Al-Kindi’s Treatise on First Philosophy: Translation, Introduction and Notes with a Glossary

Fuad N. Nucho

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Al-Kindi’s Treatise on First Philosophy: Translation, Introduction and Notes with a Glossary

Abstract
It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally important task of philosophic analysis. The major part of the present work consists of a translation of al-Kindi’s "Treatise on First Philosophy" which is, as far as we know, the first Metaphysics written by a Muslim philosopher.

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AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Translation, Introduction and Notes

with a Glossary

By

Fuad N. Nucho

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

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AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

(Translation, Introduction and Notes)

by

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Candidate for the degree of

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AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (Arabic Text) 186
The new interest in Islamic Philosophy, which began about a century ago, has gained momentum in our times. This field of study has attracted scholars in a number of disciplines. The Orientalist seeks to ascertain the original contribution of Islamic philosophy and the nature and extent of its influence on Western thinking. The Classicist searches this rather unexploited philosophical mine in the hope of finding material that would add to his knowledge of the heritage of Greece, and his efforts have not been in vain. The Medievalist studies Islamic philosophy in an attempt to shed more light on the impact of hellenistic thought upon the monotheistic religions as well as on the interaction that took place between these religions. Contemporary Muslim thinkers also have increasingly been devoting their energies to research in Islamic philosophy and have made significant contributions. Numerous works that were neglected or lost for centuries are being rediscovered in libraries of the Middle East, northwestern Africa and Europe. Unfortunately, much of this new material cannot be studied immediately as it has to be first edited and translated.

It is the purpose of this dissertation to contribute in a modest way to this primary work of translation as well as to the equally important task of philosophic analysis. The major part of the present
work consists of a translation of al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" which is, as far as we know, the first Metaphysics written by a Muslim philosopher. The Treatise is one of a collection of philosophic essays by al-Kindi which was discovered in Istanbul four decades ago. The bracketed subtitles in the translation were added by the present writer for the sake of clarity. In the left margin, the numbers 97-162 refer to the pages, and the numbers 5, 10, 15 and 20 to the lines, in the Arabic text which was edited and published in Cairo in 1950 and a copy of which has been placed at the end of this dissertation for the convenience of the reader. The translation is introduced by an account of the philosophical and theological situation in the early part of the Ninth Century A.D., a biographical sketch of al-Kindi and a discussion of the content of this metaphysical work. The Introduction is concluded with an evaluation of the Treatise and al-Kindi's philosophic position. Documentation takes the form of extensive notes which are followed by a glossary of philosophical terms used in the Treatise.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to The Dropsie College for the teaching fellowship that was granted me and the opportunity to study at this outstanding Graduate School. Special thanks are extended to Dr. Federico Corriente, Dr. Israel Efros and Dr. Theodor H. Gaster who read this dissertation and whose suggestions were most helpful. The inspiration and assistance received from Dr. Lawrence V. Berman, under whom the present work was begun when he was on the
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Fuad N. Nucho
INTRODUCTION

1. The Philosophical and Theological Background

   a. The Impact of Greek Thought

   The culture in the countries conquered by Islam in the Seventh Century was essentially hellenistic. The military victories of Alexander the Great some thousand years earlier had paved the way for the spread of Greek ideas and ideals in the Mediterranean world and the Middle East. The process of hellenization was particularly enhanced by the Greek centers that were established in Egypt, Syria and Persia. The great cosmopolitan city of Alexandria played a leading role in stimulating widespread interest in, and preoccupation with, Greek philosophy and science. It was here that the Hellenic or purely Greek culture interacted and became infused with Eastern thought and the resultant Hellenistic civilization emerged. Greek became the language of learning and was most instrumental in molding the world of that day into a wider cultural unity. Under the aegis of the Roman and Byzantine empires, the influence of Hellenism continued to color the thinking and life of the inhabitants of Western Asia and the Mediterranean countries.

   Beginning with the Third Century A.D., a new version of
hellenistic thought, Neo-Platonism, made its appearance. This powerful philosophic system was destined to dominate the speculative arena of the Middle Ages. Plotinus (205? - 270 A.D.), the founder of Neo-Platonism, revived the ancient Greek philosophy but gave it a religious bent. His fundamental doctrine consists of the derivation of the world from One supreme entity through a process of emanation. In the words of Dr. Richard Kroner, Plotinus "out-Platonized Plato" and "dared to fulfill the highest task of all speculation: to understand the plurality of being out of its unity, to derive all the contents of thought out of their primary ground."¹ In the Enneads, Plotinus wrote: "The One is not absent from anything, and yet it is separated from all things, so that it is present and yet not present with them."²

Because of its philosophic or rather metaphysical monotheism and its epistemological mysticism, Neo-Platonism found positive response in Christianity and, later on, also in Islam. It was instrumental in the conversion of Augustine to the Christian faith and influential in the shaping of his theology. The Neo-Platonic system attracted also the minds of pagan thinkers who discovered in it a religious mood that satisfied their deep spiritual longing.

For our purposes in the present study, we shall follow hellenistic philosophy as it was taken up by the Syrian Christians
because it is this stream which eventually leads into Islamic
thought. The general bent of philosophy among the Syrian Christians
was Neo-Platonic. This was due to the influence of the Syrian
disciples of Plotinus, namely, Porphyry and Jamblichus. While
Porphyry (230 - 300 A.D.) helped popularize Neo-Platonism by
stressing and developing its religious elements, Jamblichus (? - 330 A.D.)
cast it into politheistic theological forms. The transplanting of
Neo-Platonism in Syria did not find any opposition because Hellenism
had been naturalized in that region. As Bertold Spuler has pointed
out, the christological controversies in the Eastern Church, which
eventually led to its division into Orthodox State and Monophysite
(Jacobites) and Nestorian churches, indirectly encouraged the further
cultivation of Greek philosophy. Particularly the Monophysites
and Nestorians sought in Greek philosophy logical proofs for their
theological self-defence against the Byzantine Church. Especially
in the Aristotelian writings, which they translated into Syriac,
they found the necessary logical ammunition to hold their own theo­
logical ground.

The type of philosophy cultivated by the Syrian Christians was
a Neo-Platonic version of Aristotelianism. Hardly any attention
was devoted to Plato. Two of the outstanding Aristotelian commen­
tators were the Nestorian Ammonius and the Jacobite John Philoponus.
The books of the Organon and the Metaphysics of the Greek master
were translated into Syriac. For some time, part of the *Enneads* of Plotinus were thought to be the work of Aristotle and was known as "The Theology of Aristotle." Porphyry's *Isagoge* was also attributed to Aristotle.

The Greek heritage, moreover, found an agreeable home in Persia. Political intolerance and religious persecution in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries forced the Monophysites and, more so, the Nestorians to move deeper into the Middle East. They established themselves in Mesopotamia and Persia where they continued their theological and philosophical activities under the tolerant Sassanid rule. The persecution of the Emperor Justinian of all non-Christians led to the closing down in 529 A.D. of the Athenian philosophical school. Its scholars, among whom were Aristotelian commentators and Neo-Platonists, found refuge in Persia where they were patronized by the Sassanid King Chosroes (Anu-Shirvān, 531-579 A.D.). Although most of them returned to Greece after several years when conditions improved, during their stay in Persia they helped lay down the groundwork for continued philosophic development. Translations of Greek philosophic and medical works into Persian were encouraged and financed by King Chosroes. A Persian philosophic terminology was coined. The Syrian scholar Uranius, who was attached to the royal court, translated considerable works of both Plato and Aristotle into Persian. The Nestorians on the whole excelled in medicine. The
reputation that some of them gained was due to their medical rather than philosophical achievements. The works of Galen and Hippocrates also appeared in Persian.

b. The Abbāsid Cultural Renaissance

At the beginning of the Ninth Century A.D., Baghdad was basking in the limelight of a Golden Age under the reputable Abbāsid caliphate of ʿAbd al-Rahmān (786-809 A.D.). The Byzantine rulers had been subdued. Peace and order had been established in North Africa. Through ʿAbd al-Rahmān’s political and military skill, the Arab Empire enjoyed a large measure of internal tranquility. Through his ingenious administrative ability, the legendary caliph stimulated economic activity and encouraged foreign trade. Baghdad developed into a vital shipping center. Wealth poured into it from numerous provinces of the Empire as well as from foreign lands.

Through the wise leadership of ʿAbd al-Rahmān, himself and educated man, economic prosperity was made to serve constructive ends. An era of culture and learning was ushered in and a magnificent civilization began to flourish. Architecture experienced a great boom. Being himself well-versed in religion and literature, ʿAbd al-Rahmān made his court the center of culture and scholarship. He initiated discussion and debate on a high intellectual level. Medicine,
in these fields were entertained at the court where they engaged in discussion, debate and exchange of ideas. Being himself gifted in, and addicted to, poetry, al-Ma'mūn generously patronized the leading poets and stimulated a literary output that was soon to become a permanent part of Arab heritage.

Al-Ma'mūn's reign also marked the appearance of the great collectors of tradition (hadīth), notably al-Bukhārī, as well as a host of grammarians, philosophers, historians and theologians. An institute for advanced study and research and a large library (bayt al-ḥikmah) were founded in Baghdad. An observatory was also constructed in the plains of Tadmur.8

Increasingly, al-Ma'mūn became fascinated by Greek philosophy and science. Agents were sent out into all directions to search for and collect the writings of Greek philosophers, physicians, historians and geometricalians. A competent staff of translators, under the leadership of the Nestorian Christian Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (807-877 A.D.) was subsidized by the public treasury for the task of translating the whole corpus of Greek knowledge into Arabic. This valuable undertaking was carried out chiefly by Christians, Jews and Persians. At times, when the Greek original was not available, the translation was made from the Syriac version. Special interest was cultivated in mathematics and astronomy. The works of Euclid and Ptolemy were translated by al-Ḥajjāj Ibn Yūsuf Ibn Maṭar for al-Ma'mūn, who had
Supplementary material was borrowed from Indian sources. The Indian astronomical book, *Sindhind*, had been translated for al-Mansūr by Ibrāhīm al-Fazārī. At the request of al-Ma'mūn, Muhammad al-Khāwarizmi prepared the first independent book in algebra.

The most striking feature of the first half of the Ninth Century was a spirit of intellectual freedom and tolerance which encouraged philosophic curiosity and scientific objectivity. Freedom of inquiry and discussion aroused the pursuit of every kind of knowledge. Through this open-minded attitude and ideal atmosphere for learning, the frontiers of investigation and research were extended into many directions. In this climate of tolerance and objectivity, as Dr. S. D. Goitein has indicated, the deep-seated interest in religion gave birth to the new science of Comparative Religion, as exemplified in al-Shahrastānī's work, *The Religions and Philosophic Schools* (al-Milal wa'l-Nihal). This "broad tolerance within its community," in the words of H. A. R. Gibb, grew out of "the character of Islam as a strong, self-confident, conquering faith."

The Abbāsid cultural renaissance, which began in Baghdad, spread to many parts of the Arab Empire. Older centers of learning such as the rival cities of al-Kūfa and al-Asrāra continued to flourish. New centers were established at strategic points throughout the empire. Outstanding poets like Abū Nuwās, Abū-'l-`Atāhīya
and al-Mutanabbi added luster of magnificent poetry to this Golden Age. A flood of writings in history, geography, biography, lexicography, rhetoric, zoology, botany and other fields of knowledge made its appearance.

Al-Ma'mūn's brother and successor, al-Mu'tasim (833-842), showed special enthusiasm for architecture. He built a new palace outside Baghdad and surrounded it with elaborate gardens and called it "surra man ra'a" (he will be delighted who beholds it). He also built new canals and erected numerous magnificent structures including some magnificent mosques. Al-Mu'tasim's reign, however, marks the beginning of the political decline of Abbāsid glory.

c. Faith and Reason in Early Islam

The conflict between faith and reason in early Islam revolved around the problem of predestination and free will. The influence of Christianity and Hellenistic thought were, no doubt, important factors in the development of the controversy. However, the initial differences of opinion as to whether man's decisions and actions were predestined or were the product of his own free will were aroused by contradictory statements in the Koran itself regarding this matter. Both the advocates of predestination and the defenders of the freedom of the will were able to claim scriptural bases for
their views. Metaphysical determinism is unequivocally expressed, for instance, in the following passages:

Allah will open the heart of him whom He intends to guide in the right path, and close the heart of him whom He intends to lead to err.\(^{14}\)

It is not for a soul to believe except by the permission of Allah.\(^ {15}\)

He leadeth astray whomever He pleaseth and guideth unto Himself whomever He pleaseth.\(^ {16}\)

Man's freedom of choice and action, on the other hand, is indicated in utterances as

We showed them the right way, but they chose error above guidance.\(^ {17}\)

Truth is from your Lord, so let him who pleases believe, and let him who pleases disbelieve.\(^ {18}\)

We vouchsafed them also guidance, but to guidance did they prefer blindness.\(^ {19}\)

These contradictory views are most probably the result of Muhammad's own position which underwent a change from a belief in free will during his Meccan period to that of predestination after the Hegira.\(^ {20}\)

As A. J. Wensinck has pointed out, "the debates on predestination inaugurated rationalism in Islam."\(^ {21}\) The earliest defenders of reason and free will were the Kharijites, whose thinking found expression in their political doctrine concerning the khilāfah (succession). They upheld the democratic principle of election on the basis of qualifi-
cation rather than by automatic hereditary succession. Any Muslim, who possessed the necessary qualifications, the Kharijites insisted, should be eligible for election to the role of leadership in the Muslim community. They maintained that the free choice of the whole community serves as a channel to God's will.\textsuperscript{22}

The Kharijite political theory soon led to theological debates as the Muslim community was compelled to define its stand on matters concerning who is a Muslim, who is saved or damned and what is the role of faith and works in the divine act of salvation. The liberalism of the Kharijites was vigorously opposed by the Murji'ites who stressed the supremacy of faith and predestination over against reason and free will. The Murji'ites refused to pass judgment on behavior and left this matter exclusively to God.\textsuperscript{23} This sect advanced a static conception of faith. It was of the opinion that the faith of the Muslim cannot be impaired by evil acts and declared conduct and practice as secondary, but not essential, to faith.

The controversy over the primacy of faith or works took a strictly theological direction as soon as the ontological question was raised whether the Muslim's faith and works were the creation of God or the product of man's free will. The conflict was now taken up by the Qadarites and the Jabarites. The former restricted 'qadar' (God's decree, predestination) and asserted that man is the author of his own decisions and actions and, consequently, is respon-
sible for his conduct. The Jabarites, on the other hand, persisted in the belief that divine predestination encompasses also the choices and acts of man's will. Their position was in line with that of the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-Sunna), who did not hesitate to condemn the rational method in religion as innovation (bid'ah) and, hence, as a dangerous and misleading approach to religious knowledge.

The Qadarites did not survive for long as a sect, but their ideas were adopted and elaborated by their immediate followers, the Mu'tazilites, who seceded from the Orthodox Muslims and worked out a type of speculative theology. This new movement started out, as H. A. R. Gibb has shown, as a reaction against the extremism of both Kharijites and Murji'ites. It advocated the conviction that the Muslim who commits a grave sin does not completely lose his status and becomes an unbeliever, as the Kharijites said, nor does he remain a believer, as the Murji'ites thought. Instead, the Mu'tazilites designated for the sinful Muslim an "Intermediate Position" (al-manzilah bayn al-manzilatayn). This description applied also to their own theological position as being intermediate between the Kharijites and the Murji'ites. They did not accept the former's stress on "works" and the Latter's emphasis on "faith" and, instead, underscored the importance of both works and faith.

The Mu'tazilites became the champions of human freedom and
responsibility in Islam. Thereby they sought to safeguard the nature of God as Infinite Justice. They argued that the determinism of predestination violates Divine Justice, for it would mean that God holds man accountable for decisions and actions which he performs by Divine decree. The Mu'tazilites reasoned that God would not punish man for deeds he is predestined to carry out. The fact that Divine rewards and punishments are inevitable implies that man is the author of his decisions and acts. In their defence of God's Justice and in their proclamation of a theology that would not accept any relation between God and evil, the Mu'tazilites referred to the frequent use of the epithets "the Compassionate, the Merciful" in the Koran and quoted scriptural passages to support their assertion:

God will not burden any soul beyond its power. It shall enjoy the good which it hath acquired, and it shall bear the evil for the acquirement of which it laboured. 27

God is not unjust towards His servants. 28

The Mu'tazilites did not restrict the all-encompassing power of God by their stress on Divine Justice. It is God who gives man the power and the freedom of choice, but the nature of the choice itself between good and evil is entirely left to man's will. However, man must face the necessary consequences of his responsible freedom.

The Orthodox Muslims reacted vehemently to the Mu'tazilite doctrine of free will. In the first place, letting man have 'power'
over his own actions, they believed, would make him the 'creator' of his own acts and this would mean a theological dualism that encroaches on God's almighty power. Moreover, the Orthodox Muslims interpreted the Mu'tazilite emphasis on free will as implying a restriction on Divine freedom and power. For them, God is an absolute Monarch whose freedom cannot be limited by any external agency. The Mu'tazilites were also accused of making reason (al-'aql), rather than revelation (wahy), the highest norm. To quote al-Shahrastānī,

The principle of the Mu'tazilites is justice in accordance with what reason postulates from wisdom, that is, producing acts in the way of what is right and salutary. There is no decree from eternity; God has ordered and prohibited and promised and menaced by non-eternal speech. Accordingly, he who is saved deserves reward on account of his own acts. This is postulated by reason as applied to Wisdom.

In their epistemology, the Mu'tazilites vested reason with the supervisory prerogative over all objects of knowledge and derived the necessity of moral behavior from rational insight rather than revealed truth.

The question of human freedom and Divine Justice led also to that of Divine Essence and Attributes. The Mu'tazilites were not only advocates of Divine Justice but also of Divine Unity. Hence, they called themselves 'the People of Unity and Justice' (ahl al-tawḥīd a'l-'adl). Their defence of the Unity of God was
first directed against the metaphysical dualism of the Manichaeans and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. It was quite probably their struggle on these two fronts that the Mu'tazilites were first brought into contact with Greek logic and philosophy, a contact that was soon to usher the cultural renaissance of the Abbásids spearheaded by the translation of Greek works into Arabic.

Within Islam, the Mu'tazilite emphasis on God's Unity took the form of ridding the concept of God from the anthropomorphism of the Orthodox believers. The Mu'tazilites vigorously rejected the belief that God will be literally seen by the faithful Muslims in heaven and so made every effort to explain away scriptural passages that speak of God's face, eyes, hands and throne. This anthropomorphism, they argued, would mean that God is limited to one place and this implies that He is finite. The Mu'tazilite conviction that God is pure Spirit made them oppose the Orthodox belief in the divine attributes which, in their view, constitutes a plurality and, therefore, is a violation of Divine Unity. They radically denied that God possesses any personal qualities (ṣifāt dhātiyyah, shakhṣiyyah) except eternity. Al-Shahrastānī writes:

The common belief of the sect of the Mu'tazilites is, that Allah is eternal (qadīm) and that eternity is the most peculiar description of His essence. They absolutely reject all other eternal qualities, saying: It is by virtue of His essence that He has knowledge, power and life; not because they are eternal qualities or ideas inherent in Him. For if the qualities should
partake of His eternity, which is His most peculiar description, they would partake of His divinity ... and they agree upon this, that will and hearing and sight are not ideas inherent in His essence. 32

A logical consequence of the Mu'tazilite rejection of the eternity of the divine attributes was their denial of the eternity of the Koran. Orthodox Islam believed that the Koran, as the speech (kalam) of God, was uncreated and eternal. It is "a glorious Koran in a preserved tablet" (lawn mahfuz). 33 The Koran received and communicated by Muhammad was believed to be a copy of the original tablet preserved in heaven from eternity. The Mu'tazilites saw in the doctrine of the eternity of the Koran the ontological implication of something other than God co-existing with Him before creation. This meant, in their view, a dualism that violates the absolute Oneness of God. To guard the Divine Unity, the Mu'tazilites argued strongly that the Koran was created. They referred to the Koranic verse "We have made it (ja'alnahu) an Arabic Koran" 34 in support of their assertion, but the core of their argument rested heavily on the logic and dialectic (kalam) of Greek philosophy.

The rationalism of the Mu'tazilites and their theo-philosophical position, particularly their dogma that the Koran was created in time, were enthusiastically adopted and popularized by the Abbāsid chaliph al-Ma'mūn. The doctrine of the non-eternity of the Koran...
was decreed by him as an article of faith in 833 and leading theologians were forced to subscribe to it. A period of fanatical inquisition followed. The movement that began in liberalism ended in intolerance. However, it was the adoption of the Mu'tazilite creed by al-Ma'mūn and his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim that encouraged the translation and study of Greek science and philosophy. The Mu'tazilites' influence and power began to wane during the rule of al-Mutawakkil (847-861 A.D.), who reversed the policy of his predecessors and upheld the theological position of Orthodox Islam. Though the set-back of the Mu'tazilites ultimately led to their final defeat, the movement succeeded in leaving its rationalistic imprint on Islamic theology.

2. The Treatise on First Philosophy

a. Al-Kindi's Life and Work

Al-Kindi was born around 801 A.D. in al-Kūfah, where his father, Ishāq ibn al-Sabbāḥ, was governor under Harūn al-Rashīd. His family belonged to, and provided leadership for, the influential Arabian tribe Kindah. Al-Ash'ath ibn Qais, one of al-Kindi's ancestors, along with a delegation from his tribe, had adopted Islam and pledged allegiance in person to the prophet Muhammad. During the caliphate of 'Umar, the tribe of Kindah moved from
Arabia and resettled in the newly founded city of al-Kūfah in southern Iraq.

In the source material that is at our disposal at the present, there is little information about al-Kindi's boyhood and early upbrining. Orphaned when he was still a child, he was reared in the intellectual atmosphere of al-Kūfah. As is commonly known, al-Kūfah and its rival city al-Baṣrah were the great centers of Islamic learning and culture. It is quite possible that al-Kindi acquired part of his formal education in al-Baṣrah. The curriculum at the time consisted chiefly of memorization of the Koran and mastery of Arabic grammar and literature. Soon al-Kindi began to devote himself to the study of Islamic law (fiqh) and the new discipline of dialectical theology (kalām). His maturing years, however, brought about a passionate interest in the natural sciences, medicine and philosophy.

In order to pursue these fields of learning, al-Kindi went to Baghdad, where Greek and Persian studies were beginning to attract brilliant minds and where the atmosphere of religious and intellectual freedom stimulated scientific inquiry and research. We do not know the teachers under whom al-Kindi studied. There is no evidence that he acquired a knowledge of the Greek language, but it is very likely that he became proficient in Syriac. T. J.
de Boer's statement that in Baghdad, al-Kindi "came to put a higher value upon Persian civilization and Greek wisdom than upon old Arab virtue and the Muslim faith" may be true of his early years in the Abbasid capital.

Al-Kindi's philosophic interest and outstanding scholarship brought him to the attention of al-Ma'mun, the great patron of culture and learning. Al-Kindi was attached to the ruler's court and contributed no little to the activity of translating Greek works into Arabic and probably in a supervisory capacity. This important work of translation was done from original sources and, when these were lacking, then from Syriac versions. Al-Kindi also engaged in revising existing Arabic translations such as the Enneads of Plotinus. Al-Qiftī, an early biographer, reports that "many philosophical books were translated by al-Kindi who clarified their difficulties and summarized their theories."

Al-Kindi was highly esteemed by al-Ma'mun, his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim and the latter's son Ahmad, whose tutor he became. "Al-Kindi and his writings," Ibn Nabātah wrote, "embellished the empire of al-Mu'tasim." Al-Kindi became to be known as "The Philosopher of the Arabs" (faylasūf al-'Arab). He continued to provide scholarly leadership during the rule of al-Mutawakkil. However, it was during the reign of this caliph that misfortune befell al-Kindi. The philosopher's prominent position in the court, we
are told by Ibn abi Uṣaibī'ah, aroused the envy of the sons of Mūsa ibn Šākir, Muḥammad and Ṭāhir, whose conspiracy against him brought the displeasure of the caliph upon him. Al-Kindī was punished and his huge library was confiscated and transported to al-Baṣrah where it was stacked and designated "the Kindian Library." Not very long afterwards, however, the conspiracy was discovered and Al-Kindī's books were returned to him. In connection with this incident, the fact must be borne in mind that under al-Mutawakkil, as it was mentioned earlier, Orthodoxy in Islam regained the upper hand and, consequently, Al-Kindī, with his Mu'tazilite leanings, was no longer welcomed at the court as he had been under the liberal caliphs al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'tasim.

The works credited to Al-Kindī by the earliest biographer, Ibn al-Nadīm, indicate that he was an encyclopedic writer with rare competence in numerous fields of knowledge. The 268 titles of essays listed by Ibn al-Nadīm cover a wide range of subjects such as logic, philosophy, music, psychology, physics, mathematics, ethics, politics and astronomy. Unfortunately, most of this scholarly output was lost. A few of his scientific works were translated into Latin and had some influence on medieval European thought. Girolamo Cardanus, the medieval historian, considered Al-Kindī one of the twelve greatest minds in the history of human
The recognition of al-Kindī as an original and profound thinker has gained increasing support since the discovery of a collection of his essays by Hellmut Ritter in Istanbul libraries. The philosophic treatises in this collection were edited and published in two volumes (1950, 1953) by Professor Muḥammad Abū Rīdah (Cairo) under the heading Rasāʾīl al-Kindī al-falsafiyyah (Al-Kindī's Philosophic Essays).

Al-Kindī's works vary in their length and they are often addressed to the reigning caliph or to some close friend. At times, the introduction and the conclusion disclose that the treatise was written in reply to some inquiry directed to him. Al-Kindī repeatedly states in his essays that he writes concisely and with due awareness and consideration of the degree of intellectual maturity of his reader.

There is no evidence that al-Kindī was actively engaged in teaching, except as the private tutor of al-Muṭṭasīm's son Aḥmad. No doubt, he participated in the discussions and debates that took place in the presence of the caliph. A contemporary of al-Kindī, the Muṭṭazīlīt al-Jāḥiẓ, a well-known humorist, mentions in his Book on the Misers (Kitāb al-Bukhārā) that al-Kindī was notorious for his thriftiness. As Abu Rīdah has pointed out, the context in which this reference occurs is not explicit as to whether al-Kindī, the
philosopher, is actually meant. In the first part of his article, "Al-Kindi als Literat," Dr. Franz Rosenthal addresses himself to this non-complimentary trait of al-Kindi's personality, which came down in the oral tradition and was recorded by several writers, and questions the authentic reliability of this characterization. At any rate, the impression the reader gets from al-Kindi's writings seems to be expressive of the author's generous nature and his readiness to share especially the fruits of his mind. In his ethical treatise "Al-ḥīlah fī daf' al-ahzan" (The Cure and Prevention of Sorrows), al-Kindi specifically urges men not to be enslaved by their material needs and possessions and declares that happiness is dependent more on the acquisition of intellectual rather than material riches.

It is most likely that in the pursuit of his intellectual endeavors, al-Kindi lived aloof from society. Around his comfortable house in suburban Baghdad, he had a garden in which he reared a variety of strange and rare animals. Al-Qiftī relates that al-Kindi resided in the vicinity of a wealthy merchant who did not know that al-Kindi was a great physician. The merchant's son was afflicted by some serious malady which no physician could cure. Informed by someone that the prominent philosopher, who lived in his neighborhood, was also a capable physician, the merchant took his son to al-Kindi who cured him through musical therapy. According to al-Qiftī also, al-Kindi tried in vain to heal himself from some illness from which he died probably at the age of seventy-two (c. 873 A.D.).
A "Millenium of Baghdad and al-Kindi" was celebrated in the Iraqi capital in December 1962 at which a number of papers covering various aspects of this first Muslim philosopher's thought were read.52

b. Philosophy, Truth and Religion

Al-Kindi's "Treatise on First Philosophy" is the longest of his extant works. It was addressed to the Abbāsid caliph al-Mu'taṣim who succeeded al-Ma'mūn in 833 A.D. and ruled in Baghdad until 842 A.D. The complimentary words directed to the caliph at the opening of the Treatise express a mood which is indicative of the close relationship which al-Kindi had to his patron and the high esteem which was accorded him at the court. This is also substantiated by the fact that "the Philosopher of the Arabs" was granted the privilege to be the tutor of al-Mu'taṣim's son Ahmad. Al-Kindi enjoyed an honorable status at the palace also during the reign of al-Ma'mūn who entrusted him with a role of leadership in the task of introducing Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic world.

At the very end of the "Treatise on First Philosophy," al-Kindi points out that it was his intention to "continue our discussion with what would naturally follow."53 The editorial note with which the work closes states that Part I has been completed (tamma al-
It is a matter of speculation whether the continuation of this philosophic work was completed and lost or whether the projected plans, for some personal or political reason, never materialized. Whatever the case may have been, the present work, fortunately, constitutes an integrated whole and its significance as most probably the first philosophic essay in medieval Islam is invaluable.

The first chapter of the Treatise deals with the nature of philosophy and its relation to truth and religion. Philosophy, as the highest and noblest of man's arts (ginâ'ât), is defined as the knowledge of the nature of things ('lm al-ashia' bihaqâ'iqihâ) as far as this is possible to man. In other words, philosophy seeks to know the truth about things. To the question "How can we be sure that the truth we seek does exist?" al-Kindî replies: Simply by sheer necessity does the truth exist, for if the truth is identical with the nature of things, and inasmuch as we know by empirical experience that things exist, it follows that these things must have a real nature which is the object of our philosophic quest.

The knowledge acquired by philosophy, al-Kindî emphasizes, is not an end in itself. It is for this reason that he hastens to link knowledge of the truth with ethics. In his theoretical knowledge ('lm), the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth
(iṣābat al-ḥaqq). In his practical knowledge (ʿamal), he seeks to live in accordance with the truth (al-ʿamal biʾl-ḥaqq).\(^57\) This stress on the practical implications of philosophy, which al-Kindī places at the outset of his discourse, is highly significant. Aristotle had considered theoretical contemplation (theoria) as the highest and noblest activity of man.\(^58\) Apparently, al-Kindī is not in agreement with this exaltation of 'theoria' as an end in itself. In a sense, he anticipates Kant in stressing the primacy of "practical reason" as we shall have occasion to elaborate later on.

Then al-Kindī proceeds by underscoring the Greek ontological keynote that the search for the truth is inseparable from the search for causes.\(^59\) This prepares the way for his definition of First Philosophy as the knowledge of the Primary Truth which is the cause of all knowledge and of all truths.\(^60\) Knowledge of the Primary Truth (al-ḥaqq al-awwal) is identical with knowledge of the First Cause (ʿlm al-ʿillah al-ūla).\(^61\) The perfect philosopher is he who devotes himself to the attainment of this supreme goal. This ultimate Truth, which First Philosophy or Metaphysics seeks to reach, is the cause of the existence and maintenance of all things.

Al-Kindī concludes this ontological prelude with a reference to the four Aristotelian causes, the material, formal, efficient
and final. This is followed by a brief discussion of "the four scientific inquiries" (al-matālib al-'ilmiyyah): "Whether" inquires about the existence or non-existence of a thing. "What" attempts to find the genus of an existent. "Which" seeks to identify its species, and "why" searches for its final cause or purpose.

In our effort to know the truth, al-Kindi reminds us, we must keep in mind that truth is universal in character. It transcends all barriers. There can be no monopoly on the truth. Men often violate and crucify the truth by the narrowness of their minds. We should never hesitate to assimilate the truth regardless of the source from which it may come to us. Sheer necessity demands that we do so. For during the brief span of life, a person's acquisition of the truth can only be fragmentary. Men must cooperate in their search for the truth. They must gratefully remember that the bequest of truth they inherited has been the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations. Indeed, we are duty-bound to acknowledge our debt to those who have contributed, in whatever small way, to the fund of knowledge, to say nothing of our debt to those who have done so in a large measure. Those who have shared with us the harvest of their minds have thereby facilitated our investigation and attainment of the truth. They have become our intellectual in-laws (ansāb) and partners (shurakā') in knowledge.
Al-Kindi is quite severe in his criticism of the men of religion who reject all philosophical pursuits, the knowledge of things as they are, and who jump to the conclusion that all philosophical preoccupation is nothing but heresy (kufr).\textsuperscript{66} Al-Kindi's obvious liberalism leads him to use very strong language in his attack against the Orthodox traditionalists with their fanatic fundamentalism. He describes them as perverters of the truth and traders of religion and enemies of all that is refined and noble.\textsuperscript{67}

Al-Kindi's universalistic attitude toward the truth guided him in his methodology. His method of research seeks first to review in a comprehensive manner what has been said about the subject under investigation. After that he proceeds to complete and discuss what had not been elaborated by others. He pledges his reader the necessary sensitivity and regard to the prevalent usages of the Arabic language and the literary style of the times.\textsuperscript{68}

Before this introductory chapter is concluded, al-Kindi underscores the importance of philosophical knowledge as a vital instrument for attaining religious truth. In fact, he considers theology (\textit{I\textsuperscript{m} al-rub\textsuperscript{u}biyyah}), knowledge of Divine Unity (\textit{I\textsuperscript{m} al-wa\textsuperscript{d}\textsuperscript{d}niyyah}) and ethics (\textit{I\textsuperscript{m} al-fad\textsuperscript{f}l\textsuperscript{l}ah}) as falling within the scope of philosophy.\textsuperscript{69} He goes on to assert, however, that the knowledge concerning the Divinity and Unity of God, which is attained by the philosopher is
not different from that revealed directly by God to His prophets. But this revelation to the few does not in any way nullify or minimize the importance of the philosophical channel for the realization of Divine Truth. The philosophical method, al-Kindi insists, is a precious possession (qunyah nafsah) which it is our duty (wajib) to use and not to lose. Even those who are opposed to philosophy will find themselves compelled by logical necessity to avail themselves of its services. For their objections to it are invalid unless they are supported by demonstrative proof which is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge they reject.

