Relations between the Eisenhower Administration and the American Press during the Suez and the Lebanon Crises, 1956 and 1958

Robert J. Kirsch

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Relations between the Eisenhower Administration and the American Press during the Suez and the Lebanon Crises, 1956 and 1958

Abstract
This is a case study of the relations between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press* -- the printed media. Radio and television coverage is not included. The periods examined are the Suez crisis of 1956, and the Lebanon crisis of 1958. Specifically, it is a probing of the working arrangements between the Eisenhower White House, the Dulles State Department, and the American press during two crucial phases of American foreign relations in the turbulent Middle East in the late 1950’s, and the reaction of major American daily newspapers, newsmagazines, opinion journals, and scholarly journals to various aspects of Administration policy. It represents a look at Administration methods and efforts to manage political news, and their effectiveness. And it considers the success of the purveyors of printed, political news in presenting a representative, accurate, and responsible picture of these crises for the information of the American reading public.

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Comments
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE
AMERICAN PRESS DURING THE SUEZ AND THE LEBANON
CRISES, 1956 AND 1958

VOLUME I

by

Robert J. Kirsch

A Dissertation
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The Dropsie University
Philadelphia
1974
This dissertation, entitled


by

Robert J. Kirsch
Candidate for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

has been read and approved by

Isaiah Friedan

Date 4/22/74
Dedicated to
my wife, her family, and
my Uncle Marc
without whose help
this dissertation could
not have been written.
PREFACE

This is a case study of the relations between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press—-the printed media. Radio and television coverage is not included. The periods examined are the Suez crisis of 1956, and the Lebanon crisis of 1958. Specifically, it is a probing of the working arrangements between the Eisenhower White House, the Dulles State Department, and the American press during two crucial phases of American foreign relations in the turbulent Middle East in the late 1950's, and the reaction of major American daily newspapers, newsmagazines, opinion journals, and scholarly journals to various aspects of Administration policy. It represents a look at Administration methods and efforts to manage political news, and their effectiveness. And it considers the success of the purveyors of printed, political news in presenting a representative, accurate, and responsible picture of these crises for the information of the American reading public.

In my research, I found invaluable the Personal and Private Papers of John Foster Dulles deposited at Princeton University Library. These Dulles Papers include: letters, memoranda of conversations, personal notes and records, drafts of speeches and articles, newspaper clippings, photographs, momentos and memorabilia.

"Oral history" refers to the research technique of tape-—

*The foreign language American press was not included. Only the American press published in the English language was studied in depth.
recording spoken reminiscences and transcribing them nearly verbatim into manuscript form. Two collections of oral history interviews were consulted for this study: The Dulles Oral History Project, deposited at the Princeton University Library, and The Eisenhower Administration Oral History Project, deposited at Columbia University Library, and the Eisenhower Library, in Abilene, Kansas.

The Dulles Oral History Project consists of testimony from nearly 300 men and women. Included are: top officials of the Eisenhower Administration, heads of state and foreign ministers, officers of the American and foreign diplomatic corps, Dulles family members and their close friends, Dulles' associates at the Versailles Peace Conference, on Wall Street, on the Federal Council of Churches, in the United Nations, and in Congress, newsmen, Dulles' secretaries and staff assistants, classmates, and others.

The Eisenhower Administration Oral History Project gathered firsthand testimony from those who played major roles in the Eisenhower Administration (1953-1961), and the recollections of observers and of those knowledgeable about special aspects. Included are: Eisenhower and members of his family, members of the White House staff, Cabinet members, political advisers, members of Congress, administrators, scientists, journalists, ambassadors, military and civilian specialists, and others.

Transcribed interviews were reviewed and edited by their authors. The transcripts in both collections are, therefore, the nearly verbatim records of informal and unrehearsed inter-
views; they should not be regarded as literary statements. Usually textual changes were made to improve the clarity of the meaning. These oral history collections are invaluable aids to the serious student of the Eisenhower Era.

I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to various individuals for their help and comment. I owe a special thanks to Mr. Alexander P. Clark, Curator of Manuscripts, and Mrs. Wanda M. Randall, Assistant to Curator of Manuscripts, Princeton University Library, for their help and direction in the use of the Dulles Papers and Oral Histories.

Thanks are due to Mrs. Elizabeth B. Mason, Associate Director, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University Library, for her assistance in my gaining access to the Eisenhower Oral Histories.

Special thanks are due to my former professor, and dear friend, Dr. Lawrence Marwick, Head, Hebraic Section, Orientalia Division, Library of Congress, for his many kindnesses to me while I conducted my research at the Library of Congress.

For their help and advise, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Stabley Library, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, especially Mr. Chamberlin, Mr. Kaufmann, and Mrs. Freeman, and to the staff of St. Vincent College Library, especially my former coworker, and good friend, Dr. Jack Macey.

I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my principal advisor, Dr. Isaiah Friedman, for his counsel,
encouragement, and fairness during many grueling months. My deep appreciation is given to Prof. Solomon Grayzel for his interested and understanding help, and to Dr. Ben-Horin for his timely and penetrating comment.

To my wife and her family for their encouragement and assistance, a very special thanks.

And to all others too numerous to mention, thank you.

The opinions expressed are my own. For them, I assume full responsibility.

Blairsville, Pennsylvania

1974

Robert J. Kirsch
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INTRODUCTION

Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...

First Amendment, The Constitution of the United States of America

In American representative democracy, the responsible press plays a very important role. It is the major means of general, adult education. The function of the press has not changed greatly since the Commission on Freedom of the Press, in 1947, released its findings (The Hutchins Report) on the duties of a responsible press. In a world in which the United States had come to assume a leading role in the effort to maintain world peace, the Commission found that the American press was charged with the responsibility of providing the information needed by a free society in order to effectively govern itself:

Today our society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one another; fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching every member of the society by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies.¹

The Hutchins Report, therefore, envisioned a comprehensive role for the responsible press. "Responsible" is the key word. The First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution protects the freedom of the press. No other American industry enjoys this right. The Constitution guards the press in order that, unrestrained by government, the press may serve the public interest by providing the people—the voters—with the proper information about what transpires in Washington, in the rest of the country, and in the world at large, so that an informed American citizenry may cast its votes conscientiously, and perform its civic duties well. Thus, the corps of correspondents must "find out what is going on under the surface and beyond the horizon, to infer, to deduce, to imagine and to guess...what is going on inside, and what it meant yesterday and what it could mean tomorrow."\(^2\)

In order to serve the public interest effectively, the press must endeavor to uncover the truth, and to publish it accurately. It must not shrink from publishing both good news and bad, and it must present both sides of public issues.\(^3\) Truth-telling is an "inexact science" observed Jenkin Lloyd Jones who discussed some of the factors preventing the telling of the whole truth. Jones noted that the newspaper which sought


to publish all the facts all the time would:

(1) lay itself open to ruinous libel suits, since many things that are true and provable are not privileged,
(2) be an accessory to blackmail and stand guilty of bad taste, since much that is privileged is also merely degrading,
(3) be responsible for many injustices since some truths which are privileged and neither profane nor pornographic are cruel and unnecessary, and
(4) paralyze our popular government by insisting on a level of reporting so free that it would destroy deliberation.

Nevertheless, Jones regarded the duty of the press to remove those barriers to the truth that are based upon elitist theories of social justice, or that are raised by bureaucrats to protect themselves from the consequences of their mistakes, or to conceal those things which the American public have a right to know.⁴

The effort to arrive at the truth should be made, and the picture presented should be accurate. Carelessly or unfairly reporting accurate facts can be as misleading as publishing factual errors. The wrong impression can be given by placing too much, or too little, emphasis on certain facts, of by omitting important details. For a story to be accurate, it must be balanced and objective, as well as factually correct. In this way, the real meaning of the news can be given.⁵

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The critical importance of this distinction was noted more than 25 years ago by the Commission on the Freedom of the Press. The Commission pointed out that the greatest danger of reporting an accurate fact in a misleading or untrue manner lay in the communication of international information. The Commission commented:

...The press now bears a responsibility in all countries, and particularly in democratic countries, where foreign policies are responsive to popular majorities, to report international events in such a way that can be understood. It is no longer enough to report the fact truthly. It is now necessary to report the truth about the fact.6

However, the American press all too often is hampered in its efforts to present important news by its tendency to stress "the exceptional rather than the significant." As a consequence, the American citizen is not always supplied with the information and discussion needed to exercise his civic responsibilities in a mature and informed fashion.7 Charnley has argued that the press is eager to cover the odd and unusual because the reading public is almost always more interested in such events than in the routine pattern. While acknowledging the danger that emphasis on the unusual can lead to a glorification of the unique, the strange, or the atypical, he argued that such news should not be suppressed for that would create a worse misrepresentation--"the false impression that there is no atypical or evil activity....(T)he news media must report activities of this

6 Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free And Responsible Press, op. cit., p. 22.
7 Ibid., pp. 54-56.
kind. Since the first necessity for combating any evil is knowledge, the news media have an evident obligation to inform the public of the abnormal or unusual as well as of the routine.\(^8\)

In its efforts to uncover the truth about politically significant news, the press interacts with the Government on many different levels. There is a very basic rivalry between the Government and the press deriving from: 1. the press's desire to know and make known; and 2. the Government's inclination to conceal and withhold until policy becomes \textit{faite accompli}. The Government official is wary of premature disclosure, fearful that it will jeopardize policy formulation. The reporter, on the alert for a story, often rejects the idea that policy should not be discussed until it is finalized.\(^9\)

Reporters depend upon sources for their information. Therein lies both a temptation and a risk. The temptation is that, in order to keep his channels of information open, the reporter will not develop stories which are critical of his news sources. The risk is that a reporter will develop so close an identification with a particular news source that he becomes, in effect, a public relations conduit for that source.

In the simplest sense, on virtually any beat in Washington, or possibly elsewhere, there are likely to be two kinds of reporters--the "ins" and the "outs." The "ins" are those who play along with the news source, handle it their way, tend to overlook minor indiscretions and in general protect their sources. The "outs" fight

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\(^8\) Charnley, \textit{Reporting}, op. cit., p. 44.

their sources, or at least needle them. They get their news by insisting on their right to it or by sheer perseverance. They let the source know that they intend to play it straight. They get their news the hard way, running the risk of being ostracized not only by the sources but by the reporters who are "ins." A good reporter can probably do it either way, depending on the circumstances.10

One of the great paradoxes of the American press is that it is, at one and the same time, the means by which the people are informed about their Government, and, by virtue of this educational function, it serves as watchdog of the public interest by holding the Government up for closer scrutiny. Consequently, the press which attempts to expose all sides of an issue is in perpetual rivalry with Administrations which seek to advertise the best side.11 Rivers commented succinctly: "(I)f anything is clear about press-government relationships throughout our (American) history, it is this: in theory, America's leaders have wanted a free and independent press as a check upon government; in practice, they wanted no such thing."12 Not only do Administrations withhold information from the press, but they also attempt to use the press to announce their policies and to win public support for them. This fact led Thomas Schroth, Executive Editor, Congressional Quarterly, to comment:


...It may be that a really warm friendship between a high official and a member of the press corps is basically impossible, for the press must always look with a certain amount of suspicion on the actions of public officials and the press must always be ready to criticize, regardless of how close personally the reporter is to the public official. Criticism and constant surveillance of government by an alert and intelligent press is essential to the successful working of a democracy.\textsuperscript{13}

How successfully can the American press act as a viable critic of a national Administration in contemporary U. S. society with its greatly expanded Federal Government bureaucracy? How resourcefully does it ferret out accurate information? With which forces does the Washington press corps have to contend? The occupational group with which the Capital press corps has the most immediate contact is the federal press agentry. It had its small beginnings in 1910. In the mid-1930's, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia headed an investigating committee which uncovered 270 public-information employees under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's control. By the end of Harry Truman's Presidency, the Executive branch had 3,632 employees working in the "Information" and "Editorial" Civil Service classifications. There were also an unknown number of bureaucrats who held such titles as "Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs," "Administrative Assistant," and "Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary." Because Truman's publicists were protected by Civil Service regulations, the Eisenhower Administration added many new men of its own choosing, men it felt it could trust. By 1957, there were 6,878 "Information/Editorial" Civil Service employees.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}Thomas Schroth, "The Role of the Press in a Democratic Government," loc. cit.
mation and Editorial Employees" listed by the Civil Service Commission, or nearly twice the 1952 figure. The increase continued during Eisenhower's second term. In theory, the function of the federal publicity complex is to serve the public by providing useful information about the Government. In practice, federal public relations specialists have tended to become personal press agents for the incumbent Administration. The question becomes, how does the Washington press corps penetrate this formidable Government propaganda army? How successfully did the press pry into foreign affairs questions during the Eisenhower era?

The problem of cutting through the propaganda bureaucracy to learn the truth has long been a matter of concern to members of the Washington press corps. As long ago as 1950, James Reston colorfully called attention to the dilemma:

The conflict between officials and reporters in Washington over what information about foreign affairs should be made public is now becoming an important issue. In a country whose action depends upon consent of the people and whose actions now affect the interests of the whole world, an understanding between reporters and officials on the obligations and rights of the reporter is imperative, but no such understanding exists today.

Instead, responsible officials and responsible reporters...are now playing cops and robbers with each other. The object of the cops seems to be to conceal information. The object of the robbers is to disclose information. The cops seldom ask themselves why they want to conceal the information, and the robbers don't analyze very often why they want to disclose the information.

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15 James Reston, quoted by Rivers, ibid., p. 143.
Both sides just go on waging their own private little Cold War behind the gas works and the State Department in Foggy Bottom, to the despair of each other and the detriment of the public.

While recognizing that bureaucrats have legitimate concerns about premature disclosures, Reston warned of the growth of Administration power, and the need for reportorial skepticism to grow with it. The reporter’s duty to inform the American people, in the face of Government reluctance to do so, remained. Reston recommended that, to penetrate official secrecy, the brash young reporter should “ask sticky questions and keep using his legs.”\(^\text{16}\)

While the Government exercises great power over the press, it is also dependent upon the press for information about its own day-to-day functioning. Because the Government is so large, and its functions are so numerous, no one individual could possibly know all that transpires, both authorized and unauthorized. Thus, Government officials use the press to keep tabs on the Government itself. The press also provides them with valuable feedback on existing policies, and policy proposals.

Abroad, U. S. diplomatic representatives and foreign service personnel rely on the American press to inform them of the happenings back home. On the other hand, they extract information from the foreign press to supplement their reports to the State Department. Contacts with American reporters permanently

stationed in the host country give U. S. diplomatic personnel valuable insights into the affairs of their country of assignment. 17

The flow of information between the Government and the press is two directional. The question arises which direction of flow dominates during normal times, which during times of crisis?

The study of the interrelationships between the U. S. Government and the American free press during international crises is worthy of special attention for the light it could shed on the workings of the nation's Government and press in times of stress. The specific purpose of this study is to examine critically American press coverage of the Suez crisis (1956-57), and the Lebanon crisis (1958), with a view to determining: 1. the accuracy with which the actions, attitudes, and aims of the Eisenhower Administration were transmitted to the American people during the crises; 2. the extent to which the American press grasped the issues and correctly informed the American public; 3. the impact of the Administration on press coverage of personalities and events; and 4. the impact of the press on Administration policy-makers and on U. S. policy.

It is important to know how information is transmitted in

American democracy in order to be able to appreciate the mechanism of that system, particularly the sphere of information. Does the press serve as a vehicle of foreign policy through which proposed actions are tested? Finally, is the press used to send veiled messages to international friends and adversaries?

Our study of the press will be preceded by efforts to determine: 1. the means by which the Eisenhower Administration disseminated information; and 2. its working relationship with the American press. Through consideration of published sources and unpublished documents, it is hoped to arrive at a more well rounded understanding of Administration policies, and, with this background information, to achieve a more meaningful interpretation of press content.

However, before proceeding to our study of the relationship between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press during the Suez and Lebanon crises, it should prove helpful to consider briefly the history of these two crises.

The Suez Crisis

The Suez crisis was preceded by an increase in tensions in the Middle East along the Israeli-Egyptian armistice line, and by the efforts of both sides to obtain additional arms. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to obtain arms from the Western Big Three, Britain, France, and the United States. The United States Department of State responded to Nasser's request for $27 million worth of arms by demanding payment in cash when it knew, on the basis of intelligence, that Nasser
could not meet the terms.  

In 1955, Egyptian fedayeen raids into Israeli territory were followed by Israeli reprisals against military bases in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli raid against Khan Yunis, in which 39 were killed, prompted Nasser to accept Soviet offers of arms after his efforts to procure arms from the West had not been successful. Nasser disclosed the "Czech" arms deal on September 27, 1955. The Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement was far bigger than the earlier unsuccessful bid for $27 million worth of American arms. The initial Egyptian purchase was augmented by a second major arms agreement in response to reports of continuing shipments of French arms to Israel. The two arms agreements were approximately equal in value. Ten years later, Nasser disclosed that the combined worth of the weapons Egypt had purchased in the two arms deals from the Russians totaled $336 million.  

Israel regarded the arms agreements with apprehension. It was feared that Egypt would employ its newly acquired arms against Israel. The arms deals upset the comparative arms balance between Israel and Egypt—there was now a disparity in quantity and Egyptian superiority in quality of arms. The

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arms deals, the fedayeen raids, and continued Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping led Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion to decide upon the need to launch a preventive war against Egypt. ²⁰

Despite the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreements, the United States, Great Britain, and the World Bank offered Egypt aid to construct its major development scheme, the Aswan High Dam project, on December 16, 1955. This project was of crucial importance to Egypt for it would permit an expansion of agricultural land by at least 1,000,000 acres, produce 10,000 million kilowatt-hours of electricity annually which would facilitate the further development of Egyptian industry and reduce dependence upon imported fuels, and regulate river flow to eliminate flood damage and make possible better drainage, thus, contributing to higher crop yields. The High Dam project was given priority among Egyptian development programs by the Nasser regime. However, Egypt balked at accepting the Western offer which contained stipulations—"strings"—that Egypt found objectionable. According to the proposed terms, the United States and Great Britain were to make Egypt an initial grant of $70 million ($56 million from the United States; $14 million from Britain) to prepare the site for construction. The World Bank was to lend Egypt $200 million. Later, Egypt was to receive an additional American loan of $130 million. As its share of the costs, Egypt was to

contribute $900 million in local currency to cover the supply
of men, local materials and services. Terms of the loans also
stipulated that Egypt was to harmonize its economy with the
Aswan High Dam project for ten years. The Egyptians would
also be expected to limit expenditures not only on arms but
also on social and health services. "The Bank was ready to
advise the government which in turn was not to assume 'any
other obligation above a limit to be agreed upon between the
two parties or to weaken its credit in raising its share of
the money needed.'" These were the strings to which Egypt
objected; therefore, the Nasser Government delayed accepting
the Western offer while it sought to obtain better terms. 21

Meanwhile, the Western powers were beginning to have second
thoughts about participating in the project. Nasser encouraged
Western disenchantment when, in an effort to protect Egypt from
a proposed United Nations arms embargo, suggested by Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev on April 27, 1956, during his visit
to Great Britain, Nasser recognized Red China on May 16, 1956. 22
This angered American officials who feared Nasser's too warm
relations with the Communist powers. 23

By early 1956, growing dissatisfaction in British and

21 Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt In Transition (New York:

22 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 18; and
Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

American circles with Nasser's politics led to increased reluctance to continued participation in the Aswan High Dam project. The British Government maintained that it was concerned about the ability of Egypt to cover its share of the expenditure for the project since it had directed a growing proportion of its cotton exports to pay for Soviet arms. In addition, the British were apprehensive of expanding Soviet influence in the Middle East. British "allies," particularly Iraq, were exerting pressure on the British because they objected to what seemed to them to be a Western policy of rewarding Egyptian "bullying" of the West while nations friendly to the West were having difficulty getting Western aid. Furthermore, there was said to be evidence throughout the Middle East of activity by Egyptian agents. And the "Voice of the Arabs" broadcast daily from Cairo hostile propaganda against the West. 24 The American Administration, too, was becoming disenchanted with Nasser (see below: Chapter I.), and for somewhat similar reasons. In addition, there was Congressional and Zionist opposition to aiding Egypt. 25

On July 19, 1956, Secretary of State Dulles told Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein of the American decision not to participate in the Aswan High Dam. In its official announcement the State Department cited as reasons for the American withdrawal from the project: "Agreement by the riparian states has not been achieved, and the (economic) ability of Egypt to devote


adequate resources to assure the project's success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.\textsuperscript{26} Within days Britain and the World Bank also withdrew from the project.

