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University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-98-01.

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The logic induced by our semantics is a version of linear logic but in a much more expressive language, which contains the languages of linear logic and classical logic as sublanguages. Our semantics can be viewed as a materialization of the resource philosophy traditionally associated with linear logic and other substructural logics.



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# A formalism for resource-oriented planning

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**Abstract**

We introduce a formalism and a semantics for resource-oriented planning. The advantage of resource-based planning over the traditional approaches to planning is that it avoids the frame problem. Our approach can also handle many aspects of the knowledge preconditions problem without a need to introduce epistemic operators.

The logic induced by our semantics is a version of linear logic but in a much more expressive language, which contains the languages of linear logic and classical logic as sublanguages. Our semantics can be viewed as a materialization of the resource philosophy traditionally associated with linear logic and other substructural logics.

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# 1 Introduction

Since the birth of Girard's [5] linear logic, the topic of substructural logics, often called "resource logics", has drawn the attention of many researchers, with various motivations and different traditions. An extensive survey of substructural logics can be found in [4]. The common feature of these logics is that they are sensitive with respect to the number of occurrences of subformulas in a formula or a sequent, the most demonstrative example of which is the failure of the classical principles

$$A \to A\&A$$

and

$$\frac{A \to B \qquad A \to C}{A \to B\&C}$$

as a result of removing the rule of contraction from classical sequent calculus.

The philosophy behind this approach is that if formulas are viewed as resources, the conjunction is viewed as an operator which "adds up" resources and the implication is viewed as an operator which converts one resource (the antecedent) into another (the consequent), then $A\&A$ is generally stronger than $A$, and $A \to (B\&C)$ is stronger than $(A \to B)\&(A \to C)$. For example, \$1&\$1 should be understood as being equivalent to \$2 rather than \$1, so that $\$1 \to (\$1\&\$1)$ is not valid; one cannot get both a sneaker and a sandwich for \$1 even if each of them costs a dollar, so that

$$\frac{\$1 \to \mathit{sneaker} \qquad \$1 \to \mathit{sandwich}}{\$1 \to (\mathit{sneaker}\ \&\ \mathit{sandwich})}$$

fails, too.

Although this kind of resource philosophy, suggested by Girard [5] in 1987, seems very intuitive, it has never been formalized, and substructural logics owe their name "resource logics" mostly to certain syntactic features rather than some strict and, at the same time, intuitively convincing resource semantics behind them. The present work is an attempt to develop such a semantics and outline its applications in Computer Science.

We introduce a language which considerably extends the language of linear logic, and define a resource semantics for it. This semantics has been developed with Computer Science applications in mind. It is shown how the corresponding logic can be used for an alternative approach to planning problems in Artificial Intelligence. The main advantage of this approach is that it avoids the notorious frame problem. It has already been noticed that substructural-logic-based planning can be frame-problem-free, and a considerable amount of work has been conducted on exploring this alternative ([1, 3, 6, 7, 9]). However, the formalisms for this type of planners studied by other authors are too limited, — usually some special fragments of propositional linear logic, — and this greatly reduces the range of planning problems to which they can be applied. As for our

language, it enjoys a very high level of expressiveness, containing the languages of classical and linear logics as sublanguages.

Another appealing feature of our logic shows up when it comes to the knowledge preconditions problem in planning. McCarthy and Hayes [14] were the first to recognize this problem. Most Artificial Intelligence planners work on the assumption that they have complete knowledge of the world, which, in actual planning situations, is rarely the case. Many authors have approached this problem by extending the formalism of planning logics to allow to explicitly express knowledge, usually either by means of incorporating a modal logic of knowledge into the formalism ([15]), or switching to syntactic formalisms which allow us to make terms from sentences and apply special first-order predicates designated as knowledge predicates to them ([16, 8]). Our approach can handle a wide range of nontrivial partial-knowledge planning situations without the necessity to introduce special knowledge operators or predicates into the language.

Yet another potential field of application for our logic is program/real time systems analysis. The reader will find examples showing how to specify programs in our formalism. If $\Delta$ is a specification of the source software and $\Gamma$ is a specification of the goal program, then the question whether (and how) $\Gamma$ can be constructed and successfully function reduces to the question whether the implication $\Delta \rightarrow \Gamma$ is valid in our logic.

# 2 Motivation and intuition

## 2.1 Resources give us power

The more resources we possess, the greater our ability to influence the course of events in the world, achieve our goals, maintain desirable situations and prevent undesirable events.

Here are examples of what an ordinary person can view as her resources in everyday life: the amount of money on her bank account, her car, her knowledge and abilities, the hardware at her disposal and the software running on it, the duties her subordinates carry out for her at work. When she sets plans for achieving her goals, even such a simple goal as calling her friend John, she proceeds from her knowledge of the resources at her disposal: that she has a telephone which can connect her to any number she dials, that she has fingers to dial, that she knows John's name and she has a telephone directory allowing to find out anybody's telephone number by their name, ... Even facts like "The telephone directory never lies", or "$2 \times 2 = 4$" can be viewed as resources. The only difference between this type of resources from the other resources listed above is that they are unchangable/unmanageable and hence may be everybody else's resources, too. Yet, this does not make them less valuable as resources.

## 2.2 Plans should be based on resources

A resource is something that persists in time and can change only if and when the owner so desires. My car, — more precisely, its state (location, speed, etc.) is an example. It is manageable by me: it will change its location (or, at a lower level of abstraction, start, move, speed up, slow down, turn to the left/right, stop) only at my discretion. If I am planning getting to the airport by 3 PM, I can base my plan on the assumption that at 2 PM it will be in my driveway. Because it is there now (at 1 PM), and nobody else but I can change its location. My plan could hardly be successful without this assumption of stability and manageability by me. True, the plan can also involve things that are not quite manageable by me, such as whether the Ross Bridge or the Franklin Bridge is going to be closed between 2 and 3 for repairs. Still, if I have a reasonable assumption that both bridges cannot be closed at one time, I can view the disjunction "the Ross Bridge will be open *or* the Franklin Bridge will be open" as one of my resources — stable things on which I can base my plan. Just as the location of my car, it cannot change without my consent. The only difference is that in the former case I actually *can* make a change, while in the latter case I cannot. But nobody and nothing else can, either, and this is what allows me to view it as a resource. In this sense, $2 \times 2 = 4$ is another example of what I have all rights to call a resource of mine.

## 2.3 Still, what is a resource?

The simplest type of resources, which we call *unconditional resources*, consist of 2 components: *effect* and *potential*. Effect is the process associated with and supported by the resource, and potential is the set of resources into which the resource can be converted at the owner's wish. The effect of the resource "My car in my driveway" is the process "my car is in my driveway", and its potential, at a high level of abstraction, is {"My car on the Ross bridge", "My car on the Franklin Bridge", "My car at the airport",...}. For some resources, such as $2 \times 2 = 4$, the potential can be empty. And some resources can be "effectless" — their value is associated only with the resources into which they can be converted. Money can be viewed as an example of such a resource: its value is associated only with its convertibility into "real" things.

The elements of the potential can be viewed as the *commands* that the resource accepts from its owner. My computer, when it is shut down, maintains the process "the screen is dark" as its effect. In this state it accepts only one command: "start". After this command is given, it turns into another resource, — let us say "another resource" rather than "another state", — whose effect is "the initial menu is on the screen" and whose potential consists of the commands "Word Processor", "Games", "Netscape", "Telnet",... When I give one of these commands, it turns yet into a new resource, etc.

It might be helpful to think of resources as *agents* carrying out certain *tasks*

for us. Mathematically, task is a synonym of resource, and which of these two words we use, depends on the context. Between agents a master-slave (ownership) relationship can hold. What is a task for the slave, is a resource for the master.

Thus, intuitively, an unconditional resource is an agent which maintains certain process (its effect) and also accepts commands (elements of its potential) from its master and executes them, where executing a command means turning into a certain new resource.

## 2.4 Resource conjunction

Let us consider some more precise examples. Let $\Phi$ be an agent which writes in memory location $L1$ any number[1] we tell it to write, and then keeps this number there until we give it a new command of the same type again, and so on. Initially, this resource maintains the value 0 in $L1$. Here is an attempt to depict it:




Figure 1: $\Phi$

This is an example of an inexhaustible resource — it can execute our commands as many times as we like.

Consider another agent $\Psi$ which writes in location $L2$, when we give it such a command, the factorial of the current value of $L1$, and keeps that number there (even if the value of $L1$ changes meanwhile) until we give it a new command of the same type. Unlike $\Phi$, this resource accepts only one command, even though, again, infinitely many times. Initially it keeps the value 0 in $L2$.

[1] All right, all right, let it be "any 32-bit binary number".




Figure 2: $\Psi$

We denote the conjunction operator for resources by $\ddot{\wedge}$. What would $\Psi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi$ mean? Intuitively, having the conjunction of two agents means having them both as independent resources, so that we can use each of them as we wish, without affecting our ability to use the other. If we want to view $\Psi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi$ as *one* agent rather than a combination of two agents, the corresponding picture would be




Figure 3: $\Psi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi$

Initially this resource maintains the value 0 in locations $L1$ and $L2$. In every state, it accepts 2 types of commands: 1) Write in $L2$ and maintain there the factorial of the current value of $L1$ (only one command), and 2) Write in $L1$ and maintain there number $n$ (one command per number).

## 2.5 Conditional resources

Both $\Psi$ and $\Phi$, as well as their conjunction $\Psi\ddot{\wedge}\Phi$, are examples of unconditional resources: they maintain their effects and execute commands unconditionally, without asking anything in return. However, in real life, most resources are *conditional*. My car can travel, but now and then it will require from me to fill up its tank; my computer will copy any file to a floppy disk, but only if I execute its countercommand "Insert a floppy disk into drive A".

We use the symbol $\ddot{\rightarrow}$ to build expressions for conditional resources. Having the resource $\Theta_1\ddot{\rightarrow}\Theta_2$ means that I can make it work as $\Theta_2$ if I can give to it the resource $\Theta_1$. It is not necessary to actually assign some agent accomplishing $\Theta_1$ to it. I can assign to it a "virtual $\Theta_1$", which means that all I need in order to make this conditional resource work as $\Theta_2$ is to execute every command it issues for $\Theta_1$. So, $\Theta_1\ddot{\rightarrow}\Theta_2$ can be seen as a resource which consumes the resource $\Theta_1$ and produces the resource $\Theta_2$, or converts the resource $\Theta_1$ into $\Theta_2$.

Consider one more unconditional resource, $\Gamma$, which writes in memory location $L2$ the factorial of any number we give to it, and maintains it there until it gets a new command of the same type. Just like $\Psi$, initially it maintains 0 in $L2$:




Figure 4: $\Gamma$

Can I accomplish $\Gamma$ as a task? Generally — not. Even if I can compute factorials in my head, I may not have writing access to location $L2$ after all, or I may have this access but some other agent can have that kind of access, too, and can overwrite the number I needed to maintain in $L2$.

