Choosing a Financial Advisor: When and How to Delegate?

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Choosing a Financial Advisor: When and How to Delegate?

Abstract
Using a theoretical life cycle model, we evaluate how much workers benefit from having the option to hire a financial advisor when it is costly for employees to rebalance their own financial portfolios. Results indicate that having access to a financial advisor at the start of one's career can be quite beneficial. If delegation to an advisor is available only a decade after entering the labor market, the benefit of delegation is cut by half, and it falls further if delegation is available only later in life (at age 60). We also examine whether simpler target date funds (TDF) and fixed-weight portfolios benefit consumers, compared to the outcomes with customized financial advice. We show that the simpler portfolio products would need to be provided at zero cost, in order to benefit consumers as much as having access to a financial advisor.

Keywords
Portfolio inertia, life cycle saving, household finance, human capital, financial advice

Disciplines
Finance

Comments
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2017 publication: Financial Decision Making and Retirement Security in an Aging World.
Financial Decision Making and Retirement Security in an Aging World

EDITED BY

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Contents

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Notes on Contributors xiii

1. Introduction: Financial Decision Making and Retirement Security in an Aging World 1
   Brett Hammond, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen P. Utkus

Part I. The Aging Brain and Financial Decision Making

2. Aging and Competence in Decision Making 15
   Wändi Bruine de Bruin

3. Challenges for Financial Decision Making at Older Ages 33
   Keith Jacks Gamble

   Raquel Fonseca, Arie Kapteyn, and Gema Zamarro

Part II. Tools for Retirement Planning and Decision Making

5. Choosing a Financial Advisor: When and How to Delegate? 85
   Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell

6. Advice in Defined Contribution Plans 96
   Gordon L. Clark, Maurizio Fiaschetti, and Peter Tufano

7. Seven Life Priorities in Retirement 115
   Surya Kolluri and Cynthia Hutchins

8. Worker Choices About Payouts in Public Pensions 130
   Robert L. Clark and Janet Raye Cowell
Part III. Solutions and Opportunities

   Marguerite DeLiema and Martha Deevy

10. Understanding and Combating Investment Fraud 185
    Christine N. Kieffer and Gary R. Mottola

The Pension Research Council
Index 217
Chapter 5

Choosing a Financial Advisor: When and How to Delegate?

Hugh Hoikwang Kim, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell

We examine how and when delegating one’s investment decisions to a financial advisor can enhance consumer well-being, taking into account the fact that workers need to spend time to manage their own portfolios. When workers manage their own money, this reduces their opportunity to undertake on-the-job learning. Therefore, self-management of personal investments reduces future labor market earnings. We first investigate how introducing an investment delegation option at different points in workers’ careers can change results. Young investors have few investable assets but they have the longest horizon to benefit from sound financial advice. Thus it is not clear ex ante whether younger investors benefit more from having a delegation option. We also compare these outcomes with what would obtain if the worker instead adopted simple rule-based investment portfolios such as conventional Target Date Funds (TDFs) with age-linked investment glide paths. We explore welfare gains of a few portfolio rules with fixed asset allocations. Our goal is to quantify the benefits of having access to personalized financial advice versus portfolios managed according to simple rules, at different stages over the life cycle.

Our baseline model reflects widely observed portfolio management patterns of individual investors, namely portfolio inertia. A great deal of empirical research shows that most workers are inactive investors: that is, they tend to ‘set and forget’ their investment portfolios. For instance, Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) showed that over a twelve-year period, three-quarters of the retirement account holders they examined never altered their retirement asset allocations at all; similarly, Agnew et al. (2003) reported that almost 90 percent of retirement account holders never altered their portfolios. Such inertia also applies to non-retirement accounts, in that a majority of equity owners exhibited portfolio inertia in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data (Bilias et al. 2010). A prominent explanation for why investors display such inertia is the fact that financial management requires people to pay substantial amounts of monetary or non-monetary transaction costs. In this chapter, we build a baseline model of investor inertia based on the
time costs that people need to incur when self-managing their portfolios (Kim et al. 2016).

A Life Cycle Model of Rational Investor Inertia

At the outset, we outline a baseline model of rational inertia used for evaluating financial advice over the life cycle (Kim et al. 2016).¹

Time Cost of Financial Management

We posit individual investors who are not financial experts and who must incur time cost (or mental resources) when managing their financial portfolios. Time costs become particularly important when individuals gain job-specific human capital on their jobs via learning by doing (Arrow 1962; Becker 1964). In such a case, devoting time to investment management comes at the cost of reducing workers’ future labor earnings.

