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on President Lyndon Johnson, Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the Re-Southernization of the White House
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ABOUT THE REVIEW
Founded in 1991, the Penn History Review is a journal for undergraduate historical research. Published twice a year through the Department of History, the journal is a non-profit publication produced by and primarily for undergraduates. The editorial board of the Review is dedicated to publishing the most original and scholarly research submitted for our consideration. For more information about submissions, please contact us at phrsubmissions@gmail.com.

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On behalf of the editorial board, I am proud to present the Spring 2017 edition of the *Penn History Review*. Since its inception over twenty-five years ago, the PHR has dedicated itself to promoting the work of undergraduate history students at the University of Pennsylvania and schools across the nation. In this issue, you will find a diverse selection of papers that cover topics from nineteenth-century Great Britain to America in the 1960s, addressing questions of diplomacy, identity, and the role of the press. Each one of these works exemplifies the core values of the *Penn History Review*: originality, thorough research, and high-quality writing. We hope that they provide both intellectual engagement and an enjoyable read.

In our first article, “*Art Treasures*” and the Aristocracy: *Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Victorian Britain*, Julia Fine examines the role of the aristocracy in shaping displays of public art in Victorian Britain. Using parliamentary records, newspaper articles, and art-related treatises, she traces the evolution of projects such as the South Kensington Museum and the Great Exhibition of 1851. Her work also explores the work of government committees and reports, indicating that the state was interested in controlling these public displays. The paper reveals that aristocrats still held some sway in the art world, but their influence significantly decreased throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The next piece is David Murrell’s *An Affair on Every Continent: French Reaction to the Foreign Press during the Dreyfus Affair*. The work analyzes the infamous case of Alfred Dreyfus, whose story captivated France and the world from 1894 to 1906. Focusing on the role of the media, Murrell shows that the French government was largely unable to censor discussion of the affair in the international press, although it was successful in suppressing
some theater productions. Moreover, he demonstrates that the affair served as a preview of the mass media pressures that would become prevalent in twentieth-century European states.

The third paper, *Gin, Gentlemen, and Generational Conflict*, was written by Chloé Nurik. Relying on a wide array of primary source documents, she highlights changing notions of masculinity among college students in 1920s America. Her work details the traditions and rituals that were prevalent at schools such as Harvard, Yale, and Penn during this time period. In addition, the article traces the impact of fraternities, college sports, and other influential extracurricular activities. Ultimately, she finds that young men preserved key aspects of character-based masculinity, while also incorporating modernized elements such as physical appearance and social popularity.

In *The Big Stick Split in Two: Roosevelt vs. Hay on the Anglo-American Relationship*, William Shirey provides a compelling analysis of the relationship between the United States and Great Britain during the Roosevelt administration. In particular, he uses the Alaskan boundary crisis of the early 1900s as a lens to examine the diplomatic approaches of Theodore Roosevelt and his Anglophilic secretary of state, John Hay. The paper concludes that President Roosevelt’s belligerence often threatened relations between the two countries, and thus other members of his administration played a more important role in rapprochement than historians have acknowledged.

Our final piece, “*We of the South*: President Lyndon Johnson, Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the Re-Southernization of the White House,” was authored by Simon Panitz from the University of North Carolina. He focuses on the complex relationship between Lyndon Johnson and North Carolina newspaper editor Jonathan Worth Daniels, who worked to help the president carry the Tar Heel State in the election of 1964. Panitz explores the personal backgrounds of both Johnson and Daniels, with particular emphasis on the influence of their fathers. The article also highlights the collaborative nature of the relationship between
the two men, as they worked together to promote civil rights in the 1960s.

In addition to these works, we have included abstracts from the senior honors theses of several Penn history majors. The thesis program is a year-long commitment that requires intensive research, original historical analysis, and tremendous dedication. By including these abstracts, we hope to showcase the outstanding scholarship that these students have produced over the past year. Congratulations to all of the seniors who completed this formidable challenge!

The editorial board would also like to thank a number of people who helped make this edition possible. We are extremely grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate Chair of the History Department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the department’s Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies. Both of them have provided helpful guidance and insight throughout the editing and publishing process. We would also like to thank the faculty members at Penn and other universities who promoted our publication, in addition to the many students who submitted their excellent work for consideration. Thank you as well to each one of our authors, who worked tirelessly to refine their articles for publication.

Lastly, I would like to thank all of our editors for their exceptionally hard work on this edition of the *Penn History Review*. We will greatly miss our graduating seniors, Andrés De Los Ríos, Aaron Mandelbaum, Gregory Olberding, and Dan Thompson. Their enthusiasm for history and commitment to publishing excellent scholarship have helped shape the *PHR* over the past several years. I am especially indebted to Aaron, our Editor-in-Chief *emeritus*, for his invaluable advice and assistance over the course of this semester. Without his dedication, this edition would not have been possible. At the same time, we are excited to welcome on two new editors, Julia Barr and Helen Berhanu, who have already made a positive impact on our journal.
Letter from the Editor

Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors who contributed to this edition of the *Penn History Review*!

Michael J. Torcello
*Editor-in-Chief*
With these words delivered to both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, Queen Victoria opened Parliament on November 11, 1852. Her firm direction to prioritize the encouragement of art was a clear advancement from the early rejections of national collections at the turn of the nineteenth century and the ensuing governmental disinterest in the National Gallery. Victoria’s interest in this subject derived chiefly from her German-born husband, Prince Albert, who was keenly devoted to the state of arts and sciences in the country. His influence was seen in many different events and institutions, including the 1851 Great Exhibition, the South Kensington complex, and the 1857 Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition. Since the end of Charles I’s reign in 1649, the British monarchy had not played a predominant role in either the patronage or display of art; the prince’s active involvement in the cultural realm thus represented a significant shift. This, however, did not indicate a return to elite, aristocratic control. Rather, the prince aligned himself with the emerging professional class, as opposed to the traditional ruling aristocracy, who viewed him with scorn. Indeed, his passion for art was connected with his desire for “the Progress and Improvement of the Public.” To Albert, the
cultivation of popular interest in the arts was of direct value to the development of British industrial craft. This ethos was shared by leading cultural bureaucrats including Henry Cole, who would play a critical role in the emerging South Kensington Museum. New conceptions about the functions of a public art museum and what it should house were developed in this mid-Victorian period, and they were articulated by figures like the prince and professionals such as Cole and the curator J.C. Robinson. The definition of fine art expanded from simply referring to painting and sculpture to encompassing the decorative arts, a term coined by Robinson referring to art objects that are also functional.

As laid out by the 1836 Select Committee, increasing emphasis was placed on the education of the working classes, both for their moral elevation and for the improvement of manufactures. How were these novel concerns embodied in art museums and exhibitions? Did the transfer of control from elite connoisseurs to middle-class experts result in the exclusion of the aristocracy from the art world, or was the presence of the old guard still felt in these institutions? Ultimately, aristocratic control markedly diminished, but did not disappear completely.

**Art, Manufactures, and Increased Access**

The South Kensington Museum, now known as the Victoria & Albert Museum, grew out of two pivotal events: the 1836 Select Committee and the 1851 Great Exhibition. While the Select Committee was instrumental in the reform of the National Gallery in 1855, it also introduced new ideas of what art museums could contain and the effect that they could have. During the proceedings of the 1860 Select Committee on the South Kensington Museum, Henry Cole, the museum’s first director, was asked to describe the origins of its collection. He responded by pointing to the conclusions reached by the committee members in 1836. He quoted directly from the report, referring to its statement that “the Arts have received
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

little encouragement in this country” and that in a nation such as England, where industry reigned supreme, “the connexion between art and manufacture is most important.” The 1836 report also posited that it would be beneficial to develop a system of public galleries and museums of art throughout the country, and the members proposed a specific acquisition policy. Cole quoted from the report, “Besides casts and paintings, copies of the arabesques of Raphael, the designs at Pompeï, specimens from the era of the revival of the arts, everything, in short, which exhibits in combination the efforts of the artist and the workman, should be sought for in the formation of such institutions.” In addition to historical objects, the committee concluded that modern examples should also be included; the combination would educate the viewer in the principles of design. According to Cole, these ideas served as a guide to the South Kensington Museum, and as a result of this report, the first Government School of Design was opened in 1837 in Somerset House, which the Royal Academy had recently vacated. Eventually, through a series of gradual developments, the Schools of Design evolved to create the Museum.

In fact, the Government had already concluded that action needed to be taken to remedy the sorry state of Britain’s manufactures before the report was ultimately published on August 16, 1836. In July of that year, the Board of Trade asked the treasury to provide money for a School of Design. The House of Commons voted in favor of a £1,500 grant for such a project, “with a view to the improvement of the national manufactures.” The president of the Board of Trade, Charles Poulet Thomson, called a meeting of artists and businessmen to become the Council of the School. Thomson was a supporter of free trade and parliamentary reform, and he originally won his seat in Parliament due to the support of the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and the Radical Joseph Hume. However, he staffed the council exclusively with Royal Academicians, which infuriated critics like the MP William Ewart and the artist Benjamin Robert
Haydon, who had not wanted the School to be subservient to the old guard. They set up a rival institution called the Society for Promoting the Arts of Design, which did not help the fledgling Government School. As Cole reported, the first school was housed in Somerset House in London, and more were opened in various manufacturing cities throughout the country. By the 1840s, schools had been opened in Manchester, Birmingham, Coventry, Sheffield, Nottingham, York, Newcastle upon Tyne, and Glasgow. This coincided with increased access to art and art education through a flourishing press; affordable drawing books removed the activity from the realm of elite women and artists and brought it to a wider section of society. Similarly, illustrated periodicals like the *Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge* introduced a new, working class audience to aesthetic and visual culture.

While the original mission of the School did not prioritize building a collection for a museum, various specimens were acquired under the superintendence of the Scottish painter William Dyce, appointed in 1838. His dream, never achieved, was to form a museum of industrial, or ornamental, art. He did, however, acquire plaster casts of antique sculpture; his most important purchase was a copy of Raphael’s fresco paintings of decorative patterns in the Vatican, known as the Loggie. Dyce found the responsibilities of the position too difficult, and another Scottish artist, Charles Heath Wilson, assumed the role. He was determined to build for the students a collection of more than just plaster casts. In one of his annual reports to Parliament, he noted that the School had begun to acquire “real specimens of various kinds of ornamental manufactures, and decorative work” including:

patterns of stained-paper hangings, rich embroidered silks, and tissues of silk and glass, printed calicos, wood carving, ornaments of lacquered embossed metal, models in papier-
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

maché, imitations of antique stained glass from Nuremburg, iron castings in panel work, fancy earthenware, enameled tiles, and several examples of decorative painting, in tempera, enamel, fresco, encaustic, &c., including some valuable coloured tracings from fresco ornaments in Mantua.¹⁸

The report further noted that the School’s collection was open to the public on Mondays between one and three o’clock. However, the rooms in Somerset House did not provide adequate space for the growing number of objects, and thus not only were they generally unavailable to the public, but they were also difficult for the students to view freely.¹⁹

The School of Design was dogged by criticism throughout the first decade of its existence. A letter from a professor in the School, Richard Redgrave (who would later hold a position at the South Kensington Museum), to the prime minister, Lord John Russell, encapsulated many of the critics’ complaints. There was a concern that students were simply being taught to copy; Redgrave wrote that “Nature, as the true source of ornamental design, [should] be more fully insisted upon” and that “the principles of taste only are to be sought in the application of antique art to the wants of the age.” In this way, the originality of British design would be improved, thus increasing the competitiveness of their manufactures in the foreign market.²⁰ He further noted that biennial exhibitions of works of design should be instituted for both the students and the public, as this would “improve their taste.”²¹ Public exhibitions were becoming an integral part of the new educative mission for art. Eventually, critiques of the School led to a Select Committee on the School of Design in 1849, which concluded that the School had not achieved its goal of design improvement. Upon the report’s release, the Art Journal reported that there had been a “universally acknowledged necessity” for such an institution, and yet “the shadow of twelve years’ disheartening failure casts its gloom.”²² However, reforms
were not undertaken at that point. It took one of the most momentous events in the history of Victorian Britain, along with a prominent and influential civil servant, to effect change and transform the fledgling collection of the School of Design into a fully formed public museum.

The Great Exhibition of 1851, or the Universal Exhibition of the Works of all Nations, was the accomplishment of a variety of administrators and civil servants, but credit is largely given to Prince Albert and Henry Cole for both its creation and extension into permanent institutions. Albert came to England already steeped in Saxon traditions of a love for art collecting, and he was well-versed in all of Western art history, ranging from the Gothic to the Mannerist to the pictures popularized during an Italian Grand Tour. In fact, his taste in painting was advanced compared to the elite connoisseurs in control of the National Gallery before Charles Eastlake became director. He also believed that art was intimately connected to the character and industrial wealth of the nation. As such, he was appointed for membership in the rather inactive Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, founded in 1754. He assumed the presidency in 1843, and in 1847 the Society held a successful exhibition of manufactures that was visited by over twenty thousand people. Two more were held in the ensuing years, so a national exhibition featuring wares from around the world was announced for 1851, to be divided into four sections: “Raw Materials of Manufactures – British Colonial, and Foreign, Machinery and Mechanical Inventions, Manufactures, Sculpture and Plastic Art generally.” The focus of this exhibition was not on the fine arts. A Royal Commission was enacted, and it included notables from all walks of life, including members of the aristocracy such as Earl Granville, the Duke of Buccleuch, and the Earl of Ellesmere. Members from both political parties were present, with Whig Prime Minister Lord John Russell as a representative for the Government and Sir Robert Peel for the Tory opposition. Wealthy city dwellers
including Thomas Baring and prominent cultural figures like Eastlake rounded out the group. However, just as the trustees of the National Gallery were rendered largely figureheads after the 1855 reform, the commission members did not play an active role in running the exhibition and simply lent an air of prestige. Albert led an executive committee that included Henry Cole, Charles Wentworth Dilke, Colonel William Reid, and the scientist Lyon Playfair. Funding for the building, known as the Crystal Palace and designed by Joseph Paxton, came from wealthy businessmen committed to free trade, who tended to be more supportive of the prince than the hereditary classes. In particular, £20,000 was guaranteed from the railway contractor Samuel Morton Peto.

The exhibition proved to be a tremendous success, with over six million visitors. The revenue from the entrance fees ranging from one shilling to three pounds left the Commission with a surplus of £186,000. The ability to stage the exhibition was a confirmation of Victorian superiority, and it symbolized the era’s supreme self-confidence. There was, however, great concern over the poor design quality of the British manufactures on exhibit, prompting Ralph Wornum, a lecturer at the School of Design, to write a prize-winning article in the Art Journal, entitled “The Exhibition as a Lesson in Taste,” about the inferiority of English wares. Indeed, the British Quarterly Review remarked, “We have learnt from the Great Exhibition that there are numerous points in which we are inferior to the foreigner, and in some, as in the principles of design, and the science of coloured harmony, we are lamentably ignorant.” France had 1,710 exhibits at the Crystal Palace and collected 1,043 awards, as compared to Britain’s 2,155 awards for 6,861 exhibits. This was a national embarrassment and provided further proof that the School of Design had not achieved its mission. Henry Cole had long campaigned against what he regarded as the failures of the School. From 1849 to 1852, he published the Journal of Design and Manufactures, dedicated to Prince Albert, which claimed to provide
utility to all branches of commerce influenced by ornamental design” and worked to “aid in the reform of our Schools of Design.”34 It stressed Cole’s principles of taste, which rested on the notions that form and function must coexist harmoniously and the beauty of an object must match its purpose.35 Cole had been appointed to the Society for the Encouragement of Arts in 1846, and as such he played a leading role in the exhibition. This experience, in conjunction with his leading advocacy against the School of Design in its current state, made him the natural choice to be appointed as the School’s new head, at a time when its inadequacy had been proven so decisively. Thus, in January 1852, the Board of Trade named him to this new role; this appointment was a critical step toward the creation of the South Kensington Museum.36

Henry Cole was born in 1808 and grew up in a middle-class household. In 1826, his family rented space in a London home owned by the writer Thomas Love Peacock, who had a profound effect on Cole’s later activities and beliefs. He introduced a young Cole to John Stuart Mill and his circle of philosophic radicals, informed by the principles of Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. While he never became a political activist, these Benthamite views, steeped in rhetoric against privilege, suffused his work. In Cole’s first civil service job, he waged a reform campaign against the Tory aristocracy-run Record Commission. Later, in his role as cultural bureaucrat, he consistently prioritized working-class artisans.37 His interest in the art world began in the 1840s, when he published cheap guidebooks to historic sites and museums, including the National Gallery, under the pseudonym Felix Summerly. These were expressly created for the poorer working class; in the National Gallery catalogue, he wrote:

Throngs counted by hundreds of thousands belong far less to the ranks of wealth owning picture galleries than to poverty owning none but this; and that the lowly in station are the chief
visitants, were there no other evidence, seems to be shewn in the small purchase of the official shilling catalogues. Out of every seventy-six comers only one buys a shilling catalogue. Such a scanty sale seems to prove that by far the largest proportion of visitors are those to whom the outlay of twelve-pence is the denial of a dinner, and that a cheaper catalogue is wanted.\textsuperscript{38}

Cole had a clear interest in widening cultural access to a greater section of society. He started the company Felix Summerly’s Art Manufactures, which produced household goods such as tea sets and mugs, designed by artists with whom he shared design principles, including Richard Redgrave, so that they adhered to strict standards of taste.\textsuperscript{39}

Upon his appointment to the School of Design, Cole immediately embarked on its reorganization. He believed the School should become its own department under the purview of the Board of Trade, to be called the Department of Practical Art. Cole became the superintendent of general management and Redgrave was named art advisor. Parliament granted a budget of £10,050, and its first report, published in 1853, laid out the Department’s goals. The first two promoted general and advanced instruction in art for all classes of society, in order to advance correct taste for the producers and consumers of goods.\textsuperscript{40} To that end, the Department began to teach elementary art in its branch schools across the country, and it also instructed teachers so that they could impart their skills to students. According to the historian Janet Minihan, with this system, “Art had at last lost its official status as a polite, aristocratic skill and received significant acknowledgement of its importance in general education.”\textsuperscript{41} The third goal, and the one most important to the development of the South Kensington, sought “the Application of the Principles of Technical Art to the improvement of manufactures, together with the establishment of Museums, by which all classes might be induced to investigate those common principles of taste, which may be traced in the works of excellence of all ages.”\textsuperscript{42} The School headquarters moved from Somerset House to Marlborough House in Pall Mall, which was used as a minor royal residence and had more room for the display of collections. Prince Albert granted permission to use this space, as long as the Department aligned itself with his goals for the future of the 1851 Exhibition. He envisaged a set of permanent institutions that would apply the principles of art and science to industry; this was to be an educational mission for the working classes. The Royal Commission was extended after the conclusion of the exhibition in order to administer the surplus profits, which were used to secure a plot of land just south of Hyde Park, finally completed in 1858. It was christened as South Kensington, and numerous museums for the arts and sciences would be set
there. The museum at Marlborough House would relocate there in 1857 and be renamed the South Kensington Museum. The prince had a keen interest in science as well, and through his influence the Department of Practical Art would be enlarged to become the Department of Science and Art, with Lyon Playfair serving with Henry Cole as joint secretary and specifically in charge of scientific education.\textsuperscript{43} Later, the Department would be moved from the Board of Trade to the Committee of Council on Education.\textsuperscript{44}

The nucleus of the museum of art manufactures was located at Marlborough House. At the end of the exhibition in October 1851, Parliament granted £5,000 to the Department to purchase objects that had been on display that would function as models of good design to serve as the basis of a national collection. Cole and Redgrave served on a committee to make these selections, and their choices encompassed works from many different countries. These were moved to Marlborough, along with the original collection formed at Somerset House. Thus, the early museum was composed largely of contemporary wares, intended to instruct in the principles of taste for industrial objects. This soon changed, as evidenced by the shift from the name “Museum of Manufactures” to “Museum of Ornamental Art.”\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, the Third Report of the Department of Science and Art stated that the objects that had been acquired in the wake of the exhibition were diverse in nature, but were all modern, and thus, “For this reason later additions to the collection, which have been very numerous, have mainly consisted of works from bygone periods.” It went on to assert that while the Museum had an avowedly educational mission, it was meant not just for students but also for the general public and even the collector, “whose pursuits it is, for many obvious reasons, clearly a national duty to countenance and encourage.” The goal was “the illustration, by actual monuments, of all art which finds its material expression in objects of utility, or in works avowedly decorative.”\textsuperscript{46} These statements illuminate the purpose of
the ensuing acquisitions, which evince the subtle shift from a purely practical mission to better the abilities of artisans for the improvement of manufactures to one that aimed to raise the standards of all members of society.

Cole firmly believed in the efficacy of elevating the taste of consumers rather than focusing on the producers. The museum, by promoting his view of superior design quality, had the best chance of achieving this goal, as it was the only feasible means of educating the adult.47 This was seen as critical among art professionals in the mid-nineteenth century, when rising wealth among the middling classes meant that they were now empowered to purchase. However, their standards of taste had not been refined and elevated from a long history of familial collecting.48 Indeed, Anna Jameson had discussed the issue a few years earlier in her 1849 *Art Journal* essay, “Some thoughts on art, addressed to the Uninitiated.” She noted that, “the million’ have become patrons of art” and “thus it is a matter of very serious import that the young should be trained to discernment and refinement in the appreciation of such objects as are addressed to the mind through the eye, that the public taste should, through the rising generation, be more generally educated.”49 The purpose of Cole’s new museum was intimately connected with the broadening access of different sectors of society to aesthetic culture. Thus, in order to speak to all classes of consumers, the rooms at Marlborough were designed to evoke the decorated rooms of an elite collector, but there were also classrooms and lecture halls to promote the educational mission.50

A combination of purchases and loans enriched the Museum’s collections. In 1853, Cole and Redgrave approved the purchase of a collection of pottery made by James Bandinel of the Foreign Office. The next year, the Gherardini Collection was up for sale. Gherardini was an Italian who had inherited a group of wax and terracotta models by Italian Renaissance masters. These were first exhibited in the Museum for one month in order to ascertain the opinion of the public as to whether or not they
should be purchased, and this collection passed the test. This was typical of departmental policy, as the board minutes of the Department of Science and Art reveal that items were typically displayed for a considerable period of time, from a couple months to two years, before being purchased by Parliament. In 1855, the late antiquarian Whig MP Ralph Bernal’s collection, which contained art objects from the Byzantine era through the eighteenth century, was a potential acquisition for the museum. These items included porcelain, metalwork, jewelry, and furniture, among other categories. While Cole and the Department had hoped to purchase this in full, the Government believed the price to be too high and ordered it to go up for auction. The Museum was not allowed to spend more than £12,000, and it obtained 730 pieces. Interestingly, Bernal had remarked during parliamentary debates on the Museums Act 1845, which gave local town councils the ability to establish museums, that the
country needed “a Museum of Art and Antiquities…which would be worthy of the English nation.” His collection helped to form the basis of such a museum.

One of the most important purchases in the Museum’s early acquisition history was Jules Soulages’s collection. Soulages was a lawyer from Toulouse, France, who had acquired objects in Italy including enamels, medals, glass, bronzes, decorative furniture, and majolica. His collection practices specified that “his object was the illustration of Art, and not the indulgence of a taste for the merely curious,” and his acquisitions did not typically receive the “designation of ‘high art.’” Cole wished to bring the entire collection to the Museum, and a subscribers’ fund of “disinterested and public spirited men” was set up in order to purchase it before Government approval. The subscribers included some members of the aristocracy, including Earl Granville, Lord Ashburton, the Duke of Hamilton, and the Marquess of Hertford. However, it was mainly composed of wealthy men of business, men connected to the Department of Science and Art, and artists. Nevertheless, when it came time for Prime Minister Lord Palmerston to examine the objects exhibited at Marlborough House, he disliked their medieval style and did not understand how they would improve British manufactures. His disapproval proved decisive, and thus the collection could not be retained. Even at a time when aristocratic power was receding, the idiosyncratic aesthetic sense of a politician could still retain significance in determining cultural policy. The collection was sold to the executive committee of the Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition, and later the Department bought it back in portions. In fact, those in favor of the collection believed it would not only improve manufacture design, commerce, and the public taste, but would also help form “a large and complete historical and artistic museum.” The curator J.C. Robinson, who would have a profound effect on the Museum’s collection, advocated this latter acquisition policy.
The collections and individual specimens purchased for or donated to the Museum were not typically held by the aristocracy. However, aristocrats granted liberal access to their property by loaning objects for temporary exhibition. The earliest example of this came with an exhibition of Historic Cabinet Work at Gore House, also owned by the Department. Lenders to this exhibit included numerous aristocrats, including the Duke of Hamilton, the Duke of Buccleuch, the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Northumberland, the Earl Spencer, the Earl Granville, and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby, among others. In fact, the Museum, in both its earliest form and such later iterations as the South Kensington and Victoria & Albert Museum, was the first permanent institution to produce numerous temporary exhibitions. By contrast, the British Museum and the National Gallery relied solely on their permanent collections comprised of donations and purchases. In 1880, Robinson wrote that the system allowed “the enormous accumulation of works of art of all kinds, in the possession of the Crown, or corporations, and societies, the ancestral gatherings of the nobles and gentry of the land, and the rich collections of amateurs and connoisseurs, [to be] made available for the delight and instruction of everybody.” Indeed, this policy had a beneficial effect for both the Museum and the benefactors. A more widely held perception of the artistic value of the historic decorative arts, which were not as well known or authoritatively discussed in literature as fine arts, was encouraged by the elite status of those who lent them. Moreover, the social pedigree of the owners aroused further public interest in the items. The loaner’s name was always prominently displayed on labels and in catalogues. The announcement of the cabinetry exhibition lauded those who had “liberally offered” their objects for display and study. That the names of these contributors were so well publicized and celebrated suggests that their generosity was intended, at least in part, to reap a reputational benefit.