It has become evident in the course of this first chapter that al-Kindi wrote his First Philosophy with the purpose of substantiating and defending both the reality and Divinity of God against two particular enemies. He was engaged in a battle on two fronts. On the one hand, as alluded to above, al-Kindi's attack was directed to the Orthodox traditionalists (ahl al-sunnah) who vigorously opposed the infiltration of philosophy into Islam and the use of the logical method in matters of faith. Their fanatical adherence to the doctrine of predestination made them intolerant, in a very aggressive manner, of the Mu'tazilite stress on freedom and responsibility. Their fundamentalistic understanding of the Koran, the Mu'tazilites believed, was a perversion of religion and a distortion of the reality of God. The Orthodox doctrine of reward and punishment and the denial of man's
freedom of choice and responsibility was an encroachment on God's Justice. Al-Kindi was determined to defend the freedom of man, particularly the freedom to use his mind in matters of religion. He attempted in his First Philosophy to show the Orthodox traditionalists the futility of their literalism and the validity of philosophical knowledge as a path to religious truth.

On the other hand, al-Kindi was equally concerned about the danger to which his Islamic faith was subjected by the assaults of the unbelievers (al-kāfirūn) and the threat to the Divine Unity created by the dualism of the Manichaens and the trinitarian doctrine of the Christians. To the unbelievers he wanted to prove, by means of the same dialectic they themselves used, the existence and reality of God. With respect to the Manichaens and Christians, it was al-Kindi's intention in this metaphysical essay to vindicate the truth of the basic Mu'tazilite doctrine of Divine Unity. These concerns find expression in the very last section of this first chapter of First Philosophy where al-Kindi appeals to divine support and asks God "to prove His lordship and elucidate His Unity" and grant him the guidance that he may "refute by logical arguments (hujāj) the stubborm unbelievers, whose godlessness and shamefulfulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal."
c. Theory of Knowledge

Before starting his metaphysical inquiry, al-Kindī lays down the necessary epistemological foundations. The first half of the second chapter is devoted to this matter. The theory of knowledge delineated in this context deals primarily with the channels and nature of cognition.

Man acquires knowledge through two avenues: his sense organs and his mind. Corresponding to these two channels are the two modes of cognition (wujūd): perception (wujūd ḥissī)\(^74\) and conception (wujūd 'aqīli)\(^75\). Our sense perception is a function of our physical nature. It is direct and immediate. The world we come to know through the senses is the temporary world of phenomena which is constantly in flux. Knowledge gained by the senses, al-Kindī points out, is far removed from the true nature of things because it is a knowledge of the appearance only. Nevertheless, sense perception performs a vital and necessary function. It supplies us with a considerable part of the raw material which our mind organizes and utilizes, in the form of images, for its specific task. For al-Kindī, the world of phenomena does not reveal the nature of things but, unlike Plato, he considers it a real world.

We have been equipped to know not only through our senses but also through our minds. The objects of our conceptual cognition are
universal realities and rational principles. Knowledge obtained by the mind is nearer to the true nature of things than knowledge gained by the senses. What we perceive through the senses are particular things (al-ashīā' al-juzʿiyyah) which are material. These are the individual (ashkhāṣ) beings and things of the species. What we conceive by our minds are the universals (al-kulliyyāt) such as the genera (ajnās) and the species (anwā').

Al-Kindī argues quite strongly and convincingly against extreme empiricism which contends that all knowledge is acquired through the senses. He would agree with Kant that all knowledge begins with sense perception, but not with Locke that all knowledge comes from empirical experience. There are realities which we know directly through our minds, such as the fact that the states of being (huwa) and non-being (lā huwa) cannot be attributed to an object simultaneously.

At one point, al-Kindī turns to outer space to illustrate his argument and makes the statement that outside the All (jism al-kull) there is nothing at all neither a void (khalā') nor occupied space (malā'). The truth or falsity of this proposition cannot be verified by empirical observation. Only our mind can deal with this problem. We conceive the truth of this assertion logically and in the following manner: If space, whether empty or occupied, were to exist outside the All, which is the totality of being, then what we conceive to be the All could not possibly be the All at all, for
the All must contain all existence. Al-Kindi goes on to advance two logical arguments in support of his premise. He demonstrates first that space and its content are inseparable entities. Secondly, he shows that infinity cannot be an actuality because then it would be limited and ceases to be infinity. Therefore, he concludes, beyond the All there is nothing at all. This is a logical necessity and can be conceived only by the mind. 82

Al-Kindi discusses the nature of cognition very briefly in the present context. Of the mutable world of phenomena which is perceived by the senses only images are retained by the imagination (al-mugawwirah) which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (hifz) for eventual use by the mind. 83 While sensory objects require the medium (mutawassit) of images in order to be apprehended, conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instrumentality of images because it is represented by concepts which are grasped directly by the mind. The concepts have no material existence although the presence of material objects may help us in their acquisition. But this does not mean, al-Kindi hastens to add, that the concepts or the universals are abstracted from material phenomena because they never align themselves with the material. 84

The attainment of knowledge through perception and conception, through the senses and the mind, al-Kindi emphasizes, renders our knowledge of the truth easy in certain respects and difficult in
others - easy when we know that these two channels of cognition are applicable to two corresponding orders of reality, difficult when we ignore this distinction and try to use the one channel or the other for the acquisition of all knowledge. He who seeks to know the universals through empirical experience, al-Kindi warns, will be disappointed for his efforts will be in vain. His predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly visible to us. 85

Al-Kindi would be critical of the attempts of certain disciplines today which try to be scientific by imitating physical science in its empirical method. It is because of the confusion of methods of investigation, says al-Kindi, that many thinkers in his day were puzzled whenever they directed their inquiries to metaphysical fields of knowledge and tried to apply the scientific method in this higher order of reality. We should not use, for instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology, discursive reasoning in physics or demonstrative proof in rhetoric. 86

Other aspects of al-Kindi's epistemology appear in some of his other works particularly in his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risālah fi al-'aql) and the "Treatise on the Nature of Sleep and Dreams" (risālah fi māhiyyat al-nawm wa-al-ru'ya). 87 The imagination (al-muṣawwirah) has a vital role in his theory of knowledge. This faculty works continuously. During the waking hours, its energies...
are divided between the senses and the mind rendering its services to both perception and conception. During sleep, when perception ceases, it serves the mind exclusively. Dreaming is a form of thinking. The highest receiving station in al-Kindi’s epistemology, however, is intuition which he designates as inspiration (ilhām) and revelation (wahi).

d. From Cosmology to Ontology

Al-Kindi defines physics as "the science of that which moves" ('ilm kull mutaharrak) and metaphysics as "the science of that which does not move" ('ilm ma la yataharrak). The rest of the second chapter is devoted to a philosophical analysis of the terms 'Eternal' (azālī), 'Infinite' (ghayr mutanāhi), 'Time' (zamān), 'Motion' (harakah) and 'Change' (tabaddul).

What is the nature of the Eternal? In the first place, it is that which is always Being (huwa) and never non-Being (laysa). The Eternal, moreover, is self-sufficient, immutable and has no cause. It is not made of matter and has no form. It is not a species and has no genus. The Eternal has no ontological development because it is itself absolutely perfect. It is not a body and, therefore, it is immune to corruption and passing away. These qualities of the Eternal are established by means of a strictly logical argument which systematically posits the opposite and shows the contradictions that ensue.

Al-Kindi then goes on to demonstrate that the Infinite can
never be actual. It is impossible for a body to be infinite in actuality. The truth of this matter is demonstrated by strictly mathematical arguments which al-Kindi also advances in some of his other philosophical essays, particularly "The Proof of the Finitude of the Universe" (Idāh tanāhi jīrm al-'ālam), "Fi mā'iyyat mā lā yumkin an yakūn lā nihāyah lahu wamā alladhi yuqalu 'lā nihāyah lahu'" (On the Nature of that which cannot possibly be Infinite, and that which is called Infinite), and "Fi wahdāniyyat Allāh wa-tanāhi jīrm al-'ālam" (On the Oneness of God and the finitude of the Universe).

Having established the basic fact that anything that is quantitative is necessarily finite, al-Kindi proceeds now to prove that Time and Motion are quantitative entities and, therefore, finite. This is followed by a penetrating analysis of the nature and interdependence of Time and Motion and their relation to Change. The arguments presented are reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of these categories in his Physics. The famous Aritotelian definition of Time as "the number of motion" is stated and the various forms of Motion such as the locomotive, qualitative (transformation - istiḥālah) and quantitative (increase and decrease - rubūw, idmiḥlāl) are described. A more elaborate analysis of these matters is found in al-Kindi's essay "Ibānah 'an al-'illah al-fā'ilah li'-l-kaun wa-'l-fasād" (Exposition of the Active Cause of coming into being and passing away).
After showing that Change is nothing but a form of Motion, and that Time and Motion are ontologically inseparable from 'magnitudes' or 'bodies', al-Kindi goes on to refute the belief that the universe was first at rest before it was set in motion. If this belief were true impossible contradictions would be the result. These contradictions would follow regardless whether the universe were assumed to have been eternal or whether it was brought about out of nothing. If an eternal universe were first at rest and then moved, it would imply that something eternal underwent a change. But that which is eternal is immutable, as it was demonstrated earlier. We know that the universe is in motion and an eternal universe must have been eternally in motion. If we assume, on the other hand, that the universe came into being out of nothing, then the very process of its generation must have involved movement, for generation is a form of motion. The existence of the universe, in this case, could not have preceded its process of generation, but must itself be identical with that process. This means that the universe could not have possibly existed without being in motion. The conclusion that is reached from this discussion is that the universe, motion and time never preceded each other in existence. They are co-existent.

Al-Kindi has so far set the logical stage for a final act that must be performed before he can move into the heart of his metaphysics. Through a winding but consistent series of proofs, he attempts to
demonstrate the fact that the world, the cosmos, cannot be eternal and infinite. The existence (inniyyah) of the universe is, of necessity, finite and must have had a beginning. In this, of course, al-Kindī is diametrically opposed to Aristotle with his doctrine of the eternity of the world. He undertakes to prove this by more than one way, he says, in order to assist those who speculate in this field to acquire added skill in their effort to penetrate the frontiers of this field of knowledge.

The crux of the philosophical argument for the non-eternity and finitude of the universe revolves around the refutation of the theory that time can be infinite in actuality. Al-Kindī attempts to show that Time is finite in both of its dimensions, the past and the future. Time is a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttaṣīlah). This means it has a part, that is, the present (al-ān) which is common to both past and future. The present marks the end of the past and the beginning of the future. The present renders both the past and the future as finite because it defines the end of the one and the beginning of the other. The addition of two definite periods of time does not and cannot result in infinite time. By implication, the duration of corporeal bodies cannot be infinite. From this follows that a body, whether it is a single object or the body of the All (jism al-kull), the universe, cannot be eternal.
e. Existence, Essence and Causality

As a Muslim advocating the Mu'tazilite theo-philosophical position which stressed the Justice and Unity of God and the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility, al-Kindi is basically concerned in his Treatise on First Philosophy with the problem of proving philosophically both the Existence and Oneness of God and expounding the nature of Divine Oneness. The discussion so far was only a preparation for dealing effectively with this objective. He had earlier established the inevitable necessity of philosophic knowledge as a tool for attaining Divine Truth but without minimizing the epistemological importance of intuition and revelation in this matter. Man has the freedom to use his reason in the search for truth in general, and religious truth is no exception. The fact that the Muslim creed stipulates that God had revealed Himself earlier to other nations gave all knowledge and truth a universalistic quality. This meant a divine sanction of their assimilation by the Muslim regardless of the source from which they may come. Moreover, al-Kindi's logical arguments in the previous chapter have led to the conclusion that the universe is not eternal and infinite. It must have had a beginning and, therefore, a cause. But before he can search for that cause, he must first prove that it cannot have possibly been the cause of itself. This is his immediate task at the opening of the third chapter. Can a thing be the cause (اللّه) of its own generation?
Al-Kindi proceeds to answer this question by making a hypothetical distinction between existence and essence and describing the possible conditions that would result if we had the one (existence or essence) with or without the other. This is done in order to determine whether or not there can be a causal relationship between the existence and essence of one single object. 101

Of course, the question of causality does not arise if a thing had neither existence nor essence, for it would be simply non-existent, and it goes without saying that the cause-effect (‘illah wa-ma‘īlūl) applies only to existing things. Al-Kindi disposes quickly with other hypothetical situations which would not involve the problem of causality. This is the case when a thing is assumed of having existence without essence or essence without existence. This assumption is absurd because such a thing cannot possibly exist unless it has both existence and essence. The maxim is posited at this point that the existence and essence of a thing are identical. 102 The field of causal relationship is thus narrowed down to things that have both existence and essence. Can a thing that exists and has essence be the cause of itself? If this were possible then it would mean that a thing can generate its own essence. In other words, a thing would be the cause and its essence the effect. But this would be a contradiction of the logical necessity that the effect is invariably other than the cause. Therefore the conclusion must be drawn that if a thing is identical with the cause
and its essence is identical with the effect, then the essence can no longer be the thing itself. To state the matter differently, if a thing were the cause of its own essence, then it follows that that thing and its essence are two different things. But we know by empirical experience that a thing and its essence are the same thing. Therefore, it has been demonstrated, that a thing cannot be the cause of itself. It cannot bring itself into being. It must have a cause outside itself. 103

There is still one matter to be ascertained before al-Kindi can turn to the main topic of his metaphysics, the One and the Many, and can inquire into the nature of the Primary Cause of all that exists. This pertains to an analysis of substance (jawhar) and its relation to the problem of meaning (ma'na). Philosophy seeks to know that which has meaning. Meaningful words are either general, universal (kulli) or particular (juz'i). Being the knowledge of the true nature of things, philosophy is not so much concerned with the particular, which cannot be fully known, but rather inquires into the universal which is whole and not fragmentary and whose real nature is accessible to knowledge. Again, the universal, the general, is either essential (dhātī) or non-essential (ghair dhātī). That which is essential in a thing, like life in all living beings, is also called substantial, and the substance makes the very existence (qiwām) of a thing possible. 104

Moreover, it is the integrative substance (al-jawhar al-jāmi')
that unifies things and makes them wholes and thereby gives them their forms and genera. The differentiative substance (al-jawhar al-mufarriq), on the other hand, accounts for the unique features in beings and things such as the rational (al-nāṭiq) among living beings. It is called differentia (faṣl) because it differentiates things and sets them apart from each other.¹⁰⁵

Metaphysics deals with that which is universal and substantial and not with that which is particular and non-essential or accidental (‘araḍī). The existence of the accidental such as property (khasilah), like the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey, is contingent on the substance which it predicates (mawdū' lahu) and on which its existence and continuance (thabāt) depends.¹⁰⁶

f. Unity, Plurality and First Cause

Although essentially a religious book, the Koran deals with metaphysical and existential problems that are commonly shared by both religion and philosophy. Its teachings encompass basic theological and philosophical areas such as the nature of Ultimate Reality, the world and its relation to God, the origin and destiny of man, the problem of predestination and free will, the ethical and ontological conflict of good and evil, truth and error, appearance and reality, change and permanence, space and time and the certainty of knowledge.
The Koran, needless to say, is not always clear about these matters. It is often possible to derive deductively contradictory views on these issues as it was shown above, for instance, concerning the problem of predestination and free will. Practical difficulties relative the "khilāfah" (succession) and the nature and scope of "al-ummah" (Islamic community) raised quite early in Islam theological questions which pressed for answers. It was only natural that differences of opinion with respect to doctrinal interpretation of Koranic teachings should arise and, consequently, various schools of thought should develop.

The fact must be stressed that Arabic philosophy had its own original problems because it is not, as is commonly asserted, merely a repetition and reworking of Greek ideas. There is in it an element of originality and spontaneity. Prior to its encounter with Greek thought, philosophical inquiry in Islam revolved around the problem of causality. In this, the focus of attention was directed to the question of creation with the primary emphasis placed on the relation of God to the world. This is one of the basic issues which was raised early in Islamic thought. The Koranic concept of the "Preserved Tablet" (al-lawḥ al-mahfūz), for example, implied the eternity of the sacred Book. If this were true, then it would mean that something other than God co-existed with Him from eternity. Moreover, the creation of objects in time by an eternal, unchangeable Will seemed to be a contradiction to the intellectual Muslim, for this was inter-
prated by him as indicative of a change in the Divine Will. No wonder, the oldest Muttazzilites tried to solve this problem by conceiving of the Koranic terms "khalaqa," "bara" and "sana'a" (to create, generate, make) in such a way as not to refer to creation but rather to causality - First Cause - not in time but in essence. Another philosophic problem that arose quite early in Islam was related to the Divine attributes (ṣifāt) of which the Koran speaks which tended to suggest a plurality. How to reconcile this plurality with God's absolute unity presented intellectual difficulties which demanded solutions.

The influx into Islam of many converts from older religious traditions, chiefly Judaic, Christian and Persian, served to sharpen the focus on these theological and philosophical problems and to intensify the urgency for resolving them. For these converts were formerly adherents of religions that had dealt with these same issues in a systematic fashion, and not a few of them brought along, as a part of their intellectual cargo, the very epistemological and metaphysical ways of thinking which Islam itself desperately needed. Among these converts were those who had absorbed hellenistic learning and were experienced in applying the philosophical method to religious inquiry. They now set out to use their Greek philosophical knowledge for the vindication of their new Islamic faith.

How can plurality, which we encounter in the world, proceed
from God without the implication that plurality is also present in the Divine essence? It is to this difficult question that al-Kindī addresses himself in his metaphysics. He attempts to demonstrate the fact that plurality in the creation does not affect the Oneness of the Divine essence. Indeed, he goes much further. He seeks to prove that without the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-haqq), the Creator who is the absolute One, there can be no plurality in the world at all. He tries to show that the endless multiplicity of beings and things cannot be explained unless there is a Cause which is essentially One.

Al-Kindī ushers the period in Islamic philosophy during which Greek philosophy was believed to provide the solution to the fundamental problem of harmonizing faith and reason. It was he who was the first to introduce into Islamic thought the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation (fayd) as a middle way in his effort to reconcile the Koranic teaching about creation out of nothing and the Aristotelian doctrine of an eternal world.

Al-Kindī begins this major part of his First Philosophy which deals with the relationship of the One and the Many with an investigation of the general characteristics of Unity or Oneness. Unity is, first of all, continuity which is found in diverse things. Any individual being or thing may be described as "one." This applies to both natural and man-made objects such as a tree and a house. The tree is "one", a unity, by natural continuity. The structure of a house has "one" form by means of accidental continuity brought
about by craftsmanship. The house became "one" through the unification of its parts. But unity is not only descriptive of the house as a whole but also of the individual parts of it, for each part constitutes "one" part. This is true regardless whether the whole has similar parts, as in the case of a body of water, or whether it has dissimilar parts, as it is true of the body of a living being.\textsuperscript{109}

The unity that exists in all individual things, however, is not an absolute unity because individual things are divisible. This means that it is a unity by circumstantial necessity. In other words, the unity which we find in all predicables is not essential but accidental. And whatever is accidental in a thing is an effect upon it which is the result of a cause other than the thing itself.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in one object must exist essentially in another which is necessarily the cause of its accidental existence. It follows that the unity that is present in the predicables accidentally must have its cause in another source in which unity exists essentially. This line of thinking leads al-Kindi to postulate the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq) in which unity exists essentially because it is not derived from anything else.\textsuperscript{111}

Al-Kindi's next move is to examine the predicables and all that is related to them and demonstrates at great length that they all partake of both unity and plurality. Systematically, he sets forth all the contradictions which would result if only unity or
plurality were to exist in them. If the predicables partook of plurality to the exclusion of unity, then there could be, for instance, no contrariety or similarity and there cannot be one thing common to all of them. They would have to be simultaneously at rest and in motion. But by empirical experience we know that contrariety and similarity are facts, that the predicables have one thing in common and they are in motion. Nine such contradictions are advanced as proofs for the fact that the predicables cannot partake solely of plurality.\textsuperscript{112}

In a similar detailed argument, al-Kindi also proves that the predicables and all that is related to them cannot partake of unity without plurality. Another set of nine contradictions would ensue.\textsuperscript{113} If they partook of unity only, they would have no differences and no shapes and there can be neither movement nor rest. But things do have differences and shapes and are in motion.

On the basis of these two series of proofs, al-Kindi concludes that both unity and plurality are present in the predicables. It is in the very nature of things to be 'one' and 'many', to be wholes and have parts, to partake of unity and plurality. Unity and plurality cannot exist separately. Their existence is interdependent.\textsuperscript{114} This interdependence, moreover, cannot be attributed to chance (bakht) and coincidence (ittifāq) because this would imply that unity and plurality must have existed separately, and this has already been proven to be im-
possible. The interdependence of unity and plurality, therefore, must have a cause. It cannot be self-caused because this would lead to an infinite chain of causes and it has been shown that nothing can be infinite in actuality. The interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality in the predicables must, consequently, be attributed to an external cause, a cause that is transcendent and ontologically prior to both unity and plurality. This is the First Cause which is nobler and more ancient than all things. This First Cause must itself be either a unity or a plurality. If it were a plurality, it would also comprise unity, inasmuch as plurality consists of unities. This would mean that the First Cause is both unity and plurality. This possibility must be ruled out because it would be identical to saying that a thing is the cause of itself and it was demonstrated that this is impossible. Unity and plurality cannot be the cause of unity and plurality. Hence, the only possibility that remains is that the First Cause is mere Unity, One only (wahid faqat). It is void of plurality.

g. The Nature of Divine Unity

Having established the existence of God in terms of a First Cause that is mere Oneness and pure Unity, al-Kindi devotes now the final part of his metaphysics to elucidate the nature of Divine Unity. In the light of what has been said so far, the Divine Oneness or Unity must be very much unlike the unity that exists in the predicables.
What are its distinctive features? In what sense is it the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqiq)?

The fourth chapter is devoted to this metaphysical problem. Al-Kindi begins the investigation with a comparative analysis of the two terms "the relative" and "the absolute" (al-qawl bi-al-idāfah wa-al-qawl al-mursal). 117 Thereby he seeks to demonstrate the relativity of all descriptive terms and that the only exception to this is the term "One" as it is applied to the "True One" which alone is used in the absolute sense. There is nothing, for instance, that is "large" or "small" as such. It is so only in relation to another thing. An object may be "larger" than one object and "smaller" than another. The same is true of other magnitudes such as "long" and "short," "many" and "few." They can be used only in a relative sense.

Al-Kindi attempts, not without certain difficulties, to prove that the magnitude "smallness" as such cannot exist. These difficulties are created by the number "one" as the smallest number. His only way out is to subscribe to the view that "one" is not a number and that, therefore, "two" is the smallest number. But the "two" is the smallest number only in a relative, not in an absolute, sense. 118 This is so because the quality of smallness characterizes it only the moment it is considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number.

Before al-Kindi concludes that One is not a number, he advances numerous arguments for and against the idea that One is not a number.
If One were a number, then it would have to be a certain quantity, and anything that is quantitative is divisible. But by definition the One is not divisible. The One should not be confused with the matter which it qualifies and on which it bestows oneness. When we say 'one house,' for instance, it is the house that is material and not the 'one.' The house is divisible but the 'one' is indivisible. The 'one' is not a composite (murakkab) like the 'two.' It is simple (basīt), for it is composed of nothing else. The One is the constituent element of number, for numbers are aggregates of 'ones,' but the One itself is not a number. A number is a magnitude of 'ones' or units (wahdāniyyāt), a total sum, a putting together of units. 'Two' is the beginning of number and in relation to other numbers is the smallest because it is the sum of two units while the others are sums of more than two units.

Having demonstrated the fact that Unity, which constitutes the essence of the True One, is exclusively absolute, al-Kindi takes up the task now to prove that the True One is neither species nor genus. Comparisons can be made among things of the same genus. The True One cannot be compared with anything else because it has no genus. That which is without genus is eternal, as it was shown before. The True One, consequently, is eternal.

From this al-Kindi goes on to establish that the True One is not compounded of form and matter and that it is not a predicable.
Because plurality exists in motion, the True One cannot be motion. Inasmuch as thought in the soul moves from some images to others and from one passion to another, it follows that that both motion and plurality exist in the soul. Therefore, the True One cannot be a soul. After a brief discussion in which is shown how the soul becomes rational ('aqilah), that is, acquires an intellect ('aql) by means of its union (ittihaad) with the species and genera of things, that is, their universals, al-Kindi draws the conclusion that the True One cannot also be intellect simply because the universals which constitute the content of the intellect are a plurality.

What, then, is the nature of the True One? Negatively, it is not substance, genus, species, individual, differentia, property, accident, motion, time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, soul or intellect. It is void of matter, form, quantity, quality and relation. Positively, the True One is the Absolute One (al-wahid al-mursal) and nothing but Pure Oneness (wahdah mahd). The True One is the One-Itself (al-wahid bi-al-dhat) which never partakes of plurality in any form. It is indivisible in any manner. The True One, moreover, is the First Cause (awwal 'illah) of the unity and plurality which is found in all individual things. The Unity or Oneness of the Primary True One (al-wahid al-haqq al-awwal) is identical with its own Being.

The True One never partakes of plurality although it is the source of all plurality, for plurality is nothing but the aggregate
of unities (jamā'at wahdāniyyāt). Without the Unity of the True One there can be no plurality in existing things whatsoever. The accidental unity and plurality in every existent (mutahawwi) are the effect of the First Cause, the True One. Thus the emanation (fayd) of unity and, with it, plurality from the Primary True One is equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwi). 126

An individual thing comes into being when it acquires its unity from the True One. It, then, becomes a created thing (mubda'). The Primary True One, therefore, is the Cause of creation ('illat al-ibdā'). 127 It is the Active Agent (al-fā'īl), the (First) Mover (al-muḥarrik) which accounts for the beginning of motion. Consequently, the Primary True One, which sets the process of generation in motion is both the Primary Creator (al-mubdi' al-awwal) and Sustainer (al-mumsik) of all that exists. 128 The True One created the world ex nihilo.

3. Evaluations and Conclusions

a. Epistemological Realism

By accepting both perception and conception as necessary avenues of cognition, al-Kindī was advocating an epistemological realism that enabled him to bridge the gulf between empiricism and rationalism. He thus reconciles the empiricism of Aristotle and the rationalism of Plato, and before so doing he reconciled Plato and Plato by uniting Plato's Idea of the Good and the personality of the mythical demiurge,
the world-architect of the Timaeus, into One Creator-God who is
as ideal as the Idea but as personal and active as the demiurge,
and yet a Creator-God who is neither so intellectual nor so mythical
as Plato's concepts are.

Moreover, through his epistemological realism and through his
emphasis on the application of philosophic knowledge, al-Kindi was
able to solve to an appreciable degree the antinomies of faith and
reason, God and the world, the world and man. This solution was not
a speculative deduction, as metaphysical systems have offered, but
rather moral and quasi-mystical. The purpose of theoretical know-
ledge, he says, is to attain the truth. The purpose of practical
knowledge is to live in accordance with the truth. He makes the same
distinction between the "acquired intellect" (al-'aql al-mustafād)
and the "practical intellect" (al-'aql al-zāhir). In this emphasis,
al-Kindi can claim affinity to Kant who insisted on the primacy of
"practical reason" rather than "pure reason." This ethical affinity
arises out of significant epistemological similarities in both al-
Kindi and Kant. Both bridged the gap between empiricism and rational-
ism. Both recognized that it is the mind which imposes on the un-
organized and often chaotic raw material of sensory perception certain
form or order. In other words, the mind is not a mere passive re-
cipient of impressions but an active instrument that turns the flux
of sense data into meaningful order. The structure or constitution
of the mind is revealed in the finished product of the cognitive
process. Reality, as we know it, is more made than given; it is a construct rather than a datum. All that makes the world coherent and meaningful comes from what Kant calls "the transcendental understanding" and of what al-Kindi calls "The True One."

Through his universal conception of truth, al-Kindi was able to graft Greek philosophy, particularly its Neo-Platonic form, unto Islamic thought but without doing violence to his religion. Having placed intuition at the top of his epistemological hierarchy, he was able to maintain the primacy of faith. Aristotle was put in the service of Muhammad. Reason was made to bow to religious faith in al-Kindi's metaphysics. What Julius Guttmann says about Philo that he "adheres to the Jewish concept of revelation and regards the Torah as the complete and absolute vehicle of God's truth" is also true of al-Kindi in his high regard to revelation and the Koran. Like Philo, he sought to bring together the two forms of truth, namely, human knowledge and divine knowledge. Epistemological similarities are strikingly conspicuous between al-Kindi and the great Jewish philosopher, Saadia. Saadia, who was born about a decade after al-Kindi's death, also thought that "the task of philosophy was merely to provide rational proof of what was already known through revelation."131

Al-Kindi's contribution to Islam resembles that of St. Augustine to Christianity. Both strove for a philosophic knowledge of their beliefs.
Both were able to harmonize philosophy and religion and both gave religious faith the primacy in that harmony. Both stressed the fact that the highest religious truth cannot be attained by reason and can only be received with the prerequisite illumination and purification. Al-Kindi and St. Augustine were both influenced by Neo-Platonism and each of them replaced the state of ecstasy to which Plotinus appealed with religious faith. Both did not permit their respective religions to be suffocated by Greek philosophy. In the words of Dr. Richard Walzer, "in al-Kindi we find a balance unique in early Islam between an 'advanced' theology, based on reasoned interpretation of revelation, and a philosophy which aimed at utilizing the totality of our obviously limited human faculties in the understanding of God, the universe and man himself." 

In his epistemological emphasis on the primacy of religious faith and revelation, al-Kindi differed from all later Islamic philosophers. Al-Farabi (870-950 A.D.) enthroned reason on a pedestal and gave revelation a secondary place. He asserted the primacy of philosophy over religion and yet never ceased to be a devout Muslim. "The Second Teacher" (second to Aristotle, as al-Farabi came to be known), attempted to reformulate the Islamic religious tradition from the point of view of philosophy and he did this in a way that was not offensive to his fellow Muslims. "Philosophy is prior to religion in time," al-Farabi writes in "The Attainment of Happiness" (tahṣīl al-saʿādah) and "religion is an imitation of philosophy." In his
opinion, philosophy and religion must be united in the function of the philosopher as supreme ruler and lawgiver. The ruler-philosopher must be able to teach all citizens and thus enable them to achieve the happiness or perfection he is capable of attaining by nature.

The psychological process of cognition is briefly discussed by al-Kindi at the end of his "Treatise on First Philosophy" as well as in his "Treatise on the Intellect."\(^{135}\) To know the world of phenomena is not simply to copy it. The soul comes to know the exterior world because the forms of this world are potentially in the soul. The soul knows when it becomes one with the object of its cognition. The same is true of cognition of the immaterial world. Its concepts are potentially in the soul before they are known through conception.\(^{136}\) The Neo-Platonic influence on al-Kindi here is obvious. However, he differed from Neo-Platonism in conceiving of this "innateness" of the truth in the soul as merely potential rather than actual as the Neo-Platonists had asserted.\(^{137}\) In this, one is tempted to say, al-Kindi has some affinity to the seventeenth century German philosopher Leibniz, who thought that the soul (as every monad) knows the world because it is the world. The ideas or representations in the soul, according to Leibniz, are not always conscious, not always distinct and clear. Through cognition, they become clear and conscious in the soul.\(^{138}\)
In his "Treatise on the Intellect" (risālah fi al-ʿaql), which was translated into Latin and played a significant role in Medieval philosophy, al-Kindi designates four types of intellect. He accepts Aristotle's distinction between the 'passive' and the 'active' intellect. The 'passive' is the potential which resembles matter that becomes all things. The 'active' intellect is analogous to the efficient cause which makes all things. The 'active' intellect, in other words, makes the 'passive' intellect become what it apprehends. Alexander of Aphrodisias had added to these two the intellectus habitus or adeptus which al-Kindi adopts but divides into two, and this is his original contribution to the doctrine of the Intellect: "the acquired intellect" (al-ʿaql al-mustafad) and "the apparent or practical intellect" (al-ʿaql al-ẓāhir). The purpose of the former is strictly theoretical, namely, to know reality, and that of the latter is ethical, namely, to put the "acquired" knowledge into practice.

b. Metaphysical Absolutism

One of the oldest and most difficult problems with which the philosophic mind has wrestled pertains to the relation of the One and the Many. Granted that Ultimate Reality is One, how can we understand the plurality of being out of its unity? How can the multiplicity of things have come out of One supreme entity? In theological terms, what is the relation of God and the world? How could the endless varieties and diversities of beings and things in the universe have
been derived from One single Ultimate Unity? Subsidiary problems are the relations of Being and non-Being, the eternal and the temporal, the absolute and the relative. Indeed, these and many other philosophic problems are facets of the basic issue of the One and the Many.

