha, and both had fought against its program in the past. Furthermore, this program of merger was presented as a fait accompli, depriving the conference of any power of decision. The key leadership positions were already agreed upon, as was that of the chairman. This applied also to the representation of the new party in the government. Opposition to this union, and to the fact that even a majority could no longer reverse it and its elements, prompted Landauer and many others of the movement to refuse to attend its conference which they deemed destructive to the political character of the Aliyah Chadasha and leading to its liquidation.¹

¹Ibid. pp. 273-274
The movement's end came in 1948 with the establishment of the state. It had served its purpose to the extent that it provided an outlet through which Central European, and particularly German Jews could express and lend weight to their political views. The establishment of the State was so radical a change in events that adjustment to them would have required a complete transformation of the movement. Its retention would have meant the preservation of a group of individuals who once had shared a common idea whose time has passed.
Margarete Turnowsky-Pinner estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the Central European immigrants who settled in kibbutzim remained there\(^1\). As for the middle class settlements, 25 per cent left, some due to the physical strain which was too great for them, others during times of economic crises. Generally, those who joined the better organized settlements usually weathered the crises and so the dropout rate from such was low\(^2\). It must be noted that some who left their settlements may simply have joined another or opted for a different form, but did not actually give up agriculture.

The restitution payments and return of properties had a marked effect on the German Jewish settlers. It has raised the standard of living of many of these immigrants substantially but also prompted some to return to Germany. This was the case with one individual at Ramoth Hashavim who took his whole family back to Germany after his factory was restored. In another instance a judge returned with his wife, but their children remained in Israel\(^3\). Of the German Jews who immigrated to Palestine before World War II nearly 10,000 have returned to Germany\(^3\).

\(^1\) Turnowsky-Pinner, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 12.
\(^3\) Based on conversation and interview of informant from Kfar Malat who is familiar with Ramoth Hashavim.
The passage of time, the arrival of new immigrants from other parts of the world, and the growing up of a new generation has tended to reduce old antagonisms, although some basic differences still remained for the first generation on the social level. This is evident from numerous old age homes run by the Hitachduth Olej Merkas Europa where many of these immigrants opt to spend their last days with their fellow countrymen.
CONCLUSION

National Socialist persecution was the primary cause of the German Jewish migration to Palestine in the 1930s. But this migration was influenced by a number of other factors. These were British policy concerning immigration to Palestine in general, and more specifically British attitude towards the the German Jewish immigration, German policy and attitude on the same subject, the alternate places of refuge available to German Jewry, the activities of the German Jewish organizations, and the attitude of the German Jews themselves.

The German olim who began arriving in Palestine in 1933 were fleeing persecution. These immigrants came to realize that within their existing society they could no longer attain their economic and social goals, nor could they gratify their aspirations to "solidarity," i.e. to complete mutual identification with the society in which they lived. Fear of a massive physical assault on German Jewry became a major spur to this migration after the November 1938 pogroms, known as "Kristallnacht". These were not the feelings of the vast majority of German Jews prior to the Hitler era. They were hardly prepared for the events that had overtaken them in the 1930s. Although anti-Semitism was not

new to them, German Jewry had established itself in both the economic and cultural life of their country. The German Jews were on the whole a well-to-do community who saw themselves as an integral part of the German nation. Only a small percentage of Germany's Jews were Zionists. Of the German Jews who migrated to Palestine before 1933 almost all were Zionists, but even among German Zionists these olim were an exception. Before the Hitler era very few German Jews settled in Palestine. Leading German Zionists such as Adolph Friedemann, Franz Oppenheimer, Max Bodenheimer, and Herman Struck saw Zionism as not only a political movement, but also as a philanthropic enterprise. They believed it to be their duty to help their poorer East European brothers settle in Palestine. On the other hand there were other men like Kurt Blumenfeld who as early as 1912 expressed the belief that every Zionist should include within his life's program moving to Palestine. This still left open the question of when these Zionists would choose to settle there. Kurt Blumenfeld did not do so until 1933. Thus some German Zionists who eventually would have migrated to Palestine, were forced by the National Socialists to do so at an earlier date. For such man as Ruppin and Elias Auebach who did immigrate to Palestine during the early years of the Yishuv, Zionism was not the only motivating factor. As was shown in this work, the former sought a challenge in life, and the latter was inspired
by romantic notions. On the whole, the Zionists in pre-Hitler Germany were reluctant to abandon their comfort and security for the rigor and insecurity of frontier life in Palestine.

The German olim who began arriving in Palestine after 1933 were in search of economic readjustment and freedom from persecution. Their migration was characterized by the large number of families, including older, married couples and children, and contrasted sharply with the preceding aliyot of youthful pioneers. The motivation of the pre-1930s aliyot differed radically from the German Jewish immigration of the Hitler era. The pre-1930 aliyot were composed of young persons who were in most cases unmarried and, if married, without children. These were separated from their families and had actually rebelled against the communal life of the Jews in the diaspora. Most of these pioneers came from traditionalist families that were in the process of assimilation. They were the beneficiaries of both traditional and secular education and had the advantage of relative economic security. They were not forced to emigrate to overseas countries due to immediate economic need or political persecution. These immigrants sought to satisfy certain social and cultural aspirations through the transformation of Jewish society in a modern and secular community. This implied a complete social and cultural severance from their former environment. In-
individual aspirations were subordinated to the goal of restructuring the economic and social makeup of the Jewish community in Palestine. This included a return to agriculture and to other forms of manual labor. In the cultural field it meant among other things the revitalization of the Hebrew language. The pioneers of the early aliyot organized themselves into groups associated with social movements and political parties and underwent Hachsharah before going on aliyah. It must be noted that this description by no means applied to all the immigrants of the early aliyot.

Those Jews for whom the motive of economic betterment was the predominant factor migrated to areas other than Palestine. In the 1930s immigration to these areas (e.g. North- and South America) was severely restricted and the pattern of Jewish migration to Palestine became more similar to that of the general Jewish migration and could no longer be described as an aliyah of pioneers.