However, if the resources $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ are at my disposal, then I can carry out $\Gamma$. Whatever number my master gives me, I first make $\Phi$ write it in $L1$, and then make $\Psi$ write and maintain its factorial in $L2$. So, I cannot accomplish

the task $\Gamma$, but I can accomplish the task

$$\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi \ddot{\rightarrow} \Gamma,$$

which is an example of a conditional resource.

If we go to lower levels of abstraction, it may turn out that, say, $\Psi$, itself, is (the consequent of) a conditional resource. It may require some memory space, ability to write and read and perform some arithmetic operations there, etc. Let us denote this resource, — the resource required by $\Psi$ to function successfully, — by $\Delta$. In that case, the resource I possess is

$$\Phi \ddot{\wedge} (\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)$$

rather than $\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi$. I have no reason to assume that I can carry out $\Gamma$ now. However, I can carry out

$$\Big(\Delta \ddot{\wedge} \Phi \ddot{\wedge} (\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)\Big) \ddot{\rightarrow} \Gamma.$$

Because I can use the conjunct $\Delta$ to do whatever $(\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)$ wants from its $\Delta$, and thus make that conditional resource work as $\Psi$.

What if $\Phi$, too, requires $\Delta$ as a resource? That is, can I successfully handle the task

$$\Big(\Delta \ddot{\wedge} (\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Phi) \ddot{\wedge} (\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)\Big) \ddot{\rightarrow} \Gamma?$$

No, even though, by classical logic, the above formula follows from

$$\Big(\Delta \ddot{\wedge} \Phi \ddot{\wedge} (\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)\Big) \ddot{\rightarrow} \Gamma.$$

I cannot, because I have only one $\Delta$ while I need two. What if the two conditional agents $\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Phi$ and $\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi$ issue conflicting commands for $\Delta$? For example, the first one may require to write in certain location $L3$ the number 13 and maintain it there, while the other needs 14 to be maintained in that location? One location cannot keep two different values. In other words, $\Delta$ could serve one master, but it may not be able to please two bosses simultaneously. And not only because conflicting commands may occur. Certain resources can execute certain commands only once or a limited number of times. A kamikaze can attack any target, and the commands "attack A" and "attack B" are not logically conflicting; however, I cannot carry out the task of 2 kamikazes if I only have 1 kamikaze at my command: after making him attack A, he will be gone.

This is where linear-logic-like effects start to show up. As we have just observed, the principle $\Theta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Theta \ddot{\wedge} \Theta$ is not valid. On the other hand, all the principles of linear logic + weakening are valid.

## 2.6 More on our language

In addition to $\ddot{\rightarrow}$ and $\ddot{\wedge}$, we need many other connectives to make our language sufficiently expressive. When we described $\Phi$ and $\Psi$, we just drew trees. But our language should be able to express all that in formulas. In fact the language is going to be much more expressive than the language of linear logic.

The formulas of our language are divided into 3 categories/levels: facts, processes, and resources. Each level has its own operators and may use lower-level expressions as subexpressions.

*Facts* are nothing but classical first order formulas, with their usual semantics. We use the standard Boolean connectives and quantifiers (without dots over them) to build complex facts from simpler ones.

We assume that *time* is a linear order of *moments*, with a beginning but no end. An *interval* is given by a pair $(i, j)$, where $i$ is a time moment and $j$ is either a greater time moment or $\infty$.

While facts are true or false at time moments, *processes* are true or false on intervals.

The Boolean connectives and quantifiers are applicable to processes, too. To indicate that they are process operators, we place one dot over them. $\alpha \dot{\wedge} \beta$, where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are processes, is the process which is true on an interval if and only if both $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are true on that interval. The meaning of the other "dotted" connectives ($\dot{\rightarrow}$, $\dot{\neg}$, $\dot{\forall}$, ...) should also be clear. They behave just like classical connectives, — all the classical tautologies, with dots over the operators, hold for processes, too. But, as we have already noted, this is not the case for resources.

Here are some other process operators:

$\Uparrow A$, where $A$ is a fact, is a process which holds on an interval iff $A$ is true at every moment of the interval except, perhaps, its first moment.

$\angle A$, where $A$ is a fact, is true on an interval iff $A$ is true at the first moment of the interval.

$\alpha \rhd \beta$, where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are resources, is true on an interval iff $\alpha$ holds on some initial segment of the interval and $\beta$ holds on the rest of the interval; in other words, if the process $\alpha$ switches to the process $\beta$ at some internal moment of the interval.

As for the resource level expressions, they, too, use classical operators, with a double dot over them. We have already seen the intuitive meaning of two of them, $\ddot{\wedge}$ and $\ddot{\rightarrow}$. The other basic resource-building operator is $\gg$. The expression

$$\alpha \gg (\Delta_1, ..., \Delta_n),$$

where $\alpha$ is a process and the $\Delta_i$ are resources, stands for the resource whose effect is $\alpha$ and whose potential is $\{\Delta_1, ..., \Delta_n\}$. The expression

$$\alpha \gg x\Delta(x)$$

is used to express resources with possibly infinite potentials: the potential of this resource is $\{\Delta(a) : a \in D\}$, where $D$ is the domain over which the variable $x$ ranges.

To be able to express infinite resources such as $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ (Figures 1 and 2), we also need to allow recursively defined expressions. Let

$$\Phi' := \gg x\Big(\big(\Uparrow L1(x)\big)\Phi'\Big)$$

and

$$\Psi' := \gg \Big(\big(\dot{\exists}x(\angle(L1(x)\dot{\wedge} \Uparrow L2(!x)\big)\Psi'\Big).$$

Then, resource $\Phi$ can be expressed by $\big(\Uparrow L1(0)\big)\Phi'$ and resource $\Psi$ can be expressed by $\Uparrow L2(0)\Psi'$.

For readers familiar with linear logic, we will note that $\gg$ is in fact a generalization of the additive conjunction or quantifier (while $\ddot{\wedge}$ and $\ddot{\rightarrow}$ correspond to the multiplicative conjunction and implication). The generalization consists in adding one more parameter, $\alpha$, to this sort of conjunction. The standard linear-logic additive conjunction should be viewed as a special case of $\gg$-formulas where the left argument of $\gg$ is a trivial process, such as $\Uparrow \top$.

The semantics of $\gg$ is that it is a "manageable $\rhd$". If in $\alpha \rhd \beta$ the transfer from $\alpha$ to $\beta$ happens "by itself" at an arbitrary moment, in the case of $\alpha \gg (\Psi_1, ..., \Psi_n)$ the transfer from $\alpha$ to the effect of $\Psi_i$ happens according to our command. But at what moment should this transfer occur? If we assume that exactly at the moment of giving the command, then even the principle $\Delta \ddot{\rightarrow} \Delta$ can fail, because execution of a command, or passing the command which I receive in the right $\Delta$ to the left $\Delta$ always takes time. Hence, we assume the following protocol for $\alpha \gg (\Psi_1, ..., \Psi_n)$: at some time moment $t$ and some $1 \leq i \leq n$, master decides to issue the command

$$DO(\Psi_i).$$

Then, at some later moment $t'$, slave is expected to explicitly report an execution of this command:

$$DONE(\Psi_i).$$

The transfer from $\alpha$ to the effect of $\Phi_i$ is assumed to take place at some moment between $t$ and $t'$.

For real-time applications, we may want to introduce a deadline parameter for $\gg$:

$$\alpha \gg^t (\Phi_1, ..., \Phi_n).$$

This means that at most time $t$ should elapse between "DO" and "DONE". Another operator for which we might want to introduce a real-time parameter is $\rhd$: $\alpha \rhd^t \beta$ is a process which is true on an interval $(i, j)$ iff there is $e$ with $i < e \leq i + t < j$ such that $\alpha$ is true on $(i, e)$ and $\beta$ is true on $(e, j)$. We

leave exploring this possibility for the future, and the formal definitions of our language and semantics the reader will find in the later sections deal only with the non-real-time version.[2]

### 2.7 Applications in Computer Science

Later sections contain examples showing how our logic can be used for planning in Artificial Intelligence. A planning problem is represented as $\Delta \dddot{\rightarrow} \Gamma$, where $\Gamma$ is a specification of the goal as a task, and $\Delta$ is the conjunction of the resources we possess. An action is understood as giving a command to one of these resources or, — at a higher level of abstraction, — assigning one resource to another, conditional, resource. Hence, actions change only those (sub)resources to which they are applied. The effect of an action for the rest of the resources is "no change", and it is this property that makes it frame-problem-free. Some examples also show how our logic can naturally handle certain planning problems which, under the traditional approach, would require special means for representing knowledge.

Another field of potential application of our logic is software verification and engineering. Programs and their subprograms are nothing but resources. The inputs they accept are commands for them, and the outputs are the goal situations they are expected to produce. Programs are thus specifiable as tasks in our language, whether it be the assembly language level or higher levels, with a flexible degree of abstraction. And our logic can be used not only as a verification tool, but it can also show us how to compose a new program from existing programs taking into account the resources we possess. The logic is suited for dealing with reality where all kinds of resources are limited. And, with the deadline parameters added to the formalism, it can also be useful for real-time systems analysis.

## 3 Facts

The components of our language, shared by all the 3 types of expressions (facts, processes and resources), are *variables* and *constants*. The set of variables is infinite. The set of constants may be finite or infinite. For now, we will make a simplifying assumption that the set of constants is $\{0, 1, 2, ...\}$. The set of *terms* is the union of the set of variables and the set of constants.

We also have a set of *fact letters* (called predicate letters in classical logic), with each of which is associated a natural number called *arity*.

*Facts* are the elements of the smallest set $F$ of expressions, such that, saying "$A$ is a fact" for "$A \in F$", we have:

[2] The reader will also find that the language which we described here is a slightly simplified version of our real formalism.

- $\bot$ is a fact;
- if $P$ is an $n$-ary fact letter and $t_1, ..., t_n$ are terms, then $P(t_1, ..., t_n)$ is a fact;
- if $A$ and $B$ are facts, then $(A) \rightarrow (B)$ is a fact;
- if $A$ is a fact and $x$ is a variable, then $\forall x(A)$ is a fact.

As we see, facts are nothing but formulas of classical first order logic. In the sequel, we will often omit some parentheses when we believe that this does not lead to ambiguity.

The other classical operators are introduced as standard abbreviations:

- $\neg A = A \rightarrow \bot$;
- $A \vee B = (\neg A) \rightarrow B$;
- $A \wedge B = \neg(\neg A \vee \neg B)$;
- $A \leftrightarrow B = (A \rightarrow B) \wedge (B \rightarrow A)$;
- $\top = \neg \bot$;
- $\exists x A = \neg \forall x \neg A$.

A *free variable* of a fact is a variable $x$ which has an occurrence in the fact which is not in the scope of $\forall x$ (not *bound* by $\forall$). A fact is *closed*, if it has no free variables.

A *situation* is a set $s$ of closed facts such that, using the expression $s \models A$ for $A \in s$, we have:

- $s \not\models \bot$;
- $s \models A \rightarrow B$ iff $s \not\models A$ or $s \models B$;
- $s \models \forall x A(x)$ iff $s \models A(a)$ for every constant $a$.