The first extensive discussion of the relation of the One and the Many appears in Plato's Parmenides in which Plato agrees with the historical Parmenides in recognizing the distinction between the really real and the seemingly real, but disagrees with him on conceiving of the Existent as One only. In Plato's opinion, if this were true it would lead to nihilism. For him, the Existent is the world of Ideas with its manifoldness and in the Dialogue, therefore, Plato attempts to show that the One and the Many are compatible with each other.140

The problem of the One and the Many was brought into sharper focus by the conflict between Aristotelian and the Stoic philosophies. While Aristotle maintained the transcendence of God, the Stoic philosophers stressed the immanence of God. The problem became more accentuated as the religious dualism became more pronounced. As Windelband has pointed out, the dissatisfaction with contrasting God as Spirit with matter led to the tendency "to raise the divine being above all that can be experienced and above every definite content, and thus to make God who is above the world also a God above mind or spirit."141

The conception of God as complete absence of all qualities
makes its debut in Judaism in the philosophic system of Philo who elevated the infinite God far above the finite world and devested Him of all the predicates known to the human mind. The Christian Apologists who were influenced by Philo, particularly Justin,142 also indulged in this "negative theology" which was the result of widening considerably the gap between the One and the Many.

It is this same tendency to overexalt the Divine Unity above everything else that we encounter in Neo-Platonism in even more exaggerated form. For Plotinus, God is the absolutely transcendent Being, who is perfect Unity above reason. God is conceived by him as the Principle which contains plurality in its Unity.143 "Before the manifold," Plotinus writes, "there must be the One, that from which the manifold rises; in all numerical series, the unit is the first."144 In the words of Philippus V. Pistorius, "from the teleology of the universe Plotinus postulates a governing unity, which in some way must be the author or basis of all existence."145 The One is the First who is infinite, formless and precedes all thought and being. Plotinus identified the One with Plato's Good as the absolute beginning and end of all things.

And how does multiplicity proceed from this supreme Unity? What is the relation of the True One to the Many? The world is generated from the One, says Plotinus, by a process of emanation. "The One, being perfect, overflows; and this superabundance produces a thing
different from it."\textsuperscript{146} In relation to the world, which is its overflowing by-products, the True One is the highest Good, the Power and the Force which upholds everything it brings into being. Plotinus compares the activity of the One with that of the light which does not suffer at all in its own essence as it shines into the darkness.

This is the philosophic stream in which al-Kindi navigates in his First Philosophy. It is a Neo-Platonic stream into which mighty tributaries of Greek philosophers, chiefly of Plato and Aristotle, flow but which also has a strong undercurrent of Islamic religious thought. Al-Kindi displays a thorough knowledge of the great philosophers whose views and arguments he utilizes in order to strengthen his own theo-philosophic position on which he stands firmly.

As Marmura and Rist have clearly shown,\textsuperscript{147} in his effort to prove the existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables, al-Kindi is much indebted to Plato's \textit{Parmenides} which he regards not so much as a metaphysical but rather as a dialectical resource. Thus he utilizes the numerous arguments in the \textit{Parmenides} for his own purposes and yet without surrendering his originality. This is first evident in the general ontological approach to the antimonies. While Plato asks negatively as to what would happen to the "Many" if the "One" did not exist, al-Kindi proceeds positively by putting the question: "Because the "Many" exist what are the consequences for Unity?" There is also a marked difference in their epistemologies. Plato tends to
be strictly rational in his method. Al-Kindi, on the other hand, is both rational and empirical. He appeals to both logic and experience. Often our empirical experience affirms what logical deduction negates. For instance, plurality without unity, says al-Kindi, would logically lead to the conclusion of the impossibility of knowledge. "But knowledge does exist," he goes on to say, "our assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts." 148

Al-Kindi leans quite heavily on Plato's Philebus when he attempts to establish the existence of both unity and plurality in all things and the theory that it is the One who bestows unity on all existences. Plato calls it "a marvel of nature ... that one should be many or many one" and that "the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one." 149 He considered the knowledge "that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them," as "a gift of heaven." 150 Plato divides all things into four classes: the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the cause of the union. 151 He refers, on the one hand, to this union of the One and the Many as "being a birth into true being," 152 and, on the other hand, he says earlier in the Dialogue that "this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself." 153 Al-Kindi seems to be much clearer about the derivation of the unity in all things from the True One. The process occurs in time. Without this unity, says Plato, things will disintegrate into chaos. Without this unity, insists al-Kindi,
things will simply cease to exist.

Al-Kindi's understanding of the process by which the world comes into being out of the True One is thoroughly Neo-Platonic. As it was already indicated, he adopts the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation (fayd) to explain the process of generation. However, he does not accept the Neo-Platonic intermediaries through which the emanation takes place. In other words, al-Kindi rejected the Neo-Platonic Godhead which consists of the transcendent One, the Nous or Intellectual Principle which reflects the image of the One and from which the Soul proceeds and from which the world emanates. He recognizes only the True One as the Godhead from whom all things flow directly. God alone is the Creator and Sustainer of the world. In this way, al-Kindi adapted the Neo-Platonic speculative system to his monotheistic faith.

As to the nature of the True One as not being genus or species or any of the predicables, al-Kindi used the traditional Neo-Platonic view. Negative theological descriptions of the True One suited the Muslim philosopher in his effort to draw a sharp line between the creation and its Creator. The sharp distinction between the two was expressed by him through the theory that while all things partake of unity accidentally, unity is present in the True One essentially.

No doubt, the Metaphysics of al-Kindi shows the powerful influence of Aristotle. "The Philosopher of the Arabs" shows a remarkable
knowledge of Aristotle's writings especially the Organon, De Anima, Physics and Metaphysics. One of al-Kindi's essays is devoted to "the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and what is required for the Attainment of Philosophy" (Fi kammīyyat kutub Aristotle wa-ma yuhtāj ilaihi fi tahṣīl al-falsafah). Major dicta and themes of Aristotle's philosophy appear in al-Kindi's Metaphysics and the debt is gratefully acknowledged. In his argument that the co-existence of both unity and plurality in the predicables implies a Transcendent Cause, al-Kindi utilizes the Aristotelian maxim that infinite regress of the cause-effect sequence is impossible. Aristotelian theories such as pertain to the relation of potentiality and actuality, that infinity can never be actuality, and the law of contradiction that "the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect," as well as the analysis of causes, substance, time, space, motion and change by Aristotle are all extensively used in al-Kindi's First Philosophy.

The famous Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world was unconditionally rejected by al-Kindi. He maintained that the movement of the world is not co-eternal with the First Cause, the Unmoved Mover, the True One. Being is finite and not eternal. God alone is eternal. Al-Kindi's solution to the problem of infinity is based on strictly mathematical foundations. The basic Islamic dogma that God is the Creator ex nihilo and that He is the Sustainer of all that He has created are vigorously reaffirmed by al-Kindi.
This is the view that prevailed in Islamic philosophy, despite the pro-Aristotelianism of Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd with respect to the eternity of the world, a view that was reaffirmed by the great al-Ghazālī in the eleventh century.

Most of the outstanding Medieval Jewish philosophers took a similar stand and defended the biblical tradition of creation out of nothing by the One True God. The Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world was the first of thirteen theories which Saadia refuted in the first treatise of his important work *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* (kitāb al-amānāt wa-al-Iʿtiqādat). Some of the proofs he advances are of Muʿtazilite origin and, therefore, resemble those used by al-Kindī. The same is true of the arguments which Saadia develops to prove the existence and Oneness of God in the second chapter on "The Unity of God." Striking similarities may be observed also between al-Kindī and Bahya ibn Bakuda who was born in the latter part of the eleventh century and lived in Spain as a judge (dayyan) in the Jewish community. His first attack in his "Book of Guidance to the Duties of the Heart" (kitāb al-hidāyah ila farāʾīd al-qulūb) in defence of God's existence and Unity is directed to the dahrīyyah (materialism) which advocated the eternity of the world. His proofs, which are similar to those of the mutakallimūn (dialectical theologians) of Islam, are chiefly teleological. Like al-Kindī, Bahya was influenced by Neo-Platonism and thus like him asserts, through a purely conceptual deduction, that unity (of God) precedes plurality (of the world).
He echoes al-Kindi and the Neo-Platonic tradition when he writes: "The True One cannot be described with an attitude which necessitates plurality, change, subdivision or transformation in any way."\(^1\)58

An additional reference must be made in this comparative religious thought, namely, to the great Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). There are significant resemblances between al-Kindi and Maimonides not only in their common disagreement with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world but also in a number of related matters such as in their efforts to reconcile philosophy and revelation, their conceiving of philosophic knowledge as a means for appropriating the content of revelation and regarding their philosophic task of doing so as a religious one, and indeed in their intellectualist conception of faith. However, the two philosophers differ sharply in their attitude and reaction to the Neo-Platonic Aristotelian ontological process of emanation. While al-Kindi seems to acquiesce with it and incorporates it into his Metaphysics without any reservation, Maimonides makes it the target of his attack as he finds it in fundamental opposition to the Jewish doctrine of creation. For him, the question whether the world was eternal or created was basically a question whether the cosmos emanated from God by necessity or whether it was freely created by Him.\(^1\)59 In the words of Guttmann, "Maimonides' discussion of this problem is guided by the desire to replace the Aristotelian system of necessity by a system of freedom compatible with divine sovereignty, and in keeping with the voluntaristic
character of the Jewish idea of God."

As a Mu'tazilite thinker, it was natural that al-Kindi should adhere to the Islamic teaching of a creation *ex nihilo* and thus boldly oppose one of the most basic ideas of Greek philosophy that being can never come out of non-being. Thus in this decisive issue, al-Kindi the philosopher bows to al-Kindi the theologian. He is in full agreement with his Islamic faith on this fundamental tenet and in this respect differs from all the important Islamic philosophers who came after him. The element of emanation that al-Kindi injected into the creative act of God is balanced by his conception of the True One, the Creator and Sustainer, as having life and Will. This means that emanation is not the work of a blind necessity but of a Divine Will. It is the result of a free creative act.

Unlike al-Kindi, al-Fārābi, Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd adopted the Neo-Platonic theory of an eternal creation. Al-Fārābi tried to solve the problem of the One and Many by his Theory of the Ten Intelligences. God is the One who is Necessary by Himself. He is an Intelligence, knows Himself and can be known. From this Necessary One flows the first intelligence which is the first step toward plurality. The chain of emanations continues until the tenth intelligence from which emanate the human soul and the four elements. Al-Fārābi extolled the intellect so highly that revelation was rendered unnecessary. His was a religion of the mind in the light of which he set out to draw the
blueprints of the ideal society. 165 Both Ibn Sīna and Ibn Rushd assimilate the Neo-Platonic ontology and stress the primacy of reason in their metaphysical systems but not without certain modifications. It was al-Ghazālī, known as the Defender of Islam (hujjat al-islām), who about a century before Ibn Rushd reaffirmed the doctrine of creation by God ex nihilo and the primacy of religion and revelation over philosophy and reason. 166 "In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy and Theology," writes Simon Van Den Bergh, "Philosophy was defeated, and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali's attack (in his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers - tahāfut al-falāsifah) on Philosophy which in substance is incorporated in Averroës' book (The Incoherence of the Incoherence - tahafut al-tahafut) and which he tries to refute." 167

In conclusion, it may be said that al-Kindī's First Philosophy constitutes, as far as we know, the first systematic effort to weave Greek philosophy into the religious thought of Islam within the framework of Mu'tazilite theology. In it "the Philosopher of the Arabs" expounds a Metaphysical Absolutism for the purpose of defending the theological position of the Mu'tazilites in general and their dogma of the Divine Unity (al-tawḥīd) in particular. The Mu'tazilites, who called themselves The People of Justice and Unity (ahl al-'adl wa-al-tawḥīd), directed their attack against the unbelievers, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the dualism of the Manicheans and the literalism and anthropomorphism of the Traditional Orthodox Muslims. Al-Kindī's
Metaphysics contains philosophical ammunition for the fight against these enemies of true Islam. God is conceived as Absolute Oneness, the creative Source of all unity and plurality in the world, who endowed man with a mind to be used freely in the attainment of Divine Truth. The work gives evidence of the author's original and logical mind which is able to assimilate philosophical ideas and dialectical methods and to use them for religious ends. To quote Professor Ahmad Fouad El-Ehwany, "al-Kindi opened the door for the philosophical interpretation of the Qur'ān, and thereby brought about an accord between religion and philosophy." Indeed, al-Kindi's First Philosophy is the first attempt in Islam to harmonize faith and reason, speculation and revelation, religion and philosophy, an objective that continued to be a major characteristic of Islamic philosophy. As the first Muslim philosopher or, perhaps more accurately, philosopher of religion, al-Kindi pioneered in the difficult task of translating Greek works into Arabic, probably in a supervisory capacity, and, therefore, in coining a new Arabic philosophical terminology.

Through his Epistemological Realism also, which gave validity to knowledge acquired by perception, conception and intuition, al-Kindi exercised a considerable influence on later Islamic philosophers as well as on Medieval Jewish and Christian philosophical theologians. His treatises on the Intellect and Prophecy initiated a series on these same subjects by the other Islamic philosophers. As mentioned above,
his "Treatise on the Intellect" was translated into Latin and had some impact on Medieval philosophy. With al-Fārābī (known as the Second Teacher - al-mu'allim al-thānī - second to Aristotle), al-Kīndī can rightly claim to be one of the founders of Islamic philosophy. While al-Kīndī may be compared with St. Augustine in Christianity, as noted earlier, al-Fārābī resembles St. Thomas Acquinas in whose philosophical theology Aristotle conquers Plato.

Professor Richard Walzer's outstanding work in Classical and Islamic philosophy has shed considerable light on the value of the new material in the field of Islamic philosophic thought for the history of Greek philosophy. It is thanks to al-Kīndī, for instance, that we possess today the only remnant of an ancient commentary on Aristotle by Plotinus. Mistakenly known then as The Theology of Aristotle, this document was translated into Arabic, at al-Kīndī's request, for the benefit of his royal pupil Ahmad, the son of al-Mu'taṣīm. In the same context, Walzer writes:

We are indebted to al-Kīndī, as to many other Arabic philosophers, for new material for the history of Greek philosophy. The arguments he uses are not always to be traced in such Neo-Platonic works as we possess in the original Greek, and so add to our knowledge of Neo-Platonism, and treatises on the soul on Neo-Platonic lines have yielded new fragments of a lost dialogue, the Eudemus, written at a period when he still adhered to Plato's theory of the immortality of the soul.
TRANSLATION

CHAPTER I

AL-KINDI'S TREATISE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Addressed to al-Mu'tasim bi-Allah

Unto you, who are the son of the noblest masters and the bonds of happiness, may God grant a long life. He who adheres to your counsel shall be blessed in time and eternity. May God adorn you with all the robes of virtue and purify you from all the stains of vice.

(PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH)

Among man's arts, philosophy occupies the highest rank and noblest position. It may be defined as the knowledge of the nature of things as far as this is possible to man. In his theoretical knowledge ('ilm), the philosopher's objective is to attain the truth (isbahat al-haqq). In his practical knowledge ('amal), he seeks to live in accordance with the truth (al-'amal bi-al-haqq). We must bear in mind, however, that our philosophic preoccupation is not an eternal activity, for it comes to an end and we abandon it once we reach the truth.

It must emphatically be stated that the search for the truth is inseparable from the search for causes. The cause of the existence and maintenance of everything is the truth. Anything that has existence (inniyyah) has reality. Consequently, the truth exists by sheer necessity simply because there are existent beings and things.
The noblest philosophy, exceeding any other in importance, is First Philosophy. By First Philosophy I mean knowledge of the primary Truth which is the cause of all truth. The perfect and noblest philosopher is he who achieves full knowledge of this highest Truth; for knowledge of the cause is nobler than knowledge of the effect. We acquire full knowledge of every intelligible when we gain complete knowledge of its cause. A cause may be material, formal, efficient, that is, initiator of motion, or final, namely, identical with the purpose for which an object exists.

The scientific inquiries are four, as we have established elsewhere in our philosophic statements: "whether," "what," "which" or "why." "Whether" inquires solely about existence. An existant must have a genus, and "what" searches for that genus. "Which" looks for the species. "What" and "Which" together seek to find the kind. "Why" inquires into the final cause, for it aims at knowing the absolute cause.

It is quite evident that the moment we know the matter of which a thing is made, we also become cognizant of its genus. Similarly, when we comprehend the form of an object, we gain knowledge of its
kind; and knowledge of the kind implies knowledge of the species. An object is defined when its material, formal and final causes are known, and to define an object is to know its nature.

(KNOWLEDGE OF THE FIRST CAUSE)

Knowledge of the First Cause has properly been called First Philosophy, for it is the source of all other philosophic knowledge. It is first in nobleness, in genus, in certainty of cognition. It is first in time, for it is the cause of time.

(INDEBTEDNESS ACKNOWLEDGED)

The truth makes it imperative that we refrain from depreciating those from whom we have benefited even if it were in a modest way in small matters, not to speak of those who have enriched us in a large measure in significant areas of endeavor. Those who do not attain the whole truth but do share with us the fruits of their minds become our intellectual in-laws and partners. Their contributions have paved for us the way to discover a great deal of knowledge which eluded them. As it was observed by great non-Arab philosophers before us, no seeker of the truth worthy of the name has ever attained complete knowledge solely by his own efforts. Of course, there are those whose search yields nothing, while others have to be content with finding fragments of knowledge. However, the partial knowledge obtained by various minds, when assembled, does add up to a picture that is
meaningful and valuable.

We are duty-bound, therefore, to show our genuine gratitude to all those who have contributed in any manner, whether modestly or generously to the growing heritage of knowledge. By imparting to us the harvest of their thinking, they have thereby facilitated our investigation of the facts that are still hidden from us. Their discoveries have become stepping-stones on which we were able to move forward on the path of truth. Without the efforts of those who have gone before us, we could not have possibly acquired, within the brief span of our lives and research, the entire wealth of knowledge we found at our disposal at the beginning of our journey. This accumulated fund of knowledge indeed accelerated our progress in finding answers to the problems we set out to solve. We must always gratefully remember that the capital of truth we inherited has been the result of serious search and tireless research of many generations.

It goes without saying that no one person during a lifetime of concentrated intellectual activity can gain as much knowledge as may be gathered through the cooperative effort over the years. It was Aristotle, the leading Greek philosopher, who rightly said that we must never neglect to thank the parents of those who contribute to the common treasury of truth for they are the cause of their being and, indirectly, enhance our attainment of the truth.
(UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OF THE TRUTH)

We should not hesitate to appreciate and assimilate the truth regardless of the source from which it may come to us. We should not be ashamed to receive it from those who differ from us in their race and belief. Truth is universal and transcends all barriers. Any honest seeker of it is entitled to it. Truth being to him the highest value, he will naturally honor all discoverers and transmitters of the truth. Obviously, truth never degrades us. On the contrary, it constantly and consistently ennobles us.

(METHODOLOGY)

We do well, therefore, as we endeavor to perfect our species which is in line with the truth, to adopt in the present study the same principle that has guided us in all our investigations. We shall begin by stating in a comprehensive and lucid manner what the ancients had said on the subject. Then we shall proceed to discuss, to the best of our ability, the areas which require further elaboration. This we shall undertake with due regard to the present usages of the Arabic language and of the literary style in our times. And whenever necessary, we shall give a detailed analysis of that which is complex and ambiguous in order to safeguard ourselves against the possible misinterpretation of those of our contemporaries who claim to be thinkers, but who in fact are not worthy of the name because they are hopelessly alienated from the truth. They are void of the qualities which adorn the men of
independent thought. Instead of upholding the truth, they crucify it by the narrowness of their minds. These enemies of the truth diligently pursue that which is common and passionately appropriate that which is mediocre. The poisonous envy which permeates their animal natures blinds them to the light of truth. It makes them look down at all who excel in the very virtues which they themselves lack. These men misrepresent the truth and are the enemies of all that is refined and noble. Their primary concern is to guard the positions which they have illicitly created, unworthily occupied and efficiently use to rule and dominate.

(THE TRADERS OF RELIGION)

Unfortunately, these perverters of the truth are nothing but traders of religion. Having sold their religion, they are left without a religion, for what is sold is no longer owned. A trader in religion, therefore, is inevitably an irreligious man. Moreover, he who refuses to acquire the knowledge about the true nature of things and calls those who do so unbelievers should not claim to be a man of religion.

(THE SCOPE OF KNOWLEDGE AND REVELATION)

Knowledge of the nature of things or things as they actually are implies the knowledge of divine truth and divine unity. It encompasses ethics ('Im al-faḍ'Ilah) and acquaintance with all that is
useful and with the means of acquiring it. Indeed, knowledge of
the truth demands that we steer away from all that is harmful and
10 guard ourselves from it. All these facts we learn from the true
prophets who communicated them to us from God, may His praise be
exalted.

The true messengers of God - may they be blessed - have surely
professed the lordship of God alone. They have indeed preferred the
necessity of abiding in the virtues that are acceptable to Him, and
of avoiding the vices which contradict the virtues in their essence.

105 It is our duty, therefore, to adhere to, and spend our every
effort in pursuit of, the truth for the reasons mentioned above and
which we are about to expound.

(The Necessity of Philosophical Knowledge)

Even those who are opposed to acquiring it (knowledge of the
nature of things = philosophy), will be compelled by logical necessity
to yield to it. For their attitude toward philosophical knowledge
must inevitably take one of two directions, namely, that its acquisition
is either necessary or unnecessary. If they say that it is necessary,
then they would impose upon themselves the obligation of acquiring it.
On the other hand, if they should say that philosophical knowledge is
not necessary, then they will find it necessary to support their state-
ment by a demonstrative proof. But the very giving of a demonstrative
proof is itself a part of the philosophic knowledge which they reject.
They must, therefore, appropriate this valuable possession (knowledge of the nature of things or philosophy), if not willingly, then by sheer necessity.

**THE NEED FOR DIVINE SUPPORT**

10 We call upon Him who has full knowledge of our secret thoughts and is aware of our endeavors to prove His lordship and elucidate His unity, to refute by logical argument the stubborn atheists, whose godlessness and shamefulness we seek to dispel, and the defects and ill-effects of their religious beliefs we attempt to reveal, beseeching Him to shield us and all true believers with His protecting care and to enable us by His great power to reach the goal which we have set before us, namely, the victory of truth and truthfulness. We pray Him to help us reach the spiritual altitude of those whose intentions and actions are acceptable to Him and to whom He graciously granted success in life and triumph over those who have disregarded His grace and ignored His truth.
CHAPTER II

Having introduced our discussion with some pertinent facts, we shall proceed now to set forth our thesis in a systematic way.

There are two kinds of cognition (wujūd) by which man acquires knowledge. The first is sense perception which is easily accessible to us but far removed from the true nature of things. It begins to operate the moment we are born. We share it with all members of our species as well as with the animal world in general. Our cognition through the sense organs is direct, immediate and of brief duration because the objects of our perception are in a state of flux, constantly undergoing change of location, quantity and quality. The change occurs in the direction and speed of their movement. Their quantities may increase or decrease. At one moment they may be equal to each other, at another moment be unequal. Their qualities may change and thus become stronger or weaker, resembling each other at one time and differing from each other at another. Such is the mutable world of phenomena, always in flux. Its images are retained by the imagination (muṣawwirah) which, in turn, deposits them into the memory (ḥifẓ). The objects of our sense perception are retained as images in man's soul. Because they have no permanence in existence, their true nature eludes us even though they are very near to our sense organs by which they are perceived immediately. All that is perceived is invariably material (hayūlī) and is inevitably corporeal (jirm).
The other source of cognition, which is nearer to the true nature of things (tabl'ah), but not as easily accessible to us (as sense perception) is knowledge obtained by the mind (wujūd al-'aql) or conception. It is not without a reason that our knowledge is acquired through two channels, the senses and the mind. For the objects of our cognition are both universal (kulliyyah) and particular (juz'īyyah). By universal we mean the genera (ajnās) of the species (anwā'), and the species of individual beings and things (ashkhas). By particulars we mean the individual beings and things of the species.

Particular things that are material are perceived by the senses. Their genera and species, however, are not accessible through perception. They cannot be known by sense perception but rather by one of the developed faculties of the soul, namely, that which makes us human (al-insāniyyah), known as man's intellect (al-'aql al-insānī). While individual things are perceived by the senses, the images of these perceived objects which appear in the soul belong to the faculty which uses the sense organs. However, concepts signifying species and all other universals cannot be represented by images in the soul because images always presuppose empirical experience. The reality of such concepts is ascertained in the soul by means of primary, rational principles (al-'awā'il al-'qliyyah al-ma'qūlah). This is a logical necessity. Being (huwa) and non-being (la huwa), for instance, are states that cannot be attributed to one object simultaneously. This type of cognition is the function of the soul and not the senses. This is true by sheer necessity. Conceptual knowledge does not require
a medium (mutawas\^it). It cannot be represented by images in the
soul because a concept has no color, sound, taste, smell and cannot
be touched. Conceptual knowledge is comprehended without the instru-
mentality of images (idr\^ak l\~an mith\~al).

That which is material (hay\~ul\~an\~I) is capable of being represented
by images through sensation in the soul. The non-material (l\~an
hay\~ul\~an\~I) may be found in conjunction with the material. An example of this is
the form (shakl) which is identified by means of the color because it
corresponds to the area covered by that color. But it is only acciden-
tally that the form is recognized by means of visual perception (al-
his\~al-b\~asar\~I) because it is equivalent to the periphery the object
that is perceived by the visual sense.

It may be supposed that the form is represented in the soul as
an after-effect (l\~ahiqa\~h) of our total sensory perception, an after-
effect that we experience immediately following our perception of the
color. This sensation is identical with the periphery of the color
which we perceive as the form. But, it must be stressed, our cognition
of the periphery as identical with the form is a mental process which
has occurred only accidentally by means of sense perception. In
reality, the form is not perceived (but rather conceived by the mind).
All universals have no material existence although the presence of
material objects may lead us to conceive them. This does not mean that
the universal is abstracted from material phenomena because it never
aligns itself with the material. It never appears in the soul as an
image and we should not suppose that it does. This fact we must admit, for we are led to it by necessity.

(CONCEPTUAL COGNITION ILLUSTRATED)

Let us consider the statement that outside the totality of being, the All (jism al-kull), there can be no existence of any space, either empty (khalā') or occupied (malā'). We mean there can be neither empty space nor a body at all. This assumption can have no representation (by images) in the soul because "no void and no occupied space" are things that cannot be perceived by our senses. Their experience cannot follow any sense perception and thus appear in the soul as an image even if this were only a supposition. That such a space, empty or occupied, does not exist beyond the All is a truth conceived by the mind by logical necessity by means of premises which we wish to point out.

By the void (al-khalā') is commonly understood a vacant space, a space without any occupant (mutamakkin). But a space and its content are constructs, that is, they are not separate entities. By necessity (iṣṭirāṣan), the existence of space implies that it is a space for something. It must inevitably have a content. By the same token, an object is invariably found somewhere, in some place. Therefore, a space without a content is inconceivable. Although the void is defined as an empty space, we must conclude that the absolute void (al-khalā' al-muṭlaq) cannot possibly have any existence (wujūd).
Moreover, if the content of space is corporeal, then it follows that the corporeality of the All (jism al-kull) would be either infinite or finite in quantity. But it is axiomatic that nothing can be infinite (lānhayātā lahū) in actuality (bi-al-fi'il) as we shall show after a while. Therefore, we must conclude, the corporeality of the All cannot be infinite in quantity. This means that beyond the All there can be nothing at all. Because if there were, then this additional content would have to be corporeal. Logically, we will then have to assume that beyond this content there is more content and so on ad finitum (bila nhayah). This would necessitate the existence of a corporeal object that is infinite in quantity. Thus infinity will have to be an actuality. This is a logical contradiction and cannot be true. Therefore, we conclude that beyond the corporeal All there is nothing at all. For, as we have demonstrated, beyond it there can be no space or anything corporeal filling that space. This is necessarily so (wājib idṭirāran). For this conclusion there can be no image in the soul because by logical necessity this reality is conceived only by the mind (wujūd 'aqilī). 

Whoever seeks to know metaphysical (fawq al-ṭabī'ah) realities, which are incorporeal and have no material associations (tuqārin al-hayūl), will never find images or replicas of them in the soul. Metaphysical truths can be known only by intellectual investigation (al-ābāth al-'aqliyyah).
Commit to your memory this basic premise (muqaddimah) that it may be your guide in the search for all truths and a light dispelling from your intellectual vision the darkness of ignorance and the sorrow of perplexity. May God keep you in all the virtues and guard you from all the vices.

(EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS)

The use of these two channels of cognition (perception and conception) renders (our attainment of) the truth easy in certain respects, difficult in others. The intelligibles, for instance, can be comprehended only by the mind. He who seeks to know them as images (of empirical experience) will do so in vain. His predicament would be similar to that of a bat in daylight unable to see what is perfectly visible to us.

It is for this reason that many speculative thinkers (nāgifūn) have been puzzled whenever they have directed their inquiries to metaphysical matters. Their problem lies in searching for metaphysical images in their soul and thus applying the method they are accustomed to but which is applicable only to sensory knowledge. This is certainly an immature approach, namely, to use the short-cut of the familiar means to reach all ends. Naturally, the process of learning is facilitated when the subject matter has a resemblance to what is already familiar. This fact may be substantiated by the speed with which speech-making, letter-writing, story-telling and poetry are learnt, for they
are all areas which involve the ability of speaking and relating which is acquired early in life.

These thinkers have also encountered difficulties in their investigation of physical phenomena due to their application of the mathematical method which must be restricted to the non-material. For the corporeal, the physical, is subject to change, such as motion. Nature (tabi'ah), on the other hand, is the primary cause (illah awwaliyyah) of motion and rest.

All that is natural must be material. The mathematical method cannot be applied for the investigation of natural phenomena. Mathematics, being immaterial, may be applied to that which is not natural. Its use in the natural sciences will yield no results and is bound to be confusing.

It is imperative, therefore, that anyone who is engaged in research in one of the sciences should inquire first about the cause of the subject matter investigated by that particular field. Our search for the cause of natural objects, for instance, would lead us back to the first natural principles (awā'il al-tabi'ah) which account for all motion. We conclude, therefore, that the natural applies to everything that is in motion. Natural science or physics, then, is the science of all that is in motion. Metaphysics, by contrast, deals with that which is not in motion, for nothing can ever be the cause of its own coming into being (illat kawn dātihi), as we shall explain later. Thus the cause of motion cannot be motion, and the cause of a moving object (mutaharrik) cannot be a moving
object. Metaphysics is, then, the realm of that which is motionless. The knowledge of metaphysical realities, we conclude, is the knowledge of that which does not move.

(METHODS OF INVESTIGATION)

Demonstrative knowledge (wujūd burhānī) should not be sought in every inquiry, for not every intellectual problem can be solved by demonstration. This is so because not all things can be proven true. There are demonstrative proofs for certain things, but we cannot prove the proof itself. If this were possible, then the chain of establishing demonstrative evidence would go on infinitely. This would mean that nothing at all could be proven true and thus nothing at all could be known, because a thing is known only when we can trace its beginning. Thus knowledge of any kind would be an impossibility. If we want to know, for example, what is man, who is a living, thinking and dying being, and we did not understand what is meant by the terms "living, thinking and dying," we obviously would not know what man is.

Similarly, persuasion (iqnā') should not be used as a tool for establishing facts in mathematical sciences (al-'ulūm al-riyādiyyah). Demonstrative proof should be our method in this area. If we used persuasion in mathematics, then our knowledge would be mere opinion (īnniyyah) and cannot be scientific (ilmiyyah).

Moreover, analytical speculation (nāṣar tamyīz) into a field of knowledge requires particular method of investigation and verification
that may not be applicable to other fields. Overlooking this epistemological necessity and the indiscriminate use of methods, whether it be the persuasive, comparative, objective, empirical or discursive, have led many analytical thinkers astray in the pursuit of knowledge in their respective fields. The refusal to make distinctions between the various objects of knowledge and the arbitrary and persistent adherence to one method of investigation, regardless of the subject matter of knowledge, account for the failure of many to acquire any knowledge. The method of inquiry that must be adopted is determined by the area of knowledge that is pursued. We should not use, for instance, persuasion in mathematics, empiricism in theology (al-'ilm al-ilāhi), discursive reasoning (al-jawāmi' al-fikriyyah) in the inquiry about first natural principles, demonstrative proof in rhetoric (balāghah) or for substantiating another proof. If we take this basic matter into consideration, the goals of our search and research become accessible. On the other hand, if we disregard this fundamental truth, we will lose sight of our aims and fail to realize our objectives.

Having indicated these guideposts well in advance, we shall now introduce the essentials (of metaphysics) which we need in this art.

(The Concept of the Eternal)

The Eternal (al-azāli) is that which is never Non-Being (laysa) but is Being (huwa) in the absolute sense (muṭlaqan). The existence (hawīyyah) of the Eternal has no ontological development. The Eternal is that which
is self-sufficient and has no cause. It is not object, predicate, has no agent and no end - we mean that for which it exists - for there are no primary causes other than these.