The East European Jews, in contrast to those of Germany, never assimilated. The rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe served to accentuate the Jews' sense of isolation. Nationalism as well as religion served as divisive factors. Neither Pan-Slavism nor the self-assertion of the various subject peoples in Eastern Europe provided for Jewish participation within the framework of their national aspirations. They could
become neither part of the dominant nations nor of the subject groups that were striving for national recognition. In Germany the situation seemed to be quite different. Numerous Jews came to see themselves as Germans of the Jewish or Mosaic faith. During World War I they served in the German army and were as eager to see it victorious as the rest of the Germans. This was unlike East European Jewry which not only tried to escape service in the hated Czarist army, but at least in part looked forward to its defeat by the German forces. Thus those Jews who came to Palestine during the first four aliyot, unlike the German olim, did not experience an abrupt alienation from a nation and culture to which they had formed very strong attachments.

The Zionists were psychologically better prepared to leave Germany and to go to Palestine, and the percentage of Zionists among those who went to Palestine was much larger than it was for the German Jews as a whole. The intensification of persecution resulted in more and more Jews identifying with their corregligionists, and also with Zionism. The circulation of Zionist publications, such as the Jüdische Rundschau, increased sharply, Jewish communal activity was intensified and the enrolment in Jewish schools rose sharply. Between 1933 and the 1935 Nuremberg Laws many still believed and hoped that the Hitler era would pass. After 1935 fewer and fewer were of that opinion, and emi-
migration was becoming the alternative for more and more German Jews. In the earlier years a much larger number of German Jews could have come to Palestine had they been ready to leave Germany. This was no longer the case in the closing years of the 1930s, for when the need of a refuge for German Jewry became most urgent in the latter half of this decade, the British authorities put more severe restrictions on immigration into Mandatory Palestine.

Jewish emigration from Germany was a push-migration, as opposed to a pull-migration. Emigration of German Jews followed the pattern of increased persecution and its subsidence as carried out by the National Socialists against them. This even included a re-migration in the early years of the Hitler era. Migration to Palestine was less erratic than the migration of German Jews to other countries. It was a planned and organized migration, and as was shown in this work, decisions to migrate generally preceded the actual migration by many months. Increased participation in Zionist activity and greater communal cohesion among German Jews helped prepare them psychologically for the

change in national identity. Hachsharah helped prepare them for new occupations.

British policy during the years in question did give special consideration to the plight of the Jews under Nazi rule and, if anything, was inclined to favor immigrants from Central and Western Europe over those coming from other areas of the world. This preference was also shown in U.S. immigration laws which were drawn up to favor immigrants from the nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. In Australia German immigrants were more readily accepted than those coming from Italy, as is revealed in a study by Wilfried Borrie¹ in which he compared the two immigrations. This can be explained by the fact that the British and societies of predominantly British background preferred immigrants from societies similar to their own. But the situation of the Jews in Germany was not the predominant factor governing British policy. It was more closely connected to Arab opposition to the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and Arab fear that through continued immigration Jews would become a majority there. The more severe British restrictions on immigration imposed in the closing days of the 1930s in response to Arab agitation affected the German Jewish immigration as well as the total Jewish immigration to Palestine from all countries.

The policy of the National Socialist regime during the years in question was to encourage the emigration of German Jews. Emigration to Palestine was also encouraged, for it seemed promising as an area in which to relieve Germany of a substantial part of its Jewish population. Zionist activity within Germany was encouraged by the S.S. and Gestapo in recognition of the fact that it promoted emigration. On the other hand, Germany opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Foreign Ministry, with the exception of its Economic Policy Department, argued against the encouragement of Jewish migration to Palestine. Its position was that it was in Germany's interest to keep the Jews dispersed and that Palestine should not be permitted to become a power base for them. The Economic Policy Department held an opposing view, believing that Jewish migration to areas outside of Palestine, especially to centers of international trade, could harm Germany much more economically and through propaganda and press, than to Palestine. Relations with the Arabs and the fate of the Templar colonies also influenced Germany to oppose the creation of a Jewish state there. The German authorities were quite aware of Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine and believed that the Templar colonies could not continue to exist within an independent Jewish state. They feared that German policy towards its Jews would have prompted counteraction against the Templars. Germany wanted a
free hand to deal with its Jews and was unwilling to have her freedom of action compromised on account of these colonies. While migration to Palestine tended to promote the creation of a Jewish state there, Germany hindered this migration only when definite prospects of a Jewish state becoming a reality were near. This was the case in 1937, when the Peel Commission raised such prospects. Germany was able to encourage or to hinder this migration by facilitating or obstructing Zionist activities in Germany and through the Haavara agreement by easing or blocking the transfer of capital to Palestine. On the whole, Germany's main concern regarding its Jews was to be rid of them and make Germany judenrein. Where Palestine served this goal, migration to it was promoted. The National Socialists went so far as to assist in the illegal immigration of German Jews into Palestine.

The Haavara agreement served Germany's goals by: increasing production, saving foreign currency (by allowing German Jews to export their capital to Palestine in the form of merchandise but prohibiting the export of capital in foreign currency), and by promoting the export of German goods and the emigration of German Jews, the latter being the primary factor. This is evident from the Haavara agreement's continuation after Germany's unemployment was reduced and need for increased production decreased. This was particularly the case since exports to Palestine through the Haavara
Agency did not earn Germany foreign currency, as all goods purchased from Germany were paid for from the Reichmarks deposited by German Jews with the Haavara Agency. Foreign currency was paid to German exporters only where this was required to cover such outlays by Germany in the manufacture of the export item. German Jews migrating to Palestine received more for their Reichsmark holdings than Jews destined for other lands. There was considerable opposition to the Haavara agreement, particularly from the Auslandsorganisation. Opponents of the agreement argued that it helped promote the establishment of a Jewish state and did not earn foreign exchange for Germany, while draining goods from the German economy. The agreement's staunchest supporters were the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Exchange Control Office. But the Haavara activities were not terminated until the outbreak of World War II, the reason being that Germany's attitude on this question had been largely dictated by domestic considerations, which were the promotion of Jewish emigration.