If $s \models A$, we say that $A$ is *true*, or *holds* in situation $s$.

We fix an infinite set $\mathcal{T}$ of *time moments* together with a strict linear ordering relation $<$ on it. $i \leq j$, as one can expect, means $i < j$ *or* $i = j$. We assume that $0 \in \mathcal{T}$ and, for all $i \in \mathcal{T}$, $0 \leq i$.

$\mathcal{T}^+$ denotes the set $\mathcal{T} \cup \{\infty\}$. The ordering relation $<$ is extended to $\mathcal{T}^+$ by assuming that for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $t < \infty$.

An *interval* is a pair $(i, j)$, where $i \in \mathcal{T}$, $j \in \mathcal{T}^+$ and $i < j$.

A *world* is a function $W$ which assigns to every time moment $i \in \mathcal{T}$ a situation $W(i)$.

# 4 Processes

**Definition 1** The set of *finitary processes* is the smallest set $FP$ of expressions such that, saying "$\alpha$ is a finitary process" for "$\alpha \in FP$", we have:

1. if $A$ is a fact, then $\angle A$ is a finitary process;
2. if $A$ is a fact, then $\updownarrow A$ is a finitary process;
3. if $A$ is a fact, then $\Uparrow A$ is a finitary process;
4. if $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are finitary processes, then so is $\alpha \dot{\rightarrow} \beta$;
5. if $\alpha$ is a finitary process and $x$ is a variable, then $\dot{\forall} x \alpha$ is a finitary process;
6. if $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are finitary processes, then so is $\alpha \rhd \beta$;
7. if $\alpha$ is a finitary process, then so is $[\rhd]\alpha$;
8. if $\alpha$ is a finitary process, then so is $[\trianglerighteq]\alpha$.

Some other process operators are introduced as abbreviations:

- $\dot{\bot} = \angle \bot$;
- $\dot{\top} = \angle \top$;
- $\dot{\neg} \alpha = \alpha \dot{\rightarrow} \dot{\bot}$;
- $\alpha \dot{\vee} \beta = (\dot{\neg} \alpha) \dot{\rightarrow} \beta$;
- $\alpha \dot{\wedge} \beta = \dot{\neg} (\dot{\neg} \alpha \dot{\vee} \dot{\neg} \beta)$;
- $\alpha \dot{\leftrightarrow} \beta = (\alpha \dot{\rightarrow} \beta) \dot{\wedge} (\beta \dot{\rightarrow} \alpha)$;
- $\dot{\exists} x \alpha = \dot{\neg} \dot{\forall} x \dot{\neg} \alpha$;
- $\Updownarrow \alpha = \angle \alpha \dot{\wedge} \Uparrow \alpha$;
- $\Downarrow \alpha = \angle \alpha \dot{\wedge} \updownarrow \alpha$;
- $\alpha \trianglerighteq \beta = \alpha \dot{\vee} (\alpha \rhd \beta)$.

A *closed process* is a process in which every variable is bound by $\forall$ or $\dot{\forall}$.

**Definition 2** *Truth* of a closed finitary process $\gamma$ on an interval $(i, j)$ in a world $W$, symbolically $W \models_{i,j} \gamma$, is defined as follows:

- $W \models_{i,j} \angle A$ iff $W(i) \models A$;
- $W \models_{i,j} \updownarrow A$ iff for all $r \in \mathcal{T}$ with $i < r < j$, $W(r) \models A$;

- $W \models_{i,j} \Uparrow A$ iff for all $r \in \mathcal{T}$ with $i < r \leq j$, $W(r) \models A$;
- $W \models_{i,j} \alpha \dot{\rightarrow} \beta$ iff $W \not\models_{i,j} \alpha$ or $W \models_{i,j} \beta$;
- $W \models_{i,j} \dot{\forall} x \alpha(x)$ iff for every constant $a$, $W \models_{i,j} A(a)$;
- $W \models_{i,j} \alpha \rhd \beta$ iff there is $e$ with $i < e < j$ such that $W \models_{i,e} \alpha$ and $W \models_{e,j} \beta$;
- $W \models_{i,j} [\rhd]\alpha$ iff there are $e_0, e_1, e_2, ... \in \mathcal{T}$ with $e_0 = i$, $e_0 < e_1 < e_2 < ... < j$ such that for every $k$, $W \models_{e_k, e_{k+1}} \alpha$;
- $W \models_{i,j} [\trianglerighteq]\alpha$ iff $W \models_{i,j} [\rhd]\alpha$ or there are $e_0, ..., e_n \in \mathcal{T}^+$ such that $e_0 = i$, $e_n = j$ and, for every $k: \ 0 \leq k < n$, $W \models_{e_k, e_{k+1}} \alpha$.

When we later define a semantics for resources, we will also have to deal with infinite process expressions.

**Definition 3** An *infinitary process* is defined by replacing in the definition of finitary process the word "finitary" by "infinitary" and adding the following 3 clauses:

- if $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, ...$ are infinitary processes, then so is $\alpha_0 \dot{\wedge} \alpha_1 \dot{\wedge} \alpha_2 \dot{\wedge} ...$;
- if $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, ...$ are infinitary processes and $k_1, k'_1, k_2, k'_2, ..., \in \mathcal{T}$, $k_1 < k'_1 < k_2 < k'_2 < ...$, then $\alpha_0 \rightsquigarrow_{k_1}^{k'_1} \alpha_1 \rightsquigarrow_{k_2}^{k'_2} \alpha_2 ...$ is an infinitary process;
- if $\alpha_0, ..., \alpha_n$ $(n \geq 1)$ are infinitary processes and $k_1, k'_1, ..., k_n, k'_n \in \mathcal{T}$, $k_1 < k'_1 < ... < k_n < k'_n$, then $\alpha_0 \rightsquigarrow_{k_1}^{k'_1} ... \rightsquigarrow_{k_n}^{k'_n} \alpha_n$ is an infinitary process.

Thus, every finitary process is, at the same time, an infinitary proves, but not vice versa. We will use the common name "process" for both types of processes.

**Definition 4** To get the definition of *truth* for closed infinitary processes, we replace the word "finitary" by "infinitary" in Definition 2 and add the following 3 clauses:

- $W \models_{i,j} \alpha_0 \dot{\wedge} \alpha_1 \dot{\wedge} \alpha_2 \dot{\wedge} ...$ iff for every $k$, $W \models_{i,j} \alpha_k$;
- $W \models_{i,j} \alpha_0 \rightsquigarrow_{k_1}^{k'_1} \alpha_1 \rightsquigarrow_{k_2}^{k'_2} \alpha_2 ...$ iff there are $e_0, e_1, e_2, ... \in \mathcal{T}$ such that $e_0 = i$ and, for each $m \geq 1$, $k_m < e_m < k'_m$ and $W \models_{e_{m-1}, e_m} \alpha_{m-1}$.
- $W \models_{i,j} \alpha_0 \rightsquigarrow_{k_1}^{k'_1} ... \rightsquigarrow_{k_n}^{k'_n} \alpha_n$ iff there are $e_0, , ...e_{n+1} \in \mathcal{T}$ such that $e_0 = i$, $e_{n+1} = j$, for each $m: \ 1 \leq m \leq n$, $k_m < e_m < k'_m$ and, for each $m: \ 1 \leq m \leq n+1$, $W \models_{e_{m-1}, e_m} \alpha_{m-1}$.

**Definition 5** A closed process is said to be *valid* iff it is true on every interval of every world.

Here are some simple observations (all processes are assumed to be closed):
Processes of the form of a classical tautology, such as, say, $\alpha \dot{\vee} \dot{\neg} \alpha$ or $\alpha \dot{\rightarrow} \alpha \dot{\wedge} \alpha$, are valid.
$(\Uparrow A \dot{\wedge} \Uparrow B) \leftrightarrow \Uparrow (A \wedge B)$ is valid.
$(\angle A \dot{\vee} \angle B) \leftrightarrow \angle (A \vee B)$ is valid.
$(\Uparrow A \ddot{\vee} \Uparrow B) \dot{\rightarrow} \Uparrow (A \vee B)$ is valid, but $\Uparrow (A \vee B) \dot{\rightarrow} (\Uparrow A \ddot{\vee} \Uparrow B)$ is not.
$\rhd$ is associative: $\big(\alpha \rhd (\beta \rhd \gamma)\big) \dot{\leftrightarrow} \big((\alpha \rhd \beta) \rhd \gamma\big)$ is valid.

# 5 Resources

At this level of the language we have 3 sorts of expressions: resources, DO-resources and DONE-resources. We define them simultaneously:

**Definition 6**

1. A *DO-resource* is an expression $\gg x_1, ..., x_m(\Phi_1, ..., \Phi_n)$ $(m \geq 0,\ n \geq 0)$, where the $x_i$ are variables and the $\Phi_i$ are DONE-resources. If $n = 1$, we can omit the parentheses and write just $\gg \Phi$; if $n = 0$, we write just $\gg$.

2. A *DONE-resource* is an expression $\ll x_1, ..., x_m(\Phi_1, ..., \Phi_n)$ $(m \geq 0,\ n \geq 1)$, where the $x_i$ are variables and the $\Phi_i$ are resources. If $n = 1$, we can omit the parentheses and write just $\ll \Phi$;

3. A *resource* is one of the following:

   - $\alpha\Phi$, where $\alpha$ is a finitary process and $\Phi$ is a DO-resource;
   - $\Phi \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi$, where $\Phi, \Psi$ are resources;
   - $\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi$, where $\Phi, \Psi$ are resources;[3]
   - $\ddot{\forall} x \Phi$, where $x$ is a variable and $\Phi$ is a resource.

We also introduce the following abbreviations:

- $\ddot{\bot} = \dot{\bot} \gg$;
- $\ddot{\top} = \dot{\top} \gg$;
- $\ddot{\neg} \Phi = \Phi \ddot{\rightarrow} \ddot{\bot}$;
- $\Phi \ddot{\vee} \Psi = (\ddot{\neg} \Phi) \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi$;

[3] In fact, $\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi$ can be defined as $\ddot{\neg}(\ddot{\neg} \Phi \dot{\vee} \ddot{\neg} \Psi)$ (see the $\ddot{\wedge}$-independent definition of $\ddot{\neg}$ and $\ddot{\vee}$ below), but we still prefer to treat $\ddot{\wedge}$ as a basic symbol.

- $\ddot{\exists} x\Phi = \ddot{\neg}\ddot{\forall} x\ddot{\neg}\Phi$;
- $\Phi\overline{\wedge}\Psi = \dot{\top} \gg (\ll \Phi, \ll \Psi)$;
- $\overline{\forall} x\Phi = \dot{\top} \gg x \ll \Phi$;
- $\Phi\overline{\vee}\Psi = \ddot{\neg}(\ddot{\neg}\Phi\overline{\wedge}\ddot{\neg}\Psi)$;
- $\overline{\exists} x\Phi = \ddot{\neg}(\overline{\forall} x\ddot{\neg}\Phi)$.