Moreover, the Eternal has no genus (jins), for if it had a genus it would itself be a species (naw'). A species is a composite (murakkab) of the genus, which it has in common with others, and the differentia (fasl) which distinguishes it from others. This would mean that the Eternal is made of matter, namely, its genus with which its form or any other form (surah) may be combined, and of form which is uniquely its own and is not shared by any other. Thus the Eternal is made of matter and form. But it has been proven that it is without matter and form; and this is a contradiction that cannot be possible. Therefore, it must be concluded that the Eternal has no genus.

Again, the Eternal is immune to corruption which is a change of form but not of primary substance (al-hāmil al-awwal). This primary substance, which is its existence (aysa) does not undergo any change. The process of decay in an object is not the result of re-creation of its existence (ta'yIs aysiyyatihi). Alteration in an object is caused by its nearest opposite with which it shares the same genus. Heat, for instance, is changed by means of the cold and not by dryness, sweetness, length or anything else simply because these qualities are not the nearest opposite to heat. Related contraries (al-addād al-mutaqāribah) are of the same genus. A decaying object has a genus. If the Eternal decays, it must have a genus. But it has been established that it is
without a genus. This is an impossible contradiction. We conclude, therefore, that the Eternal is immune to decay.

Inasmuch as change (istihālah) is substitution (tabaddul), the Eternal is immutable because it is never substituted by something else and does not develop from a state of imperfection (naqṣ) to a state of perfection (tamām). For development (intiqāl) is a form of change, and the Eternal does not develop into a state of perfection because it it is immutable. That which is perfect is characterized by a condition of constancy (ḥāl thābitah) which is the basis of its excellence. The imperfect lacks this constancy and this excellence. The Eternal cannot be imperfect because it is impossible for it to develop into a condition by which it attains excellence. This is so because it cannot possibly change into any any state that is more perfect or more imperfect. By necessity, the Eternal is perfect. Inasmuch as a body (jīrm) has genus and species, and the Eternal has no genus, therefore the Eternal cannot be a body.

We can make the conclusive statement that no eternal body or anything else that has quantity (kammiyyah) or quality (kaifiyyah) can be infinite in actuality (bi-alfī'1), and that which is infinite is only potentially (fī al-quwāh) so.

(BASIC PREMISES)

This leads us to state several primary premises that are certain and are intelligible without the medium (of sense perception):
(a) All bodies (ajrām) of which none is larger than the rest are equal (mutasāwiyah).

(b) The distances (abād) between the farthest ends of equal bodies are congruent potentially and actually.

(c) That which is finite cannot be infinite.

(d) If a body is added to one of equal bodies it renders it larger than the rest and larger than it was before the addition was made.

(e) If two bodies finite in size were joined, the resultant body would also be finite in size. This is necessarily true also with respect to any quantity or anything quantitative.

(f) The smaller of two bodies of the same genus is smaller only in comparison with that other body or part of it.

(THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE)

If from an infinite body one were to take a body finite in size, the remainder would be either finite or infinite in quantity. Assuming the remainder to be finite in size, if then the separated body, which is finite in size, were added to it, the resultant body would be finite in size. But this resultant body is the same as the original one before anything was separated from it which was infinite in size. This is an impossible contradiction.

Suppose now that the remainder were infinite in size. If then what was taken away from it were again added to it, it would either become larger than what it was before the addition was made or equal to it. If it becomes larger than what it had been, it would mean that an infinite body has become larger than an infinite body. We know
that the smaller of two bodies is smaller in relation to the larger of part of it. Thus one of the two objects, both supposedly infinite, is smaller than the other one or part of it. If in size the smaller body ranks second to the larger one, then it inevitably ranks second to part of it. The smaller body could be said to be equal to part of the larger.

However, two bodies are equal when the distances between the periphery of their common features (mutashābihātuhumā) are equal. They are consequently finite, for equal bodies which are dissimilar have, nevertheless the same number of equal units (quantitative), although their ends may differ in plurality (kathrah) or quality or both. Thus they are finite. (According to our argument), the smaller of the two bodies would have to be both infinite and finite, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude, that neither of the two bodies (mentioned above) is larger than the other.

Moreover, if the body does not become larger than what it had been before anything was added to it, this would mean that a body has been added to another body without resulting in any increase. Thus the total sum of the two is equal to the one, although the one to which it was added is only part of the whole as well as part of of the two parts that have been rejoined. Consequently, the part is equal to the whole (al-kull). And this is a logical impossibility.

It has thus been demonstrated that a body cannot possibly be infinite. The same argument leads also to conclude that nothing
Time is a quantitative entity. Therefore, it cannot be infinite in actuality, for it has a beginning and an end. All things that are predicated by that which is finite are necessarily finite. Thus all the categories implied in a body such as number, space, time - which is divided by motion - and all that constitutes a body in actuality is also finite, because the body itself is finite. The body of the whole (universe) is finite. The same may be said of all that it contains.

Inasmuch as it is possible by imagination (bi-alwaḥm) to increase the totality of being continuously, namely, to imagine a larger universe indefinitely, therefore the possibility (imkān) of imagining a larger universe can go on infinitely. Thus potentially, the universe (jirīm al-kull) is infinite, because potentiality (of it being so) and possibility (of our imagining it to be so) are identical. In other words, that which is finite can be so only potentially. All that is inherent in what is infinite in potentiality is also potentially infinite. This applies to motion and time. To sum up, that which is infinite is infinite only in potentiality. Nothing can be infinite in actuality, as we have shown.

Because that is a logical necessity (i.e. the principle that infinity cannot be an actuality), it becomes evident that time cannot be infinite in actuality. For time is the duration of the totality of being. If
time is finite, it is so by virtue of the fact that the existence (inniyah) of the universe is finite, for time itself has no independent existence.

Moreover, there can be no body existing without time, because time is the number of motion. It is, in other words, a duration measured by motion (harakah). Whenever there is motion there is bound to be time. The absence of motion is the absence of time.

Again, motion implies a body that moves. There can be motion only when there is a body, for without it there can be no motion. Motion is a form of change. This change may involve the location of any or all the parts of an object with or without its focal point (markaz). This is known as locomotion (al-harakah al-makaniyyah). The change of location may also be the result of the movement of any or all of the parts of a body away from, or nearer to, its focal point. This would be identical with the processes of growth (rubu) and dissolution (immihallat) respectively. If the change involves the predicative qualities (al-kaifiyyat al-mahmalah) of a body only, then it would be identical with transformation (istihalal). But if the change takes place in its essence (jawhar), the process would be equivalent to generation (kawn) and decay (fasad).

Every change marks the duration (muddah) of a body. In other words, change and time are ontologically inseparable, and so are motion and bodies, for wherever there is motion, there must of necessity be
a body. The existence of a body necessitates the existence of motion. Without an body there can be no motion (for there would be nothing to move).

15 The postulated existence of an immoveable body would mean that motion is an impossibility, definitely or indefinitely, or that it is a possibility. If motion is a definite impossibility, then it would mean that it is non-existent (laisat bimawjūdah) while the body exists. But (we know that) motion does exist; and this is an impossible contradiction. When there is an existing body, then the complete absence of motion would be impossible. The existence of a body renders the existence of motion a possibility, for motion exists in some bodies by necessity. The possibility of a condition in a body may be postulated on the basis of its actuality in other similar bodies. Let us say, for instance, that the ability to write is not an actuality in Muhammad. But we can assume its existence in him as a possibility because other men can actually write. Thus the fact that motion necessarily exists in some bodies leads us to conclude that it must necessarily exist in bodies in general. Therefore, wherever there is a body, there is inevitably motion also. It has been said that there can be a body without motion.

10 If this were true, it would mean that a body can be in motion and at rest simultaneously. But this is inconceivable (muḥāl) and an impossible contradiction. Thus we conclude that the existence of a body without motion is impossible, and that wherever there is a body, there must necessarily be motion also.
(TIME, MOTION AND COMING INTO BEING)

We may suppose that the universe was originally at rest and that it moved because it was possible for it to do so. This supposition is necessarily false because if the universe were first at rest and then moved, it must have come into being out of nothing (kawn 'an laysa) or existed eternally (lam yazal). If it came into being out of nothing, then being (aysa) has come out of non-being (laysa), and this is a process of generation (kawn) which must involve movement. This fact was stated above when we described the nature of motion and pointed out that generation was one of the forms of motion. If the existence of the universe did not precede the process of generation, it must itself be identical with that process. The generation of the world, therefore, could not have possibly preceded motion.

It has been asserted that the universe existed first without motion. This means it was at rest, but (we have shown that) it did not exist without motion. This is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, if the universe were generated out of nothing, it could not have possibly preceded motion.

On the other hand, if the universe were eternal and at rest (sākin) and then it moved because it was possible for it to do so, this would imply that the eternal universe underwent a change (istahal) from actual rest to actual motion. But that which is eternal is immutable, as we have demonstrated earlier. The universe is then mutable and
immutable, and this illogical and cannot be possible. The universe could not have been eternal and at rest in actuality and then moved in actuality. But the universe is in motion. We must conclude that the existence of the world did not precede its movement at all. Therefore, wherever there is motion there must also be a body (that is in motion), and wherever there is a body there must also be motion.

It has been pointed out that time is ontologically not prior to motion. This means that time does not necessarily precede the universe in existence because there can be no time without motion. Moreover, the universe and motion co-exist. There cannot be one without the other. Similarly, it is inconceivable to have a body without duration (muddah), for there can be a duration only of something that exists. Furthermore, the duration of a body implies motion, because a body and motion are absolutely inseparable, as it has been shown. The duration of a body, which is invariably simultaneous with the existence of that body, is measured by the movement which inevitably co-exists with it. This establishes the fact that the universe is not ontologically prior to time. We conclude that the universe, motion and time never precede each other in existence.

The fact has been elucidated that time cannot be infinite for the simple reason that a quantity (kammiyyah) or anything quantitative (dhū kammiyyah) can never be infinite in actuality. All time must actually come to an end. Moreover, corporeality does not precede
The existence (inniyyah) of the universe cannot possibly be infinite. Of necessity, it must be finite. This means that the universe cannot be eternal. And although this truth has been delineated by what we have advance, we shall attempt to prove it in another way in order to enable those who speculate in this field to acquire added skill (tamahhur) for penetrating (tawalluj) its frontiers.

To begin with, change may take the form of composition (tarkib) and assimilation (titlif), that is, the assembling (jam') and harmonious arrangement (nazm) of things. A body is a three-dimensional substance having length, breadth and depth. It is composed of the substance (jawhar) which is its genus, and of the dimensions (ab'ad) of length, breadth and depth which constitute its differentia. A body is made up of matter (hay'ul) and form (fārah).

Furthermore, composition is equivalent to the change in a condition which itself is not a compound. In other words, composition is motion, for without movement no composition can take place. A body is a composite. Without motion there can be no bodies. Corporeal bodies and motion cannot ontologically precede each other.

Again, time exists through the instrumentality of motion because motion is change, and change marks the duration of that which is changing. Thus motion measures the duration of the change in a body. Time is a duration computed by by motion. All bodies have a duration, as we have stated earlier. By this we mean the duration of their
existence. Corporeality does not precede motion, as we have already explained. Corporeal existences do not precede duration which is measured by motion. We arrive at the same conclusion that corporeal existences, motion and time do not precede each other ontologically. They co-exist. Therefore, if time were actually finite, the existence of bodies will necessarily be also finite in actuality. This conclusion is inevitable if composition and assimilation were a form of change. We would not have reached this conclusion if composition and assimilation were not a type of change.

We shall attempt now to show in a different way that time cannot be infinite in actuality in both its past and future aspects. Let us proceed by assuming that each period of time is repeatedly preceded by another until a period of time is reached that is not preceded by any other. In other words, we shall go back in time until a disconnected interval is reached which is not preceded by another disconnected interval. In our opinion, things cannot be otherwise. For the alternative would be a sequence of time intervals that would stretch into the past infinitely. This would mean that we can never determine the length of an exact interval stretching from a definite point in time into the distant past because such an interval cannot be designated if its far end is in infinity. And if a period beginning with a definite point in time and ending in infinity were measurable and knowable, then that which is infinite is also finite. This is an impossible contradiction.
Moreover, if no definite period of time can be reached (in the past) without finding that it is preceded by another and that by still another and so on infinitely - and that which is infinite, its distance cannot be crossed and its end cannot be reached, for one cannot expect to cover infinite time and reach a definite period of time - but (by empirical experience we know that) a definite time can be reached. Therefore, time is not infinite and must necessarily be finite. By implication, the duration of corporeal bodies is not infinite. Likewise, a body cannot be without a certain duration because its existence is not infinite but finite. Therefore, a body can never be eternal.

Similarly, the future cannot be infinite in actuality, for as we have demonstrated, if the past, up to a definite point in time, cannot be infinite (the same would be true of the future). Periods of time do continue to follow each other repeatedly. But if any length of time is added to a segment of time that is already finite, the total time resulting from this addition would also be finite. If this were the case, the alternative would mean that the addition one finite quantity to another finite quantity results in an infinite quantity (and this is illogical).

Time is a linked quantity (kammiyyah muttaşilah). By this we mean that it has a part that is common to both past and future, namely, the present (al-šān), which marks the end of the past and the beginning
of the future.

A definite period of time has two terminations, one at the beginning and the other at the end. If two limited periods of time were joined together by a moment that is common to both, the other end of each of them would still be definite and known. It has been argued that the total sum of the two periods would be finite. This would mean that the ends in question are simultaneously finite and infinite, which is a contradiction that must be rejected. Therefore, if a limited period of time were added to another limited period of time, the sum of the two cannot be infinite. For whenever a limited time is joined to another limited time, each of these two segments of time will still have a definite end on one side. We conclude that the future cannot be infinite in actuality.
Our preceding discussion may now be followed by an inquiry into the possibility as to whether or not a thing can be the cause (اللها) of its own generation (كَأَنَّ ذَٰلِكَ). We shall attempt to argue that this is impossible, for a thing cannot be its own cause, that is, the cause of its own coming into being (تَعَلَّمَيْنَاهُ), whether out of something else or out of nothing. Some would argue that in certain situations, being (كَأَنَّ) is generated out of some specific thing. For a thing, in the first place, may exist (اْيْسَ) and be without essence (ذَٰٰٰنَّ تَلاَّسَ). Then a thing may be non-existent (يَكُونُ تَلاَّسَ) and yet have an essence (ذَٰٰٰنَّ اْيْسَ). Moreover, a thing and its essence may not have any existence. Finally, a thing may exist and have an essence.

To begin with, if a thing had neither existence nor essence, then that thing would be nothing (لاَّ شَيْءٗ) and its essence would also be nothing. This would mean that no cause-effect (اللها وَالْمَلِّعُ) sequence is involved, for such a sequence is applicable only to existing things. In this case, therefore, a thing cannot be the cause of its own generation, for there is absolutely (مَلِقْنَ) no cause. To argue that a thing can be the cause of its own becoming would be then illogical. It is impossible for a thing to be the cause of itself when that thing is nothing and its essence is also nothing.
The same conclusion is reached if a thing had an essence but without having a (concrete) existence, for in this case it would also be non-being (laya), nothing and as such it would be neither cause nor effect, as we have shown earlier. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of its own being. To assume that a thing can be the cause of its own being would be an absurdity in the event a thing had an essence without a concrete existence.

The same result applies when the essence of a thing is identical with another object, for mutable existents may undergo a change in some of their parts only without the rest being affected. Such a change could dissolve the existence of a thing without having any effect on its essence. But when a thing ceases to exist then its essence becomes other than itself. However, we know that a thing is identical with its essence. Therefore, in this case a thing will have to be both itself and other than itself. This is self-contradictory and is likewise an impossibility.

This conclusion is also true if a thing exists but without its essence. This would be the case when its essence happens to be other than itself. Such a condition may be due to the fact that the existence and essence of a thing undergo dissimilar changes. This, however, would be in conflict with the fundamental truth that a thing and its essence are identical. Therefore, the hypothesis of having an existing thing without its existing essence must be rejected because it is a sheer
impossibility.

We arrive at the same consequence when a thing has both existence and essence. Even under these circumstances, a thing cannot be the cause of its own being for the simple reason that otherwise a thing would be generating its own essence. This would mean that a thing would be the cause and its essence would be the effect, but the effect is invariably other than the cause. Thus if it so happens that a thing is identical with the cause and its essence is identical with the effect, then it follows that the essence can no longer be the thing itself. But we know that a thing and its essence are identical. According to the present argument a thing and its essence would have to be two different things while in reality they are the same. Both views cannot be correct. Therefore, we conclude that a thing cannot be the cause of its own generation when both it and its essence are existing entities.

Obviously, a non-existing thing cannot be the cause of its non-existing essence, for in this postulated instance the thing and its essence cannot be identical, while in actuality they are the same. Thus we have established as true the basic principle that a thing cannot be its own cause. It cannot bring itself into being.

(THE PROBLEM OF MEANING)

Having demonstrated the above truth, we shall now proceed by
stating that a word (lafz) may or may not signify a meaning (ma'na).
That which is void of meaning cannot be the object of knowledge and,
therefore, is of no concern to philosophy which seeks to know that
which has meaning.

Meaningful words are either general (kull) or particular (juz').
Philosophy does not seek to know particular things because they are
incomplete entities, and what is incomplete and fragmentary cannot
be fully known. Being the knowledge of the true nature of things,
philosophy inquires into the universal which is whole and whose real
nature is accessible to knowledge.

The universal, the general, is either essential (dhāt) or
non-essential (ghayr dhāt). By the essence of a thing we mean that
which constitutes its very substance (muqawwim dhāt al-shai') and that
by whose existence a thing comes into being and is maintained (thabāt).
Without an essence, a thing disintegrates and decays (intiqāq wafād).
Life, for instance, is the essence of a living being (hayy), the very
core which makes it what it is. The absence of life means the setting
in of corruption and dissolution. Thus life is essential in all
living beings, and that which is essential is also called substantial
(jawhart). It makes the very existence (qiwām) of a thing possible.

Substance may be integrative (jāmi') or differentiative (mufarriq).
That which is integrative apples to many things giving each its name
(ism) and its definition (hadd) and thereby unifying it and making
it whole. The integrative which names and defines many things may apply to individual entities (ashkhaq) as individual men. As such, it is called form (surah), for all individual men have the same form.

The integrative may also characterize many forms such as the living and thus applying to all forms of living beings as man and mare. This is called genus (jins), and the one genus is applicable to all these forms.

The substance that is differentiative, however, accounts for the unique features in the definitions of things. The rational (al-natiq), for instance, differentiates the living beings from each other. This is what is called differentia (fasl) because it differentiates things and sets them apart from each other.

The non-essential, on the other hand, is the very opposite of what has just been described. Its existence depends on that which it predicates (al-mawdu' lahu) and which is also the source of its continuance (thabat). Without the subject which it predicates it ceases to exist. It is inseparable from the substance for which its serves as a predicate. It is for this reason that it has been called accident ('araq).

An entity whose existence is contingent on the substance is found in one individual thing, a characteristic of its own, distinguishing from the rest such as the laughter of man and the braying of a donkey. It is called property (khashah) because it belongs to one specific
thing. The accidental may also appear in many things like whiteness in paper and cotton. It is called common accident (‘ara‘ ‘āmmī) because it is commonly shared by many things.

A word that has meaning is either genus, form, individual, differentia, property or common accident. All these may be classified under two headings: substance and accident. Genus, form, individual, and differentia are substantial. Property and the common accident are accidental. Moreover, a meaningful word may also be universal (kull) or particular (juz‘ī), integral (mujtami‘) or disparate (muftariq). Inasmuch as we have discussed these concepts earlier, we shall proceed to investigate the problem of unity.

( THE NATURE OF UNITY )

What are the things in which the One or unity may be said to exist? The One (al-wāhīd) is found wherever there is continuity (‘ilā kull muttagil) and in those things that do not partake of plurality kathraḥ). This is equivalent to saying that unity may be descriptive of diverse things as genus, form, individual, differentia, property and common accident and all what has been mentioned above.

The individual may be natural (tabī‘īy) as animal or plant and the like or it may be man-made (ṣinā‘īy) as house and so on. There is a natural continuity about the house. Its. Its structure is
continuous by accident, that is, by means of the occupation (of house-building). The house is one as far as its natural parts are concerned. Its structure is one by virtue of craftsmanship. The house became one by accidental unification (ittihād) (of its natural parts). But the house itself is one by natural unification.

Unity may also be said of wholes and parts. It may be applied to everything and to some things. It may be supposed that there is no distinction between the "all" and the "every", for "all" may be said in connection with things that have similar or dissimilar parts. We say, for instance, "all" the water, and water has similar parts, and "all" the body which is composed of bones and flesh. It applies to other things that have dissimilar parts as "all" the generation which has different individuals. "Every", on the other hand, is not applied to things with dissimilar parts. One does not say, for example, "every" water. However, "every" may be used with different things that are accidentally assembled or that are unified by some meaning, even though each individual thing may stand on its own, independent of the others. "All", on the other hand, may be applied to any conglomeration of things whatever the means of their unification. Thus we do not say "every" water because water is not made up of different things each standing on its own by its very nature. But we say "all" the water because water is a conglomeration of similar parts.

Likewise, there is a distinction between "part" (juz'ā') and "some"
"Part" is a designation of that which measures the whole, dividing it into equal quantities (aqdār mutasāwiyyah). "Some" is that which cannot be used as a measuring unit for the whole which it divides into unequal quantities. The "some", which divides the whole into unequal portions, is, nevertheless, part of that whole.

Unity, then, is ascribed to all the categories (al-maqālāt) and all that is derived from them whether it is genus species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole, part, every (part) or some (of the parts). (Unity is attributed to genus) because genus exists in all its species, for it is a category consistently applied to each of them. (The same is true of the ) species which is present in each of its individuals for it is invariably said of each of them. Likewise the individual which is a unity by circumstantial necessity but which is itself divisible. Thus the individual is not a unity in essence. Its unity is accidental not essential and is in reality non-existent. That which is not in reality essential in a thing must of necessity be accidental. Whatever is accidental in a thing is caused by something other than itself. The accidental in a thing is an effect upon it (athar fīh), and an effect is relative (muḍāf) and is the result of a cause (min muʿaththir). Therefore, unity (waḍāh) in individual things is necessarily an effect of a cause (athar min muʿaththir).

The species is descriptive of many things which differ as
individuals. It is, therefore, a plurality because it comprises many individuals and is also composed of things, for it has genus and differentia. An example of this is man whose constituent elements are the qualities of living (hayy), thinking (nāṭiq) and dying (māyyīt). Thus the species is essentially a plurality with respect to its individuals as well as its structure (tarkīb). The unity (waḥdah) that characterizes it is circumstantial and not essential. Therefore, it does not possess unity in reality, for the unity that it has is only accidental. That which happens to a thing accidentally is caused by some other agent. Accident in a body is an effect upon it, and the effect is relative (mudāf), for it is the result of a cause. It has, then, been established that unity in the species is necessarily an effect of a cause also.

The genus covers many things that differ in their species which is indicative of what a thing is (ma'īyyat al-shay'). It is, therefore, a plurality because it has numerous species each existing independently. It is thus a plurality in this respect. This means that unity in it also does not exist in reality, for it appears in it only in an accidental manner. An accident in a thing has an external causation. The accident is an effect in a thing and is, therefore, relative. The effect is the result of a cause. We conclude that unity in the genus is likewise an effect necessarily caused by another agent,

The differentia embraces many things having different species which identify what a thing is (ayyīyyāt al-shai'). The term comprises all
the individuals of the species under which this differentia comes indicating its classification. Thus the differentia is a plurality with respect to the species and the individuals that belong to these species. The unity that is apparent in it, therefore, is not real.

Its presence is only accidental. An accident has its causation outside the thing in which it occurs. It is, consequently, an effect in the thing in which it happens, and that which is effect is relative, for it is the result of a cause. It must be concluded that unity in the differentia is also an effect of a cause.

Property is said of one species and of all the individuals that belong to it. It substantiates the existence of a thing which of necessity must be particular. Property is, therefore, a plurality because it exists in numerous individual things, and because it is motion which is particular. Thus the unity present in property is also not real, for it is accidental. That which is accidental in a thing is caused by another agent. It is, therefore, an effect which is relative and is the result of a cause. Consequently, unity in property is also an effect of a cause.

The common accident is also said of many individual things. Therefore, it is a plurality because it is found in many individual entities. The common accident is either a quantity which is disposed to increase or decrease and is, therefore, particular. Or it may be a quality (kayfiyyah) which has a propensity to assimilate that which is similar or dissimilar, stronger or weaker. Thus quality can
accommodate contrariety (ikhtilāf) and is, therefore, a plurality. This means the unity present in it is not real unity because it is accidental. Accident, as we have already shown, is an effect of a cause. It must then be concluded that unity in common accident is likewise an effect of a cause.

"The all" (al-kull) applies to the categories (al-maqūlāt) which are composed of parts and this is true of all the categories. Any category (maqūlah) to which the "all" is applied has also parts because every category is a genus. This means it has forms, and every form has individual things. The "all", then, is a plurality because it has many divisions. The unity that it manifests, therefore, is not real, for it is accidental and thus an effect, as we have demonstrated before with respect to all that is accidental.

The same is true of "every" (jamī'), for it is a designation that applies to many assembled things. Therefore, it is a plurality. The unity that is present in it is not real, for it is accidental and, consequently, an effect of a cause, as it was pointed out above.

The particular is either essential or accidental. The parts of the essential may be similar or dissimilar. That which has similar parts is a plurality. An example of this is water whose every part is truly water and is itself divisible. Every part of water, which is water in its perfect form, is a plurality. The essential which has dissimilar parts is also a plurality. By "dissimilar parts" we
different parts such as the animal's body which is composed of flesh, skin, nerves, veins, arteries, ligaments, dermis, diaphragms, bones, brain, blood, gall, mucus and all that constitutes the body of a living being. All these are dissimilar, and each part of the body which we have just enumerated is itself divisible.

The particular which is accidental, on the other hand, is implied in the particular which is essential. An instance of this is the length, width and thickness in the flesh and bones as well as in the other parts of an organism, and to which we can add the color and taste and other accidentals. The particular that is accidental follows the essential in its divisions. Therefore, it has parts and is a plurality. We conclude that unity in the particular is also not real.

Both natural and accidental continuity have parts. The natural continuity of the house, for instance, lies in its form which has sides. Its accidental, that is, man-made continuity consists in the assembling of the material of which it is constructed as the stones, mortar and the parts of its bulk. Thus it is a plurality also. Its unity, then is not real.

As we have mentioned above, a thing may be said to partake of unity in relation to another thing. An illustration of this is the mile which signifies unity when we refer to "one mile" as a whole or general (measurement) for distances covered by a flung arrow (ghalwāt).
But in relation to the parasang (farsakh), the mile represents only a part. On the one hand, the mile is continuous and unified because the specific distances of a flung arrow (ghalwāt) are continuous and unified in it. Thus it is a whole, an "all" (kull) for such distances.

On the other hand, the mile is disconnected (munfaṣil) from other miles, namely, the miles which add up to one parasang. Therefore, the unity present in it is not real also, for it is accidental.

To sum up, the categories we have investigated do not in reality partake of unity. In each of them, unity exists accidentally. Whatever happens to a thing accidentally must have its cause in something other than the thing itself. It is the result, therefore, of some external causation. An accident, in other words, is an effect of some external cause, and cause and effect are always inseparably related.

Moreover, whatever exists accidentally in an object must exist essentially in another. This fact must be underscored that accidents which appear in an object exist essentially in another. Having demonstrated the fact that unity is present in the categories only accidentally, we must now draw the conclusion that unity in them is not particular, that is, it is whole and general, not essentially but accidentally, and inasmuch as as the accidental existence of unity in one thing must necessarily be attributed to another in which unity exists essentially, it follows that the existence of the True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq) must be postulated whose unity is not an effect caused by another. Further light needs to be shed on this reality.
All predicables (maqūlat), whether perceived by the senses (al-hiss) or conceived by the mind (al-'aql) must relate to unity and plurality in one of the following ways: each existent can be either (1) one or many, or (2) both one and many, or (3) one only, or (4) many only.

(I. PLURALITY WITHOUT UNITY)

If the predicables were supposed to consist of plurality only, then they could not possibly share in one common state or meaning. But the truth of the matter is that they do share in one common state and meaning. Therefore unity (in them) co-exists with plurality. We have assumed that unity does not exist. This means that unity is both existent (aysa) and non-existent (laysa), and this is an impossible contradiction.

Similarly, if the predicables partook of plurality to the exclusion of unity, then plurality would have no contrariety at all because such contrariety (khilāf) can only be unity. If the predicables had no contrariety, they would necessarily have to be identical. But in reality they are not identical, for identity (ittifāq) would imply having one state or meaning in common. But the predicables cannot be simultaneously identical and non-identical. This is illogical. Thus the existence of unity is inevitable.

Moreover, plurality without unity would imply that the predicables
are dissimilar (la mutashābiha), for things that are similar must necessarily have at least one thing in common. Our supposition of the existence of plurality without unity would rule out the possibility of having one thing that is common to all of them. This means that the predicables are dissimilar. But as a matter of fact they are similar (in a negative way) in not having unity. However, they cannot at the same time be both similar and dissimilar. This is an impossible contradiction. We conclude that it is inconceivable not to have unity.

Again, plurality without unity would also mean that the predicables are in motion inasmuch as the absence of unity would negate the existence of one state of being. This would imply that they cannot be in a state of rest (sukūn), that is, without change (mutaghayyir) or motion (muntaqil). And if they cannot be in a state of rest they must be in motion. But plurality alone would likewise necessitate the absence of motion because motion is a form of change of place (makan) or quantity (bi-kām, lit. change in the "how much"), or quality (b-kaīfa, lit. change in the "how") or substance (jawhar). Change is equivalent to becoming other than it had been. But a state other than plurality is unity. Without the possibility of unity, plurality would be immune to change. Our presupposition of the non-existence of unity would mean that change of plurality is also non-existent and that movement, consequently, cannot exist. In other words, plurality without unity
would lead to the conclusion that the predicables are without motion and at the same time not at rest, as we have demonstrated before. This is contradictory. Therefore, unity must of necessity exist in the predicables.

Furthermore, plurality to the exclusion of unity would imply that the predicables either have or do not have individual things (ashkās). If they were composed of individual, then these individuals of plurality (ashkās al-kathrah) are or are not single units (āhād, lit. ones). If they were not single units, then they would have to be an infinite plurality (kathrah bila nihāyah). If a section is separated from that which is infinite, notwithstanding the remainder being larger than what was separated from it, this severed section would have to be either finite or infinite in plurality. If its plurality were finite, and we have supposed it to be infinite, it would mean that it is simultaneously finite and infinite in plurality. If, on the other hand, its plurality were infinite, and we know that it is smaller than the remainder, the implication would be that one infinity is larger than another infinity. This is also self-contradictory, as we have shown earlier.

This is a logical contradiction. If, on the other hand, its plurality was infinite, and we know that it is smaller than the remainder, the implication would be that one infinity is larger than another infinity. This is also self-contradictory, as we have shown earlier.

The individual entities of plurality are, therefore, by necessity ones (āhād), that is, single units. Thus unity exists because each individual is one, that is, a unity. To the earlier statement that predicables partake of plurality only, we must now add that they
do not partake of plurality only. And yet unity is present in them. This is contradictory. We would arrive at the same contradiction if we supposed the predicables not to consist of individual entities or of plurality, for plurality signifies assembled individual things. Things cannot be simultaneously a non-plurality (lā kathrah) and a plurality. Therefore, it is inevitable that unity must be present in the predicables.

Likewise, plurality without unity would result in the impossibility to define any of the individual entities of plurality. For definition (ḥadd) is one thing applicable to one meaning. If there were no oneness in plurality, no definition could be made because there would be nothing that could be defined (maḥdūd). But the individual entities of plurality are defined for they are definable. Thus they are both defined and indefinable. Again, this an impossible contradiction. We must here also assert the necessary existence of unity in the predicables.

Plurality without unity would also mean that plurality cannot partake of number since one, that is, unity is the beginning of number and number, moreover, is a plurality composed of ones (ahād). A plurality exceeds another by the additional ones or single units it has. Therefore, if there are no ones, there can be no number. And if there were a plurality without ones, it could not be numbered. But plurality can be numbered. Consequently, the ones or unity are present with
plurality. Our assumption that plurality contains no ones or single units is, therefore, a contradiction of empirical evidence. Thus it is impossible not to have ones, single units, that is, unity.

Once again, to have the many without the one or plurality without unity would mean the impossibility of knowledge (ma'rifah). This is so because knowledge involves description (rasm), the description or picture of the known object in the soul of the knower as that object exists in one particular state. For if it were not in one specific state, which would make it possible for the soul of the knower and the picture of the known object to be united, knowledge would be impossible. But knowledge does exist and, therefore, the one state also exists. Consequently, unity is a reality. Our assumption that it does not exist is a contradiction of the facts. Unity cannot but exist.