Mohamed Heikal claimed that Nasser knew by April, 1956, that the Americans were going to renege on their offer. Heikal attributed the intelligence to an Iraqi Minister who had passed the Egyptians photographs of the documents and complete notes of the top secret meeting in March, 1956, of Baghdad Pact ministers in Teheran. During the first week in July, in a discussion with Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, Nasser told Hussein that he had concrete evidence that the Americans would not go through with the Aswan High Dam project. Hussein demurred that the problem was with Congress. Heikal wrote that Nasser told Hussein to go and tell Dulles that Egypt accepted all U. S. conditions. Nasser said: "Go and tell him that we have accepted everything. But don't humiliate us. Because we are not going to get the High Dam."\textsuperscript{27} In 1966, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) produced a series of eight programs on the Suez crisis. In a broadcast interview with Erskine B. Childers, Nasser indicated: "I was surprised by the insulting attitude with which the refusal was declared. Not by the refusal itself."\textsuperscript{28} Yet, Nasser, who repeatedly expressed his preference for Western aid,\textsuperscript{29} sent Hussein to Washington to accept the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26}"Aswan High Dam (press release 401 dated July 19)," \textit{The Department of State Bulletin} (Hereafter: State Dept. Bul.), Vol. 35, No. 892, July 30, 1958, p. 188.
\item Heikal, \textit{Cairo Documents}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 64-65.
\end{itemize}
American offer, perhaps, because he felt he had nothing to loose by making one last effort to secure Western help.  

When Nasser first learned of the American decision on the flight back from Brioni, Yugoslavia, he said to Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Foreign Minister, and to Heikal: "This is not a withdrawal. It is an attack on the regime and an invitation to the people of Egypt to bring it down." On July 21, 1956, Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, and, according to Heikal, on July 24, he broke the news to two or three members of the Revolutionary Command Council. In an Alexandria speech to the Egyptian people on July 26, Nasser proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and announced Egyptian intentions to use canal revenues to finance the Aswan High Dam project. Heikal wrote: "The way in which Nasser announced the take-over, the violence of his speech, and the insults he hurled at Britain and the United States surprised (British Prime Minister) Eden, but there was no reason for his surprise because the insults were deliberately calculated as a reply to the insulting fashion in which Dulles withdrew his offer of help for the Aswan High Dam." After review of the Revolutionary Command Council's situation report, which indicated that Britain did not have a sufficiently powerful force in the area to intervene immediately, and which estimated it would take two months to assemble such a force, Nasser announced his decision. Nasser estimated that if Egypt could buy two months time by diplomacy, it would be safe.

from attack because pressures against Eden would build. Although he foresaw the possibility of combined Anglo-French intervention, Nasser could not conceive the possibility that Britain would align itself with Israel against Egypt because, he felt, such action would jeopardize the security of Britain's friends and Britain's own position in the Arab world.  

Western reaction to the Egyptian announcement was sharp. British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden was dining with the Iraqi King and other Iraqi leaders when news of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal arrived. The dinner party broke up early and Eden conferred with British Ministers Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Home. The British decided to invite French Ambassador Chauvel and U. S. Charge d'Affairs Foster to participate in their consultations. In his memoirs, Eden wrote: "In our judgement the economic life of Western Europe was threatened with disruption by the Egyptian seizure of the canal. Here was an issue of the first importance, in which an international agreement was at stake. We ought immediately to concert steps between our three Governments."  

In a BBC documentary on the Suez crisis, broadcast on July 14, 1966, former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau indicated French thinking on Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Pineau noted that Nasser's action was seen by the Algerian people (then in revolt against French rule) as a suc-

32Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 52.
cess for the entire Arab world. "For us (France) it was very
dangerous if we did nothing." Pineau revealed that, a year or
two prior to Suez, France increased military aid to Israel to
enable it to serve as a counter-balance to Nasser's power in
Egypt. Then Pineau cited the fact that Egypt would not let
Israeli merchant shipping pass through the Suez Canal. He
expressed his personal apprehension that Nasser might likewise
blockade the Canal to French shipping. "That (was) very
dangerous for us because at this period we had...some very big
interest in the Far East." An additional factor was French
concern that if the West accepted Nasser's nationalization of
the Canal, it would be "impossible" for developing countries
to obtain private and government investment capital because
of the fear of additional expropriations. Pineau claimed that
this was a more important consideration than has been generally
recognized.

Later in the broadcast, the Foreign Editor of Le Monde
at the time of Suez, M. Andre Fontaine, explained that there
was a strong French feeling of solidarity with Israel. Further,
the Radical components of the French Government felt that "a vic-
tory over Nasser would kill the roots of the rebellion in Algeria,
and would bring about a possibility of finding a solution to
that irritating problem." For these reasons, the French went
to war at Suez, and the war was very popular among the French
people.33

33 Moncrieff, Suez: Ten Years After, op. cit., pp. 62-64.
Following receipt of Eden's proposal for an immediate conference of the British, French and American foreign ministers, on July 28, 1956, President Eisenhower authorized the dispatch of Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy to London. In a series of frank, private discussions with British and French leaders in London, he learned of the seriousness with which they regarded Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Murphy was informed that the British Government regarded Suez as a test and that it must make a stand. The French were in agreement with the British. Both were prepared to undertake military action to return the canal to international control. Murphy noted that the British and French "seemed to assume" U. S. involvement in their plans, and he cabled Eisenhower to relay what he had learned.\(^{34}\)

On July 31, 1956, Dulles departed for London for three-power talks on the Suez situation. The discussions between the British, French, and Americans resulted in agreement to convene an international conference of Suez Canal users to discuss means to return the canal to international control. With this Three Power decision began a long series of fruitless international conferences during which the British and French made military preparations for invasion of Egypt to retake the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the United States sought to use these conferences to forestall Anglo-French military action. Early in the crisis there developed a split between the Americans and the British and French over the use of force to settle the Suez dispute. The U. S. was opposed to a forceful solution; Britain and France were not.

Britain and France wanted the First London Conference to

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\(^{34}\)Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N. Y.: Pantheon, 1967), pp. 43-44.
meet as soon as possible. Dulles favored several weeks of preparation. The compromise date of August 16, 1956, was finally agreed upon. Twenty-four countries were invited to attend the First London Conference; included were the eight surviving signatories of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the sixteen principal users of the canal on the basis of tonnage and trade.

The First London Conference met from August 16 to August 23, 1956. The conference concluded with presentation of a majority proposal and a minority proposal. The minority proposal, offered by India on August 20, 1956, called for establishment of a consultative committee of canal users while leaving the canal under Egyptian control. Backers of the Indian proposal were: India, the Soviet Union, Indonesia, and Ceylon. The majority proposal was introduced by Secretary of State Dulles on August 20. Following minor amendment, it was adopted on August 23, 1956, by 18 of the 22 nations attending the conference. A committee of representatives of five nations led by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies was appointed to "present and explain" the Plan to Egyptian President Nasser.

On September 3, 1956, the Menzies committee met with Nasser for the first time. But the series of meetings between the Egyptian leader and the committee were destined to fail. On September 9, Egypt rejected the proposals of the First London Conference. While the Menzies committee was negotiating in Cairo, Dulles was vacationing on Duck Island, where it occurred to him that the canal users "had the equivalent of an 'easement' on the waterway, a legal right that they could band
together to protect and exercise against the man who threatened to deprive them of its use.\(^{35}\) From this the Suez Canal Users' Association was evolved by Dulles and presented to the British and the French. Reluctantly they agreed to convene a Second London Conference to discuss ways of implementing the concept.\(^{36}\)

On September 12, 1956, Prime Minister Anthony Eden announced to Parliament plans for establishing the Users' Association. The eighteen nations which had supported the majority plan of the First London Conference met on September 19 to consider the scheme for a Canal Users' Association. Agreement on the Association was reached on September 21. As formulated, SCUA was to collect canal tolls from Users and to furnish pilots for User ships. In the event Egypt could not run the canal, or attempted to close it to the Users, they would pass through the canal with the aid of their own pilots. The successful Egyptian operation of the canal, following the pull-out of European pilots on September 15, 1956, and Dulles' earlier statement of September 13 that the U. S. did not intend to shoot its way through the canal should Nasser refuse cooperation to Association ships, deprived SCUA of all significance. It is difficult to believe that SCUA could have been made to work without at least having the threat of force to induce Nasser's compliance. On the heels of these developments, the British and French decided to place the Suez dispute before the United


\(^{36}\) Eden, *Suez Crisis*, op. cit., p. 113.
Nations Security Council. This they did on September 23. 37 They took the step without prior notification of the U. S. Dulles learned of the Anglo-French decision when his plane landed in the United States. 38 This action signaled a widening rift to American policy-makers between themselves and the British and French. (see below: Chapter I.)

On October 5, 1956, the United Nations began consideration of the Suez question. In secret discussions, the foreign ministers of Egypt, France and Britain agreed to Six Principles for further negotiations. The Security Council approved the Six Principles unanimously. However, the Soviet Union vetoed the British implementing resolution which implied that the majority plan of the First London Conference met the requirements of the Six Principles. On October 13, the long series of negotiations ended. SCUA, weak at birth, lingered and languished in inconclusive organization efforts.

During the various conferences, British and French preparations for military action against Egypt proceeded. Britain, which had geared its defense forces either to all out nuclear war with Russia, or to counter insurgency in colonies, had little potential to wage limited or conventional war. Therefore, there could be no immediate British response to the Egyptian challenge. It would require a minimum of six weeks


to prepare the assault. 39

The military operation was to be under the general direction of the British Middle East theatre with the French participating in an integrated system of command. The British retained final say in decision-making. Initial plans called for an Anglo-French landing at Alexandria, with an advance on Cairo. The landing was to take place on September 15. The plan was altered around September 10 to provide for an attack at Port Said, with an advance along, and confined to, the Suez Canal. 40

In the months of military planning and international conference-holding, the British gave the French the impression that they were hesitant to undertake military operations against Egypt due to American pressure and Dulles' diplomatic acrobatics. As a result of British hesitation, the French decided in September, 1956, to seek Israeli participation in the venture. Towards the end of 1955, Israeli spokesmen Moshe Sharett, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres went to Europe in search of arms. Dayan and Peres attempted to discover the French attitude toward an Israeli preventive war against Egypt. They learned that the French were not averse to the idea. 41


In renewed discussions between French and Israeli leaders, beginning in September, 1956, a Franco-Israeli accord was reached. Israel would attack Egypt in a preventive war providing France with the pretext to seize the canal in order to keep it open. French leaders then persuaded the British to agree to the operation with Israel. On October 16, 1956, British Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd met for talks behind closed doors in Paris with French Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau. At that meeting, the British gave their agreement to the Franco-Israeli scheme. 42

On October 29, Israel launched an attack against the undermanned Egyptian positions in Sinai. In anticipation of an Anglo-French attack, Nasser had previously ordered the redeployment of troops from the Sinai to defend Alexandria, where he expected the Franco-British attack to come. 43

On October 30, the British and French issued an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to withdraw their troops ten miles from either side of the Canal. If either failed to comply, there

42 Ibid., pp. 149-158; and Beaufre, Suez Expedition, op. cit., pp. 65-74.

43 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 490; and Bell, Long War, op. cit., p. 310. Bell commented: "This move left (Egyptian Sinai Commander) General (Ali Ali) Amer with a few more than 30,000 troops and, still worse, with an impression that the main threat would not be to Sinai....To complicate matters, the transport bringing the Egyptian officers back from Damascus (following the signing of the Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian defense pact) was shot down on the eve of Kadesh (code-name for the Israeli battle plan), removing at one stroke most of the Egyptian senior commanders. Amer, who had taken a different plane back to Cairo, escaped. On October 29, therefore, the Sinai command had too few troops, a disoriented high command, vulnerable positions, and no hint of danger."
would be an Anglo-French occupation of the canal. The ultimatum would have required Egyptian forces still fighting in Sinai to withdraw from the Peninsula to the opposite side of the Suez Canal. As expected, Egypt rejected the ultimatum. Israel agreed to accept it, if Egypt would also accept. Following the Anglo-French ultimatum, the remaining Egyptian forces were also ordered by Nasser, at noon on November 1, to fall back in order to avoid their being trapped in the Sinai by the anticipated Anglo-French advance along the canal. The order was given too late. Heikal reported that Nasser spent almost the entire previous night debating with General Abdel Hakim Amer, Egyptian commander-in-chief, whether to evacuate the Sinai. Amer opposed the withdrawal. Delay of the order contributing to the ensuing chaos. Bell commented: "If a general evacuation order had gone out much earlier, immediately after the Anglo-French ultimatum, there would have been a far better chance to withdraw in an orderly fashion, maintaining cohesion for a defense against the anticipated landing. By November 1, however, with little hope of air support, the disorganized columns were extremely vulnerable to air strikes and armored pursuit. By evening the Sinai defense had turned into a shambles, for once withdrawal began the army had turned into a mob." The fighting performance of those Egyptian units which did stand and fight seemed to justify

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44 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 490; and Bell, Long War, op. cit., p. 327.
45 Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 109.
46 Bell, Long War, op. cit., p. 327.
Bell’s conclusion: “Certainly, if the Egyptians had felt free to commit their total forces, the campaign would have lasted slightly longer, but the outcome could hardly have been different.”

On October 30, in the Security Council, Britain and France vetoed U. S. and Soviet resolutions calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines. In the days to follow, there was strong U. S. opposition to the armed invasions of Egypt. There were strenuous U. S. diplomatic efforts in the United Nations to halt the aggression in the Middle East. Following Israeli, British, and French acceptance of the United Nations General Assembly cease-fire resolution of November 2, the Eisenhower Administration continued U. S. pressure to compel withdrawal of all British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt in compliance with United Nations resolutions.

All that lay in the future as British and French air forces struck at Egyptian airfields on October 31. The Security Council called an emergency session of the General Assembly which, on November 2, called for a Middle Eastern cease-fire, and the withdrawal of all attacking forces. The following day, Israel agreed to the cease-fire, provided Egypt did likewise.

On November 5, British paratroops landed at Port Said, and French paratroops landed at Port Fuad. The British pound sterling came under intense speculative pressure. The United States

blocked British drawing of funds from the World Bank. There
was great Labor Party outcry within Parliament. The U. S. S. R.
sent Britain, France, and Israel notes threatening the use of
nuclear force to end their aggression. This combination of
pressures led Britain to induce France to accept a U. N. spon­s­
ored cease-fire. On November 7, all hostilities were termi­
nated along the Suez Canal. British-French forces stopped
their advance 23 miles south of Port Said at El Cap--far short
of their objectives of retaking the Canal, and of unseating
Nasser. 48

On November 7, the United Nations General Assembly agreed
to establish a United Nations Emergency Force composed of troops
from non-permanent members of the Security Council. The purpose
of the Emergency Force was to supervise the cease-fire and with­
drawal of foreign troops from Egypt. Egypt agreed formally to
accept the United Nations force on November 12, provided Egyp­tian sovereignty would not be infringed. The first UNEF con­t­
ingents arrived in Egypt on November 15. The last British and
French troops withdrew from Suez on December 22, 1956. The
question of Israeli withdrawal remained to be settled in the
new year.

American policy during the Suez crisis was quite unpopular
among many sectors of American public opinion. Questions were
raised about the U. S. role in causing the crisis and about
U. S. refusal to support its friends--Britain and France, in
particular. Calls were made repeatedly for a new American

48 Anthony Nutting, No End Of A Lesson: The Story Of Suez
(New York: Potter, 1967), pp. 17-18, 27, 31-35 and 58; and
Beaufre, Suez Expedition, op. cit., p. 31.
policy towards the Middle East. (see: Chapters IV and V.)

Apparently bowing to popular sentiment, and recognizing the growth of a Middle Eastern power vacuum following on the heels of the abortive Anglo-French invasion of Egypt, the Eisenhower Administration sought a Congressional resolution to fill the "power deficit" and to counter Soviet penetration of the Middle East. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower appeared before a joint session of Congress to request legislative support for an Administration proposal for granting Middle Eastern nations economic and military assistance, and for employment of U. S. armed forces on behalf of nations of the region requesting such aid "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." Eisenhower's address became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Congressional support was given on March 9, 1957, in the Middle East Resolution. On March 16, Lebanon was the first and only Arab state to subscribe to the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Lebanese step later contributed to the outbreak of the Lebanese crisis of 1958.

Eisenhower reported that as early as November 8, 1956, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban had transmitted a message from Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion to him indicating Israeli intentions to withdraw from Egypt "upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection

with this international force entering the Suez Canal area."\(^{50}\)

After stating that the Israeli Government never declared any intention to annex Sinai, Ben-Gurion's paraphrased account of his November 8th letter to the U. S. President confirmed the substance of Eisenhower's report. Ben-Gurion recalled that then he "pointed out that, although as a result of our operation fedayun bases had been destroyed, it was necessary to repeat our urgent request to the United Nations to call upon Egypt to renounce her status as a belligerent, implying war with Israel, to abandon her policy of blockade and boycott, to cease sending murder gangs into Israeli territory, and to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel."\(^{51}\)

On December 3, the day British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd announced that Britain and France would withdraw from Egypt, Israel began its pull-back of troops in Sinai. However, with the coming of the new year, Israeli troops still controlled much of the Sinai Peninsula. Israel was extremely reluctant to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran until it received guarantees of open transit through the Straits and assurances that the Gaza Strip would not once again become a base for fedayeen operations against Israeli territory. Israel argued that the latter could be achieved through United Nations administration of the Gaza Strip. Israeli refusal to comply with repeated U. N. withdrawal resolutions caused a tense diplomatic drama whose purpose was to win Israeli compliance with General Assembly resolutions. The United States played a key role.

\(^{50}\) Eisenhower, \textit{Waging Peace}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.

On February 2, 1957, the United Nations General Assembly passed two resolutions supported by American United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., demanding, for the sixth time, Israel's immediate withdrawal, and calling for restoration of the 1949 Israel-Egypt armistice line. Israel rejected the U. N. resolutions the next day.

On February 11, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles handed Israeli Ambassador Eban an aide memoire which indicated the American position that no nation had the right to prohibit free and innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran, and that the U. S. was "prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."52

Israel continued to stall. This forced the United States to consider support for United Nations sanctions against Israel as a means to compel Israeli adherence to U. N. withdrawal resolutions. In a nationwide radio and television address on February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower repeated the prior U. S. position of support for U. N. administration of the Gaza Strip, with Egypt's approval; and on free and innocent passage of the Straits. Noting Israel's continued reluctance to withdraw without firm guarantees, the President argued this threatened the survival of the United Nations for it rewarded aggression. To ward against this, Eisenhower indicated that the United Nations had "no choice but to exert pressure

upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions."\textsuperscript{53}

On February 22, 1957, Lebanon, Iraq, the Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Indonesia introduced a resolution calling for the termination of all military, economic and financial assistance to Israel. A U. N. sanctions resolution was moving toward a vote. It never was taken. On March 1, 1957, Israeli Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir announced to the General Assembly Israel's decision upon "full and complete withdrawal" of its forces. The last Israeli troops left Egypt on March 16. They had returned along the coast with armored vehicles from Sharm el-Sheikh.\textsuperscript{54} In the diplomatic maneuvering to convince Israel to accept American assurances, the French played an important role.\textsuperscript{55} With the withdrawal of Israeli troops the long Suez crisis came to an end.

The Lebanon Crisis

Unlike the Suez crisis which was international in scope and origin, the Lebanon crisis was local in origin and initially local in scope. It arose from a dispute between indigenous Lebanese factions and was reinforced by international factors. There were religious overtones to the dispute. Support for Lebanese President Camille Chamoun came generally from among


\textsuperscript{54}Love, \textit{Suez: The Twice Fought War}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 669.

the Christian sects of Lebanon. Opposition support came largely, but not exclusively, from among Lebanon's Moslem groups.