Thus, every resource is a $(\ddot{\rightarrow}, \ddot{\wedge}, \ddot{\forall})$-combination of expressions of the type

$$\alpha \gg \vec{x}\Big(\ll \vec{y_1}\big(\Phi_1^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1}), \ldots, \Phi_{k_1}^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1})\big), \ldots, \ll \vec{y_n}\big(\Phi_1^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n}), \ldots, \Phi_{k_n}^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n})\big)\Big),$$

where $\alpha$ is a finitary process and the $\Phi_i^j$ are resources. This expression represents an agent which maintains the process $\alpha$ as its effect; a command to it should be given by specifying $\vec{x}$ as a sequence $\vec{a}$ of constants, and specifying one of the $i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$. The expression to the right of $\gg$ represents the potential of this resource. We see that this potential is more complex than the type of potentials discussed in Section 2. The intuitive meaning of $\ll \vec{y_i}\big(\Phi_1^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i}), \ldots, \Phi_{k_i}^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i})\big)$ as a command is that slave has to produce the resource $\Phi_j^i(\vec{a}, \vec{b})$ for a $j$ $(1 \leq j \leq k_i)$ and $\vec{b}$ of his own choice, and report about this choice (along with the fact of executing the command) to master.

The operators $\gg$ and $\ll$, when followed by a nonempty list of variables, act as quantifiers: they bind the occurrences of these variables within their scope. An occurrence of a variable in a resource is said to be *free*, if it is not in the scope of $\gg$, $\ll$, $\forall$, $\dot{\forall}$ or $\ddot{\forall}$. If a resource does not contain free occurrences of variables, then it is said to be *closed*.

Note that our definition of resource allows infinite expressions: there is no requirement "... is the smallest set of expressions such that...". Naturally, we only want to deal with resources which can be expressed finitarily. One way to express certain class of infinite resources finitarily is to allow *recursive definitions* for their subexpressions. For safety, we will only allow definitions that have the following form:

$$\Phi := \ \gg \vec{x}\Big(\ll \vec{y_1}(\alpha_1^1\Phi_1^1, \ldots, \alpha_{k_1}^1\Phi_{k_1}^1), \ldots, \ll \vec{y_n}(\alpha_1^n\Phi_1^n, \ldots, \alpha_{k_n}^n\Phi_{k_n}^n)\Big), \qquad (1)$$

where the $\alpha_i^j$ are finitary processes and the $\Phi_i^j$ are DO-resources introduced by the same type (1) of recursive definitions, so that, $\Phi$, itself, can be among the $\Phi_i^j$.

A recursive definition is not a part of a formula but should be given separately, and if a resource contains a recursively defined subexpression $\Phi$, we assume that $\Phi$ just abbreviates the right-hand side of its definition.

Another type of finitarily represented infinite expressions we will allow in resources is

$$!\Phi,$$

which is understood as an abbreviation for the infinite conjunction

$$\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Phi \ddot{\wedge} ...$$

We will call the resources that are finite expressions, possibly containing !-expressions and recursively defined subexpressions of the form (1), *finitary resources*. Since we are going to deal only with this type of resources, from now on, the word "resource" will always refer to finitary resources.

We are now going to give a formal definition of the semantics for resources. This definition is in a game-semantical style as we understand a resource as a potential game between master and slave, where moves consist in giving commands and/or reporting execution of commands.

A *position* is one of the following:

- a resource;
- a DONE-resource;
- $\Phi \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi$, where $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ are positions;
- $\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi$, where $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ are positions;
- $\ddot{\forall} x \Phi$, where $x$ is a variable and $\Phi$ is a position.

When speaking about a subexpression of an expression, we are often interested in a concrete occurrence of this subexpression rather than the subexpression as an expression (which may have several occurrences). In order to stress that we mean a concrete occurrence, we shall use the words "osubexpression", "osubposition", etc. ("o" for "occurrence").

A *surface osubexpression* of a resource or a position is an osubexpression which is not in the scope of $\gg$ or $\ll$.

Such an osubexpression is *positive*, or has a *positive occurrence*, if it is in the scope of an even number of $\ddot{\rightarrow}$; otherwise it is *negative*.

**Definition 7** A *master's move* for a position $\Phi$ is a position which results from $\Phi$ by

- replacing some finite (possibly zero) number of positive surface osubpositions of the form $\alpha \gg \vec{x}\big(\Psi_1(\vec{x}), ..., \Psi_n(\vec{x})\big)$ by $\Psi_i(\vec{a})$ for some sequence $\vec{a}$ (of the same length as $\vec{x}$) of constants and some $i$ $(1 \leq i \leq n)$, and/or

- replacing some finite (possibly zero) number of negative surface osubpositions of the form $\ll \vec{x}\big(\Psi_1(\vec{x}), ..., \Psi_n(\vec{x})\big)$ by $\Psi_i(\vec{a})$ for some $\vec{a}$ and $i$ $(1 \leq i \leq n)$.

*Slave's move* is defined in the same way, only with the words "positive" and "negative" interchanged.

Thus, master's moves consist in giving commands in positive osubresources and reporting execution of commands in negative osubresources, while slave's moves consist in giving commands in negative osubresources and reporting execution of commands in positive osubresources.

Suppose $\Psi'$ and $\Psi''$ are master's and slave's moves for a position $\Phi$. Then the *composition* of these two moves with respect to $\Phi$ is the position $\Psi$ which results from $\Phi$ by combining all the changes made by master and slave in $\Phi$ in their $\Phi$-to-$\Psi'$ and $\Phi$-to-$\Psi''$ moves. $\Psi$ is said to be a *move* for $\Phi$. Note that every position is a move for itself.

For a position $\Phi$, a $\Phi$-*play*, or a *play over* $\Phi$, is a finite or infinite sequence of the type

$$\langle \Phi_0, t_1, \Phi_1, t_2, \Phi_2, ... \rangle,$$

where $\Phi_0 = \Phi$, the $t_i$ are increasing time moments $(t_1 < t_2 < ...)$ and, for each $i$, $\Phi_{i+1}$ is a move for $\Phi_i$.

A play is said to be *compact*, if no two neighboring positions ($\Phi_i$ and $\Phi_{i+1}$) in it are identical. If a play $P$ is not compact, its *compactization*, denoted by $P^+$, is the play which results from $P$ by deleting every position which is identical to the previous position, together with the time moment separating these two positions.

Intuitively, the $\Phi_i$ are the consecutive positions of the play, and $t_i$ is the time moment at which the position $\Phi_{i-1}$ is replaced by $\Phi_i$.

Note that the $(\dddot{\rightarrow}, \ddot{\wedge}, \ddot{\forall})$-structure of a position in a play is inherited by the subsequent positions.

Every (compact) play $P$ produces a unique process $P^*$ defined below. In this definition, "..." does not necessarily mean an infinite continuation of the list (play): such a list can be 1-element, $n$-element or infinite; in clause 6, $\vec{Q}$ stands for an arbitrary (possibly empty) sequence $t_1, \Gamma_1, t_2, \Gamma_2, ....$

**Definition 8** (of the operation $^*$)

1. $\langle \alpha \gg \Phi \rangle^* \ = \ \alpha.$
2. $\langle \Phi_0 \dddot{\rightarrow} \Psi_0,\ t_1,\ \Phi_1 \dddot{\rightarrow} \Psi_1,\ t_2,\ ... \rangle^* \ =$
   $\langle \Phi_0,\ t_1,\ \Phi_1,\ t_2,\ ... \rangle^{+*} \dddot{\rightarrow} \langle \Psi_0,\ t_1,\ \Psi_1,\ t_2,\ ... \rangle^{+*}.$

3. $\langle \Phi_0 \ddot{\wedge} \Psi_0,\ t_1,\ \Phi_1 \ddot{\wedge} \Psi_1,\ t_2,\ ...\rangle^* \ =$
$\langle \Phi_0,\ t_1,\ \Phi_1,\ t_2,\ ...\rangle^{+*} \dot{\wedge} \langle \Psi_0,\ t_1,\ \Psi_1,\ t_2,\ ...\rangle^{+*}.$

4. $\langle \ddot{\forall} x \Phi_0,\ t_1,\ \ddot{\forall} x \Phi_1,\ t_2,\ ...\rangle^* \ = \dot{\forall} x (\langle \Phi_0,\ t_1,\ \Phi_1,\ t_2,\ ..\rangle^*).$

5. $\langle \alpha \gg \vec{x}(\Psi_1(\vec{x}), ..., \Psi_n(\vec{x})), t, \Psi_i(\vec{a})\rangle^* = \dot{\bot}.$

6. If $P = \langle$
$$\alpha \gg \vec{x}\Big( \ll \vec{y_1}\big(\Psi_1^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1}), ..., \Psi_{k_1}^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1})\big), ..., \ll \vec{y_n}\big(\Psi_1^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n}), ..., \Psi_{k_n}^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n})\big)\Big),$$
$$k,$$
$$\ll \vec{y_i}\big(\Psi_1^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i}), ..., \Psi_{k_i}^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i})\big),$$
$$m,$$
$$\Psi_j^i(\vec{a}, \vec{b}),$$
$$\vec{Q}\rangle,$$
then
$$P^* \ = \ \alpha \rightsquigarrow_k^m \langle \Psi_j^i(\vec{a}, \vec{b}), \vec{Q}\rangle^*.$$

**Explanation:** According to clause 3, a play over a $\ddot{\wedge}$-conjunction of resources produces the $\dot{\wedge}$-conjunction of the processes produced by the (sub)plays over the conjuncts of the resource. Similarly for the other double-dotted connectives $\ddot{\rightarrow}$ (clause 2) and $\ddot{\forall}$ (clause 4).

A play over
$$\alpha \gg \vec{x}\Big( \ll \vec{y_1}\big(\Psi_1^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1}), ..., \Psi_{k_1}^1(\vec{x}, \vec{y_1})\big), ..., \ll \vec{y_n}\big(\Psi_1^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n}), ..., \Psi_{k_n}^n(\vec{x}, \vec{y_n})\big)\Big)$$
produces $\alpha$, if no moves have been made (clause 1). If a command
$$\ll \vec{y_i}\big(\Psi_1^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i}), ..., \Psi_{k_i}^i(\vec{a}, \vec{y_i})\big)$$
was given but a report never followed (clause 5), we consider this a failure of the non-reporting resource to carry out its task, and associate the always-false process $\dot{\bot}$ with this play so that it is never successful. Finally, if a report $\Psi_j^i(\vec{a}, \vec{b})$ followed the command, the play produces $\alpha \rightsquigarrow_k^m \beta$, where $k$ is the moment of the command, $m$ is the moment of the report, and $\beta$ is the process produced by the subplay over $\Psi_j^i(\vec{a}, \vec{b})$; truth of this $\rightsquigarrow$-process means that the process $\alpha$ switches to the process $\beta$ at some time after the command and before the report.

One can show that as long as $\Phi$ is a closed finitary process, the process $P^*$ produced by a $\Phi$-play $P$ is always a closed infinitary process in the sense of Definition 3.