Likewise, plurality without the one or unity would lead us to argue that each predicable is either a thing or no-thing. If it were a thing, then it must be one. Thus unity co-exists with plurality. We have assumed that the predicable is merely plurality. This means that it is both a plurality without unity and a plurality with unity; and this is contradictory. If the predicable were no-thing, then neither can it form a plurality nor can itself be a plurality. It was assumed to be a plurality. Thus it is simultaneously a plurality and a non-plurality, and this is illogical. We conclude
that the predicable cannot be without unity.

It has thus been demonstrated that it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality only simply because nothing can be mere plurality. For an existent can be either some-thing or no-thing. If it is some-thing, then it must necessarily be one. If it is no-thing, then it cannot be plurality. Thus an existent cannot be a plurality. But the fact is that it is a plurality. This is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality to the exclusion of unity.

Our investigation has shed light on the fact that the predicables or things in general cannot be plurality without being also unity simply because it is impossible for some things to partake of plurality without also partaking of unity. At the same time, it has also become clear that unity cannot exist without plurality. Without exception, nothing can be a plurality without its being a unity.

(2. UNITY WITHOUT PLURALITY)

We shall now argue that if the predicables partook only of unity without plurality, contrariety (muğaddah) would have to be ruled out because an opposite (didd) is an opposite of another thing and "otherness" (ghayriyyah) involves at least two things, and two things constitute a plurality. Thus the absence of plurality means the absence of contrariety. But if there is contrariety then there must also be
plurality. Since contrariety exists, therefore plurality must also exist. We have supposed it to be non-existent. This would mean that it is both existent and non-existent, and this is self-contradictory. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Also, unity without plurality would mean the absence of exception (istithnā'), for exception applies to one or more things other than that to which the exception is made. In other words, exception implies plurality. It is an empirical fact that both the exception and that to which the exception is made do exist. Therefore, plurality exists also. We have supposed it to be non-existent. This would mean it is both existent and non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction. Consequently, the existence of plurality is inevitable.

Moreover, mere unity without plurality would exclude the possibility of difference (tabāyun), for in order to have difference there must be a minimum of two things. Two or more things constitute a plurality. Without plurality difference is inconceivable. If there is difference, then there must necessarily be plurality. As a matter of fact difference does exist. Therefore, plurality exists also. We have assumed its non-existence. This would mean it is simultaneously being and non-being, and this is a contradictory impossibility. We conclude that plurality necessarily exists.

Furthermore, mere unity without plurality would rule out agree-
ment (ittifāq) and disagreement (iktīlāf) as well as continuity (ittisal) and separation (iftiraq). For these conditions are possible when there are at least two things, and two things comprise a plurality. Without plurality there could be neither agreement nor disagreement.

But agreement and disagreement are empirical facts. Consequently, plurality exists. We have assumed that it does not exist. This means that at one and the same time it exists and does not exist. This is illogical. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Again, unity to the exclusion of plurality would necessarily eliminate the possibility of a beginning (ibtida'), a middle (tawassüt) and an end (akhir), for these can exist only in things that have parts. The one has no beginning, middle or end. However, a beginning, middle and end do exist. Therefore, things which have parts must necessarily exist and such things are obviously more than one. Consequently, plurality exists in that which is more than one. We have supposed plurality to be non-existent. This is self-contradictory. We conclude that plurality exists by sheer necessity.

Once again, mere unity without plurality would rule out the possibility of a thing having a particular shape (shakl). Shapes (ṣahkāl) are composed either of curved or straight lines or of both. They may also be formed by curved or straight surfaces or both. Shapes that are circular or spherical must have a focal point (markaz) and a circumference. That which is composed of curved lines and curved
surfaces or of straight lines and straight surfaces or a combination of these two possibilities must necessarily have angels and ends and, therefore, constitute a plurality. Thus wherever there are shapes there must also be plurality. But shapes do exist. Consequently, plurality is an existing reality. We have assumed that it does not exist. To say that it both exists and does not exist is self-contradictory. We conclude that it is impossible not to have plurality.

Likewise, mere unity without plurality would exclude the possibility of both motion and rest in the predicables, for the movement of an object is equivalent to a change of place, quantity, quality or substance, and all these constitute plurality. That which is at rest is at rest in a specific place. Yet some of its parts are elsewhere. Thus both terms "place" and "parts" imply a plurality because "parts" are more than one part and "place" consists of top, bottom, front, back, right and left. By its very nature (bitib'îhi), "place" necessitates the existence of plurality. For place is other than the occupant (al-mutamakkin). An occupied place implies an occupant. Height implies that which is high, diminution that which diminishes, change that which changes, existence that which exists, and decay that which decays. Negation (nafî) of all these entities would necessitate the existence of plurality, for to refer to a thing as not existing, not decaying, not rising, not diminishing or not changing would constitute a subject (maw'ûd) and predicate (ma'îmul), a subject
that is predicated by a negation of limited things. Therefore, if there is rest there is bound to be plurality. Without plurality, there can be neither rest nor motion. But rest and motion do exist. Consequently, plurality exists also. We have assumed its non-existence. This would mean that it both exists and does not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, plurality inevitably exists.

Thus it has been demonstrated that it is impossible for a thing to exist without partaking of plurality, because without plurality it can neither be in motion nor at rest. But the fact is that nothing perceptible (shay' min al-mahsūsah) or anything related to things perceptible can neither be in motion nor at rest. Therefore, not a single thing can be without plurality.

Likewise, unity alone without plurality would eliminate the possibility of a part or a whole existing at all, for the whole is the sum of the parts which are at least two in number, and two parts constitute a plurality. Thus without a plurality there can be no whole, and without a whole there can be no part because the whole and the part are inseparably related. The existence of the one presupposes the existence of the other. The one cannot be without the other. We are then led to say that things are not wholes and that they do not have parts. But empirically things are wholes and have parts. This would mean that the whole and the part are simultaneously being and non-being, and this is self-contradictory.
The part is also one. Therefore, if there is a part, then there is unity. Similarly, the existence of the part implies the existence of the whole, for without a part there can be no whole. And if there were neither part nor whole, then nothing could possibly exist. If nothing existed, then there can never be anything perceptible (maḥsūs) or conceivable (ma'qūl), and there can never be unity in anything perceptible or conceivable. If we assume that there is no part and no unity, it follows that there can be no part and whole and, consequently, no unity. We have supposed that unity exists. This would mean that it both exists and does not exist, which is illogical. Therefore, we conclude that plurality must inevitably exist.

It has thus been proven that none of the predicables mentioned above could partake of unity without partaking of plurality also for the simple reason that there cannot but be parts and wholes, as we have shown. The preceding investigation has also demonstrated the fact that there can be no plurality without unity in any of the predicables which were discussed. Part of the discussion has also shown that there can be nothing that partakes of unity without partaking of plurality also.

(3. UNITY, PLURALITY AND CAUSALITY)

It has become clear, therefore, that unity and plurality cannot exist separately and independently. All the predicables mentioned
earlier partake of both unity and plurality. It is a sheer necessity that the one and the many be present in all things such as we have enumerated above. Having established the fact that it is in the very nature of things to be both unity and plurality, it must now be stated that unity can be either distinct (mubahin) from plurality or the two (unity and plurality) are interdependent. If unity were distinct from plurality, that is, if unity existed separately, we would have the same contradictions which were pointed out when the possibility of unity without plurality was postulated. The same would be true of plurality (if it existed separately).

The one alternative that remains is for unity and plurality to be interdependent (musharikah), namely, co-existing in all perceptible objects and all that is related to them. In other words, anything that partakes of plurality partakes also of unity, and wherever unity is present, there one finds also plurality.

Having demonstrated the co-existence of plurality and unity in all sensory objects and all that is related to them, it must now be pointed out that this simultaneity or co-existence (ishtirak) (of unity and plurality) can be due either to chance (bakht), that is, by coincidence (ittifaq) without a cause, or is the result of a cause. If it were due to chance, then we would have to assume that unity and plurality had existed separately. But to this condition (separate existence of unity and plurality) would be applicable all the contra-
dictions (musālāt) which we have encountered when we searched for plurality without unity. And how is it possible to have plurality and unity simultaneously if they were distinct? Is not the many simply a plurality of ones, an assembled group ofunities? Therefore, unity must exist with plurality. Things cannot be otherwise. Moreover, if they were distinct, how could possibly by mere unity, when they are two things (unity and plurality), and two things constitute a plurality? We conclude that it is inconceivable for unity and plurality to be distinct.

We could return to the possibility of attributing the cause of the (assumed) distinctiveness (of unity and plurality) to chance. But this distinctive features are existences (inniyyāt) and to these, too, apply the logical contradictions which we have encountered. Therefore, unity and plurality could not have possibly been separate and then have united (ittafaqat) by chance, that is, without a cause. Hence, the only possibility that remains would be to say that the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality must have been the result of a cause and that this condition must have prevailed from the beginning when they came into being.

Having established the necessity of a cause to explain their interdependent simultaneity, we must go on to say that this cause can either be from within itself (internal) or other than itself, that is, external and separate from it. If we suppose the cause to be
from itself, it would necessarily have to be part of the self. This would be identical to saying that the part (as the cause) is ontologically prior to the rest (as the effect). Since the cause precedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our Book on the Differences (kitāb 'la al-mubā'yanah), it follows that any sensory object or that which is related to it, we mean all things, would have to be either mere unity (wahdah faqat) or mere plurality (kathrah faqat) or must be both unity and plurality simultaneously. If it were mere unity (or mere plurality), the ensuing result (i.e., contradictions) would be similar to what was encountered earlier. Consequently, unity and plurality must co-exist interdependently. This interdependent co-existence must be the result of either chance or a cause from within or from without. If it were due to chance, the same contradictions would follow which have already been indicated. If it were self-caused, the consequence would be a chain of causes that is infinite. But it has been demonstrated that nothing can be infinite in actuality. Therefore, we must conclude that the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality cannot be self-caused.

(4. FIRST CAUSE: THE TRUE ONE)

The only possibility that remains would be to attribute the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality (in predicables or perceptibles in general) to a cause other than themselves (unity and
plurality), a cause that is transcendent and nobler than, and ontologically prior to, both unity and plurality. For the cause precedes the effect in existence, as we have shown in our essays on Differences, a cause that is separate from both. For simultaneity is a necessity in co-existents, as we have shown earlier, and it is caused by some exterior agent. If this were the case, we would have an infinite chain of causes. But infinity in causality is an impossibility, as we have demonstrated. This is so because nothing can be infinite in actuality.

Moreover, this transcendental cause cannot be of the same genus as unity and plurality, for nothing can be ontologically prior to other things of the same genus. For instance, neither the substance of man's humanity (al-insāniyyah) nor that of the horse's animality, which are both of the same genus, the living, could precede each other ontologically. The cause exists prior to the effect. Therefore, the cause that accounts for the interdependent co-existence of unity and plurality in things that are many and one cannot be found in a genus.

If it (the transcendental cause) does not have a genus in common with them (unity and plurality), it does not also share with them one similarity. For things that are similar are so with respect to one genus, one species, such as redness, redness and shape, and shape and so on. Therefore, the cause of the interdependent co-existence of plurality and unity in things that are many and one cannot be located
in a genus or similarity or form. This is so because it is the very cause of its (simultaneity of unity and plurality) being and continuity and must, therefore, be higher, nobler and older than it.

It has thus been demonstrated that all things have a First Cause (illah 'ulā) which does not partake of any of their genera, forms and similarities and has nothing in common with any of them. This First Cause is higher, nobler and more ancient than all things. It accounts for their coming into being as well as for their continuous existence.

This Cause must itself be either one or many. If it were many, then it comprises unity, inasmuch as plurality is the configuration of ones. This would mean that this First Cause is both a plurality and a unity. Consequently, we would have to say that the cause of plurality and unity is unity and plurality. In other words, a thing is the cause of itself. But the cause must be other than the effect. A thing is then other than itself, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude that the First Cause cannot be a plurality or both a plurality and a unity. Hence, the only possibility that remains is that the First Cause must be One only (wāhid faqaṭ) without plurality in any way.

Thus we have delineated the fact that the First Cause is One. The One (or unity) is found in all things that are caused. We have discussed above the variety of forms the one or unity takes in sensory
objects and related things. We must now elucidate the nature of unity in the predicables as well as the nature of the True Unity (al-wahdah al-haqq) and the meaning of unity allegorically (bi-al-majāz) and in reality (bi-al-haqīqah). This is our objective in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

We shall now discuss the type of unity that exists in the predicables (al-maqūlāt) and the nature of the One in Truth (al-wāhīd bi-al-haqq) and the One when it is used in the allegorical (bi-al-majāz), rather than the real, sense.

(THE RELATIVE AND THE ABSOLUTE)

Beginning with the necessary premises, the fact must be stated that "the great" and "the small," "the long" and "the short," "the many" and "the few" are terms used to describe things in a relative (bi-al-Iḍāfah) rather than absolute (qawl mursal) sense. Thus a thing is described as "great" in relation to, or comparison with, something that is smaller. It is said to be "small" when it is compared with something that is greater. Likewise, a matter or affair is described as great in contrast to a matter that is small or minor. A mountain is depicted as small in relation to another mountain that is bigger.

If the word "big" were applied in an absolute manner to that to which bigness may be ascribed, and in the same way the term "small", we would be referring to something infinite that can never (battah) exist in actuality (bi-al-fi'īl) or in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah).

This would be the case because there could not possibly be anything bigger than that which is described as big in an absolute manner.
Thus the absolutely large cannot be infinite actually or potentially. For if something other than it that is larger existed actually or potentially, then it itself could not be said to be absolutely large because the existence of something larger would render it comparatively small. If this were not the case, then that which is larger than it would by comparison be either smaller than it or equal to it, and this self-contradictory. Therefore, we conclude, nothing could possibly be larger, actually or potentially, than that which is absolutely large.

This argument means that a magnitude (azīm) exists which cannot be doubled in actuality or in potentiality. To double a thing is to double its quantity (kammiyyah), and this doubling of its quantity exists either actually or potentially. Therefore, a magnitude twice as large as the absolutely large exists in actuality or in potentiality. Thus the absolutely large can be doubled. The resultant double (di'f) is a whole to that which is doubled, and that which is doubled is equal to half the double, and the half (nisf) is part of the whole. This would mean that which is doubled is part of the double.

This all adds up to the conclusion that the absolutely large is both a whole and a part. If the double of the absolutely large is not larger than the absolutely large, then it will have to be either equal to it or smaller than it. If it were equal to it, an
absurd contradiction (muḥāl shanī‘) would result, namely, the whole
would be equal to the part, and this is illogical. A more absurd
impossibility would ensue if the double of the absolutely large were
to be smaller than the absolutely large.

Inasmuch as the whole is larger than the part, it follows that
twice the magnitude of the large, which was thought to be absolute,
exceeds in size the large that is supposed to be the absolutely
large. Now what is meant by the expression "the absolutely large"
is simply that magnitude which nothing can surpass in size. Thus
we must conclude that "the absolutely large" is not a magnitude that
is large absolutely. Therefore, it is either not great at all or
it is relatively large, for the term "large" cannot be used in the
absolute but rather in the relative sense.

If the absolutely large is not large, this would be equivalent
to saying that being is identical to non-being (huwa lā huwa), and
this is a contradiction of terms. Moreover, if the absolutely
large were equal to the relatively large, then the two words "absolute"
and "relative" would have to be synonymous (mutarāḍifān), applying
to one thing, a thing in comparison with which nothing could be
smaller. For it has already been established that nothing can ever
be larger than the absolutely large, potentially or actually.

By the same argument (tadbīr) it could also be proven (yatabayyan)
that a thing can be described as small only relatively and not
absolutely. The terms "large" and "small" may be used to describe any quantity. The terms "long" and "short", on the other hand, are applied to describe a continuous quantity (kammiyyah muttasilah) to which they strictly belong and not to any other kind of quantity.

But these terms are also used relatively and not absolutely. The proof (bayàn) for this fact would be the same as that advanced for the terms "large" and "small." When we come to the words "few" and "many" we find that they are applied to a discrete quantity (kammiyyah munfaṣilah). What has been said of the terms large and small, long and short, is also true of "many", namely, it may be used only in a relative and not in an absolute sense. This fact is proven by what has been stated before inasmuch as the argument is the same.

As to the term "few" (al-qalîl), it may be supposed that it could be used in the absolute sense, namely, when "two" is thought to be the beginning of number and all numbers other than "two" would then be larger than the "two." On the basis of this supposition, "two" as the smallest number would be, therefore, identical with "the absolutely few," because it can never be "many" for there is no number smaller than it.

(The Nature of the One)

If the "One" were a number, and there is nothing less than the One, then it would be equivalent to the "absolutely few." But this conjecture cannot be true because if we considered the One a
number, a considerable absurdity would necessarily follow. For if
the One were a number, it would have to be a certain quantity; and
if the One were a quantity, then quantitative characteristics would
necessarily have to be attributed to it. In other words, it would
have to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others). If
thus the One had units, some equal to it, others unequal to it, then
the One will have to be divisible. For the smaller unit must come
after the largest unit of after some parts of it. This would mean
that the largest unit is equal to some units, and is, therefore,
divisible. But the One is not divisible. Its divisibility, then,
exists and does not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction.

We conclude that the One is not a number.

Our saying "One", however, should not be interpreted to mean
the material (hayūf) constituent of the One, namely, the substance
('unsur) which is found in the One and thereby becomes One. It is
the substance that exists and not the One (or oneness). Likewise,
that which is formed of matter may be enumerated by number, but is
not a number itself. For instance, when we say "five horses," it
is understood that the horses are enumerated by five which is a number
but which does not consist of matter. The material is in the horses.
Thus our saying "One" should not be construed in such a way as to
lead to that which derives its oneness from the One (i.e. the material)
(al-muwahhad bi-al-wāhid). Our saying "One" should be understood
to suggest oneness or unity (wāhdah) itself, and this unity is never
divisible.

If One were a number and not a quantity, and the rest of the numbers, namely, two and the numbers that follow it, also constituted quantity, then the One would have to be classified under a category other than quantity. Therefore, the One and the other numbers are all said to be numbers by virtue of the similarity of their names rather than their natures. Consequently, One is a number by name only and not by nature. For numbers are not used except in relation to one thing. The various branches of medicine, for instance, are related to the one science, medicine, and the medical drugs (al-mubri'at) are related to the one process of healing (al-bahr').

But how can this hypothesis (zann) be true? In other words, if the One were a number, it would necessarily have quantitative characteristics which are equal and unequal (to other quantities). This would mean that besides the One there are other ones some of which are equal to it while others are either more or less than the One. But if this applies to the One, it must also be applicable to all other numbers. In other words, a number would have a synonym (samā) that is equal to it and another synonym that is smaller and still another that is larger. Number three, for instance, would have other threes, some equal to it, others smaller and still others that are larger. This would be the case with each number.
Now if this is not true of numbers about which we have no doubt (that they are numbers), it cannot also be true of oneness (al-wahdaniyyah). If our saying that the characteristic feature (khassah) of number as well as of anything that is quantitative is to be equal (to certain things) and unequal (to others) means that each number has another number similar to it and another number that is dissimilar to it, namely, larger or smaller than it, it would follow that two is not a number. This conclusion is based on the fact that there is no number less than two, but that there are numbers larger than two. If two were considered a number on the basis that it has a number equal to it, namely, another two, and that it has numbers unequal to it, namely, those that are larger, we would have to conclude that One is also a number because it has a number equal to it, that is, another One, and numbers that are not equal to it, namely, two and all the numbers which follow. If this were true, then One would have to be a quantity. The One and the other numbers would then be quantitative. Thus if the One is not a number by name, it must be a number by nature.

Again, the One must be either a number or not a number. If it were a number, it would have to be an even (zawj) or an odd (fard) number. If it were an even number, it would have to be divisible into two part that are similar (mutamathil) in their oneness. But the One is indivisible. To say that it is both divisible and indivisible would be self-contradictory. Furthermore, if the One
contained single units, then it is a composite of such units. This means it is constituted of its own essence. It is thus One and at the same time units. But the One is One only and not Ones or units. To say that it is both One and Ones (unity and plurality) would be also self-contradictory.

If the One were not an even number, it would have to be an odd number. Now an odd number, when divided into two, would have two parts that are dissimilar in the number of their units. This would mean that the One is simultaneously divisible and indivisible, and that it is Ones and not just One, and this is an impossible contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude that the One is not a number.

It must, however, be pointed out that this manner of defining the odd number may be supposed to be legitimate only after the proof has been established that One is not a number. Otherwise, what would prevent anyone, who considers the One a number, from defining an odd number as the number whose division into two parts would have two sections that are dissimilar in the number of their units? This definition would apply to the One which of necessity is indivisible.

If it has not been demonstrated by the previous discussion that One is not a number, the following argument will then have to be advanced: The basic element which constitutes a thing is not necessarily identical with the thing itself. The vocal letters, for instance, from which speech is composed, are not equivalent to the speech itself.
For speech is a harmonious sound meaningfully arranged to indicate a certain thing with respect to time. The letter, on the other hand, is a natural sound which does not have any components. If that which is generally considered a number were composed of Ones or single units, then the One is the constituent element of number. Therefore, the One itself cannot be number. Furthermore, the One has no constituent element from which it is composed and which also becomes the constituent element of the numbers that are formed of groupings of Ones. This would render the One a number whose basic substance is also the substance of all the recognized numbers. In this way, the One could be considered a number.

It may be supposed that the One is the constituent element of Two, and the Two the constituent element of Three, simply because the Two is contained in Three. If Two, which is a number, is the constituent substance of Three, the conclusion is drawn that One, which is the constituent substance of Two, must also be a number. This supposition, however, is not true because Two, which is a composite, if thought to be the constituent substance of Three, has itself the One as its own constituent substance. But the One, while being the constituent element of Two, is itself without a constituent element. The One is not a composite. Unlike the Two, it is simple (basit). The Two, on the other hand, is a composite (murakkab) made up of the simple One. But a number cannot be partly simple, which constitutes its basic substance - and by "simple" we
mean that which is composed of nothing else - and partly composite made up of that simple element.

It may be believed, however, that this is the case in composite substance (al-jawhar al-murakkab) such as a body that is composed of two simple substances, namely, matter ('unsur) and form (qūrah). It has been argued that substance has three components: two are simple, namely, matter and form, and the third is a composite of these two, in other words, formed matter (al-'unsur al-musawwar), which is the body itself. In a similar fashion, number is believed to be composed of simple parts, the One, which is the constituent substance of what are accepted as numbers, and of the recognized number itself, which is a composite of the simple One.

This belief is not true, for this is a converse comparison (tamthīl 'aksī). The primary, simple substances (al-jawāhir al-Ūlā al-basītah), from which a body is made, are matter and form. But the body itself, even though it is composed of matter and form, it is so composed only accidentally, for by nature it is nothing but a body, that is, composed of matter and dimensions (abād), which are identical with its form. Neither matter nor the dimensions, which are the form, can separately become a body, which comes into being only as the result of their union.

Thus the One, which is the basic substance that constitutes what is commonly known as number, cannot itself be number. For
number is the aggregate of Ones. It is made up of Ones or units in the same sense as the body is substances because it is composed of substances. Of course, nothing can prevent us from designating names and giving definitions to the constituent parts which go into the making of things, such as "the living" (al-hayy) in living beings and "substance" in substances, and what we have in mind here are the essential and not the accidental names. This discussion leads us to conclude that the One is the constituent element of number, but itself is positively not number.

Thus it has been demonstrated that One is not a number. The definition that is used of number is rather a comprehensive (muhār) description of number. By this we mean that the number is a magnitude ('izam) of units or ones (wahdāniyyat), a total sum of units and a putting together of units.

Two, therefore, is the beginning of number. Considered by itself without thinking of the other numbers, Two would not by nature seem a small number. The quality of "smallness" or "few-ness" (al-qillah) becomes its characteristic the moment it is considered in relation to, or compared with, a larger number. It is then that it (the Two) may be described as small or "few", because all other numbers are larger than it. Thus Two is few or not many in relation to other numbers. However, by its very nature, the Two is a doubling (tad'if) of the One, a sum of two Ones. It is, then, made up of two Ones, and that which is a composite must have parts and it is the whole or the total of its
parts. But the whole is larger than the part. Therefore, number Two is not small by nature.

The terms "large" and "small," "long" and "short," "many" and "few" cannot be used in an absolute but only in a relative sense.

Each may be related only to another thing which has the same genus and not to that of another genus. The word "largeness," for example, if it referred to a body, could then be related only to another body and not, for instance, to another surface (sath), line (khat), space (makān), time (zaman), number (‘adad) or speech (qawl). As an illustration, one cannot say: 'a body larger or smaller than a surface, line, space, time, number or speech' but rather 'a body larger than (another) body.' The same rule applies to all the other categories (mentioned above). In other words, it is incorrect to use the terms 'larger' or 'smaller' to compare things of different genera.

Nor could one say: 'a surface larger or smaller than a line, space, time, number or speech' but rather 'a surface larger or smaller than (another) surface;' and not 'a line larger or smaller than a space, time, number, speech or line,' but rather 'a line larger or smaller than (another) line;' and not 'a place larger or smaller than a time, number or speech,' but rather 'a place larger or smaller than (another) place;' and not 'a time larger or smaller than a number, speech, but rather 'a time larger or smaller than (another) time; and not 'a number larger or smaller than a speech' but rather 'a number larger
or smaller than (another) number; and not 'a speech larger or smaller than any of the rest of qualities' but rather 'a speech larger or smaller than (another) speech.'

Likewise, it would be incorrect to say: 'a body longer or shorter than a surface, line, space, time, number or speech.' One would be utterly mistaken in making the statement that 'a body is longer or shorter than a surface, line or place. If it is supposed that the length of a body were longer or shorter than the length of a surface, line or place, then the comparison would be referring only to the length of each of these categories, and the length is only one of their dimensions and this dimension is a line. Therefore, when we say that a body, surface, line or place is longer or shorter what we really mean is that the line of this is longer than the line of that. For in this case we would be having varieties of the same continuous quantity (al-kammiyyah al-muttaqilah).

Time is also a continuous quantity. But because time does not have an overtly recognizable line, it could not, therefore, be said: 'a body longer or shorter than time.' Obviously, length and shortness cannot be applied to anything in comparison to another except if they were of the same genus even though both may have length and shortness. The two things will have to be either bodies, surfaces, places or periods of time. Length and shortness in themselves, however, cannot be applied to number or speech except with reference to the duration of
time in which they take place. Thus we can say: a long number, meaning in a long time. Similarly, it may be said: long speech, 15 meaning of long duration, not that the qualities of length and shortness can be applied directly to speech and number.

Similarly, the terms "many" and "few" are used to designate things of the same genus. Take, for instance, number and speech. It would be incorrect to say: "a speech more or or less than a number," and "a number more or less than a speech." It would be correct to say: "a number more or less than (another) number," and "a speech more or less than (another) speech."

(THE NATURE OF THE TRUE ONE)

What has been established in the preceding argument leads us to conclude that the One cannot really be related to anything else of a similar genus. This would be possible if the One itself had a genus. But the True One (al-wahid al-haqq) has no genus at all. We have shown earlier that whatever has a genus cannot be eternal (azalî) and that the eternal is void of genus. Therefore, the True One is eternal. The True One never multiplies itself in any form and cannot be related to, or compared with, anything else. It has neither matter, which would render it divisible, nor form consisting of genus and species. That which has these (matter and form) multiplies through its constituent elements. Moreover, the True One is never a quantity (kammiyyah) and also does not have a quantity. That which is quanti-
tative is also divisible, for every quantity or anything quantitative is prone to increase or decrease. That which decreases is divisible, and what is divisible is capable of multiplying in some form. It has been said that plurality (kathrah) is present in all the predicables (al-maqūlāt) and anything that is implied in them, that is, genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, whole, part and all (the rest). Likewise, the One may be said to be present in all the numbers that follow it. Therefore, the True One cannot be one of these.

Motion exists in any of these, that is, in any body which is matter and form, for motion is movement (naqlah) from one place to another (locomotion), increase, decrease, generation, decay or transformation (istiḥālah). Moreover, motion partakes of plurality because space is quantitative and, therefore, divisible. That which in sections is divided by the different locations. Consequently, it is a plurality. Locomotion (al-ḥarakah al-makāniyyah), it must be concluded, partakes of plurality.

Increase (rubuwiyyah) and decrease (naqṣiyyah) also partake of plurality, for the movement of the extremities (nihāyāt) of that which increases or decreases is divided by reason of its taking place in the different locations extending between the points before and after the increase or decrease.

The same may be said of generation and decay, for the processes
of generation and decay, from their beginning to their end, are divided by means of the intervals of time during which they occur.

5 Thus the movements of increase and decrease, generation and decay, are all divided (into parts). Similarly, transformation of a thing into its opposite (qiyyad) or toward perfection (tammam) is also divided by means of the periods of time in which it occurs.

Thus all movements are divisible but are also unified (mutawab'hadah) because every movement in its totality is One. This is so by virtue of the fact that every absolute whole (al-kull al-mutlaq) partakes of unity. This is also true of any part of the whole, for an absolute part (al-juz' al-mutlaq) also constitutes a unity. No if plurality exists in motion, it must then be inferred that the True One is not motion.

10 Inasmuch as all things that are perceived by the senses or conceived by the mind must exist either by nature objectively (fi 'aynahu) or subjectively (fi al-fikr), or by accident in our speech or writing, it follows that motion exists in the soul. What is meant by this is that thought (al-fikr) moves from the images (suwar) of some objects to the images of other objects as well as from one of the soul's virtues and passions to another such as anger and fear, joy and sorrow and so on. Thus thought is capable of partaking of both plurality and unity. Because each plurality consists of a whole and parts, it can be measured. What has just been described happens accidentally
to the soul and thereby the soul pantakes of plurality and unity. The True One, therefore, cannot be a soul.

If the logical course of thought is traced back, it would lead to the intellect (al-’aql). The intellect contains the species of things, for a species and that which is prior to it (i.e. genus) are conceivable (ma’qūl). The individuals (al-ashkhāṣ), on the other hand, are objects of sensory perception. By individuals we mean particular things which do not determine the names and definitions of objects. The fact that the species unite with the would is an evidence that they are conceivable. The soul conceives in actuality (bi-al-fīl) when the species are united with it. Prior to this union (ittihād), the soul’s conception was only in potentiality (bi-al-quwah). It always takes another agent to change anything from potentiality to actuality. Without this agent a thing is a thing only potentially. But this agent (mukhrij, lit. producer) must itself be in actuality. The rationality of the soul is turned from potentiality into actuality by means of the universals themselves (al-kullīf a’yānuha). This process is identical with the unification of the species and genera of things, which are their universals, and the soul. It is through this merger (ittihād) that the soul becomes rational (‘aqilah), that is, acquires an intellect (‘ql). To say that the soul has an intellect is the same as saying that it contains the universals of things. These universals, which by being in the soul have moved from potentiality to actuality, are identical with the soul’s Acquired Intellect (al-‘ql al-mustafād). The Acquired Intellect had
existed in the soul only potentially. The universals are, therefore, the Efficient Intellect (al-'q1 bi-al-fi'l) which moved the soul from potentiality to actuality. Inasmuch as the universals are multiple (mutakathirah), as shown above, it must be concluded that the Intellect partakes of plurality. The Intellect may be considered Primary and multiple. But somehow it partakes of unity because it is a universal, a whole, as has been demonstrated, and a whole is One and partakes of unity. Thus True Unity (al-wahdah bi-haqq).

In our language, the synonyms (al-asma' al-mutaradifah) 'blade' and 'knife' are both used to designate the iron instrument of slaughter. Synonyms are said of One thing. The 'blade' and the 'knife' are One thing. But this One is also multiple because its substance ('unsur) and its designations are multiple. In this case, the iron instrument of slaughter is the substance of the synonyms 'sharp edge,' 'blade' and 'knife,' and is itself divisible and multiple. Likewise, the terms by which it is identified are multiple. The True One, we must conclude, cannot be synonymous with anything.

Moreover, there are in our utterances words that have a resemblance to names, such as the lion which is called dog and the star which is also called dog. Both are One as far as the name is concerned which is 'dog.' The substance of this 'dog' is multiple, that is, the lion and the star. Neither of these similar terms is the cause of the other, for the star is not the cause of the lion, and the lion is not the cause of the star. However, there are cases in which the things that
share the same name can be the cause of each other. Examples of this are the terms 'the written' (al-makhtūt), 'the spoken' (al-malfūz), 'the contemplated' (al-mufakkar fīhi) and 'the thing-itself' (al-'ayn al-qā'īmah). The 'written', itself a substance (jawhar) spells out that which is 'spoken', which is also a substance; and the 'spoken', which is a substance, expresses that which is 'thought about', which is likewise a substance. Moreover, the 'contemplated', which is substance, represents the 'thing-itself,' which is also a substance. The One may be ascribed to all of these, namely, 'the thing-itself' (al-'ayn fi dhātiha), 'the idea' (al-fikrah), 'the utterance' (al-lafz) and 'the inscribed' (al-khatt). The thing-itself is the cause of the 'thing-in-thought' (al-'ayn fi al-fikr), and the thing-in-thought is the cause of the 'thing-in-utterance' (al-'ayn fi al-lafz), and the thing-in-utterance is the cause of the 'thing-in-writing' (al-'ayn fi al-khatt). This kind of One is also multiple because it is used to designate many things. Therefore, the True One cannot be One of mere resemblance of names.