The tenor of the parliamentary debates over the
retention of the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park is illustrative of the tenuous position of the aristocracy at this time. After the Great Exhibition had concluded, some executives and MPs wished to maintain the physical location of the building in order to provide a recreational space for the working classes. During debates in April 1852, the MP James Heywood, a Liberal with radical tendencies who supported increased access to public museums,66 claimed that whereas the middle class was in favor of keeping it, the aristocracy opposed the plans, and this class division could “agitiate this country.”67 While this statement was not entirely accurate, as friends of the movement for the preservation of the Crystal Palace included notables such as the Duke of Devonshire (Joseph Paxton’s patron), the Duke of Argyll, and Lord Harrowby,68 Heywood’s subsequent remarks are significant. He recounted a story in which he met a French nobleman at Haddon Hall, the seat of the Duke of Rutland. The Frenchman explained that “a reason why the English aristocracy retained their privileges and position, and the French lost theirs, [is] that the English aristocracy knew when to make just concessions.” Heywood then concluded that this was a moment for the aristocracy to “make a small concession to the opinions and wishes of the middle classes.”69 Later in the debate, the Radical MP Thomas Wakley noted that the aristocracy “had risen wonderfully in the estimation of the people since they had mingled with them at the Crystal Palace,” but they would “lose more in public estimation if they now demolished that building.”70

Ultimately, these impassioned pleas did not save the Crystal Palace; it vacated Hyde Park and was re-erected at Sydenham by a private company as a visitor attraction.71 However, these statements help to clarify the nature and purpose of the aristocracy’s involvement with a museum that was far removed from any notions of elite trusteeship and taste in the fine art of painting. Indeed, it has been described as a “middle-class space, where middle-class norms of behaviour were protected and, if
possible, enforced; middle-class values shaped and strengthened; and middle-class hierarchies displayed." Aristocrats were absent from the management and creation of the institution. The Art Journal commented approvingly in August 1861 that the South Kensington Museum did not suffer from “an effete system of trusteeship” with “gentlemen little conversant with the matters they are called upon to decide,” which had afflicted the National Gallery. Rather, the South Kensington was “new, active, intelligent, and useful.” As with the National Gallery, members of the aristocracy did not make permanent bequests of their property. However, they did not shun the Museum, and they complied when their holdings were solicited and desired, perhaps out of an aspiration to gain in the “public estimation,” in the words of Wakley, at a time when the middle class was asserting its power in all areas of society. The Art Journal remarked on the temporary loan policy again in November, noting that the periodical had often focused on the incredible amount of art still held privately in Britain, including paintings and decorative art, but now “collectors have been frequently induced to allow their treasures to pass temporarily from their cabinets to the public gaze.” Thus, the Journal stated approvingly, knowledge of the historic ornamental objects was extended beyond “a few wealthy individuals.”

Eighteenth-century, Grand Tour-era preferences may have been irrelevant to the approach of the new museum, but Cole made sure that his firmest standard of what constituted good taste was followed. He and his fellow design reformers were attempting to become new societal tastemakers; he chose objects that he believed exemplified these principles and didactically explained his doctrine in affordable catalogues. In the early days of the Museum at Marlborough House, Cole devised a room called “Examples of False Principles in Decoration,” which later came to be known as the “Chamber of Horrors,” where he showcased what he viewed as bad taste. This attempt to impose notions of taste was not uniformly accepted, as
Cole and Redgrave faced criticism from numerous sources, including a notable Manchester economist named F.J. Prouting, writing under the pseudonym Argus. He published a series of pamphlets called *A Mild Remonstrance against the Taste-Censorship at Marlborough House*, in which he demonstrated his contempt for what he believed to be the foreign preferences of the museum’s managers. He wrote sarcastically: “Englishmen know nothing of taste…Benighted Britons…know nothing of Beauty, nothing of Refinement, nothing of Fine Art, nothing of Taste!” He charged that these notions governed Cole’s administration of the Museum. In fact, the idea of a correct standard of taste was itself a foreign, Continental creation. Prouting asserted that “if these qualities are real and definable, and if they have anything to do with morals and right-mindedness, we think England has as good a claim to the possession of Taste and to the appreciation of the Beautiful.” These complaints are striking in their resemblance to the attacks leveled against aristocrats during the eighteenth century, an era in which they retained cultural control. They too were chastised for their foreign proclivities, preferring European masters to native British artists. Cole’s attempt to impose aesthetic criteria subjected him to the same criticisms that the aristocracy had faced decades earlier when they dictated the standards of taste.

Cole was not alone in shaping acquisition policy at the Museum. John Charles Robinson was appointed curator in 1853, and he energetically drove the collection toward an art historical approach. His concern was not simply to elevate the standards of taste in contemporary society; he was primarily focused on the representation of a full history of decorative art. Indeed, he had a wide-ranging interest in art that had not been popularized in Britain yet, such as the Portuguese and Spanish schools, including the work of El Greco. He went to Paris as a young man to study art, and his experiences there were to have an effect on his later collection practices. Various antiquarian collections existed in Paris in the nineteenth century following the French
Revolution, during which many of the objects and artifacts of the Middle Ages were in danger of destruction due to their association with the monarchy and the Catholic Church. Almost immediately, however, scholars and collectors attempted to rescue these items. These grew into great collections, including the influential Musée de Cluny, which opened in 1832 and was transformed into a public museum in 1844. The French viewed this museum of decorative art not as a means to improve manufacture design, but rather as a way of showcasing history through objects. This idea of a museum featuring a historical series of art objects would come to suffuse Robinson’s activities as curator. He focused heavily on medieval and Renaissance art, engineering the acquisition of an important group of Italian Renaissance sculptures, despite the contemporary view that this had little to do with improvement of industry or taste and thus did not fit the Museum’s purported mission. Robinson was a serious scholar, writing well-respected catalogues on the works in the Museum, including the Soulages Collection and the Italian sculptures. He served as a mediator of Cole’s didactic utilitarian taste reform, and there are obvious parallels with the new director of the National Gallery, Charles Locke Eastlake, who similarly tempered the aristocratic trustees’ elite preferences by embarking on a campaign to collect early Italian masters. Experts in the emerging discipline of art history endeavored to tell a fuller story of the fine arts and material culture, rather than catering either to eighteenth-century connoisseur taste or the principles of correct design for economic benefit. Knowledge of art spread to all classes of society in this period, but it was also transforming into a serious field of study, which would have a profound effect on museums and exhibitions.

Victorian museums thus accommodated themselves to distinct visions and impulses. Regardless of the collection policy pursued, however, there remained a general sense that exposure to the art objects would be morally and educationally beneficial. When the Museum of Ornamental Art at Marlborough House
moved to its new location and became the South Kensington Museum, the institution took on even more revolutionary characteristics. The original museum aimed to be available to the broader public, open from Monday to Friday with Saturday as a free day. However, the South Kensington went even further, as Cole intended this museum primarily to benefit the working class. In his 1857 Introductory Lectures on the Science and Art Department and the South Kensington Museum, he remarked: “It is much less for the rich that the State should provide public galleries of paintings and objects of art and science, than for those classes who would be absolutely destitute of the enjoyment of them, unless they were provided by the State.” To that end, the museum was open six days a week throughout the year, with no vacation, and on three nights a week it would be open until ten o’clock in the evening. This policy was expressly for workers who would not be able to visit during the day, and it was achievable through gas lighting the galleries. Chambers's Journal of Popular Literature, Science and Arts celebrated this as a “successful novelty…for artisan visitors who cannot come during the day.”

It was for this reason that middle-class collector John Sheepshanks decided to donate his collection of British paintings to the South Kensington rather than the National Gallery, as Robert Vernon, the other eminent collector of British artwork, had done. Whereas Vernon had longed for elite approval, Sheepshanks was secure in his middle-class identity and preferred the beneficial policies toward the lower orders at the South Kensington. He agreed with the liberal access policies, even desirous that his pictures be open to the public on Sunday. Critics charged that the location of the museum in West London rendered it too far from the working-class public it supposedly served to be of any value, and indeed the neighborhood of South Kensington did have aristocratic associations. Cole consistently defended the museum’s accessibility, reporting during proceedings of the 1860 Select Committee on the South Kensington Museum that his institution averaged thirty thousand more visitors per year.
than the British Museum.  He was aware of the potential issues, however, and therefore he collaborated in the construction of boulevards and roads to improve access. The museum was also situated on omnibus routes, and Cole helped ensure that it would be a stop on the new Underground system.

As the Museum was so clearly oriented toward the accommodation of the working class, and entirely managed by middle-class professionals, it would be easy to conclude that elite aristocrats were largely absent from this new mission. However, The Literary Gazette reported upon its opening that “The Museum appears to have excited much interest among the higher orders. It was attended by crowds of well-dressed people.” Further, when the Queen attended a private viewing of the museum before it opened to the public, the Morning Star noted that she was met there by notables such as the Marquess of Lansdowne, Lord Stanley of Alderley, and the Duke of Buccleuch. These figures were sufficiently important to merit continued reporting on their public activities, and their art possessions were highly prized for their potential as valuable additions to loan exhibitions. Members of the aristocracy did not create this institution, or propagate the rhetoric that surrounded it, but they were generous toward it. These balancing forces, along with the emergence of scholarly art history, would express themselves in one of the most important cultural events in mid-Victorian Britain: the 1857 Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition.

**Art Treasures and Art Wealth: Equipoise in the Cultural Realm**

As a result of the movement of art from country homes to the capital that began in the eighteenth century, art in Britain was increasingly centered in London. As part of the ongoing effort to make art and art instruction more available to the wider populace, the Museum of Ornamental Art instituted a provincial loan system in which certain objects deemed unnecessary to the
central museum would be circulated to the provinces, a practice that would be continued by the South Kensington Museum. In this way, “the contents of the Museum will, in time, have been literally brought home to each locality, and [an] incentive to the formation of permanent local museums of art will thus be given.”96 The desire to increase access to art for the entire country, especially in industrial towns and cities, precipitated the Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition. Manchester was the epitome of an urban, manufacturing city in the mid-nineteenth century, controlled by the new wealthy middle class. It was not a coincidence that the most comprehensive blockbuster art exhibition in Britain took place there.97 *The Art-Treasures Examiner*, a special publication issued by a city newspaper, *The Manchester Examiner and Times*, described the origins and impetus behind this venture:

It was in the early part of the year 1856 that several of the influential merchants and manufacturers of Manchester, strongly impressed with the happy results of the Paris Exhibition of the previous summer, as well as those of the Dublin Exhibition of 1853—forcibly struck, above all, with the important claims and uses of the fine arts, and calling to mind the remark made by Dr Waagen in his valuable work, that the art-treasures in the United Kingdom were of a character, in amount and interest, to surpass those contained in the collections upon the continent, bethought them of the grand idea of bringing the *élite* of these works into view under one roof, for the edification of their fellow-men.98

Waagen’s *Treasures of Art in Great Britain*, which brought to light the numerous private art collections of quality in Britain, provided the idea to bring these works together in one space for
the benefit of the public.

This concept eventually made its way to Thomas Fairbairn, who had been a commissioner of the Great Exhibition and became the principal driver of the Art Treasures Exhibition. He was the chairman of the executive committee, composed of notable Manchester citizens, which raised a guarantee fund of over £70,000 in order to begin planning. He then reached out to Prince Albert to receive royal patronage from him and the Queen, which was, not surprisingly, quickly granted, as Albert took a keen interest in the project. The Earl of Ellesmere was appointed president of the General Council, which lent an air of prestige and authority to the exhibition. Ellesmere, son of the Marquess of Stafford, was a trustee of the National Gallery and a member of a family with a long history of involvement in the arts. Several other noblemen were approached to provide their support, including Lord Derby and Lord Overstone. Manchester businessmen were responsible for the creation and management of the project, while the royalty and aristocracy served as prestigious figureheads. This was a project that encompassed both sectors of society, although the driving force came from the newly wealthy.

In order to successfully mount this exhibition, it was critical that those who held art treasures in their private possessions would be willing to lend them. The Report of the Executive Committee asserted its confidence that gifts would be forthcoming, stating:

It will be necessary to invite extensive cooperation from all patrons and lovers of Art, and the Committee have reason to believe, from the very favourable reception which the project has already experienced…from all classes among the Public…that they will not meet with any serious difficulty in securing contributions.
Indeed, the response to loan requests was overwhelmingly positive.\textsuperscript{101} The solicitations often noted the support that the monarchy had given to the project;\textsuperscript{102} Prince Albert wrote to the Earl of Ellesmere expressing his opinion that collectors would be willing to part with their paintings and objects if they knew that not doing so would “mar the realisation of a great National object.”\textsuperscript{103} This was a project with patriotic implications, and the elite were expected to play their part due to the value attributed to their holdings. The contributors’ generosity was lauded in the press, with the \textit{Art-Treasures Examiner} pointing to some of the most prolific donors, including the Duke of Hamilton, the Duke of Newcastle, the Duke of Manchester, Earl de Grey, Lord Overstone, Lord Ashburton, the Earl of Portsmouth, the Duke of Richmond, and the Duke of Marlborough.\textsuperscript{104} The publication sniffed at the “ingratitude” of the Duke of Devonshire, who had contributed nothing even though he held a significant collection at Chatsworth and Devonshire House.\textsuperscript{105} However, the duke had declined to participate due to ill health, not out of any disdain for the project,\textsuperscript{106} and he in fact paid a visit to the exhibition, which the \textit{Art-Treasures Examiner} noted.\textsuperscript{107} Many other elite figures attended, but it was by no means a preserve of the aristocracy and the wealthy. Indeed, the organizers hoped for the attendance of the working class, and the entrance fees on Saturday afternoons were reduced in order to induce them to come.\textsuperscript{108} In fact, the exhibition garnered over one million visitors, greatly helped by the ever-increasing railway system that made cheap travel much more feasible.\textsuperscript{109}

The Art Treasures Exhibition showcased the harmony between the belief that comprehensiveness was publicly beneficial along with an increasingly sophisticated understanding of art history. It occurred at the moment when art history was emerging as a codified field of study, and the paintings and objects exhibited, as well as the way in which they were displayed, reflected this scholarly, universal impulse. The exhibition included “not only Oil Paintings, Water-colour Drawings, Engravings, and
Photographs” but also sculpture in all media, decorative furniture, musical instruments, glass, tapestry, antiquities, and costume, reflecting the collections of the South Kensington.\textsuperscript{110} Both old master paintings and contemporary British art were included.\textsuperscript{111} Notably, Italian paintings from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and early fifteenth centuries were displayed,\textsuperscript{112} reflecting Eastlake’s new acquisition policy. The paintings were hung chronologically and by school.\textsuperscript{113} The art critic George Scharf was responsible for the selection and discussion of the old masters, and his goal was to showcase a complete sample of the history of art from the Byzantine to the Baroque.\textsuperscript{114} This exhibition demonstrated the same scholarly interest evidenced by the new professional class of curators such as Eastlake and Robinson.

The Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition confirmed that the possessions acquired over generations of aristocratic collecting, along with holdings of the newly wealthy purchasers of the nineteenth century, were emphatically part of the national cultural heritage, even if they were still held privately. The \textit{Art Journal} remarked approvingly that “the aristocracy—of rank and riches—[were] not only willing, but desirous, that the people should, as widely as possible, participate in the enjoyments they themselves derive from their treasures.”\textsuperscript{115} As long as they afforded liberal access to their works, there was a sense that the objects belonged to the British public as a whole. This growing consensus was further confirmed by a temporary exhibition curated by Robinson at the South Kensington in 1862, officially titled the “Special Exhibition of Works of Art of the Medieval, Renaissance, and More Recent Periods, on loan at the South Kensington Museum,” but colloquially known as “The Art Wealth of England.”\textsuperscript{116} This was intended to demonstrate representative specimens of decorative art throughout the ages, and requests were sent out for donations from the monarchy, universities, corporations, and private aristocratic and wealthy collectors. Gifts were liberally given by all of the groups, and it was difficult to accommodate everything that arrived at the
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

Museum. Notables such as the Marquess of Abercorn, the Duke of Devonshire, Earl Granville, the Duke of Richmond, and Lord Willoughby d’Eresby all contributed, and they were joined by other non-aristocratic collectors. This exhibit was the brainchild of a new organization of which Robinson was a member, the Fine Arts Club, which included scholars, connoisseurs, and collectors who shared and discussed their knowledge and possessions. In the late 1860s, this club was rechristened as the Burlington Fine Arts Club, an organization that brought prominent members of the old aristocratic guard, such as Lord Lansdowne, into association with professional
curators like Robinson. The historian Gordon Fyfe describes the foundation of this club as a moment of “cultural rapprochement between the old and new orders.” Indeed, the “Art Wealth” exhibit represented an attendant turning point in the history of the South Kensington Museum, as it had little to do with the utilitarian purpose of elevating contemporary taste and was instead a celebration of the history of collecting in Britain, often under the purview of the aristocracy.

The historian W.L. Burn famously described mid-Victorian Britain as an age of equipoise, signifying a period of political and social harmony, one in which class conflict waned, hierarchies were made slightly more flexible, and balance was maintained. Historians have debated this interpretation, but the evolution of the South Kensington Museum and the Manchester Art Treasures Exhibition in the 1850s and 1860s proves that equipoise had arrived in the cultural realm. A vast new populace was allowed ever-increasing access to works of art that had previously been the preserve of the elite. Eighteenth-century connoisseur taste no longer dominated, and there was a new expert class of curators that emphasized a more comprehensive art historical approach, while bureaucrats like Cole asserted the achievement of the education, refinement, and broadened cultural horizons of the working class as the primary goal of museums. The aristocracy had relinquished cultural control, but the oversight of a realm of society that had once been dominated by a particular class could not be so simply transferred. Indeed, even though trustees at the National Gallery lost much of their power, they were not abolished altogether. Aristocratic donations were solicited and appreciated for temporary exhibition, and their treasures were claimed as the nation’s cultural heritage, without demanding that they be bequeathed permanently to the public. The aristocracy continued to lend an air of prestige, even if they no longer managed and created cultural institutions. Just as J.J. Angerstein, a banker, followed connoisseur preferences, and Robert Vernon, a middle-class collector, yearned for
acceptance from the old guard, many middle-class grandees still aped aristocratic techniques and ideas throughout the period. The reach of the art world had been expanded to all classes of society, and it was professionally controlled, but the influence of generations of aristocratic cultural authority was still felt to a significant extent.
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NOTES

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Images

Page 22: William Linnaeus Casey, The First Room at Marlborough House, 1856,
“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy

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An Affair on Every Continent: French Reaction to the Foreign Press during the Dreyfus Affair

David Murrell

On October 15, 1894, artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus was summoned to the French Ministry of War in Paris. At the time, the Jewish soldier, born in the northeastern French region of Alsace, thought nothing of the matter, believing he was merely due for his annual inspection. The only peculiarity was that he was specifically ordered to wear civilian clothing, but this seemed unimportant. Upon arriving at the ministry building, Lieutenant Colonel Charles du Paty de Clam met Dreyfus and asked the artillery captain to compose a letter on his behalf, citing a sore finger. Dreyfus obliged, still unaware that anything was amiss. It was only after he had finished the letter, when du Paty de Clam rose and announced emphatically, “In the name of the law, I arrest you; you are accused of the crime of high treason,” that Dreyfus realized this was no ordinary inspection.

Such were the humble beginnings of what came to be known as the Dreyfus affair, an international scandal that wracked France, as well as the rest of the world, from 1894 until 1906. Specifically, Dreyfus had been accused of passing on French army secrets to the German military attaché in Paris, Maximilien von Schwartzkoppen. As evidence, senior officials on the French General Staff cited a document which would come to be known as the bordereau, an unsigned sheet of paper containing sensitive French military information that had been picked up by a French spy in Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket at the German embassy. When du Paty de Clam summoned Dreyfus on that mid-October morning, his finger was not really injured. It was a trap, meant to prove that Dreyfus’s hand had written the incriminating document. The evi-
dence was good enough for du Paty de Clam, for he immediately ordered Dreyfus’s incarceration. Dreyfus was then convicted by a closed-door military tribunal in December 1894 and sent to Devil’s Island, a penal colony off the coast of French Guiana, South America, notorious for its brutal conditions. With Dreyfus shipped halfway across the world and locked in a stone cabin measuring four square meters, the story of a traitorous Jewish officer ought to have ended once and for all.

Without the mass press that was burgeoning throughout Europe and, indeed, much of the world, this might very well have been the case. The turn of the twentieth century, however, brought with it a newly powerful actor: the modern newspaper.

Illustration of Alfred Dreyfus’s degradation ceremony at the École Militaire
In France, the foundations for a literate, engaged citizenry were laid decades earlier with the adoption of the 1833 *Loi Guizot*, which established primary schools throughout the country and created a new base of readers in addition to the urban dwellers and educated classes. Not only were these new segments of society now capable of reading, but they also had access to a novel brand of popular press which, according to historian Christophe Charle, “abandoned the political function that dominated the press, instead choosing to distract and move the new readers, leading to the development of so-called tabloids.” With its diverse cast of characters, the Dreyfus affair served as fantastic tabloid fodder throughout Europe. Whether one was a “Dreyfusard” supporting the artillery captain, or an “anti-Dreyfusard” in favor of the guilty verdict, there was no shortage of heroes and villains to support.

The case itself had an inherently dramatic quality to it, for it soon became evident that a number of the documents used to convict Dreyfus in his first court-martial were forgeries created by members of the French military. Colonel Georges Picquart, one of Dreyfus’s earliest defenders in the military, also realized that the leaks to Schwartzkoppen had continued even after Dreyfus’s arrest, which led him to discover the real traitor, a soldier by the name of Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. While the French military had no desire to reopen the Dreyfus case, even wrongly clearing Esterhazy of any wrongdoing in a court-martial, the press was now reporting on the various developments in the nascent affair with great zeal. This was in large part thanks to an article from a French newspaper, Georges Clemenceau’s *L’Aurore*, which helped spark serious international interest in the Dreyfus affair. That article was “J’accuse…!,” celebrated French novelist Émile Zola’s seminal open letter to French President Félix Fauré, published January 13, 1898. In “J’accuse,” Zola alleged that a massive conspiracy was being propagated by the French government and military to cover up Dreyfus’s innocence. In the aftermath of the article’s publication, it became clear that the
French government would not succeed in burying the Dreyfus case, for Zola had managed to transform it into a bona fide international scandal. Indeed, from 1898 onward, Zola’s open letter polarized individual citizens within France, while also galvanizing support for Dreyfus throughout the world in the pages of the foreign press.

There would be many developments and revelations between January 1898 and August 1899, the month Dreyfus was recalled from Devil’s Island for a second military tribunal in Rennes, France. But in some ways, Zola’s “J’accuse,” imposing such pressure upon the French government, fast-tracked the Dreyfus case straight to Rennes. Indeed, by this point, the Dreyfus affair had gripped France, as well as the rest of Europe. In one Belgian town, the entire community put on a parade in advance of the Rennes court-martial, complete with citizens dressed up as French officers and lawyers. It is conceivable that these Belgian townsfolk were not well-versed in the political and legal intricacies of the Dreyfus affair. But to them, these details did not matter. They were drawn to the characters and the theatrics of it all, as if the affair itself were a real-life play. This was the legacy of the popular press, which highlighted narrative and drama over the more burdensome legal and political details.

If the French government was concerned about the political and social ramifications of an incendiary article like Zola’s, then it was equally troubled by the new international tenor of the affair. Admittedly, these fears proved to be quite rational. On the day of Dreyfus’s reconviction at Rennes, demonstrations broke out in favor of the ex-captain around the world. From Egypt to Australia, and virtually everywhere in between, the message was the same: people were indignant that Dreyfus had been reconvicted, particularly given the revelations that many of the documents used to convict him had been fraudulent. The French consul in Melbourne, Australia, reported that the situation “could not be worse.” In Belgium, the press was described as having a “rare violence.” Tens of thousands demonstrated
in favor of Dreyfus at Hyde Park in London, England. And in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a group of socialists signed a petition condemning the verdict, with the hope that their message could be transmitted to Dreyfus’s lawyer, Fernand Labori.

In 1899, nearly five years after Dreyfus’s original conviction, the case inspired more controversy than ever before. It was ultimately the risk of a continued media fiasco that led French President Émile Loubet to offer Dreyfus a pardon, which the artillery captain accepted on September 19, 1899. This, however, did not bring about a calm denouement to the affair. Indeed, the Dreyfus affair was like a Hydra: when one controversy

Émile Zola’s “J’accuse…!”
was settled, two more appeared in its place. Eventually, in 1904, Dreyfus’s lawyer submitted a request on behalf of his client for a new appeal. After a slow march through the French courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal announced on July 12, 1906, that Alfred Dreyfus was innocent. The French Senate passed a bill to promote Dreyfus to the rank of major within the army. The following decade, Dreyfus would serve alongside his countrymen as an artillery officer in the First World War.

The foreign press played an instrumental role during the affair, familiarizing individuals across borders and continents with the plight of Dreyfus. These people then mobilized around the world, pressuring the French government to amend the verdict. Newspapers worldwide, some utilizing news agencies such as Reuters and others hiring their own foreign correspondents, reported detailed updates on the affair on a daily basis. The extent of the spread of information was impressive, even by today’s standards. In 1898, for instance, the London Times republished a letter, originally sent to a newspaper in Vienna, Austria, which had been written by an American woman living in a small Finnish town. The woman, describing the conditions in her village, reported, “People here are so frightfully interested in [the affair]. Even the peasants in quite out of the way places spoke about it to my husband on his last journey. The general opinion in this country is that Dreyfus is innocent.”

This sort of article, which did not condemn the French state or military, was relatively benign as far as the French government was concerned. But there were still many other stories written by the foreign press that directly attacked the French government’s treatment of Dreyfus and, at least implicitly and occasionally explicitly, encouraged its readers to protest against France. Such demonstrations and discourse inevitably hurt France’s reputation as a bastion of justice and equality, a position it had enjoyed since the French Revolution in 1789. This change in perception was a central concern of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which kept detailed reports from its consuls and
ambassadors abroad pertaining to the activities of the foreign press.

Of much greater concern to the ministry, however, was the publication of numerous articles, particularly in neighboring Britain, which subsequently trickled into France and served to reignite the debate surrounding Dreyfus. This phenomenon was especially prevalent during the years between Dreyfus’s first conviction in 1894 and the publication of “J’accuse” in 1898, a period when the affair was by no means entrenched as an international scandal. Most famously, in 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus, the brother of Alfred, convinced the British *Daily Chronicle* to publish a false story proclaiming that his brother had escaped from Devil’s Island. Mathieu hoped this would keep his brother’s name in the press and provide a reminder that the Dreyfus affair had not yet concluded. Ultimately, Mathieu’s gamble paid dividends as a number of British papers picked up the story, prompting the French press to follow suit and thus keeping the Dreyfus scandal in the public consciousness in France.

Given this volatile atmosphere, it should come as no surprise that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to keep close tabs on the foreign media in order to control any discourse pertaining to Dreyfus. This desire to control information abroad led the French government to pursue attempts at censorship more broadly than it ever did with its own domestic press. Although the French certainly spied on their own newspapers and reporters, the government never moved to prevent the publication of a domestic news story. This was due to the Press Law of 1881, which effectively guaranteed newspapers the freedom to print whatever they pleased. The French treatment of the foreign press, on the other hand, was a different story, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly attempted to intervene through diplomatic channels in order to limit the publication of damning materials against the French state. Unfortunately for the French government, many of the foreign countries that covered the affair most aggressively (particularly Belgium, Britain, Germany,
and Switzerland) either had their own liberalized press laws or had no incentive to restrict the publication of articles that were hostile to France. For these reasons, the French focused their censorship efforts, particularly within Europe, on theater productions, which were not yet granted similar freedoms from government censors. Even on the few occasions when France did move to influence the press outside of Europe, the country’s efforts were generally unsuccessful.