A *slave's strategy* is a function $f$ which assigns to every position $\Phi$ a slave's move for $\Phi$. We assume that this function is implemented as a program on a

machine, and we denote by $f'(\Phi)$ the time this program takes to give an output for input $\Phi$; if the program doesn't give any output, or gives an output which is not a slave's move for $\Phi$, then we assume that $f'(\Phi) = \infty$.

Let $\Phi_0$ be a resource and $f$ be a slave's strategy. Here is an informal definition of a $\Phi_0$-*play with slave's strategy* $f$. The play starts at moment 0, and at this stage it is the one-position (sub)play $\langle\Phi_0\rangle$. Slave, i.e. the function $f$, takes $\Phi_0$ as an input, and starts computing an output for it, — thinking what move to make for $\Phi_0$. While slave is thinking, master can make some moves $\Phi_1, ..., \Phi_n$ at time moments $t_1, ..., t_n$, where $n \geq 0$, $t_1 < ... < t_n$ and each $\Phi_i$ $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ is a master's move for $\Phi_{i-1}$. Note that $\Phi_n$ is a master's move for $\Phi_0$ by the transitivity of this relation. The play has thus evolved to

$$\langle\Phi_0, t_1, \Phi_1, ..., t_n, \Phi_n\rangle.$$

Finally, at moment $t_{n+1} = f'(\Phi_0)$, $f$ computes a slave's move $\Psi$ for $\Phi_0$, and the next two items of the play become $t_{n+1}$ and $\Phi_{n+1}$, where $\Phi_{n+1}$ is the composition of $\Psi$ and $\Phi_n$ with respect to $\Phi_0$. Note that $\Phi_{n+1}$ is, at the same time, a slave's move for $\Phi_n$.

So far slave has been busy processing the input $\Phi_0$ and did not see master's moves. Only now he looks at the current (last) position and sees that it is $\Phi_{n+1}$. So, he takes this position as a new input, and starts computing a move for it. While slave is thinking on his second move, master can continue making moves and the play can evolve to

$$\langle\Phi_0, t_1, \Phi_1, ..., t_n, \Phi_n, t_{n+1}, \Phi_{n+1}, ..., t_m, \Phi_m\rangle$$

until, at some moment $t_{m+1}$, slave comes up with a move $\Gamma$ for $\Phi_{n+1}$. The next two items of the play become $t_{m+1}$ and $\Phi_{m+1}$, where $\Phi_{m+1}$ is the composition of $\Gamma$ and $\Phi_m$ with respect to $\Phi_{n+1}$. And so on...

If, at some stage, $f$ fails to compute a move, that is, thinks for an infinitely long time, then all the further moves will be made only by master. In this case, master may make not only a finite, but also an infinite number of consecutive moves.

We say that a play $P$ is *successful* with respect to a world $W$, iff $W \models_{0,\infty} P^*$.

A slave's strategy is said to be *universally successful* for a closed resource $\Phi$, iff every $\Phi$-play with this strategy is successful with respect to every world.

**Definition 9** We say that a resource is *universally valid* iff there is a universally successful slave's strategy for it.

# 6 Resource schemata

In this section we extend our language by adding to it *resource letters*. Formulas of this extended language can be viewed as schemata for resources, where

resource letters stand for resources.

Every resource letter has a fixed arity. The definition of *resource schema* is the same as the definition of resource (where the word "resource" is replaced by "resource schema"), with the following additional clause:

- if $\Phi$ is an $n$-ary resource letter and $t_1, ..., t_n$ are terms, then $\Phi(t_1, ..., t_n)$ is a resource schema.

For safety, we assume that the set of variables occurring in resource schemata is a proper subset of the set of variables of the language introduced in the previous sections, and that there are infinitely many variables in the latter that don't occur in resource schemata.

A resource is said to be *safe* if it is $\dot{\top}\Phi$ for some DO-resource $\Phi$, or a $(\ddot{\rightarrow}, \ddot{\wedge}, \ddot{\forall})$-combination of resources of this type.

Safe resources are what we could call "effectless" resources: they are not responsible for maintaining any nontrivial process and their value is associated only with their convertibility into other resources.

A *substitution* (resp. *safe substitution*) is a function $\tau$ which assigns to every $n$-ary resource letter $\Phi$ a resource (resp. safe resource) $\tau\Phi = \Psi(x_1, ..., x_n)$ with exactly $n$ free variables which does not contain any variables that might occur in resource schemata.

Given a resource schema $\Phi$ and a substitution $\tau$, $\Phi^\tau$ is defined as a result of substituting in $\Phi$ every resource letter $P$ by $\tau P$. More precisely,

- for an atomic resource schema $\Phi$ of the form $P(t_1, ..., t_n)$, where the $t_i$ are terms and $\tau P = \Psi(x_1, ..., x_n)$, we have $\Phi^\tau = \Psi(t_1, ..., t_n)$;
- $\Big(\alpha \gg \vec{x}\Big(\ll \vec{y_1}(\Phi_1^1, \ldots, \Phi_{k_1}^1), \ldots, \ll \vec{y_n}(\Phi_1^n, \ldots, \Phi_{k_n}^n)\Big)\Big)^\tau =$
  $\alpha \gg \vec{x}\Big(\ll \vec{y_1}((\Phi_1^1)^\tau, \ldots, (\Phi_{k_1}^1)^\tau), \ldots, \ll \vec{y_n}((\Phi_1^n)^\tau, \ldots, (\Phi_{k_n}^n)^\tau)\Big)$;
- $(\Phi \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi)^\tau = \Phi^\tau \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi^\tau$;
- $(\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi)^\tau = \Phi^\tau \ddot{\wedge} \Psi^\tau$;
- $(\ddot{\forall} x \Phi)^\tau = \ddot{\forall} x(\Phi^\tau)$.

We say that a resource $\Phi$ is an *instance* of a resource schema $\Psi$, iff $\Phi = \Psi^\tau$ for some substitution $\tau$. If $\tau$ is a safe substitution, then $\Phi$ is said to be a *safe instance* of $\Psi$.

**Definition 10** We say that a resource schema $\Psi$ is *universally valid* (resp. *universally s-valid*) iff there is slave's strategy such that for every instance (resp. safe instance) $\Phi$ of $\Psi$, the $\Phi$-play with this strategy is successful with respect to every world.

# 7 The MALL and MLL fragments

Our logic, — the set of universally valid resources or resource schemata, — is certainly undecidable in the full language as it contains first order classical logic. However, some reasonably efficient heuristic algorithms can apparently be found for it. Also, some natural fragments of the logic are decidable. This paper doesn't address these issues in detail as its main goal is to introduce the language and the semantics and show possible applications in case efficient algorithms are elaborated. This is a beginning of the work rather than a completed work.

Here we only state the decidability of two fragments of the logic. The first one we call the MALL fragment. Its language is the same as that of Multiplicative-Additive Linear Logic, where $\ddot{\rightarrow}$, $\ddot{\wedge}$, $\overline{\wedge}$ and $\overline{\forall}$ correspond to the multiplicative implication, multiplicative conjunction, additive conjunction and (additive) universal quantifier of linear logic, respectively. Here is the definition:

*MALL-formulas* are the elements of the smallest class $M$ of expressions such that, saying "$\Phi$ is a MALL-formula" for $\Psi \in M$, we have:

- $\ddot{\bot}$ is a MALL-formula;
- if $\Psi$ is an $n$-ary resource letter and $t_1, ..., t_n$ are terms, then $\Psi(t_1, ..., t_n)$ is a MALL-formula;
- if $\Psi$ and $\Phi$ are MALL-formulas, then so is $\Phi \ddot{\rightarrow} \Psi$;
- if $\Psi$ and $\Phi$ are MALL-formulas, then so is $\Phi \ddot{\wedge} \Psi$;
- if $\Psi$ and $\Phi$ are MALL-formulas, then so is $\Phi \overline{\wedge} \Psi$;
- if $\Psi$ is a MALL-formula and $x$ is a variable, then $\overline{\forall} x \Psi$ is a MALL-formula.

Here is our main technical claim:

**Claim 1** *The set of universally s-valid closed MALL formulas is decidable. In particular, it is the logic ET introduced in [10]. The decision algorithm is constructive: it not only states the existence of a successful strategy (when it exists), but actually finds such a strategy.*

We let this claim go without a proof. An interested reader who carefully studies [10] should be able to re-write the soundness and completeness proof for *ET* given there as a proof of the above claim. In fact, our proof in [10] establishes the completeness of *ET* in a much stronger sense than claimed above (see section 13).

A *MLL-formula* ("Multiplicative Linear Logic") is a MALL-formula which does not contain $\overline{\wedge}$ or $\overline{\forall}$. Since we have no quantifiers, we assume that all resource letters in MLL-formulas are 0-ary. We have a stronger soundness/decidability

result for the MLL-fragment of our logic. Stronger in the sense that it is about validity rather than s-validity.

A MLL-formula is said to be a *binary tautology*, if it is an instance of a classical tautology (with the double-dots placed over $\bot$, $\wedge$ and $\to$) in which every predicate letter (non-$\bot$ propositional atom) occurs at most twice. For example, $\Phi\ddot{\wedge}\Psi\ddot{\to}\Phi$ is a binary tautology, and so is $\Phi\ddot{\wedge}\Phi\ddot{\to}\Phi$ as the latter is an instance of the former; however, $\Phi\ddot{\to}\Phi\ddot{\wedge}\Phi$ is not a binary tautology. Note that in fact a binary tautology is always an instance of a classical tautology where every predicate letter has either one occurrence, or two occurrences, one of which is positive and the other — negative. Blass [2] was the first to study binary tautologies and find a natural semantics for them.

**Claim 2** *A MLL-formula is universally valid iff it is a binary tautology. Hence, validity for MLL-formulas is decidable; again, the decision algorithm is constructive.*

The "only if" part of this claim follows from Claim 1 together with an observation that a MLL-formula is a binary tautology iff it is in $ET$. The "if" part, as always, is easier to verify, and instead of giving an actual proof, we will just explain the idea behind it on particular examples.

The simplest binary tautology is $\Phi\ddot{\to}\Phi$. Why is it universally valid? Observe that since one of the two occurrences of $\Phi$ is negative and the other occurrence is positive, what is a master's move in one occurrence of $\Phi$, is a slave's move in the other occurrence of $\Phi$, and vice versa. The slave's strategy which ensures that every play is successful, consists in *pairing* these two occurrences: copying master's moves, made in either occurrence, into the other occurrence. For example, let $\Phi$ be

$$\alpha \gg \Big(\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg),\ \ \ll (\delta \gg)\Big).$$

Then, the initial position is

$$\alpha \gg \Big(\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg),\ \ \ll (\delta \gg)\Big)\ \ \ddot{\to}\ \ \alpha \gg \Big(\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg),\ \ \ll (\delta \gg)\Big).$$

Slave waits (keeps returning the above position without changes) until master makes a move. If master never makes a move, then (after compactization) we deal with a one-position (0-move) play and, according to the clauses 2 and 1 of Definition 8, the process produced by this play is $\alpha\ddot{\to}\alpha$. Clearly, this process is valid and hence the play is successful. Otherwise, if master makes a move at some moment $t_1$, this should be replacing the positive occurrence of $\alpha \gg \Big(\ll (\beta \gg, \gamma \gg),\ \ll (\delta \gg)\Big)$ by either $\ll (\beta \gg, \gamma \gg)$ or $\ll (\delta \gg)$. Suppose the former. Thus, the next position of the play is

$$\alpha \gg \big(\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg),\ \ \ll (\delta \gg)\big)\ \ \ddot{\to}\ \ \ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg).$$

Then slave does the same in the antecedent of this position, thus making

$$\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg) \ \ddot{\to} \ \ \ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg)$$

the next position of the play. This move will happen at time moment $t_2$ which is greater than $t_1$ by the time slave needs to copy the master's move.