Chamoun's subscription to the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957, was very unpopular both in Lebanon and in neighboring Arab states. Lebanese Opposition leaders considered Chamoun's action repudiation of the National Pact of 1943, which provided for neutrality in international relations and cooperation, but not union, with other Arab states. Lebanese Opposition leaders expressed their objections to the Government's policy in debates over a vote of confidence for the foreign and domestic policies of Lebanese Premier Sami es-Solh on April 4 and 5, 1957.56

The situation in Lebanon was aggravated by the reputed readiness of President Chamoun to seek a second six-year term as President. Since it was unconstitutional for the Lebanese President to succeed himself, the constitution would have to be amended. Four important Opposition representatives—Ahmed al-Assad, Kamal Junblatt, Abdallah al-Yafi, and Saeb Salam—lost their traditional seats in the fraudulent parliamentary elections of June, 1957.57 The elections resulted in overwhelming victory for Chamoun supporters, and fed speculation that the way was being prepared for a constitutional amendment


57 Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon (Washington, D. C.: Middle East Institute, 1961), pp. 56-57.
to permit Chamoun to hold a second term. 58

The formation of the United Arab Republic (U. A. R.) by Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, and the subsequent visit to Damascus, Syria, by U. A. R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser on February 24, 1958, contributed to the divisions in Lebanon. Lebanese supporters of Arab unity—primarily Moslems—welcomed enthusiastically formation of the U. A. R. Scores of Nasser supporters journeyed from Lebanon to Damascus to take part in the festivities surrounding Nasser's visit. These factors created strong fears among some segments of the Lebanese public—particularly among the Maronite Christians—that Lebanon's independence was threatened. "Nasir's visit also hardened the lines of division between the opposition and its followers, and the government and its supporters, and made them extremely suspicious of each other and willing to give any move the worst interpretation." 59

On the night of May 7, 1958, Opposition editor Nassib al-Matni was assassinated. His assailants were never found. The Opposition blamed his death on the Chamoun regime. Riots and strikes broke out in Lebanon. Opposition leaders called for Chamoun's immediate resignation. 60

The Lebanese army of 9,000 played a strange role throughout the crisis. Its entire strength was never committed to suppress the revolt, nor to uphold the Chamoun Government.

58 Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., p. 147.
59 Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 63.
Army commander-in-chief General Fuad Chehab was reluctant to commit his ethnically divided army to either side in the crisis for fear of tearing the army itself apart. He preferred to preserve its record of political impartiality, and to maintain its integrity as a cohesive force. Thus, Chehab employed the army to referee the conflict, containing the opposing forces in their respective strongholds. He ignored orders from the President and Prime Minister to crush the rebels.61

Following the outbreak of disturbances in Lebanon, Chamoun inquired of the British, French, and American Ambassadors whether their Governments would respond to a Lebanese call for help. Two days later, the three Governments replied in the affirmative. Chamoun wrote:

...Cette démarche avait été faite à titre d'information. Espérant en un redressement de la situation par le gouvernement libanaise lui-même, j'étais décidé à n'avoir recours à une intervention étrangère qu'à la dernière limite, au moment où elle apparaîtrait comme la seule mesure capable de sauver le pays de l'anarchie et de la guerre civile, et de préserver sa souveraineté. Avant d'en arriver là, il était tout naturel de déployer le maximum de notre effort. Par ailleurs, nous comptons demeurer dans le cadre de la légalité internationale tant par rapport à la Ligue des États Arabes que par rapport à l'Organisation des Nations Unies....62

Before replying favorably to the Lebanese request, President

61 Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., pp. 176-177; and Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 81.

62 "...This step had been taken as a point of information. Hoping for an improvement in the situation by the Lebanese government itself, I had decided not to have recourse to foreign intervention except as a last resort, at the moment when it appeared as the only measure capable of saving the country from anarchy and civil war, and to preserve its sovereignty. Before it came to that, it was completely natural to deploy the maximum of our effort. Incidentally, we planned to stay within the limits of international law while reporting to the Arab League and to the United Nations...." Camille Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Edition Gallimard, 1963), pp. 414-415.
Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan consulted by transatlantic telephone. 63 In May and June, the Eisenhower Administration prepared American public opinion for a possible U. S. intervention in Lebanon. Initially they based their policy on a loose interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. (see: Chapter VI.)

On May 21, 1958, Lebanon placed its complaint of massive U. A. R. infiltration of arms and men into its territory before the Arab League, and, on May 22, before the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council adjourned until June 3, pending the outcome of Arab League efforts to cope with the Lebanese situation. Following Arab League inability to agree on a resolution, the Security Council was reconvened. On June 11, the Security Council resolved to establish a United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL) to determine the amount of U. A. R. intervention in Lebanon. On June 13, the Observation Group began its activities in the tiny Middle Eastern country.

Upon his return from the Middle East, U. N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold told reporters at his news conference of July 3, that there was "no foundation" to support a judgement of "mass infiltration" of men and arms into Lebanon. On

63 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 266; and Harold Macmillan, Riding The Storm, 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 506. If, as Meo and Qubain suggested, Chamoun had previously informed the American, British, and French Ambassadors in Beirut of his determination to seek a constitutional amendment to make possible his re-election, and if, as Meo implied, the U. S. had at first indicated its approval of a second term for Chamoun, then the Eisenhower Administration had little choice but to respond in the affirmative to Chamoun's query, or to lose face. See: Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 65; and Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., p. 196.
July 4, release of the preliminary UNOGIL report indicated that the "vast majority (of rebels) was...composed of Lebanese."64

In early July it seemed to the Eisenhower Administration that U. S. intervention in Lebanon would not be called for. American policy was to support the U. N. Secretary-General and the U. N. Observation Group. Secretary of State Dulles expressed confidence in UNOGIL's ability to ameliorate the situation.65

On July 14, 1958, the pro-Western Iraqi regime was violently overthrown. The United States was taken by surprise, having received little advance intelligence of the impending coup.66 President Camille Chamoun summoned the Ambassadors of Britain, France, and the United States, each in turn, and requested their help in defending his regime. Chamoun claimed that he explained to each Ambassador that he had refrained from requesting the intervention of their respective countries in the hope that the Lebanese Government would succeed, without their military assistance, to reestablish order and security. But the revolution in Iraq created an entirely new and grave situation, menacing not only Lebanon, but the entire Middle East. He felt that it was time for them to honor their commitments.67 The accuracy of part of Chamoun's account is called into question

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by Charles W. Thayer's report that the American Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, received several calls from Chamoun for U. S. assistance. After renewed rioting in June, Chamoun sent word to McClintock, through a special emissary, that the time had come for American intervention. The Ambassador, who did not agree, refused to accept the emissary's message, insisting that Chamoun himself must make so grave a request. On another occasion, Chamoun withdrew his appeal for help when McClintock demanded it in writing. Chamoun, who had been barricaded in his palace for weeks behind steel shutters, snatched a piece of paper and began to write. As he wrote, his anxiety subsided, and he merely slipped the paper into his desk drawer. 68

The United States decided to intervene in Lebanon "to stop the trend toward chaos," and to protect the remaining Western interests in the area. 69 U. S. Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958. Simultaneously, the United States initiated a diplomatic offensive in the Security Council. In response to a similar request from King Hussein, British troops were airlifted to Jordan on July 17, 1958. The United States cooperated closely with the British during the period of their concurrent interventions, airlifting supplies and ensuring Israeli cooperation on the overflights. 70

70 Ibid., pp. 278-280; and Macmillan, Riding The Storm, op. cit., pp. 523-525.
United Nations Security Council debate of the Middle Eastern crises ended in deadlock on July 22, 1958. American efforts to get the U. N. to assume the American role of policing Lebanon, and to guarantee Jordanian peace, were vetoed by the Russians.

Even before the deadlocked Security Council adjourned, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, on July 19, began a long series of fruitless public exchanges of letters with Western leaders by suggesting a summit conference of Heads of Government of the U. S. S. R., the U. S. A., Great Britain, France, and India, with the participation of U. N. Secretary-General Dag Hammar- skjold in Geneva on July 22. The Russian proposal was countered by an Anglo-American suggestion to hold the proposed summit conference in the United Nations Security Council under U. N. auspices, and in accordance with U. N. rules of procedure. Several letter exchanges followed the initial exchange. The West and the Russians waged propaganda battle over the form and setting of the proposed summit. The matter came to a head when, following a visit to Peking, Khrushchev backed out of the summit and called for a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The United States quickly agreed to a General Assembly session.

In the meantime, Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy had been sent to Lebanon by Eisenhower to attempt to work out a solution with Lebanese leaders. Murphy's efforts were suc-

cessful. The Lebanese agreed on the need to elect a compromise candidate to the Presidency immediately. On July 31, 1958, General Fuad Chehab was elected President of Lebanon on the second ballot.

The United Nations General Assembly was called into session on August 8, 1958. Originally the United Nations Secretariat had prepared a plan for the Middle East to be presented at the proposed summit. When the summit did not materialize, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld decided to present the plan to the General Assembly. Because some diplomats feared the General Assembly session would become a propaganda duel, Hammarskjöld's presentation was advanced to the keynote position in order to establish a positive tone for the debate. The Secretary-General called for: 1. extension of U. N. activities in Lebanon and Jordan; 2. Arab mutual reaffirmation of their intention not to interfere in each other's internal affairs; and 3. Arab cooperation in joint economic development through coordination of Arab oil and water resources.

On August 13, 1958, President Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly. The Eisenhower six-point proposal closely paralleled the Hammarskjöld plan. In addition to elaborating on the Secretary-General's points, Eisenhower requested General

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72 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 407.
Assembly reaffirmation of U. N. policy against inflammatory propaganda, creation of a standby United Nations peace force, and establishment of a U. N. body to make arrangements for an arms control program for the Middle East. 75

Little was made of the Hammarskjold, Eisenhower and other proposals. It looked as though the General Assembly was about to become hopelessly deadlocked. But ten Arab states--Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen--introduced an Arab Resolution calling for Arab non-interference in each other's affairs, and calling upon the Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The Arab Resolution was passed unanimously by the General Assembly on August 21, 1958. 76 Its passage, to all intents and purposes, ended the Lebanon crisis.

General Fuad Chehab assumed office on September 24, 1958, and named Rashid Karami Premier. Karami appointed an eight-man cabinet, all but one of its members drawn from the Opposition. This caused an extremely tense period from September 25 to October 14, during which Chamoun supporters struck, erected barricades, demonstrated against the Chehab Government, and clashed with the police. The new outbreak of hostilities was ended when Karami announced the formation of a new four-man


cabinet, two ministers from each side in the controversy. Order was restored to Lebanon. The last American troops were quietly withdrawn on October 25, 1958, bringing the American involvement in Lebanon officially to an end.

Criteria of Selection

In the following chapters, we shall try to examine the relationship between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press during these two Middle Eastern crises. Our study will concentrate on the printed news media—newspapers, newsmagazines, opinion journals, and scholarly journals—which treat politically significant news and political opinion. Specific criteria of selection were used for the separate categories. In all cases, accessibility was a prime consideration.

Newspapers: The American newspaper industry, among world news systems, is unusual. In other countries, national newspapers are issued in one or two major cities, and are distributed throughout the nation as the primary serious journals. In the United States, the news is distributed primarily by a highly fragmented complex of local newspaper firms. The United States has no national newspaper available in all parts of the country at its time of publication. The three American papers which come closest to being national newspapers are the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor.

77 Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

*In this work, the term "American press" refers specifically to the English language press printed in the United States. Study of the foreign language press printed in the U. S. was not included.
Despite its great influence, the New York Times, printed only in New York City, does not displace a significant portion of national newspaper reading or sales.

The Wall Street Journal, published in six different cities, is more available than any other American daily. It specializes in business and financial news.

The Christian Science Monitor of Boston is distributed nationwide. Its readership is small.

Between 1940 and 1968, total American newspaper circulation increased by 50 per cent. But two of these three national dailies out-paced the general rate of growth. In New York state, the Wall Street Journal's circulation increased 2,100 per cent, but outside the state its circulation rose 4,700 per cent. The New York Times's circulation in greater New York went up 30 per cent, but outside that area, it rose 165 per cent. While the Christian Science Monitor's circulation in Boston actually dropped, elsewhere in the country it rose 26 per cent. Thus, nationally these papers are becoming increasingly important as news sources.

Our study of American newspaper coverage of the Suez and Lebanon crises will concentrate on these three great papers because of their recognized national prominence. Their status was acknowledged by the Eisenhower Administration, as evidenced by their frequent invitation to background news briefings. (see: Chapter II and Appendixes B and C.) Their standing has also

been attested to by newsmen. In a survey conducted in the middle sixties, Washington press corps newsmen ranked newspapers they used in their own work, and graded them on fairness and reliability. The results of the survey are given below:

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<th>NEWSPAPERS USED IN WORK</th>
<th>Number answering--257 per cent</th>
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<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>87.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Star</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Sun</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Herald Tribune</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington News</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Commerce</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Star</td>
<td>33.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore Sun</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>15.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York Herald Tribune</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee Journal</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville Courier-Journal</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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In both cases, the newsmen ranked the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor in the top ten. The preeminence of the New York Times is clear. So great is the impact of the Times that Rivers observed:

...One of the most striking features of almost any government office is a copy of the Times. Most high officials have experienced the irritation of being briefed on developments by assistants who got most of their information from the same issue of the Times that the official himself had read a short time earlier. For governments here and abroad,
the Times is the one indispensible newspaper.

...every official, even the most powerful, needs a New York Times, for he is to some extent insulated from the realities his own administration creates by the fears and the ambitions of his subordinates, not to mention the confusion in communications.79

To determine the representativeness of the Times, Journal, and Monitor during the Suez and Lebanon crises, a check was made of the editorial policies advocated by four Mid-Western and Far Western daily newspapers: the Chicago Daily News, the Chicago Sun Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Los Angeles Times. Appropriate references will be made in the footnotes, and findings will be summarized at the end of the relevant chapters. These four newspapers were also regularly represented at Dulles' background news briefings.

Newsmagazines: The newsmagazines were chosen on the basis of their acknowledged importance; they are: Business Week, Newsweek, Time, and U. S. News and World Report. They, too, were frequently invited to send representatives to Dulles' backgrounders. Their importance was further signified by the Washington press corps newsmen surveyed in the mid-1960's. The results are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAGAZINES USED IN WORK</th>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>U. S. News &amp; World Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Reporter</td>
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<td>Government publications</td>
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<td>Harper's</td>
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<td>Business Week</td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Economist</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Republic</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortune</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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</table>


79 Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
In the period 1940-1968, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U. S. News and World Report* increased their national circulation by 585 per cent. 80

**Opinion Journals:** The opinion journals of this study—*Commonweal*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, and *The Reporter*—were likewise chosen because of their recognized importance. Two of the four, *The Reporter* and *The New Republic*, were among the top ten magazines used by the Washington press corps men in their work. John L. Hulteng and Roy Paul Nelson have indicated that although opinion journal circulation is small, under 100,000, some with circulations under 20,000, they are influential "because the reader of an opinion magazine typically is an educator, editor, legislator, or clergyman. He passes along what he reads to much larger audiences." 81 The four opinion journals of our study were indexed in the *Public Affairs Information Service Index*.

**Scholarly Journals:** The scholarly journals chosen are acknowledged organs of the history, law, and political science professions. The journals considered were selected because either they carried articles indexed in the *Public Affairs Information Service Index*, and/or in the *Reader’s Guide to Periodical Literature*, or, as professional journals, they might be expected to show an interest in the crises. Like the opinion journals, 


scholarly journals have a limited circulation. However, their readers also hold positions from which they can, and often do, pass on the information gleaned from these journals to a wider audience.

Since opinion journals, scholarly journals, and news-magazines are widely distributed to libraries, their pass-along readership is high. This is also true for the Times, Journal, and Monitor.
CHAPTER I

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS

Preliminary Observations

In this chapter an effort will be made to analyze the highlights of American foreign policy during the protracted Suez crisis. Public statements of policy will be examined in the light of subsequently revealed private interpretations of United States aims, objectives, and reasons for pursuing specific policies. This is necessary in order to be able to determine how accurately and effectively the American press reported and interpreted U. S. policy during the Suez crisis.

Our analysis will rely on three types of primary source material. The first of these are published, official documents released by the White House, and the Department of State. This is only a partial record, at best, for it represents merely what the American Government wanted its people, and foreign governments and peoples to know at the time.

The second type of primary source is the published memoirs of various top government officials actively involved in political decision-making in connection with the crisis.

The third type is the collections of oral history memoirs of prominent, contemporary political figures kept in the Princeton and Columbia university libraries.
The latter two types of sources suffer from the same kinds of deficiencies. Writers of memoirs are known for the inaccuracies which they record due to memories grown fuzzy over details with the passage of time. They suffer from a common human weakness—they care about their image—so, often, consciously or unconsciously, they color their interpretations of past events to conform to their self-image, to cover a mistake, or to deliberately perpetuate a fiction. Furthermore, they often seem unable to analyze past events critically or objectively. Flaws in one's own character, or another's, are often glossed over, or simply forgotten, in the mellower light of retrospect and/or nostalgia.

Because most of the documents of this period are not yet open to the public, there is no way to check the accuracy of much of the material one uncovers. Furthermore, the researcher must often rely heavily on the information revealed by a single source, without having the opportunity to look for corroborative evidence from other sources. Nevertheless, an effort will be made to determine the accuracy of sources by checking for internal evidence, and by juxtaposition of evidence from corollary sources, when available.

The special relationship which existed between President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is a further governing factor in an analysis of U. S. foreign policy. Rarely in American history has a Secretary of State wielded such strong and obvious influence over the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy.
Writing in penciled long-hand on yellow, legal tablet paper, Dulles personally drafted many of his major speeches.\(^1\) The original, hand-written drafts were later typed, and often revised several times before delivery. Dulles would submit a major foreign policy text to President Eisenhower for consideration. Only after Eisenhower reviewed, edited and approved the text would Dulles give a major foreign policy address. Conversely, Eisenhower, prior to presenting a foreign policy speech, would send the prepared, written text to Dulles "to go over and give him the benefit of his thinking."\(^2\)

Eisenhower recalled that he and Dulles consulted frequently with each other. When matters were unusually pressing they might contact each other eight or ten times a day. Eisenhower remarked: "I suppose there was no one I kept in as close touch with as I did with Foster."\(^3\)

Dulles kept Eisenhower informed of his actions and plans for action. Herman Phleger, former State Department Legal Advisor, reported that, when in the United States, Dulles spoke

\(^1\)The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Library (Hereafter: Dulles Project, Princeton), Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, 11 Jan. 1966, pp. 16-18.


\(^3\)Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 July 1964, p. 28.
with the President by telephone three or four times daily, on the average. When abroad, Dulles cabled detailed daily reports to Eisenhower. Dulles' practice of keeping Eisenhower posted underscored his conviction that he was answerable to the President for his conduct of foreign affairs. While he exercised great discretionary power in the making and handling of this country's foreign affairs, Dulles never lost sight of the fact that President Eisenhower had the last say in major foreign policy decisions. Therefore, Dulles always consulted with him before making an important move.4

The Crisis Begins

Late in the morning of July 19, 1956, Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein entered the office of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He came to formally announce the Egyptian acceptance of the Western offer of help in constructing the Aswan High Dam project. Waiting to see him were John Foster Dulles, George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State. Dulles began the conversation by explaining the difficulties the Administration was having with Congress. Hussein expressed sympathy for the problems facing the Eisenhower Administration, and indicated his strong desire that the United States, Britain and the World Bank assist Egypt with the project. He mentioned further that Dmitri Shepilov, Soviet Foreign Minister, while in Cairo, had offered Russian help to Egypt in building

4Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Herman Phleger, 21 July 1964, pp. 40-41.
the High Dam. Hussein "touched his pocket to emphasize, 'We've got the Russian offer in our pocket.'" The implication was clear--if the West would not help Egypt, the Soviet Union would.

Dulles did not take favorably to Hussein's tactics, and, though in the expert opinion of World Bank engineers the project was practicable and would be beneficial to Egypt, none the less, Dulles proceeded to tell Hussein that the United States was led to the conclusion that the project was not feasible under present conditions, primarily because it would constitute "too great a strain on the Egyptian economy." Allen recalled that Dulles did not mention that Egypt had "mortgaged" its cotton crop for five to ten years into the future to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. "(B)ut that's what he had in the back of his mind."6 If Allen's recollection is correct, Hussein could understandably have been miffed at Dulles' slur of the Egyptian economy.

Herman Finer, author of the first definitive study of American Suez policy, recorded that Dulles retorted to Hussein: "Well, as you have the money already, you don't need any from us! My offer is withdrawn!"7 Whichever account in the more accurate, it must be noted that both methods were highly insulting to Egypt.