Inertia vs. Active Management

We consider portfolio inertia as one investment management method. If an investor chooses portfolio inertia in period $t$, he keeps his current stock balance for the next period, and the next period’s stock balance is only influenced by the stock market return. By choosing portfolio inertia, he incurs no time cost for managing his financial assets, sparing him the need to analyze new information to reshuffle this portfolio. By electing active portfolio management, he could determine a new mix of equity and bonds, but in turn, this requires him to incur time cost. This latter will be deducted from his available time for working, and he may lose an opportunity to accumulate more job-specific skills. We formulate the lifetime discounted utility for each portfolio management method and allow the investor to optimally choose the portfolio management method with the higher-value function.² Thus, central to the rational inertia model are two competing costs: an opportunity cost for human capital accumulation, and suboptimal portfolio allocation for a long time.

Preferences

The consumer has a time-separable power utility function defined over a composite good consisting of current consumption $C_t$ and time devoted to leisure $L_t$, which is given by $U_t(C_t, L_t) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} (C_t^{\alpha} L_t^{\gamma - 1})$. Here $\alpha > 0$ captures
the investor’s preference for leisure relative to consumption and the parameter $\gamma$ measures relative risk aversion.

**Labor Earnings**

Yearly labor income ($E_t$) is determined by the individual’s job-specific human capital level ($H_t$), wage shock ($Y_t$), and labor supply ($l_t$):

$$E_t = (1 - h_t)(1 - \tau_t)l_t H_t Y_t U_t,$$

where $h_t$ and $\tau_t$ represent housing expenditures and labor income tax, respectively. $U_t$ is a temporary idiosyncratic shock in the labor market. After the (exogenous) age-65 retirement age ($t = 45$), the individual stops working ($l_t = 0$) and receives a lifelong pension benefit equal to a fraction of his final labor earnings.

We have calibrated this model for the US using information on labor income patterns, mortality, retirement benefits, and capital market parameters (see Kim et al. 2016). Our calibrated parameters appear in the Appendix. Consistent with most prior life cycle models (e.g., Cocco et al. 2005), our baseline model matches well with empirically observed patterns of labor earnings, consumptions, stock balance, and wealth accumulation/decumulation profiles (Figure 5.1).

![Figure 5.1. Life cycle profiles of key variables from a baseline model](image_url)

*Notes: This figure shows average life cycle profiles of key variables when only active management or inertia are available, generated from 2,000 independent simulations based on the baseline specification. All dollar amounts are in $1,000s deflated to year 2012.*

*Source: Kim et al. (2016).*
When Does Financial Delegation Make Sense?

We model the main benefit of having the option to delegate one’s investment decisions to a financial advisor as the time saved for accumulating more job-specific skills or human capital (Kim et al. 2016). When an individual uses an advisor, he must pay a fee for the customized advice. By contrast, if he self-manages his portfolio, this takes time which reduces his opportunity to invest in job-related human capital that can enhance his future earnings. Evidently, the attractiveness of delegating to an advisor will vary over the life cycle in a complex manner. For example, younger workers have longer time horizons over which to reap the benefits of financial advice. But they also have little money to manage, so hiring a financial advisor might add little value.

If a worker handles his own portfolio himself (self-management), he incurs time costs which can cut into both leisure and work time. The individual seeking to limit such time costs could simply maintain his current portfolio allocation (inertia). Alternatively, he could engage a financial advisor (delegation) to do the job in exchange for a fixed plus a variable management fee. To evaluate when access to financial advice would be most beneficial, we introduce the delegation option at different points over the life cycle. Prior to the introduction of the advice, investors are assumed to either do nothing (i.e., engage in portfolio inertia), or self-manage the account (and thus incur the time cost), whichever is optimal. After access to the advisor is introduced, this remains an option for the rest of his life.

We assume that financial advisors charge an annual management fee which is a percentage of total assets under management (AUM), along with a minimum fixed fee. According to documents filed by Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) reporting to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, we have determined that the average annual percentage fee was 1.41 percent of AUM in 2014. The baseline minimum fixed fee was $2,100 for an investor with a minimum balance of $150,000 ($2,100/1.41 percent).

Table 5.1 summarizes how making financial advice available at different ages shapes several key outcome variables, including welfare gains (i.e., the certainty equivalent amount of consumptions), wealth, labor earnings, consumption, labor supply, and leisure time. Four introduction dates are considered for the delegation option, namely ages 20, 30, 45, and 60. What we see is, first, that consumers are always better off when given access to a financial advisor (row (a)). Second, these gains decline with the age when the delegation option is made available. That is, workers can expect a 1.07 percent improvement in lifetime welfare when they have an opportunity to delegate their financial decisions to an advisor from the start of their working lives, at age 20. By contrast, a ten-year delay in the introduction of the delegation option cuts the gains by almost half. When the delegation
option is introduced just prior to retirement, at age 60, the lifetime welfare gain is tiny, only 0.02 percent.