One may be said of things whose substance is One. However, the substance may undergo change either by action (fi'l), effect (infi'āl), relation (idāfah) or by some other way. For example, the door and the bed, which are made of one substance - wood or any other substance of which things with various forms are made - and thus it is said that the door and the bed are of One substance. But these (the door and
the bed) are also 'many' with respect to their substance, which is multiple and is made up of parts and 'many' with respect to their forms. Thus it is possible for things whose primary substance is One to be multiple with respect to that substance simply because it exists in numerous forms.

The expression 'One in substance' (wāḥid bi-al-'unsur) may also be applied to things with reference to One specific thing in them but which, by necessary implication, would refer to another thing also. An example of this is when we speak of decay as it manifest in an object and, by implication, involves also generation inasmuch as the decay of one thing may be at the same time the generation of another. Therefore, it may be said that the existent (al-ḵā'īn), in this case, is in actuality identical with that whose substance is decaying. This is another instance of multiplicity because the one substance is used for several forms.

This kind of potential Oneness, namely the 'One in substance', may be said of things which apply to One thing and imply another. Growth (rubū), for instance, designates increase but also implies decrease. For that which increases has the potential to diminish. Thus we may refer to the One process of increase-decrease. In other words, this dual process may apply to the one and the same thing. But this One thing is also multiple with respect to substance because the substance belongs to several forms due to the process of increase-
decrease, expansion-contraction (al-rubū wa-al-damr). The True One, therefore, can never be substance. None of the various things that are One in substance qualify to be called "The One."

The One may be used to describe that which is indivisible, as we have pointed out. That which is indivisible is so either actually or potentially. A thing may be indivisible in actuality due to its hardness (ṣalābah) as it is the case with a diamond. But a diamond has parts by necessity because it is a body and, consequently, is multiple. A thing may also be indivisible by reason of its minuteness which eludes the action of a dividing instrument (al-ṣīlah al-qāsimah). It is indivisible simply because there is no device that can divide it. But the fact remains that it has parts because it is a magnitude ('izam) and has been subject to diminution (al-ṣighar). It is, therefore, multiple.

A thing may also be described as indivisible in actuality even though it may undergo continuous separation, for through this separation it does not digress from its basic nature. Its definition and name continue to be applicable to the separated part. This is true of all continuous magnitudes (al-a'ẓūm al-muttaṣilah), namely, a body, surface, line, space and time. Needless to say, a part separated from a body is also a body, a surface severed from a surface is a surface, a line taken from a line is a line, a place disconnected from a place is a place, and a time separated from a time is a time.
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All these are never divided actually or potentially into anything other than their species. Each of them is permanently susceptible to differentiation (tafsīl) and multiplicity within its own species.

Furthermore, a body multiplies by means of its three dimensions (abʿād) and six ends (niḥāyāt), a surface by means of its two dimensions and four ends, and a line by means of its two dimensions and two ends. Similarly, a space is multiplied or increases in proportion to the dimensions and ends of its occupant. Likewise, time is increased by means of its ends which are the moments (ānāt) of time that designate those ends. This is similar to the points that indicate the two ends of a line.

Moreover, the One may be said of anything whose parts are similar. Such a thing is indivisible because whatever is separated from it retains the same definition and name. But this also is subject to multiplicity even though it is not divisible (in the real sense). In other words, everything is permanently susceptible to division.

Reference may also be made to what is indivisible actually or potentially, for such a division would result in the loss of its essence. An illustration of this is "the One man" or man as a unity, such as Muhammad and Saʿīd, and "the One horse," as ʿal-ʿrāʾīd (the explorer) and ʿdhū al-ʿiqāl (the one with the hobbled hoofs). The
same may be said of all natural individual things that have magnitudes, as well as of accidental things and of species, genus, differentia, property, common accident. If any of these is divided it ceases to be what it is (lam yakun huwa ma huwa). But it is multiple by virtue of its components and its constant differentiation. All these may also be described as partaking of unity, for each constitutes a continuity.

The One is ascribed to that which cannot be divided into anything else. That which is indivisible because it is not continuous applies to two things: First, that which is not continuous, not compound, and has nothing in common with other things. An example of this is the numerical One (al-wahid al-`adadi) which is not a continuous entity. In other words, it has dimensions and ends. But the fact is that it is a continuous thing and is indeed indivisible and indescrete (lā munfasil). At the same time, it is also multiple with respect to its components which we can count. This numerical One is the measure of all things. The other thing (that is indivisible because it is not continuous) is the vocal letters (huruf al-qafāt) which are not continuous. The causes which render the numerical One indivisible cannot be set forth. The numerical One is a measure for the vocal utterances only.

The One is a designation that is said of that which is indivisible. It cannot be divided because it has no part that has any resemblance
to it or to anything else. It is also common. Whatever has this
quality may be one of two kinds. The first of these is circumstantial (lahu waq') such as the point of a line which constitutes its end. It has no parts because it represents the termination of one dimension, and the end of a dimension is not a dimension itself. On the other hand, this termination of the line is multiple by reason of being subject to past and future and by being common to both.

The designation One is also applied to that which as a total entity (kulliyyah) cannot be divisible. When one says 'One pound,' for instance, it is implied that it ceases to be 'One pound' the moment a portion is separated from it, that is, from the total quantity of the pound. In other words, the 'One pound' would no longer be a whole. It is for this reason that the One may be more appropriately ascribed to a circumference (khaṭṭ al-dā'irah) than to any other line because a circumference is a complete whole. The circumference contains the whole circle perfectly and is a complete whole. Whatever is constituted in this manner is also multiple by virtue of its differentiation. Among the things to which the One may be applied as a designation, it is the indivisible which is the most qualified to have Unity ascribed to it.

Our discussion has elucidated the fact that the One may be One essentially or accidentally. The term One may be used in an accidental sense as in a common name, synonyms or a designation that
contains many accidents. This may be illustrated by saying: the writer and the orator are One, whether the reference is to one specific man or to man in general; or the man and the writer are One and so on. On the other hand, if the One is used in an essential sense, it would apply to all the things mentioned above which partake of unity. This is so because in essence they are One, that is, they have the same substance in common. The essential may be differentiated primarily by continuity when it is a substance, by form when it is a species, by name when it is both substance and form, or by genus when it is continuity.

That which is One by virtue of its continuity is One either by substance or by amalgamation (ribāṭ). This is called One in number or shape. That which is One in form applies to things which have the same definition. That which is One in genus refers to things whose predicates are identical. Things which have the same name are, therefore, equal and necessarily One. Things which are One by reason of their equality (musawāt) are the things that have One common relation such as medical things which are all related to medicine.

Each of these things we have just mentioned, namely, that which constitutes Oneness in number, form, genus and relation follows (with respect to unity and plurality) that which precedes rather than that which follows it (in the order indicated). In other words, if a thing is One in number, it would be also One in form; and if it is One in
form, it would be also One in genus; and if it is One in genus, it would be also One in relation. On the other hand, if a thing is One in relation, it would not necessarily be One in genus; and if it is One in genus, it would not necessarily be One in form; and if it is One in form, it would not necessarily be One in number.

It has thus been established that over against unity stands plurality. Plurality characterizes all the varieties of existences. A thing is said to be multiple either because it is not continuous, that is, discrete (munfaṣil) or because its substance is divisible into forms or its forms into genus or relation. The fact has also been elucidated that individual existence (ḥawīyyah) applies to anything that owes its being to the One. Individual existence, therefore, is a designation of all that owes its identity to the various forms of the One.

It has so far been proven that the True One (al-wahid al-ḥaqq) is not one of the intelligibles (al-ma’qūlāt). It is neither substance, genus, species, individual, differentia, property, common accident, motion, soul, intellect, whole, part, all, few nor is it related to anything else. The True One is the Absolute One (wahid mursal).

It is immune to multiplicity. It is not compound and is not 'many'. It is not identical with any of the existences mentioned above even though they partake of unity in one form or another. Whatever is implied in their names does not apply to the True One. All the
things we have enumerated are the simplest (absaṭ) manifestations of the True One or, more correctly, its simplest descriptions, and an intensified form (of their unity) would not constitute the True One. It follows that the True One is void of matter, form, quantity, quality, relation and cannot be described by any other category. It has no genus, differentia and is not individual, property, common accident or in motion. It simply eludes any description that would negate its being truly One. Consequently, the True One is solely Absolute Oneness (mahdah mahd). In other words, it is nothing but pure Unity. Any unity other than the True One is necessarily multiple.

Therefore, unity which is accidental in all things is other than the True One as we have shown before.

The True One is the One-itself, the One in essence which never partakes of plurality in any way. It is indivisible in any manner within itself or with respect to anything else. The True One is not time, space, subject, predicate, whole, part, substance or accident. It is immune to any form of division or multiplicity. The unity found in all other existences is not identical with it. This unity is accidental, and whatever exists accidentally in things has its has its cause elsewhere. For whatever is found in things exists accidentally or essentially. Nothing can be infinite in actuality. The First Cause (awwal 'illah) of the unity which is found in all individual things is the True One whose unity is not derived from any other source (than itself). For the cause-effect sequence cannot
be infinite at its inception. Thus the cause of unity in all individual beings and things is the Primary True One (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqq al-awwal). Anything that receives unity from a source other than itself is an effect (ma'lūl). All Oneness other than that of the True One is metaphorical and not real Oneness. The source of Unity in all objective existences is outside their own being. This implies that its plurality is not self-caused, for it is a fact that each existent is multiple and is not absolutely One or is not Unity in the absolute sense. The Absolute One never partakes of plurality. Its Unity is nothing other than its own Being.

If unity and plurality exist simultaneously in all sensory objects and anything that is related to them, and if unity in all of these is an effect of a cause (athar min muathir), occurring in them by accident and not by nature, and, moreover, if plurality is nothing but the aggregate of unities (jamaʿat maḥdāniyyāt), it follows as a matter of sheer necessity (idṭirāran) that without unity there could never be plurality. This leads to the conclusion that the coming into being of any plurality is brought about by unity.

Without unity, plurality cannot possibly have any existence. Therefore, every existent (mutahawwī) is an effect (infiʿāl) that is brought into being out of non-being (mā lam yakun). Consequently, the emanation (fayḍ) of unity from the Primary True One is equivalent to the process of coming into being (tahawwī) of every sensory object (maḥṣūs) and anything that is related to it. An individual thing
comes into being when it acquires unity. Thus the cause of generation is identical with the True One whose unity is not derived from any other source because its very essence is unity or oneness. The cause of Being cannot be non-Being, and that which is not non-Being (layṣa ʾām yazal) must be a created thing (mubda’), namely, it owes its existence to a cause. Thus that which is brought into being is created. If the cause of coming into being is the Primary True One, it follows that the cause of creation (ʿillaṯ al-ībdā’) is the Primary True One. The cause which accounts for the beginning of motion or that by which motion is initiated, namely, the (First) Mover, is the Active Agent (al-fāʾil). Consequently, the Primary True One, being the cause which sets the process of generation into motion which is the effect, is itself the Creator (al-mubdi’) of all that exists. There can be no existence (lah huḏiyyah) without unity. In fact, acquiring unity (tawḥiẓ) and coming into being are the same thing. Unity is the backbone (qiwām) of all that exists. The disappearance of unity would mean the simultaneous (maʿān) and immediate (bilā zamān) obliteration of all existing beings and things. The True One is, therefore, the Primary Creator (al-ʾawwal al-mubdi’) and Sustainer (al-mumsik) of all that He has created. Without His sustenance (imsāk) and power every existent would disintegrate.

As we have set out to do, we have explicated the distinctions between the types of unity for the purpose of shedding light on the nature of the True One, the (First) Cause and Creator, the
powerful Sustainer, as well as to understand unity in the metaphorical sense. Such a unity is derived from the True One, may He be exalted far above the descriptions of the unbelievers.

We shall continue our discussion with what would naturally follow. This we shall attempt to do through the support of Him whose perfect Will is all-powerful and whose gracious bounty is inexhaustible.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


6 Ibid., p. 353


8 Ibid., p. 508f


10 Ibid., p. 126

11 Ibid., p. 126


14 Koran 6:126

15 Koran 10:100

16 Koran 13:27; 16:95; 74:34

17 Koran 41:17
18 Koran 18:29

19 Koran 41:16


21 A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (Cambridge, 1932), p. 53


23 Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 38


25 Gibb, Mohammedanism, p. 112


27 Koran 2: 286

28 Koran 22:10

29 Guillaume, Islam, p. 131; cf. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, p. 62


31 Ibid., p. 63

32 Ibid., p. 75

33 Koran 85:22

34 Koran 43:3

35 Al-Kindi's full name is Abu Yusuf Ya'qub ibn Ishāq al-Kindi. Medieval Arab biographers elaborate on the genealogical background of al-Kindi and are in general agreement concerning his descent, but they are silent about the exact date and place of his birth as well as about the year of his death.

36 Gustav Flügel states, on the authority of al-Nawai (born 1233 A.D.), the Shafi'i jurist and traditionalist, that al-Ash'ath, upon his return to Yemen and after the death of Muhammad, deserted Islam. Thereupon, Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, sent his troops and subdued him. Al-Ash'ath

54 Al-Mu'tasim who ruled from 833 to 842 A.D. was al-Ma'mūn's brother and successor and, like him, subscribed to the Mu'tazilite doctrinal position. The fact that al-Kindī, at the opening of his Treatise on First Philosophy, addresses and dedicates this important work to al-Mu'tasim may be regarded, as Dr. Richard Walzer has shown (Greek into Arabic, p. 176), as "external evidence" of al-Kindī's theological kinship to the Mu'tazilites. It is possible that Part I of this metaphysical work was written during the last years of al-Mu'tasim's reign and that the opposition of the succeeding caliph, al-Mutawakkil, to the Mu'tazilites might have made al-Kindī abandon his plans to write Part II because of the danger to his life this would have entailed.

Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 97. Al-Kindī's description of philosophy as an art (ṣinā'at) and his definition of it as the knowledge of things as they are ('ilm al-ashyā' bi-naqāṣiḥā) are in line with the Hellenistic tradition which gave to philosophy the practical meaning of an art, based upon scientific principles (Cf. Seneca, Epistle 89). The Arabic term 'ilm has a wider connotation than the English word 'knowledge.' With the advent of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world, 'ilm acquired the meaning of 'scientific' and thus it is more akin to the German term Wissenschaft. The definition of philosophy as 'ilm of things as they are, therefore, must be understood to signify the methodical work of thought through which we come to know reality. In his Treatise "On the definitions and Descriptions of Things," al-Kindī lists six definitions of philosophy that were known to the ancients (al-qudāmā'): (a) Love of wisdom, (b) Imitation of God in His works for the purpose of attaining perfection in virtue, (c) Elimination of lusts, (d) Self-knowledge, (f) Knowledge of eternal, universal things - their existences, substances and causes (Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 172f). Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1005b 6f where philosophy is conceived as the study of the nature of all substances.

Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 97

57 Ibid., p. 97. Al-Kindī's division of philosophy into theory ('ilm) and practice ('amal) appears also at the beginning of his Treatise "On the Five Substances" which has come down to us in its Latin translation "liber de quinque essentitis." (Professor Abu Rīdah has included this work and an Arabic retranslation of it in Vol. II of Rasā'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah, p. 8ff). In this work, al-Kindī states that the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical corresponds to the division of the soul into mind and senses, thought and sensation (op. cit. p. 8). Cf. Franz Rosenthal, "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts, VI," Journal of the American Oriental Society,
In this article, Dr. Rosenthal quotes a brief statement by al-Kindi "On Theory and Practice" (al-'ilm wa-al-'amal) which appears in a MS. in Istanbul (kitab al-Musiq by Hasan Ibn Ahmad Ibn 'Ali al-KUib). After stating that "theory and practice are the beginning of virtues" (awwal al-fada'il), al-Kindi goes on to divide 'theory' ('ilm) into the physical, mathematical and theological divisions, and 'practice' ('amal) into ethics, economics and politics. The theoretical subdivisions, as Dr. Rosenthal has pointed out, correspond to the well-known Aristotelian classification of the sciences (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1026a 19). The practical subdivisions appear in the later Aristotelian literature but not in Aristotle's own writings.

58 Al-Kindi seems to be in disagreement here with Aristotle who considered theoretical contemplation (theoria) as the highest and noblest activity of man. However, the distinction in objectives between "theoretical" and "practical" knowledge which al-Kindi stresses echoes Aristotle's statement that "the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action" (Metaphysics 993b 20f).

59 Abu RIdah, op. cit. p. 97. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 993b 23 where it is said that "we do not know a truth without its cause," and 994b 30-31 "For we think we know only when we have ascertained the causes. Cf. also Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12, 94a 20.

60 Abu RIdah, op. cit. p. 98

61 Ibid., p. 101

62 Ibid., p. 101. Aristotle discusses these four causes or inquiries in his Metaphysics 1013a 24f. Cf. also Posterior Analytics, Book II, 89b 21-26 and 94a 21-23.

63 Ibid., p. 101

64 Ibid., p. 103

65 Ibid., p. 102. This is basically Aristotle's attitude. Cf. Metaphysics 993a 31ff

66 Ibid., p. 104

67 Ibid., p. 104

68 Ibid., p. 103. This procedure is reminiscent of Aristotle (Metaphysics).

69 Ibid., p. 104

70 Ibid., p. 104

71 Ibid., p. 105
72 Ibid., p. 105. According to Richard Walzer ("The Rise of Islamic Philosophy," Orions, Vol. 3 (1950), p. 9), this argument of the inescapable necessity to use philosophical knowledge has its origin in Aristotle's lost work Protrepticus which was imitated in the Hortensius of Cicero. This work, in turn, influenced St. Augustine's religious development. The same argument was used in similar circumstances by Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI, 18 (p. 515, 31ff. Stählin). Cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Göttingen, 1948), p. 415; II (1949), p. 200. Cf. also Aristotle's concept of "the necessary," (Metaphysics 1015a 20-1015b 16).


74 Abu Rida, op. cit. p. 106. Al-Kindi is most probably the only Muslim philosopher who uses the term 'wujûd' to signify 'cognition' and 'knowing'. The word is derived from the root 'wajada,' 'to find'. Thus "wujûd" has the connotation of 'finding' (Cf. the Arabic dictionary al-munjid which states that 'wajada' (to find) is also used to connote 'alima (to know)). The later Muslim philosophers use 'wujûd' for 'being' and 'existence' as well as the 'universe.' To determine whether al-Kindi identifies 'existence' and 'cognition,' in the Berkeleyan sense (For George Berkeley, "to be is to be perceived," esse is percipi - cf. his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge - 1710 - sec. 33) would require further study of al-Kindii's epistemology. 'Al-wujûd al-burhani' (Abu Rida, op. cit. p. 111) is used by al-Kindi to signify 'demonstrative knowledge.'

75 Abu Rida, op. cit. p. 107

76 Ibid., p. 107

77 Ibid., p. 107

78 Ibid., p. 108ff


80 Abu Rida, op. cit. p. 107


Imagination is considered by al-Kindi as a secondary source of cognition. It receives the images of sense perception and deposits them in the memory for eventual use by the mind. The imagination also registers the mental images of the mind and stores them in the memory. The recollective function of the imagination consists of reproducing both the sensory and mental images from the memory and placing them at the disposal of the mind for its organizing and synthesizing work. What al-Kindi says about the nature of dreaming as a form of symbolic thinking and about the interpretation of dreams might be of interest to psychoanalysis.

In order to understand the place and importance of intuition as a source of knowledge we must turn to al-Kindi’s "Treatise on the Quantity of Aristotle’s Books and what is required for the attainment of Philosophy" (kammiyyat kutub Aristutālis wa-ma yuhtāju fi taḥṣīl al-falsafah), Abu R̲īdhah, op. cit. pp. 372-376. Here he seems to conceive of intuition as a radar-like function of the mind that is capable of receiving hidden realities (al-ummūr al-khafīyyah al-ḥaqiqiyah), that is, transcendental truth. The context in which al-Kindi deals with this matter is quite significant. Into the survey of the Aristotelian syllabus as it existed then, he injects rather abruptly a discussion on the fundamental distinction between the "human sciences" (al-‘ulūm al-insāniyyah) and "divine knowledge" or theology (al-‘ilm al-ilāhi), the distinction, in other words, between philosophic and religious knowledge. The former, as exemplified by the works of Aristotle, al-Kindi points out, is attained through
systematic investigation and deliberate effort (talab wa-takalluf). Much of religious knowledge, he goes on to say, is attained by reason but only through a long and weary detour of philosophic inquiry. There are, however, certain transcendental truths of religion which the mind can neither reach nor comprehend. These truths are apprehended by intuition and without strenuous research and time-consuming methods (bila talab wa-la takalluf wa-la biallah bashariyyah wa-la zaman). But this avenue of cognition is not open to all, according to al-Kindi. It is limited to the prophets whose religious knowledge is communicated to them without the human devices (hiyal) of logic and mathematics and is received directly and immediately. The conditions which the prophets must meet to qualify and prepare for the receptivity of these hidden truths are not intellectual but moral and spiritual, namely, the purification (tathir) and illumination (inarah) of their souls. But this preparatory process takes place through God's support (ta'yid) and help (tasdid) and by inspiration (ilham) and messages (rasa'il). Al-Kindi cites two tenets of Islam which confronted the Greek mind with insurmountable difficulties, namely, the resurrection of the body and the creation of the world out of nothing. Certainty about such truths, he stresses, is directly imparted by God to the minds of the prophets.

90 Abu Ridah, op. cit. p. 111

91 Ibid., p. 113. The term 'laysa' is a composite of 'la' (not or none) and 'aysa' (to be, being). As Soheil Afnan says, al-Kindi has "a passionate attachment" to these terms, aysa and laysa and words that are derived from them such as aysiyyah, laysiyyah, ta'yis, mu'ayyis and al-aysat (Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden: E. J. Brill (1964), p. 97f). The first appearance of the root aysa is found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics which was performed by Ustath for al-Kindi (Soheil Afnan, op. cit. p. 97). Most probably, al-Kindi took the term from the Syriac ayth. Its use after al-Kindi was short-lived.

92 Abu Ridah, op. cit. p. 116

93 Ibid., pp. 186-192

94 Ibid., pp. 194-198

95 Ibid., pp. 201-207

96 Ibid., p. 117. Cf. Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), Physics 219b 2. Al-Kindi does not give the definition in its entirety and omits the words "in respect of 'before' and 'after'." Cf. also Aristotle's Metaphysics 986a 17 where reference is made to the Pythagoreans with respect to their theory of numbers.
Abu Rıdah, op. cit. pp. 214-237. This important Treatise opens with the teleological argument for the existence of God. In the phenomenal world we see the evidence (dalalah) for the planned designing of a First Designer (tadbır mudábbır awwal). In the course of his discussion, al-Kindi refers a few times to his First Philosophy and identifies God as al-Inniyyat al-Haqq (the True Being or True Existence) who is never non-being but is always Being (p. 215). God is also called al-Hayy al-Wabid (the Living One) who is never plurality. He is also al'i'llat al-Ülah (the First Cause), the Efficient and Final Cause as well as the Creator of all things ex nihilo (al-mu'ayyis al-kull 'an laysa) (p. 215, 219). Only at the very end of his "Treatise on First Philosophy," al-Kindi equates the First Cause with the True One (al-wâhid al-haqq), Abu Rıdah, op. cit. p. 161. He is the Primary Cause of Creation and motion (p. 162). In his essay "On the First, True, Perfect Agent and on the imperfect (one) that is an agent only metaphorically" (al-fâ'il al-haqq al-aqwa'll, al-tâmm wa-mâ al-fâ'il al-naqiq alladhī huwa bi-al-majâz), he identifies the First Cause as the Creator (al-mubdi'), the exalted One (p. 183).

Ibid., p. 118f. There is no general agreement as to the origin of the term inniyyah. Abu al-Baqâ', in his work al-kulliyat (The Universals), Cairo, 1903, p. 76, derives the word from İnna, the Arabic particle of emphasis which stresses the actual existence of an object. Some mystics pronounced the word aniyyah and derived it from ana, the first person singular. This is what 'Abd al-Karîm al-Djili (died about 1417 A.D.) does in his book al-Insân al-kâmil fi ma'rîfat al-awâkhîr wa-al-awâ'il (The Perfect Man as conceived by Modern and Ancient People), chapter 27. In line with this, Muhammad Iqbâl in The Development of Metaphysics in Persia (p. 153) translates the term "I-ness." Dr. Abd al-Rahmân Badawi, who pronounces the word âniyyah, is of the opinion that it is the arabi- zation of the Greek term εἶναι (to be). As Abu Rıdah has convincingly shown (op. cit. p. 98f), this is not likely and the resemblance of terms is only coincidental. T. J. de Boer believes that the word âniyyah represents the Platonic "being" or "existence" (ζυγόν, σύ) as the highest category but that it takes its name from the Aristotelian "thatness" (ζητείς), existence as distinguished from the "whatness" (Arabic: mâhiyyah) (The Encyclopedia of Islam, Supplement 1938, E. J. Brill, Leiden & Luzac, p. 24f). The plural inniyyat is used by al-Kindi to signify 'individual created being and things' (Abu Rıdah, op. cit. p. 97). Since al-Fârâbî, the words wujûd and mawjud were used in philosophical language to denote "being" and "existing."

Abu Rıdah, op. cit. p. 121f

Ibid., p. 123
Al-Kindi's highly formalized dialectical argument is reminiscent of Plato's *Parmanides* which ends with what has been called the 'portentous conclusion' that "whether one is or is not, one and the others (the many) in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear to be and appear not to be." (B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, p. 140)

Dr. Richard Walzer is probably right in his contention that "al-Kindi has his ultimate philosophical roots in the Athenian school of Proclus" (*Greek into Arabic*, Harvard University Press, 1962, p. 202), although it is not possible at the present to determine the connecting link. The fact that al-Kindi accepts the validity of astrology, says Walzer, places him in the vicinity of the same Neoplatonic trend which has its source in Proclus. Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*, Oxford 1933, p. 107 ff.
143 Enneads, V, 9, 6
144 Enneads, V, 3
145 Philippus Villiers Pistorius, Plotinus and Neoplatonism (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952), p. 4
146 Enneads, V, 5, 2
148 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. p. 135
150 Ibid., p. 348
151 Ibid., p. 355f
152 Ibid., p. 359
153 Ibid., p. 347
154 Philippus V. Pistorius, op. cit. p. 2, 17
155 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. pp. 363-384
156 Saadia b. Joseph, kitāb al-amānāt wa-al-iʿtiquādāt (Book of Beliefs and Opinions), Arabic Text (edited by S. Landauer), p. 63f
157 Bahya ibn Pakuda, kitāb al-hidāyah ilā farāʾīd al-ghulūb (Book of Guidance to the Duties of the Heart), Arabic Text (edited by A. S. Yahuda), 56
158 Ibid., p. 63
160 Julius Guttmann, op. cit. p. 165
161 Abu Rīdah, op. cit. 168 (definition of 'irādah - Will), 252
163 Al-Fārābī, Risālah fi Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fādilah (Essay on the Opinions of the Noble City), Leiden, 1895, pp. 5-10

164 Ibid., pp. 58-59

165 Al-Fārābī excelled as a political philosopher and was greatly influenced in this respect by Plato’s Republic. His interest in political theory was stimulated by the pressing problems of his times particularly concerning the khilāfah (succession) and the ideal ruler. In his work, quoted in the preceding notes, al-Fārābī discusses the characteristics of the ideal state and the necessity of its being ruled by the philosopher-king.

166 Simon van den Bergh, Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). In this work we find the substance of al-Ghazālī’s arguments which Averroes (Ibn Rushd) states and attempts to refute.

167 Ibid., p. xi

168 M. M. Sharif, op. cit. p. 427


170 Richard Walzer, "The Rise of Islamic Philosophy," p. 10

171 Ibid., p. 10. Another work through which Neo-Platonic thought reached the Arabs was the pseudo-Aristotelian De causis, an abridgment of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (Richard Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 9, 209 note 2).
The future

Effect

Cause

Assimilation, coordination, harmony

The eternal

Existence, being

A priori, rational or first principles

to bring into being, to create, generate

generation, creation

What a thing is, identity

Disparity, difference

Research, investigation, inquiry, study

Chance

Bringing something out of nothing, creation ex nihilo

The Creator

Innovation

Transformation, exchange

Demonstration, proof

Empirical evidence

Simple

Invalidity, nullity

Dimension, distance

Prove, delineate, explicate
perfection, completion
perfecting, final (cause)
constancy, permanence, stability
substantiation, confirmation, proving
exception
body, corporeal object
part, particular
divisible
body, organism
the all, totality of being, cosmos
integrative, collective
discursive reasoning
substance, essence
metaphorical
impossible, illogical
inevitable
transformation, alteration
proof, argument
definition
definite, finite
motion, movement
locomotion
the mover
sensation
sensory object, perceptible
the truth
Primary Truth
reality, true nature (of things)
memorization, retention
memory
predicate, object
contingency, possibility
property
the void, empty space
the absolute void
contradiction, inconsistency
contrariety, the opposite
continuous, permanent, constant
realization, comprehension, apprehension
time, eternity, destiny
essence, self; essential, intrinsic
essential (non-essential, contingent)
opinion, view, notion, proposal
divinity, lordship
theology, religious knowledge
synonymous
absolute
description, image
compounded, composite, complex
compound, composition
basic element, constituent
symbolic, representative
mathematics
time
immediate, instant
disappearance, cessation, vanishing
eternal, permanent
at rest, motionless
equality, equivalence
similar
condition, provision
participation, having in common
individual, particular, specific
shape, form
truthfulness
verified, established, proven
form
imagination
conceptualization, abstraction
correlation, relation
correlated, relative
opposite, contrary
necessity
disintegration, dissolution
nature, reality
by nature, inherent, intrinsic physics
first philosophy, metaphysics
problem, inquiry
assumption, belief
non-being, nonexistence, nothingness
accident, contingency
accidental, non-essential, contingent
knowledge
magnitude
intellect, mind, reason
the acquired intellect
the apparent, visible or practical intellect
the potential intellect
the active intellect
intelligible, comprehensible
the opposite, antithesis
antithetical, inverse
cause
first cause
material cause
formal cause
efficient cause
final cause
the cause of itself, self-caused
caused, effect

knowledge of the nature of things, knowledge of things as they actually are known, intelligible

mathematical

matter

meaning, connotation

mutable, changeable

otherness, alterity

to assume

assumption, hypothesis

void, vacuum

difference, incongruity, disparity

differentiative

corruption, decay

differentia

disconnected

agent

in actuality

philosophy

first philosophy, metaphysics

emanation, outflow

magnitude

premise
refutation, disproof

faculty, force, potentiality

in potentiality, potentially

persuasion

proposition, statement, hypothesis

predicable

to constitute

creation ex nihilo

perfection, entelechy

quantity

qualitative

quality, modality, state

non-being, nothing, nonexistence

image, picture, model

symbolical, allegorical, representative

similar, homogeneous, resembling
absolute, pure, genuine
duration, interval
sustainer, upholder
the past
space, place
occupant
possible, contingent
possibility, contingency
occupied or filled space
impossible, prohibited
essence, substance
essence, quiddity
school of thought
relation, proportion, affinity
speculation
speculator, thinker
the speculative science
analytical speculation
negation, nonentity
obliteration, disintegration
contradiction, inconsistency
finitude, end
infinity, limitless
species
being, existing
non-being, nothing, nonexisting
existence, identity, he-ness, it-ness
coming into being out of nothing
necessity
necessary, imperative, duty
cognition, knowledge, universe
sense perception
conception
the True One
unity, unit
oneness
the True Unity
pure or absolute unity
union, unification, amalgamation
delineation, elucidation
circumstance, position, convention
subject
truth, certainty


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... "On the knowledge of Plato's philosophy in the Islamic World." *Islamic Culture* (1941).


Wittmann, M. "Die Unterscheidung von Wesenheit und Dasein in der arabischen Philosophie." *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters,* Supplementband (1913), pp. 35-44.

وَمَا نَفَقِ النَّارِ إِلَّا بَيْنَا

كتاب السنيد إلى المعتصم بالله
في الفلسفة الأولى

ألاَّنَ لَا يَقِلُكَ بِأَنَّ ذُرْوَيْ السَّادِت وَعَرْبِيَ السَّعَادَات، الَّذِينَ مِن
عَمِلَ السُّمَّا بِهِمْ خَيرًا فِي دَارِ الدِّينِ وَدَارِ الأَبْدِ وَزَٰلَّمْكِ بِجَمِيع مَلَائِقَ الفَضِّلَة،
وَطَبَّرَكَ مِنْ جَمِيع طَرِٰبَ الرِّؤْلَةُ

إِنَّ أَعْلَى الَّذِينَ يُدُرَّبُهُمْ إِلَى الْحَقِّ أَوَّلًا وَأَوْلِيَةٌ مِنْ أَمْرَهُمْ قَدْ رَأَى
إِلَى الْحَقِّ وَفِي أَمْرِهِمْ بِالْحَقِّ، إِنَّ الْحَقِّ سَرْمَدًا، إِنَّا نَتَسَمَّكَ، وَيَنْصُرُهُ
الْحَقِّ، إِنَّ كُلَّ مَا لِيَّةٌ إِلَّا (١٣٠) لَهُ حَقِيقَةٌ، فَالْحَقِّ أَضْطَرَارًا مَوْجُوضٍ، إِذْنَ،
لَا إِيَّاهَا مَوْجُودٌ.