The blow was hardly softened when, immediately after Hussein's visit, and before he had an opportunity to consult

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5 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with George V. Allen, 29 July 1965, pp. 36-37.
6 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
7 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 48.
with his Government, the U. S. State Department released to the press a communique of the official reasons for refusing to go ahead with the project. The formal State Department statement of cancellation indicated:

Developments... have not been favorable to the success of the project, and the U. S. Government has concluded that it is not feasible in present circumstances to participate in the project. Agreement by the riparian states has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to assure the project's success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.

This decision in no way reflects or involves any alteration in the friendly relations of the Government and people of the United States toward the Government and people of Egypt.

The United States remains deeply interested in the welfare of the Egyptian people and in the development of the Nile. It is prepared to consider at an appropriate time and at the request of the riparian states what steps might be taken toward a more effective utilization of the water resources of the Nile for the benefit of the peoples of the region. Furthermore, the United States remains ready to assist Egypt in its efforts to improve the economic condition of its people and is prepared, through its appropriate agencies to discuss these matters within the context of funds appropriated by the Congress.8

The official statement was, likewise, insulting to Egypt. It called into question, before the entire world, the economic solvency of Egypt, and implied that Egypt was a poor credit risk. Within a matter of days, the insult was heightened as Britain and the World Bank also withdrew from the project.

The reneging on the U. S. offer to aid the Aswan High Dam project was primarily a Dulles' decision. On June 8, Eisenhower suffered a severe attack of ileitis. He was kept away from the

8 "Aswan High Dam (Press release 401 dated July 19)," State Dept. Bul., Vol. 35, No. 892, July 30, 1956, p. 188.
White House until July 15. The President's ailment prevented the full consultations on the High Dam which Dulles normally had with Eisenhower on all other important foreign policy decisions. On July 13, Dulles conferred with the recuperating President at his Gettysburg farm. Dulles expressed his judgment that the Egyptian decision to accept the Western offer probably meant that the Soviets had failed to give Nasser a firm commitment. Eisenhower indicated his annoyance that, on the threshold of a presidential campaign, he should be asked to take domestic political risks for Egypt. Eisenhower did not resolve this dilemma. While the discussion tended toward a negative response, the manner, timing, and substance were left largely to Dulles' discretion. Consultation with the British and further consideration were to precede the final decision. Dulles, after he had chosen the course of action he preferred to pursue, discussed the withdrawal statement with Eisenhower on the morning of July 19, in a meeting which lasted just 12 minutes. Eisenhower approved the press release. 9

Nevertheless, the renege was mainly a Dulles' action. Members of the Eisenhower White House staff later blamed Dulles for starting the Suez crisis. They claimed that Eisenhower would not have approved the move if he had been aware of the manner in which Dulles was going to do it. As Love noted: "Eisenhower's (subsequent) requests for explanations from Dulles show that he was not happy at the time about it and he does not

seem to have been fully satisfied with the explanations."¹⁰

Why did Dulles make this decision? Why did he employ such an insulting method to announce it? The official reasons for cancellation of the Western offer do not furnish a satisfactory explanation. The reasoning after-the-fact should also be considered.

First, there was Congressional opposition. Early in the summer of 1956, in a long talk, Senate Minority Leader William F. Knowland reportedly told Dulles that he would have a hard time getting the votes required for the Aswan High Dam project. Senators from the cotton-growing states (in the South and California) were opposed to the Dam which would increase Egypt's cotton growing and exporting capabilities, thereby causing greater competition with American cotton on the international market. Pro-Israel Senators were opposed. Also some Senators opposed Nasser's politics of neutralism and his buying arms from the Communist bloc.¹¹

Hoover recalled that "in discussions with Congress on a purely theoretical basis relating to foreign aid in general," the Administration was told that Congress would not appropriate funds for more than two years in advance. When they asked how the Congress would feel about committing an enormous amount of American money for ten years into the future, they found that Congress was opposed to the idea.¹²

¹⁰ Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 325.
¹¹ Dulles Project, Interview with Allen, pp. 33-34.
¹² Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with George Humphrey and Herbert Hoover, Jr., 5 May 1964, pp. 34-35.
The argument that Congressional opposition to the High Dam project figured in the Administration's decision to cancel the American aid offer has been disputed by Members of Congress. Ambassador James P. Richards, former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, observed that although Dulles would have had to fight for Congressional approval for American participation in the project, he probably would have gotten it, if both he and President Eisenhower had asked for the funds.\(^\text{13}\)

A close reading of Eisenhower's memoirs lends support to Richard's observation. Eisenhower wrote: "(I)t would take all the pressure Foster and I could bring to bear to obtain congressional approval for our contribution, and we had little zest for an all-out legislative fight in behalf of a nation that thought it could do as well by dealing with the Soviets."\(^\text{14}\) It seems reasonable to conclude that Congressional opposition was not a decisive factor in the cancellation of the American offer.

Second, Egypt's ability to pay was questioned. The project was a vast one which would tax Egypt's resources to the limit. (see above: pp. 13-14.) American experts estimated that it would take Egypt in the neighborhood of 25 per cent of its total gross national product over a 25 year period which would entail tremendous national sacrifice.\(^\text{15}\) Not only had Egypt already pledged large portions of her cotton crop to cover the Czech

\(^{13}\text{Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ambassador James P. Richards, 23 Sept. 1965; pp. 26-27; and Dulles Project, Interview with Senator John Sparkman, 19 March 1966, pp. 34-36.}\)

\(^{14}\text{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.}\)

\(^{15}\text{Dulles Project, Interview with Humphrey and Hoover, pp. 32-33.}\)
arms deal, but "(o)ther reports of an agreement by Nasser to purchase an additional $200 million in arms from the Communists (mortgaging Egypt's stockpile of cotton) made it obvious that Egypt could never fulfill her part of the financing on terms we could accept."\(^{16}\) (Italics added.)

Administration public and private statements about the supposed inability of Egypt to finance its share of the project contradicted the findings of World Bank experts. Despite Egypt's conclusion of a second arms deal with the Russians, the Bank believed Egypt capable of carrying the economic burden.\(^{17}\) Egypt was to pay for the arms obtained from the Soviets through the sale of surplus cotton which it could not sell in Western markets. Far from weakening its economic position, the arms deals enabled Egypt to diversify its cotton trading markets. Now Egypt could trade with both the West and the East.

Third, American officials claimed that the close association with Egypt, which the agreement would necessitate, was tailor-made to fifteen years of quarreling over which Government was abiding by the agreement.\(^{18}\) Eisenhower wrote: "In view of the burdens the project would impose on the Egyptian people, he (Dulles) was beginning to think that any nation associated with construction of the dam would eventually wind up very unpopular among the Egyptians."\(^{19}\) This argument overlooks the probability

\[^{16}\text{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 32.}\]
\[^{17}\text{Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., pp. 49-50; and Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., pp. 316-317.}\]
\[^{18}\text{Dulles Project, Interview with Allen, pp. 33-34.}\]
\[^{19}\text{Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 32.}\]
that by agreeing to the project the West would have had significant leverage with which to influence Egyptian domestic and foreign policy. Such a close relationship for an extended period of time would have undoubtedly precluded Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. Nasser would have been unlikely to jeopardize completion of the High Dam project when the Canal was already scheduled to revert to Egyptian sovereignty in 1968.

Fourth, Americans were distressed with Nasser's obvious willingness to deal with the Soviets, thereby, affording them their first toehold in the Middle East. And they were upset over Nasser's recognition of Communist China in May of 1956. The Americans were also annoyed by Egyptian arms deals with the Russians. It is worth remembering, however, that the first Soviet-Egyptian arms deal preceded the initial Western offer to assist in the High Dam project's construction; it could not legitimately be used later to justify withdrawal of that offer.

Fifth, the United States was apparently concerned with nipping in the bud attempts by Third World countries to play East off against West in order to obtain better terms. Nasser had been bargaining back and forth between the Western World and the Communist bloc. The eyes of the whole world, particularly the Third World--much of which was interested in securing American aid--were upon the United States. Therefore, Dulles made a calculated decision to put a stop to Nasser's tactics, and, thereby, to demonstrate to the entire world that playing East off against West was not the way to deal with the United

20Ibid., p. 31.
Sixth, Eisenhower indicated that he would not submit to Egyptian "blackmail." He refused to allow the Egyptians to win concessions by threatening to go to the Russians to get what they wanted if they could not get acceptable terms from the West. 22

Eugene Black, past President of the World Bank, and privy to much Administration thinking on the subject, has suggested an additional reason for the withdrawal of the American offer. Black indicated that neither he nor Dulles felt that there was any threat of the Soviets backing the Aswan Dam project in the event of a Western pull-out. Since the project was so important to Egypt, Dulles felt that if Egypt were unable to get either Western or Eastern help "this would be the death knell of Nasser." Thus, Dulles "was glad to call this thing off because he thought if he did call it off, the Russians wouldn't do it—and if they didn't do it, this would put Nasser in a very difficult spot." 23 Dulles took a calculated risk hoping to expose what he believed to be the hollowness of Soviet offers of economic aid for the High Dam, and to trigger Nasser's fall. This would explain the insulting manner in which he handled the withdrawal of the U. S. offer. His dual policy of exposing the Russians by undercutting Nasser failed, for Dulles did not foresee the resilience of the

21 According to a reliable, high Eisenhower Administration State Department source.
22 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 32.
Egyptian President, and he did not project correctly the Egyptian response. Apparently, while hoping to cause Nasser's overthrow, Dulles did not wish the West to be openly associated with it. In an October 30, 1956, background news briefing, Dulles indicated to the American newsmen in attendance that, prior to the Anglo-French ultimatum and the Israeli invasion of Egypt, the U. S. estimated that Nasser could last no longer than six months to a year. Because, Dulles claimed, Nasser's policies were self-defeating, there was no need for the British, French, and Israelis to use force. (see: Chapter II.)

The actual withdrawal decision had been agreed upon by the Americans and the British before Hussein announced his intention to return to Washington to accept the Western offer. The Anglo-American agreement was to let the offer "lie on the table...to wither on the vine." But the U. S. decided to inform Hussein of the U. S. decision to cancel its offer of help in the construction of the High Dam project.

Dulles informed Eugene Black in order to prepare him. He also notified Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, who notified his Government. The British indicated their belief that the action might be a bit precipitate. Eden wrote: "I would have preferred to play this thing long and not to have forced the issue." Dulles overruled his Allies' suggestions.

Initially the American decision was greeted with caution.

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24 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Sir Roger Makins (later Lord Sherfield), 5 June 1964, p. 5.
25 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 49.
When it did become clear that Russia would not immediately lend support to the High Dam project, American public reaction was generally favorable, prior to Nasser's nationalization speech. During this brief period, the American press also applauded the Secretary's action. (see: Chapters IV and V.)

The evening of July 19, 1956, following his confrontation with Ambassador Hussein and release to the press of the carefully worded American statement, Dulles communicated his misgivings to his assistant, William Macomber, Jr. In a brief encounter in Macomber's State Department office, the following colloquy took place:

Dulles: Well, this has been quite a day.
Macomber: Yes, sir.
Dulles: Well, I certainly hope we did the right thing.
Macomber: I hope so.
Dulles: Yes, I certainly hope we did the right thing.

Then Dulles got up and left. 26

A few days later, Macomber showed Dulles an article in *Time* magazine which, Macomber recalled, carried the phrase, "Master chessman Dulles made his finest move." Dulles looked at the article, then he said to Macomber: "It's much too early to tell. We must wait to see what their reaction is."

Macomber concluded that Dulles "was much more guarded and much more concerned about this than the public reaction to it at the time." 27

The Western action in withholding funds from the Aswan High Dam project precipitated an angry Egyptian response. On July 26, 1956, in a public address in Alexandria, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, and announced that the tolls would be used to build the High Dam. The Suez crisis was well under way.

Nasser knew in advance that Western participation in the Aswan High Dam project would be cancelled. Therefore, he was not surprised by the American decision. Scholars usually agree that Nasser was angered by Dulles' slur of Egyptian credit, and by the insulting manner in which Dulles withdrew the U.S. from the project. The minority view has it that Dulles played into Nasser's hands by providing the pretext to nationalize the Canal. But the High Dam project was of such importance to Egypt that it is difficult to conceive that Nasser would have risked sacrificing it in order to obtain a pretext to nationalize the Suez Canal. Apparently he felt there was nothing to lose by making one last effort.

When the Eisenhower Administration considered the possible reactions of Egypt, it concluded that Nasser might try to get help from the Russians, and that he would accept a Russian offer if it were forthcoming, which was considered unlikely. The

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Americans also envisioned "anti-American riots, confiscation of American property, and things like that." Nationalization of the Canal, which intelligence reported Nasser had been contemplating for nearly two years, was not considered "very probable" because the Canal Charter had only twelve years more to run until the Canal would revert to Egyptian sovereignty. So little was the nationalization expected that Dulles was in Peru for the inauguration of President Predo when he learned of the Egyptian action.

The British and French were very angry; they felt that Nasser's action could not go unchallenged. From the first, they considered force a legitimate tool to regain Western control of the Canal. On July 27, Eisenhower received a message from the American charge d'affairs in London, and a report from Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon in Paris to that effect. After consultation with Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, Eisenhower approved the sending of Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy to London. Murphy left for London with no formal instructions. "Just go over and hold the fort," Eisenhower had told him. By that, Eisenhower understood that Murphy was "to urge calm consideration of the affair and to discourage impulsive armed action."

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30 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with William Park Armstrong, Jr. (Foreign Service Officer--Intelligence Briefer at Staff Meetings), 10 Sept. 1965, pp. 15-16.

31 Dulles Project, Interview with Allen, p. 39.

32 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., pp. 53-54; and Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

33 Ibid., Murphy, p. 379.

In discussions with British and French leaders, Murphy quickly discerned their willingness to resort to armed force to resolve the Suez issue. Further, Murphy noted the tendency of British officials to assume that the United States would go along with any Anglo-French action. Eden indicated that the British and French were not asking the United States to participate directly, but they did hope that the U. S. would “take care of the Bear,” i.e., neutralize the Soviet threat of counter involvement. Murphy surmised that Eden was laboring under the mistaken impression that a common identity of interest existed among the British, French and Americans over Suez. Murphy noted that that was not the American view, and that he gave no encouragement to the idea.35

Before Congress recessed early for the campaigns for the November elections, there was scattered comment in both the House and Senate on Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Representative Emanuel Celler, New York Democrat, charged that Dulles, Eden, and Pineau had reaped what they had sown through “a constant policy of appeasement subordinating national self-respect to the fog of fear.” Celler, who believed military and economic reprisals would be “the least satisfactory of policies,” recommended construction of an alternate canal from Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba to Ascalon on the Mediterranean.36 Representative James Roosevelt, California Democrat, observed that

35 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., pp. 381-382.

"Nasser's answer to our refusal to help finance the Aswan Dam... vindicates our position for it confirms the view that the Nasser regime cannot be relied upon to keep its commitments." Roosevelt recommended that the Administration sell arms to Israel, and reappraise U. S. Middle East policy. 37 Montana Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield, who believed that Nasser had the right to nationalize the Suez Canal, argued that the Western response to Nasser's action should lie "in the use of diplomacy and the development of new policies and ideas." Mansfield, who foresaw the possibility of Egyptian closure of the Canal to the West, repeated several suggestions current at the time: 1. To allow U. S. oil companies to expand and develop their oil production; 2. To encourage the building of super-tankers to go around the Cape, or to export oil from the Western Hemisphere; and 3. To consider construction of a new canal through Israel. Above all, the U. S. should seek a peaceful solution through the Three-Power Conference, then upcoming, and, failing that, through the International Court of Justice in the Hague. In the event of "aggressive action" by any of the involved parties, the U. S. should take the matter immediately to the United Nations Security Council. 38


A Succession of Conferences

When it became clear to Eisenhower just how seriously the British and French were contemplating military action, he decided to send Secretary of State Dulles to London for the tripartite conference which Eden had recommended. This was to be the first of a series of conferences which, in the American interpretation, were convened to seek a peaceful solution to the problems arising from the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. Phleger indicated that upon receipt of Murphy's reports that the British and the French were very angry and contemplating military action, "the Secretary and the President ... decided ... that under no circumstances should the United States become militarily committed in the Middle East." Chief responsibility for this decision Phleger assigned to Eisenhower, who, Phleger felt, would have made this decision regardless of what Dulles might have advised him. "But I'm sure that was equally the Secretary's view, to help the French and the British in whatever way they could morally and materially, but not to become militarily involved." 39

The reasons for the American decision to avoid U. S. military involvement in the Middle East, and to discourage Anglo-French use of force to settle the Suez dispute were: 40

1. The privately-held Administration conviction that Egypt was exercising its power of eminent domain, i.e. the power of a nation to appropriate property within the state to a neces-

39 Dulles Project, Interview with Phleger, pp. 46-47.
40 The following relies heavily on Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 38ff.
sary public use, reasonable compensation being made. In this view, Egypt was acting legally by nationalizing the Suez Canal, which lay completely within Egyptian territory and under Egyptian sovereignty, provided it paid just compensation, which it had indicated a readiness to do. As Eisenhower stated later in the crisis: "I think no one can challenge the legal right of Egypt to nationalize the Canal." 41

2. The belief that the Egyptians could operate the Suez Canal by themselves; and

3. Fear of both political and military consequences. Prior British experience had shown just how difficult sustained occupation of the Suez Canal Zone could be. Eighty thousand British troops were in virtual state of siege in the face of violent Egyptian opposition. Furthermore, military action could lead to the very blockage of traffic flow which it was meant to prevent. The pipelines in neighboring Arab states might also be cut, impeding the flow of oil to Europe. To reopen them and to guard them would require many troops.

If the Western aim were to unseat Nasser by force, conquest of Egypt might prove necessary. To conquer and occupy Cairo alone, then a city of two million, in the face of expected guerrilla opposition, would entail house-to-house fighting and involve large numbers of troops. Dulles later voiced Administration fears on NBC TV's "Meet the Press," September 23, 1956.

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Dulles observed: "(T)here are different opinions as to whether a collapse would quickly come about or not but certainly there is great danger that war started there will bog the parties down for an almost indefinite length of time; it would be a terrible drain on their economies and the end is not readily to be seen." 42

The Tripartite London Conference

John Foster Dulles left for London on Tuesday morning, July 31, 1956, for two days of intensive talks with the Foreign Ministers of France and Great Britain. In the tripartite talks, the three Governments agreed to the convening in London of an international conference of the principal Suez Canal user nations to consider the problem. A formula was devised for choosing the invitees. Those eight nations which were signatories of the 1888 Constantinople Convention,43 and sixteen other principal users determined by annual tonnage and trade shipments through the canal were invited. The countries asked to attend


43 The Constantinople Convention was drawn up by the major Nineteenth Century maritime powers and Egypt to preserve the freedom of the Canal for the passage of all ships at all times. Article I of the Convention reads:

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade.

were: Egypt, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the U. S. S. R., and Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States. Egypt and Greece refused to attend.

The date for the start of the first London Conference was set for August 16, 1956. Dulles wanted several weeks for preparation; the British and French preferred to meet as soon as possible. So the compromise date of August 16 was fixed.44

Dulles private remarks during the tripartite discussions have given rise to considerable controversy since then. Prime Minister Eden has subsequently argued that Dulles gave Britain the impression that the United States "did not exclude" the use of force to settle the Suez controversy, provided sufficient effort was given beforehand to attempts to find a peaceful solution to the impasse. Eden quoted Dulles as having said:

A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow....We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favor the international operation of the canal....It should be possible to create a world opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated. Then if a military operation had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.

Eden remarked, "These were forthright words. They rang in my ears for months."45

While it cannot be overlooked that much of Eden's memoir

44Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., pp. 385-386; and Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 67.
is a defense of his Suez policies, thus raising doubts of his credibility, there is substantiation in American sources for Eden's recollection of Dulles' remarks although the Americans sometimes differ on the interpretation.