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Relative to the rest of the world, the European press received the vast majority of attention from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was expected, for Europeans were much closer to France geographically and thus more familiar with the country’s history and culture. Naturally, this geographic proximity enabled the European press to locate more sources and invest more in breaking stories over the course of the entire affair, as opposed to covering only crucial events such as the Rennes court-martial. The shared cultural and historical understanding among Europeans was a primary reason the French government was so concerned with European press coverage. Indeed, much of the affair was couched in terms that were intra-European in nature, making it relevant to the entire continent. When the coverage was critical of France, as it almost always was, this constituted a political threat. For instance, after the British *Daily Mail* coined the term in September 1899, much of the European press began referring to the Dreyfus affair as France’s “moral Sedan,” connecting the scandal to France’s humiliating military defeat at the Battle of Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Moreover, the European press had an incentive to market the affair in a way that appealed to Europeans on a broader level. In doing so, the press created a continent-wide scandal, involving various players from France, Germany, and Italy alike. It became impossible for Europeans not to link the infiltration of Maximilien von
Schwartzkoppen, the German spy to whom Dreyfus allegedly sold military secrets, to the French military and its involvement in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, the Dreyfusard European press could not help but frame the ex-captain’s convictions as a repudiation of the gains of the French Revolution. In this regard, Europe was better equipped to cover the affair with vitriol and acumen than any other part of the world.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted immense resources to tracking the activities of this international press. The department’s minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, received daily updates from his consular and ambassadorial staff on the day’s foreign news. These dispatches took many different forms: press clippings of specific articles, hand-written translations, and detailed syntheses describing the coverage of numerous papers. In the early days of the affair, it was not a foregone conclusion that the foreign press would become obsessed with covering the case of Alfred Dreyfus. For instance, on November 6, 1897, the French ambassador to Germany wrote to Hanotaux, “the Affair in question offers no direct interest for the German government.” The sentiment was echoed by the German press, and one German newspaper, *La Gazette de la Croix*, mentioned, “This whole question is for France an internal affair, of which we in Germany do not need to exaggerate the significance.”

This detachment disappeared in a matter of weeks, following allegations in the French press that the German kaiser himself dealt with Dreyfus and coordinated his espionage. Such an assertion transformed the Dreyfus affair in the eyes of the German populace from an entirely French scandal into a calumny that attacked the honor and reputation of Germany. In other words, the affair became something of a geopolitical conflict. As the French ambassador to Germany later described, “As a result of all this, the German newspapers have modified their original attitude and no longer publish exclusively news articles about the affair.” Indeed, *La Gazette de la Croix*, which had downplayed the affair’s significance weeks earlier, now termed it France’s
“military Panama,” referring to the bribery scandal over the Panama Canal that wallop the French government in 1892. If this anti-French sentiment was only burgeoning in Germany by the end of November, it no doubt crystallized the following month. On December 12, 1897, Henri de Rochefort published an even more accusatory article in his popular newspaper L’Intransigeant, further implicating German Kaiser Wilhelm II.\(^\text{17}\)

This budding conflict with Germany was certainly troubling for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French ambassador to Germany continued to provide numerous updates on the “biased and Francophobic” writings in German newspapers, such as those by the Paris correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt.\(^\text{18}\) Germany was expected to cover the basic facts of the affair, but this transition to aggressive anti-French opinion pieces did not bode well for Franco-German relations. Indeed, only two decades earlier, France had lost the mineral-rich territory of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The relationship between the two European powers, therefore, was already tense. And for a country that wished to appear strong in the aftermath of such a devastating military defeat, the Dreyfus affair seemed to do just the opposite for France, reflecting the image of a nation in decline for all to see. In the context of Franco-German relations, these small changes in public perception had tangible diplomatic consequences.

Although no British diplomats were implicated in the Dreyfus affair, much of the British press coverage has been understood by historians in similar geopolitical terms. As historian Ricky Lee Sherrod argues, British interest in the affair stemmed in part from fear over the prospect of a diminishing role of liberalism—particularly as it pertained to enlightened notions of justice, democracy, and laissez-faire economics—in the coming twentieth century. The recently unified German Kaiserreich seemed to demonstrate that a state could achieve its desired ends through means that were decidedly illiberal, and the Dreyfus affair signaled that perhaps France was journeying down a
similar path. Thus, as Sherrod writes, British reportage of the affair reflected “a subliminal sense of national insecurity,” which highlighted “an intense concern about the future of liberalism and the declining popularity of liberal values in both Britain and Europe.”19 As one magazine in Edinburgh noted, “If what is now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the world, then the beginning of a new century may be a rude one, a terrible shaking, the end of which no human foresight can predict.”20 But if the British media were concerned about the future of European liberalism, then the Dreyfus affair offered a rare opportunity for Britain to assume the mantle as the “true world leader and principal promoter of civilization and progressive ways. The Affair demonstrated the fragility of French claims in these respects.”21 This widespread sense of disappointment with the apparent French descent into injustice and illiberalism was not only felt across the English Channel. In 1898, the French consul in Antwerp, Belgium, recorded a conversation in which a local dignitary in the Masonic Lodge said, “If a war broke out between France and Germany, all of the people would be happy to hear of the defeat of the [French] ‘Grand Nation,’ which has abdicated the ideas of justice and humanity of which she has been the guardian since 1789.”22

Historian Ronald K. Huch identifies a British press that was quite brazen in its geopolitical motivations for covering the Dreyfus affair. Huch notes that there were protests throughout Britain after Dreyfus’s second conviction at Rennes, but the moment Dreyfus was pardoned, the country seemed to lose any sense of outrage regarding the affair. Thus, while a small number of British citizens continued their noble fight and claimed that a pardon was still unjust, most of the population felt as though their task had been completed. Huch argues that this reaction was no surprise, writing, “In England, the reaction to the Rennes trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.”23 In other words, the British had used the affair as a means of criticizing the French, stoking the centuries-old rivalry between the two
countries. The moment France realized the folly of its ways and pardoned Dreyfus, however, the British no longer had anything to gain from attacking the French. Put simply, the fate of Dreyfus himself was irrelevant.

The aforementioned “J’accuse” was unquestionably the spark that ignited much of the rhetoric surrounding the Dreyfus affair around the globe. This rhetoric had tangible consequences for French citizens living abroad. Indeed, in one February 1898 report sent to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rotterdam consul in the Netherlands warned that “business with our country is suffering from the current crisis. A certain number of travelling French commerce agents have been recently recalled by their firms because they have not been able to conduct any business.”

Reports such as this one solidified the belief within the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the spread of anti-French commentary across Europe had to be halted.

In Amsterdam, the French consul general reported that many of Zola’s pamphlets had been translated into Dutch and were now appearing in the windows of libraries across the city. Equally concerning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the fact that two pro-Dreyfus French newspapers, Le Siècle and L’Aurore, were beginning to emerge on the shelves of small boutiques in the Netherlands. The Amsterdam consul concluded that, since these newspapers were not being sold in the official kiosks that had a monopoly on the sale of foreign newspapers, they must have been coming directly from Paris as a propaganda tool to sow anti-French discord. Hanotaux found this development so troubling that he forwarded the consul general’s message to his superior, Prime Minister Jules Méline, and to his colleague in the French cabinet, Minister of War Jean-Baptiste Billot. The subtext in Hanotaux’s action is clear: the French government may not have been able to censor Le Siècle or L’Aurore within its own borders, but it certainly could attempt to prevent the illegal smuggling of these Dreyfusard papers throughout Europe.

In attempting to control the foreign press’s access to
French newspapers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached out to diplomats in neighboring countries. Only three days after Hanotaux received the news from his consul in Amsterdam, the Ministry of the Interior sent him a separate message, asking Hanotaux to telegraph his German counterpart to see if *L’Aurore* was sold there too.²⁷ The French suspected that the newspaper had made its way to Germany either through Belgium or the Netherlands. Still, there is no evidence that the French government solicited the Germans to ban the sale of *L’Aurore*. Rather, it is likely that the French were attempting to uncover the extent of the smuggling of the newspapers, which they could then address internally by preventing them from ever leaving France illegally in the first place.

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Although the French government had to exercise some degree of caution in controlling the press abroad, it felt much more freedom in pursuing censorship of the arts, particularly the theater. Even France itself, which had almost fully liberalized its press laws in 1881, did not end censorship of the theater until 1906. This was in part because in the mid-nineteenth century, the theater was considered even more influential than the press, as it was one of the only ways through which the illiterate masses could be exposed to political caricature and criticism of the ruling elites. However, as the century progressed and the masses became more literate, the printed word surpassed plays as a more powerful medium for influencing public opinion. Nevertheless, the French government remained invested in censorship of theatrical productions sympathetic to Dreyfus. In particular, the production of a play entitled “Dreyfus, or the Martyr of Devil’s Island,” which quickly spread across Europe, preoccupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. In a letter dated January 17, 1898, French diplomats in Belgium first notified Minister Hanotaux about the play’s existence. Hanotaux and the French consul of Antwerp then worked together to find a way to outlaw the performance altogether. Despite their efforts, the play’s popularity persisted and performances were carried out on a regular basis in countries such as Italy and the Netherlands. Although the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of the Italian government, was able to suppress a production of the play being staged in San Remo, Italy, Dreyfus’s mass appeal rendered the play too difficult to suppress entirely. Indeed, not long after receiving the positive news regarding San Remo, Hanotaux confided to his consul in Amsterdam, “Are these performances still going on? I can only regret that they haven’t been forbidden like they were in The Hague.”

French efforts to suppress theater productions brought mixed results. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
did enforce the interdiction of some performances, particularly in countries that maintained strong and beneficial diplomatic relations with France. Unlike major European powers such as Britain or Germany, smaller European states understood that there was little to gain from consistently tarnishing France’s world standing. As a result, these smaller countries were more sympathetic to France’s plight. As one Italian newspaper proclaimed, “We love France and we wish her only the best: we hope she stays in Europe as a leader of civilization rather than of barbarism.”31 These smaller European states were perhaps also wary that a similar scandal could befall them one day in this new mass media environment—they understood that by helping France now during this time of need, they could rely upon the country to return the favor at a later date.

Even for those European governments that did sympathize with France, enacting censorship necessitated a calculation between the benefit of helping France versus the social cost of enacting overly harsh suppression. In Amsterdam, for example, the French were unable to convince Dutch diplomats to ban the production of “Devil’s Island.” On January 26, 1898, the Amsterdam consul general broke the news to Hanotaux, writing, “A prohibition would only create in the press an ardent polemic; the legality and the opportunity would be contested…It would be a redoubling of commotion, extra publicity from which only those amateurs seeking scandal would benefit.”32 This must have come as a disappointment to Minster Hanotaux, but the failure illustrates the complicated position occupied by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it came to the coverage of the Dreyfus affair abroad. Although the press was much more of a threat to public opinion given its ability to reach and affect more people, it was nearly impossible to censor the scandal through diplomatic channels due to the widespread freedom of the press laws in Europe. All that was left to censor, then, were the cheap and often poorly attended “Boulevard theater” productions, such as “The Captain Dreyfus,” which was staged in Hamburg, Germany, in
February 1898. According to one Frenchman who attended the play on behalf of the French consul, the spectacle was terrible. “Poorly directed and without any artistic value,” he wrote, “there were at least as many whistles as there was applause.”

An advertisement for an American play based on the 1899 work *Devil’s Island: A Novel founded upon the famous Dreyfus case*. Though there is no evidence the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever sought to censor this particular production, plays such as this one were often the targets of censorship efforts led by the ministry.
The French efforts to censor negative press in the arts constitute an early form of so-called “cultural diplomacy.” This was, of course, unlike the cultural diplomacy of the Cold War, where cultural products were sent from the United States to the Soviet Union, and vice versa, in an effort to establish some degree of understanding between the two enemy powers. Instead, in the French context, cultural diplomacy was a strategy implemented as a means of shaping the cultural realm of foreign countries in a way that was beneficial to French interests. Such efforts at cultural diplomacy were not deployed solely by the French. After the Rennes retrial and the decision to convict Dreyfus, masses across Europe petitioned their respective governments to use cultural events to punish France. This took the form of calls to boycott the 1900 World’s Fair, which was to be held in Paris. These demands began as early as 1898, albeit more quietly. One German newspaper first made the suggestion after Zola was convicted for libel following the publication of “J’accuse.” The French took these concerns seriously, for the World’s Fair was anticipated to be not only an economic boon for France, but also an opportunity to celebrate the country’s history and glory as one of the great states of Europe. Any boycott would have been a serious blow both to finance and national pride. In September 1899, the French consul at Hamburg alerted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about a German news article that suggested a boycott and also noted that “many very important American businesses have made the decision to send nothing to the Exposition if the situation does not improve, and the business world in England is set to follow this example as well.” As Michael Burns notes in his historical study of the 1900 World’s Fair and the Dreyfus pardon, the risk of losing the international festival played a significant role in pressuring the French government to pardon Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict. As Burns asserts,

[Prime Minister Pierre] Waldeck-Rousseau’s gov-
ernment quickly realized that a pardon would serve many purposes: it would eliminate the very real possibility of the prisoner’s death while in custody…The pardon would also serve to liberate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and thereby pacify many factions in France); and it would salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming international protest.  

Although the threats to boycott never derived from individual governments, the international community nevertheless exercised its own sort of pressure on France, much like France did in its suppression of foreign theater productions through cultural diplomacy.

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Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French made little if any effort to engage with or amend the portrayal of Alfred Dreyfus in the United States. Perhaps in that country, where freedom of speech was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of society, the French recognized that any requests for censorship would either not be accepted or not be upheld. That is not to say, however, that the French ignored American coverage of the Dreyfus affair altogether. And there was indeed tremendous coverage of the scandal in the United States, which continued to crest leading up to and during the 1899 Rennes trial. As Egal Feldman, a scholar of Jewish American history, records in his book The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, for a country “aspiring to play a meaningful, if not heroic, role in the world, it was only natural that the attention of Americans would be attracted to major political and social crises abroad.” Much of the affair was transmitted to the United States through British media outlets—only a few newspapers based out of major cities in the United States could afford their own foreign correspondents to
travel to France and report on the unfolding events there—and consequently, a significant portion of American coverage began to reflect certain British idiosyncrasies and perspectives. Most notably, this manifested into what Feldman terms an “Anglo-American bond” in judicial procedures. A New York Times article from 1898 illustrates this tendency:

In France...there are no rules of evidence... Witnesses have appeared before the judges and have spoken their minds freely. They have not presented evidence. They have given their own opinions. They have expressed the opinions of others. They have repeated conversations that they have heard at second or third hand. All this is called testimony in Europe.

Much of this coverage can be interpreted as American self-congratulation. The not-so-subtle subtext in articles such as these was that Dreyfus’s conviction never could have occurred in a more civilized or democratic nation such as the United States, where judicial procedures and norms were much more rational. In this regard, American press coverage hardly differed from the self-aggrandizement that historian Ricky Lee Sherrod detected in his study of the British press.

On the other hand, the French judiciary undeniably tolerated a great deal of testimony that would have been impermissible in the United States. During the Rennes court-martial, for instance, former French Minister of War Auguste Mercier testified that German and British bankers had donated over thirty-five million francs to mysterious forces—frequently referred to in the anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusard press as the so-called “Jewish Syndicate”—who were working to exonerate Dreyfus. The French newspapers were left to rebut this claim, with one article in Le Figaro commenting, “Nothing is more unjust, nothing more slanderous, monstrous, however, than that accusation of Gen-
eral Mercier... It is an attempt to dishonor all those who fight for the triumph of the truth." Thus, in France, newspapers played the role of quasi-arbiter, condemning false testimony when the judicial structure failed to do so. Still, to an American public unfamiliar with the intricacies of French legal customs, testimony like Mercier’s was laughable and undermined justice.

The French were well aware of the growing power of the United States, and this sometimes manifested itself as unreasonable paranoia about the influence of the American press. The most pronounced instance of such fears transpired in December 1897, when Minister Hanotaux sent a letter to the New York consul marked “very confidential,” inquiring into an alleged plot orchestrated by the New York newspaper the World to free Dreyfus from Devil’s Island:

An individual who calls himself Antoine de Bastillac, and who has collaborated at the World in New York, recently passed through Paris, stating that he had participated in a plot that was organized a few months ago in the United States by the Israelite director of the newspaper to remove Dreyfus; he assures that the project will soon be restarted and that an expedition will be organized in Louisiana to this end, under the pretext of a shipment of arms to Cuba. Do your best to provide me information on Bastillac and on what he alleges. If need be, consult with your colleague in New Orleans.

That the French believed such a complex scheme to be plausible speaks volumes about their perception of the American press. Indeed, the French were so concerned about the possibility of such a plot that they even contacted Spain to request that the Spanish provide any intelligence they might have procured pertaining to the alleged conspiracy. Such a plan never materialized.
and was, of course, no more than an elaborate fiction. Yet the seriousness with which the French government processed and reacted to this warning reveals a deep-seated fear of the power of the American press.

If French government officials feared American newspaper influence, they also often expressed disdain for the negative coverage that so frequently emanated from the United States. The reports sent from the Chicago consul to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Rennes trial of 1899 were particularly indicative of this French sentiment, which contained a powerful mix of wounded pride and betrayal. In these letters, the Chicago consul compiled an impressive list of grievances against the United States. From criticism of the newspaper coverage itself, to jealousy over the country’s privileged position in the world, to dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of American society as a whole, these missives expressed in impassioned language the frustration felt by a proud Frenchman and diplomat serving his country in hostile isolation.

In one of the consul’s earliest letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated August 24, 1899, the diplomat noted with contempt that every single newspaper in Chicago was supporting Dreyfus. This was compounded by the fact that, curiously, many pro-Dreyfus Frenchmen had been contributing articles to the American press, which had infused the local coverage with a heretofore unseen tenacity and proximity to the story. As the consul in Chicago observed, “Numerous French writers such as Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Marcel Prévost, and Clemenceau contribute regularly to this extraordinary service of the American press, which we can say has been unanimously favorable to the condemned of 1894.” He later continued, “All good Frenchmen abroad cannot rid themselves of an incommensurate sadness in the presence of exaggerated interference of the foreign press in a family affair.” Implied in these musings of the consul was the belief that the foreign press took an interest in the Dreyfus affair not for noble reasons of justice, but instead due to
a voyeuristic fascination with watching and analyzing what he believed to be a private “family affair.” Thus, it must have been disheartening for the diplomat to hear from an American journalist that “It is good style now to run down France; it makes money; it shows to France that there is something else than herself and behind her in the world.”

Arguably the most fascinating aspects of these letters from the consul in Chicago were his own interpretations of American society near the turn of the twentieth century and the visible contradictions he discerned between the holier-than-thou tone expressed in American newspapers versus the actual news unfolding within the borders of the United States. Of particular interest was an anecdote reported by the consul in 1899, when a Jewish cadet was forced to leave the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, following repeated anti-Semitic treatment from his classmates. On this issue, the consul in Chicago noted that the American press remained silent. “It is, anyhow, the third incident of this sort that has occurred in recent years… We are getting used to being treated in the manner in which we treat China… At home, we cover up all things,” he mused, mimicking the American thought process, “but when we need to provide something exciting to our readers, we demand light, always more light on the affairs of France.”

If American anti-Semitism and hypocrisy were not already disgraceful enough, the consul also hurled accusations at the Americans for being fortunate geographically, yet ungrateful to the French, who had helped secure American independence over a century earlier:

If they had, to the west, a powerful Mexico possessing a fleet twice their size, and wealth, and an incommensurable means of attacking them, the press of this country would better understand the indignity of its current behavior against our nation, which has poured its blood and given its gold, even when it was weak and fighting almost...
without hope for its independence from which it has grown ever since.\textsuperscript{48}

The link between the foreign press and diplomacy was clear to the Chicago consul. In his view, the press was a tool with which geopolitical games could be conducted. This was by no means incorrect, for as has been noted earlier, the British press printed false stories about Dreyfus’s escape from Devil’s Island with the hopes that this would reignite the affair. Indeed, the British motivation for doing so was, as Ronald Huch contended, to help encourage anti-French sentiment and in turn promote the superiority of the British.\textsuperscript{49} The French diplomat in Chicago perceived many similarities in American press coverage, speculating that the country’s pro-Dreyfus sentiments stemmed from, above all, a desire for Anglo-American friendship: “I am convinced that the American press would not be so violent against us, if behind its movements existed the desire…to benefit their new British friends.”\textsuperscript{50} This is precisely what Egal Feldman speculates, referring to the Anglo-American friendship as “a rediscovery of a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, a ‘unique partnership’; proposals were even made for an alliance or reunion of the English-speaking people.”\textsuperscript{51} But the consul in Chicago was not only concerned with the burgeoning Anglo-American friendship. In a letter sent on September 10, 1899, the French diplomat also reported that Kaiser Wilhelm II recently sent a German flag to Chicago and remarked to an American that “a war between Germany and the United States would be impossible.”\textsuperscript{52} For the French, witnessing this condemnation from both Britain and Germany must have been a gravely concerning diplomatic development. Perhaps most frustrating of all was the fact that France was powerless to control the American press. With regards to the United States, therefore, France found itself in a subservient position, only able to express its displeasure in private dispatches sent back to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
Beyond Europe and the United States, France attempted to control the foreign discourse surrounding the Dreyfus affair with greater latitude, particularly in South America and India. No longer burdened by strictly enforced liberal freedoms granted to the press, the French could refocus their attention to influencing the printed word, which they never dared to do in Europe or the United States. Indeed, on September 19, 1897, Minister Hanotaux sent a telegram to the French consul in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. “I understand that certain Brazilian newspapers are covering the Dreyfus Affair in order to spread negative press about the government of the Republic,” the minister said, “I ask you to keep watch over this campaign, and if necessary, refute the noise put into circulation.”

The order coming from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs here was somewhat ambiguous—perhaps Hanotaux was using a euphemism to advocate for direct attempts at censorship of the Brazilian newspapers. Even if Hanotaux only meant for his consul in Rio to make a public denunciation of the Brazilian press, this still demonstrated a degree of direct intervention into another country’s foreign affairs that France did not even attempt to employ in Europe.

France still met some opposition in its quest to control the foreign press outside of Europe. Perhaps the most glaring failure came in British-controlled India, following a particularly incendiary sermon given by the bishop of Calcutta in September 1899. The speech, which was printed in its entirety in the local newspaper *The Englishman*, attacked the moral fiber of the French state for allowing the Dreyfus affair to transpire in the first place, despite the recent pardon of the artillery captain. The bishop began by lamenting the entire ordeal: “What has become then of those high principles of liberty, equality, and brotherhood of which France has been held to be the self-constituted exponent? What final interest can a nation possess save in truth and justice and equity?”

Next, he issued an attack on France,
denouncing the French people with a flourish:

There are conditions of a comity among nations as among individuals. We do not endow a man with our confidence if he has proved guilty of some flagrant crime; at least until he has repented of it. Nor can we stand upon friendly terms with a nation of men which has violated the elementary laws of human truth and justice.\(^{55}\)

Despite this disappointment in the French regime though, the bishop’s sermon concluded on an optimistic note:

Let us pray then that France, that great and gallant nation, may know ere it be too late “the things which belong unto her peace.” Let us pray that she may cast off the bondage of that military spirit which idolizes and sanctifies mere force. Let us pray that she may turn her back upon the unhappy policy which has too often in public life ignored or dishonoured the sacred name of God. Let us pray that in her national history she may recognize and realise yet again the eternal principles of truth and justice and equity.\(^{56}\)

Unsurprisingly, the French found this sermon to be harsh and unacceptable, going so far as to lodge an official complaint with the British colonial government.\(^{57}\) Citing a number of different passages from the sermon, including one in which the bishop advocated a boycott of the 1900 World’s Fair, the French consul general in Calcutta claimed that the sermon was “injurious” and “an act of hostility against France.” Three weeks later, the French government received a response from the colonial government, which refused to apologize for the bishop’s behavior:
The government of India can accept no responsibility for statements on matters of current interest that may be uttered from the pulpit either by the metropolitan or by any Bishop or minister of religion in India. Such a responsibility is not, so far as the government of India are aware, assumed by the civil power in any country; and it would appear to be fatal to that freedom of thought and speech with which the pulpit among all civilized peoples is, by virtues of its moral and spiritual authority, endowed.\textsuperscript{58}

This controversy helps reveal a crucial element of the French response to the foreign press: the French government was concerned not only with newspaper coverage pertaining to the Dreyfus affair, but also with the spread of information pertaining to Dreyfus more generally, whether it be a sermon or a theater production. Nor did these goals seem to have any sort of geographic limits—indeed even India, which was neither a French colony nor close to the European continent, was not exempt from receiving the attention of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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That the French government invested so many resources in the monitoring of the foreign press served as a tacit acknowledgement that the foreign press was among the primary engines driving the scandal of the Dreyfus affair. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a rather simple strategy when it came to controlling coverage of the affair: limit any discourse, positive or negative, pertaining to Alfred Dreyfus. The hope was that by limiting any kind of knowledge, foreign populations would eventually lose interest in the drama of the affair. Given the links between
foreign and French publications, this strategy might have served as a means of minimizing French interest in the affair as well.

As a result, within Europe the French government looked to control those elements of the press that it could manipulate with ease. This frequently meant wielding France’s close diplomatic ties to its neighbors to engage in a sort of “cultural diplomacy,” by which France could convince other countries to suppress certain theater productions about Dreyfus. In this cultural realm, however, France experienced limited victories. The theater had been the primary means of disseminating information to the masses in the mid-nineteenth century, but by the turn of the twentieth century, the masses of Europe began to receive much of their information from the press. And when France turned its sights to this newly influential European press, other states’ liberal press laws severely limited the country’s ability to restrict the growing discourse of the Dreyfus affair.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the French experienced no successes of any sort. The American press viewed the Dreyfus affair as a means of solidifying its friendship with Britain and felt especially secure in knowing that the French could not censor them in any way. The only arena in which the French government could attempt to control both the press and the cultural sphere, therefore, was outside of the United States and Europe. Even in these cases, however, the French experienced opposition. In a humiliating display of its own weakness, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not even manage to quell the anti-French rhetoric of an anonymous preacher in the British imperial colony of India. This incident served to demonstrate both the incredible spread of information about Dreyfus’s plight, as well as the inability of France to control foreign engagement with the scandal.