Third, we find that early exposure to financial advisors generates substantial additional lifetime wealth (row (b)). If workers have access to investment delegation from age 20 onward, their average wealth is 20 percent higher than in the no-delegation case. If the delegation is available ten years later, wealth accumulation rises by less, just 14 percent. And for even later ages, the impact on wealth is smaller still. And fourth, delegation also changes income and consumption patterns, as reported in rows (c) and (d) of Table 5.1. Delegation allows workers to provide more labor supply by saving their time (row (e)). Again, we see that making advice accessible early in the work career enhances outcomes the most. We also highlight the interesting pattern that emerges when we compare the result from introducing delegation at age 45 versus age 60. When financial advice is made available only from age 60, people enjoy slightly more consumption compared to when it is introduced at age 45 (2.2 percent vs. 2.1 percent) as well as more income (1.29 percent vs. 1.25 percent), but less leisure (6.1 percent vs. 6.75 percent). The smaller leisure levels produce less measured life satisfaction (0.02 percent vs. 0.19 percent in welfare terms) compared to the benchmark case.

In sum, our results indicate that it is better for investors to have an early opportunity to hire financial advisors, since access to financial management early in life can produce important improvements in wealth and well-being. If financial advisory services are only introduced when people are in their 60s, welfare increases by only small amount (0.02 percent).

---

**Table 5.1** Impact of introducing a delegation option at alternative ages: investor gains in well-being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Age = 20</th>
<th>(2) Age = 30</th>
<th>(3) Age = 45</th>
<th>(4) Age = 60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Welfare gain</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Wealth</td>
<td>20.03</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Earnings</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Consumption</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Labor supply</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Leisure</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:* This table displays the impact of having access to a financial advisor to whom investment decisions can be delegated, at different points in the life cycle. The model with investor inertia in Kim et al. (2016) is the benchmark case. The table describes the worker’s welfare gains and average changes in key variables under the delegation option versus the benchmark without a delegation option. All numbers are in percentage points (%). *Source:* Authors’ calculations.
Comparing Customized Financial Advice vs. Simplified Investment Portfolios

In our benchmark model of investor inertia (Kim et al. 2016), the benefit of hiring a financial advisor is due to the time saved in financial management. In return, an investor will need to pay fees comprised of a minimum fixed and a variable fee based on total assets under management. To judge how sensitive people’s welfare gains are to such costs, we next consider varying fee levels. This question is timely because we observe an emerging industry of low-cost financial advice providers based on modern portfolio theory and sophisticated computer programs, sometimes called ‘robo-advisors’. These represent a relatively new phenomenon in the financial advice industry, and they involve the provision of online automated investment services with virtually no human contact (Reklaitis 2015). Compared to human advisors, robo-advisors have a cost advantage since their investment suggestions are pre-programmed based on clients’ characteristics and conditions (e.g., risk aversion, background risk, current asset mix). In what follows, we model robo-advisors as investment advice providers charging a lower minimum fixed fee (i.e., requiring a lower minimum balance) than do human advisors. In return, they provide recommended asset mixes derived from solving clients’ dynamic portfolio choice problems.

To evaluate results conservatively, we assume that robo-advisors charge an annual management fee of 1.41 percent of AUM, just as do the human advisors, but they levy a lower minimum fixed fee. Table 5.2 reports results for workers having access to robo-advisors from age 20. When there is no minimum annual fee, we see that the young worker’s lifetime consumption is higher by 1.3 percentage points, or around 19 percent above the levels with customized but more expensive human financial advisors. As the minimum annual fee rises, this decreases client welfare gains. In other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare gain</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2** Welfare consequences of financial advice provision for alternative minimum fees

Notes: This table displays the impact of having access to a financial advisor charging alternative annual minimum fixed fees. In each case, the annual variable fee is assumed to be an annual 1.41% of AUM. The model with investor inertia in Kim et al. (2016) is the benchmark case. The table describes the worker’s welfare under the delegation option alternative, versus the benchmark without a delegation option. All numbers are in percentage points (%).

Source: Authors’ calculations.
In Table 5.3 we compare investor well-being when ‘plain-vanilla’ investment portfolios are offered in lieu of customized financial advice. The first row (a) assumes that the investor must hold 60 percent of his assets in equity, while the second (b) assumes the equity fraction is 60 percent prior to retirement, and 20 percent afterwards. The third row (c) assumes that the equity share equals 100 minus the investor’s age, while the final row (d) assumes that the glide path has the equity share fall to zero as of age 80. The latter two examples are akin to the prominent portfolio rule of conventional Target Date Funds, which have become extremely popular in the marketplace over the last two decades. None of these plain-vanilla portfolios takes account of differences in investors’ background risk or job-specific earnings patterns. Thus these rules ignore the fact that investors’ decisions regarding portfolio allocation and the characteristics of their other sources of investable assets are tightly connected. For example, investors whose labor earnings are quite volatile would prefer investment profiles with a lower equity share to hedge against their labor income risk.