After this, slave waits again until master reports an execution of this command. If this never happens, then the play is successful because, by the clauses 2 and 5 of Definition 8, the process it produces is $\dot{\bot}\ddot{\to}\dot{\bot}$, which is always true. Otherwise, at some moment $t_3 > t_2$, master reports an execution by replacing $\ll (\beta \gg,\ \gamma \gg)$ by, say, $\gamma \gg$. So that the next position now becomes

$$\gamma \gg \ \ddot{\to} \ \ll (\beta \gg, \gamma \gg).$$

Then, as soon as he can, — at some moment $t_4$, — slave reports the same in the consequent of this position, and we get

$$\gamma \gg \ \ddot{\to} \gamma \gg .$$

Since there are no moves for this position, the play ends here. An analysis of the clause 6 of Definition 8 convinces us that the process produced by this play is

$$\left(\alpha \rightsquigarrow_{t_2}^{t_3} \gamma\right) \dot{\to} \left(\alpha \rightsquigarrow_{t_1}^{t_4} \gamma\right).$$

Since $t_1 < t_2 < t_3 < t_4$, it is easily seen that this process is valid, and thus the play is successful.

A similar strategy can be used for other binary tautologies. E.g., the strategy for $\Phi\ddot{\wedge}(\Phi\ddot{\to}\Psi) \ddot{\to} \Psi$ consists in pairing the two occurrences of $\Phi$ and pairing the two occurrences of $\Psi$. This trick, however, fails for resources that are not binary tautologies. For example, in $\Phi\ddot{\to}\Phi\ddot{\wedge}\Phi$, slave can pair the negative occurrence of $\Phi$ only with one of the two positive occurrences of $\Phi$. The (sub)play over the unpaired occurrence then may produce a false process while the (sub)play over the negative occurrence — a true process. In that case the process produced by the whole play over $\Phi\ddot{\to}\Phi\ddot{\wedge}\Phi$ will be false.

# 8 The assembly world in terms processes

What is going on in a computer at the assembly language (as well as higher) level can be formalized in our language as a process. Here we consider an example of a simplified assembly world.

Our "computer" has only 3 memory locations or registers: $L_1$, initially containing 2, $L_2$, initially containing 0, and $L_3$, initially containing 0. The assembly language for this "architecture" has only 3 commands: command #1, command #2, command #3. Command #i results in adding the contents of the other two locations and writing it in $L_i$.

There are several ways to formalize this situation in our language, and here is one of them.

Since giving a command is an instantaneous event, we assume that command #i creates a "puls" which makes the contents of $L_i$ change. Creating a puls means making a certain fact — denote it by $P_i$ for command #i — become true for one moment. Between commands another fact, $Np$ ("no puls"), holds. It can be defined by

$$Np =_{df} \neg\big(P_1 \vee P_2 \vee P_3\big). \tag{2}$$

The further abbreviations we will use for convenience are:

$$\begin{aligned}
\alpha_1 &=_{df} \ \angle P_1 \dot{\wedge} \updownarrow Np \\
\alpha_2 &=_{df} \ \angle P_2 \dot{\wedge} \updownarrow Np \\
\alpha_3 &=_{df} \ \angle P_3 \dot{\wedge} \updownarrow Np
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, issuing command #i can be seen as starting (switching to) process $\alpha_i$.

The formulas $\lambda_1$, $\lambda_2$ and $\lambda_3$, defined below, are meant to describe the behavior of the processes going on in the 3 locations:[4]

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda_1 &=_{df} \ [\trianglerighteq]\Big(\angle P_1 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \updownarrow \neg P_1 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \dot{\exists} x, y\big(\angle L2(x) \dot{\wedge} \angle L3(y) \dot{\wedge} \Uparrow L1(x+y)\big)\Big) \\
\lambda_2 &=_{df} \ [\trianglerighteq]\Big(\angle P_2 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \updownarrow \neg P_2 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \dot{\exists} x, y\big(\angle L1(x) \dot{\wedge} \angle L3(y) \dot{\wedge} \Uparrow L2(x+y)\big)\Big) \\
\lambda_3 &=_{df} \ [\trianglerighteq]\Big(\angle P_3 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \updownarrow \neg P_3 \ \dot{\wedge} \ \dot{\exists} x, y\big(\angle L1(x) \dot{\wedge} \angle L2(y) \dot{\wedge} \Uparrow L3(x+y)\big)\Big)
\end{aligned}$$

Before we analyze the $\lambda_i$, let us agree on some jargon. Every (true) process $[\triangleright]\gamma$ or $\gamma_1 \triangleright \ldots \triangleright \gamma_n$ can be divided into $\triangleright$-*stages*, which are the consecutive time intervals on which $\gamma$ is true. A transition from one stage to another will be referred to as a $\triangleright$-*transition*. Similarly, we will use the terms "$\trianglerighteq$-stage" and "$\trianglerighteq$-transition" for processes of the type $[\trianglerighteq]\gamma$ or $\gamma_1 \trianglerighteq \ldots \trianglerighteq \gamma_n$.

In these terms, $\lambda_i$ starts its $\trianglerighteq$-stage when puls $P_i$ is given (the conjunct $\angle P_i$), and will stay in this stage exactly until the same puls is given again. A $\trianglerighteq$-transition to the new stage before this is impossible because, due to the conjunct $\angle P_i$, that stage requires that $P_i$ be true at the moment of the transition. And a late transition to a new stage is also impossible because, as soon as $P_i$ becomes true, the conjunct $\Uparrow \neg P_i$ is violated. Throughout each $\trianglerighteq$-stage, except its first moment, the location $L_i$ then stores the sum of the values that the other two locations had at the initial moment of the stage.

[4] Although our language does not allow terms such as $x + y$, we can pretend that it does, because every expression containing this kind of terms can be rewritten as an equivalent legal expression the language defined in the previous sections. So that, for convenience, here and later we assume that our language is based on predicate logic with function symbols and identity rather than pure predicate logic.

Now we need to axiomatize the situation where the initial value of $L1$ is 2, the initial values of the other two locations are 0, and these values will be maintained until the corresponding command (puls) is given. This will be captured by the following 3 axioms:

$$\Big((\Updownarrow L_1(2))\dot{\wedge}(\Downarrow \neg P_1)\Big) \trianglerighteq \lambda_1 \tag{3}$$

$$\Big((\Updownarrow L_2(0))\dot{\wedge}(\Downarrow \neg P_2)\Big) \trianglerighteq \lambda_2 \tag{4}$$

$$\Big((\Updownarrow L_3(0))\dot{\wedge}(\Downarrow \neg P_3)\Big) \trianglerighteq \lambda_3 \tag{5}$$

Next, for safety, we need to state that two different pulses cannot happen simultaneously:

$$\Updownarrow \Big(\neg(P_1 \wedge P_2) \wedge \neg(P_1 \wedge P_3) \wedge \neg(P_2 \wedge P_3)\Big) \tag{6}$$

We also need to axiomatize some sufficient amount of the arithmetic needed. We may assume that $Arithm$ is the conjunction of the axioms of Robinson's arithmetic (see [11]), although, for our purposes, just

$$2+0=2 \wedge 2+2=4 \wedge 2+4=6 \wedge 6+4=10$$

would do as $Arithm$. In any case,

$$\Updownarrow Arithm \tag{7}$$

should be one of our axioms.

The final axiom below represents a program which, after being idle ($\Downarrow Np$), issues command #2, then command #3, then command #1 and then, again, command #2.

$$(\Downarrow Np) \rhd \alpha_2 \rhd \alpha_3 \rhd \alpha_1 \rhd \alpha_2. \tag{8}$$

Our claim is that given the truth of these axioms, we can conclude that the process $\Updownarrow L_2(10)$ will be reached at some point. In other words, the process

$$\Big((3)\dot{\wedge}(4)\dot{\wedge}(5)\dot{\wedge}(6)\dot{\wedge}(7)\dot{\wedge}(8)\Big) \dot{\rightarrow} \Big(\dot{\top} \rhd \Updownarrow L_2(10)\Big)$$

is valid. Indeed, in the initial situation,[5] we have

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(0),\ L_3(0),\ Np.$$

[5]We use the word "situation" with a relaxed meaning: here it denotes some "core" subset of facts rather than a complete set of facts.

While we have $Np$, the values of $L_1$, $L_2$, $L_3$ cannot change, because a $\trianglerighteq$-transition to $\lambda_i$ would require the truth (at the moment of transition) of $P_i$, which is ruled out by (2). So, the situation will change only if a puls $P_i$ occurs.

The first stage $\Downarrow Np$ of axiom 8 prevents occurring such pulses. So, the situation will change exactly when the process (8) makes a $\triangleright$-transition from $\Downarrow Np$ to $\alpha_2$, i.e. to $\angle P_2 \dot{\wedge} \updownarrow Np$. This transition forces (4) to switch to $\lambda_2$, which results in starting the process $\Uparrow L_2(2)$: $L_2$ will have its old value 0 at the first moment of the stage, and the value 2 after that. On the other hand, in view of (6), no $\trianglerighteq$-transition can happen in (3) or (5). Thus, the situation at the moment of transition becomes

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(0),\ L3(0),\ P_2,$$

which will become

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(2),\ L3(0),\ Np$$

right after the moment of transition because of $\Uparrow L_2(2)$ and $\updownarrow Np$.

Continuing arguing in this manner, we get that the further development of situations is:

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(2),\ L_3(0),\ P_3,$$

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(2),\ L_3(4),\ Np,$$

$$L_1(2),\ L_2(2),\ L_3(4),\ P_1,$$

$$L_1(6),\ L_2(2),\ L_3(4),\ Np,$$

$$L_1(6),\ L_2(2),\ L_3(4),\ P_2,$$

$$L_1(6),\ L_2(10),\ L_3(4),\ Np.$$

Since the last stage of the program (8) contains the conjunct $\updownarrow Np$, no further changes will occur, and the value of $L_2$ will remain 10.

# 9 The assembly world in terms of resources

The example from the previous section shows that the process level of our logic could be used as a system/program specification and verification tool. But to use the logic for constructing new programs, we need the higher, — resource, — level.

In the previous example we dealt with processes that ran "by themselves". We could not interfere and manage them, so that there was no space for planning.

Presenting the world as a set of resources rather than processes allows us to capture our ability to influence the course of events in the world. Our way to interact with the world is giving and receiving commands.