Confronted by a new era in which the press acted as the engine of knowledge and scandal in the world, the French were presented with a Sisyphean endeavor when it came to limiting the scope of the Dreyfus affair. These forces would only con-
continue to swell in the coming twentieth century, as newspapers continued to exert a massive influence on society. Indeed, in the years leading up to the First World War, the German government also began to closely monitor the press as a means of gauging public opinion. It too viewed the press as a device with which it could track and potentially influence the public. The Germans would soon find, as the French had before, that their patriotic press was ultimately impossible to control. The British would also come to learn this lesson, for in 1909, the famous “We want eight and won’t wait!” slogan propagated by the patriotic press and naval armament interest groups compelled the Liberal government to double its annual dreadnought production from four to eight ships. These were the same underlying forces that gripped France during the affair. The Dreyfus affair was thus a preview of the powerful mass media and domestic pressures that would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
An Affair on Every Continent

NOTES

2 Ibid, 65.
4 Ibid.
6 One of the main forgers, Colonel Hubert-Joseph Henry, confessed to his transgression and committed suicide in 1898, one year before Dreyfus’s retrial. The artillery captain’s second trial, therefore, was widely expected to exonerate him. One pro-Dreyfus French newspaper, *Le Siècle*, even wrote in advance of the trial that “the result is no longer doubtful.”
7 Archives Diplomatiques, Relations Franco-Allemagnes, NS 58.
8 Ibid.
10 Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF), NAF 16823.
11 In other words, the significance of this dispatch, which was no more than 150 words in length, required the message to traverse two continents, four countries, and three separate languages.
12 BnF, NAF 28046 (29).
14 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53. In a statement given nearly a year later in 1898, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, confirmed his government’s desire to stay out of the Dreyfus Affair. Bülow commented, “Even if they did exist, we should not admit the alleged relations between Mr. von Schwartzkoppen and Esterhazy, as such an indiscretion would render much more difficult the process of procuring information from agents in the future…Our principle interest is to rest as far outside the Affair as possible.” Thus, while Bülow hoped for a long and drawn-out affair at France’s expense, the German minister of foreign affairs hoped such a scenario would transpire without German diplomatic involvement. For more, see Éric Cahm, “L’Affaire Dreyfus dans la presse quotidienne allemande 1897-1899,” in *L’Affaire Dreyfus et l’opinion publique* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1995), 215–228.
15 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53. Note that in some cases, French diplomats translated the names of foreign newspapers into French. This appears to be
one of those cases.
16 Ibid.
18 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53.
19 Sherrod, “Images and Reflections,” 38.
21 Sherrod, “Images and Reflections,” 40.
22 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 54.
24 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 54.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53.
30 Ibid.
31 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 58.
32 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53.
33 Ibid.
36 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 58.
39 Ibid, 23.
42 Ibid.
43 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53.
44 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 58.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 For more, see Ronald K. Huch, “British Reaction to the Dreyfus Affair,” and Sherrod, “Images and Reflections.”
50 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 58.
52 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 58.
53 Archives Diplomatiques, NS 53.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.

Images
Page 45: Courtesy of the Lorraine Beitler Collection of the Dreyfus Affair, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.

Page 48: Courtesy of the Lorraine Beitler Collection of the Dreyfus Affair, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.

Page 56: Courtesy of the Lorraine Beitler Collection of the Dreyfus Affair, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.

Page 59: Courtesy of the Lorraine Beitler Collection of the Dreyfus Affair, Kislak Center for Special Collections, Rare Books and Manuscripts, University of Pennsylvania.
And there are certain definite duties of the student at Harvard…He must be a gentleman. A gentleman respects tradition. And the traditions at Harvard are quiet traditions. Nothing so bespeaks a vulgar and impoverished intellect as noise in word or action.
—The Harvard Crimson, 1926

College Windows, a FLIRTATION, Moonshine, gin, HALLUCINATION; This is part of EDUCATION Living in our GENERATION.
—The Punchbowl, 1925

During the 1920s, youth symbolized modernity, progress, and development as a young generation of Americans espoused new values and served as a lightning rod for social change. Collegemen epitomized these transformations as they confronted the values of their educational institutions and asserted unique aspects of their identities, which they believed separated them from the previous generation. Through on-campus protests, open defiance of Prohibition, and a cavalier attitude toward academics, collegiates defined a new type of masculinity that challenged authority and prioritized peer approval. In addition to these changes, historians cite the increased prominence of college sports (particularly football) and fraternities as evidence of a dramatic transition from an internal, character-based model of masculinity to an external, personality-based model. However, a close examination of college records and student publications reveals that many young men attending Harvard, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania in this decade sought to retain key
aspects of character-based masculinity (such as honor, integrity, and self-sacrifice) while incorporating features of the more modernized version (such as social popularity, physical appearance, and self-indulgence). Their lived experiences call into question the existing historiography by suggesting that notions of masculinity did not shift in an abrupt or absolute manner in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{5} Campus activities that promoted male bonding and school spirit became more significant in this era but were also present in previous decades, revealing continuity in forms of masculine affiliation and rituals across generations. Furthermore, many young men at elite universities struggled to incorporate disparate and opposing notions of masculinity into their identities. They adopted a complex, multifaceted construct of manhood that simultaneously anchored them to the past and allowed them to embrace the new values of a modernized society.

\textbf{Peer Culture and Intergenerational Conflict}

In the 1920s, due to increased enrollment in college\textsuperscript{6} and the establishment of a “network of peer relations,” youth suddenly burst onto the social scene and became influential in American society.\textsuperscript{7} The devastation of World War I significantly affected the mentality of young people, creating a profound sense of disillusionment coupled with an urgency to live life to its fullest.\textsuperscript{8} Consequently, members of the younger generation sought to differentiate themselves from the older generation, blaming their elders for leading the nation into war. In his 1920 article, “These Wild Young People,” John F. Carter Jr. makes the resentment of youth explicit:

\begin{quote}
I would like to observe that the older generation had certainly pretty well ruined this world before passing it on to us…We have been forced to live in an atmosphere of “to-morrow we die,” and so, naturally, we drank and were merry…We may
\end{quote}
In this indictment, Carter distances youth from the older generation, a dynamic that fueled the importance of peer affiliations. The primary sphere of influence for youth shifted from authorities to peers, a transition that was especially dramatic for college men who operated within a subculture separate from the outside world. From the time freshmen arrived on campus, they confronted a new social order and sought the acceptance of their peers. In 1925, Yale’s Eli Book provided the following advice to freshmen: “here in college we find ourselves in a world teeming with men of about our own age whom we meet at every turn, going to the same places, doing pretty much the same things, living all about us in the Oval. From among these we are going inevitably to choose our associates and our friends.” As reflected in this statement, students valued college as an avenue through which they could form social connections, strategically positioning themselves for later success. The locus of influence naturally shifts from parental authority to peer approval when youth leave for college. However, this transition may have been more dramatic during this era, as young men felt compelled to differentiate themselves from the older generation and empowered themselves through the expansion and idealization of youth culture.

In their eagerness to identify with peers, college men emphasized modern values, adopting habits of dress and behavior that helped them fit in. They conformed to a set of standards that defined a new type of masculinity, setting them apart from their fathers. A 1923 ad featured in The Harvard Crimson captures this tendency. As a young, clean-shaven man compares himself to a picture of his heavily mustached father, he draws attention to the contrast in their appearances: “And Dad was my age when he sat for that!” On a superficial level, this ad conveys the message that a more youthful look can be achieved by
purchasing the featured shaving cream. However, on a symbolic level, the dual image in the ad exaggerates the clash between generations of men who subscribed to different values. Young men grounded themselves in a changing world by highlighting these contrasts. By rejecting certain characteristics they saw in their fathers, collegiates defined their identities in opposition to these images and aligned themselves with their peer culture.¹⁸

This ad plays off a stark contrast between a young man and his father.
Anchored by their social communities, emboldened college men challenged institutional authority and envisioned themselves as the vanguard of cultural change. Their sense of self-importance is evident in a speech by Hannibal Hamlin on Yale’s Class Day in 1927: “CLASSMATES—You are the apostles of change...You are 1927, typifying nothing and representing everything...The Class of 1927 is pointed to as the end of an old era, as the beginning of a new era, and as the transition between the two.” Hamlin’s impassioned speech suggests that collegiates recognized this era as a liminal period between old and new values. They viewed themselves as both unique and the product of generations who came before them. Elite universities fostered a sense of connection to the past by reminding students of their place in a long lineage of cultivated leaders. Schools expected students to appreciate their pedigree and to make the institution a cornerstone of their identity. Yale collegiate E. J. Begien made this agenda evident in his address to the freshman class of 1926: “You are coming to New Haven to be for four years a part of that process whereby Yale men are made...[and] each man...will add to the store for the generations to come.” These socially conservative institutions promoted Victorian values, and collegiates carried the mantle of their school’s legacy upon their shoulders. While college men in the 1920s still clung to an institutional identity that offered them social prestige (expressing pride about being a “Yale Man” or a “Harvard Man”), they also railed against the old order and tested the bounds of established authority.

**Boys Behaving Badly**

College men of this era had a reputation for self-indulgence, personal vanity, and lack of restraint. In mass media representations, collegiates were depicted as rambunctious, rebellious, and immoral. While this portrayal was stereotyped and flat, a review of student records reveals that it held more
than a grain of truth. Archival sources indicate that college men bonded with each other by transgressing laws, bending rules, and behaving mischievously. These peccadillos were a central way in which young collegiates enacted their masculinity, illustrating the connection between behavior and gender construction. Feminist theorist Judith Butler explains that individuals rehearse, perform, and repeat gendered actions in order to fulfill social scripts. Men of the 1920s “performed” their manhood through rebellious actions during Prohibition, a so-called “Dry Decade.” Historian Paula Fass identifies alcohol consumption in this era as a ritualized masculine behavior: “unlike the other moral issues of the twenties, drinking was a male-centered problem…but drinking had always been a male prerogative.” Collegetes consumed alcohol at parties and at football games, openly demonstrating their disregard for the law. They used alcohol as a signifier of manly defiance and carefree living. Historian Nicholas Syrett explains that since drinking in the 1920s represented “a defiance not only of the college administration but also of federal law,” drinking became a key way to demonstrate masculine bravado within one’s peer group. For example, the 1927 Yale Class book included humorous comments from students that linked college life with alcohol consumption. When asked, “What do you think is Yale’s greatest need?” a student responded, “Repeal of 18th Amendment.” When asked, “What is your chief regret in regard to your college career?” one student said “Prohibition,” while another quipped, “Not drinking more.” Rather than feeling the need to hide the fact that they engaged in this illegal activity, collegiates at Yale (and other Ivy League schools) openly flaunted their drinking habits. By failing to enforce the law, school administrators provided an opportunity for collegiates to bond through rebellious acts.

Many college men broke with the gentleman-like conduct stressed by their upbringing and were prone to mischievous behavior. They played practical jokes, engaged in demonstrations, and took collective action over minor grievances. For
instance, students at Harvard, who were tired of being served the same food, protested through an “egg rebellion.”\textsuperscript{33} Yale athletes, celebrating a football victory over Harvard, carried away the goalposts as “Souvenirs.”\textsuperscript{34} In the classroom, students often created chaos, showing little interest in academics and minimal respect for their professors. In fact, students sometimes threw objects (such as raw eggs) at their professors during lectures.\textsuperscript{35}

During this era, school-wide rituals became immensely popular, particularly those that pivoted on class rivalry. At the University of Pennsylvania, these events occurred with such regularity that they became a routine part of college life: “Throughout the school year, the freshmen would struggle to meet the challenges set by the sophomores as a rite of passage into the privileged world of the University.”\textsuperscript{36} One annual ritual in the 1920s was an event in which sophomore and junior architecture students at Penn fought over the right to wear smocks (to signify the dominance of their class), resulting in mudslinging and tearing clothes off one another.\textsuperscript{37}

This 1929 photo at the University of Pennsylvania shows the Smock Fight.\textsuperscript{38} According to scholar Amey Hutchins, students “hurled eggs and mud.”\textsuperscript{39}
Several of the rituals at Penn became so popular that they drew spectators from the city of Philadelphia to the campus. However, the level of rowdiness was sometimes difficult to contain, and there were a few occasions when such events brought negative attention to the school. Such was the case with the annual “Pants Fight,” an end of the year event that started in 1922 in which freshmen and sophomores engaged in a brawl, culminating in the losers being stripped of their pants. In May 1923, when a group of enthusiastic freshmen publicly advertised this fight by appearing on a trolley car wearing only their undergarments, “they drew gasps of horror from maids and matrons by trying to board a Woodland Avenue trolley car in which girls and women were passengers,” and they were promptly arrested for their indiscretion. School administrators valued interclass rivalries, which expanded in the 1920s, as a way of promoting class unity and school spirit. In fact, the annual “Flour Fight” and “Poster Fight,” which were physically dangerous (sometimes resulting in concussions and broken bones), were routinely at-
tended by faculty spectators who cheered and hissed at participants during the event. It seems that university administrators and collegiates alike viewed these organized fights as a natural part of manhood and as a way for new students to prove their worth as college men.

The majority of these rituals were intended to provide an outlet for expressing the playful vitality of youth and to foster male bonding. However, some incidents erupted into widespread rioting that created chaos and spilled over into the local community. Rioting at Harvard, Yale, and Penn had a contagion effect, starting on one campus and then spreading to the others in succession. In 1925, The Harvard Crimson published an editorial that applauded a recent incident of rioting at Yale: “Judging by newspaper accounts of it, the annual freshman riot at Yale was a great success.” These comments endorsing the rebellious behavior of Yale students may have encouraged collegiates at Harvard to act in a similar manner. Archival records indicate that rioting at Penn increased in frequency over the course of the decade with one riot in 1920, two riots in 1928, and four riots in 1929. Some students regarded these incidents as a source of amusement and an outlet for their pent-up energy. This tendency is exemplified in the aftermath of a riot in 1929, as students justified their behavior by stating: “We didn’t have any fun for a long time.” Thus, their pursuit of pleasure sanctioned the destruction of property and sometimes even led them to block authorities from controlling the situation. Students at Penn were suspected of burning down a fraternity house and then jeering at firemen when they arrived on the scene.

A well-publicized riot between Harvard students and the local police force in 1927 illustrates how peer bonding in collegiate communities empowered men to act in a disruptive way. While attending a show at University Theatre, students (who may have been intoxicated) threw “eggs and vegetables at the actors” and produced a “shower of coins” on the stage. As students left the show, a “great deal of horseplay from the
crowd” resulted, and when police rushed to the scene, they hit a student over the head with a stick. During the subsequent legal proceedings, collegiates took a bold stance: they defended one another in court by shifting the blame to local police officers rather than taking responsibility for their own actions. Students testified that the police officers were deliberately violent towards them and were overheard bragging to one another: “we licked [the collegiates] good and proper.” An editorial from The Harvard Crimson entitled “Riot or Assault?” reinforced the perception that the students were victimized by declaring: “there was no riot until wagon loads of police charged the crowd…The police, in other words, created a riot before quelling it.” Testimony offered by both sides suggests that generational and class differences played a part in fueling the conflict between these men.

In some instances in which young men acted out, authorities allowed them great latitude and were reluctant to impose sanctions even when their infractions were dramatic. Following the Freshman Riot of June 4, 1923, Yale parents and administrators exhibited ambivalence about enforcing institutional compliance, suggesting that masculine standards of behavior were in flux. During this event, freshmen threw bottles out of their dorm windows, dumped buckets of water outside, shot firecrackers at lamps, threw burning paper, and even destroyed city property, forcing the fire department to come. Administrators estimated that 341 of the 789 members of the class (a staggering 43%) participated in the riot. School officials initially felt pressed to respond in a harsh manner, as these students not only vandalized public property but also stepped outside the bounds of what was considered appropriate conduct of a Yale Man. After much deliberation, administrators decided to ban participants from sports for the first term of the following year. While this was the most lenient option out of several considered, it was enough to trigger a wave of protest letters from parents who, in almost every instance, insisted that their son was being punished
too harshly, was an honorable boy, and had barely contributed to the ruckus.66 Under pressure from angry alumni and parents, school authorities quickly overturned their ruling.67

As revealed in their letters, Yale parents ascribed the riotous behavior of their sons to youthful impulses and did not consider their actions to reflect poorly on their character. This attitude suggests that they adopted changing views of masculinity, granting greater tolerance for behaviors that might have been considered unacceptable in their own generation.68 Through their interference, the older generation validated peer influence and endorsed the concept of adolescence as a distinct stage of life that extended through the college years.69 This tendency is evident in the way that a Yale parent admonished the administration (rather than his own son) by appealing to a naturalized view of gender: “Extra curriculum activity furnishes the main outlet for the surplus team of youth, and by repressing it, you destroy your safety valve and thereby increase your hazard...boys will be boys.”70 When the young men involved in this riot committed acts of defiance, their parents excused their poor behavior and irresponsibility rather than upholding the institution’s moral code. This attitude not only signaled a shift in the expectations of male behaviors, but also reflected a sense of elite privilege. These incidents illustrate how manifestations of college masculinity reflected a complex mosaic of on-campus culture, class values, and broader social changes.

SECRET SOCIETIES AND FRATERNAL MASCULINITY

College men prioritized forms of exclusive male bonding at this time due to a confluence of factors. At the turn of the century, an influx of immigrants to the United States from eastern European countries led to increased cultural heterogeneity.71 Penn’s Quaker heritage and its greater degree of diversity made the process of absorbing these students less disruptive (and less threatening) than at Harvard and Yale, institutions that prided...
themselves on their traditional Anglo-Saxon roots. As their social environment was altered by newcomers from more diverse and less desirable backgrounds, it became more important for students to carve out special spaces for themselves on campus.

Yale University, with “its distinctive—and professedly meritocratic—social system,” bestowed prestige upon a select group of students who were “tapped” for membership into secret societies during the spring semester of their junior year. Societies such as Skull and Bones, Scroll and Key, Wolf’s Head, and Elihu represented a longstanding tradition at Yale, but membership took on special meaning in the 1920s as a way of reinforcing class distinctions within the student body. Since selection for senior societies was based heavily on a student’s contribution to the Yale community through leadership positions, the competition to rise to the top of the school’s social hierarchy was fierce. However, this system became self-perpetuating as certain groups of students were denied leadership opportunities (and sometimes even membership) in extracurricular clubs. Students who had come to Yale directly from public schools (rather than preparatory schools) and those who were Jewish were at a disadvantage, as the former were rarely “tapped” for membership and the latter were altogether excluded.

Social class was clearly required for initiation. Yale’s secret societies thus ensured a separate social space—one of enviable distinction—for young men of means who reflected its Anglo-Saxon ideal.

Select clubs were also a part of the undergraduate culture at Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania, albeit to a lesser degree. Through the years, generations of Harvard men vied for spots in Final Clubs such as Porcellian, AD, Fly, Spee, and Delphia, which mirrored Yale’s senior societies in function and status. These Final Clubs had a long-standing tradition of selecting well-groomed men from the most prominent social circles, favoring students who were legacies or came from elite boarding schools. Many of those selected, such as Theodore Roosevelt, went on to become national leaders, highlighting the
importance of this avenue for establishing connections.\textsuperscript{80} Penn also established senior societies, including the Mortarboard, Friars, and Sphinx in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{81} Although these clubs were not cloaked in the same mystery as those at Yale and Harvard, they were also based on leadership and sociality. Thus, there was an imperative at all three universities for students to develop their social capital so that they might be recognized as the quintessential collegiate by their peers.\textsuperscript{82}

While fraternities were less selective than these senior societies, they were also an important part of campus culture, providing a way to assert aspirational masculinity. Although fraternities had existed for a long time at these elite universities, they increased in status and prominence during this time.\textsuperscript{83} In fact, the 1920s witnessed a large growth in fraternity membership, indicating the rising popularity of this form of male homosociality.\textsuperscript{84} Nicholas Syrett notes both the continuity and progression of this tradition:

The seeds of 1920s fraternal masculinity had been planted long before the dawn of the twentieth century: the reverence of athletics and of other extracurricular involvement, the exclusivity...None of this was particularly new. Novel, however, was the degree to which all of these elements were emphasized among fraternity men... Fraternity men’s actions were by definition the most cutting edge, the most worthy of emulation—in short, the most collegiate. To be popular on campus, one played by fraternity rules almost without exception or one did not play at all.\textsuperscript{85}

Fraternities had special appeal because they not only perpetuated social distinctions within the student body, but also provided a clear model of masculinity, regulating standards of behavior at a point when ambiguity, uncertainty, and role confu-
cision characterized college life. They offered young, impressionable men the chance to bond with others who held similar values and behaved in comparable ways. During rush, fraternities enabled student-judges to exclude classmates who did not meet their subjective notions of social worth. An article from the Yale Daily News described the process of selecting fraternity brothers, declaring: “The essential requirements are…conventionality and conformance to a certain social standard.” Here, it is important to note that students constructed these standards so that the fraternities mirrored their own values. Thus, through this process, fraternities reinforced a limited notion of masculinity that was passed down from one generation of brothers to the next, ensuring continuity and conformity within the system.

From the start, fraternities aimed to promote a specific form of masculinity. In fact, the process of rushing was likened to dating, in which a potential brother experienced “calling and hold-offs.” As students attended smokers at the most prestigious fraternities, “judges” would question them about their family background, financial status, dating life, and activities. Fraternities looked for students who, in addition to having the right pedigree, demonstrated a fun-loving nature and a certain mischievousness endemic to masculinity at this time. In a 1923 letter to the editor of the Yale Daily News, a recruit recalled how he was spurned during this process. When the student explained at a fraternity house that he did not drink alcohol, his interviewer promptly “emptied his mouthful of cigarette smoke into [his] face and passed onto the next candidate.” Thus, in this situation, peers selected the type of men with whom they wanted to associate, favoring those who displayed a similar rowdiness and disregard for institutional authority.

Fraternities had a significant impact not only in determining which traits were socially desirable, but also in raising the social capital of those men selected to join, setting in motion a self-perpetuating system of elitism. An editorial from The Pennsylvanian noted, “seldom is it that a worth-while man does not
receive a bid from at least one house.”\textsuperscript{93} This statement reflects the belief that if a collegiate was not pursued by at least one fraternity, he was not considered to be socially desirable. Such a rejection was perceived by other college men as a sign of personal deficiency rather than a reflection of a flawed selection process that favored cronyism.

Since men on campus were judged on their fraternity affiliation, freshmen felt pressured to get in with the good crowd from the start of their tenure in college. A 1923 editorial from \textit{The Pennsylvanian} acknowledged that successful rushing mattered to freshmen “because it will have a great bearing on the three and one-half years that remain of [their] college career.”\textsuperscript{94} The social clout of fraternities (an intangible quality) was concretized through the fraternity pin, which became a coveted possession. As a status symbol, it elevated the prestige of its owner through his conspicuous display of the pin. In fact, the fraternity pin carried so much social currency that it was featured prominently

Advertisers used the image of the fraternity man to emphasize the importance of consumerism and appearance.\textsuperscript{95}
in collegiate films of this era such as *The Fair Co-Ed*. Some men regarded their fraternity membership as a key marker of their masculine identity, granting them social prominence on campus. In *The Plastic Age*, Hugh Carver notes that his pin was “a sign that he was a person to be respected and obeyed; it was pleasant to be spoken to by the professors as one who had reached something approaching manhood.” Since fraternity culture promoted material consumption, appearance, and social conformity, advertisers played off these ideas to convince college men to buy their products. These ads revealed the ways in which fraternities endorsed and encouraged modernized elements of masculinity that were socially oriented and appearance-based.

However, fraternities were not solely linked to social status and superficiality; they also reinforced values of fidelity, civic duty, and scholarship. Some fraternities considered the moral standing of men before admitting them. Harvard’s chapter of Kappa Sigma summarized its selection process as follows: “We do not, therefore, pick men simply because they are athletes or literary wonders, but we try to get men of character.” Fraternities also encouraged community engagement through chapter-based programs and activities. For instance, Kappa Sigma at Harvard revealed plans to maintain scholastic achievement through peer advising. Their “Big Brother” or “Daddy” system was “intended to bring the newly initiated and younger men into closer contact with the chapter work, and, through the watchfulness of one of the older brothers, keep the younger fellow up in his studies if need be.” This program indicates that while promoting male bonding, fraternities also upheld the values of loyalty and service. One article from *The Pennsylvanian* explained that fraternities helped students “become better men; better qualified to assume positions of leadership; better qualified to help others.” Thus, fraternities sought to prepare men to take their place as leaders in business, industry, and professional fields.
Similar to fraternities, college sports reflected a nuanced construction of masculinity that combined social appearance with internal convictions. Displays of male physicality were celebrated during the 1920s, giving rise to the “Golden Age of Sports.” Scholar Michael Oriard postulates that interest in football grew in an uncertain time of masculinity: “Concern about… football was inevitably highest when American life seemed softest, in the 1920s.” Through football in particular, masculinity was publicly contested and proven. In the aftermath of World War I, college educators received a national directive to focus on sports. The records of President Lowell of Harvard testify to the growing interest in college athletics. Among his archived documents is a 1920 message from P.P. Claxton of the United States Commission of Education stressing the importance of physical endeavors for young males: “The highest ambition of every boy should be to become a man as nearly as possible perfect in body, mind and soul; fit and ready for all the responsibilities of manhood…Every boy should want to excel in boyish sport, and win and hold the respect of his fellows.” President Lowell retained this communication, which aligned with his commitment to expand athletic programs. College football had wide-ranging appeal, connecting to notions of nationalism, masculine strength, and fidelity, qualities that were especially prized at this time. One 1928 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post* placed the iconic image of a pilgrim side by side with a football hero, suggesting that these male figures were both emblematic of America’s culture, past and present.

While football had already been an important part of college life, it became commercialized in an unprecedented manner during this era as college enrollment increased and universities invested in expanding their athletic programs. The Yale Bowl, a massive stadium that could seat 80,000 individuals (the largest stadium since the Roman Coliseum), was constructed in prepa-
ration for future Yale-Harvard games.\textsuperscript{108} By the 1920s, athletics often dwarfed academics, an increasingly common phenomenon satirized in \textit{The Freshman}, a film in which Tate University was described as “a large football stadium with a college attached.”\textsuperscript{109} The immense popularity of college football was further evidenced by its rapidly growing fan base. Oriard explains that “[a] ttendance at college football games increased 119 percent in the 1920s, exceeding 10 million by the end of the decade, slightly more than for major league baseball.”\textsuperscript{110} As further evidence of this craze, news pertaining to football was plastered across the front pages of \textit{The Harvard Crimson} and \textit{The Pennsylvanian} on a daily basis and given significantly more coverage than other stories.\textsuperscript{111} As the weekends approached, these periodicals included glossy inserts that featured pictures of the school’s football team, biographies of individual players, and statistics about the home team and its rivals. Additionally, college newspapers regularly reminded students about upcoming games against important rivals and included ads that encouraged them to purchase cars, raccoon coats, and other big-ticket items in connection with attending these events.\textsuperscript{112}

Football became so visible that it naturally led to a glorification of the men who played it, increasing their popularity and prominence on campus.\textsuperscript{113} Since an athlete’s success “sold” his school to the broader public, students respected the sports heroes who brought honor to their institutions.\textsuperscript{114} An editorial from the \textit{Yale Daily News} described school spirit as “the flames which burn at the altar of the God of football,”\textsuperscript{115} and an editorial in \textit{The Harvard Crimson} remarked that athletes “cease to be mortal.”\textsuperscript{116} This deification elevated football to a sacred sport whose heroes were idolized by their peers. Percy Marks captured this tendency in his novel \textit{The Plastic Age}. As a professor upbraids his students for their shallow values, he exclaims: “Who are your college gods?…They are the athletes…And they are worshipped, bowed down to, cheered, and adored.”\textsuperscript{117} The professor’s dismissal of “false gods” reflects the tension between the
older and younger generations, as youth often prioritized athletics over academics and challenged the importance of traditional values.\textsuperscript{118}

However, while college sports featured externally-based aspects of masculinity (such as social status, physical vanity, and the pursuit of personal glory), they were also essential to campus life as they promoted aspects of character development in young men (such as loyalty, hard work, and honorable conduct).\textsuperscript{119} In fact, the football hero epitomized the ideal man because he straddled two worlds, the old and the new. He seamlessly manifested aspects of both the traditional model of masculinity and the more modernized version, earning both the praise of his elders and the esteem of his peers. The struggle to integrate these opposing forces is illustrated in F. Scott Fitzgerald's short story “The Bowl.” In this tale, protagonist Dolly Harlan plays football for the good of his team as well as to attain popularity and prestige. When his girlfriend Vienna tries to get him to quit football, she exposes his need for male attention, which was satisfied through the sport: “You’re weak and you want to be admired. This year you haven’t had a lot of little boys following you around…You want to get out in front of them all and make a show of yourself and hear the applause.”\textsuperscript{120} However, Dolly rejects this view and frames his participation as a noble act: “If I’m any use to them—yes [I’ll play].”\textsuperscript{121} Fitzgerald's story indicates that football not only served as a way of gaining popularity, but was also linked to traditional values, including self-sacrifice, loyalty, and filial obligation.