(١) هَذِهِ السَّكِّالَةُ عَلَى مَقْوَةَ إِلَى الْأَسْلَمِ، وَمَعْنَاهَا بِفَتَحِ الْيَبَأَ الْدِّينِ.
(٢) فِي الْأَسْلَمِ أَيْنَا دُوِّنَ مِشْكَل، وَلا تَشْدِي، وَهَذَا اسْتِلَامٌ فَلِيْنْ قَدِيمٌ، يُوَفِّر
بِهِ مَعْلَمَةً، إِنَّ كَانَ ضُرُطَالَا فَلِيْنَى، وَأَصْلُهَا مُخْرُوجٌ عَلَى الْحَقِّ، إِنَّا نَتَسَمَّكَ، وَيَنْصُرُهُ
لَا إِيَّاهَا مَوْجُودٌ.
أشرف القلمة وأعلاها مرتبة القلمة الأول، أعني علم الحق الأول الذي هو علة كل حق: وذلك يعنى أن يكون الفيلسوف العام الأشرف هو البرية.

إن عملي الزمان، فقد تكون في كتاب إلا مضرة، وذلك في مثل قول الدار، إن هذان اللسان، على تقدر: أن قوم للناس، وذلك في لغة كتب الاجتماع الأشرف، وقد قوله أن الصبر، اجتهاد عن ذلك البيت، والقول أن في البيت:

وبابان، ليس قد علا، وقد كبرت، فكل: إنه أي: إنه قد كان، فإن، أو عبسبب هذا على أن: أي احتصار من كل العرب. إن، وهو بالصدر، لأنه قد شكر، فإنا، وإن، فقد يكون الجواب عن قول النائل: هكذا موجود أن قول احتصار: إن، أي: موجود، فقد يجوز أن قد صب من هذه الكلمة.

على أن الدكتور الزمن، قوي أن القلمة القصيرة وهو يظهر أن برأيا آية.

وقد، وفي تأويل، وتلفظ، وนะคะ، وقول كتب الزمن.

إن من الطاهر أن الكلمة القصيرة هو، وهو يظهر أن برأيا آية.

وقد، وفي تأويل، وتلفظ، وนะคะ، وقول كالكل.

وقد، وفي تأويل، وتلفظ، وนะคะ، وقول كتب الزمن.

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لлюд العلم الأشرف، لأن علم العلم الأشرف من علم العمل. لأننا إنما نعمل كل واحد من المعلوم علماً التاماً، إذا تخلى أحدها على أنه.

لأن كل العلم إما أن يكون منصراً أو إما صورة، وإما فاعلاً، أو إما منه.

ويما الد대로 أربعة، فكانن في غير موضع علماً الفاسفة.

إما: "هل؟" و: "ما؟" و: "أي؟" و: "لم؟".

أما: "هل؟" فإنها بحجة عن الإشارة فقط.

فأما كل إبناها لما يلد فإن "ما؟" تبكي عن جنسها.

و "أي؟" تبكي عن فصليها.

و "ما؟" عن عسائها الفاسفة، إذ هي بحجة عن العلة الفاسفة.

و "لم؟" آنما أحتله بين عصرها قد أحتله بعلم جنسها: ومن أحتله ببر صورة فلا أحتله ع بلوعها.

و: ع: أعلى لأحتله موضعها في العلة المطلقة، إذ هي أعلى للأجسام.

فيج: "إنه علماً الفاسفة: "الفساطة الأول"، إذ جميع بألي الفاسفة.

موضع في عيتها، و: إذ هو أول بالشرف، وأول بالجنس، وأول بترتيب من جبة الشيء الأغنى علمياً،"(1) الأول بالزنام، إذ هي علة الزنام.

أما عند بعض الصوتي فإنه ترتيب "بأة"، وذلك بzione بالذات الإدراكية في مثل قوله: "إذا أنا الله وإلي الله أنا، وإذا: أن كانت الوريد هي بوز النتيجة على الأدلة المقال.

إذلال إلهة على مقول اليد لها (أثر كتب الإسلام الكاملاً في مفعمة الأعراض والآثاء).

ابن الأكبر الماليز (1291 1311 سـ (96 99).

1) (في الأصل: علة، وهو خطأ ناطر.

2) ذلك الوريد في عناية اللازم في أصل الأول الإحساس بوضوح التفكين، فيا.

3) يذكر الجملي في مقالة الوريد في النص الأول الآن برسوم التفكين، فيا.

4) في النص الأول الإحساس بوضوح التفكين، فيا.

5) إذا يوجد في موضع من بحجة إن المادة: "إنه النباح الخير" (كتاب السادات) في الإفادة عن المادة الزنانية (1).

إذلال إلهة على مقول اليد لها (أثر كتب الإسلام الكاملاً في مفعمة الأعراض والآثاء).

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فُنِم أَرَسطو طاَلِس، مُنظَّر اليُنُوين في الفلسفة، وأنى أَن أُشكِر
أَباَ الذين أُنا مَن فِنُم، إذاً كَانَوا سَببَ كُونِهِم، فِضلاً عَنْهُم، إِذْ هُم سَبب
لهم، إِذْ هُم سبب لناِ لِلِلِلَّهِ- فَأَمَّا أَنْ مُنَالَهُمْ فِي ذَلِكَ!
وَإِنَّ أُنَام مَن لَا سَببُ من استُحْجَاتِ الحَقَّ وَقُنُوَنِهِ، مَن أَنْ أَنَّهُمْ
بَطَالُ الحَقَّ، وَلَسَشْيام، (بَنَبِي) بِحَكِمَةِ الحَقَّ، مَان وَقَارِئُ بَقائِهِم.
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فِي هذِهِ فَنُم أَن أُشْيَأَ عَلَى بِنَبِيَّ عِيْنَةٍ عَنْهُمُ، إِذْ هُم سَبب
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القرن الثاني

وهو الجزء الأول في الفلسفة الأولى

إن قررنا ما يجب تقديمه في صدر كتابنا هذا فظّلنا ذلك بما يتبُّوحُ طبيعياً، نقول:

إن وجود الإنسان وجودان:

أحدهما أقرب لنا وأبعد عند الطبيعة، وهو وجود (1) الحواس التي هي لنا، عند نشوؤنا، وللجنين لاذنا ولناكم، غيرنا، على الحس العام لجميع الحيوان، فإن وجودنا (2) بالحواس، عند مباصرة الحس محسنها، بإرمانهم (3) ولا مؤنث، وهن الحواس، ولا تباشر سيتته ويتدهُّد في كل حال أحد أنواع الأفكار، وناضجلك الكنيفية في الأكبر والأقل التناول وغير التسامو، ونفاد الأفكار الكيفية في الشبيه وغير الشبيه، الأند الأضعف، فهي الدار في رؤى دام، وتباشر غير متصل؛ وهو الذي تبث صورة في الصورة (4) فتؤديها إلى الاظف، (5) متصل ومعصور في نفس الحي؛ فهو وإن كان لا تباث لابد في الطبيعة، فيدفع عنها، وخفي للذكاء، فهو قريب من الحاصل جداً، ووجدناه (6) بالحس مع مباشرة الحس يهاب.

(1) يتضمن في فتاء وجود الحواس ما لم تعد، حتى إذا كا ما كتدر، ووجود هنا في رسائل أخرى للсанدي (أُنزأ مثل رسائل في ماهية النوم والرؤية) لا يعمي الوجود القابل.

(2) إنه الأسباب لا تتوب، لا تبول، لا تكذب، ورسائل، لا يفطران، ولا يقذفون، إنه يفعل في نفس، له أثر على نفس، هو الذي يفتح، هو الذي يبند، وهو الذي يفرد.

(3) لا يزال هنا وهو خير فإن

(4) في الأصل، الجسم، وله كان قطعًا، الصورة، على سبيل التصحيح، ورأت ما بعدها: تباثها، وإن كانت غير متصلة، وراء الصورة فوق فه، يفطرانها الكائنين

(5) يعود القرب على ما تبع الحواس وما تباثها

(6) أي إذا كأ كأ كأ كأ كأ
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
إن الأولى هو الذي لم يجب لس هو مطلقًا. (1) فالأولى لا قبل كونه. (2) فلو بعثت؛ فالأولى هو قائم من غيره. (3) فالأولى لائجة له؛ فالأولى لا موضوع له ولا محول. (4) ولا تقبل، ولا سبيل. (5) من أجل كأن - لأن العلامة المقدمة ليست غير هذه.

والأولى لائن له. (6) لأنه كان جنس. (7) فهو نوع، والتوثيق مركب من جنسه العام. (8) ونجزر، ومن فعل ليس في غيره. (9) فله موضوع هو الجنس القابل لصورته وصورة غيره، ولله موضوع. (10) وله صورة الخاصة له دون غيره. (11) فله موضوع.

وقد كان تبين أنه لا موضوع ولا محول له، وهذا حال لا يمكن. (12) فالأولى لائن له.

لأن النص ينص على عدم إلغاء المحول لا الحامل الأول. فأما الحامل الأول الذي هو الأيسر. (13) طلب يقبل، (14) لأنه قدفه ليس فسا. (15) تأسيس. (16) فكما مُنجز، فإنه بإلغاء هذه الأسباب. (17) أعني الذي معا في جنس واحد، كالحارة المديدة بالبرودة، لأنه لا تنتمي إلى المقابلة كالحارة بالبيس. (18) أو بالحارة أو طول، أو ما كان كذلك، والأضداد المتناقض هي جنس واحد.

(1) هذا الصد; (2) في رسالة السكيني في حذره الإيام، ورسومها. (3) هذا بعرف بأن ما في ليس (4) إن نحن على قوانينه غيره. (5) في نقص في غraith له. (6) في واقع، لنا، أن يضمن. (7) نحن أن تكون كله بخبر من النص. (8) أن الأولى لم يتوجه بوجه الوجوه له. (9) إن المدينة. (10) في الأساليب، وهم يسرون يا نساء، ولا يسرون أن المطلوب في كثر.

في (1) بعض الأشياء، وليس للبركان، بل لأن هذا يكون بل نهاية. (2) كان لكل بر كان، بل لا يوجد من جبلية، لأن ما يتعلق إلى عمل أو أعلام يقابل، ولا يكون عامًاً فينفة. (3) لأننا إنا أعلم ما الإنسان، الذي هو الحي، والناطق المبتعد. (4) ولم أن كيهما والناطق، وما المبتعد. (5) إننا الإنسان إذن. (6) وكذلك ينبغي أن لا تطلب الإقناعات في العلم الرياضية. بل البركان.

أما إناستعمنا الإقناع في العلم الرياضية كانت إقناعنا به تقليلًا لعليهة. (7) وكذلك يمكنناإليك تيمي. (8) وجود نواصي ووجود أخرى. (9) للذالك ضل (10) أكثر من الناس في الأشياء التمييزية، لأنهم من جرى على عادة طلب الإقناع وبعضهم جرى على عادة الأثاث، وبعضهم جرى على عادة

شهادات الأخبار، وبعضهم جرى على عادة الحسن، وبعضهم جرى على عادة البركان، مما قلصوا عن تميز المطلوبات، وبعضهم أراد استعمال ذلك في وجود 1 مطلوب، مما التصويب عن أسلوب المطلوبات، وإما لفظة للتفسير من سبل الحق. (11) ينبغي أن تقصد بكل مطلوب ما يجب، ولا تطلب في العلم الرياضي إقاعة، ولا المطلوبات. (12) ولا في أويل العالم الطبيعي الجوانب الفكرية، ولا في الإبلاسة. (13) ولا في أويل الإنسان. (14) إن حلت هذه الشروط سلبت علينا المطلوب المقصود، فإن خالفنا ذلك أخطاناً. (15) أعراضنا من مطالبة، وعمري علينا وجدان. (16) مقصوداتنا.

فإن تقدمت هذه الوصايا ينبغي أن تقدم الفوائد التي تخرج إلى استعمالها.

في هذه الصناعة، فقول: (1) زادة يتبعها الملي. (2) في الأساليب، (3) إذا، (4) في الركود، (5) وراء الإيحاء، (6) وراء التكلم عن المطلوب والرسول إله، (7) بما عبد الأقوام وأقوام الاستغلال، وهذا ما يمكن أن يدبر من رساله في كية، (8) كعب أو آبائه. (9) أن يكون في هذه السلكة، يتم سدوس في الأساليب، وقراً، ما كهذا أقدر الروج.
قال القادس جنس: فإن فساد الأولي فله جنس، وهو لا جنس له - هذا خلاف لا يمكن، فالأولي لا يمكن أن يفسد والاستحالة (1) ويدل ؛ فالأولي لا يستحيل، لأنه لا يبد، ولا ينقل من النقص إلى الاسم، فالاستحالة ما: فالأولي لا ينقل (2) إلى تمام، لأنه لا يستحيل؛ والتمام هو الذي له (3) حال ثابتة، يكون بها فاضلا، والناقص هو الذي لا حال له ثابتة يكون بها فاضلا؛ فالأولي لا يمكن أن يكون ناقصا، لأنه لا يمكن أن ينقل إلى حال يكون بها فاضلا - لأنه لا يمكن أن يستحيل إلى أقصى منه ولا إلى أقصى منه بذاء، فالأولي نامان اضطرارا؛ وذل الجرم ذو جنس وأواع - والأولي لا جنس له - فالجمر ليس هو (4) الأولي.

فلقلق الآن إنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم أول ولا غيره، مما له كيفية أو كمية، لا نهاية له بالفعل (5)، وإن [ما] لا نهاية له إذا هو في القوة: فأقول (1): إن المقدمات الأولية الحقيقية المعقول بالاستحالة: (أ) أن كل الأجرام التي ليس منها شيء أعظم من شيء متساوية (ب) والتساوية أعاد ما أبعادهما من نهاية، ومساوية بالنسبة بالفعل والقوة: (ج) وهذا النهاية ليس لها نهاية (د) و بكل الأجرام المتساوية إذا زاد على واحد منها جرم كان أعظمهما، وكان أعظمما كان قبل أن زاد عليه ذلك الجرم: (ه) وكل جريمن متنامي الظلم، إذا جمعا، كان الجزء الكائن عنهم من الأفعال القاسية - وهذا واجب أيضاً في كل ظلم و كل ذي عظم؛ (و) وأن الأصر من كل شئين متاجسين بينهم الأكبر منها أو بعده بعضه.

(1) يعني الغي.
(2) يعني النفق.
(3) يعني الشيء.
(4) يعني الواضح.
(5) يعني النفي.
وإن كان ليس بأعظم مما كان في الإنسان، فقد زيد على
الجِمَّر، مَّثَّلُتْ سِبْعَةً، وصار جمع ذلك مساوياً له وحده،
وزيد عليه رجاء له وحُزِّه له الذَّين اجتمعوا:
فَالجُرْم، مِثلِ الكَلِّ - هذا خفف لا يكَن؛
نهى عنه، فتنين أنه لا يكُن الجِرم (۲) من الكَبَات أن تكون لا نهاية لها بالفعل.
والجِمَّر كَبِيسة، وليس يمكن أن يكون زمان نهَيَّة له بالفعل؛ فالزمان (۴)
دَوَأُر مَتَماً.
والأشيا، أيضاً، الحُملِ في المجَمَّة مَنَاً بالاضطرابً;
فَكَّلَحُمَّول في الجِرم سَيْمَة أو حركة أو زمان - الذي هو مفصَل
بالمجرَم، وجمع كل ماهو حُمَّول في الجِرم بالفعل، فتعاد أيضاً، الجِرمِ مَتَماً،
فَجَرَت الشَّكل مَتِمًا. فَكَّلَحُمَّول فيه بعدة (۵) أيضاً.
وإذا الجِرم الشَّكل مَكَن، أن يَزَاد به بالزَّياَدة دَائِمًا، [۶] أن تَزَاد
أعظم منه، ثم أعظم من ذلك دائماً - فإنه لا نهاية على النَّحو من جهة
الإمكَان - فهو بالفَوَّّة بلا نهاية، إذ القوة ليست شَبَtures، [۶] غير الإمكَان، [أُعَيَت] أن يكون الشيء المَتُول هو الفَوَّة؟
فِنَّمَا وَالشَّيء لا نهَيَّة له بالفَوَّة هو أيضاً، الفَوَّة لا نهَيَّة له؛
ومن ذلك الحركة والزمان. فإذًا (۷) الذي لا نهَيَّة له إذا هو في الفَوَّة - فأصل الفَوَّة فِنَّمَا
يمكن أن يكون شيء لا نهَيَّه له، لما قدمًا -

(۷) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۶) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۵) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۴) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۳) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۲) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
۱) في الرسالة الأخرى: فِنَّمَا
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الملف الذي تم 제공ه.
هذا الكتاب والتأليف ليس لهما ما، وإن لم يكن التركيب والتأليف تبدلاً، بل هي هذه النتيجة بواجهة، وتشير الآن إلى أن ما لا يمكن أن يكون زمانا لا نهاية له، إذ لا يمكن أن يكون شيء أو دوكي لا نهاية له بالفعل، فالزمان هو نهاية بالفعل.

والجزم لا يسبق الزمان، وليس يمكن أن يكون جزء الكل لا نهاية له.

إن كل فصل من الزمان فصل إلى أن ينتهي إلى فصل من الزمان لا يكون فصل قبلي، Any text here...

إن أن يكون دوكي، فإن كل من الزمان فصل لا نهاية له، فإن لا يمكن أن يكون فصل قبلي لا نهاية له، لذا فإن الزمان لا تنتهي إلى فصل من الزمان.

إذا هذا الزمن الفروع مساويا للفصل الذي من هذا الزمن الفروع تعاند (1) في الأزمة إلى ما لا نهاية له.

إذا كان من نهاية إلى زمن محدود معلومة (6) فإنه من ذلك الزمن العالم، إلى ما لا نهاية له من الزمان معلومة (1)

ومن ذلك الزمن العالم.

 tửى إن يكون (17) لامتنا من نهاية، وهذا خلف لا يمكن، وأيضا إن كان لا ينتهي إلى الزمان المحدود حتى ينتهي إلى زمن قيبل، ولا إلى الذي قيل حتى ينتهي إلى زمن قيبل، وكذلك بالنهاية، وما لا نهاية له لا تنتهي مساويا، ولا يؤثر عليه، فإنه لا يخضع ماللاقحية له من الزمان، حتى (1)

(1) حكذا في الأصل، وأيضا في رسالة وحاسمة في كتاب حرر العالم، فإن لم تكن كلته ك ذلك، «إلا في ذلك، فإن ليس أن نشير إلى الذي هو غير ذلك، ببعض المنى.

(2) في الأصل: فصل، كما في رسالة الواقعة، والكلمة كله على تشكيل، وقد صحتها، لأن الأصل لا ينبغي للنحو، ويوجب أن نعتبر خلاف القبل، ويستعمل المعنى واللفظ أيضا.

(3) غير منظور في الأصل، ويجب أن تكون: تحته.

(4) في الأصل: مثاولة.

(5) شكك أن jakie، يعني زمن معلوم.

(6) في الأصل: معلوم.

(7) في الأصل: إذا، والكلمة التالية إذا، أي أن تكون: إذا، وثانيا.

(8) في الأصل: جزم، وهو خطأ.
القرن الثالث
من الجزء الأول

وقد يئنوا ما قدمنا، البtutorial عن الشيء، هل يمكن أن يكون علة كون ذاته لم يمكن ذلك; فنقول إنه ليس مكننا (1) أن يكون الشيء، علة كون ذاته، 
أعني يكون (3) ذاته، وهؤلاء (4) من شيء، أو لا من شيء. فقلنا: كون، 
في مواقف أخرى، الكائن من شيء، خاصة لأنه لايستطيع أن يكون أيا، وذاته ليس، أو (3) يكون ليس وذاته ليس أو يكون أيا، وذاته ليس.

في هذا خلاف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن يكون علة كون ذاته، فإن كان ليس، 
وذلك بصرف إن كان ليس وذاته أيس؛ إذ هو ليس، لا شيء.

ولشيء لا علاقة ولا علة، لا علاقة ولا علة، كأن قدمنا: فلولا علة كون ذاته، 
وقد قدم أنه علة كون ذاته، وهذا خلاف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن أن يكون 
عـلة كون ذاته، إن كان ليس وذاته أيس، وفب عرض من ذلك أيضا أن يكون ذاته غيره، لأن المناظرات التي يمكن 
في الأصل: تمكن
(1) في الأصل: سمك
(2) في الأصل: غير متوفى
(3) في الأصل: مهيبة – وهو غير مستقيم، لأن التهوية، عند البكتري، هو 
صيغة النفس، شؤولة.
(4) في الأصل: و
(5) مدي لوا، هذا وقبل ذلك، وبعد أن مزود
(6) في الأصل: سعة.

1. ينتمى إلى زمن محدود، بتنا – والانهاة، إلى زمن محدود موجود به: فليس الزمان
فصل من لا نهاية، بل من نهاية انطراها; ليس مدة الجرم بل نهاية الجزم
ليس يمكن أن يكون جزم، بالمقولة، فإني الجزم ليست لا نهاية لها، فإنية 
الجرم متئنهاً، فتينن أن يكون جزم لم ينزل.

وليس يمكن أن يكون آنا الزمان لا نهاية له بالفعل، لأنه إن كان الزمان 
المحدود إلى زمن محدود ممتعًا أن يكون لا نهاية له، كما قدمنا، والزمن متئنها، 
زنان محدود، فإن كلما زيد على الزمان المحدود المحدود زمان، كانت جزء الزمان 
الحدود والزيادة محدودًا فليس لا نهاية له. فقد زيد الشيء: محدود
الكيمة على شيء محدود الكيمية، فاجتمع جميع شيء لا نهاية له في الكيمية؟
والزمان من الكيمية النصلة، أعني أن له فصول مشتركة الماسي منه، والذكر؟ 
والفصل المشتركة هو الآن الذي هو نهاية الزمان الماضي ومزانية الزمان
الأيق الأول؟

وتلك زمان محدود مبتعتان: نهاية أول ونهاية أخرى (1)، فإن اتصل زمانان 
محدودان باينة واحدة مشتركة لها، فإن نهاية كل واحد منها الباقية محدودة 
معاوية، فإن كان قبل إنه تصور جلة الزمانين محدودة (2) فهي لاحدود النهايات؟
وهي محدودة النهايات،
وهذا خلاف لا يمكن، فليس يمكن ان إن زيد (4) على الزمن المحدود زمان 
محدود، لأن تكون الجلية محدودة: فسناها (4) زيد على الزمن المحدود زمان 
محدود، شكله محدود النهاية من آخره; فليس يمكن أن يكون الزمان الآتي 
لا نهاية له بالأصل؟

1. يشتبه الآن هذا الفن الثاني.

(1) في الأصل بلا شك ولا كفي، ويجوز أن تكون: أخيرة أو أخرى.
(2) في الأصل: المحدود.
(3) بعده هذه السياحة في الأصل: ما زيد، وهي زائدة بلا شك.
(4) في الأصل: شك.
ونذرلا علامة بالأشياء التي لها على بعضها مشاكلها؛ ففي إذن إذا تطلبت الأشياء الكاذبة المتضمنة على سمعها كالفا ؛
والأشياء الكاذبة العائلة (2) لا يمكن أن تكون ذاتية أو غير ذاتية ؛
أعني بذلك ما هو مقتوم ذات الشيء، وهو الذي ينتمي قوم كون الشيء، وتبثه وبدأه انقباض الشيء وفصوله، كحليه التي بها قوم الحث وتبثه،
وبدما هناك الجاهز أو انقباضه ؛
 فالحلي ذاتية في الحلي، والذات هو النسيج جوهرلي، لأن به قوم جوهرلي ؛
والجاهز لإنقياض من أن يكون جامعا أو مفرقا ؛
أما الجامع للوقائع على أشياء كثيرة يعطي كل واحد منها حصة وواحدة، فهو يجمعه بذلك ؛
والوقائع على أشياء كثيرة أن يعطي كل واحد منها حصة (3) وحدة ؛
إما أن يقع على أشخاص كلاالناس الواقع على كل واحد من أحاد الناس، أعني على كل شخص إنسان؛ وهذا هو المسبي صورة، إذ هي صورة واحدة وواحدة وواحدة على كل واحد من هذه الأشياء ؛
وإما أن يقع على صور (4) كثيرة كحلي الواقع على كل صورة من صور الحلي، كالناس والفرس، وهذا هو النسيج جنسا، إذ هو جنس واحد (5) وواقوم كل واحد من هذه الصور.
وإما أن يوجد فيه نفوق؛ فهو الفارق بين حدود الأشياء، كالناظر الفاصل.
لبعض الحلي من بعض؛ وهذا هو النسيج صلا، لفصل بعض الأشياء من بعض.
وأما الذي ليس بلداي فهو ضع هذا المقدم ونصبه، وهو الذي قومه بالشيء.

(1) قراءة إنجيدية.
(2) ماذا في الأصل.
(3) مما كان في الأصل.
(4) كهذا في الأصل، ولمما قد، من جهة واحدة أو على نحو واحد.
(5) وما كان له معنى لا يخلق من أن يكون كما أو جزءا كالفلسفة.
(6) لما وذاع عنه، وهذا لايتفق مع المتأت.
وإمّا صناعا كايلت وما أشبه ذلك، فإن البيت متصل بالطبع، وتركبه
متصل ببرع، أينى بالمحلة (1)؛ فهو أحد بالطبع، وتركبوه واحد بالمحلة؛ لأنه
إذا صار واحداً بالاتحاد (2) العرض، فإما البيت عينه فبالاتحاد الطبيعة.
ويدخل (3) أيضاً على السلك في بقية الغزء، ويقال على الجمع، ويقال على
البعض؛
وقد يظن أن السلك لا نفصل بينه وبين الجمع.
لأن السلك يقال على المجزءة (4) الأجزاء، وعلى [الأشياء] (5) اللائي ليست
بمشتته الأجزاء، كقولنا: كل المناء، ومنا من المشتته الأجزاء - وكل
البدن، المركب من عظم ولحم، وماحق ذلك من المختلفة الأجزاء، وكل الجيل،
وهي أشياء مختلفة;
فأما الجمع فلا يقال على المشتته الأجزاء؛ فإن يقال: جمع الماء، لأن الجمع
أيضاً يقال على جميع مختلفة بعصر، أو أن تكون موحدة (6) معنى ما، وكل
واحد منها قائم بطاعبة غير الآخر، فوقع عليها اسم المجموعة؟ فإما السلك يقال
على كل متحدة أي نوع كان الاتحاد، وذلك لابقى جمع المناء، إذا ليس هو
أشياء مختلفة فامًّا، وإلا واحد بطاعبة (7) بل يقال كل الماء، إذ هو متحدة.
وكل ذلك بين الجزء، والبعض فرق:
(1) هكذا في الأصل، ولله يقصد نقل البيان له.
(2) هذه الكلمة، وهي بعيدة غير متوسطة، ولكن اختار قراءتها هكذا حسب
البناطيل الثانية.
(3) المضموم يوجد هنا على الواحد.
(4) وراجع تعرف السلك والمجزء في سؤالة في تحديد الأشياء، ورسومها؟ وهو يطلق.
(5) هكذا في الأصل.
(6) زاد شاملاً.
(7) زاد للإيضاح.
(8) هكذا في الأصل، وقد يجوز أن تكون موجودة، وهذا يلبس مع المتن أيضًا.
(9) في الأصل: جمع على كل واحد بطاعبة؛ وقد أصلحت طبعاً ما لقبة جبلي
من وجه.
(10) راجع تعرف الجزء، والمتن في سؤالة في تحديد الأشياء، ورسومها.
(11) إضافة.
الموضوع له، وثباته به، وعده بعدم الشيء الموضوع له: فهو إذن في الجوهر
الموضوع [1] (1)، وليس الجوهر [(2) عرض] في الجوهر، فسمى ذلك عرضًا؟
وهذا الذي في الجوهر لا يخلو من:
أن يكون في شيء واحد منفردًا به خاصًا له دون غيره، كالضحك في
الإنسان والحيوان في الجهد، فسمى ذلك خاصًا، لأنه يخص شيئًا واحدًا.
أو يكون في الشيء كثيرة يعمها كالبضائع في الورق والقطن، فسمى ذلك
عرضًا عامة على حاله، لأنه يعرض (3) لأشياء كثيرة.
فكل منظور له معنى:
إما أن يكون جسناً وإما صورة وإما شمساً وإما خاصًا وإما عارضاً عامًا.
وهذه جميع إيجابها شيئان: هما الجوهر والمرض -اللعبة والصور والشخص.
والنصل الجريمة، والخاصة والمرض العام عرضًا.
وإما كلاً وحدهاً، وإما مجتمعاً وإما متفرقًا.
وإذ يندق ذلك لمثل على كم نوع يقال الواحد؛ فنقول: إن الواحد يقال
على كل متصل، وعلى مالم بقبل السكينة أيضاً؛ فهو يقال إذن (1) على أنواع
شيء، هما اللبس والصور والشخص والخاصة والمرض العام وعلي
جميع ما قد قُدّم.
والشخص إما أن يكون:
طبيعة كالحيوان أو النبت (1) وما أشبه ذلك،

(1) زيادة بحسب النص التقدير ماتسيرة.
(2) غير مثول الكورة في الأصل، وإذا لم يكن معلقاً، فإنها قد سقطت كلمة في، بعد كلمة
عصر، بحيث يكون النص: وليس الجوهر [(2) عرض] في الجوهر، فسمى ذلك
عصرًا... إلخ.
(3) في الأصل: لأعرض، وهو يهتف العني.
(4) في الأصل: إذا.
(5) غير مفتوحة، وقد اختير قراءتها هكذا.
الجهة لا ذاتية؛ فليس الواحد في نوع عرضي، والمرض لشيء، من غيره، فالمرض أو في المرض فيه، والأثر من الضفف، فالاخر من مؤثر، فالوحدة في النوع أثر من مؤثر اضطراراً أيضاً.

والل страхов هو القول على كثير من معتقلي البند (6) عن مادة الشيء؛ فهو كثير، لأنها ذو أوراع كثيرة، وكل نوع من أنواع فوه هو (6) وهوي أبو (6) والتي في نوع (6) في كثير من أشياء كثيرة، وكل شرف من أشياء في (6) هو أيضاً، فهو كثير من هذه الجهات؛ فالوحدة فيه أيضاً ليست بحقيقه، فهي فيه نوع (6) في نوع عرضي، والمرض لشيء، من غيره، فالمرض أو في المرض فيه، والأثر من الضفف، فالاخر من مؤثر، فالوحدة في النوع أثر من مؤثر اضطراراً أيضاً.

والل الإنسان هو القول على كثير من معتقلي البند (6) من (6) عن أبي (6) (6) في، فهو مولى على كل واحد من أشياء الأوراع التي يكون عليها الفصل، منها (6) أي (6) من (6) أي (6) وهو بسرعة، يعني (6) إذا ذكر

(1) في الأصل: إذا
(2) هكذا في الأصل، ويجوز أن تكون حكراً عن: بحقيقه.
(3) في الأصل، بنى، وقد صححنا هكذا، ويجوز أن يكون أسراً مسمواً (على أن تكون حالاً)، ولكنها لم يبرع فيها النحو، كما هو في كثير من الواضع.
(4) هكذا في الأصل، ولهذا قصد في هو هو، أي هو هو، يعني (6) كما ذكر
(5) هكذا في الأصل، وهو جائز.
(6) هكذا في الأصل، دون علاقات التغذية، فعله بصد، أي (6) هو، تحت
(7) هكذا في الأصل، دون علاقات التغذية.

(1) في الأصل: إذا
(2) جرب لأن فيها بعد
(3) يعي بالوضع والمسة لا بالطبع والمحتفل
(4) زمن لا نجأل الهجر، ولا لازم مكتبة حملة ف هو إذن بالذات زاداء، ولا بد من إصلاحها لأنها تناقص كل مال، وتشفف
(5) يذكر أن تقرأ: تجيده وتجوز أنها: بحقيقه، وواحدة بيان لها نقولاً ومغالباً
كثير، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست محددة فليس فيه نوع عرض فيه إذن، في أثر من مؤثر، كما قمنا، والجزء إذا كان جوهرية، وما عرضية؟ والجزء إذا كان مشتبيه الأجزاء، وإذا لم يكن مشتبيه الأجزاء، والمشتبيه الأجزاء كملك، الذي جرى ماء بقاله، وكل ما فهو فعال للتجزئة في الماء، إذ هو ماء بقاله، كثير؟ وأما لا مشتبيه الأجزاء، أي مختلف الأجزاء، فسكندان الحيوان الذي هو من سم، ولد، عصب، وعروف، وأوردة، وربط، فسائق (أ)، وحجب وعلم، وربك، ووردة، وربك، وحب ما ركب منه بين الحي، التي ليست مشتبيه؟ وكل واحد ما ذكرنا من بين الحي تقابل التجزئة، فهو كثير أيضا. وأما الأجزاء العرضية فعمل في الجزء الجوهرية، أي كالطول والعرض والمثل في الماء وذكر من أجزاء الدائنة الحي، واللون والظلم وغيرها من الأعراض، فهو نمط بجسم الجوهرية، فهو إذن ذا أجزاء، فهو كثير أيضا، فالوحدة في الجزء أيضا ليست محددة.