A highly publicized controversy over the Haavara agreement arose within the Jewish community, but within the Zionist leadership its proponents prevailed. The agreement did raise moral questions for the Yishuv, namely was it proper to have dealings with the persecutors of German Jewry and did the agreement benefit the National Socialists and prolong
the Nazi regime? There is no doubt that the Yishuv stood on weak moral grounds when it concluded the Haavara agreement. Much of world Jewry was boycotting German products and also sought the support of non-Jews in this matter. The Yishuv's position was thus not only detrimental to a united Jewish front in the boycott of German products, but helped undermine efforts to obtain the support of various nations in this effort. The argument that the agreement helped prolong the Nazi regime by aiding the German economy and reducing unemployment had some validity, but it is doubtful that trade with Palestine through the Haavara was large enough to have an impact on the German economy sufficient to alter the course of events. On the other hand Haavara provided major economic benefits to the Yishuv. The massive infusion of transfer capital to Palestine helped build up the country. It also enabled German Jews to rescue parts of their fortunes and thus encouraged some to migrate to Palestine. Special precautions were taken to protect infant industries in Palestine from German dumping by preventing the import of the types of goods manufactured locally. The agreement's benefits far outweighed its drawbacks, and where dealings with the National Socialists were necessary to promote the emigration
of German Jews, and in the final analyses save Jewish lives, they had some moral justification as well.

In comparison to other areas of refuge, Palestine had a number of special features. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate of the League of Nations gave international recognition to the special role Palestine should play in absorbing Jewish immigrants. Jewish tradition and hope was also strongly connected with this land, the historical homeland of the Jewish people. Jews accounted for approximately one third of Palestine's population and were able to do more to integrate these refugees into the Yishuv than other Jewish communities could in their respective countries. Although some feelings against the refugees may have existed even among Jews, it was not of the intensity or scope that could be found in other areas of the world. Arab opposition to, and consequent British restriction of, immigration were not directed against the German refugees as such, but were dictated by the aforementioned general British policy considerations, i.e. British efforts to appease the Arabs who were opposed to any Jewish immigration. Palestine which saw rapid economic development, partly stimulated by the immigrants themselves, was able to absorb the
German olim. Most of the western countries were suffering from economic depression and unemployment and were therefore reluctant to admit refugees. Anti-Semitic propaganda by the National Socialists also had its effect in some of these countries which consequently put more severe restrictions on Jewish immigration. Some German emigrants chose Palestine in the belief that it was the only area free of anti-Semitism.

The European countries bordering on Germany were generally only transit areas, while settlement in overseas countries other than Palestine was desirable for the German emigrants only in the developed parts of the world which could absorb substantial numbers of middle class businessmen and professionals. The United States, South America, and Palestine were the areas in which most of Germany's Jewish emigrants settled. Restrictions in all three areas prevented the absorption of a more substantial part of German Jewry there.

The Jewish organizations, and more specifically the Jewish Agency with its Palestine Office in Berlin and its Central Bureau for the Settlement of German Jews helped organize this migration and direct it to Palestine. It acted as the representative of the Jewish people in questions pertaining to Palestine and dealt with both the German and British authorities in matters concerning the
migration of German Jews to Palestine. The policy of the Jewish Agency was governed by practical as well as humanitarian considerations. The former predominated at least until Austria was occupied by the Germans, at which point younger able-bodied immigrants no longer received preference over others. The Jewish Agency was open to criticism by those denied category C (labour) certificates, for the British authorities placed them in the Agency's charge for distribution. This criticism was not entirely unwarranted, for political considerations played a role in the determination of how these certificates were granted. Although the Jewish Agency denied that an applicant's past Zionist affiliation was taken into account, it defended the desirability of requiring an applicant to have at least a minimal knowledge of Hebrew. In the case of German Jews at least, a young agriculturist or artisan with some knowledge of Hebrew was very likely to have been a Zionist. In this respect, albeit indirectly, the Zionists did receive some preference. Unfortunately internal politics within the Yishuv also had an influence on the granting of certificates. The group affiliation of young immigrant pioneers was taken into account when they were brought to settlements in Palestine. Thus, if a group affiliated with Mapai had been
brought to the country, those affiliated with other political movements would demand that the next batch of certificates be granted to them. This meant that the more urgent cases did not always receive first consideration. The New Zionists (Revisionists) who were in dispute with the old socialist dominated Zionist party, felt particularly discriminated against both in matters of certificated and fund allocation. Their criticism was not entirely unjustified and points out some of the shortcomings of the Jewish Agency's policy. In the distribution of the category C certificates German Jews consistently received a smaller percentage of certificates than their representation in the total immigration warranted. In defence of the Jewish Agency it must be noted that it did not have a completely free hand in the distribution of category C certificates. The British authorities did lay down some guidelines. These stressed the employability of the immigrants and favored younger olim with agricultural or artisan experience.

In line with its policy that as many Jews as possible be settled on the land, the Jewish Agency concentrated its resources on constructive absorption. It allocated only 6 per cent of its total outlay for social welfare, and the remainder it spent on integrating the
immigrants into the economy of the Yishuv. Although practical from an economic point of view it was a harsh policy which provided little relief for the new arrivals. These had largely to rely on their own means even during their most difficult period between the time of their arrival in Palestine and the time they found employment.

In order to analyze the absorption process of the German Jewish immigration we must consider a number of factors. These include: 1. motivation for migration; 2. the role the immigrating group expects to play; 3. the new values accepted by it; 4. the possibilities open to the new immigrants; 5. the role expected of them by the new country. Then we must see to what degree the conditions for full absorption were met by the German Jewish immigrants in the perspective of the following criteria: a.) acculturation; b.) personal adjustment of the immigrants; c.) dispersion of the immigrants as a group within the various spheres of the absorbing society.

The motivation of the German olim was described as a negative one (push migration). By contrast the pioneers of the preceding aliyot came to Palestine with an idealistic program which enabled them to change their social roles
and cultural values more readily. German Jewry had developed strong attachments to the German culture. This included its language, literature, and status symbols. The motivation for migration in this instance conformed with a negative predisposition to change. For unlike the pioneers of the previous aliyot they did not come with the ambition to revitalize the Hebrew language and literature, nor alter the social structure of their society. Their occupational aspirations, unlike those of the earlier pioneers, were not directly connected with the national goals of the Yishuv, but with their personal economic security and the status symbols of their former homeland. Thus even the German Jews who settled on the land in middle class settlements often did so because the purchase of a home and plot of land presented the most secure way to invest their limited capital. Although Palestine offered them freedom and a refuge, it lacked the economic and cultural possibilities of pre-Hitler Germany. These immigrants, who sought to rebuild the lives they had known in Germany, had to do so on a much more modest scale and with little prospect of ever attaining their former position. For, certainly in their lifetime, and even after, Palestine would not be able to provide the opportunities, either in scope or in scale, that
Germany offered. The German Jewish industrialist could find neither the labour force nor the market formerly available to him in Germany. The banker could hardly hope to handle transactions of the size he may have been accustomed to. Numerous professionals could hardly expect to continue to work in their fields which were rapidly reaching the saturation point in the Yishuv. They came to a small country which had neither the population nor resources comparable to their former homeland.