Elite universities endorsed athletic competition as a vehicle for promoting character development,\textsuperscript{122} often prioritizing this extracurricular activity above academics.\textsuperscript{123} Mather A. Abbott, a crew coach at Yale, explained that a thorough and sustained involvement in athletics would help to develop “character and manhood” in college men.\textsuperscript{124} Coaches like Abbott were entrusted with reinforcing moral values in the students they trained by modeling ideal behaviors themselves: “The coach is more than
a teacher; he is a character-builder; he molds personalities.”¹²⁵ By tying physical pursuits to personal virtues, college sports grew in importance and became self-justifying. Administrators held athletes to high moral standards and expected them to demonstrate honesty, great effort, and fair play when competing for their school. The “Athletic Code of Ethics,” which appeared in a 1922 issue of The Pennsylvanian, explained that the student-athlete must: “strive to carry more than [his] own burden, to do a little more than [his] share…To be unselfish in endeavor, caring more for the satisfaction which comes from doing a thing well than for praise.”¹²⁶ The imperative to maintain a “sportsmanlike ideal of honor” indicates that college sports promoted aspects of gentlemanly conduct among athletes, including honorable conduct and fair play.¹²⁷ By competing in this manner, sports produced “the greatest pride deep down in the individual that he is a Yale man or a Harvard man.”¹²⁸ Thus, college athletics provided students with a way to construct a nuanced concept of masculinity that integrated new and old values into their social repertoire.

CONCLUSION

The 1920s was a decade of youth, as the younger generation suddenly became visible and influential. Embracing new values, college students symbolized the broader national trajectory toward modernity and became objects of social criticism. As they emphasized the ways in which they were different from the previous generation, collegiates increasingly turned to peers to assert themselves and to shape their identities. In doing so, they challenged institutional authority, often created chaos on campuses, and prioritized the pursuit of social relations over academic studies. While these behaviors indicate new features of masculinity, there is also evidence of continuity in the extracurricular activities that collegiates pursued. Although senior societies, fraternities, and athletics had existed in previous generations, they became especially prominent during this era, fulfilling
an even more essential social function. These opportunities for male bonding reinforced conformity within select groups and maintained a culture of elitism. As students stretched to meet the competing demands of parents, school administrators, and peers, they navigated disparate social systems and expectations, weaving together multiple forms of masculinity rather than adhering strictly to one template. For these college men, the shift to a modernized version of masculinity was not monolithic or abrupt but instead was fluid and integrative.  

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Images


Page 89: “Browning, King & Co.,” ad, *The Pennsylvanian*, February 9, 1925. From the Collections of the University of Pennsylvania Archives.
In 1895, the United States and Great Britain found themselves in a state of crisis over a British intervention in Venezuela that had been sparked by a disagreement over the Venezuela-British Guiana border. Most American political elites sought to solve the issue by arbitration; many academic elites wished for their government to be as conciliatory as possible. During the crisis, a half-cowboy-half-politician named Theodore Roosevelt, then a candidate for the New York City mayoralty, wrote a letter to his alma mater’s newspaper stating his thoughts on the international debate in no uncertain terms: there was no time now, Roosevelt declared, for “stock-jobbing timidity” or “the Baboo kind of statesmanship,” nor was there any time for those who were “still intellectually in a state of colonial dependence on England.” The United States, according to Roosevelt, should insist upon the Monroe Doctrine in its fullest application, and, for good measure, “build a really first-class Navy.” Yet according to most historians, within two decades, Theodore Roosevelt had played a significant if not determinative role in laying the foundation for the Anglo-American “special relationship” that carried the two nations through the world wars.

Frederick W. Marks III, in his 1979 book *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt*, posits that “[Roosevelt] liquidated virtually every object of discord between the two countries and would probably have sought a more formal tie had he not feared the veto power of German and Irish-American voters.” Marks argues that Roosevelt’s seemingly cool attitude toward Britain was concealing his true desire, Anglo-American partnership, for the sake of political prudence in a largely Anglophobic country.
The Big Stick Split in Two

The main scholar of Theodore Roosevelt’s relationship with Great Britain, William N. Tilchin, argues that Roosevelt combined his own bombastic nationalism with a pro-British attitude, a sentiment he held because of the cultural affinities between American and British societies as well as his cherished relationships with British statesmen such as Cecil Spring-Rice, the best man at his second wedding. Tilchin writes that, from his grand geostrategic considerations down to his handling of minor details, Roosevelt played a pivotal role in nurturing Anglo-American relations.³

Howard K. Beale, the deliverer of a prolific set of lectures on Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University and the author of perhaps the most-cited work on the subject, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, argues that Roosevelt and his ardent companion Henry Cabot Lodge were indeed cold (if not somewhat hostile) toward the British in the early 1890s, but grew friendlier as their careers progressed. This friendliness grew, his narrative goes, after the Spanish-American War, when Britain refrained from censuring America like the other European powers.⁴ After describing Roosevelt’s fury toward Britain’s aforementioned incursion upon the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela, Beale posits that by 1898 Roosevelt had “developed a full-blown foreign policy based on the belief that the British and Americans shared common interests.”⁵ Beale propounds a view of Roosevelt’s actions toward Great Britain that he dubbed “the cementing of an Anglo-American entente”; in other words, Roosevelt helped consummate an informal but mutually understood relationship of diplomatic solidarity with Britain. His analysis is colored by the fact that Roosevelt “played England’s game” in the conferences and diplomatic skirmishes that led to the First World War.⁶

Scarce dissent is to be found on Theodore Roosevelt’s general affinity for England and his playing a major role in the building of the Anglo-American entente. Indeed, England and America began to deliberately form a friendly diplomatic
relationship beginning, at the latest estimate, in 1900, when Lord Lansdowne became the British secretary of state for foreign affairs. Furthermore, it is plain that Roosevelt had a respect for the affinities between American and British culture and that he had dear British friends in important diplomatic roles.

But the trend from wariness to entente in British-American relations was more a British phenomenon than an American one; the respect that Roosevelt found for British culture was not meaningfully different from the respect that he found for other nations as disparate as Russia, Germany, and Japan. Similarly, though Roosevelt’s greatest foreign friends were indeed British, he surrounded himself with an international coterie of Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Japanese, and Russians with whom he shared an immense mutual fondness. Yet one must go back to 1957 in order to find a historian who credits the strengthening of the bonds between England and America not to Theodore Roosevelt himself, but to people like John Hay, Lord Pauncefote, Henry White, or the general foreign policy establishments of England and America, or even to the mutual enmity toward Germany from both countries.

The historical facts, upon closer examination, cast the general conclusion of historians like Marks, Tilchin, Beale, and others in a suspicious light. Historical episodes involving both the United States and Britain reveal that Roosevelt was, even after 1898, often blatantly anti-British, while in fact other Republican actors worked to pacify Washington’s dealings with London. The general historical consensus thus fails to recognize that a diplomatic and political corps whose ideologies and affinities differed from Roosevelt’s levied a crucial influence on the actual comportment of his administration. In addition to obscuring the importance of other Republican policymakers, the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s foreign policy interprets his actions anachronistically through the screen of the world wars, attempting either to ascribe to him a foresight that he did not possess, or to fit him into a facile teleology of America’s
seemingly inexorable entente with Britain while ignoring the contingencies of that relationship. No history has adequately explained Roosevelt’s role in Anglo-American relations without falling into these traps of faulty historical reasoning.¹⁰

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BRITAIN, EUROPE, AND THE UNITED STATES

Britain, from at least the termination of her disastrous effort in the Second Boer War, had been in need of a new geopolitical approach. Before the imperial boom of the 1870s and 1880s, only Britain had anything more than a toehold in the wider world. Once the other European powers—save Austria-Hungary—crashed into Africa and Asia, Britain’s comparative naval and financial advantage began to wither. In the late 1890s, the British fought their disastrously long war in southern Africa against the Boers for three years, seriously draining their resources and their morale; at the same time, Britain and France nearly collided on their imperial frontiers. Under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany began the construction of a “risk fleet” to compete with the Royal Navy in the late 1890s, a clear threat against Britain’s traditional dominance on the sea.

The British realized that the “splendid isolation”—in actuality, unilateralism—that they had practiced for decades was no longer viable in an increasingly multipolar world order. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, the last great lion of British conservative statecraft and a staunch supporter of unilateralism, left office in 1902. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne had been working since 1900 on broadening Britain’s friendships and minimizing the number of her enemies, a task that became easier when Salisbury could impede him no longer. Although Lansdowne’s attempted overtures to Berlin were fruitless, the British successfully formed a naval compact with Japan in 1902, an “entente cordiale” with France in 1904, and a triple entente
with France and Russia in 1907.

Before all of this, however, Britain had made diplomatic overtures to the United States, even though many northern American statesmen—Senator Lodge foremost among them—publicly conveyed their detestation of both Britain’s antagonism toward American control of Hawaii and her stringent upholding of Canadian fishing rights. Nevertheless, the path to an unofficial Anglo-American entente was paved by Britain’s hostility toward Spain in 1898; the relationship was slowly brought to its consummation as Britain brought garrisons back from Canada. The British at this time were also beginning to negotiate over recognizing at least partial American rights to the future Isthmian canal—and was, therefore, tacitly toying with allowing full American dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

The diplomatic behavior of the United States was going through a set of changes at the turn of the century as well, perhaps even more profound changes than Lansdowne was to make in Britain. In 1898, the United States crashed onto the world scene in the Spanish-American War, taking the Philippines and other colonies. Roosevelt and his fellow “imperialist” Republicans such as Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and—though he only influenced policy indirectly—the historian Alfred Thayer Mahan had been working their way up the ranks of the Washington elite during the preceding decade, and by the late 1890s they were influencing naval affairs, the State Department, and the Senate. These men developed what Henry Cabot Lodge called the “Large Policy,” meaning worldwide American assertion. The Large Policy finally found its way into the Oval Office when Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency after the assassination of William McKinley in 1901.

The expansions, different as they were, of both Britain and the United States throughout the globe were in part subtended by cultural assumptions of civilizational superiority. These assumptions were the product of both Enlightenment thought and retroactive justifications of colonial control and
displacement. In the U.S., the Republican Party and progressive elites peddled imperial expansion in the lead-up to the Spanish-American War as synonymous with national honor; dominance in the Western Hemisphere became, therefore, an imperative for the sake of civilization and Christendom. Furthermore, not only did the British end up ceding hemispheric dominance to the United States for pragmatic reasons during this period, but they also held the selfsame cultural assumptions that made it appear valid. That published works of fiction, philosophy, and social and political thought began to flow in sharply increased volume between the U.S. and her motherland during the dawning hours of joint Anglophone global dominance was no coincidence.

England was reaching out for friends and allies at the same time that the United States began to seriously exert its power throughout the world; the friendship was, in a sense, natural. (German Weltpolitik had seemed always to stand athwart America’s aims at expansion; by virtue of the Anglo-German naval race and general rivalry, then, British and American diplomatic goals of the late nineteenth century found a somewhat organic alignment.) The historiographical consensus is that Roosevelt played a positive role in bringing about this alignment, which facilitated Anglo-American cooperation during both world wars. Among major historians on the subject, Howard Beale has the most generous view on when Roosevelt began to seriously cooperate with the British. By 1898, Beale argues, Roosevelt was basing his foreign policy on the palpable necessity of the Anglo-American understanding.

Yet Roosevelt, rather than favoring Britain categorically over Germany or other European powers, was far more erratic than historians have acknowledged. He was friendly toward the diplomats of Downing Street when Britain stood to advance American interests, but he could be shockingly pugnacious whenever Britain posed even a minimal threat to America’s geopolitical goals. Besides the latent trend that made an Anglo-American understanding propitious at the turn of the century,
it was Roosevelt’s diplomatic corps, including his Anglophilic Secretary of State John Hay, that truly made an effort to build the Anglo-American relationship that came to define later decades. The clearest case of the tension between the rabid “pro-American” style of Roosevelt and the Anglophilia of Hay and the State Department—and the importance of the structural trend of Anglo-American friendship—can be seen in the Alaskan boundary dispute of the early 1900s.

**Hay and Choate in Canada**

By the end of the nineteenth century, the spheres of both British Canada and the United States were growing; by the 1890s, they were bumping into each other. Roosevelt’s “pro-Americanism” reached a fever pitch in the face of this ever-so-mild and indirect abrasion between America and the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, which controlled Canadian foreign affairs at the time. In 1895, two years after a dispute between the British and the Americans over fisheries in the Bering Sea had been resolved by arbitration, then-New York City Police Commissioner Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge to say that “Great Britain’s conduct about the seals is infamous… [we should] seize all Canadian sailors as pirates.”

Roosevelt also expressed his wish to invade Canada as punishment for Britain’s half-violation of the Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. In late 1895, he wrote: “Let the fight come if it must; I don’t care whether our sea coast cities are bombarded or not; we would take Canada.”

(The Americans would most emphatically *not* have taken Canada; at the time of Roosevelt’s letter, Great Britain had fifty available battleships in the northern Pacific to America’s three).

Canadian-American—and, by extension, British-American—friction ebbed after 1895. The British Admiralty continued to worry about both American and German naval ambitions in the North Pacific, but the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902 eventually diminished the fears.
Street recognized that, in the event of a war with the United States in the coming decades, British ships would ineluctably be batted away from Canada’s Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence by the up-and-coming United States, which had established its Naval War College in 1884 and come under the leadership of a fire-breathing naval advocate in Roosevelt. Aside from a small fleet of submarines, the British abandoned their military presence in the Western Hemisphere, preferring to count on diplomatic courtship of the Americans and the loyalty of the Canadians.\(^1\) Still, the tension between America’s increasingly positive relations with Britain and America’s increasingly strained relationship with British Canada was the dialectic that defined the Anglo-American understanding in its infant stages.

The year 1900 saw the beginning of the Alaskan boundary question. According to the 1825 treaty that demarcated the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the line of separation was to “follow the summit of the mountains parallel to the coast” north of the Portland Channel. Yet the language was far too vague to draw an actual line, and an exact boundary had not been established.\(^2\) It is in fact unclear whether or not a mountain summit line parallel to the coast even exists. The treaty also included the phrase “winding of the coast” and referred to the “Portland channel” at points crucial for its own interpretation, neither of which is an obvious feature based on geography alone, and neither of which had been previously defined. The British/Canadians and the Americans each claimed two different lines that ran approximately northwest-southeast along the coast. Crucially, each side claimed control of a pass over the Lynn Canal, the key spot which controlled the headwaters and allowed for all riverboat transport in the area.\(^3\)

When gold was discovered in the Yukon in the 1890s, the Canadians pressed their claim for territories that were left ambiguous by the treaty. In January 1900, the American ambassador to London, Joseph Choate, made it clear that the United States would agree to an arbitrative tribunal on the matter.
Lansdowne, wishing to be as conciliatory as possible toward the Americans while still keeping the Canadians happy, saw the question as an unnecessary roadblock to an entente. With discussions between London and Washington about the nature of the future Isthmian canal becoming more serious by the week, the Alaskan boundary dispute became a major bargaining chip for both sides. As it was the most emotionally charged issue dividing the British and the Americans and was tightly linked to the future of transportation, trade, and naval power in the Western Hemisphere, the topic of Alaska’s boundary was the *sine qua non* of Anglo-American rapprochement.

Secretary of State John Hay sent a drafted proposal for the tribunal to Julian Pauncefote, envoy extraordinary and

![The Lynn Canal and the Skagway River.](image)

A gold discovery in the area would bring the United States and the British Empire into a pivotal near-confrontation.
minister plenipotentiary to the United States. The British were initially surprised and satisfied, but Pauncefoote reported that the judges would have very little interpretive power outside of the 1825 treaty, which was firmly in the United States’ favor. Canada and Governor-General Minto were at first “delighted,” but on further consideration of the precise terms, they considered the United States’ proposal “most insidious.”

Secretary Hay, as historians have noted and as was clear to his contemporaries, was willing and eager to bend U.S. policy in England’s direction. “In sum,” comments one Hay biographer, “under Hay’s direction, American neutrality was distinctly benevolent to England.” In the Alaskan situation, however, an American interest was directly involved. Once Roosevelt was in office, Hay could not nakedly alter U.S. policy to favor England, even though (as will be shown) he disagreed with President Roosevelt’s tacit idea that American claims in Alaska were more important than the prospective relationship between Washington and London. His willingness to arrange an arbitration only served to put him on thin ice as secretary of state. As Roosevelt would recall after Hay’s death, he was simply “not to be trusted on issues concerning England”—and, as an important corollary, he was “foolishly distrustful of the Germans.”

Fortunately for the Americans, a canal treaty with England was in its final stages and Lansdowne was determined not to jeopardize it. Lansdowne’s secretary wrote to his counterparts in the British Colonial Office that Lansdowne wished that the communications to the Dominion Government should not in any way imply that His Majesty’s Government associate the settlement of the Alaskan Boundary and other primarily Canadian questions with that of the Interoceanic Canal question, or that the negotiations for the… Treaties are interdependent.
Lansdowne and Hay, therefore, were committed to an amicable resolution of the issue. It was Roosevelt who stood as an inhibitor of the trend toward conciliation.

**Hay vs. Roosevelt in Canada**

Canada already stood on shaky legal ground. That her mother country of England was unwilling to throw weight behind the Alaskan issue only worsened her hopeless situation. The British, as Canadian Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier knew, would frown upon any further obstructive tactics he used. Thus Laurier, in January 1902, decided to arbitrate. Hay and those at the British Foreign Office were delighted that this source of friction between Washington and London would soon be removed.

But the events of the previous September—the assassination of William McKinley and the inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt as president of the United States—had introduced a great deal of volatility into America’s cooperation on the Alaskan issue. Roosevelt immediately made clear his opposition to any such arbitration as had been tentatively approved by the Canadians, the British, and Hay. In March 1902, a crestfallen Pauncefote told Lansdowne that “the President considers the claim of the United States is so manifestly clear and unanswerable that he is not disposed to run the risk of sacrificing American territory under a compromise that is the almost certain result of an arbitration.” Roosevelt, according to Henry Cabot Lodge, had posited in the presence of two senators that at the first sign of trouble in the disputed territory he would send United States troops to occupy it. One of the two senators intimated that this would be a popular decision among both members of Congress and the people.

Secretary of State Hay pushed the reluctant Joseph Choate to enter private discussions at the British Foreign Office despite Roosevelt’s heated opposition toward anything
resembling arbitration. Choate noted that the British and Canadians were indeed open to significant compromise. In August 1902, Lansdowne had suggested to Choate that the United States could even determine the format and style of an arbitration if it were to take place.\textsuperscript{33} The significance of Hay’s apparent dismissal of Roosevelt’s hawkishness on this issue is often overlooked in the later historiography.\textsuperscript{34}

In September 1902, Lansdowne sent Sir Michael Herbert, a friend of Roosevelt’s, to Washington as ambassador to the United States. Roosevelt gave him a warm reception but made it clear that he wished to move immediately ahead with the Alaskan issue. The president suggested, during his first interview with the new ambassador, that he might accept an Anglo-American jurist tribunal that carried no formal weight. Instead, it would be made up of jurists selected by the American and British governments. The Canadian government gave its tentative assent on November 18. Said the Governor-General of Canada, “My ministers would be disposed to consider it favorably, provided that the reference to a Tribunal should include all aspects of the question.” Lansdowne told Hay that the British, too, would agree.\textsuperscript{35} Roosevelt’s grudging acceptance of Hay’s initial arbitrative idea could be put into effect because Lansdowne was willing to cooperate and because Hay had used his influence to grease the skids for peaceful diplomacy.

The Alaskan issue was primarily seen as one between Britain and America, not as one between British Canada and America or some combination of the three. Hay, in predictable if absurd Anglophilic fashion, wished to see only one American on the commission of six jurists. Herbert wished to see three Americans and three Britons, leaving out any Canadians.\textsuperscript{36} This was no small source of friction between Canada and her imperial motherland. Laurier, in January 1903, once again publicly criticized the Americans for their position and actions regarding the Alaska treaty. He would have rather had the issue submitted to The Hague than to what he increasingly saw as a clearly biased
Anglo-American old boys’ club.\textsuperscript{37}

Herbert and some British diplomats began to dream of some sort of Anglo-American supreme court, while other elder British statesmen were more cautious of the Americans.\textsuperscript{38} But Herbert, Hay, and Lansdowne were the central players in the Alaskan boundary issue, and their wish for Anglo-American friendship superseded Roosevelt’s demand of the satisfaction of American interests on one hand and British colonial relations on the other. In Canada, Minto and Laurier recognized their helplessness and on January 21 assented to a tribunal of six impartial jurists. Two days later, King Edward VII gave his blessing.\textsuperscript{39}

In the U.S., representatives from the northwestern states put up a fight. They believed that ceding to Canada what was not Canada’s would endanger their own states; they asserted that there were no legal grounds on which the Canadians could stand
and that even deigning to arbitrate was a farce on the part of the United States. Those Americans who favored the arbitration declared that no matter what the tribunal said, no territory would be lost to Canada. Despite the protestations of the Northwest (whose states were the most anti-Canadian of all) and the constant, truculent “pro-Americanism” of the president, the treaty passed the Senate on February 11 and cleared the path for negotiations to take place. 

The international table was set for the pacification of the Alaskan issue. Hay, Herbert, and Lansdowne had ensured Anglo-American friendship, and the Canadians’ complaints seemed to have been sacrificed for the sake of placating the Americans. Even so, Theodore Roosevelt and his pro-Americanism found a way to make trouble. On February 18, 1903, Roosevelt appointed three of the most grossly biased politicians in all America as his “impartial” jurists: Secretary of War (and longtime Roosevelt man) Elihu Root; Senator George Turner of the anti-Canadian state of Washington; and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, progenitor of the “Large Policy” and Roosevelt’s most steadfast political partner. When the inevitable outrage came, the pathetic American excuse was that three unbiased judges could not be found. This, of course, did little to quell the anger. Herbert declared himself severely disheartened and disillusioned with the Americans.

Lansdowne was disappointed but still hoped for accommodation over anger. Britain had just terminated its involvement in the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela on February 14, and the blockade had caused Roosevelt’s animal Americanism to come frightfully to the fore. The president—perhaps by coincidence, but more likely not—had ordered the admiral of the navy to practice naval maneuvers on what was then the largest scale in American history in the same theater as the Anglo-German blockade. Now was simply not the time for the British to anger the rough-riding Roosevelt. Herbert, too, fully comprehended the strength of American feeling about what
was seen as Britain’s bad faith. He sent notes on February 23 to Ottawa and London urging amicability and a quick conclusion.\textsuperscript{45} The will of the Canadians would not be allowed to obstruct the rapprochement of the English and the Americans.

The Canadians, angered at once by the Americans for their preposterous choice of “impartial” jurists and by the British for their appeasement of Roosevelt’s bullish Americanism, “felt called upon not only to express their dissatisfaction at the recent exchange of ratifications at Washington before their official consent had been given, but practically to indicate that their assent had been rendered unavoidable by His Majesty’s Government.”\textsuperscript{46} Lansdowne, struggling between the rock of Anglo-American amity and its import and the hard place of Britain’s colonial obligations, was forced to ask the Americans for two delays in the tribunal to allow the Canadians to gather the necessary documents. Hay was also trying to reconcile his own intense, fundamental affinity for the British with the fact that he was the secretary of state of the United States of America. Hay expressed disappointment at what he saw as stalling tactics. Roosevelt asserted to Hay a duty:

If the English decline to come to an agreement this fall, under any pretense, I shall feel that it is simply due to bad faith—that they have no sincere desire to settle the matter equitably. I think they ought to be made to understand that there must be no delay; that we have come to a definite agreement with them and that the agreement must be kept on their side as well as on ours, and that we shall expect them to live up to it without fail...I shall probably, if they fail to come to an agreement, recite our case in the message to Congress and ask for an appropriation so that we may run the line ourselves.\textsuperscript{47}
Yet Hay was not the only member of the American foreign policy establishment to receive word from Roosevelt in these terms. On June 29, Roosevelt wrote Lodge to say that, if the British continued to make things difficult, he would “declare the negotiations off, recite our case in the message to Congress, and ask for an appropriation to run the boundary as we deem it should be run.” To Hay on July 29, he stated that “if we can’t come to an agreement now nothing will be left but to act in a way which will necessarily wound British pride.” To Root on August 20, Roosevelt expressed his hope that the “the British will see reason. If they do not, it will be unpleasant for us, but it will be far more unpleasant for Great Britain and Canada.” To Hay on September 21, Roosevelt stated that he was wondering

if the Jacks realize that…it will be far more unpleasant to them, if they force the alternative upon us; if we simply announce that the country is ours and will remain so, and that so far as it has not been reduced to possession it will be reduced to possession, and that no further negotiations in the matter will be entertained.

Other letters of Roosevelt’s indicate even more explicitly his proclivity to use state force to resolve the issue. To Henry White on September 26, Roosevelt wrote that

I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours, as being for the most part in our possession, and the remainder to be reduced to possession as soon as in our judgment it was advisable—and to declare furthermore that no additional negotiations of any kind would be entered into.

To Elihu Root on August 8, the president wrote how he “shall at once establish posts on the islands and sufficiently far up the...
main streams to reduce at all the essential points our claim to actual occupancy…This will not be pleasant to do and it will be still less pleasant for the English.” To Frederick Jackson Turner on August 8, he stated that in case of “captious objections on the part of the English, I am going to send a brigade of American regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed territory and hold it by all the power and force of the United States.”

Roosevelt was playing fast and loose, and the British saw that he would risk severely harming the budding relationship between England and America for the sake of a small strip of land in a barely inhabitable area bearing trace amounts of gold. Fortunately for the sake of smooth Anglo-American relations at this critical stage, Hay and the British statesmen kept cool heads and paved the way for London and Washington to get

Theodore Roosevelt in his presidential years.
A pugnacious pro-American: “I am going to send a brigade of American regulars up to Skagway and take possession of the disputed territory and hold it by all the power and force of the United States.”
along. Joseph Chamberlain, then British secretary of state for the colonies, had been spooked enough by Roosevelt. He too resolved to quickly settle the Alaskan issue no matter the cost to Canada and the empire.  