Murphy, recalling Dulles' statement about the need to make Nasser "disgorge" the Canal, wrote:

It is true, as Eden reported, that Dulles once declared: "A way must be found to make Nasser disgorge what he is attempting to swallow!" But one never could be quite sure of the thoughts in the innermost recesses of the Dulles mind.... Perhaps Dulles wanted to show some sympathy, which I am certain he felt, for our Allies' indignation about Nasser.\textsuperscript{46}

Winthrop W. Aldrich, former American Ambassador to Great Britain, remarked on the incident in question that he had no doubt that Dulles gave Eden the impression that the U. S. would not exclude the use of force should every possible peaceful alternative prove ineffective. Aldrich commented: "One of the tragic things about the situation was that Eden did not see that in (Dulles' diplomatic) language there was no commitment to use force and that when it came to the final and formal decision we might not be willing to use it."\textsuperscript{47}

It seems clear that in this early encounter Dulles did lead Eden to believe that the United States was not opposed to the use of force to settle the Suez dispute should peaceful efforts fail. It was the first example during the Suez crisis of Dulles' penchant for making strong statements from which he

\textsuperscript{46} Murphy, \textit{Diplomat}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 386.

later backed down.

This lack of clarity concerning American intentions was hardly improved by public statements of U. S. policy early in the crisis. Initially, American statements were ambiguous regarding a possible use of force by the U. S. to settle the Suez dispute. In his statement made upon arrival back in the United States following the conclusion of the tripartite London conference, Dulles remarked, "We do not...want to meet violence with violence." Instead the United States supported the concept of an international conference of the principal user nations to determine their opinion. "We would hope that out of this would come a solution which all the nations, including Egypt, will respect so that the danger of violence may be averted."48

Although Dulles indicated a clear U. S. preference for a negotiated settlement, he did not rule out the use of force. Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor, noted: "It may be significant that...Mr. Dulles did not say 'we will not meet violence with violence,' but said 'we do not want to meet violence with violence.'"49

Official American attitudes and expectations at this early point were given further expression by Dulles in his radio and television report to the nation on August 3, 1956. Broadcast from the White House, following an introduction by President Eisenhower, Dulles' words transmitted official American attitudes


toward Nasser's act of nationalization of the Suez Canal. In Dulles' interpretation:

...The basic reason he (Nasser) gave (to take over this operation of the Suez Canal) was that if he took over this canal it would enhance the prestige of Egypt.

And also he said that by seizing the Suez Canal he would strike a blow at what he called "Western Imperialism." And he thought also that he could exploit the canal so as to produce bigger revenues for Egypt and so retaliate for the failure of the United States and Britain to give Egypt the money to enable it to get started on the $1 billion-plus Aswan Dam.

In the official American view Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was pictured as "an angry act of retaliation against fancied grievances." Nasser's speech proved that Egypt would use the canal "to promote the political and economic ambitions of Egypt and...the 'grandeur' of Egypt."\(^\text{50}\)

Thus, in the official U.S. position, Nasser "seized" the canal illegally. The official position did not accurately reflect the Administration's privately held conviction that Egypt had the right to nationalize the canal under the laws of eminent domain. Perhaps, Dulles' public statement was an attempt to accommodate the views of America's Anglo-French allies.

In the early statements, American officials were fond of referring to the Suez Canal as "internationalized by treaty."\(^\text{51}\) Later, following Egyptian protest to the former terminology, "usage" of the canal was said to be "internationalized."\(^\text{52}\)


\(^{51}\)Ibid. See also: "Statement by the President Following Receipt of Secretary Dulles' Report on the London Suez Conference, Aug. 29, 1956, Public Papers, 1956, pp. 716-717.

\(^{52}\)"The President's News Conference of August 31, 1956," Public Papers, 1956, p. 718
In Dulles' August 3rd address, the former terminology was used. Dulles argued that it was inadmissible that a waterway internationalized by treaty and vital to so many nations should be selfishly exploited by one country. He denounced Egypt's striking down the Suez Maritime Canal Company as an act of vengefulness. "To permit this to go unchallenged would be to encourage a breakdown of the international fabric upon which the security and the well-being of all peoples depend." Dulles' words implied that the U. S. regarded Nasser's action as illegal. Therefore, a legal response was required. It was to take the form of an international conference of "the nations most directly involved with a view to seeing whether agreement could be reached upon an adequate and dependable international administration of the canal on terms which would respect, and generously respect, all of the legitimate rights of Egypt." Nasser's action was not to go unchallenged. The road of negotiation was to be followed. The counsels of immediate resort to force were to be ignored, for such action would violate the principles of the United Nations and "would undoubtedly have led to widespread violence endangering the peace of the world."

Dulles depicted Egypt as unreliable and undependable. He expressed fears that Nasser would use the canal for selfish national ends. He expressed hope that out of the London Conference would come a plan for the international operation of the Canal in accordance with the principles of the 1888 Convention.

Dulles indicated that the United States did not anticipate the failure of the conference. Concluding his remarks, Dulles
stated: "We have given no commitments at any time as to what
the United States would do in that unhappy contingency." Dulles again left unresolved the question of possible U. S.
use of force to settle Suez. The initial ambiguity of official
U. S. statements on this crucial point remained.

**The First London Conference**

With the further development of the Suez crisis, official
American statements of opposition to the use of force to settle
the problem became more pronounced.

Before the London Conference, on August 16, 1956, Secretary
Dulles repeated his plea for a plan for an "international system"
to operate the Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople
Convention. The Convention, which provided that passage of the
canal should "be free and open, in time of war as in time of
peace" to all ships of all nations, was never adhered to liter-
ally. When the English ruled Egypt, use of the Canal was denied
to Britain's enemies during World Wars I and II. And Egypt had,
since 1948, restricted passage of Israeli shipping through the
Canal. Nevertheless, Dulles argued that the Canal should not
become the instrument of national policy of any one nation.
Only this would give confidence to the nations which use the
Canal.

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54 Schonfeld, *Suez Canal, op. cit.*, pp. 70-72, 110-111, and 121-123.
Confidence is what we seek, and for this it is indispensable that there should be an administration of the canal which is nonpolitical in its operation. That, I think, is the key to the problem—an operation which is nonpolitical in character. The canal should not be, and should not be allowed to become, an instrument of the policy of any nation or group of nations whether of Europe or Asia or Africa.

Secretary Dulles' proposal included mention of respect for the sovereignty of Egypt, recognition of Egypt's right to a just profit, and the right of the Universal Suez Canal Company to adequate compensation. 55

On August 20, 1956, Dulles introduced a series of proposals to the London Conference which embodied the United States official views and suggestions for acceptance by the conference. Following minor amendments proposed by Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the American resolution became the draft declaration supported on August 23, 1956, by 18 of the 22 countries represented at the conference. Mr. Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister, was appointed to head the five-man delegation sent to Egypt to present the proposals to President Nasser.

The majority resolution of the London Conference called for:

1. Running of the waterway in accordance with the principles of the 1888 Convention, through establishment of a system "to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal";

2. "Insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation";

3. Fair payments to Egypt;
4. The lowest possible canal tolls; and
5. Compensation to the Universal Suez Canal Company.\textsuperscript{56}

The last point was mentioned in the preamble.

In his final remarks to the London Conference, Dulles indicated that he regarded the London Conference as a forum for the expression of majority opinion about the way in which transit through the canal could give the greatest possible economic security to the nations whose millions were intimately affected by the reliability of passage. The majority views were to be communicated to the Egyptian Government in the hope that Egypt would agree to negotiate a treaty or convention.\textsuperscript{57}

Eden had requested that Dulles, as the only man capable of handling the matter, lead the mission to Egypt. But Dulles refused, possibly because he feared associating U. S. prestige with a venture that had a high risk of failure. Instead, Robert Menzies and party conveyed the majority plan to Nasser, who, after five days of discussion, rejected it. Even before the completion of the Menzies mission, and in anticipation of its failure, which Dulles had made more likely by not going to Cairo himself, Dulles sought an alternative plan. While vacationing at his retreat, Duck Island, he conceived the idea of a Users' Association. He communicated his idea to the British and French for their consideration.\textsuperscript{58}


\textsuperscript{58} Hoopes, \textit{The Devil and J. F. D.}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 355-359.
The Suez Canal Users' Association

Following Nasser's rejection of the resolution of the London Conference majority, the Western Big Three put forth Dulles' scheme for a users' association. In a speech before the House of Commons on September 12, 1956, Prime Minister Eden presented the idea. Concluding in what he claimed were the exact words agreed upon with the United States and French Governments, Eden remarked:

I must make it clear that if the Egyptian Government should seek to interfere with the operations of the association, or refuse to extend to it the essential minimum of cooperation, then that Government will once more be in breach of the Convention of 1888. In that event, Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of their rights. 59

Eden's final remarks were interpreted at the time as a veiled threat to resort to armed force should Egypt not cooperate with the Users' Association.

The following day, September 13, 1956, in his weekly Washington news conference, Dulles announced the United States intention to participate in the Users' Association. "We assume that such an organization would act as agent for the users and would exercise on their behalf the rights which are theirs under the 1888 convention and seek such cooperation with Egypt as would achieve the results designed to be guaranteed by that convention." 60

59 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 113.

In this and subsequent press conferences, Dulles outlined his conception of the Users' Association. According to Eden, Dulles had presented the Users' Association to Britain and France "as something that 'Egypt would like much less' than the eighteen-power proposals which...the Egyptians, having rejected these, could not expect such good terms again."61 In his public statements, however, Dulles represented the Users' Association as a voluntary association binding no one to adhere to its provisions or to accept its decisions. It was to be, according to Dulles, an international organization totally lacking in military coercive power—muscleless. It is difficult to imagine that Dulles seriously believed that an organization lacking in military coercive power could effectuate Egyptian compliance. Dulles' public temporizing lends weight to the view that the Users' Association was a stalling device to buy time to allow European tempers to cool.62

61 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 113.

62 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 386. Murphy wrote: "If John Foster Dulles ever was actually convinced of the possibility of organizing a Canal Users Association to operate the Suez Canal, I was not aware of it. Perhaps he considered the idea useful as a negotiation device. Probably he thought that a legal case could be made, sound enough to be upheld in any tribunal, which could demonstrate the good faith of the Association in keeping the Canal operating and in paying tolls to maintain it. A practical effect would be to divert tolls from Egyptian hands until a settlement and compensation for nationalization could be arranged. But Dulles did not spell this out and it seemed to me that he was skillfully working for time in the hope that public opinion in western Europe would harden against a military adventure. He recognized that it would be almost impossible to arouse Americans to join in defense of the Canal Company, especially considering the history of the original Suez concession and its long profitable enjoyment from 1888 to 1956. (Italics added.)
In his opening remarks to the September 13, 1956, press conference, Dulles sketched the American position. He outlined the U.S. arguments: 1. that the nations which used the canal had usage rights under the 1888 treaty; and 2. that these usage rights could not be "nullified by unilateral Egyptian action." Therefore, the user nations had the right to organize to seek to protect their rights in association with each other. Thus, an attempt would be made at a second London Conference to organize the 18 nations which sponsored the London proposals into a Suez Canal Users' Association. Dulles envisioned that the Users' Association's functions would be to:

...provide qualified pilots for the users' ships; ...initially receive the dues from the ships of members of the association passing through the canal, which sums would be used to defray the expenses of the organization and to pay appropriate compensation to Egypt for its contribution to the maintenance of the canal and the facilities of transit; and, so far as practical, arrange for the pattern of traffic of the member vessels through the canal.

It is our hope that perhaps practical, on-the-spot arrangements for cooperation can be achieved without prejudice to the rights of anyone. This may provide a provisional de facto working arrangement until formal arrangements can be reached.63

Dulles proposed that these arrangements could only be made by removing the issue from the political arena and placing it in the hands of the operators of the canal. Dulles argued that the problems involved in the Suez controversy were not unsolvable, "but they became unsolvable in the context of great concepts such as 'sovereignty' and 'dignity' and 'grandeur' and 'the East versus the West,' and things of that sort." Dulles advocated that the problems be broken down into "concrete things,

63 "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 13," pp. 476-477.
such as who are going to be the pilots; where are they going to be; are they qualified pilots; do we have a right to pilots of our own choosing if they are qualified or has Egypt the right to impose upon our vessels pilots of its own choosing; what is the pattern of traffic?" In order for the matter to be handled in this way, Dulles suggested that settling the operating problems be taken from the diplomats, the statesmen, and given to those who actually operated the canal. "(T)his is our hope--if we get operating problems out of the hands of the diplomats, the statesmen, and get it down perhaps into a situation where practical ship operators are dealing with practical people on the part of Egypt, maybe some of these problems will be solvable." How Dulles envisioned that this intensely political problem could be surrendered by the interested statesmen is a mystery. Dulles argued that he was interested in finding a practical solution to the Suez dispute. But no practical solution could survive unless it had the political support of statesmen. Besides, the operators would ultimately be responsible to politicians, both for approval of their agreements, and for guidelines in their negotiations. The real power to enforce negotiated agreements rested with politicians. How Dulles imagined this could be otherwise is difficult to see. 64

In answer to the question, "if Egypt should resist this plan, are there other peaceful alternatives that you envisage," Dulles replied:

64 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 234.
Well, if we cannot work out at the working level a program for getting ships through the canal on acceptable terms, and if physical force should be used to prevent passage, then obviously, as far as the United States is concerned, the alternative for us at least would be to send our vessels around the Cape. Now, of course, that would involve inconvenience, cost, delays. But we have given a careful study to that whole problem, and we believe that it is solvable.

This statement proved to be a graphic public example of Dulles' tendency to overstate U.S. intentions during the Suez crisis. As his strong remarks to Eden during the tripartite conference were later softened, so, too, his threat to boycott the Canal was dropped, within two weeks.

Just how effective an American detour of the Suez Canal would be was doubtful from the moment Dulles made his follow-up remarks. Other user nations would not be required to abide by a "concerted boycotting" of the Canal. "(E)ach country would have to decide for itself what it wanted its vessels to do." Dulles had two feasible means to ensure SCUA's operation. The first was economic sanctions. The second was force. The chief economic sanction which Dulles had recommended was for all the users, or as many as possible, not to use the Canal. Dulles threw away one of his principal weapons when he publically disclaimed any intention of a concerted boycott. Shortly, he would also renounce totally the second sanction--force.

The degree to which economic boycott, if concerted, could be expected to compel Egypt to accept the concept of the Users' 

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65 "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 13," pp. 477-478.

66 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 235.
Association was questionable. Secretary Dulles admitted in his news conference of September 26, 1956, that the amount of pressure that could be exerted upon Egypt by a boycott of the Suez Canal was minimal.

...bear in mind that the amount of money which Egypt gets out of the Suez Canal is not a major factor in the Egyptian economy and the pressures which could be exerted by going around the canal would be relatively little. There will still be plenty of boats to go through the canal...there will always be a certain amount of revenue to Egypt from that source...

...The amount of revenue that Egypt has derived from it (the Suez Canal)...and the idea that any grave economic blow can be struck at Egypt through the nonuse of the canal is a quite false conception.647

Thus, it is difficult to see how Secretary Dulles intended the Users' Association to be a viable entity, and to be accepted by Egypt. Not only was it to have no means of compelling member nations to adhere to its policies, it was to have no means of exacting Egyptian compliance.

By now the earlier ambiguity of public statements by American officials on the use of force by the United States was gone. In his September 13 press conference, Dulles outspokenly endorsed peaceful means. So emphatic was Dulles in his renunciation of the use of force, that in the context of Egyptian interposition of force to block the canal, he indicated: "We do not intend to shoot our way through....If we are met by force, which we can only overcome by shooting, we don't intend to go into that shooting. Then we intend to send our boats

around the Cape."  

By renouncing the use of force, the British felt that Dulles had scuttled his own plan. Eden claimed: "American torpedoing of their own plan...left no alternative but to use force or acquiesce in Nasser's triumph."  

Although he had effectively swamped SCUA, Dulles persisted in public wishful thinking. As substitutes for the real power whose use he had renounced before the entire world on September 13, Dulles resorted to moralizing and pleading to win Egyptian compliance. During his September 26 press conference, Dulles argued unconvincingly that the key to Egypt's acceptance of the Suez Canal Users' Association was Egyptian recognition of the "obligations of interdependence." In the modern world, nations must cooperate with each other for their mutual well-being. No nation can ignore world opinion for long. "When a nation's conduct frightens others, there are inevitable consequences." For example, foreigners and tourists are driven away, foreign exchange is lost, foreign markets and sources of credit are lost---"these are not readily available to a nation which rejects the implication of interdependence." Thus, it would be in Egypt's interest to avoid the undesirable consequences by cooperating with SCUA. For these nebulous threats to have succeeded, Egypt would have to have been convinced that damaging

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68 "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 13," p. 479.  
69 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 119.  
70 "Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 26," p. 543.
international sanctions would actually be applied. There is no evidence that Egypt ever was so convinced.

In his opening statement at the first plenary session of the Second London Conference on the Suez Canal, Secretary Dulles outlined the American proposal for the Suez Canal Users' Association. The U. S. proposal had six provisions:

1. That the 18 nations which sponsored the resolution of the First London Conference should continue their association;

2. That they should continue to accept, as a basis for the negotiation of a permanent solution, their joint statement of August 28, 1956;

3. That they should set up a small operating staff to assist the ships of the user nations and those that serve the user nations in operating through the canal;

4. That they establish a small governing board chosen from among the user nations;

5. That a modest working fund be advanced by the members and reimbursed out of the funds paid by member ships for services rendered; and

6. That membership would not involve the assumption by member nations of any obligation. Member nations should "voluntarily take such action with respect to their ships and the payment of canal dues as would facilitate the work of the association and build up its prestige and authority, and consequently its ability to serve." 71

Since the Users' Association, as established by the Second London Conference, did not require the Administration to submit it to Congress for ratification, Dulles announced the American decision to subscribe to the declaration of the Association, and his intention to take steps with U. S. Treasury officials and with the representatives of owners of American flag vessels to obtain their cooperation with the Suez Canal Users' Association.\(^\text{72}\)

Upon completion of the Second London Conference, Dulles returned to the United States. After his departure from London, the British and French announced their decision to take the Suez Canal issue to the United Nations. Eisenhower reported: "The decision was made without our knowledge. While Selwyn Lloyd and Christian Pineau had discussed this possibility with Foster during the Second London Conference, the latter had no inkling at the time that a decision had been made or would be made without further consultation."\(^\text{73}\)

Britain and France were disgusted with Dulles' contrivances without sanctions. They suspected he was merely delaying until they would be compelled to renounce what they regarded as their rights. Dulles failed to dispell their intention to resort to force, if they deemed it necessary. But he succeeded in destroying their momentum, and in dissipating the early support they had enjoyed. Therefore, they decided to go to the Security Council, without either asking him or informing him.\(^\text{74}\)

\(^{72}\)"Second London Conference on Suez Canal: Mr. Dulles to Mr. Lloyd, September 21," in ibid., p. 507.

\(^{73}\)Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 52.

\(^{74}\)Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 270.
The Anglo-French decision to go before the United Nations effectively killed the Suez Canal Users’ Association. Discussion of SCUA continued, in public and private, for nearly a year, although it had no chance of coming into a meaningful existence.

On October 2, 1956, Dulles made a major diplomatic error during his regular press conference. He indicated that there were differences of a "fundamental nature" which split the United States and its allies, Britain and France, on the Suez dispute, and that they were related to the "independent role" the United States sought to play on the colonial issue. Furthermore, Dulles admitted that there were no "teeth" to SCUA. While Dulles later sought to correct his "blunder," he was unable to undo the harm done. (see: Chapter II.) Publicly, and, perhaps deliberately, Dulles had denigrated his own creation, SCUA, and he had linked the Suez dispute to the thorny issue of Colonialism. Furthermore, he had intimated that the U. S. intended to totally disassociate itself from Colonialism.

Debate Before The United Nations

The Anglo-French decision to take the canal issue to the United Nations gave rise to considerable anxiety among American policy-makers. The Administration feared that the British and French were setting the stage for the eventual use of force at Suez. An alarmed Dulles intensified his efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. He sent messages to London and Paris and to United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. When

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Childers, Road to Suez, op. cit., p. 223.
the foreign ministers and delegates gathered for the first Security Council session on October 5, 1956, it was learned that the real discussions would be held privately between British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, and Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi in the Secretary-General's U. N. office. 76

When Dulles met separately with Lloyd and Pineau in New York on the morning of October 5, they indicated to him that "they did not believe that any peaceful way existed. They urged the use of force, arguing that only through capitulation by Nasser could the Western standing in Africa and the Middle East be restored." 77 Thus, early in October, the Americans had partial confirmation of their worst fears. As the month progressed, signs of the widening rift between the Americans and their two oldest and closest Allies increased.