The institutional structure of the Yishuv was created by immigrants and it remained in its formative stage during the first aliyot. The early immigrants who settled in Palestine had no fixed institutional framework into which they could be absorbed. The members of the first aliyot who had a strong cultural affinity created the institutional structure of the Yishuv. By 1933, when the German Aliyah started, such a structure had emerged. The German olim had to integrate themselves into an institutional structure which was not of their making and which was not conceived with them in mind.* The kibbutzim, the small-holders settlements, and the Histadruth were oriented towards a working class society. The German immigrants were mostly from the middle class. The existing institutions were helpful in

* Youth Aliyah was an exception for it was initially organized to deal with the problems of German Jewish youth in Hitler's Germany.
integrating these immigrants into the working class. On the other hand they did not always meet the needs of the German olim and new institutional forms had to be established for some of these immigrants. This is evident from the middle class settlements, described in this work, which were designed to meet the specific needs of some of the German olim.

The extent of institutional concentration and dispersion serves as one indicator of absorption. The early aliyot were characterized by a large degree of dispersion within the various spheres of society. The population distribution in the various settlements was based more on membership in a given pioneer movement than in a particular immigration wave or country of origin. The immigration of German Jews did result in the establishment of settlements almost exclusively of that group.

While the early Yishuv never developed political parties on the basis of specific immigrant groups, a predominantly Central European and German Aliyah Chadasha party was formed. The Landsmannshaften of the German Jews on the one hand assisted in the economic absorption of the German immigrants, and on the other hand helped perpetuate certain aspects of their former way of life.

Youth Aliyah, founded in 1934, contributed
immeasurably to the absorption of a considerable part of the German immigration. Through this institution German youths were educated in agricultural settlements with a view to having them settle permanently on the land. To a lesser extent others received technical training in an urban setting. Youth Aliyah provided the framework within which German youth was introduced to the pioneer ideology of the early Yishuv and thus facilitated their assimilation by enabling them to become active members of the pioneering communities. It also provided for a wide dispersion of these immigrants which aided in their absorption. This institution, through the utilization of German Jewish madrichim, at least during the early transitional stages, and through its various other sociological and psychological considerations, was of immense help in the personal adjustment of these youths. On the whole, Youth Aliyah was particularly suitable for the promotion of a productive integration of German Jewish youth into the Yishuv. It provided these young immigrants with the education and to a certain degree indoctrination necessary for them to become part of the Jewish community of Palestine. A home environment of the type their parents could have provided would only have perpetuated the German culture and social values. Through the institutions of Youth Aliyah they were taught the Hebrew language, the geography of Palestine, and the history of the Jewish people. In all these areas of
knowledge German Jewry was particularly lacking. The placement of these youths in the households of Jewish farmers in the smallholders settlements introduced them both to a new way of life and culture and played an important role in integrating these youths into the Yishuv.

A majority of Youth Aliyah's graduates went into the productive endeavors for which their training was intended. They did come to feel themselves as part of the Jewish people and nation. This attests to the general success of Youth Aliyah. On the other hand problems did arise and Youth Aliyah had some drawbacks. Initially there was an overemphasis on agricultural training and an underutilization of the skills acquired by some of these youths in Europe. Some of the settlements in which they were placed provided inadequate schooling, and in other cases Youth Aliyah institutions were unable to satisfy the needs of some of their charges. The problems of adolescence were compounded by these youths' separation from their parents.

Without minimizing its deficiencies Youth Aliyah may still be described as a success, and although there was room for improvement we must recognize that it was a young organization lacking in experience. There was also no alternate institution to undertake the task of integrating these young German Jews into the Yishuv.
The mass immigration of German Jews did result in a measure of institutional segregation and a tendency towards isolation in clusters. This applied specifically to those who had reached adulthood before their migration. The younger generation, and foremost those who came through Youth Aliyah, assimilated more readily.

The retirement homes of the German and Central European Jews serve as continuous evidence that self-imposed institutional segregation persists among the older generation of German olim. The dispersion of the German olim within the various spheres of the absorbing society was thus shown to be incomplete, particularly where it applied to those who immigrated as adults.

The marriage pattern is a valuable indicator of the immigrant's propensity to integrate. As for the second generation, over fifty per cent of those who answered my questionnaire indicated that their children married persons of non-German Jewish origin.

Acculturation implies the learning of the various norms and customs of the absorbing society. This includes language, dress, and modes of behavior. The immigrant must conform to these sets of behavior so that he will continue to behave in accordance with them. The acculturation of the first generation of adult German Jewish immigrants was limited in scope. The German language remained a major means of communication, so much so that out of 117 who were asked whether they spoke German in Israel, all but one re-
plied in the affirmative. Of the German Jewish immigrants only a very few had a command of the Hebrew language at the time of their arrival, and even thirty years later many had still not mastered it. The Germans' linguistic shortcoming presented a barrier between them and the rest of the Yishuv. It even led to resentment, for the Hebraization of the Yishuv was a major tenet of Zionist philosophy. The use of German compounded the resentment, for many sections of the Yishuv identified everything German with Hitler.

To the German Jews their own practices and mannerisms were so important that change became extremely difficult for them. The German culture was deeply ingrained in them and they were convinced of its superiority and were thus most reluctant to part with it. These immigrants had also come from a society that had reached the highest level of technology and thus all the comforts that this implied. They wanted to transpose these to Palestine, as well as their exaggerated expectations in matter of civility. These expectations were unrealistic in a land of pioneers and often led to their ridicule by the latter. Their formal mode of dress and titular status symbols all smacked of bourgeoisie standards and clashed with the open shirts, khaki trousers, and informal behavior of the pioneers of the earlier aliya. In Germany many of the Jews were accustomed to look down on their East
European brethren. Despite a lack of Jewish education, which hindered their assimilation, they considered the East European Jews to be lagging in culture, and were therefore less inclined to make up for their own shortcomings. Their stubborn adherence to their former roles, habits, and modes of behavior was interpreted as a lack of mental flexibility on their part by the rest of the Yishuv.