The negotiations began in September. According to Lord Alverstone, the British representative at the tribunal, the Americans behaved badly, but he wished to put up a fight. On several issues concerning the dispute he remained unwaveringly set against all that the United States wished to do. An abrupt turnaround in early October was likely the result of pressure from Lansdowne (who was in turn feeling pressure from Roosevelt) toward conciliation on the part of the British. The Americans came out with a total victory; Roosevelt and the three jurists were met with wide acclaim for what was seen as an enormous diplomatic win. The Canadians were fittingly resentful and knew that all injuries to Canada were being sustained for the sake of British friendship with America.  

But it was Hay, not Roosevelt, who worked for diplomacy surrounding the Canada issue. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where Anglo-American amity would have remained on a smoothly upward ascent without Secretary Hay tempering the Roosevelt administration’s response. Roosevelt’s truculence, in actual fact, threatened significant setbacks to Anglo-American amity on multiple occasions; it brought Lansdowne and his enormously conciliatory attitude to his wit’s end. Hay’s Anglophilia and Lansdowne’s determination to end Britain’s “splendid isolation” were the determining factors that allowed the Anglo-American understanding to progress despite the Alaskan boundary conflict. Roosevelt was, realistically, a liability throughout the resolution of this dispute.

**LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS**

Roosevelt and Hay’s respective roles in the Alaskan crisis should bring the historical consensus regarding Roosevelt’s
relationship with Britain under much harsher scrutiny. Yet a far more thorough analysis of the diplomatic episodes throughout Roosevelt’s career is needed to establish precisely when Roosevelt became more disposed to treating the Anglo-American entente as a serious diplomatic goal. These analyses must rely on explorations of the attitudes of Roosevelt’s fellow American diplomats and policymakers, as the Alaskan boundary case shows that perhaps they were the authors of the Anglo-American rapprochement that undeniably took place between 1895 and 1917. (Tantalizing leads for such an analysis exist: Roosevelt left much of his East Asian diplomacy to Secretary Hay until his death in 1905, and Hay, in a remarkable suspension of logic fitting only the most ferocious of Anglophiles, attempted to blame the Russo-Japanese conflict on Germany, then clearly Britain’s nemesis. Roosevelt, on the other hand, at one point attempted to blame Japanese aggression on Britain, also a plain twist of the reality on the ground.) In any case, a fuller exposition of Roosevelt’s potentially more neutral attitude toward Britain—as opposed to the palpable Anglophilia of other Republicans of his time, like that of John Hay, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry White—must explain the fact that Roosevelt seemed to favor Britain in his later diplomacy.

The Alaskan boundary dispute does not conclude the inquiry into Teddy Roosevelt’s views on Great Britain or the evolution of those views, but it does destabilize the historiographical consensus that Roosevelt was, in his personal thought, a friend to Britain—or that he had become a friend to Britain by 1898. That others in the Republican Party of Roosevelt’s time—most importantly, Secretary of State John Hay—were indeed Anglophilic has created the illusion that Roosevelt himself was pro-Britain, whereas, in fact, until at least the early 1900s, Roosevelt was in fact something of a practical (if absurdly feisty) “pro-American” situated in a largely pro-Britain party and administration. Secretary Hay, in the case of the Alaskan boundary, was not tightly managed by Roosevelt with regard to diplomatic actions and, as illustrated above, would sometimes
go against the wishes of his president. Despite Roosevelt later denying that Hay was a major player in the boundary dispute, it was indeed Hay who curbed Roosevelt’s dangerous influence on the situation, made the necessary diplomatic maneuvers, took advantage of the British retreat from “splendid isolation,” and allowed the conflict to come to its peaceful resolution.

The case study above has implications for the debate that runs through the literature on the appropriate characterization of Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the grandest sense. Some scholars, most famously Henry Kissinger, have argued that Theodore Roosevelt can be most accurately be described as an American realpolitiker, always thinking systemically and globally while at the same time remaining conscious of the balance of power.\(^58\) Historian Walter McDougall also projects some degree of realism and balance-consciousness onto Roosevelt, although McDougall’s narrative is far more nuanced than Kissinger’s and is informed by the fact that the extant “Progressivism” at the turn of the century was a fundamental aspect of the Rooseveltian worldview.\(^59\) Howard Beale also portrays Roosevelt as seeing the world chiefly through the lens of power.\(^60\) Others have disagreed sharply with the realist school of analysis. Frank Ninkovich in his book *American Imperialism* argues that a structural, cultural, and intellectual moment was the plinth upon which American expansion in the Edwardian era stood, while William C. Widenor and John Milton Cooper Jr. have in tandem argued that Roosevelt and Lodge were in fact more idealistic than Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan, due to the “Large Policy” group’s Lamarckian and neo-Darwinian assumptions, their (arguably) more overt racial paternalism, and their near-worship of the militaristic spirit.\(^61\)

The clearest example of the anti-realist view of Roosevelt’s foreign policy is Frank Ninkovich’s article “Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology,” where Ninkovich asserts that Roosevelt’s diplomatic thought and behavior was driven primarily and fundamentally by an idealization of “civilization”
informed by a “metahistorical outlook” of a sort of souped-up Whig history.\textsuperscript{62} Citing Roosevelt’s praise of imperialism, his efforts to form diplomatic ties with European nations, and his tendency to try to be on the “civilized” side of conflicts abroad, Ninkovich portrays Roosevelt as a blind ideologue, one who saw himself as having, above all else, a “duty upon the civilized races to transplant the seeds of civilization where they had failed to germinate of their own accord.”\textsuperscript{63}

Ninkovich’s article is unconvincing. A disproportionately large amount of the primary source material used by Ninkovich to create his narrative is made up of letters to high-ranking foreign officials, texts of public speeches, or articles in widely circulated magazines—all discursive scenarios in which any president or diplomat might justify his actions in the most high-minded light. While Ninkovich’s argument in \textit{American Imperialism}, which places Roosevelt’s actions in their proper intellectual and cultural context, is a welcome tonic to Kissinger’s retrojection of later-twentieth century American realism onto Roosevelt, his selective and tenuous material for “Civilization as Ideology” causes him to miss the mark. Ninkovich’s “civilizational” framework is excellent for Roosevelt’s approach to, for example, Latin America, but is unequipped to handle the looming and central diplomatic question of Roosevelt’s presidency: how the United States should navigate the increasingly dire Anglo-German rivalry. It is no wonder that Ninkovich’s article only dares to approach the question of Roosevelt’s ideas on U.S.-German relations after the point that the German war machine brutalized Belgium, five years \textit{after} Roosevelt had left office.\textsuperscript{64}

The Alaskan boundary issue seems to show that Roosevelt’s self-proclaimed “pro-Americanism” manifested itself as a short-term explosiveness, inimical both to calculated, systematic, balance-of-power realism and to high-minded normative ideas of “civilization.” Roosevelt’s actions, when examined closely, cannot fit on any facile midpoint between the two. Furthermore, it seems that the steady hands in American
foreign policy were in Roosevelt’s administration. The emphasis ought to be taken away from Roosevelt the man, and a responsible evaluation of U.S. diplomacy from 1901 to 1909 should not attribute successes blindly to the president but rather take into account the efforts of Hay, White, Root, and others who worked to set policy and tame the wild man in the White House.

The question of Roosevelt’s role in the informal, loose drawing together of the United States and Britain also engages a hotly debated topic in the theory of international relations: the degree to which leadership matters in statecraft and diplomacy. Most in the field of international relations implicitly or explicitly work with the idea that looking at structural, impersonal forces, along with culture, bureaucracy, and political systems, is the appropriate method by which to understand diplomacy and history. This is not an uncontested idea: Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, for example, have asserted that even small idiosyncrasies of leaders can have a profound impact on the course of history—that the human element is a significant variable. They defend their thesis on a theoretical level, positing that state intentions—often tied up with specific leaders’ intentions—are germane to theories of international relations; they ground their idea in case studies as well.\(^\text{65}\)

Within the debate of leadership vs. structural causes in international relations theory, Robert Jervis engages with the tension between leaders and advisors. Jervis argues that political role can be a determinative force in the intentions of different actors, though Jervis himself is somewhat ambivalent about the extent to which structural forces dominate personal forces in statecraft.\(^\text{66}\) The president, Jervis’s argument goes, will face political pressures, while a secretary of state like Hay will be freer of electoral constraints. Jervis’s thesis is a powerful explanation of the dynamics of the Roosevelt administration during the Alaskan boundary crisis. Yet Roosevelt’s personality—along with the residue of his previous tepidness regarding Britain—most certainly was a factor in how he behaved, in addition to the
presidential pressure he faced. Similarly, Hay’s well-documented Anglophilia was a factor in his comportment along with his position at the State Department.

Even if structural factors were among the ultimate causes of the Anglo-American rapprochement, to ignore the role of leaders—especially particularly influential ones, like Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, or Lansdowne—is dangerous and reductive. Matters of international relations and diplomatic history are too complex to focus only on any one element; biography and psychology must be explored as much as political systems and international structures. The historiography on Theodore Roosevelt’s own tastes and predilections regarding diplomacy has crucially ignored evidence of his own ambivalent-at-best attitude toward Great Britain, and Roosevelt’s very persona is far from unimportant in this analysis. The Anglo-American entente steadied both nations before the coming collapse of world order, and the causes of that entente—not only those distal and impersonal, but also those proximate and personal—deserve painstaking attention.
The Big Stick Split in Two

Notes

5 Ibid., 96.
6 Ibid., 85–158.
8 Nelson Manfred Blake, in his 1955 article “Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt,” deals with this issue imaginatively and succinctly. Blake analyzes Roosevelt’s relationships with the ambassadors to Washington from influential nations and stresses the import of these friendships in an era of personal diplomacy. Roosevelt had a favorite British diplomat whom he attempted to secure as British ambassador to Washington and failed (Cecil Spring-Rice), and a favorite German diplomat whom he succeeded in securing as ambassador (Baron Speck von Sternberg). Overall, Roosevelt had relatively cold relationships with the British ambassadors. The French ambassador, a scholarly and well-raised gentleman named Jules Jusserand, was most certainly Roosevelt’s favorite. The attitude Roosevelt took toward his ambassadorial court was often determined by how well the men could perform to the president’s tastes, from dinner-table discussions revolving around classical history and mythology to tennis to vigorous (and often dangerous) hiking around the Potomac valley. Blake argues that these relationships had an intelligible and material influence on the diplomatic actions of Roosevelt and his administration. See Nelson Manfred Blake, “Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42, no. 2 (1955): 179–206.
10 Campbell Jr.’s *Anglo-American Understanding*, while assuming a defensible historical framework and avoiding the temptation to lionize Roosevelt, nonetheless is not an analysis of Roosevelt’s actions; rather, it features Roosevelt as a supporting character in the genesis of the entente. Campbell’s analysis of Roosevelt and his relationship to the Anglo-American “understanding” is not developed as a subject of its own and is instead sprinkled throughout the book.

Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, 9–90.


Beale, Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, 96.

Roosevelt to Lodge, May 21, 1895

Roosevelt to Lodge, December 20, 1895.

Evan Thomas, The War Lovers (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2010), 68.

Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005), 83. While Iestyn Adams makes several points that contradict Marks, Beale, Tilchin, and the general consensus on Roosevelt’s attitude toward Great Britain, Adams’s book is not part of the Roosevelt historiography. Brothers Across the Ocean is a dissertation on the international policies of Lord Lansdowne; his exposition of Roosevelt, however, deserves to come into full contact with the work of Roosevelt scholars.

Ibid., 91.

The treaty was originally between Russia and England; the United States inherited the Russian side of the treaty in the 1867 Alaska purchase.


Ibid., 94.

Ibid., 240.

Ibid., 95–96

Kenton J. Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), 166. When, during the second Boer War, a group of Boer delegates visited Washington to speak with the U.S. secretary of state, Hay received the delegation with an air of contempt, spat out a prepared statement rejecting their plea for American mediation, shooed them
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out of his office, and promptly ushered the British ambassador into his door within their sight.

26 Ibid., 166–167.
27 Roosevelt to Lodge, January 28, 1909.
28 Sir Francis Villiers to the British Colonial Office, September 19, 1901. Despite his letter, the negotiations were interdependent.
29 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 97.
30 Ibid., 97–98; British Colonial Office to British Foreign Office, January 4, 1902.
31 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 98; Pauncefote to Lansdowne, confidential, March 28, 1902.
32 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 99; Raikes to Lansdowne, May 23, 1902.
33 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 100–101.
34 A previous joint-high commission that intermittently worked to solve the issues between British Canada and the United States had collapsed after a brief effort to solve the Alaska-Canada boundary dispute. John Hay, then secretary of state under William McKinley, took it upon himself to institute a stopgap settlement in areas around the Klondike to ward off conflict arising between Canadian and American authorities. See Perkins, The Great Rapprochement, 164.
35 Ibid.; Minto to Chamberlain, November 18, 1902.
36 Herbert to Lansdowne, confidential, December 9, 1902.
37 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 103.
38 Ibid., 102–103.
39 Ibid., 104.
40 Ibid., 105.
41 Lodge had previously spoken out against Canada’s even having a contention. See Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 107.
43 Ibid.
45 Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean, 109.
46 Ibid., 111; Minto to Chamberlain, confidential, March 9, 1903.
47 Roosevelt to Hay, July 29, 1903 (emphasis added).
48 Roosevelt to Lodge, June 29, 1903
49 Roosevelt to Hay, July 29, 1903
50 Roosevelt to Root, August 20, 1903
51 Roosevelt to Hay, September 21, 1903
52 Roosevelt to White, September 26, 1903
53 Roosevelt to Root, August 8, 1903
54 See Campbell, Anglo-American Understanding, 327–328; Roosevelt to Turner,
August 8, 1903.

55 Adams, *Brothers Across the Ocean*, 114.

56 Ibid., 118.

57 Ibid., 119–121.


63 Ibid., 232.

64 Ibid., 242.


67 Eric Hobsbawm and Immanuel Wallerstein, historians of “structure” and bigger-picture movements and trends in this era, have next to nothing to say about the Anglo-German-American triangle of diplomacy in the decades leading up to the First World War, although Wallerstein has stated his intent to engage with it in the forthcoming fifth volume of his world-systems analysis.
We of the South:
President Lyndon Johnson,
Jonathan Worth Daniels, and the
Re-Southernization of the White House

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INTRODUCTION

At 12:30 p.m. on Friday, November 22, 1963, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Two hours later, the Texan Lyndon Baines Johnson was sworn in as the thirty-sixth president of the United States aboard Air Force One. Kennedy’s assassination stunned the world. As with momentous events such as Pearl Harbor before, and 9/11 after, the great majority of Americans remember exactly where they were and what they were doing at the moment Kennedy was shot. Despite being floored by a profound sense of loss, however, the American people also recognized the symbolic importance of President Johnson’s ascension to the highest office in the nation. As soon as Johnson entered the White House, commentators stressed that he was the first resident of a southern state in a century to get there.¹ Although President Woodrow Wilson was born in Virginia, another former Confederate state, he was considered to have voided his southern credentials by establishing residency in New Jersey. Many thought a true southerner would never reach the Oval Office, and southern elites were among the principal doubters. As historian William Leuchtenburg stated in his book, The White House Looks South, prior to the culmination of Johnson’s political ascent, “[a]mong Southerners on Capitol Hill it was an article of faith—bitter faith—that no Southerner would ever be President of the United States.”² As Johnson
assumed the presidency and prepared to run for election in his own right, this “southern-ness” quickly became a critical issue.

This paper examines the story of Johnson’s rise and his victory in the 1964 presidential election. It traces the arc of Johnson’s ambitious political career, paying specific attention to the 1964 election and the way in which the Texan won North Carolina. This paper argues that Johnson calculated and shaped a specific path to the White House by leaning heavily on figures such as Jonathan Worth Daniels, the North Carolinian editor of the Raleigh News & Observer (N&O). Daniels and Johnson’s relationship was more than simply a strategic bond; it offers a case study of southern identity and the evolution of southern liberalism in the twentieth century. The give and take between Daniels and Johnson yields interesting takeaways with regard to the press, the populace, and the president. Their interactions reveal that Jonathan Daniels was a pivotally important figure in Lyndon Johnson’s presidential campaign. Johnson’s relationship with Daniels afforded the Texan a window into the minds of North Carolinians; it allowed him to truly grasp these citizens’ feelings, especially on divisive issues such as race. This nuanced understanding of North Carolinian politics ultimately proved decisive in carrying the state.

Although Daniels was clearly among the elite of society—his family was one of the wealthiest in the southeastern United States—his correspondences reflected interactions with all elements of society. For every letter addressed to President Johnson or Governor Terry Sanford, there is one postmarked to a farmer in eastern North Carolina, or a thoughtful piece authored in response to an angry “letter to the editor.” These letters provide a fascinating window into North Carolinian politics, where race was a contentious, highly partisan topic in the 1960s due to polarizing events such as the Greensboro sit-ins and ongoing debates regarding segregation.

Throughout his tenure in national politics, Lyndon Johnson maintained a close relationship with Jonathan Daniels,
a bond held together by a mutual commitment to bring the South back to the forefront of American politics. While several biographers—most notably Robert Caro, Robert Dallek and William Leuchtenberg—have written on the issue of Johnson’s southern identity, none have done so by examining his relationship with the press, or more specifically with Daniels. The correspondence between Lyndon B. Johnson and Jonathan Worth Daniels raises important questions about the nature of relations between press and president in the twentieth-century election cycle. It also exposes questions about the concept of “southern-ness” in early twentieth-century America and sheds light on the intense feelings of alienation many southerners such as Daniels and Johnson felt.

Ultimately, this paper concludes that Lyndon Johnson and Jonathan Daniels formed a mutually beneficial relationship, which allowed the Texan to gain a more nuanced understanding of North Carolinian feelings on issues such as sectionalism and race. Despite their vastly different professional and personal backgrounds, Daniels and Johnson bonded over their shared southern identity and desire to mend regional tensions. Moreover, the two men possessed the foresight and determination to realize that providing a solution to the South’s racial issue would be the best way forward. Johnson and Daniels’s symbiotic relationship was built upon a bedrock of mutual southern understanding and borne out of a shared desire to correct the historical record as it pertained to the South’s post-Civil War reputation.

**Jonathan Daniels Finds His Voice**

During World War I, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels posed for his picture at the entrance to the White House with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his assistant secretary. Later, while reflecting on the photograph, Daniels said to FDR, “We are both looking down on the White House, and you are saying to yourself, being a New Yorker—‘Some day I will be living in
that house’—while I, being from the South, know I must be satisfied with no such ambition.”\(^3\) Josephus would not live to be proven wrong. Nor would the senior Daniels live long enough to watch his son Jonathan become an integral part in the rise of the southerner he could not foresee.

Jonathan Worth Daniels was born on April 26, 1902, in Raleigh, North Carolina. Daniels enjoyed an unconventional childhood, yet he did so within the mainstream of southern society. Though Daniels was encouraged to adopt traditional southern liberal attitudes towards race—his father taught him to condemn the Ku Klux Klan, but favor segregation—Jonathan’s unique childhood experiences led him to eventually reconsider such norms. The Danielses’ house sat directly across the street from Shaw University, a historically black college in Raleigh. According to his biographer, Charles Eagles, Daniels’s proximity to Shaw likely led him to believe that black and white differed less than most whites thought, since Daniels saw young black students working and studying at Shaw just as whites did at nearby schools like North Carolina State.\(^4\) Daniels also enjoyed the company of a black housekeeper and playmate during his youth. These relationships in Raleigh proved vital to the formation of Daniels’s inquisitive nature and atypically liberal attitude towards race. The experiences of his childhood echoed in Jonathan Daniels’s mind for his entire life and undoubtedly shaped his attitude regarding civil rights.

Daniels’s father, Josephus, was a prominent southern liberal who served as secretary of the navy during World War I and as United States ambassador to Mexico. These jobs forced the Daniels family to move to the nation’s capital when Jonathan was ten, but they also afforded him an exciting change in lifestyle. Jonathan Daniels benefited from his parents’ intellectually stimulating lives. Their position in society provided Jonathan with an abundance of good books to read, interesting people to meet, and serious conversation in which to engage.\(^5\) Josephus’s work also provided Jonathan with the opportunity to travel
and expand his worldview. Among his various jobs, Josephus’s true love was journalism. This passion led the elder Daniels to purchase a controlling interest in the Raleigh News & Observer, a once proud regional publication, at a foreclosure sale in 1893. At the conclusion of his tenure on Capitol Hill, Josephus and his family returned to the Tar Heel State to run the N&O as a family enterprise.

Jonathan Daniels was similar to, and shaped by, Josephus. Both father and son graduated from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Both father and son served time on Capitol Hill. And both of them possessed a natural curiosity, which begat a love for journalism. The Raleigh News and Observer would become the channel for this passion and a vessel for father-son bonding. Like his father, Jonathan Daniels worked closely with Franklin Roosevelt in Washington. Whereas Josephus served above FDR as secretary of the navy during World War I, Jonathan served under Roosevelt as his press secretary prior to the president’s death in 1945. In late 1944, Josephus became sick like FDR himself.

After remaining on board long enough for President Harry S. Truman to choose his replacement, Jonathan Daniels returned home to assume control of the News & Observer. He presided over the paper during a period of immense growth, as the News & Observer bought out the Raleigh Times, opened a new downtown office, and rapidly built upon its base readership throughout North Carolina. All the while, Daniels made sure the paper maintained its liberal bent. Personally responsible for the bulk of the editorial board, Jonathan ensured that the News & Observer actively promoted stances in keeping with those of his father and the Democratic Party. It is critically important to qualify, however, that the News & Observer’s positions were typical of North Carolinian Democrats and not the national party. Like Josephus Daniels, the paper often supported positions such as segregation in schools that were antithetical to the national Democratic Party. This began to change as Jonathan assumed
control.

As Jonathan took over the *News & Observer*, he sought to uphold his father’s vision of the role the paper should play in North Carolinian life. As Cleves Daniels wrote in a letter to his family concerning the future of the *N&O* in October 1964, “[Josephus] believed that it was important to both give people the news and to educate them at the same time.” The younger Daniels worked steadfastly to ensure that his family’s newspaper did just this. The *News & Observer* did not simply present stories for its readership to digest. “Old Reliable,” as it was known, brought its readers—who hailed primarily from the rural, otherwise isolated parts of North Carolina—into the mainstream by shaping their understanding of how to think about certain issues. A September 1963 letter to the editor from a seemingly typical reader named C. Stanton Coates demonstrates the degree to which Daniels was successful. Coates detailed in gushing terms the way the *N&O* had served as a father figure and educator in his life. As a boy, Coates “always looked forward to the Sunday issue, which came to [him] in rural Johnston a day late via R.F.D.” The *N&O* was not simply a source of entertainment for Coates as a child, however. Coates grew with the paper, and in turn “Old Reliable” educated him on the affairs of the world and how to feel about such developments: “Growing into manhood I put away the comics for the more noble and glorious sections.” Despite expressing concerns over the veracity of some stories in the *N&O*’s recent past, Coates’s account reveals the degree to which the *News and Observer* was more than just a paper. The Danielses’ family paper was not only a fixture in the community and an educating force—it constituted a powerful political weapon.

Jonathan Worth Daniels reached his prominent, publicly visible position largely due to the influence of his father. Josephus Daniels paved the way for his son financially and professionally. Moreover, Josephus taught Jonathan to think critically, develop his passions, and view education as an essential, never-ending pursuit. While Daniels owed his father a great deal for helping
him grow, Jonathan had to split from Josephus in order to further his growth and cultivate his own voice. This meant adopting more progressive stances in his daily editorials. As Charles Eagles wrote, Josephus Daniels saw no need to discuss racial affairs; he simply accepted that segregation and subordination of Negroes was the best solution for the matter. On this issue specifically, and many others, Jonathan Daniels refused to accept the status quo or simply take traditionally accepted beliefs at face value. Jonathan was somewhat apologetic for his racial editorials at first. He knew that he had his father’s confidence and trust, however, which overcame their differences in opinion. Not only did Josephus accept his son’s stances, he even encouraged them. In a personal correspondence between father and son, Josephus agreed to set aside his private ideological differences with Jonathan for the good of the N&O. He told Jonathan, “In the meantime you must go ahead doing your duty as you see it.”

**LBJ Finds His Passion**

Despite the fact that they were born over 1,300 miles apart and into entirely different socioeconomic backgrounds, Lyndon Johnson and Jonathan Daniels enjoyed similar upbringings in several critical respects. Although he was not a national figure like Josephus Daniels, Lyndon’s father, Sam Ealy Johnson Jr., was a prominent regional figure who served in the Texas House of Representatives for a decade. Sam Johnson and his wife, Rebekah, encouraged their eldest son to read newspapers and interact with his fellow schoolchildren so as to nurture his curiosity and broaden his worldview. Johnson’s parents also emphasized achievement, ambition, and public service. According to his primary biographer, Robert Caro, Johnson’s parents instilled in him a civic ethic from a young age. Sam Johnson would also encourage his children to think critically; he would spur talk of “serious issues” and stage debates on a myriad of topics at the dinner table on a regular basis. Like Daniels, Johnson was said to
have had a “highly inquisitive mind” from his earliest days. Well aware of this fact, Sam Johnson consciously worked to nurture his son’s curiosity.

Much like Jonathan Daniels, Lyndon Johnson was the beneficiary of an unconventional racial education. Although he grew up in a nearly exclusively white section of Blanco County, Texas, Johnson witnessed the worst excesses of southern segregation and racial prejudice while teaching at the Welhausen School in Cotulla, Texas, as a young man. In 1927, Johnson moved to Cotulla, in the state’s southwestern corner, in order to earn enough money to complete his undergraduate degree. Upon reaching Cotulla, he found it to be a destitute town with an overwhelmingly Mexican population. This experience, however, did not reaffirm Johnson’s preexisting racial biases. Instead, Johnson’s time in Cotulla became a watershed event in the formation of one of his guiding political ideologies, as he came to view education as the key to realizing the American dream.
Johnson felt that his students were hampered not by inherent racial inadequacies, but by poor education and the unfortunate circumstances of their birth. Thus, Johnson’s spell in Cotulla led him to second-guess his innate racial biases.

Whereas Josephus Daniels nurtured his son to love journalism, Sam Johnson raised Lyndon to take an interest in politics. Much as Jonathan revered Josephus, Lyndon adored his father from a young age; he could usually be found sticking to Sam like a shadow and imitating his mannerisms. As Lyndon Johnson grew, so too did his ambition. When Sam Johnson was elected to the legislature in Austin, it only seemed natural to bring Lyndon with him. Sam brought his son into Austin’s legislative chamber so frequently that many legislators believed Lyndon was one of the page boys. While Johnson certainly learned a great deal with his father in the state capital, his experience in Austin paled in comparison to the wisdom Sam imparted to him on the campaign trail. Lyndon relished the opportunity to campaign with his father and interact with people across Blanco County. Prior to one particularly important campaign stretch, Sam told Lyndon, “If you can’t come into a room and tell right away who is for you and who is against you, you have no business in politics.” This piece of advice stuck with Johnson his entire life and permanently shaped his approach to politics.