In their arguments before the Security Council of the United Nations in early October, American leaders continued to stress their belief in the need to find a peaceful solution to the Suez problem. They argued for insulation of the Canal from the politics of any one nation. Thus, Dulles told the Security Council:

...The heart of the problem, as I indicated, seems to me to be whether...we can get acceptance of the principle that there should be a system to insure that the canal cannot be used by any country as an instrument of its distinctly national policy.

76 Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., p. 128.
77 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 52.
If Egypt accepts that simple and rudimentary principle of justice, then I believe that the subsidiary problems can be resolved. But if that principle be repudiated, then it is difficult to foresee a useful role for a negotiating body. Indeed, under those conditions it is difficult to foresee any settlement in accordance with the principles of justice and of international law.

And if this case cannot be settled then the whole system of peace with justice sought to be established by this charter will be undermined. 78

Again Dulles implied that Egypt had acted illegally by nationalizing the Canal. He placed the burden of settling the dispute upon Egypt. By doing so, he intimated that the Anglo-French case was valid. By noting that negotiations could fail, he raised the issue of the other alternative—force. But, he concluded by suggesting that none could doubt that the U. S. would chose the peaceful alternative.

The United States supported the private negotiations which took place between Lloyd, Pineau and Fawzi at the time of the Security Council debates. Secretary-General Hammarskjold chaired the discussions, Britain's Lloyd suggested Six Principles "off the cuff" for a Suez settlement. Lloyd recalled: "Dag (Hammarskjold) wrote them down and they suddenly became the word of God." 79 The Egyptians agreed to the Six Principles, which were approved by the Security Council unanimously. The Six Principles were:

1. There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert...;
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;

3. The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
5. A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and
6. In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.80

Eden and Mollet, realizing that Egypt's acceptance of the Six Principles opened the way to serious negotiations over the Canal, ordered a rider attached to the proposal which was so prejudicial that they knew Egypt could not accept it.81 The Anglo-French rider for implementing the Six Principles:
1. insisted that the Eighteen Power proposals of the First London Conference were suitably designed to bring about a peaceful settlement, and that the Egyptian Government had not yet formulated sufficiently precise proposals to meet the requirements of the Six Principles; 2. invited the Egyptian Government to make known promptly its proposals; and 3. said that, pending agreement, Egypt should cooperate with SCUA "which has been qualified to receive the dues payable by ships."82 Nasser was thus requested to recognize the Eighteen Power proposal which he previously had rejected, and to cooperate with SCUA, an

81 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 446.
organization which he was not likely to accept. Little wonder
the Soviet Union, which had been supporting the Egyptian posi-
tion in the Security Council, vetoed the Anglo-French implementing
proposal.

Despite the Soviet veto, it seemed to many diplomats that
the next move would be direct negotiations between Britain,
France, and Egypt. A further meeting was tentatively scheduled
for October 29, 1956. Lloyd and Pineau felt that since Egypt
had accepted the Six Principles there was no way out of a peace-
ful solution. 83

The Allies Split

According to Anthony Nutting, former Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs, who resigned his post because he could not
support the Prime Minister's warmaking policies, and can at
times be suspected of efforts to excoriate Eden, the Prime Min-
ister "was...by no means happy at this turn of events....(A)
negotiated settlement was now in sight which conceded Egypt's
sovereignty over the Canal in return for protection for the
users' interests." But Eden wanted war, he wanted to unseat
Nasser. Hence he set out to wreck prospects for a negotiated
settlement both in public and in private. 84

83 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 446; and
Thomas, Suez Affair, op. cit., pp. 101-102. Robertson, however,
questioned this hypothesis. He indicated that, according to
Pineau, there was no definite intention of seeing Fawzi again,
or of returning to New York. He also cited Lloyd's remarks that if
the Six Principles, which he originated, were not liked in Britain,
he would be called an appeaser. Lloyd reportedly said to a
group of non-Asian Commonwealth delegates: "I would not be sur-
prised if I were handed an umbrella when I get back to London,
perhaps a bowler hat too." Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., pp. 144ff.

84 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, op. cit., pp. 77-79. See
American officials have since interpreted Eden's actions as indicative of the British Prime Minister's conviction that Nasser had to be removed, and that Eden was not interested in a peaceful resolution of the canal issue. Robert Bowie, former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, commented:

As you probably know, when the thing was thrown into the United Nations, Hammarskjold had some negotiations with the British and the French and Nasser's representative, and they got very close to some resolution of the issues—so close I think that Eden and the French were persuaded that if they were allowed to go on to the second meeting, which was scheduled for Geneva, it was very likely that they would be forced into a position in which there wasn't any really legitimate basis for not saying, "All right, let's settle." And I think that is why they cancelled the meeting in Geneva and went ahead with their own planning for the invasion—basically, because, as I say, Eden's own notion was that the right policy was one of trying to unseat Nasser, not of trying to solve the problem of the Canal.85

Bowie offered no proff. However, his conclusion seems justified by subsequent historical developments. But, Bowie did not note that Eden seemed to equate solution of the Suez problem with the fall of Nasser, a major difference between the British-French and American positions.

None the less, at the time, the apparent progress of the private talks seems to have occasioned the optimistic public

also: ibid., Love, pp. 446-447, and Thomas, pp. 105-106. Thomas wrote: "...The Foreign Secretary, still dubious on the use of force but unable to recommend to his colleagues that the UN discussions, either in New York or Geneva, would really lead to anything, had become aware that Dulles would never back SCUA on the matter of dues. Exhausted after his flight and weeks of incessant work, he was swept along by Eden, and no more was heard of the 'six principles.'"

85 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Robert Richardson Bowie, 10 August 1964, pp. 34-35.
statements made by American officials. In them, Administration figures expressed hope that a peaceful settlement of the Suez controversy was in prospect.

In his nationwide television broadcast, "The People Ask the President," on October 12, 1956, Eisenhower announced:

The progress made in the settlement of the Suez dispute this afternoon at the United Nations is most gratifying. Egypt, Britain and France have met, through their foreign ministers, and agreed on a set of principles on which to negotiate; and it looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us. I don't mean to say that we are completely out of the woods, but I talked to the Secretary of State just before I came here tonight and I will tell you that in both his heart and mine, there is a very great prayer of thanksgiving.86 (Italics added.)

President Eisenhower's optimism was echoed by Secretary of State Dulles in the opening statement to his news conference of October 16, 1956. Dulles remarked, "There has, I believe, been progress toward achieving a just and peaceful solution of the Suez crisis." He premised his conclusion on the Security Council's adoption of the Six Principles and "the substantial moral support" given the second part of the Anglo-French resolution by the affirmative votes of 9 of the 11 members of the Security Council. While acknowledging that "there are many difficulties still in the way," Dulles observed, "each difficulty overcome means one less difficulty remaining to be overcome, and we can thus take satisfaction from what occurred last week at the United Nations."87

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These public statements by American leaders did not reflect their growing private awareness of the widening rift between the American position and the Anglo-French stand on the Suez problem. In his memoirs, Eisenhower observed that one of the first signs of rift between the United States and the British and French was their decision to take the canal question before the United Nations.\(^{88}\) Developments in the Middle East, the Israeli mobilization, and increased radio traffic between Paris and Jerusalem, all added to American apprehensions.

On October 15, Foster and several assistants came to see me about a new situation. The Israeli, for some reason we could not fathom, were mobilizing. High-flying reconnaissance planes revealed that the Israeli had sixty French Mystere airplanes, not twelve, as the French had reported to us. Obviously a blackout of communications had been imposed. From about this time on, we had the uneasy feeling that we were cut off from our allies.\(^{89}\)

In the private talks between the British, French and Americans in the Waldorf Towers in New York during the Security Council debates on the Suez question, Dulles first became aware of a breakdown in communications with the French and British. Ambassador William R. Tyler, former Special Assistant for Liaison with Foreign Delegations, reported on these discussions that he was "very conscious of the absence of personal rapport between Dulles and his opposite numbers." While the Americans suspected that the British and French were "in cahoots with each other," Secretary Dulles was not able to learn what they had in store for the world.


\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 56.
I remember one evening, very clearly, working late at the delegation offices when Mr. Dulles said to me, "This whole thing is a nightmare to me because I have the feeling that we're talking about things that are not the reality of the situation—that the British and the French have other plans which could bring about a very dangerous situation and that we're not being told about them." And that was, also, my feeling.\(^{90}\)

Despite private misgivings, official American statements of optimism continued to emanate from Washington. On Sunday, October 21, 1956, on CBS network's program, "Face the Nation," in reply to Mr. Peter Lisagor's question whether the United States, France and Britain could develop a common policy toward easing the Suez situation, Secretary Dulles replied, "We have developed a common policy...(T)he fact that there are certain minor, superficial difficulties as to details...doesn't detract from the fact that basically we do have a common policy."\(^{91}\)

But evidence of the split continued to accumulate. Daily the Anglo-French intention to resort to force became clearer, as, finally, did their intention to combine forces with the Israelis. American intelligence sources kept the Administration informed of the Anglo-French buildup on Cyprus, and of the Israeli mobilization.\(^{92}\) The Administration knew that the Israelis were putting mud on their trucks, on anything that might gleam.

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\(^{91}\) John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings...of J. F. D., L. 3, Interviews, 1920-1959, Transcript of: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on "Face the Nation," CBS Network, Sunday, October 21, 1956, 5:00 p. m. EST, pp. 15-16.

\(^{92}\) Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 May 1965-3 June 1965, pp. 73-74.
"Well, now if they were doing that there was only one way they were going—south to the desert." There were also all those Mystere jets at Israeli airports.\textsuperscript{93}

The exact point at which the Administration knew of Anglo-French-Israeli intentions to go to war against Egypt is not yet clear. However, by the last twenty-four to thirty-six hours, all uncertainties were removed.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, some advance warning of the impending invasion was given to Secretary Dulles by the American intelligence community.\textsuperscript{95}

American intelligence also knew of the secret meetings in Paris, although they did not know what was discussed. But they were able to "put two and two together." John Foster Dulles was "terribly surprised, and he was terribly hurt" that he was not informed by the British and French of these secret meetings, or of what was decided.\textsuperscript{96} Although in the last crucial day or two before the outbreak of war American officials could foresee what was coming, they were unsure of the timetable on which the British, French, and Israelis were operating.\textsuperscript{97}

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., former Top Assistant to CIA Chief Allen Dulles, may have shed some light on the apparently contra-
dictory optimism of American public statements in the latter half of October, 1956, and the pessimistic intelligence information available to the Administration, when he observed:

It was known that the British and the French were making preparations. I don't think we knew as much about the Israeli preparations, but we knew that something was going on there. The uncertainties...concerned whether these governments would finally take the plunge and, if so, exactly when. Now, that uncertainty, in turn, was dissipated in about the last twenty-four or thirty-six hours. I've always surmised that Foster Dulles hoped, up until about the last twenty-four or forty-eight hours, that he could dissuade, or that his actions would dissuade, the French and the British.98 (Italics added.)

During the pre-invasion period, the Eisenhower Administration, in its public and private communications, repeatedly informed Britain and France of the American commitment to a peaceful solution of the Suez issue.99 When Israel mobilized in late October, 1956, President Eisenhower sent a series of letters to Premier David Ben-Gurion, indicating his "concern at reports of heavy mobilization on your side...I renew the plea...that there be no forceable initiative on the part of your Government which would endanger the peace."100

On October 28, 1956, apparently before the American intelligence community had deduced Anglo-French-Israeli collusion and informed Dulles, the White House released a Presidential statement on the Middle East and the Israeli mobilization. The

100 Ibid., Eisenhower, pp. 69-71.
statement announced that Eisenhower had "given instructions that these developments be discussed with the United Kingdom and France," cosignatories of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which evoked Israeli Major-General Moshe Dayan's comment:

...From both his signals it is apparent that he (Eisenhower) thinks the imminent conflict is likely to erupt between Israel and Jordan and that Britain and France will co-operate with him in preventing this. How uninformed he is of the situation! In all its aspects, the reality is the reverse of his assumptions. The arena is not Jordan but Egypt, and Britain and France are likely to be found on the same front with Israel against United States opposition, and not with the US against Israel.102

Eisenhower, in his memoirs, indicated that the American Government did indeed, at this point, believe that Israel would attack Jordan, and that Dulles later recalled this misconception in a morning meeting in the President's office, November 1, 1956.103

Israel disregarded Eisenhower's request that it do nothing to endanger peace in the area. On Monday, October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt in force.

Both Dulles and Eisenhower were reportedly exceedingly angry at the Israeli attack on the eve of the American elections. The Administration resolved to undertake two parallel lines of action: 1. the U. S. would seek a United Nations resolution to

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102 Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, op. cit., p. 74.
103 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 82.
stop the fighting; and 2. the U. S. would reassert America's intention to abide by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and to assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{105}

On Tuesday, October 30, 1956, the United States introduced a resolution to the Security Council of the United Nations calling for an immediate cease-fire, the immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces behind the armistice lines, and asking all U. N. members: 1. to refrain from the use of force or threat of force in the area; 2. to assist the U. N. in ensuring the integrity of the armistice lines; and 3. to refrain from aiding Israel militarily, economically or financially. The vote was 7 to 2 with Australia and Belgium abstaining. France and Britain vetoed the resolution,\textsuperscript{106} much to the chagrin of the American Government. Just prior to the veto by Britain and France of the American proposal, the Anglo-French ultimatum to the Egyptians and Israelis to withdraw to a distance of ten miles from either side of the canal was released.

As soon as the American Ambassador to Britain, Winthrop W. Aldrich, heard of the Israeli invasion, he asked Lloyd for an appointment. Their meeting was set for 9:30 a. m., October 30. Lloyd told Aldrich that the French and the British had not yet decided whether they would use force. He indicated that he would let Aldrich know what was concluded after his and Eden's meeting with the French Premier Guy Mollet, and Foreign Minister

\textsuperscript{105} Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 355.

Christian Pineau, who were on their way to London. Aldrich kept a telephone line open to the State Department. When Lloyd finally did call Aldrich, he told the American Ambassador of the Anglo-French ultimatum which was then being released. Aldrich asked: "Do you realize that will mean that the first Eisenhower hears of the fact that the British and French are going to move in is when he reads it in the newspapers because I can't get to him in time?" After the Suez crisis had ended, Aldrich learned that the American Ambassador to France, C. Douglas Dillon, had heard privately from Pineau that the British and French were going to intervene. Dillon sent a telegram to the State Department, but because he had promised Pineau that he would not reveal the information to anybody but the American Secretary of State, he did not send a copy to Aldrich, which would have been standard operating procedure otherwise.

Apparently for diplomatic reasons, the United States denied prior knowledge of the Anglo-French ultimatum. A White House Presidential press release maintained that the first formal knowledge the United States had of the ultimatum was "obtained

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108 Ibid., Interview with Aldrich, p. 25. Previously unpublished, this information indicates that Robertson (Crisis, op. cit., p. 169.) was incorrect when he stated that: "Washington, from the President down to the most junior official at the State Department, heard about the ultimatum on the ticker tapes." Somebody at the Department of State knew. But they did not tell Aldrich, who found the information, much later, in the Israel file.
through press reports.” Upon receiving press accounts of the ultimatum, Eisenhower sent urgent personal messages to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, expressing "his earnest hope that the United Nations Organization would be given full opportunity to settle the items in the controversy by peaceful means instead of by forceful means." 109

The Israeli attack came a little over one week before the American presidential election on November 6, at the very height of the campaign. In a Boston speech on October 29, 1956, the Democratic Presidential candidate, Senator Adlai Stevenson, took advantage of the outbreak of hostilities to warn his fellow countrymen that the Eisenhower Administration had been less than candid about the situation in the Middle East, a charge that bore more than an ounce of truth. The Democratic aspirant accused:

The Government in Washington...that has been continuously telling us that all is well in the world, that there is peace, that there is—as the President announced only a few days ago—"good news" in the Middle East, has not been telling us the whole truth.

These reassurances—as today's news (of Israeli invasion) seems to confirm—have been tragically less than the truth....110

The following day, in a speech in Philadelphia, Stevenson reminded his audience that the year before he had warned of the explosive Middle Eastern situation along the Armistice Lines,


which could result in war. Stevenson recommended the establishment of a group of U. N. guards to police the Armistice Lines. He charged that Eisenhower was either badly informed, or that he did not want the American people to know the true situation, or to care about it. 111

In his October 31, 1956, radio and television address to the nation, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States had not been consulted or informed in advance about the decision of Israel, France and Britain to resort to force in the Middle East. 112 As indicated above, the United States did have advanced information from intelligence sources, and Pineau's unofficial remarks to Dillon, but it had no such information through normal diplomatic channels. For ten days, the United States had no direct communication diplomatically with either Britain or France. 113

Eisenhower continued his address by stating: "As it is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is our right...to dissent. We believe these actions to have been taken in error. For we do not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes." 114


113 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 73.

114 "Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East," pp. 744-745.
Recognizing that Britain, France and Israel had "been subjected to grave and repeated provocations," the United States nevertheless disagreed with their use of force. In the American understanding, this difference of opinion was in no way meant to minimize American friendship with these three states. The violent actions of Britain, France and Israel could "scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations." Furthermore, resort to war could hardly "serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations." To the relief, no doubt, of Americans watching and listening, President Eisenhower went on to announce:

In the circumstances I have described, there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plans to call the Congress in special session. Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with congressional leaders of both parties. At the same time it is—and it will remain—the dedicated purpose of your Government to do all in its power to localize the fighting and to end the conflict.

President Eisenhower concluded his remarks by observing that "there can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."^{115}

In his own nationwide radio-TV address on November 1, 1956, Adlai Stevenson responded to the President's remarks of the evening before. Stevenson charged that the Eisenhower Administration's Middle Eastern policy was bankrupt. It had presented the Communists with a great double victory: 1. the establishment of Soviet influence in the Middle East; and 2. the break-down

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^{115}Ibid., p. 745.
of the Western alliance. "As the climax, the United States finds itself arrayed in the United Nations with Soviet Russia and the dictator of Egypt against the democracies of Britain, France and Israel." Stevenson also repeated his accusation that the Administration had withheld information about the international situation from the American people.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{Return to the United Nations}

In his October 31st address to the nation, Eisenhower set the tone for American policy to be followed in the U. N. debates on the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. The United States would seek an end to hostilities and a peaceful solution to the problem under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance with the principles of the U. N. Charter.

Following the Israeli invasion, the Anglo-French ultimatum, and the British bombing of Egypt, Dulles addressed the General Assembly on November 1. Dulles began: "I doubt that any delegate ever spoke from this forum with as heavy a heart as I have brought here tonight....(T)he United States finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship, admiration, and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, most trusted and reliable allies." The United States believed that "peaceful processes...had not yet...run their course." The Anglo-French-Israeli action against Egypt must be treated as "a grave error, inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the charter and one which if persisted in would gravely under-

\textsuperscript{116} "Adlai Answers on Middle East--U. S. Policy Makers 'Appeased And Provoked Egypt' (Text of Stevenson's Address)," \textit{U. S. News and World Report}, Nov. 9, 1956, pp. 77-78.
mine our charter and undermine this organization." Next the Secretary of State read the United States draft cease-fire resolution to the General Assembly. Then Dulles indicated America's hope that the pre-crisis situation in the Middle East would not merely be restored, but that the United Nations could be instrumental in arranging a permanent peace. Advocating that first things be put first, Dulles continued, "I believe the first thing is to stop the fighting as rapidly as possible lest it become a conflagration which would endanger us all--and that is not beyond the realm of possibility." 117

It is hard to believe that the Administration was entirely serious about the possibility of a general war. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made it clear to Dulles that the Soviet Union was in no position to act militarily in the Middle East even by way of a dispatch of "volunteers." 118 Yet Dulles voiced this fear in his November 1 address to the General Assembly, and Eisenhower, later, raised the prospect during his February 20, 1957, White House conference with Congressional leaders on the matter of compelling Israeli withdrawal through threat of U. N. sanctions. One suspects that the Administration stressed this rather remote danger in order to lend urgency to its calls for cease-fire and withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, and in order to maximize domestic and foreign support for its policies. Soviet rocket-rattling


118 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 186.
statements and Sino-Soviet threats to send "volunteers" might have lent credibility to the American position, but they did not materially alter the small prospects of general war. As a former soldier, Eisenhower was little impressed with Communist threats, but he was not opposed to letting them increase the pressures on Britain, France, and Israel, whom he hoped to maneuver into cease-fire and withdrawal. There were, in fact, indications that during this period the CIA fabricated reports of Russian military activity, which had no factual basis.\textsuperscript{119}

In the final paragraph of his November 1 address, Dulles expressed his conviction that the United Nations faced a severe challenge in the Suez crisis; that the U. N. must demonstrate in this situation an ability to act to restore peace in the area and to devise a solution, lest the so-called police action "develop into something which is far more grave. Even if this does not happen, the apparent impotence of this organization to deal with this situation may set a precedent which will lead other nations to attempt to take into their own hands the remedying of what they believe to be their injustices. If that happens, the future is dark indeed."\textsuperscript{120} The Anglo-French intervention dealt a severe blow to one of the major pillars of the Administration's diplomacy--the Alliance. The Administration felt it necessary to depend heavily on another major pillar--the United Nations.\textsuperscript{121} Dulles' statement expressed his own and

\textsuperscript{119}Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 384; and Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 615.