Although the use of the German language has continued both orally and in print, i.e. in German language newspapers, a marked change has occurred in other respects. In dress the German Jews conformed to the general style of the Yishuv and in day-by-day behavior they have also adjusted, but to a lesser degree. The personal adjustment of the individual to his occupational role in the country of immigration is related, as was previously stated, to the motivation for immigration. They did not come to create a new society but rather sought security within the framework of the existing social structure. In this respect the German Aliyah was much the same as all the subsequent aliyyot. The most pervasive motive was the attainment of economic and social security within the existing Jewish community. The motivation of the first aliyyot, with minor exceptions, found no counterpart in later immigrations. The need to change occupations may have involved giving up a pattern of behavior, a mode of dress, a style of living, and other amenities that symbolize social sta-
tus. Although in distinguishing between a positive and negative disposition to change on the part of German Jews one must judge individual cases, some general conclusions about the German Aliyah can be drawn. The German youth was absorbed into the working class of Palestine without great difficulty. The middle aged middle class immigrants presented the greatest problem where occupational adjustment was concerned. Large numbers of professionals came to Palestine and had no alternative but to change their occupation. Occupational readjustment meant for many of these refugees not only a lower standard of living, but also a social setback. This was a particularly severe problem for German Jews for whom social positions and titles played such an important role. Their negative response to this change in some cases led to suicide, particularly among middle-aged German immigrants. The high incidence of such cases induced some reporters to describe it as of epidemic proportions.

Another indicator of the German olims' unwillingness, or inability, to change was their persistence in having their children pursue academic careers. With the development of modern Israel opportunities for German Jews to continue in their professions increased. This facilitated a more satisfactory absorption of these immigrants. Not all have been able to return to their former profession, and resentment persists. This resentment is often given expression by a criticism of almost everything in modern Israel.
Many of those who migrated in the 19th century from Europe to the United States, Canada, and Australia did not plan to settle there on a permanent basis. Some sought to acquire a sum sufficient to purchase a farm or establish themselves in another manner in their homeland. Many actually did return. Remigration, or return migration, was not a viable alternative for the German olim for as long as Germany remained under National Socialist control.

The question of group identification was less pressing for the migrants of the 19th century than it was for the German olim. The latter were expected by the Yishuv to identify with it completely, for migration to Palestine implied a commitment to the Jewish people. This was a particularly difficult adjustment for the German immigrants who, up to the Hitler era by and large saw themselves primarily as part of the German nation. Even if they harbored thoughts of returning to Germany in better days, they could not express them openly. By contrast the European migrants who went overseas to areas other than Palestine were not forced to make an immediate commitment to their new countries. In their case remigration was not burdened with the implications of yored (one who goes down)
and an immediate change in group identification was not expected of them. If they chose to remain in their new homeland it was often left to a succeeding generation to undergo this change. Even in the case of migration where religious freedom rather than economic betterment was the primary motivating factor the question of group identification presented no special problems, as the early migrations of the Puritans and Mennonites to North America show. These never intended to return to their former homelands but continued to identify with their own particular group wherever they settled. Those German Jews who remained in Israel came to identify with their new homeland, though not without a good measure of criticism. This was indicated by their answers in the questionnaire and by their conversations with the author. Of all 116 who replied to the question "do you want to leave Israel?" not one answered in the affirmative. Of those questioned on their attitude towards Israel an overwhelming majority gave a positive response, although many expressed criticism of various aspects of Israeli society.

Borrie described the German settlement in Australia as an example of economic absorption and cultural segregation. He ascribes responsibility for preservation of Deutschtum to the German-language press, German clubs and the Lutheran church, the last being the primary factor. The German-language press continued its existence throughout the 19th and into the 20th
century. This Borrie interpreted to be as much a symptom of an interest in German ideas and ideals as a cause. Although the press influenced its readers, it could only exist as long as there was a market for it. Borrie discovered that later German arrivals to Australia, on whom the Lutheran church had little influence, still retained a strong attachment to their nation and had a consciousness of its impending greatness. By contrast he found that the Italians who migrated to Australia did not harbor the same sentimental attachment to their ancestral homeland. It thus seems that the Germans' attachment to their nation and culture was a particularly strong one. The example of the German immigrants in Brazil gives additional weight to this theory. Of all the groups that settled in that country the Germans resisted assimilation most stubbornly. They took pride in their German heritage, their German schools, and their way of life. In the German settlements created in and around Blumenau in the middle of the 19th century seventy five per cent still spoke German before World War II. Communication with them in Portuguese was difficult.\(^1\) In a law aimed chiefly at the Germans, the Brazilian government prohibited instruction in any language but Portuguese. Although

this law was passed in 1938, as late as 1956 German schools were to be found in Brazil, staffed by German teachers. These were unlike the schools for British and North American children which followed the Brazilian system. The German schools taught in German and their curriculum was completely divorced from the Brazilian educational system. This tenacious attachment to the German culture, if not nation, was also characteristic of German Jewry. Among the types of migrations, family immigration seems to be the most stable. Personal identification is maintained within the family unit. "Stability of migration is thus often viewed as a function of the proportion of women among the migrants." This characteristic may also have a role in preserving the immigrants' old culture, for family life tends to isolate the immigrant more from his new environment than is the case with the individual immigrants. Migrating families are more likely to transplant their domestic lifestyle than are individual immigrants. There is a greater tendency to perpetuate the old culture within the intimacy of the home. This pertains as well for the second generation where the offsprings are introduced to their parents' culture and lifestyle. A most

1 Ibid., p. 87.
* For additional details see Milbank Memorial Fund, Selected Studies of Migration Since World War II. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1958.
obvious expression of this was the continued use of the German language made in the homes of the adult immigrants as well as its introduction to the second generation. The widespread knowledge of German among children of German olim tends to confirm this. An immigration of individuals is also more likely to result in an intercultural marriage pattern if only because of the imbalance between males and females within that group.

The German Jews who came to the United States during the 1930s came to a developed country. Although beset with economic problems, it could offer opportunities commensurable with what they were accustomed to, and with even greater potentialities. Socially and culturally the United States provided an environment, though quite different from that of Germany, still much closer to it than that of Palestine. For the United States was basically a product of Western civilization. In the United States there were cities that could compare with those of Germany in size and sophistication, while Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa must have seemed provincial to former residents of Berlin or Hamburg. This was not an inconsiderable factor, for German Jewry was highly urbanized.