The outcomes reported speak to the question of how plain-vanilla portfolios akin to those seen in the marketplace affect lifetime well-being, across
different management fee levels. Column (1) assumes an annual manage-
ment fee of 0.84 percent of AUM, which is the same as the average fee for 
TDFs (Yang and Lutton 2014). Columns (2)–(4) show results for succes-
sively lower AUM fees. Results show that consumers do benefit from these 
plain-vanilla portfolios, as compared to the baseline model with no access to 
delegation options. Nevertheless, the gains are only 30–43 percent of the 
robo-advisor case. In columns (2)–(3), we show how lower fees increase 
consumers’ levels of well-being, and the final column reports results for a 
zero management fee. Generally speaking, plain-vanilla investment 
accounts and zero management fees generate similar (though still lower) 
welfare gains as compared to robo-advisors. TDFs do not perform better 
because the equity investment rules depend only on the clients’ ages, and 
they ignore clients’ particular circumstances such as human capital risk, 
wealth levels, and the time costs of portfolio management. Overall, Table 5.3 
suggests a customized delegation option such as a robo-advisor could be 
more desirable than a simple rule-based equity share account standardized 
for all.

Additional Considerations
Thus far we have noted that having a delegation option tends to increase 
consumer well-being. Nevertheless this can also give rise to a principal–
agent problem, due to information asymmetry and possible conflicts of 
interest between advisors and investors. For example, financial advisors 
might attempt to maximize their compensation at the expense of investors’ 
gain. In this chapter, our model considers ‘ideal’ financial advisors without 
such agency issues. It might be possible that a sophisticated robo-advisor can 
mitigate this problem, but including this issue in a life cycle model calls for 
additional research beyond the scope of the present chapter.

Another question is what an optimal default option would be for inactive 
investors, taking into account additional decisions including how much 
clients should contribute to and withdraw from their retirement accounts. 
This consideration can become an important issue in retirement plans, and 
automatic default options would appropriately explore optimal contribu-
tion and withdrawal patterns over the life cycle, in addition to the portfolio 
management.

We have also assumed here that there are no communications problems 
between financial advisors and investors. Nevertheless, fee communications 
are often shrouded (Anagol and Kim 2012) when investors lack knowledge 
or have limited time to evaluate information presented. Understanding how 
financial advisor disclosures shape investor behaviors is likely to have rich 
policy implications for regulating the financial advisory industry.
Conclusions

We have quantitatively analyzed the impact of having a delegation option at different points over the life cycle. We show that having access to a delegation option in one’s early career can have a substantially positive impact on the investor’s lifetime welfare. Access to advice at age 60 is less beneficial in the context of our model. And finally, although TDFs are widely used, they appear to deliver lower gains compared to having a financial advisor customize portfolios to investors’ specific financial and economic circumstances. Clearly, however, these conclusions about investment advice and portfolio management depend on the costs of each, as well as the benefits.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Baseline value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working periods</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement periods</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time discounting</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure preference</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of permanent wage shock</td>
<td>0.0710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of human capital shock</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of transitory wage shock (pre-retirement)</td>
<td>0.1726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
Notes
1. This section summarizes a model developed in Kim et al. (2016) to which readers may refer for a discussion of model parameters.
2. There can be behavioral reasons for why investors are inactive in managing their portfolios. For example, investors may have emotional hurdles to actively manage their financial asset. Although this line of reasoning can be informative, here we focus on the rational optimization framework to provide quantitatively more accurate evaluations of having financial advice over the life cycle.
3. In practice, robo-advisors can charge even less; see <https://investorjunkie.com/42668/true-costs-robo-advisors/>.
4. Not all TDFs implement the same gliding path of equity allocation. Some TDFs use a glide path targeted towards the retirement year (called a ‘to’ glide path), and others lower the equity allocation through retirement (called a ‘through’ glide path). The latter group of TDFs have more equity exposure in general (Yang and Lutton 2014).

References

Table 5A.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Baseline value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of transitory earnings shock (post-retirement)</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk premium</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. of stock return</td>
<td>0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-free rate</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation annual fee: variable rate</td>
<td>1.41% per annum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation annual fee: fixed fee (1.41% of min. req’d balance of $150,000)</td>
<td>$2,115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table summarizes parameter values for the benchmark case in Kim et al. (2016).
Source: Authors’ calculations.


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Choosing a Financial Advisor 95