\textsuperscript{120}"Statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly, November 1," \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{121}Thomas, Suez Affair, op. cit., p. 134.
Eisenhower's fear that the very existence of the United Nations was endangered. The United States determined to make the United Nations work. The Administration decided: 1. to secure an immediate cease-fire; and 2. to show that aggression did not pay. The Administration backed the Secretary-General in his efforts on behalf of peace, and it supported the concept of a United Nations Emergency Force to police the peace in the Middle East.

The U. S. draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on November 2, 1956, by a margin of 64 to 5 (Australia, France, Israel, New Zealand, and Great Britain opposed) with 6 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa abstained). The major provisions of the General Assembly Resolution on the Middle East urged:

1. An immediate cease-fire and the cessation of movement of military forces into the area;

2. Withdrawal of parties to the Armistice Agreements behind the Armistice lines; stopping of raids across the Armistice lines; and observance of the provisions of the Armistice Agreements;

3. That member nations refrain from sending military goods into the area or in other ways delay or prevent implementation of the resolution; and

122 Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., p. 186; and Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., p. 562.

123 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 402.
4. Effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal.  

In the General Assembly session of November 2, Secretary Dulles indicated U. S. interest in the Canadian proposal for a United Nations Emergency Force to police the cease-fire, and to implement and keep peace in the Middle East area of conflict. Dulles noted: "The United States delegation will be very happy indeed if the Canadian delegation would formulate and introduce as part of these proceedings a concrete suggestion along the lines which Mr. Pearson made."  

At midnight on November 2, Dulles was awakened by severe abdominal pains. He was taken to Walter Reed Army Hospital, where a three-hour operation revealed serious abdominal cancer. Before the operation, Dulles had instructed his assistant, William Macomber, to have Hoover take charge of all policies in the State Department, except Suez. Dulles had hoped to manage the crisis himself from the hospital. But, because of the seriousness of the cancer, he was forced to relinquish control, during a critical period, to the President, who assumed effective charge of U. S. Mideast policy the following morning. Dulles did not return to the State Department until December 3. Although he kept in close contact with Suez developments during his period of convalescence, he was not firmly in charge. Eisenhower now had full responsibility for U. S. Suez  

124 "An Appeal For A Cease-fire In Egypt And Withdrawal Of Military Forces To The 1949 Armistice Lines (Resolution 977 (ES-1))," Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology, op. cit., pp. 139-140.  

On November 3, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., announced that the United States thought that the Canadian draft resolution "should be acted on promptly...given priority. We should like to see it acted on this evening because it contains a real hope of meeting the very grave emergency that confronts the world." 127

On November 4, Ambassador Lodge announced that, in order to facilitate the success of the United Nations Emergency Force operation, the United States was willing to give important help "as regards airlifts, shipping, transport and supplies." 128

In the United Nations General Assembly proceedings, the United States pressed for cease-fire and the non-introduction of foreign troops in the area of Suez. The Soviet suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union take joint military action to separate the belligerents unless the fighting stop within twelve hours was branded "unthinkable" by American officials. Lodge remarked, "This would convert Egypt into a still larger battlefield." 129

Lodge later greeted the news of the Anglo-French accept-

128 "(Ambassador Lodge's) Statement in General Assembly on November 4," in ibid., p. 791.
ance of the cease-fire. The United Nations had achieved its "first objective" but much remained to be done, he remarked. The United Nations must now turn to its "second objective... to arrange for the withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel, France, and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory." 130

Later that day, Ambassador Lodge indicated that the withdrawal, in the United States understanding, would be phased with the arrival of the United Nations Emergency Force which the U. S. hoped would begin arriving "as soon as possible." 131

Throughout November and on into December, Lodge continued to press for Anglo-French-Israeli withdrawal of forces from Egypt, for an immediate beginning on clearing the canal, and for the quick consignment of the full United Nations Emergency Force to the area. 132

When the British and French Governments declared their intention to comply with the United Nations withdrawal resolution, and to work out with General Burns, UNEF Commander, a schedule for early withdrawal, the Eisenhower Administration welcomed their decision and urged that the United Nations now turn to deal with the remaining issues in the Middle East. 133

130 "(Ambassador Lodge’s) First Statement in General Assembly on November 7," in ibid., p. 791.

131 "(Ambassador Lodge’s) Second Statement in General Assembly on November 7," in ibid., p. 792.


133 "Withdrawal of British and French Forces From Egypt: Department Announcement (Press Release 606, dated December 3)," in ibid., pp. 951-952.
Before turning to the problem of Israeli withdrawal, it might prove worthwhile to briefly consider factors contributing to American policy prior to the Anglo-French withdrawal.

For nearly two-and-a-half months, Secretary Dulles had argued with the British and French against being too hasty to take the Suez issue before the United Nations. When the British and French did decide to take the matter to the U. N., this signaled to the Administration a breach in allied relations. At the second London Conference, Dulles told Eden that he thought it would be a mistake to take the issue to the public stage.

Ambassador Tyler has since reported:

I remember very distinctly his saying to Eden, "Now look, let us, for Heaven's sake, not rush this thing. This is very difficult. Things could go wrong very easily. Don't go to the United Nations. Wait and let us see whether it can be handled with personal talks."...I was under the impression that the British and we had agreed....

Dulles had no sooner left London, but on his arrival in Washington the next day, the first thing was that he was hit by the press with a request for comments on the U. K. having thrown the Suez issue into the Security Council.

...(T)his is really one time when I saw Mr. Dulles really upset. He felt he had been double-crossed--I don't think the word is too hard. He felt that Eden had done this in order to sharpen the thing and to make out a case, which in the light of later events, of course, Dulles' judgement was probably right....134

Additional light has been shed upon Dulles' reluctance to see the British and French take the Suez matter before the United Nations by former State Department Legal Advisor Herman Phleger who noted that Dulles "didn't want them to go to the UN with the object of simply saying that they had gone to the UN, and it

134 Dulles Project, Interview with Tyler, pp. 11-13.
had been unable to accomplish anything. I think he would have cooperated in the idea that they go there seeking a solution.\textsuperscript{135} Dulles feared that the British and French were going to the U. N. in order to prepare the diplomatic ground for their invasion of Egypt by showing that they had exhausted every peaceful means to a settlement. Dulles sought to retain the maximum of flexibility. He hoped to delay taking the Suez dispute to the Security Council where resolutions favorable to Britain and France ran the risk of being vetoed by the Soviet Union, which could provide the pretext for an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. Dulles believed that if force could be avoided, the propitious time to implement Anglo-French plans for military action would pass.\textsuperscript{136}

When the British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt, it was President Eisenhower who decided to come down hard on them, not Dulles. The decision to press for an immediate cease-fire in the United Nations, and to pressure the British, French, and Israeli armies to withdraw was first and foremost Eisenhower's. Both Eisenhower and Dulles were hurt by the Anglo-French decision to resort to force and to refrain from official communication of their decision to Washington. Eisenhower made his displeasure known to Eden in a heated telephone call.\textsuperscript{137} Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty reported:

\textsuperscript{135} Dulles Project, Interview with Phleger, pp. 55-56.
\textsuperscript{136} Finer, Dulles Over Suez, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{137} Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Bernard M. Shanley, 14 July 1966, p. 47.
...all the way through this, it was Eisenhower who said, "We cannot permit this to happen. If it does, we will have to take a different stand on this than our major allies, France and Great Britain, and one of our smaller but vitally concerned friends, the State of Israel."

I will always be convinced...that this whole timing of Suez in the closing weeks of the 1956 presidential campaign was deliberately timed, because our friends and allies did not believe that an American President would take an opposite side in the closing weeks of the campaign, because of the political reaction of the Jewish voters in our country.

It was Eisenhower's decision, and no one could make that decision, but himself, in that campaign. It was his decision to do exactly what we did....138

Throughout the period prior to the Anglo-French withdrawal, the Eisenhower Administration was concerned with restoring friendly relations with the British, the French and the Israelis, particularly the British. Eisenhower has indicated that he "just couldn't think of anything worse that to have Britain and the United States completely on the outs on anything."139 Nevertheless, the U. S. did not hesitate to exploit the economic weakness of the British pound sterling, and the oil shortages of all Western Europe, caused by the blocking of the Suez Canal and the rupture of the Syrian pipeline, to extract concessions from the British and French. The United States only lent funds to Britain after it had agreed to cease-fire. And the U. S. allowed the shipment of Western Hemisphere oil to Europe only after receiving Anglo-French assurances that they intended to withdraw promptly from Egypt.140

138 Dulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, pp. 24-25.
139 Dulles Project, Interview with Eisenhower, pp. 36-37.
An additional factor influencing American policy during this period has been brought out by President Eisenhower in his memoirs: "We could not permit the Soviet Union to seize the leadership in the struggle against the use of force in the Middle East and thus win the confidence of the new independent nations of the world."\textsuperscript{141} The theme of the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East is a recurring one, from the time of the Czech arms deal, in American Middle Eastern policy. It figured in the withdrawal of the offer to finance the Aswan High Dam project. Throughout the period of the Suez crisis of 1956-1957, one is struck by the conscious efforts of the Eisenhower Administration to restrict the growth of the Soviet influence in the area. Foremost among these was the Eisenhower Doctrine promulgated in January, 1957--it was geared to filling the power vacuum left by the decline of British and French power and prestige in the area, a decline which U. S. Suez policy had accelerated. The Administration was too preoccupied with avoiding the stigma of too close association with Colonialism which it apparently feared would usher the U. S. S. R. into the Middle East. The U. S. was so concerned with keeping the Soviets out of the area, and with calling the world's attention to Soviet repression in Hungary (see: Chapter II.), that the Administration failed to recognize that American long-range objectives were not endangered by the maintenance of Anglo-French power in the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{141}Eisenhower, \textit{Waging Peace}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 83.
The Israeli Withdrawal

Following the Anglo-French withdrawal from Suez, the American Government still had to cope with the Israeli presence in Sinai. Ben-Gurion indicated in his memoirs that delay of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai was of crucial importance to Israel which needed time so that the issues might be judged more soberly after the "fright and hysteria" of the brief war had subsided. It would also permit the development of international understanding for Israel's security problems. Thus, Israel balked at withdrawing all her forces from Sinai until she received guarantees of open transit through the Straits of Tiran, and on the status of the Gaza Strip. But the United States pressed for Israeli withdrawal, and the replacement of Israeli troops with United Nations forces. On January 17, 1957, Ambassador Lodge stressed before the United Nations the American position "that the United Nations Emergency Force move in immediately behind the withdrawing Israeli forces in order to assure the maintenance of the cease-fire and to safeguard the Armistice Agreement." On January 28, 1957, Lodge repeated this position.

On February 11, 1957, Secretary of State Dulles handed an aide memoire to Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban, which indicated that in the American view the Gulf of Agaba "comprehends international waters and that no nation has

the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto." Secretary Dulles added: "In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." 144

In a renewal of its appeal to Israel to withdraw her troops from Sinai, the White House released a statement on February 17, accompanied by publication of the February 11 aide memoire. The White House statement noted that:

The United States believes that the action of the United Nations of February 2nd and the statements of various governments, including the United States memorandum of February 11th, provided Israel with the maximum assurance that it can reasonably expect at this juncture, or that can be reconciled with fairness to others. 145

In his news conference of February 19, 1957, Secretary Dulles indicated, in reply to a question about Israel's right to use the Suez Canal, that the United States interpreted the Six Principles to mean "that there should be free and open transit through the canal without discrimination and that the canal should be insulated from the politics of any nation. We have


no reason to assume that those principles will not be applied." He had been making this point since November, 1956.

When Israel procrastinated, the American Government was forced to give consideration to the question of sanctions against it, to compel it to adhere to repeated United Nations resolutions. Word that the Administration was considering sanctions caused Congressional opponents to speak out against their imposition. Senator Lyndon Johnson led the pro-Israel group among Democratic Senators, while William F. Knowland, the Senate Republican leader, threatened to resign from the American delegation to the U. N. General Assembly. Knowland denounced a U. N. "double-standard" of morality in applying sanctions to a small country, Israel, while "side-stepping" the question of sanctions against the U. S. S. R. for its "crime" against Hungary. Such a double-standard was "both immoral and in good conscience insupportable." (see: Chapter III.)

Dulles, American U. N. Ambassador Lodge, Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey, and Eisenhower decided on February 16, 1957, "that the White House had to make a stand against Congress and against Israel." In a special White House conference on February 20, with the Congressional leadership of both the Republican and Democratic parties, called to secure

146 "Secretary Dulles' News Conference of February 19," in ibid., p. 404.


Congressional support for Administration Middle East policy, President Eisenhower voiced his fears that Israeli noncompliance with the United Nations withdrawal resolution would ultimately result in increased Middle Eastern economic stagnation. "(T)hese developments, along with increased influence of Russia in the Arab states, could lead to interruption of the flow of oil through the remaining pipeline, continued blocking of the Canal, possibly a serious crash in the French and United Kingdom economies and, finally, an increased possibility of general war." 149

Eisenhower was not successful in his bid to secure the backing of Congressional leaders. Instead, the Administration went ahead with its intention to threaten sanctions in the face of Congressional opposition. Prior to his nationwide radio and television address of February 20, 1957, Eisenhower cabled Prime Minister Ben-Gurion about his reluctance to take measures, or to see the United Nations take measures, "which might have far-reaching effects upon Israel's relations throughout the world." 150

In his broadcast address, Eisenhower noted: 1. that the U. S. aide memoire of February 11 stated that the U. S. would seek such disposition of UNEF troops as would assure that the Gaza Strip could no longer be used as a source of armed infiltration and reprisals; 2. that the Secretary of State had orally informed Ambassador Eban that the United States would urge and support

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150 Ibid., p. 187.
United Nations participation in the administration of the Gaza Strip, with Egypt's approval; and 3. that the United States held the conviction that the Gulf of Aqaba constituted international waters and that no nation had the right to restrict passage in the Gulf. The United States Government would join with others to secure general recognition of the right of free and innocent passage. Eisenhower proceeded:

Israel seeks something more. It insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces of invasion.

This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its withdrawal?

If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope of establishing a world order. That would be a disaster for us all.151

In apparent reply to Congressional and press critics, Eisenhower noted that it had been suggested that U. N. action against Israel should not be pressed because in the past Egypt had itself violated the Armistice Agreement and international law. Eisenhower stated: "It is true that both Egypt and Israel, prior to last October, engaged in reprisals in violation of the Armistice Agreements. Egypt ignored the United Nations in exercising belligerent rights in relation to Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba." Eisenhower indicated that he did not regard these violations as sufficient justification for

Israel's invasion of Egypt. Israeli failure to withdraw would be harmful to the "long-term good of Israel," to the United Nations and to prospects for a peaceful solution of the problems of the Middle East. Eisenhower now turned to the key passage

The United Nations must not fail. I believe that—in the interests of peace—the United Nations has no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions. Of course, we still hope that the Government of Israel will see that its best immediate and long term interests lie in compliance with the United Nations and in placing its trust in the United Nations and in the declaration of the United States with reference to the future.152

On March 1, 1957, Israeli Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir announced Israel's decision to comply with U. N. resolutions for full and complete withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai. Israel's decision was met with American statements of thanks-giving. President Eisenhower cabled Prime Minister Ben-Gurion: "I was deeply gratified at the decision of your Government to withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice lines."153 With the pull-out of the last Israeli troops later that month, the long Suez crisis came to an end.

Although American policy during the Suez crisis often drew heavy criticism, Dulles regarded U. S. policy toward the United Nations during the crisis as one of his three greatest achievements as Secretary of State. "If we had not adopted the policy

152 Ibid., p. 390.

153 "Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From Egyptian Territory: Letter From The President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Israel, March 2, 1957," Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology, op. cit., p. 169.
we did, the UN might have gone under."  

Further light has been shed on the subsequent attitudes of the two most important formulators of American policy during the Suez crisis. Former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State William B. Macomber recalled Dulles saying:

I believe that we were right, the way we handled the British, French, Israeli actions there. But in the end, it's for history to judge. Any defense of it simply tears away the scar tissue—the healing—that we're building up over this thing. And the important thing now is to get back together again. It's essential that our friendships—not only with Britain—but all the friendships, are put together again, and defending it will just put back the process....It's a matter of conscious policy that I have never again spoken out in defense of what we did. I believe what we did was right, but we'll let history judge it.  

This report seems contradictory of remarks made by Dulles to British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and British Ambassador to the U.S. Sir Harold Caccia, who visited Dulles in the hospital on November 17, 1956. Upon their arrival, Dulles immediately asked his guests, "Well, once you started, why didn't you go through with it and get Nasser down?" Lloyd replied, "Foster, why didn't you give us a wink?" Dulles responded, "Oh! I couldn't do anything like that!" Perhaps, the best explanation for this seemingly enigmatic remark is that it revealed the differences between Eisenhower's and Dulles' views of the ultimate legitimacy of force at Suez, and Dulles' complete reluctance to deviate.

155 Dulles Project, Interview with Macomber, p. 67.  
156 First reported by Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., pp. 446-447.
from the President's position. Similarly, Dulles' loyalty to Eisenhower might explain his later insistence to Macomber that U. S. Suez policy was right.

Eisenhower, when asked what the United States would have done had the British, French, and Israelis succeeded in toppling Nasser and in taking Cairo, or their immediate military objective, answered: "Had they done it quickly, we would have begun to insist, I'm sure, that they would have to get out." 158

157 Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 381.
CHAPTER II
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

In matters of foreign policy, chief spokesmen to the press for the United States Government have traditionally been the Department of State and the White House. During the years of the Eisenhower Administration, foreign policy was made known to the public, through the press, in a variety of ways. First, were what might be described as the formal channels of public information, including: 1. White House and State Department daily press conferences; 2. the regular press conferences of the President of the United States and of the Secretary of State; 3. nationwide radio and television addresses by the President and by the Secretary of State; and 4. President Eisenhower's television interview program, "The People Ask the President." Operating parallel to this formal (official) network was an informal system of communications between the Government and the press, consisting of: 1. background news briefings; 2. informal dinner and cocktail discussions; and 3. personal (exclusive) interviews.

The Formal Channels
Both the White House and the State Department had daily press conferences. Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, or in his absence, his Assistant, Murray Snyder, held these White House press conferences twice daily, Monday through
Friday, and once on Saturday. None were held on Sunday unless
the White House staff worked that day. The attempt was made to
have these press conferences at 10:30 a.m. and at 4:00 p.m.
whether in Washington, D. C., or on the road. Sometimes, when
the President was traveling, they would be held only once a
day. These daily White House press conferences were taken quite
seriously by the Presidential Press Secretary and his staff.
Considerable preparation and planning went into them.

The principle aim of these daily press conferences was
rather succinctly outlined by Assistant Press Secretary Murray
Snyder in the following terms:

The principal target...was to use these (daily press
conferences) to grind out the routine news. Action by the
President on legislation, action by the President on
appointments, the President's personal plans, travel plans
and this sort of thing, and reports by various study
groups or outside organizations to the President, his
responses, resignations, changes in personnel. Of course,
these were scheduled sometimes days in advance, for
various reasons...