Palestine of the 1930s was still very much a product of Middle Eastern society, while the Yishuv itself was East European in character and quite alien to much of assimilated German Jewry. In this new environment three languages predominated: Hebrew, Arabic,
and English. Practically none of the German Jews spoke Arabic, few knew Hebrew, and many had only a very limited knowledge of English. There were also climatic and geographic factors. The United States had much in common with Germany in this regard. By contrast, Palestine was largely hot and arid and had little similarity with what these immigrants had known.

The German Jews who played an active role in the highly developed German economy were able to transplant or start new industries in Palestine and other countries in which they settled, e.g. England. This was not an entirely unprecedented phenomenon. The Huguenots who left France during the 16th and 17th centuries, brought industries to wherever they settled. Similarly the Puritans, and later Jewish immigrants from Russia, created industries in the United States, the latter introducing the ready-made clothing industry.

All the aforementioned cases concern national, religious, or other minorities whose migration was due to factors other than their economic situation. The German Jews who migrated from a highly developed to an underdeveloped country, such as Palestine, were in a situation unlike others involved in such a population movement. Certainly they could not be compared with the colonial settlements of the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola where a surplus peasant population was settled on new land and where they remained under the rule of the mother country.
The British colonies in Asia and Africa attracted individuals with specific purposes in mind. Those who went sought to advance themselves through business ventures, such as plantations, trading companies, or mines. Others went as administrators and colonial officials, while remaining British subjects. By contrast, the German Jews who came to Palestine in the 1930s found a country in which the higher administrative posts were occupied by the British, while those next in line for leadership were members of previous aliyot. Their economic situation and social position experienced a marked decline, and their relations with their former homeland were severed.

The German immigration was better organized than those which preceded it. The Central Bureau was established as a department of the Jewish Agency for that purpose. On the other hand it was largely an immigration of individuals rather than of groups. It was also the first massive non-Eastern European migration to Palestine. Thereafter other Central European, and later Middle-Eastern and North-African migrations followed. The German immigrants thus found themselves at the edge of this change, to which not only they, but also the predominantly East European Vi-
shuv had to adjust.
The German Jewish immigration represented a rather substantial influx of a different cultural group into a relatively small Jewish community. At the start of the 1930s the Jewish population was around 170,000, and at the end of the decade it had grown to around 460,000. Within that time period approximately 60,000 German Jews migrated to Palestine. The relative size of this migration would by itself assure that they have an impact on the Yishuv, but the composition of this aliyah was as important as its size.

The German Jewish immigrants included a considerable number of capitalists accounting for 48 percent of all immigrants to Palestine in that category between 1933 and 1938. This amounted to twice their share of the total immigration in that time period. These immigrants, through the Haavarah agreement, and outside of it, brought considerable capital to Palestine (over LP 8 million through Haavarah alone). Also forty one percent of the German Jewish immigrants belonged to the liberal professions, representing a potentially very valuable resource. By itself the capital brought to the country by these immigrants cannot be used as a measure of their economic contribution. The way this capital was invested is an additional indicator of their economic contribution. They invested a substantial proportion of their capital in industry and handicraft (26 per cent for 1933-1934) and 17 percent for the same years in commerce. By contrast their
predecessors of the Fourth Aliyah invested only 5 percent each in industry and commerce. These German olim helped raise standards of production through the introduction of modern European techniques.

The German Jews found conditions in Palestine much more favorable than their predecessors. Had the immigrants of the earlier aliyot not developed the country to the extent that they had done, it is doubtful whether the German immigrants would have been able to invest their substantial resources so effectively. An agricultural basis had been established and agricultural settlements developed to a point where they could absorb new immigrants. Opportunities for export in various fields had increased as a result of prior work in the Yishuv. The growth of Jerusalem and Haifa, as well as the founding of Tel-Aviv, provided the German immigrants with increased opportunities to establish themselves.

The presence of German Jewry in the Yishuv was felt immediately upon their arrival, if only because of the impact of their numbers on the small Jewish community of Palestine. The early arrivals brought with them large quantities of belongings and inundated the major cities with German products. They attempted to transpose their former lifestyle to the Yishuv, especially to the cities of Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem. Western European style stores were opened by them, as well as modern restaurants and hotels. They introduced a new way
of life to the cities of Palestine, i.e. middle class and bourgeoisie in nature. Their contribution to the arts and to higher education was of major proportions. They comprised a substantial part of both the faculties and student bodies in the Hebrew University and the Technion. In the graphic as well as the performing arts their contribution enriched the Yishuv. German olim were responsible for the creation of the Israel philharmonic orchestra. They provided a majority of its performers as well as a considerable part of the audience. By contrast the previous aliyot put little emphasis on the arts. Their major efforts in this direction were concentrated on the revival of the Hebrew language and literature. With the passage of time Israel was able to utilize more fully the large reservoir of professionals among the German Jewish immigrants. This contribution, although a more gradual one, may have been even more important than the initial contribution of German Jewry to the Yishuv.

The German olim found in Palestine not only a refuge which saved their lives but also a homeland with which they were encouraged to identify. By contrast in Germany no matter how hard they tried to identify with that nation they were always considered a foreign body.
APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of children per family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Did you have other dependents in Germany, e.g. parents; if so, what was their age?

Yes 86  No 31

5. When did you decide to leave Germany?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. What triggered your decision to leave Germany?

- Zionism: 9
- Does not remember: 1
- Nazi Persecution: 102

* 3 specified Kristallnacht.
  1 specified the 1935 Nuremberg Laws.

7. What was your age at the time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>24</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>26</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|       | 45| 46| 47  | 48  | 49  | 50  | 51  | 52  | 53  | 54  | 55  | 56  | 57  | 58  | 59  | 65
|       | 4 | 6 | 2  | 4  | 1  | 6  | 2  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  |    |    |
8. When did you leave Germany?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1937 | 8
1938 | 15
1939 | 23
1940 | 3

9. Did you have any alternative to Palestine?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not consider</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any alternative</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. If yes please state in order of preference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. and Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa and Holland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. and England</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, Belgium, England, U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France and Tunisia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden and U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland and U.S.A.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina and U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 44
11. Did you go directly from Germany to Palestine?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Went Directly</th>
<th>Did not Go Directly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 went directly to Palestine in 1932.
** 2 just passed through other countries.