والتصل الطبقي والتشتت العرضي كل واحد منهما ذو أجزاء - كالميم - فإن اتصال الطربي شكك، وهو ذو جهات؟ وانطلاق البعده -nine من الأداء - ياجع ما ركب منه كجمارته وملاءته وأجزاء جسمه؟ فهو كثير أيضا، فالوحدة فيه ليست محددة.

وقد يقال الواحد أيضا بالإضافة إلى غيره بعض هذه التي قمنا ذكرها، كالميم، فقمنا يقول: ميل واحد، إذ هو كل للغة (أ)، وإلى الطور (ب)، وجزء للفرخ، ولأنه مفصل ومنفصل، لأن غلوناته متصلة ومحددة: فهو جميع غلوناته; ولأنه مفصل من

للشيء غيره، فالعرض أثر في الموضع فيه، والأثر من المضاف، فالأثر من مؤثر، فالوحدة في التصل أثر من مؤثر أيضا.

والعلاقة هي القول على نوع واحد وعلى كل واحد من أشيائه، مبنية على "(1) الشيء، وليس بجزء لما أثبت (2) عن إنيته (3) "، فهي كثير لأنها موجودة في أشياء كبيرة، لأنها حركة والحركة متجزئة؛ فالوحدة أيضا فيه ليست محددة؟ فمن إشاره في الموضع فيه، والأثر من المضاف، فالأثر من مؤثر، فالوحدة في الخصائص أثر من مؤثر أيضا.

والعرض المطلق أيضا مقول على أشياء كثيرة، فهي كثيرة، لأنها موجودة في أشياء كبيرة؟ وإما أن يكون كمر، فقيل الزادة والتقص، فهو متجزئ؟؛ وإما أن يكون كمر، فإنه الشيء ولا شيء، والأدوات المعلقة، فيقول الاختلاف؟ فهو كثير، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست محددة فهي إذن فيه نوع عرضي والعرض، كما قمنا أثر من مؤثر؛ فالوحدة في العرض المطلق أثر من مؤثر أيضا.

والشكل القول على الفعلات ذو أبعاد، لأن كل واحد من الفعلات بعض له؛ والشكل القول على مقوله واحدة ذو أبعاد أيضا، لأن كل مقوله جنسيش، فشكل مقوله ذات صور، وكل صورة ذات أشياء، فالشكل إذن كثير، لأن ذو أقسام كثيرة، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست محددة، "(4) فهي إذن فيه نوع عرضي، فهي إذن من مؤثر، كما قمنا، فيها (5) كان نوع عرضي، وكذلك الجمع أيضا، لأن جميع يقال على أشياء محتوية على مجموعه فهي

(1) في الأصل: إذا
(2) في الأصل: إذا
(3) في الأصل: إذا
(4) في الأصل: إذا
(5) في الأصل: إذا
أو بعضها (١) كثيرًا لا واحدًا بحجة، فإن كان طبعًا كل مقول الكثرة فقط، فلا اتفاق اشتراك في حالة واحدة، أو معنى واحد؟

والاختلاف موجود، أعني الاشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد؟

الفاحدة موجودة بالقراءة؟

وقد فرضنا أن الوحدة ليست موجودة؟

الفاحدة ليس لها، وهذا خلاف لا يمكن.

وأيضاً إن كان كل مقول كثرة فقط، فلا شيء يخالف الكلمة، لأن خلاف الكثرة الوحدة، فلا خلاف، فإن لم يكن خلاف في القولات فهي مشقة، وهي ليست اتفاق، لأن الاختلاف اشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد، وهذا خلاف لا يمكن، ليس يمكن إلا أن تكون الوحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بالإضافة، فإنه لا مشاشة، لأن المشاشة لها شيء واحد، يكون، تشبيهاً بها، ولا واحدة بالكثرة، كما فرضنا، فلا واحد يعمها، فهي لا مشاشة، وهي مشاشة بضمنها الواحدة، فهي مشاشة لا مشاشة معاً، وهذا خلاف لا يمكن، ليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بحجة، كانت تكون، كانت متجمعة، لأن لم يكونوا، ولم يمكن حجة واحدة، ولم يمكن حجة واحدة، لم يمكنهم، لأن الساكن ما كان مجال واحد، غير مستدير، ولم يكونوا، إن لم يكن ساكن، لم يكن ساكن، وإن لم يكن ساكن كان متحركة (٢).

وإن كانت كثرة فقط، كانت أيضاً غير متجمعة، لأن الحركة تبطل: إنما يمكن، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، إنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، إنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، إنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، وإنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنما يكون، إنма...
وأيضاً فإن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، فإن كل شهاد من أشخاص
الكثرة غير محدود؛ لأن الحد الواحد يقع على معنى واحد؛ لأن لم يكن في الكثرة
واحد، قد يكون محدود، وإذا لم يكن محدود فلست أقدام؛ وأشخاص الكثرة محدودة
فهي محدودة، وهي لامحدودة؛ وهذا خلف لليمكن، وليس يمكن أن لا يكون
ووحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، فلا تكون الكثرة إلا أحاد
العدد الأحاد، لأن العدد كثرة مركبة من أحاد (1)، وتفاضل بعض الكثرة
على بعض أحاد؛ لأن لم يكن أحاد لم يكن عدد، فإن كانت كثرة بلا أحاد، لم تكن
محدودة؛ والكثرة محدودة، فلأحاد مع الكثرة.

وقد كنا فرضنا أنه لا أحاد معها؛ فإذا خلف لليمكن، وليس يمكن أن
لا يكون أحاداً (3).

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، لم تكن معرفة؛ لأن المعرفة بقسم،
يرجع في نفس العرف مجال واحدة، لأن لم تكن مجال واحدة
تلتعد بها نفس العرف ورسوم المعرفة، فلا معرفة، ففالوحدة موجودة، فالوحدة موجودة؛ وفقد كنا فرضنا أنها لاموجودة؛ وهذا
خلف لليمكن، وليس يمكن أن لا يكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، فكل مقول إذا أن يكون شيئاً
فعاً أن لا يكون شيئاً؛ فإن كان شيئاً، فهو واحد؛ فالوحدة موجودة مع
الكثرة؛ وفقد كنا فرضنا أنه كثرة فقط ففي كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، وهو كثرة
ووحدة؛ وهذا خلف لليمكن.

9 8

وغر الوُلادة؟ فإن لم يكن وحدة، لا تبال للكثرة؛ وفَضْنَا
وَعَدَّةُ الْيَيْسَ (1) تَبَال كثرةَ يَيْسَ (2) فَلَكيْ.َسَ (3) فإن كانت
كثرة فقط بلا وحدة، ليست متحركة أيضاً ولا ساكنة، قد تقدم وهذا
خَلَف لليمكن، ليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدة.

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرة فقط، فلا يحُذو من أن تكون ذات أشخاص،
أو ذات أشخاص بتَمَا؟

إذا كانت ذات أشخاص، فإنا أن تكون أشخاص الكثرة إما آحاداً
وإنا أن لا تكون آحاداً، فإن لم تكون آحاداً، ولم تتعلق إلى أحرار سلطة،
وهي كثرة بلا نهاية.

وإذا قولنا لا ينتهي شيء، وكل مقسوم أعظم مما يقاس منه، فالقصور
مني تساراً أو لمني السلكة، فإن كان مني السلكة، فقد كان فض لمني السلكة، فهو إذن
مني السلكة لمني السلكة.

وإن كان مني السلكة، وهو أصغر من المقسوم، فلا متناه أعظم
مني لمني.

وأيضاً خلف لليمكن، فإنا قدمنا.

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وإن ذكر (1) أشخاص السلكة، آحاداً (2) اضطراراً، فالوحدة موجودة.
إذا إن (3) لأن كل شهاد واحد، فإنا إن كثرة فقط، وهي كثرة
فلا وحدة معها موجودة؛ وهذا خلف لليمكن، فإن كانت ليست ذات
أشخاص ولا كثرة بَنَة، فإن عن السلكة هي الأشخاص الجامع، فهو كثرة
وهو كثرة، وهذا خلف لليمكن، ليس يمكن إلا أن يكون وحدة.

(1) في الأرس ل: ولا
(2) في الأرس ل: و ана ل: وهذا رجاء، ولكن الأصل أن نسجها آحاد
(3) الكهنة: غير متفقهين، ويمكن القراءة على وجه آخر، وقد يجوز أن تكون الكثرة
الأولى زائدة

(4) في الأرس ل: إذا
(5) في الأرس آحاد
(6) في الأرس ل: إذا
(7) في الأرس ل: إذا

(8) في الأرس ل: ولا
(9) في الأرس ل: ولا
فإن كان استثناء فلكرية موجودة، والاستثناء، والمستثنى موجودان,
فلكرية موجودة;
وقد فرضت أنها ليس، فهي (1) ليس ليس؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن، ليس يمكن
أن لا تكون كرية.
وأيضاً إذا كانت واحدة فقط فلا كرية، فلا تابع؛ لأن أقل ما فيه التابع اثنان;
والاثنان وما فوقهما كرية؛
فإن لم تكون كرية، لم يكن تابع؛ وإن كان تابع، فلكرية موجودة؛
والتابع موجود، فلكرية موجودة.
وأيضاً قد فرضنا أنها ليست موجودة، فهي ليس ليس، وهذا خلف لا يمكن.
ليس يمكن أن لا تكون كرية.
وأيضاً إذا كانت واحدة فقط فلا كرية فلا اتفاق ولا اختلاف، ولا اتصال.
ولا اتفاق، لأن أقل ما يكون الاتفاق والاختلاف والاختلاف والاختلاف
في اثنين. فالاثنان كرية؛ فإن لم تكن كرية لم يكن اتفاق ولا اتفاق.
ولا اتفاق.
والاختلاف والاختلاف موجود.
فلكرية موجودة؟ وقد فرضنا أنها لا موجودة، فهي ليس ليس.
وهذا خلف لا يمكن، ليس يمكن (1) أن لا تكون كرية.
وأيضاً إذا كانت واحدة فقط فلا كرية، فلا اتفاد ولا توسط.
وهذا، لأن ذلك لا يكون إلا في ذي أجزاء (8).

(1) في الأصل: هي.
(2) هذه الكلمة في الأصل مكررة.
(3) في الأصل على هذا الترتيب، وأكثر.
(4) في الأصل: اتفاقا.
(5) كل: ولا اتفاق، وافد في الطلب.
(6) زيادة تطابق المعي (7) حكذا، وهو مفهوم.
(7) في الأصل: أخرا.
فإن كانت الكتلة واحدة، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت تشكيلًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت طبقاتًا واحده، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدة، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت موادًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت تشكيلًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت طبقاتًا واحده، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدة، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت موادًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت تشكيلًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت طبقاتًا واحده، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت مكوناتًا واحدة، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.

وإذا كانت موادًا واحدًا، فإن الكتلة لا تكون كتلة غير حركة.
(1) إنا فين عين نكون الوحدة مشتركة للثواب إذا مشاركة من
(2) في جميع الحضور وما يلبس الخمسات، أي أن ما يلبس من الثواب
(3) في الواحد، وما فيه الوحدة فيه الكبيرة.
(4) فإذا نكون اشترى الكبيرة والوحدة في كل حضور وما يلبس
(5) الخمسة، فلا تعلم ذلك الامتناع أن يكون بالبخت، أي الانتها، بلا علة\\n(6) أو علة؟
(7) فكان بالبخت فقد كانت مثابا، فيلزمها الحالات التي لزمت في الأحاديث؟
(8) إذ لم يوجد كرد فيها بلا وحدة؟
(9) كيف يمكن أن تكون كرد ووحدة معًا، وما مثابا؟ والكبيرة إذا
(10) هي كبدا الأحاديث، أي جمعة وحدات؟
(11) فين من أصله الكبيرة ووحدة فقط، وسما السيناء، كرية كبرى؟
(12) وفلا يمكن أن يكون كذلك.
(13) فيلزم فيها أيضا ما قد من الخلف؟
(14) وفلا يمكن أن نرى إلى ما كانت عليه بالبخت من التنبيه، وهي إثباتات؟
(15) فيلزم فين إذا ما قدمنا من الخلف؟
(16) قف إذا أن يكون اشترى كبدا مثل هذه كبرتها؟
(17) فلا قد نكون أن اشترى كبدا، فلا تحمل العلة من أن تكون من ذاتها أو
(18) يكون لاشترى كبدا أخرى من غير ذاتها، خارجة بالذات عننها؟
(19) فإن كانت على اشترى كبدا من ذاتها فهي بعضها، فذلك البعض أقدم من
(20) بقية؟
(21) ولكن لا تقدم بالمعنى بالذكر، كما فين أن كتبنا على المثابرة؛ فيكون الشيء
(22) الذي هو آخر الخمسات أو ما يلبس الخمسات، أي جميع الأشياء؟
(23) فين الأصل إذا
(24) هذه السكتة بإنسا القراءة، وترابطها على اجتناف
(25) عملها إجتناف، وتمكنا كتابة: عنة، ولكن عنة الدارجة بعد قطعها على نحو آخر
(26) فين الأصل: إذا
(27) زادة للايضاح
(28) فين الأصل إذا
(29) ثلاث للايضاح
(30) فين الأصل إذا
(31) ثلاث للايضاح
(32) فين الأصل إذا
(33) ثلاث للايضاح
(34) فين الأصل إذا
(35) ثلاث للايضاح
(36) فين الأصل إذا
(37) ثلاث للايضاح
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
بالنسبة للعظام: إذا ت dúك العظام في الموئل (أو بالقوة) فبالنسبة للعظام، فإن العظام الرسالة ضعيفة، وضعفو كل عضو، وهو الضعف نفسه، وهذا يعني JVM، والتصفين جزء الكسل، إذا أن ضعفو جزء الكسل، فإن العظام الرسالة ضعيفة.

فإن العظام الرسالة مكونة من العظام الرسالة في مكان أو أصغر منه، فإن كان مطأ عرض من تلك الحالات، وهو أن يكون الكسل مثل الجزء، وهذا خلف لا يمكن: وكذلك ضعفو، إن كان أصغر منه، فإن يكون الكسل أصغر من الجزء، وهذا

أعظم إجابة وشاذة.

فإن الكسل الأعظم من الجزء، فإن ضعفو العظام الذي ظن أن مرسال

أعظم من العظام المفتوحة أن العظام الرسالة.

العظام الرسالة إذا ت dúك بمالذي آنية أعظم منه، فإن العظام الرسالة لمهما أن تكون (أو بالأضافة)، إذا لا يقال

أعظم إلا (أو بالأضافة).

(1) في الأصل: عظام
(2) في الأصل: وأردت ذلك في أول السطر الأول.
(3) في الأصل: فاذًا فاذًا أن يرد العظام الرسالة.
(4) في الأصل: فاذًا فاذًا أن يرد العظام الرسالة.
(5) في الأصل: فاذًا فاذًا أن يرد العظام الرسالة.
(6) في الأصل: الهام.
(7) هذه هي فيما يرد في النتيجة المتانة ما يقدح.
(8) هذا الكلام غير لابسة.
(9) هذا الكلام غير لابسة.
(10) إذا كان العظام الرسالة لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال.

ومع ذلك فإن ذلك هل الذي هو أعظم منه أصغر منه أو مثله، وهذا خلف لا يمكن.

فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال.

فإن لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال.

فإن لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال، فإن العظام الرسالة لا يقال.

ووضع الشيء نفسه تفكيكه، ومقدمة كثيرة موجودة بالفعل أو

(1) في الأصل: عظام
فإن كان للواحد أواحه، بعضها مساوٍ له، وبعضها ليس له، فالواحد متقدم، لأن الواحد الأصغر بعد الواحد الأكبر، أو بعد بعضه، فالواحد الأكبر بعض، فهو متقدم.
والواحد لا يقتسم، فإن سماء أليس ليس؟ وهذا خلاف لا يمكن.
فإن كان العظم المرسل لاستغلال فيه هو، وقد يكون لا يمكن.
فإن كان العظم المرسل هو العظم بالإضافة، فإن العظم والاستحالة 이미 مترادفان.
أليس، أحد، وهو ما كان شيء آخر صغير منه، إذا كان أنه لا يكون شيء.
فإن هذا التدبير (1) يبتين أنه لا يكون شيء (3) مرسلًا، وإذا يكون الصغير بالإضافة أيضاً؟
والعظم والصغير يقالان على كل كمية؟ أما الطول والقصير فيقالان على كل كمية مترتبة، خاصة أنها دون غيرها من الكيانات؟
وإذا يقال بعلاوة أيضاً، لا قول مرسلاً؟ وبيان ذلك مثل ما قدمت.
في العظم والصغير فإنها خاصة للكية المنفصلة.
فأما القليل والكبير فإنها خاصة للكية المنفصلة.
وعندما يعرض الكبير ما يعرض العظم والصغير والطول والقصير، فإن أنه لا يقال قول مرسل (4) بالاضافة: وبيان ذلك ما قدمت، فإن التدبير واحد.
فأما القليل فقد يظن أنه يقال مرسل؟ وذلك أنه يظن أنه إن كان أول العددتين، كل عدد غير الاثنين أكبر من الاثنين، فإن الاثنين أقل الأعداد؟
فالثاني هو القليل المرسل، إذا ليس هو كبير، بالعكس؟ إذ لا يوجد أقل منه؟
وإن كان الواحد عدداً، ولا شيء أقل من الواحد، فالواحد هو الأقل.
والمرسل.
وأما أن ليس بصادق، لأن إذا إن كان الواحد عدد، فإنه يحتوي على ذلك شناعة قبيحة جداً، أنه إن كان الواحد عدد، فهو كبره ما، وإن كان الواحد كبره، خاصة الكية تحتك وتلك، أعنى أنه من لا مساو (4)؟

(1) في الأصل: إذا
(2) في الأصل: تكون
(3) يصح رسم الكلمة أيضاً بأن تقرأا: الواحد
(4) في الأصل: فإذا
(5) في الأصل: إذا
(6) زيادة إلى الإيضاح، وفإن سمحت بدوها أيضاً.
(7) في الأصل: والآيات إلى البر.
العدد، أعني أنه يعلمُ الوحدانيات، وجميع الوحدانيات، وتأليف الوحدانيات، وتأليف الأثمان الأول، الأول القرآن، إن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أكبر منه، إن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، إن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أكبر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضاً إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإن كان نبضة إلى ما هو أصغر منه، فإ
فقد تبين ما قد تحسن بليس إذن الواحد بالمقارنة بالأشياء، وإن كان هكذا قول أن ينفث إلى بعضه، لأن هكذا للواحد الحق بيئة، وقد قدمت أن ماه بليس بازي وأن الأوزان لابن له، فاذن: الواحد الحق أول: لا ينكر قرة بنوع من الأنواع أبداً، ولا يقال: الواحد، بالإضافة إلى غيره؛ فاذن: هو الذي لا هو قرة لا يقبل بها، ولا صورة مؤتة من جنس وأنواع، فإن الذي هو كذلك يتكلم كألف منه، ولا هو كنية بهجة، ولا له كنية: لأن الذي هو كذلك أيضًا ينقسم، لأن كل كنية أو ذى كنية يقبل الزادة والنقس، وما قول: النقص منقسم، والنقس منقسم: ينفع ما، وقد قب إلكترون تكون في كل واحد من المقولات ونها بلعها من الجنس والذكاء والشخص والخاصة والعرض العام والكامل والجزء، وجميع: وذلك الواحد يقال على كل واحد من بعد: فاذن: الواحد الحق ليس هو واحد، من هذه، والحركة فما هو من هذه، أن الحالة الذي هو هيكل موصورة، إذا: الحركة إذا نفث من مكان إلى مكان، أو دُرت أو نقص، أو يكون أو نماد، أو استحالة، والحركة المتكررة، لأن السكان كنية، فهو منقسم: فالواحد في أقسام منقسم بأقسام المكان، فهو منقسم: فالحركة المتكررة، فإن حركة نهائية الراوي الناقص منقسمة موجودة في أقسام المكان الذي ما بين نهاية الجرم قبل الروه إلى نهاية الجزم في نهاية الروه، وكذلك ما بين نهاية الجزم قبل النقص إلى نهاية النقص.

1. (1) في الأصل: فاذن
2. (2) يمكن قراءتها: أول
3. (3) في الأصل: فاذن
4. (4) غير متوقفة في الأصل
5. (5) في الأصل: فاذن
6. (6) في الأصل: وان
7. (7) في الأصل: إلا
8. (8) لا يقبل عليه إلا في جنس واحد، أعن فيها تقلل على السطح والقول: فإنه لا يقبل ولا صدق، قول: أكتر أو أقل من عدد، ولا عدد أكتر أو أقل من عدد، يقول أكتر أو أقل من قول.

(1) هذه السلكة مكررة
(2) في الأصل: أو سطح أو خص أو مكان، ولا يجب تصحيحها، لأنها في أصل
(3) السلط متوقفة على قوله: جزء
(4) ربما يعدل من الخط السفلي، وكذلك فيها
(5) ينكر جميع رسم السلكة أن نقرأ: بما
(6) في الأصل: لكان
وكلما تحدث بالنفس في معرفة، والنفس قلقة بالفعل عند تمام الأنواع بها؛
وقبل أخذها بما كانت عقلة بالقوة: وكلي شيء هو نسيًا بالقوة تنصرفه إلى الفعل في آخر، هو ذلك الجرّ من القوة إلى الفعل، ولكل جرّ من النفس الذي هي عقلة بالقوة: أعتن بالأدلة بها أوعى النفس الشياطين تنازلها بالعقل، ولكل جرّ من النفس التي هي عقلة بالقوة: أي لها ما لها كلاميات أنفسها: فإنها باصداء النفس صالحة النفس قلقة بالقوة، أي لها ما لها كلاميات أنفسها: فكل كلاميات الأشياء: إذاً هي النفس خارجة من القوة إلى الفعل، هي تلك النفس المستقلة التي كان لها بالقوة، فهي القلق الذي ينفجر النفس قلقة بالقوة: (1)
والأدلة المكتوبة كمساء، الفعل مكتوب.
فقد تنكر أنه أول منكرون، وهو متفرد بنوع ما، إذ هو كل ما قدمنا،
وأن الوحدة تقال على الكل، ووحدة يمنح لعقل.
(2) في أفقات الأشياء، الترابرة كنافذة والمحمدة [على]
حديدة الذبح، فدققنا: واحد، المتارة، وإنهمت المدورة والشياطين واحد؛ وهذا الواحد مضمر أيضًا، لأنه ينصرف وما يقال على نفسه مكتوب: فإن حديدة الذبح التي نصر على المدورة، التي هي المدورة والشياطين، متجزئة مكترفة: (3)
وأيضاً أفعال الترابرة على مكتوبة: فالأجر الحق لا أفعال متاردة.
وأيضاً، إذا في أفقات الأشياء بالاسم، كألف السمي كبا والكوكب السمي كبا، فإنها تقول إنهما واحد برأس، أي كل؛ ونصرف هذا الكوكب، أغير السمي والكوكب: وهذه المشتقات بالاسم ليس منها شيء: لعل شيء: لأن الكوكب ليس عشر السبع ولا利好علة الكوكب. وقد يوجد مشابهة بالاسم بعضها على بعض كالمطبع، والمتكوف، والمسكر، في، والعين، والعين المكترفة: فإن الهز الذي هو جوهر مني، عن الفي الذي هو جوهر، والفسكر فيه الذي هو جوهر مني، عن الهز.
(4) إن كل الكواكب هنا عن الفي لنغمسه في الفيل
(2) أهل بالإضافة: الفعل مكتور، وضع تبخر الفيل في رحلة المرعية
(5) في الفيل: ناتج
(1) في الفيل: ناتج، وقد أثرت هذا التصحيح لكون المضرر، إذا أروع، لأن
هذا يطبق مع أخذ في رسالة الفيل للسكني
(6) في الفيل: شياطين
وقد يقال الواحد الذي (1) لا ينقسم إلا في الحال، وإذا قلنا أنicornي لا ينقسم بالفعل، وإذًا أنicornي لا ينقسم بالفعل فإنا لا نقص في حالته كجر، ولا أنicornي كجر، فإن نقص كان عصر الانتقاص، وهذا هو في أجزاء اضطراباً، إذا هو جرم، فهو منكمك، أو كلذى يصير جزءاً عن الانتقاص، فان ذلك يقال له: لا ينقسم، (2) إلا ليس [الم] أنتقاصه، وهو ذو أجزاء، لأنه عمم ما، إذ خلقه الصغر، فهو منكمك.

ويطال لا ينقسم بالفعل أيضاً، وإذا قلنا أنicornي لا ينقسم فإن منقول من يجعل حده على عامة ذلك -(1) الجر والمعطى، وطول السكال والزمان: فإن منقول الضر الضر، وكل منقول السكال السكال، ومنقول السكال مكان، ومنقول الزمان زمان: بهذا جميعاً لا ينقسم بالفعل ولا بالقول إلى غير نوعه.

وكل واحد منها قال للنقول والتكبير قبولاً دائما إلى قوله، وأيضاً فإن الجرم ينكسر بأبعاد الثلاثة ومواجهتها السبعة، والبسط بعديتها، وكذلك السكال ينكسر قدر أبعاد الممكن ومواجهتها، وكذلك الزمان ينكسر بنائها التي هي آنات (3) السكال الحادة لمواجهتها، كحد العلامات للكفاحات.

(1) في الأصل الواحد الذي.
(2) في الأصل الواحد الذي.
(3) في الأصل: آنات، وهو قال في السبعة.
(4) في الأصل: كل منقول قبولاً دائماً، وقد سمحت البارحة. ويجوز أيضاً أن يكون تصميحها: أي كل ما قاله لفظة....

(1) في الأصل: واحد.
(2) في الفكرة، وفي اللفظ، وفي المسمى، وفي البشر.: وفي الإنسان الذي فيه العين.
(3) في الفكرة، وفي اللفظ، وفي المسمى، وفي الإنسان الذي فيه العين.
(4) في الفكرة، وفي اللفظ، وفي المسمى، وفي الإنسان الذي فيه العين.
(5) أظهر أن إن هذه الممارة التي صاحبته بعد إشارة في حاشا الأصل، تكراراً، ومعنى أن هذه الممارة التي صاحبته بعد إشارة في حاشا الأصل، تكراراً.

وقد يقال واحد، إذا قلنا بعدها واحد، إلا أنه نكسته نفسيماً ما، فإنه معلم أو منقول، أو إيضافة، أو غير ذلك من التفاسير، كالأعمال، والسمع إلى عنصرها واحد، وأن عصرها أفقياً أو عنصر صنع من أنه، جميعاً، إذا يقال: البار، والمسوو باب العنصر، وهذه أيضاً من جهة عصرها (4) أنه عنها (5).

وهو منكست جزء جديد من جهة عصرها، أو لا يكون من جهةmarvin، أو لا يكون من جهةmarvin، أو لا يكون من جهةmarvin، أو لا يكون من جهةmarvin.

أعني باللام، مكسته من جهة العنصر، إذا هو موجود، إلى كثيرة.

وأيضاً قد يقال: واحد بالعنصر، الأشياء التي تقال على شيء، فيقيقها شيء آخر، وسط أباضة: كان أن يقال على القاسم، فإن يلبس الكون، إذا فضاد القاسم.

كون أخر، فإن يقال إن الإنسان هو الأفراد بالعنصر، وهذا بالفعل.

وقد ينتكر هذا أيضاً إذا عمتد من

وقد يقال هذا النوع من الواحد بالقول، أو الواحد بالعنصر، الأشياء التي تقال على شيء، فتكون القاسم، وسط أباضة: كان أن يقال على القاسم، فإن يلبس الكون، إذا فضاد القاسم.

كل من يقول هذا النوع من الواحد بالقول، أو الواحد بالعنصر، الأشياء التي تقال على شيء، فتكون القاسم، وسط أباضة: كان أن يقال على القاسم، فإن يلبس الكون، إذا فضاد القاسم.
وما كان كذلك من كل شخّص طبيعي ذي مثال أو عرضاً كأياً أو نوع أو
جنس نفل أو خاص أو عرض عام، فإنه إن قسم لم يكن هو ما هو؟ وهو
مستكشف بما ركب منه ولفظهُ، أي كما خاصه، وهذا جمعها منقول: واحد
لاعثالة أيضًا؟

ويقال: واحد، لأننا لا ينقصون بنيو آخرين، ما كان لا ينقصهم، لأنه ليس
متصلًا: وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين: أحدهما، لأنه ليس منتصلاً،
ولا وضع له، ولا مشتركة، كواحد العبد، فإنه ليس مشتركةً (1) في أن له
أباداً والbacات، فهو شؤون مفصل، بل هو لا ينقص ولا منفصل، وهذا مستكشف
اً من جهة موضوعاته التي تتبعها (2)؛ وهذا هو الواحد المضمون كل
[الأشياء]؛ والآخر حروف الأصوات، فإنها ليست متصلة ولا وضع للعلل
التي بها الواحد المضمون، وهو مكمال للأفاظ فقط.

ويقال: واحد، لأنه لا ينقص بنيو آخر، وهو ما كان كذلك، لأنه
لاجزء له مثله، ولا مثل غيره.

وأيضاً وهو مستكشف؛ وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين: أحدهما، لأنه
وضع، كلامية الخط الذي هي نهاية، فإنه لازج لها، لأنها نهاية سيئها واحد،
وهناك الباء لا يعد؛ وهو مستكشفة بحاصالها، أعني الزمان الماضي والزمان الآتي.
التي (4) هي مشتركة لها.

ويقال: واحد، أيضًا الذي لا ينقص من جهة السكيكية، فإنه يقال: رطل
واحد لأنه إن الفصل من كلماتي الرطل شفوي، بل الرطل، فليس كلاماً لرطل
واحد؛ ولذلك ما يقال إن خط الدائرة أشد استحًا إلى الواحد من غيره من الخطوط
إذ هو كل الحد، لأننا لا نقص فيه ولا زيادة، بل كل كامل； وما كان كذلك.

(1) في الأصل: واحد
(2) في الأصل: تذكر
(3) السلكة غير منقوطة في الأصل
(4) متكاً في الأصل

(5) بل هي، أيضاً، الذي لا ينقص من جهة السكينة، فإنه يقال: رطل
واحد لأنه إن الفصل من كلماتي الرطل شفوي، بل الرطل، فليس كلاماً لرطل
واحد؛ ولذلك ما يقال إن خط الدائرة أشد استحًا إلى الواحد من غيره من الخطوط
إذ هو كل الحد، لأننا لا نقص فيه ولا زيادة، بل كل كامل؛ وما كان كذلك.

(6) في الأصل: واحد
(7) في الأصل: تذكر
(8) السلكة غير منقوطة في الأصل
(9) متكاً في الأصل

(10) بل هي، أيضاً، الذي لا ينقص من جهة السكينة، فإنه يقال: رطل
واحد لأنه إن الفصل من كلماتي الرطل شفوي، بل الرطل، فليس كلاماً لرطل
واحد؛ ولذلك ما يقال إن خط الدائرة أشد استحًا إلى الواحد من غيره من الخطوط
إذ هو كل الحد، لأننا لا نقص فيه ولا زيادة، بل كل كامل؛ وما كان كذلك.

(11) في الأصل: واحد
(12) في الأصل: تذكر
(13) السلكة غير منقوطة في الأصل
(14) متكاً في الأصل
عِرَضٍ فِي جَمِيعِ الأَشْيَاءِ، نَهْيُ عَنْ الْوَاحِدِ الحَقٍّ، كَأَمَدَّنا؛ وَالْوَاحِدُ الحَقّ هُوَ الْوَاحِدُ الْأَفْقِيّ الَّذِي لَا يَتَكَلِّدُهُ بِجَبَهَةٍ مِّنَ الْحَيَاةِ، وَلَا يَتَقَسَّمُنَّهُ بِنَوعٍ مِّنَ الْأَنْوَاعِ، لَا مِنْ جَهَةِ ذَاتِهِ، وَلَا مِنْ جَهَةِ غَيْرِهِ، وَلَا [هُوَ] رَمَانٌ، وَلَا مَكَانٌ، وَلَا حَامِلٌ، وَلَا مَحْوَلٌ، وَلَا جَوْهِرٌ، وَلَا عُرْفٌ (١)، وَلَا [يَقْسِمُهُ] رَأْيٌ.

فَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

وَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْمَوْهَبَةَ تَقَالُ عَلَى كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ وَاحِدٍ، فَالْفُهْوَيَةُ تَقَالُ لَمْ تَعْمَدَ (٢)

١٠. أَنْ أَوْلَى الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

١٥١٠. أَنْ أَوْلَى الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

١٨. فَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

١١١٨. فَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

٢٠. فَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.

٢٣. فَبَلَّغَهُ أنَّ الْوَاحِدَةَ الْمَكْرُورَةَ: فَالْكَائِمُهَا إِذَاّ ذَلِّلَ بِكُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنَ هَذَا، فَقَالَ: كِبْرٌ، إِذَا ذَلِّلَ لَا يَعْتَصِمُ، وَلَا يُفْنِسُ، وَلَا يَمْكُرُ، وَلَا يَضَّعُ، وَلَا يَجْلَبُ إِلَيْهِ.