Lyndon Johnson’s father was integral to his son’s political rise and to the development of his political ethic. Sam Johnson paved the way for Lyndon’s professional future by introducing him to the world of politics. He also encouraged his son to think critically, develop his passions, and treat education as essential. Like Daniels, Johnson inevitably had to split from his role model in order to realize his true potential. While Jonathan Daniels looked past his father’s ideals, Lyndon Johnson set his career sights significantly higher than his father had. Although Lyndon idolized his father in his youth, the two Johnsons strove to fulfill starkly different dreams. The elder Johnson never harbored ambitions of making it to Washington. As fellow Congressman
Wright Patman once said of Lyndon’s father, “Sam’s political ambitions were limited. He didn’t have any aspirations to run for Congress. He wanted only local prestige and power, and the Texas House was fine for him as his limit.”¹⁹ For Sam’s son, Blanco County—and even all of Texas—would never be enough. Legend has it that on the day of Lyndon’s birth, the Johnson family patriarch rode around town on horseback shouting that a United States senator—his grandson—had been born that day.²⁰ Lyndon did not shy away from such rhetoric; rather, it imbued in him a strong sense of belief. Johnson truly believed he would one day become president.

The difference in political aspirations between father and son is encapsulated perfectly in the account of a Johnson City, Texas, resident who told Robert Caro, “Sam liked to argue; Sam’s son liked to win arguments—had to win arguments. Sam wanted to discuss; Lyndon wanted to dominate.”²¹ Lyndon Johnson sought to dominate every discussion, win every argument, and triumph in each election. This ceaseless ambition would ultimately lead LBJ to Washington and later to the highest office in all the land. It was there on Capitol Hill that he would become acquainted with Jonathan Worth Daniels.

**CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACQUAINTANCE**

Lyndon B. Johnson relied on a savvy use of the press as a political weapon to take the pulse of his constituency and to widen his sphere of influence. Jonathan Daniels proved to be a particularly important figure in helping Johnson realize these aims. Although the precise first point of contact between the two men is unclear, correspondence between them dates back to the mid-1940s. Johnson and Daniels continued a steady, if not robust, rapport over the years as Johnson accrued power on Capitol Hill. Naturally, as Johnson’s power and reach widened, so too did his level of interaction with the press across the nation. From the early days of his youth, Johnson recognized the power
of the newspaper. Throughout his childhood, he could be found reading a copy of whatever he could get his hands on. Johnson would read any paper cover to cover; it did not matter if the publication was from a local outlet or a national titan. When he ventured into the world of regional politics, he maintained this habit and began to interact strategically with the major players. He made a concerted effort to make friends with the most important people across his district. Johnson canvassed far and wide to court the right people in the right places all across Texas, leading many to believe that he had statewide ambitions from the day he arrived in the legislature.22

Johnson made and used friends in the press to solidify his support within his district, specifically by allying himself closely with George Marsh and his influential Austin newspaper, the *Austin News-Tribune and Herald*.23 Lyndon Johnson could work his constituency directly when he was simply a congressman. As former Texas State Representative Welly Hopkins attested, “Lyndon knows every man woman and child in Blanco County.”24 By all accounts, Johnson possessed an unusual gift for meeting and interacting with the public. As Johnson’s ambitions and reach shifted, however, so too did his contacts, as his ability to reach the people directly diminished. Upon moving to Capitol Hill, he kept on reading, yet Johnson began to favor more nationally influential publications such as the New York and Washington newspapers, as well as the *Congressional Record*.25 During his rise, Johnson never forgot his father’s advice. He possessed an incredible ability to find and identify the pulse of his constituents, and the press played a pivotal role in his ability to do so. This luxury allowed Johnson, as his father instructed, to always know who was for him and who was against him as he walked into any given room. Johnson sought to retain this advantage as his influence expanded from the fourteenth district to the entire state of Texas. In the nation’s capital, this task became exponentially more difficult as Johnson’s influence magnified. As his ambitions outgrew even the Lone Star State, regional mouthpieces such
as Jonathan Daniels became necessary contacts for Johnson’s Rolodex.

**Daniels and Johnson’s Symbiotic Relationship Forms**

Jonathan Daniels and Lyndon Johnson would eventually strike up a mutually beneficial relationship based on a shared southern understanding, which existed in the hopes of delivering North Carolina to Johnson in the 1964 election. In exchange for his political support, Daniels received a host of benefits. This relationship began to form in the period between Kennedy’s assassination and the 1964 presidential election, as Daniels and Johnson’s correspondence intensified. During this period, the two men discussed a wide-ranging set of issues in a consistently cordial and friendly tone. They spoke about everything from issues of minor importance to matters with serious national implications. Ultimately, however, their conversations centered on the two men’s visions of a better America. Johnson and Daniels bonded over discussions of civil rights and their progressive, evolving ideas regarding the matter. They also bonded over their shared southern identity.

Lyndon Johnson and Jonathan Daniels asked and received a great deal from each other. From Daniels, Johnson asked for public support—in editorial form—on several key issues, which would shape popular opinion and ultimately help sway the 1964 election in North Carolina. Johnson understood just how much Daniels’s word—and the paper’s word by extension—meant to the readers of the *News & Observer*. Kennedy had added Johnson to the Democratic ticket in 1960 almost exclusively to win states in the solid south, such as North Carolina. Johnson’s increasingly progressive stance on racial equality, however—in tandem with Goldwater’s pandering to segregationists—meant these southern states would be in play in 1964. Keeping his father’s advice in mind, Johnson recognized that he would have to campaign aggressively and work collaboratively with major
figures of the press like Daniels in order to retain traditionally Democratic strongholds such as eastern North Carolina, where the *N&O* circulated heavily.

Johnson and his advisers would repeat a simple process when reaching out to Jonathan Daniels. President Johnson would write Daniels, asking for an editorial on issue X, written with slant Y. Daniels would comply immediately. Shortly thereafter, he would receive a letter from Johnson thanking him graciously for his support. Daniels would then write back to the president, thanking him for his letter and pledging unlimited support in the future. Typically, such letters would close with a bonding remark relating to southern pride, or with Daniels mentioning how thankful he was for Johnson’s friendship. One example of many concludes with a note from Jonathan Daniels postmarked September 28, 1964. In this letter, Daniels wrote, “Dear Mr. President: I am grateful for your note about my editorial based on my understanding and appreciation of your fighting qualities back in the days of our first associations.” This remark was in response to Johnson’s earlier request for Daniels to write an editorial acknowledging the pair’s longstanding relationship. By “the days of our first associations,” Daniels alludes to the early days of the pair’s friendship, dating back to the mid-1940s, when Johnson was a little known member of the House hailing from Texas’s tenth district. This editorial served as an “I knew him when” piece. It was likely effective in fostering a positive perception of Johnson in the eyes of working class eastern North Carolinians.

Such an editorial aimed to make the readers of the *N&O* understand Johnson as a relatable character—a hard worker of modest origins. In reality, Johnson likely understood these citizens, as he had developed sympathy for the poor and oppressed during his childhood and experiences in Cotulla. The Texan never forgot the poverty and rural isolation of the Hill Country of his youth. Although Johnson did ask for specific editorials to portray himself and his candidacy in a
calculated manner, Daniels’s personal notes indicate that the North Carolinian wrote in good faith while doing so. The two operated with a mutual understanding that Daniels’s work was of vital importance; though never explicitly stated, it is clear that Daniels and Johnson believed a series of strategically planned, well-written editorials would help the Texan carry the eastern portion of North Carolina and win the state.

While Johnson asked a considerable amount of his North Carolinian friend, Jonathan Daniels also requested his fair share of favors in return. Daniels’s correspondence with Johnson reveals a bevy of requests for the Texan. On January 18, 1964, Daniels wrote President Johnson at Governor Sanford’s suggestion in order to notify the president of the excitement in North Carolina relating to “the establishment of the proposed Environmental Health Center of the United States Public Health service.” Daniels hoped that the president could turn the proposed center into a reality. While Daniels’s request, like all from his camp, was submitted humbly, it also not so subtly listed reasons why it would be in Johnson’s best interests to comply. Knowing that the president was eyeing the 1964 election, Daniels pleaded a case for Johnson having the *N&O* on his side: “We have had three tough goes in Presidential elections in the years just behind us. I’m proud that we carried the State all three times, and thought it may sound like boasting, we carried it in the area dominated by the circulation of the *News and Observer*.”

Moreover, in asking for the realization of a North Carolinian dream, Daniels crafted an appeal that detailed the ways in which the *N&O* could prove pivotal in the realization of some of Johnson’s own political aspirations: “[The *N&O*’s area of circulation] roughly is our ‘black belt’ where feeling has been highest on civil rights and could be intense again.” Here, Daniels craftily hinted at the merits of forming a reciprocally beneficial relationship and appealed to Johnson on an issue in which he knew they both had a vested, common interest. Thus, Daniels subtly indicated to Johnson that he could not only help
him win North Carolina, but also shape the state after winning it.

Jonathan Daniels submitted a variety of other requests for Johnson’s consideration, such as one in March 1964 to issue a “stern rebuke to extremists on city streets as well as political platforms.” All evidence suggests that the president was receptive to such requests. The Environmental Health Center in the aforementioned correspondence was erected in Durham in 1966, two years after Daniels helped provide Johnson with the east North Carolinian firewall the Texan needed to win the Tar Heel State.

Daniels’s support proved immensely important for Johnson as he carried every North Carolinian county east of Randolph. Johnson ran up particularly large margins in winning rural eastern counties where the News and Observer reigned supreme, despite the expectation that such counties would be hotly contested. As Daniels noted in a post-election letter to Johnson, “We’re proud of you! We’re proud of North Carolina! And we are happy about the fact that Eastern North Carolina, where the News and Observer circulates went strong for Johnson despite dire predictions that that was the area where Goldwater would break through to victory in this state.” Daniels and Johnson’s correspondence continued well after the Texan had secured victory in 1964. Despite the importance and maintenance of their relationship, however, Daniels’s post-election communications were outsourced to the president’s staff. Nonetheless, Daniels sent requests for Johnson to consider certain proposals and attend events in North Carolina, such as the Shaw University centennial celebration of 1965, which he saw as relevant to the promotion of the Great Society.

Daniels, moreover, remained happy to publish editorials essentially on demand when they would promote positions he already supported. He penned one typical editorial in October 1965, advocating the adoption of the highway beautification bill. He wrote to the president’s wife, Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson, “Your Gal Friday Liz Carpenter called me yesterday morning
about an editorial on the highway beautification bill and I was happy to oblige.” On this occasion, and many others, Daniels immediately and obediently served Johnson and his administration when called upon. Later in the same letter, Daniels voiced his appreciation to the Johnson administration, writing that he had been “beating the drum” for the cause of highway beautification for many years, adding that he did so “without much hope before you came along.” This remark reflects Daniels’s feelings for President Johnson. Despite Daniels’s obvious strategic interest in forming a relationship with the president, the North Carolinian also revered and believed in the man.

Although he was called upon to write on a wide variety of subjects, Daniels’s correspondence with President Johnson’s office indicates that the North Carolinian was always ready to serve on command. On May 14, 1965, for example, one of Johnson’s special assistants wrote to “express [President Johnson’s] sincere appreciation for [Daniels’s] editorial of May 5th concerning the nature of America’s actions in the Dominican Republic.” This aide went on to detail why President Johnson felt Daniels’s literary contribution was so crucial:

The situation in the Dominican Republic is most troubled and complex. The reasons for the United States’ actions could easily be misinterpreted to America and to the World. Because of this, the President was so pleased to see the informative explanation which you gave to this manner.

Johnson and his advisers recognized Daniels’s reach and role in shaping public opinion in North Carolina. The Johnson administration viewed Jonathan Daniels as a valuable asset in securing re-election and in promoting stances on a variety of issues such as foreign policy, mental health, and specific proposals such as the highway beautification bill once re-election had been secured. Johnson viewed Daniels as having the power
to correct the historical record in North Carolina on complex issues such as U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in the 1960s. Daniels held a reciprocal belief in the ability of a Johnson presidency to correct the historical record on a major issue near and dear to both men.

**WHAT LBJ’S PRESIDENCY MEANT FOR THE SOUTH**

Daniels’s relationship with the president suggests that they both felt a shared duty to restore the South’s reputation and return the region to national prominence. Although Daniels’s primary job was editor of the *Raleigh News & Observer*, the North Carolinian concurrently worked in several auxiliary capacities. Daniels represented North Carolina as a delegate at a handful of Democratic National Conventions. Additionally, he published a number of books and poems. Interestingly, Daniels also accepted invitations to write forewords on a wide variety of subjects, frequently using these forewords as a platform to correct the historical record as it related to southern attitudes towards race and the South more generally. In his 1957 foreword for Dr. Thomas J. Woofter’s *Southern Race Progress: The Wavering Color Line*, Daniels wrote:

> Sometimes in the South today [the segregation problem] is treated like something that fell off the moon or was dropped almost as fortuitously by a fumbling supreme court. And in the North the impression is sometimes given that the South itself is one furious posse pursuing every colored man who asserts its rights.

Daniels believed that racial issues such as segregation were too often portrayed in a fundamentally incorrect, incomplete, and harmful manner. He refuted the notion that racism and racial issues were problems that were simply dropped in the South’s
lap. As a southerner, Daniels was deeply aware of the region’s long, complex racial history. He believed that discounting that history, and looking solely at recent developments, was reductionist. In his foreword for Dr. Wootter’s book, Daniels also addressed what he deemed to be an unhealthy relationship between the North and the South as it related to race. Daniels was very well-educated and progressive; he clearly acknowledged that the South had room to improve inter-racial tensions. Yet he also recognized and hoped to debunk two myths: Daniels hoped to prove that racial issues were not exclusive to the South and that the region was not composed solely of racists.

President Johnson’s official White House portrait.
Another foreword for a revised edition of George Nichols’s *The Story of the Great March* illustrates the ways in which Daniels believed the Civil War was the genesis of the two aforementioned myths and the reason for a southern sense of profound collective guilt. Daniels was highly critical of Nichols, a former Union soldier and journalist who served under General William Tecumseh Sherman prior to publishing his account in 1865. Daniels pointed to inconsistencies in Nichols’s work and the way they created a “devil’s brew.” Nichols wrote that seeing “the spectacle of burning homes aroused in him only feelings about a south paying its long overdue debt to justice and humanity.”

Daniels believed that Nichols’s factually incorrect, biased, toxic narrative, and thousands like it, led Americans to view the South as fully culpable for the Civil War without acknowledging the sins of the North. Daniels eloquently pointed to the hypocrisy of this statement and highlighted the ways in which Sherman’s march “wasn’t simply a march of disciplined military destruction.”

Nichols noted that “men and officers, too, took everything from silver cups to carriages, gold watches, chains and rings.” Daniels did not seek to excuse the wrongs of the South; he simply aimed to prove that the South was not “occupied only by extremists on both sides,” in the hope of debunking the idea that the South had a long overdue debt to pay. Moreover, Daniels hoped to highlight the fact that the South and North could work together, as the two were neither diametrically opposed nor free of guilt. He believed that Lyndon Baines Johnson could be the man to foster this reunification of a splintered nation and correct the South’s historical record.

Lyndon Johnson was acutely aware of his southern identity and of the potential he held to mend daunting regional tensions. As a president born in a former Confederate state, Johnson felt he carried a personal burden in representing the South and dispelling the myths surrounding the region. When he became president, Johnson determined, “I’ve got to show southerners are not dumb, I’m going to defend the south by
showing every time how much I know. I’m not going to use metaphors. I’m not going to be folksy.” He felt a personal duty to prove that southerners belonged in the executive branch. Johnson and Daniels both recognized that a successful LBJ presidency could help bring the South back into the Union and the mainstream of American politics. From his first moments in office, Johnson offered the hope of reconciliation and the prospect of a future in which the South could be an integrated part of the United States rather than a separate region that stood against the rest of the nation.

Johnson was uniquely well equipped to appeal to the South. As a southerner himself, he understood both the history and feelings of southern people. He truly understood what it meant to come from the South in twentieth-century America. Johnson empathized with the southern pride the Sons of Dixie felt, and he understood the shame of being discriminated against solely due to his place of birth. The president understood these concepts because he had lived and breathed them. Lyndon Johnson and figures like Daniels were also prescient in recognizing that promoting civil rights would unblock the quickest route to reclaiming southern pride and correcting the South’s historical record. In the words of political journalist Theodore White, LBJ spoke “in the presence of other southerners as a southerner who had come to wisdom.” This wisdom led Johnson to provide his southern compatriots with an ultimatum disguised as a choice. On the campaign trail in 1964, he issued one of the signature speeches of his political career, declaring:

“Today the south like the rest of the nation is at a crossroads...between a glory of what can be—and a glory that was. A choice has been forced upon us. It is the choice between a new progress—and a new nullification. Here in Charleston, once the hub of the Old South, you have to make that choice.”
Daniels and Johnson eventually came to see race not as an issue, but as the issue that prevented the South from reentering the American political mainstream. This was not always the case, however, despite the prognostication of another Texan, sociologist V.O. Key. In the 1940s, Key identified the bulk of literature on southern politics as conforming to one of two caricatures:

In both caricatures there is a grain of truth; yet each is false. The south, to be sure, has its share of scoundrels, but saints do not appeal markedly less numerous there than on the other side of Mason and Dixon’s line. Rather, politics of the south is incredibly complex.47

Key asserted that a variety of issues set the South “against the rest of the country.”48 Despite all of its issues he believed that one towered above all the rest: “The race issue broadly defined thus must be considered as the number one problem on the southern agenda. Lacking a solution for it, all else fails.”49 While it is difficult to pinpoint an exact date, it is clear that Daniels and Johnson came to the same conclusion as Key by 1964; they believed that abandoning Jim Crow once and for all was the only way the South could truly merge with the rest of the nation.

Neither of these men, however, came to such a conclusion in a linear manner. According to Charles Eagles, Daniels’s challenge to attitudes towards race emerged tentatively over the span of several decades.50 Daily editorials forced Daniels to constantly grapple with his personal stances, as well as the moral and political ramifications of such statements. Johnson also took many years to see the light and incorporate civil rights into his own political imperative. Reflecting on his career after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, LBJ observed, “I do not want to say that I have always seen this matter, in terms of the special plight of the black man, as clearly as I came to see it in the course of my life and experience and responsibility.”

Daniels and Johnson also shaped each other’s understanding and views regarding racial equality during their two decades-long correspondence. Upon reaching this understanding, the two men were uniquely qualified to enact the changes they deemed necessary.

Daniels used his pen to educate and shape the minds of his readership. Week after week, he sold the men, women, and children of rural, eastern North Carolina on the idea of a new, post-Jim Crow South, while Johnson attempted to make that new South a reality. Lyndon B. Johnson had the sensitivity, personal experience, political acumen, and southern credentials to connect with southerners and work the political establishment to inspire a shift in attitudes towards racial issues. He was able to connect with people in places such as rural, eastern North Carolina partially because of contacts like Daniels, but also because he

President Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
knew how the denizens of such areas felt. Johnson knew that citizens of poor, rural southern states were not just poor. He understood that they felt poor. The president empathized with these men and women who felt “back in the woods” because as a southerner in Washington, he felt the same way. \(^{52}\)

Johnson was able to tap into an intangible feeling and rally enough support in key areas of the South to carry the torch for an evolving southern liberalism in Washington. His alliance with Daniels was integral in rallying the base of support that was necessary to carry North Carolina in 1964. Johnson had to internalize and set aside both his southern pride and his southern shame in order to lead. Rather than serving as purely a southern leader, Johnson served as a national leader. The president certainly felt the sting of northern elitism and name calling; he battled crippling insecurity and constantly wondered if he could ever fit in amongst the Washington elite, whom he referred to as “Harvards.” Yet Johnson overcame these feelings of insecurity in an attempt to lead the South back into the political mainstream.

As much as he tried, however, Johnson could never entirely separate himself from his southern pride. He toiled ceaselessly to ensure that future generations of southerners would not have to feel the sting of “discrimination for the geography of their birth” or grow up in a dichotomy of two regions in which it was simply unthinkable that a southerner could become president. \(^{53}\) Johnson’s southern identity served as the catalyst for his fight against racial injustice and his struggle to correct the South’s historical record as Daniels had hoped. He once said, “I know the burdens the south has borne... And I want to see those burdens lifted off the south. I want the ordeals to end and the south to stand where it should stand as the full and honored part of a proud and united land.” \(^{54}\) Even some of Johnson’s fiercest opponents—many of them southern—conceded that the Texan was integral in leading the region from the fringes of politics into the core of the nation. One of these opponents, Virginia Durr, stated, “Lyndon brought the south back into the
mainstream politics of the United States. That is my belief, that he really struck the shackles. I mean, Lincoln struck the shackles off the slaves, but Lyndon struck the shackles off the south. He freed us from the burden of segregation.” Johnson could never have done so without the help of men like Jonathan Worth Daniels.
“We of the South”

NOTES


5 Ibid, 11.


8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, 3.


14 Ibid, 17.

15 Ibid, 18.

16 Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 98.

17 Ibid, 114

18 Sam Ealy Johnson, quoted in Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 75.

19 Wright Patman, quoted in Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 178.

20 Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 89

21 Anonymous Johnson City Resident, quoted in Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 78.

22 Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 534.

23 Ibid, 1.

24 Welly Hopkins, quoted in Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*, 203.

“We of the South”


29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


34 Ibid.


36 Ibid.


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.


44 Ibid, 276.


48 Ibid, 3.
“We of the South”

49 Ibid, 675.
50 Eagles, Jonathan Daniels and Race Relations, 16.
51 Lyndon Johnson, quoted in Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 127.
52 Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, 118.
53 Ibid, 340.

Images


Rejecting the Blackmail of the Enlightenment: Foucault’s Critical Ontology of the Present

Kyle Bigley

This thesis analyzes the way in which the Enlightenment served as a catalyst in the work of Michel Foucault, a twentieth-century French intellectual who contributed to diverse disciplines, including political theory, philosophy, sociology, and literary theory. In examining Foucault’s treatment of the Enlightenment, this work rejects the notion that Foucault was “anti-Enlightenment,” the accusation he faced throughout his career that he rejected science, reason, and universality. Instead, this thesis argues for an understanding of Foucault’s work that posits a distinction between the Enlightenment as a historical period and the Enlightenment as a philosophical ethos, or critique. In making this distinction, this thesis can distinguish between Foucault’s criticism of practices that emerged during the Enlightenment in the human sciences and his simultaneous commitment to a Kantian and Enlightenment form of critique. The findings conclude that Foucault attempted to turn the form of critique the Enlightenment engendered against what Foucault considered to be pernicious practices that originated during the eighteenth century.

Plebiscite and Partition: Propaganda, Mass Mobilization, and Diplomacy in Weimar Germany’s Struggle for Upper Silesia

Samuel Byers

This thesis examines the propaganda, political mass mobilization, and diplomatic campaigns waged by the nascent government of Weimar Germany to defend its sovereignty...
over the disputed border province of Upper Silesia in the years immediately following the Treaty of Versailles. The Weimar government has conventionally been characterized as impotent during this period and subjugated by the harsh terms of the Versailles Peace. However, the handling of the Upper Silesian crisis demonstrates that this is at least in part a mischaracterization. The provisions of the Treaty mandated that the region’s sovereignty would be determined by a popular referendum of its ethnically-mixed (and nationally-ambivalent) residents in accordance with the principle of national self-determination. This thesis uses documentary evidence from the records of the Weimar Chancellery and Interior Ministry, as well as newspapers and the personal papers of local government officials, to argue that Berlin’s propaganda and political mobilization campaigns were successful in convincing Silesians to vote to remain in the Reich. Successive Weimar governments leveraged their own advantages and exploited the terms of the Treaty to their advantage in order to defend Germany’s patrimony. The Weimar government then leveraged its victory in the March 1921 plebiscite as the key part of its diplomatic strategy to retain control of the province. This research joins a growing body of work which characterizes early Weimar Germany as a dynamic and vibrant government capable of taking initiative and effectively defending its own interests, even when placed at a significant disadvantage by the Treaty of Versailles or the governments of the victorious Allies, giving us a more nuanced perspective on inter-war German political development.

**Progressive Profit: Identity, Culture, and Branding at Polaroid in the 1970s**

*Conor Cook*

Although one rarely sees a Polaroid camera in use today, the Polaroid Corporation remains an iconic American brand. Little research, however, has analyzed the company’s cultural
history and legacy through the latter half of the twentieth century. Building upon existing scholarship, this work integrates sources such as advertisements, interviews, photographs, and annual reports to illuminate a larger narrative about Polaroid. Polaroid embodied technological innovation and novelty, and by the late-1960s and 1970s, the company promoted a constructed progressive public image that emphasized its social and cultural agenda. This work examines the Polaroid Corporation’s social and cultural progressivism and the extent of its eventual impact using the contemporary framework of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Ultimately, the economic environment in which the Polaroid Corporation promoted its products stunted the impact of the company’s social and cultural progressivism. The thesis highlights three essential components of Polaroid’s cultural history: the place of Polaroid in the social and racial zeitgeist of late-1960s and 1970s America, artistic initiatives and sponsorship, and the Polaroid Corporation’s marketing and branding strategies. Though Polaroid’s contributions to minority self-expression and self-actualization were significant, they were ultimately limited because they did not address the material, organizational, or structural causes of corporate marginalization.

A Long, Hot Summer: The 1964 Columbia Avenue Race Riot and the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia
Hannah Fagin

In August of 1964 on Columbia Avenue in North Central Philadelphia, a minor police incident escalated into a weekend-long race riot. This thesis explores how this specific event shaped Black-Jewish relations in Philadelphia through the perspective of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia (JCRC), a local community-organizing agency. On Columbia Avenue, like many northern cities during the 1960s, Jews served as landlords and business owners in Black neighborhoods, yet
lived elsewhere in emerging middle class areas of the city. The vandalism and looting perpetuated by rioters largely affected Jewish business owners, increasing hostilities and resentment on Columbia Avenue and complicating the JCRC’s mandate to promote Black-Jewish relations. While many contemporary observers viewed August 28, 1964, as the pinnacle of the decline between Philadelphia’s Black and Jewish communities, this thesis argues that hostilities existed well before the violence ensued and that collaborations continued long after. Over the course of the decade, partly because of the riot, the JCRC transitioned its work from promoting interpersonal relationships and sustaining dialogue between Jews and Blacks in the early 1960s to aiding Jews in moving out of Black neighborhoods by the early 1970s. Through archival research, largely derived from the unprocessed JCRC Records Collection, this study explores a race riot that has been largely overlooked in previous historical literature due to its relatively mild outcome. This thesis claims that the mythologized Black-Jewish relationship in Philadelphia promoted by the JCRC, and elsewhere in the United States, was never a true or natural alliance, but one always defined by fractures and fissions long before and long after the race riot.