12. If not where did you go first?

- France .......................................................... 3
- Lithuania ....................................................... 1
- Rumania ......................................................... 2
- Lebanon .......................................................... 3
- Switzerland ..................................................... 1
- Holland and Belgium .......................................... 1
- Meran, Tirol .................................................... 1
- Argentina ........................................................ 2
- Shanghai .......................................................... 1
- France and Tunisia ............................................. 1
- England and Australia ........................................ 1
- Sweden ............................................................ 1
- Latvia .............................................................. 1
- Czechoslovakia .................................................. 1
- Switzerland and Italy ......................................... 1
- Bulgaria ........................................................... 1
- France and Luxemburg .......................................... 1
- Poland ............................................................. 3
- England ........................................................... 1
- Persia .............................................................. 2
- Belgium ............................................................ 4
- Italy ............................................................... 1
- Thailand ........................................................... 2
- Cuba, Belgium, and France .................................... 2
- Holland ............................................................ 2
- Lithuania, Poland, Austria, and Italy ...................... 1
- Holland, Switzerland, and Italy ............................ 1
- Total .............................................................. 42
13. By whose help did you emigrate, privately, or through organizations?

Privately 89
With help of an organization 26

14. If you had children did they precede you to Palestine?

Yes 20
Some preceded, some did not 3
Does not apply 60
No or children born in Israel 34 117

15. What did your children do when they arrived in Palestine?

Worked in kibbutz .......................... 9
Worked as photographer ...................... 1
Went to school ................................. 24
Went to Kindergarten ...................... 5
Was foreign correspondent ............. 1
worked as musician .................... 1
worked as maid ...................... 1
Architect ...................................... 1
Silversmith .................................... 1
Worked in agriculture .................. 4
Went to university ....................... 1
worked in factory ................... 1
Business ...................................... 1
Worked in family store ................. 1
Bus driver ................................... 2
Worked in bank ................................. 1
Went to India as physician ............. 1
Worked in university ..................... 1
Worked as meteorologist .............. 1
Worked (did not specify) .............. 6

I was a child 66 does not apply
16. Were any of your children self supporting in Germany?
   Too young 12
   No 36
   Does not apply 66
   Yes 8

17. Are you or any of your children college graduates?
   No 67
   Yes 51 Individual or offspring one said husband

18. What languages did you speak?
   German 118
   English 78
   French 45
   At least some Hebrew 40
   Polish 2
   Dutch 2
   Spanish 1
   Jewish 3
   Italian 3
   Czech 1
   Swedish 1
   Latin 3

19. What Jewish Newspapers did you read in Germany?
   59 Jüdische Rundschau
   7 Centralverein Zeitung
   28 read none.
   7 did not answer
   The remainder read a variety of other Jewish newspapers many of them local ones.
20. Where did you settle in Israel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ramataim then Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karkur, Haifa, Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karkur</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Hashavim, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Hashavim</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RASSCO Settlement, Kiryat Shemesh, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa then Jerusalem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahalal, Naharia, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv, Haifa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, Haifa</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa, Naharia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa, Kfar Ata</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv, Rechovot, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naharia, Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acco</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias, Naharia, Jerusalem, Kiryat Bialik</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rechovot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petach Tikvah</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rechovot, Petach Tikvah, Rishon Lezion, Jerusalem, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzlia, Ramat Gan, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Bialik, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Tivon, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Amal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Pines</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Shemen, Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat Galim, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Saba, Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz Degania, Kibbutz Chanita</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz Ramat Rachel, Jerusalem</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz Chanita</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Harod, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz Maabarot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz (did not specify), Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvutzat Kinneret, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibbutz then village, then Jerusalem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pardes Chana, Haifa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 115
21. Did you settle privately at first, or in a camp?

Privately 95
Camp or beit olim 10
Kibbutz 11

22. Did you have any private means, or relatives in Israel who helped you?

Had private means or help from friends or relatives ......................... 73
Had no help but worked and were on their own 36
Had help from Jewish Agency .................. 1

Some did not apply, e.g. those who came on Youth Aliyah.

23. What was your average income in Germany?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark per Month</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>250-300</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-500</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-600</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>600</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660-1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
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</tr>
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<td>950</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1,250</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 said good income.
13 said that they were well to do.
2 said low income.
2 said average income.
24. Were you able to bring a substantial part of your property from Germany with you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost everything</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everything</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some things</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only L 1,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A small part</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 percent of property</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If they had they could have</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not have any</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Could you have taken more, less, or the same amount of property to another country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Could not take more</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could take more</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only to Palestine could take L 1,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing to any other country</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. What was your occupation in Germany?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saleslady in brother's store</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in father's store</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealer in gold and silver</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managed a business</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in my father's office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book dealer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookbinder and leather worker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in instrument factory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank agent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher and governess</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agronomist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager of Schocken Publishing Company</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a sausage factory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten teacher</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a mens' clothing store</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplier employed by the government</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiotherapist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nurse .................................................. 1
Had none .............................................. 2
Dealer in flour ........................................ 1
Assisted husband (physician) ..................... 1
Librarian in an industrial enterprise .......... 1
Trustee executor ..................................... 1
Archivist and historian ............................ 1
Receptionist .......................................... 1
Had a shoe store .................................... 1
Assisted at the Jewish Museum in Berlin .... 1
Secretary .............................................. 5
Journalist ............................................. 1
Arts and crafts ...................................... 2
Concert singer and teacher ....................... 1
Lawyer's assistant .................................. 1
Housewife ............................................ 19
Lived with parents .................................. 1
Buyer and store manager .......................... 1
Jewelry dealer ........................................ 1
Had women's saloon ................................ 1
Worked in husband's business .................... 1
Had a business in ladies garments ............. 1
Worked in automobile factory .................... 1
Foreman in factory ................................ 1
Office manager ...................................... 1
Laboratory assistant ............................... 1
Worked in husband's store ....................... 1
Worked in office .................................... 1
Clerk .................................................. 2
Typographer .......................................... 1
Rabbi .................................................. 1
Physician ............................................. 2
Dentist ............................................... 1
Businessman ......................................... 12
Social worker ....................................... 5
Dental assistant ..................................... 1

Some added husband's occupation

Children's doctor ................................... 1
Physician ............................................. 4
Had his own store ................................... 1
Had a clothing factory ............................. 1
Shoemaker .......................................... 1
Bookbinder .......................................... 1
Dealer in metals .................................... 1
Building official ................................... 1
Correspondent ...................................... 1
Had a cigarette store ............................. 1
Had a silversmith factory ......................... 1
Had a shoe factory .................................. 1
Lawyer .............................................. 1
27. Did you continue in that field within the first 2 years after your arrival in Palestine?