Here is an attempt to present the assembly world as a resource. We assume that we have, as an empty-potential resource, the $\dot\wedge$-conjunction $\Gamma$ of the axioms (3)-(7), suffixed by $\gg$:

$$\Gamma =_{df} \ \Big((3)\dot\wedge(4)\dot\wedge(5)\dot\wedge(6)\dot\wedge(7)\Big) \gg .$$

As for axiom (8), which is a "ready program", instead of it we have a resource which accepts from us any of those 3 commands, as many times as we like.

This resource will be expressed by

$$(\Downarrow Np)\Theta, \tag{9}$$

where $\Theta$ is introduced by the recursive definition

$$\Theta := \gg \Big(\ll(\alpha_1\Theta), \ll(\alpha_2\Theta), \ll(\alpha_3\Theta)\Big).$$

Now we can ask the question if we can accomplish the task $\Big(\dot\top\triangleright(\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg$. In other words, whether

$$\Gamma\ddot\wedge(9) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg \Big)$$

is universally valid. Yes, it is. The strategy is:

Convert $(\Downarrow Np)\Theta$ into $\ll(\alpha_2\Theta)$; after getting the report $\alpha_2\Theta$, convert it into $\ll(\alpha_3\Theta)$; after getting the report $\alpha_3\Theta$, convert it into $\ll(\alpha_1\Theta)$; after getting the report $\alpha_1\Theta$, convert it into $\ll(\alpha_2\Theta)$, and stop.

Thus, unless (9) fails to carry out its task, the only play corresponding to this strategy is the following sequence of positions:

0. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big((\Downarrow Np)\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
1. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\ll\alpha_2\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
1′. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\alpha_2\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
2. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\ll\alpha_3\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
2′. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\alpha_3\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
3. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\ll\alpha_1\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
3′. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\alpha_1\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
4. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\ll\alpha_2\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$
4′. $\Gamma\ddot\wedge\big(\alpha_2\Theta\big) \ddot\to \Big(\Big(\dot\top \triangleright (\Updownarrow L2(10))\Big) \gg\Big)$.

One can easily see that this play produces the same process as the process described in the previous section, and hence it achieves the goal provided that the resources $\Gamma$ and (9) successfully accomplish their tasks.

However, this is not the best way to represent the assembly world. Although it avoids the representational frame problem, — no need in anything like frame axioms, — the inferential frame problem[6] still remains: in an analysis of the play, after every move, we need to verify that only one $\dot\wedge$-conjunct of $\Gamma$ (which is the major part of the world) changes its $\trianglerighteq$-stage; these changes are not reflected in the current position — $\Gamma$ remains $\Gamma$ and we need to separately keep track of in what stages the $\trianglerighteq$-processes of its effect are. It is just the presence of the operators $\triangleright$, $\trianglerighteq$, $[\triangleright]$, $[\trianglerighteq]$ in resources that makes a trouble of this kind.

A better way to represent the assembly world, which avoids the inferential (along with the representational) frame problem is to view each memory location as an independent resource which can directly accept our commands. Then we can be sure that a command changes only the resource (the contents of the location) to which it is given, and we don't need to check or re-write the other agents of the system as long as their effects don't contain the operators $\triangleright$, $\trianglerighteq$, $[\triangleright]$, $[\trianglerighteq]$.

Below is a description of this sort of axiomatization for the assembly world. Observe that it is totally $(\triangleright, \trianglerighteq, [\triangleright], [\trianglerighteq])$-free.

Let

$$\Lambda_1 := \gg\!\ll \Big(\Big(\dot\exists x, y\big(\angle L_2(x)\dot\wedge\angle L_3(y)\dot\wedge \Uparrow L_1(x+y)\big)\Big)\Lambda_1\Big)$$

$$\Lambda_2 := \gg\!\ll \Big(\Big(\dot\exists x, y\big(\angle L_1(x)\dot\wedge\angle L_3(y)\dot\wedge \Uparrow L_2(x+y)\big)\Big)\Lambda_2\Big)$$

$$\Lambda_3 := \gg\!\ll \Big(\Big(\dot\exists x, y\big(\angle L_1(x)\dot\wedge\angle L_2(y)\dot\wedge \Uparrow L_3(x+y)\big)\Big)\Lambda_3\Big)$$

We assume the following axioms:

$$\Big(\Updownarrow L_1(2)\Big)\Lambda_1 \tag{10}$$

$$\Big(\Updownarrow L_2(0)\Big)\Lambda_2 \tag{11}$$

$$\Big(\Updownarrow L_3(0)\Big)\Lambda_3 \tag{12}$$

together with $\Big((6)\ddot\wedge(7)\Big) \gg$.

Thus, each of the agents (10), (11), (12) accepts one single command, the execution of which results in writing in the corresponding location the sum of the contents of the other two locations. A strategy for achieving the goal $\big(\dot\top\triangleright \Updownarrow L2(10)\big) \gg$ is: Give a command to (11), then to (12), then to (10) and

[6] For a discussion of these 2 sorts of frame problem, see [17].

then, again, to (11). A reasonable algorithm which finds this kind of strategy and verifies its successfulness, would only keep track of the changes that occur in the effect of the resource to which a command is given. As we noted, however, this relaxed behavior of the algorithm is possible only if those effects don't contain the "trouble maker" operators $\rhd$, $\trianglerighteq$, $[\rhd]$ and $[\trianglerighteq]$.

# 10 The navigation world

Yet another example. We have $n$ moving agents. According to our commands, they move up, down, left or right one cell on an $k \times m$ or $\infty \times \infty$ board. Some cells are closed. If an agent receives a command to move into it, it will fail to move and remain in the old cell. The same happens if that cell is already occupied by another agent. Also, some cells contain pits. If an agent moves there, it will fall into the pit and get stuck there. For each agent, we can also test if there is a pit in a neighboring cell (but we cannot know in which one exactly). Problems we need to solve are like this: given some (maybe incomplete, disjunctive) information about which cells are closed or have pits, and about the initial and the goal positions of the agents, find a way how to achieve that goal.

Let us try to formalize this in our language.

First of all, the fact letters (atoms) we need are:

- $Up(x, y)$ (cell $y$ is the upper neighbor of cell $x$)
- $Left(x, y)$ (cell $y$ is to the left-hand neighbor of cell $x$)
- $Pit(x)$ (cell $x$ has a pit)
- $Closed(x)$ (cell $x$ is closed)
- $In(z, x)$ (agent $z$ is in cell $x$).

$Down(x, y)$ and $Right(x, y)$ can be defined as $Up(y, x)$ and $Left(y, x)$, respectively.

$Neighbor(x, y)$ can be defined as $Up(x, y) \vee Down(x, y) \vee Left(x, y) \vee Right(x, y)$.

Let

$$Cannotmove(x, y) =_{df} \Updownarrow Pit(x) \ \dot{\vee} \ \Updownarrow Closed(y) \ \dot{\vee} \ \dot{\exists} z' \big( \angle In(z', y) \big).$$

This process is true on an interval iff cell $x$ has a pit, or cell $y$ is closed, or, at the initial moment of the interval, cell $y$ is occupied by some agent $z'$. This corresponds to a situation where an agent cannot move from cell $x$ to cell $y$: if cell $x$ has a pit, the agent is trapped there and cannot move anywhere; and if cell $y$ is closed or occupied, the agent cannot move into it.

Let

$$Leftcommand(z) =_{df} \quad \dot{\exists} x, y\Big(\angle In(z,x) \ \dot{\wedge} \ \Updownarrow Left(x,y) \ \dot{\wedge}$$

$$\big(Cannotmove(x,y) \ \dot{\wedge} \ \Uparrow In(z,x)\big) \ \dot{\vee} \ \big(\dot{\neg} Cannotmove(x,y) \ \dot{\wedge} \ \Uparrow In(z,y)\big)\Big).$$

This process represents what happens when agent $z$ tries to execute the command to move left: $x$ is the cell in which the agent is staying at that moment, $y$ is the left-hand neighbor of $x$; if it is impossible to move from $x$ to $y$ (i.e. if $Cannotmove(x,y)$ is true), then the agent stays in $x$; otherwise it moves to $y$.

The processes $Rightcommand(z)$, $Upcommand(z)$ and $Downcommand(z)$ are defined similarly.

Now, the potential of an agent $z$ can be represented as the following DO-resource $\Pi(z)$:

$$\Pi(z) := \ \gg\Big(\ll\big(Leftcommand(z)\Pi(z)\big), \ \ll\big(Rightcommand(z)\Pi(z)\big),$$
$$\ll\big(Upcommand(z)\Pi(z)\big), \ \ll\big(Downcommand(z)\Pi(z)\big)\Big).$$

Let

$$Safe(z) =_{def} \ \dot{\exists} x\Big(\angle In(z,x) \dot{\wedge} \dot{\forall} y\big(\Updownarrow Neighbor(x,y) \ \dot{\rightarrow} \ \Updownarrow \neg Pit(y)\big)\Big).$$

This process is true iff there are no pits in cells neighboring to the cell in which agent $z$ is at the initial moment of of the interval.

Now, let

$$Test'(z) := \ \gg\!\ll\Big(\big(Safe(z)\big)Test'(z), \ \big(\dot{\neg} Safe(z)\big)Test'(z)\Big),$$

and let

$$Test(z) = \dot{\top} Test'(z).$$

$Test(z)$ represents the resource that allows us to test whether the immediate neighborhood of the current location of agent $z$ is pit-free. This is the first natural example we have seen so far where $\ll$ has more than one argument. This is how it works: we give $Test(z)$ the only possible command, and thus pass to the position

$$\ll\Big(\big(Safe(z)\big)Test'(z), \ \big(\dot{\neg} Safe(z)\big)Test'(z)\Big).$$

The resource has to report an execution of our command by making either the move $\big(Safe(z)\big)Test'(z)$ or the move $\big(\dot{\neg} Safe(z)\big)Test'(z)$. In the former case we can be sure that the current location of $z$ is in a safe neighborhood, and in

the latter case we will come to know that this neighborhood is unsafe. Note how we handled a partial knowledge/knowledge acquisition problem without having special operators for knowledge. Slave's strategy can rely on his ability to acquire knowledge using $Test$: what his further actions are may depend on the outcome of this test. For example, the strategy may say that if the outcome is "safe", then move left, and otherwise move down.

The following two axioms state that having a pit or being closed is something that never changes in time:

$$\Big(\dot{\forall} x(\Updownarrow Pit(x) \mathbin{\dot{\vee}} \Updownarrow \neg Pit(x))\Big) \gg$$

$$\Big(\dot{\forall} x(\Updownarrow Closed(x) \mathbin{\dot{\vee}} \Updownarrow \neg Closed(x))\Big) \gg$$

We would also have to state some arithmetic facts describing the cell configuration in terms of $Up$ and $Left$; these facts, as axioms, should be prefixed by $\Updownarrow$ and suffixed by $\gg$.

Suppose we have 2 agents, 0 and 1, on the board and all we know about them is that the initial position of agent 0 is cell 12 and the initial position of agent 1 is either cell 20 or cell 21. Suppose we also know that if cell 13 has a pit, then cell 14 is closed, and that cells 1,2 and 3 have no pits.