“Art Treasures” and the Aristocracy: Public Art Museums, Exhibitions, and Cultural Control in Britain, 1805-1862

Julia Fine

This thesis examines the evolving nature of cultural authority in early- to mid-nineteenth century Britain, focusing specifically on the aristocracy’s involvement in the creation of public art museums and exhibitions. The eighteenth century was a period of aristocratic cultural dominance, during which a codified notion of correct ‘Taste’ was created and expressed by the art treasures collected during Grand Tours and housed in elaborate country homes and London townhouses. The 1800s, however, witnessed a dramatic expansion of the economic and political
presence of the upper middle class, although the aristocracy still retained significant power. This period also saw the creation of public art museums, including the National Gallery and the South Kensington Museum (later called the Victoria & Albert), and my research explores the shift in the balance of power between the aristocracy and the emergent middle class in this cultural realm. Who were the main drivers of these newfound institutions, and who controlled their management? Which sectors of society were desired and allowed to enter into these spaces of culture? This examination of the cultural issues related to the rise of public museums illuminates the social history of class relations in a time of political change. Through the use of institutional Boards of Trustees minutes, parliamentary reports and debates, newspaper articles, and treatises on art and collecting in Britain, this thesis traces the history of art for public consumption in this era through the lens of class. Ultimately, elite authority over the arts, once so firmly established, was diminished as Parliament, professionals, and men of business and industry became the new managers and overseers of museums and exhibitions. Aristocrats were reduced to figureheads, holding positions of symbolic control. However, their influence as the original tastemakers was to be felt for generations, as their art treasures became firmly established throughout this period as the nation’s cultural heritage.

Trimming Liberty’s Tree: John Dickinson Before He Was “A Farmer”

Benjamin Fogel

John Dickinson (1732-1808) did more to affect the founding of this nation than nearly any man, yet his refusal to sign the Declaration of Independence has confounded scholars for centuries. He earned the sobriquet “Penman of the Revolution” for his Letters from a Farmer (1768) and The Liberty Song (1768). He was the de facto voice for the
colonies, drafting the Declaration of Rights (1765), the Bill of Rights (1774), the List of Grievances (1774), the Letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec (1774), the Petitions to the King (1774, 1775), the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms (1775), and the Articles of Confederation (1776). He was an elected representative in the Delaware (1759-1761) and Pennsylvania (1762-1764) Assemblies, a delegate to the Stamp Act (1765), First Continental (1774), Second Continental (1775-1776), and Confederation (1779-1781) Congresses, and the President of Delaware (1781-1783), Pennsylvania (1782-1785), and the Annapolis Convention (1786). He personally took up arms during the Revolution and served as a colonel in Pennsylvania’s militia before joining Delaware’s. And yet, he abstained from the vote on Independence. Dickinson is largely forgotten and oft neglected for this decision. It has become his sole legacy and source of confusion about his politics. Only two proper biographies have been published on Dickinson and neither offers an adequate explanation for his fateful decision. Contradictory claims have failed to explain the apparent paradox: How could Dickinson, that staunch advocate for the American cause, reject the Declaration yet still fight for liberty? Several recent discoveries at archives in London and Philadelphia offer a unique glimpse into Dickinson’s education and legal career and help construct a new understanding of his theory of government, conceptions of rights, and jurisprudence. With these tools, this thesis reconsiders the nuances of his politics and presents a new perspective on his ideological influences.

**Out of Control: The Ulster Special Constabulary, the Cushendall Incident, and Anglo-Irish Relations, 1920-1922**

*Anna Garson*

On June 23, 1922, in the village of Cushendall in Northern Ireland, three Catholic civilians were brutally murdered by members of the Protestant-majority Ulster Special
Constabulary, a newly formed quasi-military police force. The Specials claimed they had been attacked and fired in self-defense, a lie accepted by the government of Northern Ireland. Subject to four investigations—including one ordered by Winston Churchill—hundreds of letters of correspondence, and two trials, the truth of the incident was suppressed and all files relating to the matter were classified for 75 years. Analysis of the incident is almost entirely absent from secondary scholarship or is discussed anecdotally with little archival evidence. Why, then, is this particular moment of violence, which appears to have been an immense problem for the Northern Ireland government, worthy of study now? This thesis argues that the Cushendall incident exposes competing authorities and political ambiguities and inconsistencies within the very new Northern Ireland government, and it is also evidence of the state’s deliberate encouragement of the Ulster Special Constabulary to be the violent Protector of Northern Irish Protestant, Unionist, and Loyalist supremacy at the expense of the Catholic minority. The Specials were designed to organize Protestants and to disorganize Catholics: the Cushendall episode tested whether the new Unionist regime would be free to keep the Ulster Special Constabulary from British scrutiny and determined the tone with which the government of Northern Ireland would approach the next fifty years of sectarian conflict.

“Let George Do It”: Simkins v. Cone and the Making of Hospital Integration in Greensboro, North Carolina

Eli Goldman

This thesis examines the role that local civil rights activist George Simkins Jr. played in the struggle to integrate Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Wesley Long Community Hospital in Greensboro, North Carolina, during the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, racial segregation defined southern healthcare, as hospitals regularly
denied patients treatment on racial grounds and relegated African Americans to inferior service in segregated facilities. Not until 1963, when Simkins organized a successful legal challenge to segregation at Greensboro’s two prominent, private hospitals in *Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital*, did the federal government address this critical inequality in healthcare. However, existing scholarship on the medical integration process lacks the same attention paid to other aspects of the civil rights movement and often overlooks the complexities of grassroots efforts to integrate. This thesis addresses these critical shortcomings by analyzing the importance of the local socio-political climate in Greensboro, as well as the agency of local leaders like Simkins in the progression of the *Simkins v. Cone* case. In doing so, it relies on official court documents from the case, correspondences between civil rights leaders and hospital administrators, hospital administrative records, news coverage, and transcripts of interviews with Simkins. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates the great impact local circumstances and activity had in forcing the desegregation of southern hospitals and draws connections between the *Simkins* case and the broader progression of medical integration.

**Between Judaism and Christianity: The Intellectual Journey of Moses Margoliouth**  
*Jill Golub*

This thesis analyzes the life and thoughts of one convert: Reverend Dr. Moses Margoliouth (1815-1881). Margoliouth was a Polish-born Jew who grew up in a traditional Jewish household. Eager to escape his observant Jewish community and the wife he had just married, Margoliouth set out to see, and better understand, the larger world. While traveling, he ended up in Liverpool, England. There, he met members of the conversion society called the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews, read the New Testament, and
converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, for the remainder of his life, Margoliouth’s identity was caught between Judaism and Christianity. Although religiously he had become a full Christian after his conversion, his connection to his Jewish heritage and ethnicity was never foregone. As a result, both the Jewish and Anglican communities were never able to fully accept his change of faith. Margoliouth’s split identity manifested itself in his writings and relationships. The study of Margoliouth not only contributes to the general historiography on the phenomenon of conversion, but also focuses on a much smaller segment of the convert population—those who left Judaism because they believed in the Christian message. Margoliouth went on to become a devoted Christian missionary and his story allows a closer analysis into faith-based conversions and the climate in England in the nineteenth century for those who converted and attempted to get others to do the same.

Sermons of Sacred Fire: Interwar Congressional Attenuation of U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia

Joseph Kiernan

This thesis explores the influence of the New Deal political coalition upon the United States’ foreign policy positions in East Asia. The subtle sinews between the frenetic domestic politics of the early 1930s and the decay of American post-First World War internationalism reveal a striking abandonment of key precepts of the 1920s U.S. foreign policy order. Through the triumph of newly-empowered populists, progressives, and militarists with the Roosevelt coalition, dormant political agendas achieved consonance and strength in the congressional milieu. Illustrating the ramifications of this political revolution and seeking to explore the domestic catalysts for the United States’ East Asian foreign policy shifts, this thesis examines two distinct narratives: the quest for pro-silver economic policies and the promotion of naval rearmament, and their ramifications for
American diplomacy and global geopolitical change.

Before the advent of the Roosevelt era, the 1920s were marked by the emergence and maturation of an international order, founded on the Washington treaties of 1922 and largely guided by the United States, which emphasized multilateral cooperation on naval disarmament and the defense of Chinese sovereignty. Through Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover’s administrations, these efforts were centerpieces of American foreign policy, a careful balance between the United States’ expanded presence in world affairs and the popular reluctance to pledge to the enforcement of peace promotion through overseas military commitments. The U.S., therefore, would lead by example as an advocate for Chinese self-determination and expansive naval disarmament.

This foreign policy order, emphasizing American leadership, entered terminal decline due to the insurmountable pressures of the New Deal political system and Roosevelt’s single-issue allies. By forcing the United States to massively increase the price of silver, pro-silver and pro-mining congressmen and senators knowingly sacrificed the Chinese economy, which was dependent upon a stable price. This dramatically, and perhaps fatally, weakened the Chinese Nationalist government while enhancing Japan’s interference in China. Navalist politicians, such as Carl Vinson, used the demand for military economic stimulus to finally overcome the pacifistic, disarmament status quo defended by the Hoover administration and its predecessors. The internationalists of the 1920s could not endure the onslaught of introverted progressivism, an irresistible political populism which contradicted the inertia of preexisting policy and hobbled the United States’ alleged friend, China. The disregard and contempt for the system enshrined at Washington in 1922 reveals how the United States’ politicians of the 1930s played a key role in destroying the post-WWI order and amplifying the conditions that would lead toward the Second World War.
“Unhallowed Bonds”: Interracial Sex, Rape, and the Law in the Antebellum Carolinas

Dorian Ledbetter

This thesis explores the legal response to interracial sexual relationships in two southern states, North and South Carolina, during the antebellum era. Such an analysis reveals how interracial sex functioned in a slave society and further elucidates the complexities of the racial hierarchy and the structure of southern power dynamics in the period leading up to the Civil War. Legal responses to interracial adultery are examined primarily through the use of divorce petitions penned by betrayed spouses. The study also expands to include nonconsensual relationships, specifically analyzing trial transcripts from cases of rape. This thesis also considers the dangers that the children of interracial sexual relationships produced for North and South Carolina and their racial hierarchies. When attempting to racially classify an individual, the courts of North and South Carolina considered factors beyond ancestry—physical appearance, character, and reception in society could all contribute to either the elevation of an individual to the superior white caste, or the relegation of an individual to the inferior black caste. Relevant state statutes are referenced throughout. The research demonstrates that during the antebellum era regulations regarding interracial sex were less necessary as slavery ensured that boundaries in the racial hierarchy were well defined—the peculiar institution ensured the confinement of black people to a degraded position in society.

Popular Neutralism in the English Civil War, 1642-49

Julia Levitan

This thesis examines the everyday experiences of individuals of the middling sort in six localities during the English Civil War (1642-1649) in order to assess the various nuances of popular allegiance expressed throughout the conflict. In doing
so, the findings of this thesis undermine traditional notions of allegiance that fall into such clearly defined camps as the Marxist interpretation, the geographic interpretation, and the social deference interpretation. Instead, this work posits that popular neutralism pervaded England’s middling sort throughout the war years. Popular neutralism was not just a renunciation, but a capacious idea into which various defenses of local identity, articulations of social grievances, and patterns of popular association could be accommodated. This argument for popular neutralism has a profound impact on the rest of seventeenth-century England, a period of turmoil and change. It calls into question the authority upon which Oliver Cromwell took power and provides a better understanding of the muddled motivations of a people who removed the very institution of monarchy only to quickly replace it.

**In Search of the Great Lies and the Clever Disguise: The Life and Legacy of Baron Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben**

*Aaron C. Mandelbaum*

After another dismal year of fighting in the American Revolutionary War, the Continental Army limped into Valley Forge, Pennsylvania for the 1777-78 winter season. While this hiatus from the battlefield afforded the Patriots time to regroup and reassess their war strategy, much of their attention had to address the blistering cold, pelting snow, rampant disease, and diminishing supply lines of food, clothing, and firewood in the encampment. Indeed, as one observer noted, the Patriots had become a “skeleton of an army.”

Curiously, though, it was in the midst of these deplorable conditions that an unlikely hero, Baron Friedrich Wilhelm de Steuben, a former lieutenant general in the Prussian Army and aide-de-camp to Frederick the Great, emerged onto the scene. Almost instantaneously elevated to the role of Inspector General of the Continental Army, Steuben succeeded in
instilling organization and discipline into the Patriot soldiers and, as a result, transformed what was a ragtag militia into a formidable armed force in less than four months. In fact, after his experiences at Valley Forge, Steuben transcribed the first standardized drill manual in American military tradition, which helped solidify his promotion to the Pantheon of American Military Heroes. Upon further review, however, Steuben’s self-portrayal and commitment to the American Cause calls for deeper examination. This thesis, therefore, explores the life and legacy of Baron de Steuben and, in doing so, concludes that the Baron committed one of the greatest deceptions in American history. Specifically, this thesis analyzes Steuben’s European prosopography, revealing that Steuben was not an aristocrat, procured and liberally leveraged the title of “Baron,” advertised himself as a lieutenant general due to a mistranslation, and spoke no English whatsoever. Moreover, this thesis suggests why Steuben’s career in Europe had ended so abruptly, which some historians suspect emanated from the Baron’s rumored homosexuality. Thus, ultimately, this thesis argues that the man described as “indispensable to the Achievement of American Independence” was a self-promoting charlatan who, through a series of back room dealings, combined an exaggerated and opaque past with his adroit talent as an ambitious sycophant to dupe the inexperienced and nascent American military and political leadership to secure a position in the Continental Army, and attempt to obtain the wealth and distinction that had eluded him in Europe.

Kathryn Marshalek

Political turmoil and religious tensions plagued seventeenth-century London as the city underwent dramatic changes between the ascension of King James I in 1603 and
the Glorious Revolution in 1688. During this period, tensions festered between Catholics and Protestants, erupting into violence centered around three key nodal points: the potential ‘Spanish Match’ between Prince Charles and the Infanta of Spain in the early 1620s, the English Civil War and Commonwealth era of the mid-century, and the panic surrounding the Popish Plot of the late 1670s. This thesis traces the nature of this violence across the changing political landscape to reveal the ways in which larger national anxieties surrounding religion materialized in small-scale interpersonal relationships. Specific cases of violence are read as meaningful gestures that reflect popular anxieties, fears, and animosities that express fundamental features of Catholic and Protestant relations in post-Reformation England. This work aims to augment the historical record, largely focused on state-sponsored action, by emphasizing religious violence committed by Catholics who felt the oppressive weight of the state and by Protestants who felt the state’s negligence left them at risk. To demonstrate that the perpetrators of violence viewed their actions as a conscious challenge to the prevailing order, three aspects of these actions—motivation, justification, and response—were examined using an in-depth consideration of rhetoric, theological defenses of violence, and a number of pointed case studies. The result challenges the traditional exclusion of violence from the category of social crime and shows that interpersonal religious violence was employed to defend a doctrine, to issue a charge, and to demonstrate that attitude of the perpetrator toward the law differed from those who made and enforced the law.

**Gone Viral: The Role of the Press during the Dreyfus Affair**

*David Murrell*

On December 22, 1894, French captain Alfred Dreyfus was convicted of treason for leaking military secrets to the German military attaché in Paris. Dreyfus did not, however, commit the crime. The press immediately joined the budding
polemic, both in defense and in condemnation of the disgraced captain. This internal debate played a massive role in publicizing the Dreyfus case, turning a minor domestic scandal into a full-blown international affair, which only concluded following Dreyfus’s exoneration in 1906. While many historians have analyzed the complex history of the Dreyfus affair, the media is rarely treated as a central figure. This thesis attempts to recast the affair as one that was intimately shaped by the press. Indeed, the French government maintained daily reports on the writings of the domestic and foreign press, in what amounted to an attempt to control the narrative of the affair. To this end, the government surveilled newspaper delivery boys at home and censored pro-Dreyfus theater productions abroad, though it failed to censor any newspapers due to European free press laws. Ultimately, no one was sure how to harness the power of the mass press for one’s own benefit. The strategies discussed by the thesis—centralized monitoring of the press, censorship, and government pressure exerted by the press—would become commonplace in the coming century. In this regard, the Dreyfus affair served as a preview of the modern mass media and domestic pressures that would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.

**Collegiate Masculinity and the Rise of American Youth Culture during the Roaring Twenties**

*Chloé Nurik*

Using a combination of both archival sources (from Harvard, Yale, and the University of Pennsylvania) and media depictions, this study examines the construction, representation, and lived reality of collegiate masculinity in 1920s America. In particular, the factors of consumerism, the increased public presence of women, and the rise of youth culture are analyzed for their impact on the way that young men viewed themselves and their peers. This thesis argues that multiple models of masculinity existed at this time, creating tension for young men as
they navigated these competing ideals and formed their identities in an increasingly complicated social environment.

“From Dump to Glory”: Robert Moses & Flushing Meadows-Corona Park
Mark Paraskevas

This thesis explores the intricacies of infamous New York urban planner Robert Moses’s park-planning process in regards to Flushing Meadows-Corona Park, with the two World’s Fairs hosted at the site (1939-1940 and 1964-1965) as bookends. Examining this gargantuan process piece by piece, we can determine Moses’s intentions for the park—both long-term and short-term—with confidence. With an overhead view of the four-decade endeavor, it is possible to compare the earliest plans of the project with the final product to determine what changed during the process and whether these changes were deliberate or due to circumstances not decided by Moses. This study also offers an analysis of his managerial style and its effectiveness (or lack thereof) in efficiently furthering his agenda. Moses had an especially abrasive and blunt style of management and communication that often alienated those he worked with, and an analysis of the Flushing Meadows project shows that his attitude likely had a negative effect on the final result. Finally, this project considers the role that Flushing Meadows plays in modern Queens, and it also examines its relevance in the ongoing debate over the benefits and drawbacks of Moses’s vast influence on the city in the twentieth century and their effects on today’s New York. The park-building process involved endeavors that Moses is lauded for, such as massive and unprecedented public works projects, and those he is criticized for, such as his preference for roadways and automobile travel over expansions to the city’s public transportation system.
From Lamb to Lion: The East India Company and the East Indies, 1600-1630

May May Pau

This study provides a counterpoint to the narrative of the unstoppable rise of Western empires through situating the founding, struggle, and evolution of the English East India Company in the narrative of early modern Western expansion. Though it ultimately found fortune and fame through conquest of the Indian subcontinent and trade with China, the Company struggled to achieve its founding mission of gaining a trading foothold in the East Indies during its early years of operation in the seventeenth century. The rise and fall of the Company in its early years in the East Indies informed and shaped the norms and patterns of Company operation in the Indian subcontinent, and the Company subjects in the East Indies played a significant role in shifting the focus of the Company from relational trade in the East Indies to more direct territorial control of India. This shift in Company operation is further incited by the English Company’s rivalry with their Dutch counterpart, the Dutch East India Company, and the English Company’s estrangement from the English Crown. The struggles confounding the Company in its early years suggest that the rise of Western powers in Asia is a complex story of intricate relationships, conflicting interests, and circumstantial innovation.

What was lost in the fire: Analyzing Representations of the Bogotazo

Mariana Pavia

On April 9, 1948, as he was walking out of his office, the enormously popular leader of the Colombia Liberal Party, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, was mortally shot in broad daylight on one of the busiest streets in Bogotá. His assassination immediately sparked a wave of riots originating in the very spot where Gaitán fell
and radiating across the capital city and the rest of the country. The violence that followed his assassination was complicated by the accusation that either communist forces or the Colombian conservative party were implicated in the assassination and by the presence of North and South American diplomats gathered in Bogotá for the Pan-American Conference. In Colombian popular lore, the Bogotazo—as the riots are known—has come to be known as the day that “split Colombian history in two.” This thesis analyzes how this singular event has been represented politically, socially, and culturally. The belief in the titanic impact of the riot on the whole of Colombian history is simplistic; however, by looking at the way that Colombians have come to terms with Gaitán’s death we can see how this singular day of violence stands out in a long history of conflict. The research used includes oral history interviews, analysis of literary and artistic representation, and immediate political reactions both in Colombia and abroad.

Who’s Invited? The Desegregation of Emory University, The University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton University
Samantha Rahmin

This paper deconstructs the desegregation of Emory University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton University. Analyses of these schools’ various archival collections reveal that each school desegregated when doing so would foster a more positive national reputation. Both local contexts and individual agents catalyzed each school’s desegregation process. While each school had desegregated by the early 1970s, the schools did not begin integration processes until a more significant proportion of black students attended each university.
Japanese Foreign Policy and Jews: Misconceptions and the Promotion of National Interests

Hannah Rosenfeld

The story of Jewish refugees escaping Europe to the Far East between 1938 and 1941 is generally little known and can easily be overlooked or even forgotten. The story of the Japanese and Jews is a complex and protracted one, and this thesis sheds light on Japan’s Jewish policy before, during and after World War II. This study indicates that the Holocaust had far-reaching, complex repercussions that extended far beyond Europe. It is estimated that over seventeen thousand Jews reached Shanghai in 1939 and their number exceeded twenty thousand by the end of 1941. This influx of a large number of Jewish refugees to Japan and Japanese-occupied territories in the late 1930s was the result, not of a military policy or a humanitarian cause, but rather the crude state of Japanese immigration policies, the lack of coordination within the government, and their misconception of Jews. This shift over time demonstrates the consistency in Japanese attitudes toward Jewish refugees: that Jews were simply a diplomatic apparatus in systematic efforts to appease other international powers and to fulfill Japan’s national agendas.

“An Outstanding and Unusual Contribution”: The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars

Sarah Samuels

This thesis will investigate the efforts and impact of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Scholars. The first chapter delves into the obstacles faced by the committee because of the social and political climate of the time. Xenophobia and anti-Semitism were deeply entrenched in American culture, and many of these tensions came to a head in the years surrounding the Second World War, impeding the acceptance of refugee scholars.
The United States closed its borders to fleeing scholars, and American universities often followed suit. Though universities did not always make these reasons explicit, independent research conducted by the Emergency Committee, as well as private correspondence, reveals the pervasive anti-Jewish and anti-foreigner sentiments that hindered the immigration and placement of refugee scholars.

The Emergency Committee sent scholars to different colleges and universities throughout America. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, or HBCUs, employed a small subset of refugee scholars. Chapter Two explores the tension inherent to the relationship between refugee scholars and HBCUs through two case studies.

Regardless of their placements, refugee scholars endured ongoing struggles. They were thrust into a foreign society and expected to acclimate immediately. Chapter Three examines the scholars’ sense of cultural dislocation. The Emergency Committee attempted to ease these transitions, advocating on behalf of the refugee scholars to the American government and university professors. More than just financial support, the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars served as an invaluable resource to refugee scholars at a crucial turning point of their lives.

My research at the NYPL archives supported my hypothesis that the individual scholar’s transition to American university life was more turbulent than previously thought. The records revealed that xenophobia and anti-Semitism did obstruct some of the committee’s efforts. Additionally, correspondence between the Emergency Committee and refugee scholars placed at HBCUs complicated the optimistic narrative presented by historians. The inter-office correspondence and application dockets suggest that the selection process was less randomized than I had assumed; certain refugee scholars requested to be placed at HBCUs. Finally, refugee scholars placed at various universities reported difficulties in adjusting to their drastically different surroundings.

Logan M. Staller

This thesis explores the life and works of Hugh Broughton, a sixteenth-century Christian scholar of Hebrew texts. In particular, this study focuses on Broughton’s most controversial works, examining them through three different lenses and placing them in three different contexts. First, the work attempts to construct a previously neglected biographical history of Broughton, the man, using his works and letters as primary sources to help piece together his life. Next, those same works are again examined from the perspective of Christian intellectual history, placed into a larger English Puritan context. Finally, they are reviewed one last time from the lens of Jewish history, revealing their previously uncovered Jewish significance. Thus, this work aims to bridge the gap and blur the lines between the fields of Jewish and Christian histories of sixteenth-century England. The research methods entailed primary research, both in person at various archives in London, and online utilizing records and archives from around the world. The research suggests that, while previously, historians have thought that English Jewish history begins in the seventeenth century, in fact, the sixteenth century is fruitful with Jewish elements, albeit more subtle and less pronounced. Thus, through this study, a greater understanding of the broader intellectual history of Early Modern England is achieved.

Defrocking Cuba’s Clergy: The Catholic Church’s Struggle for Autonomy in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959-1961

Daniel Thompson

Scholars studying the Cuban Church from 1959 to 1961 generally concur that its conflict with the government
arose from gradually escalating tensions between clergymen and government officials. Indeed, the clash between clerics and government leaders progressively intensified, eventually culminating in violence and the large-scale expulsion of most of Cuba’s Catholic clergy in 1961. However, previous scholarship has largely ignored that clerical opposition to the government did not progress in a linear fashion. Instead, the clergy’s resistance to the government fluctuated, intensified, solidified, expanded, and finally collapsed.

The first chapter of this thesis compares Church responses to major socialist reform in two areas: land and education. The Catholic clergy’s varying reactions to agrarian and education reform reveal that clerics were more concerned with an expansion of the government’s power than socialist reform. The second chapter discusses the role of clerical power, as defined by intra-clerical unity, support from the Cuban people, and the Church’s political legitimacy and influence. Contrary to current scholarly assumptions, the Catholic Church gained increasing power from 1959 to the beginning of 1961. The final chapter examines the role of violence in the conflict between Catholics and government officials. Government authorities and other anti-Catholic groups specifically targeted Catholics in churches and at Catholic gatherings because these places functioned as the clergy’s main platforms to spread dissent.

Over the ensuing decades, the Cuban Catholic hierarchy began to tentatively recognize the legitimacy of the Cuban communist regime. Nonetheless, the confrontation between the Church and the government in Cuba from 1959 to 1961 captures a moment in the history of the Cuban Church—and transnational Latin American Church—before many clerics accepted that Marxist precepts could be integrated into Catholic thinking.
The Enemy of My Enemy: Motivation and Disillusionment Among British Volunteers to the International Brigades

Miranda van Dijk

This work explains some of the more detailed aspects of motivation and disillusionment among British volunteers to the Brigades by examining initial ideological positions and attitudes towards the Spanish Civil War among British communists. It focuses on profiles of six men: Will Paynter, Fred Copeman, David Crook, John Angus, Bob Cooney, and James Jump. This thesis contends that the motivation of volunteers was substantially different for hard line communists, described as “Real Communists,” than it was for anti-fascists, described as “Popular Front Communists.” This work then tracks how the process of disillusionment originated from tensions between these two groups and affected each of them in unique ways. By identifying distinct sources of motivation and processes of disillusionment, this work is able to show the breakdown of morale among British Volunteers to the International Brigades without the need to place blame on a certain group.

Orange, Green, and Blue: Sectarian Politics and Police Reform in Northern Ireland, 1922-2001

Alec Ward

This paper examines the ways in which political processes and interests affected attempts to reform Northern Ireland’s policing infrastructure in three major moments during the twentieth century. In each of these cases, a major political event prompted the creation of an expert committee charged with proposing a set of reforms; the Committee produced a recommendation to “de-sectarianize” Northern Irish policing; and the suggested platform was modified during the political processes of passing it into law. In tracking these processes, the paper explores the linkage of policing, conflict, and political
power in a region which has remained deeply divided in ways that make it, in the author’s view, illustrative of trends in politics and policing which have broad implications for communities and challenges worldwide.