Yes 38
No 73

28. Did you belong to a Zionist organization in Germany?

Yes 57 1 was too young.
No 59

29. If yes when did you join?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1899</td>
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<td>1907</td>
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<td>1913</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before W.W. I</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>1920's</td>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>1927</td>
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<td>1928</td>
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<td>1929</td>
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<td>1930</td>
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<td>1932</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Before 1933</td>
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<td>1933</td>
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<td>1934</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1</td>
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30. What congregation did you belong to?

- Halle a/S .......................................................... 1
- Northeim in H ................................................. 1
- Fulda ............................................................... 1
- Liegnitz ........................................................... 1
- Berliner Grossens Gemeinde ................................. 1
- Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Dessau-Anhalt ................ 1
- Marktfreid am Main ........................................... 1
- Dresdener Kultusgemeinde .................................... 2
- Jüdische Gemeinde Sailingen-Baden .......................... 1
- Beuthen a/Schles .............................................. 1
- Essen a/Ruhr ................................................... 1
- Jüdische Kultusgemeinde Wiesbaden ........................... 1
- Liberale Gemeinde Frankfurt a/Main .......................... 1
- Siklawe in Pommern ............................................ 1
- Gleiwitz-Breslau .............................................. 1
- Gleiwitz a/S ................................................... 1
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<td>Köln a/Rhein</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waldenburg in Schleswig</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frankfurt a/Main (Austrittsgemeinde)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friedenstempel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jugendbewegung</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congregation of Rabbi Dr. Emil Cohen</td>
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<td>Israelitische Kultusgemeinde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saar C.S.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mörchingen in Baden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rostenburg-Breslau</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Würzburg</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
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<td>Westphalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frankfurt a/Main</td>
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<td>Frankfurt Grossgemeinde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agudah Frankfurt a/Main</td>
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<td>Jüdische Religionsgesellschaft Frankfurt</td>
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<td>Allgemeine Jüdische Gemeinde Frankfurt a/Main</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hauptgemeinde Frankfurt</td>
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<td>Frankfurt a/Oder, later Berlin</td>
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<td>Berlin</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.V. Berlin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berliner Jüdische Kultusgemeinde</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin, Lindenstrasse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberale Kultusgemeinde, Berlin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahadat Yisracl, Berlin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Habonim, Berlin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin then Frankfurt</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berliner Reformgemeinde</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jüdische Gemeinde Berlin, later Frankfurt a/Main</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danzig</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heilbronn</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breslau</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kassel and Breslau</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Königsberg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelitisch Religionsgesellschaft, Stuttgart</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nürnberg and Berlin</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nürnberg Liberale</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emsich a/Rhein</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torpen, Ost Preussen</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saarbrücken</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duisburg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>München</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiesbaden</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fürth in Bayern</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31. Did your German Rabbi, if he survived, ever try to contact you?

Yes 20
No 54
Did not answer 26
Did not apply for others.

32. If your children have married in Israel, did they marry persons of German origin? Otherwise, what was the original nationality of their spouses?

Yes 48
No 63

- Russian 11
- Polish 13
- C.S.R. 1
- American 1
- Israeli born with one parent from Rumania and one from Iraq 1
- Morocco 2
- Rumania 2
- Lithuania 3
- Married in U.S. 1
- Persia 1
- Russian and Polish 1
- Hungarian 3
- Slovakian 1
- English 1
- Dutch 1
- Sephardic 2
- Persian and Bucharan 1
- Poland and Israel 1
- Poland and Uruguay 1
- Czech 2
- Israeli born (did not state where parents came from) 11

Does not apply (have no children or children unmarried etc.) 70
33. In what communal activities do you engage in Israel?

None ................................................................. 73
Ezra Hadatit and Magen David Adom ............... 1
Bar Kochba, Wizo ................................................. 1
Kibbutz ................................................................. 4
Histadruth, Mishmar Ha'am, Wizo .................. 1
Mishmar Ha'am ...................................................... 1
Chalutz ................................................................. 1
Haganah ................................................................. 3
Chevrat chashmal ................................................. 1
Hitachduth Olej Germania, Wizo ................... 1
Youth Aliyah .......................................................... 1
Histadruth Haklalit, Mishmar Ha'am ............... 1
The building of Naharia ........................................ 1
Synagogue ............................................................ 1
Nashim Datiot, Chevra Kadisha ....................... 1
Irgun Nashim Datiot .............................................. 1
Bnei Brith ............................................................ 2
Wizo ....................................................................... 7
Privat Gemeinde .................................................. 1
Hitachduth Olej Germania .................................... 1
Writes for local newspaper in German, was in two wars ........................................ 1
The establishment of Ramat Hashavim, Bnei Brith ............................................... 1
Cancer Society ....................................................... 1
Wizo and Bnei Brith .............................................. 1
Bible teaching and choir singing ...................... 1
Social pedagogical ............................................... 1
Political and economic institutions and organizations .............................................. 1
Teaching adult education ................................... 1
Attended courses and lectures (political, cultural) .............................................. 1
Party member, member of merchants' organization .............................................. 1

34. Are you religiously observant?

Yes ................................................................. 25
No ..................................................................... 68

Religious ......................................................... 3
Traditional ....................................................... 1
Progressive ....................................................... 1
Liberal ............................................................... 11
Not Orthodox but religious .............................. 2
Somewhat ......................................................... 1
35. Did your experience alter your attitude to Judaism, either positively or negatively?
Positive 31
Negative 3
No 70

36. What is your present attitude towards a.) Israel b.) Germany?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Indifferent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>Respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive but critical</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anxious about the</td>
<td>Tolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development of</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel in many ways</td>
<td>Neutral (has some good Christian friends in Germany) 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never returned to Germany but corresponds with German friends 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a way to negotiate with new generation 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estranged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enmity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. Did you participate in underground activities against Hitler?
Yes 1
l organized illegal meetings when adults were taken to concentration camps.
No 101

38. Do you want to leave Israel?
No 116
Lives in Australia 1
39. In Israel, have you maintained contact with people from your native town?

Yes 89
No 20
Hardly 1

Do you find that such as have survived maintain any unity? Or are they all blended in the general Yishuv?

Maintain Unity 51
Blended in the general Yishuv 32

40. Do you speak German in Israel?

Yes 116
No 1
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