Our additional axioms then would be:

- $(\Updownarrow In(0,12))\Pi(0)$
- $(\Updownarrow In(1,20)\dot{\vee} \Updownarrow In(1,21))\Pi(1)$
- $\Big(\Updownarrow (Pit(13) \rightarrow Closed(14))\Big) \gg$
- $\Big(\Updownarrow (\neg Pit(1) \wedge \neg Pit(2) \wedge \neg Pit(3))\Big) \gg$
- $Test(0)$
- $Test(1)$.

If our goal is to move agent 0 to position 12, the question whether this goal can be achieved is equivalent to the question whether

$$\Gamma \mathbin{\ddot{\rightarrow}} \Big(\Big(\dot{\top} \rhd (\angle At(0,12))\Big) \gg\Big)$$

is valid, where $\Gamma$ is the $\ddot{\wedge}$-conjunction of our axioms. Another example of a possible goal is the task of moving agent 1 two cells up each time we receive such a command. Or, the task of finding out whether cell 99 has a pit. No

problem, we can express these goals, too. In particular, the latter could be expressed as

$$\dot{\top} \gg\!\ll \Big( (\Updownarrow Pit(99)) \gg, \quad (\Updownarrow \neg Pit(99)) \gg \Big)$$

or

$$\Big( (\Updownarrow Pit(99)) \gg \Big) \overline{\vee} \Big( (\Updownarrow \neg Pit(99)) \gg \Big).$$

# 11 How to open a safe

Here is another example of planning involving knowledge acquisition steps. We are in a room with safes. Each safe $s$ has a key combination $c$ which opens it, which can be expressed by the fact $Key(c, s)$. My hands are my agents allowing me to perform the key-dialing action. In simple planning systems which assume full knowledge of the world, this would be sufficient to conclude that I can open any safe, because there is an action leading to the desired result. However, this kind of "there is" information is not constructive. The existence of an opening combination is not really sufficient for opening the safe — I also need to *know* this combination.

However, if I have an agent telling me the key combination for any safe, then I am better off.

Having this agent can be axiomatized by

$$\dot{\top} \gg s \ll c \Big( (\Updownarrow Key(c, s)) \gg \Big), \tag{13}$$

$$\overline{\forall} s \overline{\exists} c \Big( (\Updownarrow Key(c, s)) \gg \Big).$$

Let it be an exercise for the reader to verify that these two resources are equivalent for our purposes.

Whenever we give (13) a command, — by specifying a particular $safe$ (a constant) as a value for the variable $s$, — it should report an execution by specifying a particular *combination* as the value for $c$.

Having the resource "my hands" can be axiomatized by

$$\overline{\forall} s \overline{\forall} c \Big( (\Updownarrow Key(c, s) \dot{\rightarrow} \angle Open(s)) \gg \Big). \tag{14}$$

We can accomplish the task of opening any (one) safe, which can be expressed as the goal resource $\overline{\forall} s(\angle Open(s) \gg)$. This is what we need to do for it: after we receive a command to open $safe$, we use (13) to find the key *combination* for $safe$. That is, we specify $s$ as $safe$ in our command to (13) and then look how this resource specifies $c$ in its report. Then we use $safe$ and *combination* to give command(s) to (14). This should result in opening $safe$.

However, we cannot accomplish this task arbitrarily many times. In other words, we cannot accomplish $!\overline{\forall} s(\angle Open(s) \gg)$. Because our axioms allow us

to inquire about a combination or open a safe using a combination only once. However, if we prefix these axioms with !, then the above infinite goal becomes achievable.

## 12 Planning with the MLL fragment

Sometimes, in modeling planning situations, it might be more convenient to use an extended language with resource letters that are no further specified as "real" resources. This can be a useful abstraction tool, helping us avoid sophisticated details when they are irrelevant.

Let us consider a simplified version of our navigation world. It has a 4-cell board




and 2 Moving agents: $X$ and $Y$. No pits or obstacles. Initially, $X$ is in cell 1, and $Y$ in cell 2. The other 2 cells are empty. Provided that the destination cell is empty, we (have agents who) can move $X$ to the right twice, move $Y$ up once and move $Y$ down once. Our goal is to get the position on the board where $X$ is in cell 3 and $Y$ is in cell 2. We will axiomatize this situation in the pure MLL language.

The resource atom $Xi$ ($i = 1, 2, 3, 4$) will represent the resource "X in cell $i$". We don't specify what its effect or potential is, even though we may keep in mind that the natural effect of this resource should be "X is in cell $i$". Similarly, $Yi$ represents "Y in cell $i$". And the resource of having cell $i$ empty will be represented by $Ei$.

Our goal then is to obtain the resource $X3 \ddot{\wedge} Y2$, and our axioms are:

1. $X1$
2. $Y2$
3. $E3$
4. $E4$
5. $Y2 \ddot{\wedge} E4 \ddot{\rightarrow} Y4 \ddot{\wedge} E2$ (the resource which moves $Y$ down)
6. $Y4 \ddot{\wedge} E2 \ddot{\rightarrow} Y2 \ddot{\wedge} E4$ (the resource which moves $Y$ up)

7. $X1\ddot{\wedge}E2\ddot{\rightarrow}X2\ddot{\wedge}E1$ (the resource which moves $X$ to the right from cell 1)

8. $X2\ddot{\wedge}E3\ddot{\rightarrow}X3\ddot{\wedge}E2$ (the resource which moves $X$ to the right from cell 2)

Remember the pairing operation informally described on page 23. It can be viewed as a resource allocation or subordination move, a move allowing us to convert one resource into another. For example, axiom 5 is a resource which converts the resources $Y2$ and $E4$, as long as they are allocated to it, into the resources $Y4$ and $E2$.

A slave's strategy that achieves the goal $X3\ddot{\wedge}Y2$ is the following: Pair $Y2$ and $E4$ from axioms 2 and 4 with $Y2$ and $E4$ from axiom 5, respectively. This will give us the resources $Y4$ and $E2$. Then pair this $E2$, and $X1$ from axiom 1, with $E2$ and $X1$ from axiom 7. This will produce the resources $E1$ and $X2$. Pair this $X2$, and $E3$ from axiom 3, with $X2$ and $E3$ from axiom 8. We will get $X3$ and $E2$. Now, pair this $E2$ and the $Y4$ we obtained above (from the consequent of axiom 5) with $E2$ and $Y4$ from axiom 6. This restores the resource $Y2$, and we are done.

This strategy corresponds to moving $Y$ down, then moving $X$ to the right twice and then moving $Y$ up.

**Exercise:** Formalize the 8-puzzle or the 8-queens problem (see [17]).

# 13 Informational resources

I [10] we studied the MALL-fragment of the language with a semantics which can be considered as a version or a "special case" of the semantics introduced in the present paper. MALL-formulas there are understood as what we can call *informational resources*. We have already met this kind of resource in Section 11, — the resource telling us an opening combination for a given safe. That resource did not have commands whose execution would mean changing something in the world. It could only be used for getting information. Commands for this kind of resources should be understood as questions to the informational agent, and reports or countercommands should be seen as answers to these questions. We get the semantics of informational resources if we assume that the world is static — all situations are the same at every moment.

This makes the process level of the logic collapse to the fact level. $\Uparrow A$, $\updownarrow A$ and $\angle A$ become equivalent and we can write just "$A$" for them, $\alpha \rhd \beta$ becomes equivalent to $\alpha\dot{\wedge}\beta$ which, after re-writing $\alpha$ and $\beta$ as facts $\alpha^*$ and $\beta^*$, can be represented as the fact $\alpha^*\wedge\beta^*$, etc.

However, the resource level does not collapse, even though its syntax and semantics can be simplified. In particular, the need in reporting moves disappears: since the world is static and we no longer care about time, we may assume that every command is executed immediately. Hence, there is no need in $\ll$ when it has only one argument and binds no variables. A multiple-argument $\ll$ can

be simulated by $\overline{\vee}$, and a variable-binding $\ll$ by $\overline{\exists}$. So that $\ll$ becomes totally redundant. If we only deal with safe resources,

$$\dot{\top} \gg \vec{x}\Big(\ll \vec{y_1}(\Phi^1_1, ..., \Phi^1_{k_1}), ..., \ll \vec{y_n}(\Phi^n_1, ..., \Phi^n_{k_n})\Big)$$

can be replaced by the equivalent

$$\overline{\forall}\vec{x}\Big(\overline{\exists}\vec{y_1}\big(\Phi^1_1\overline{\vee}...\overline{\vee}\Phi^1_{k_1}\big)\ \overline{\wedge}\ ...\ \overline{\wedge}\ \overline{\exists}\vec{y_n}\big(\Phi^1_n\overline{\vee}...\overline{\vee}\Phi^1_{k_n}\big)\Big).$$

This means that the MALL-fragment of the language is sufficient to represent all safe *finite* informational resource schemata, — resource schemata not containing ! or recursively defined subexpressions.

Then, as we already know from Section 7, it turns out that the MALL-fragment of our general logic of safe resources (the set of s-valid resources) is exactly the same as the logic $ET$ of informational resources studied in [10].

The philosophic explanation for not collapsing the resource level of the logic of informational resources to the fact level is that $\overline{\vee}$ and $\overline{\exists}$ are *constructive*, whereas $\vee$ and $\exists$ are not.

$$\forall safe \exists combination\ Key(combination, safe)$$

means just an existence of a key combination for every safe, while

$$\overline{\forall} safe \overline{\exists} combination\ Key(combination, safe)$$

means that this combination not only exists, but also can be actually found. The introduction to [10] presents this philosophy in more detail.

# 14 Future work

1. There is a considerable amount of work to be done on isolating decidable fragments (other than MALL and MLL) of our logic, finding axiomatizations and algorithms for them, exploring the efficiency of those algorithms, finding efficient heuristic algorithms.

2. To widen the field of applications for our logic, — first of all, applications in real-time systems analysis, — we could extend its language by introducing "deadline" parameters for $\rhd$ and $\gg$, as this was outlined on page 10. We may also want to introduce some more "real-time-minded" process operators; in particular, the operator that takes a time duration $t$ and a fact $A$ as arguments, and creates the resource which is true iff $A$ holds for (at least, at most, exactly) time $t$ in the interval; we may also introduce a special fact symbol $Clock(x)$, which, at any time moment $t$, is true for $t$ and false for any other argument.

3. The restriction we imposed on recursive definitions for finitary resources on page 16 should be relaxed. This is certainly possible and desirable. We

imposed that restriction only out of safety reasons, because arbitrary infinite resources, in a play, can produce infinite processes whose semantics might be not quite clear, while the above restriction guarantees that every play produces only the sort of infinite resources defined in Definition 3. However, a reasonable semantics can be defined for a much wider class of infinite processes than the processes captured by Definition 3, which will allow us to relax the restrictions on recursive definitions for resources.

4. It makes sense to extend the semantics in a way that would allow us to treat resources containing resource letters as resources in their own right rather than resource schemata. We would then need to declare resource pairing a legal move of slave's, instead of treating it only as a strategy component as we have done so far.

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