The daily White House press conferences were also important
from another perspective. The questions that the Presidential
Press Secretary received during the week would enable him and
his staff to anticipate 90 per cent of the questions in the
"public domain" which would be asked the President in his
regular news conference. It was considered virtually impossible
to "anticipate purely local questions from a local reporter

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1 *Eisenhower Project*, Columbia, Interview with James Hagerty,

2 *Eisenhower Project*, Columbia, Interview with Murray Snyder,
   1968, pp. 30-32.

3 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
representing a local area."  

In addition to the daily White House press conferences were the daily Departmental announcements of policy. There are scores of minor or routine announcements of policy. More importantly, major policy decisions are also announced.

The Presidential Press Secretary held frequent meetings with the information directors of the different Departments and the press secretaries of Cabinet officers, follow-up to Cabinet meetings, to relay to them "what was coming up, what had been decided" in order that they might discuss policy more intelligently with their Cabinet officers or with their subordinates. 

In case a policy decision would require cooperation between a number of different Departments of the Government, Press Secretary Hagerty would utilize these meetings to indicate President Eisenhower's agreement on the policy and his request that the appropriate Cabinet officers work it out. The Cabinet officers would then have to prepare a joint press release.

Early in the administration, it was decided that, whenever possible, major policy decisions would be spread out to avoid the competition of one policy announcement with another for public attention.

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5 Ibid., p. 427.

6 Ibid., pp. 427-428.
on the major policy decisions of a Department of State, or a Department of Defense or the Department of Agriculture or any of the other Departments, it was felt that you had a better chance of informing the American people of what you were doing, and that the news media of the country would give it fuller coverage, if you did not have two or three major pronouncements on the same date. Now, there were times, of course, when you could not hold announcements, and this does happen. But where possible it was felt that a Department should know what the other Departments were going to do on any given date. And this was the reason for these meetings.7

These meetings were also geared: 1. to ensuring that the appropriate officials were knowledgeable so that they would not "go off half-cocked"; and 2. to see to it that press announcements were well distributed in order to guarantee proper dissemination of information and appropriate recognition for the Administration's action.

...the major part was, quite frankly, two fold: one, to permit the American public to get a fuller story of any major decision, and secondly, by getting a fuller story, in effect, to give credit to the Administration for that....

7Ibid., pp. 426-427.

8Ibid., p. 428. Rivers noted that Hagerty demonstrated how a clever public relations man creates a favorable image for his employer. Frequently, Hagerty made subtle decisions about which news stories should involve the President. For example, news of the first successful U. S. satellite was released from Augusta, Georgia, because Eisenhower was vacationing there, not from the launching site. Furthermore, Hagerty blunted public criticism of Eisenhower's numerous vacation trips by making each appear to be a working vacation. He scheduled press releases to keep Eisenhower on the front page by seeing to it that there was rarely a newsless day. Although the Administration's methods were sometimes heavy-handed, such as its efforts to cut out-of-favor reporters off from official sources, Rivers concluded that it won its battle with the correspondents. Only the exposure of Sherman Adams aroused public displeasure and tarnished Eisenhower's prestige. "Counter-publicity muffled each of the other exposures of Eisenhower Administration officials. Hagerty was especially adept at releasing big, positive stories to compete with the headlines of expose. And then Eisenhower himself had a certain talent for divorcing himself from the mistakes of his own Administration." Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 143-149.
The rationale employed in the release of information followed a division of the Executive Branch of Government into two groups: 1. agencies dealing primarily with domestic affairs, such as, the Department of Agriculture (unless the shipment of surplus food overseas was involved), the Department of Interior, the Department of Labor, the Post Office Department, and the like; and 2. "sensitive" agencies dealing with national security or foreign affairs, such as, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Attorney General's Office, and the like. In the domestic field, the practice, prescribed by President Eisenhower, was to announce domestic decisions as quickly as possible. Thus, untimely leaks—always a possibility given the comprehensive news coverage in Washington, D.C.—could be avoided, and the Administration could receive full credit for its policies. Policy decisions of the sensitive agencies were treated somewhat differently. When intelligence was not involved, overt policy decisions were also announced as soon as possible. However, matters touching on the national security of the United States or its friends and Allies were not released. When asked questions on security issues, Hagerty would reply, "Gentlemen, I'm sorry, I cannot answer this question. This deals with the security of the United States." Generally this answer sufficed, for the newsmen would not usually pursue the question. Before release, information had to be weighed in this manner. The Government therefore exercised the powers of review and suppression of information. News made available to the press was well scrutinized and

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9Ibid., Interview with Hagerty, pp. 430-431.
thoroughly digested.

Among the Departments which issued daily announcements was the Department Of State. The chief of the news division of the Bureau of Public Affairs reported to Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, daily, around twelve noon, to review developments and to anticipate questions likely to arise. As Dulles' press secretary, McCardle had access to information on everything that was taking place and could pass it on to the news division chief. Following his meeting with McCardle, the chief of the news division would brief the correspondents at 12:30 p.m.\(^{10}\) Because he dealt with the reporters during the week, the news division chief was also called in on weekly pre-press conference meetings with the Secretary of State to prepare for that week's press conference.\(^{11}\)

In the case of both the White House and the Department of State, the daily press conferences served as sounding boards for

\(^{10}\) Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Carl W. McCardle, December 1964, p. 90. That newsmen who cover the State Department are thoroughly familiar with this method of operations was brought out by Marvin Kalb, CBS News' Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, in one of a series of lectures in advanced journalism at the American University in Washington, D. C. Although Kalb was speaking of the State Department under Dean Rusk in the Johnson Era, the modus operandi Kalb detailed was essentially the same as that described by McCardle. Kalb called attention to the fact that the State Department gives out a vast number of handouts—a speech or two a day, and voluminous records about U. S. relations throughout the world. Kalb commented: "I think all reporters should read all handouts but question them and try to put them into some kind of perspective." Marvin Kalb, "Covering the State Department," in Hiebert, The Press In Washington, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., Interview with McCardle, pp. 105-106.
much of the material to be covered in the regular press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State held his press conference on Tuesday, except when a crisis intervened, and the President held his less frequent news conferences on Wednesday.\textsuperscript{12}

Preparation for the weekly press conferences of the Secretary of State entailed a number of steps. The members of Dulles' staff would prepare, in their respective departments, series of questions which might be raised at the press conference, and their suggestions for answers. These were then coordinated by the news division chief, who got together a black book for the Secretary of State, and one for the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. These books were usually completed around five or six o'clock Monday evening. McCordle would then place a copy in Dulles' briefcase, and request that, to expedite matters, Dulles read it over at home. McCordle likewise would take home his own copy and read it.

McCordle attempted to always see Dulles the morning of his weekly press conference to review the black book with him. McCordle observed: "I would mark the places where I felt that the answers were rather overly cautious and I'd read down below what the actual situation was. I thought the American people should have been told about it. There was no violation of security or anything else."\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 92-93.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 104-106. See also: Eisenhower Project, Interview with McCordle, p. 5. McCordle estimated that 85 per cent of the news regarding foreign policy could be explained to the
The news division chief would also be called upon to report on his daily news conferences and on the results of staff analysis of the content of the principle stories of all the available American newspapers, and the comments on them by top State Department officers. After discussing the black book, they considered what was contained in the newspapers, cables and news service news flashes. About fifteen or twenty minutes before Dulles news conference was scheduled to begin, McCardle would suggest that the news division chief check to see that they had all the latest news. Then McCardle and Dulles would rehearse a series of anticipated questions and appropriate responses. And he would suggest where Dulles' replies could lead the reporter into further areas, or he would recommend modifications or enlargements. McCardle was careful to fully prepare Dulles for possible follow-up questions which might catch the Secretary by surprise, eliciting the wrong response. 14

American people. The two criteria which he observed were: "(1) absolute security had to be protected, and (2) pending negotiation had to be protected," The skepticism with which newsmen often regard such assertions is evident in the remarks of Marvin Kalb: "It is important to realize that the philosophy of the newsmen and that of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs are at odds. The State Department official says, 'It is our responsibility to steer a line between the people's right to know and the problems of national security.' He claims that 90 per cent of the news is released or gets released; he claims that the crucial thing is timing." Kalb, "Covering the State Department," loc. cit.

14 Ibid., Dulles Project, Interview with McCardle, pp. 113-114.
Following the press conference, Dulles would ask McCordle for his opinion about how the conference had gone. "(H)e always expected a frank answer." Later, Dulles continued this procedure with Andrew H. Berding, McCordle's replacement.

As might be expected, Presidential press conferences also required considerable preparation. Press Secretary Hagerty and his staff would begin preparing for the President's next news conference almost the minute after the current press conference ended. On the basis of the questions he received during his daily press conference, Hagerty and his staff would compile a list of questions which it was felt would be asked the President on Wednesday morning. The list would then be sent to the appropriate Departments for consideration and comment. By Tuesday, he would get the replies back from the Departments. The replies of most Departments would arrive either in the morning or by noon; the State Department, which always had more questions, would send over a book of facts and answers by Tuesday evening. Secretary Dulles always went over the book and made certain changes before it was sent to the White House. In the morning, prior to the President's press conference, Dulles would consult by phone either with Eisenhower or Hagerty, "just going over certain points that we felt might be likely to come up on the part of newsmen questioning the President."

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15 Ibid., p. 117.
16 Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 150.
17 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. III, pp. 441-442. See also: Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 27.
18 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Berding, p. 28.
Wednesday morning, Hagerty and Assistant Press Secretary Murray Snyder would have a breakfast meeting with the President's staff and any Cabinet officer with whose Department that day's press conference might deal. They would go over anticipated questions and recommend responses. Then at 8:30 or 9:00 a.m., there would be a meeting with the entire White House staff, and the list of questions would again be gone over.

Almost an hour before the press conference was to begin, Hagerty, Snyder and a few top members of the staff would meet with the President for a "refreshing of his memory." If a Cabinet officer were present, he would indicate what his Department had done on the President's orders. Eisenhower would frequently telephone Dulles and others to talk about last minute developments, and their final suggestions as to how he should answer the key questions.

If there was going to be a prepared statement by the President, mimeographed copies were made for the press; they were distributed outside the press room when the news conference broke up. In between his various Wednesday morning meetings, Hagerty would meet with representatives of the Associated Press, the United Press, the International News Service, the networks, and one or two members of a prominent morning or afternoon paper, and inform them of the planned, formal Presidential statement,


20Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, pp. 27-28.
and that mimeographed copies would be distributed after the news conference.21

If the announcement dealt with an area requiring a certain amount of expertise, Hagerty would suggest that the news offices send over their experts in a particular field.

...They appreciated it and we did too. It was much better for them and for us to have a man who was fully acquainted with that field present, than just a regular reporter who did not have the background of coverage of that particular field.22

Both McCordle and Hagerty regularly sat in on policy discussions. McCordle insisted on this as a condition if he were to be effective as the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and "get the knowledge of public affairs out to the people."23 Hagerty often sat in on Cabinet meetings. When he did not attend, he had access to Cabinet meeting minutes.24 He was briefed by Cabinet members if he was not present when a decision was made inside or outside Cabinet meetings. Hagerty attended Cabinet meetings when there was going to be a final decision or a discussion of a developing situation, and he wanted to have continuity on the discussions within the Government. He was able to determine which sessions to attend by consulting the agenda the day before. In the event he was unable to attend due to a prior Presidential assignment, Hagerty could

23 *Dulles Project*, Interview with McCordle, p. 90.
avail himself of the working arrangement that he made with Eisenhower a day or two after his nomination in Denver. According to their agreement, Hagerty had a right at any time to find out what Eisenhower was doing, on a need to know basis. It was not necessary for him to attend all Cabinet meetings.25

During the Eisenhower years, some important innovations were made in the handling of Presidential press conferences, and in the rules for press, radio, and television coverage of them. For the first time, Presidential press conferences were removed from the third person and placed on the record. Reporters were permitted to quote the President verbatim. The Administration agreed to the suggestion of Tony Leviero of the New York Times that reporters be allowed to admit their own stenotypists to Presidential news conferences. The stenotype operators would transcribe the President’s comments and distribute the texts to the newsmen who were allowed to print them.

The second innovation was to allow the radio networks to tape the whole news conference and to broadcast it verbatim.

The third innovation was to permit the filming of the entire press conference for use on television.26

Eisenhower never held a news conference on live radio or live television. Apparently, the Administration preferred to reserve to itself the right to edit and to change the tapes in


the event the President expressed himself in a way which could cause diplomatic embarrassment. Usually, about 20 minutes after the press conference, Press Secretary Hagerty would give the reporters permission to use the whole news conference. Only in the beginning did Hagerty make minor corrections.

Hagerty has indicated that a major reason the Eisenhower Administration encouraged television coverage of the Presidential news conference was that "the increased use of television, for a President or anybody else, has made for more honest factual reporting in the papers, particularly with those that represent some slant one way or the other." It is very difficult for a reporter to slant an article when he knows the person reading the newspaper is likely to have seen the President on television the night before in his own living room and to recall what the President actually said.

Important innovations were also made in the rules for press, radio and television coverage of the press conferences of the Secretary of State. In all previous years, the Secretary of State, like the President, could not be quoted directly. Step by step, Carl McCardle selected certain portions of Dulles' press conference transcript and suggested to the Secretary of State that they be put on the record. McCardle progressively

27 Ibid., Scherer, pp. 5-6; and Pollard, p. 186. Pollard noted that technically television recording of Presidential news conferences, and direct quotation of the President's replies were subject to White House release and approval. That these controls were not exercised (after the initial period) "was more significant than the fact that they existed."

enlarged the quotable portions until finally he convinced Dulles that a particularly good press conference should be put on the record in its entirety. From then on edited texts of Dulles' press conferences were on the record for direct quotation. The New York Times and other papers regularly carried the entire transcript.

Dulles also agreed to television coverage of his press conferences once he was assured the TV newsmen would use only what was the approved transcript for the newspapermen and the magazine writers. The TV reporters could edit the tapes to conform to the approved texts. 29

Dulles and McCardle personally edited the texts before they were released to the media. Most of the changes made were minor, "mainly to prevent any misunderstanding in foreign countries." 30 Occasionally a major change was made.

One such major change was made during the Suez crisis of remarks made by Dulles at his press conference of October 2, 1956. In answer to a question about reports of a split or a difference in degree of approach to the Suez issue, Dulles answered the following, as paraphrased by the New York Times:

There is no detectable change in the formula for the users' association between what it now is and what was planned, at least as far as the United States is concerned, and, as was made known to the British and French before the project was publically launched. In private consultations a charter of the users' association was drafted and what is coming into being today is almost exactly what was planned then. There is talk that the teeth were pulled out of it. There were no teeth in it.

30 Dulles Project, Interview with McCardle, pp. 102-104.
There is some difference in the approaches to the Suez Canal problem. That difference relates perhaps to some rather fundamental things. In some areas the three nations are bound together by treaty, certain areas, such as the Atlantic pact area, the three nations are bound by treaty to protect. In those areas the three powers stand together.

Other problems relate to other areas and touch the so-called problem of colonialism in some way or other. On these problems, the United States plays a somewhat independent role.31

Thus, in these brief remarks, Dulles confirmed the worst fears of critics of SCUA that there were no "teeth" in the organization, no means of ensuring that it would work. Furthermore, Dulles words indicated that there were indeed differences of a "fundamental nature" which split the United States and its allies, Britain and France, on the Suez question, and that they were related to the "independent role" the United States sought to play on the colonial issue. These remarks, uttered at the very time when representatives of the users' association were meeting in London and were awaiting the American decision to pay canal tolls to SCUA, caused a storm of protest in Western Europe when reported in the world press. Not only did Dulles' remarks underscore the Administration's extreme reluctance to be in any way associated with European Colonialism, but, made imprudently on the eve of Security Council debates of the controversy, they could well have confirmed the British and French in the wisdom of their decision to go it alone.

Almost as soon as they were spoken, members of the State Department staff recognized the trouble Dulles' words could

cause. Inside two hours, the State Department had prepared a revised version which it disseminated immediately. The revised transcript represented the official United States position which Dulles was willing to stand behind. The revised text read:

As far as the formula for the users' association is concerned there is no detectable change, at least not detectable to me, between what it now is and what was planned, at least as far as the United States is concerned, and as we made known to the British and the French before the project was publicly launched in any way. There was drawn up a draft of the charter, so to speak, the articles of the users' association, and what is coming into being today is almost exactly what was planned at that time. There is talk about the "teeth" being pulled out of it. There were never "teeth" in it, if that means the use of force.

Now there has been some difference in our approach to this problem of the Suez Canal. This is not an area where we are bound together by treaty. Certain areas we are by treaty bound to protect, such as the North Atlantic Treaty area, and there we stand together and I hope and believe always will stand absolutely together.

There are also other problems where our approach is not always identical. For example, there is in Asia and Africa the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the United States plays a somewhat independent role. You have this very great problem of the shift from colonialism to independence which is in process and which will be going on, perhaps for another fifty years, and there I believe the role of the United States is to try to see that that process moves forward in a constructive evolutionary way and does not either come to a halt or take a violent revolutionary turn which would be destructive of very much good.

I suspect that the United States will find that its role, not only today but in coming years, will be to try to aid that process, without identifying itself 100 per cent either with the so-called colonial powers or with the powers which are primarily and uniquely concerned with the problem of getting their independence as rapidly as possible. I think we have a special role to play and that perhaps makes it impractical for us, as I say, in every respect to identify our policies with those of other countries on whichever side of that problem they find their interest.32

Thus, Dulles attempted to soften his original remarks. Whatever teeth SCUA might have had, were not meant to be extended,

in Dulles' view, to the "use of force." While noting "some difference" in the American approach to Suez--he placed the difference in the past tense--Dulles did not spell out what that difference was; he eliminated reference to the "fundamental nature" of that difference. Also Secretary Dulles attempted to separate Suez from the colonial issue by treating the question of colonialism in the context of Asia and Africa and by handling it in a generalized and speculative fashion. He indicated that this was one of the "other problems where our approach is not identical" and that Asia and Africa were other areas in which "the United States plays a somewhat independent role." Edwin L. Dale, Jr., reporting in the New York Times on October 3, 1956, indicated that: "Officials said this was what Mr. Dulles had meant all along—that the Suez was one example of a 'somewhat different approach' and colonialism another." Speculating on the possible meaning of the "difference of approach" over Suez, Dale theorized that it referred to the extensive efforts of the United States "to moderate, at various stages, the more extreme British and French positions."³³

Despite the American amendments, the harm had already been done. Eden has referred to Dulles' original remarks as a "damaging statement" which "however unintentionally, was likely to make Nasser believe that if he held fast, the United States would fall apart from France and Britain over the seizure of

the canal."  

Nor could Eden find solace in Dulles' original remarks on SCUA which formed the first part of his two-part answer. In it Dulles remarked, "There is talk that the teeth were pulled out of it. There were no teeth in it." This statement was amended to read, "There is talk about the 'teeth' being pulled out of it. There were never 'teeth' in it, if that means the use of force." On this question of "teeth," Eden, referring to the original version, pointed out: "The representatives of the Users' Association countries were then assembled in London confidently awaiting the United States decision to pay the canal dues to their organization. These were the teeth. Mr. Dulles statement was in conflict with the users' understanding of the United States Government's intentions. Our representative on the committee, Lord John Hope, reported exasperation and dismay in their ranks." (Italics added.) Then, returning to Dulles' remarks about colonialism, Eden observed: "The dispute over Nasser's seizure of the canal had, of course, nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with international rights."  

In his press conference of September 25, 1956, Dulles had indicated that it was a false conception that Egypt derived large amounts of revenue from the Suez Canal, and that a grave economic blow could be struck at Egypt through the nonuse and subsequent denial of revenue. (see above: pp. 81-82.) Thus,  

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34 Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 135.
Dulles doubted the effectiveness of withholding Canal revenues. Regarding Eden's remarks that nationalization of the Suez Canal had nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with international rights, it bears remembering that although publicly Dulles frequently implied the illegality of Nasser's action, privately the Administration felt that Egypt had acted legally. Since the Canal lay entirely within Egyptian territory and under Egyptian sovereignty, Egypt (Nasser) had the right to nationalize the Canal under the laws of eminent domain (see above: pp. 66-67.) provided Egypt paid just compensation, which Nasser, in his nationalization speech, indicated a readiness to do. Dulles also recognized, according to Murphy, that it would be almost impossible to convince Americans to join Britain and France in defense of the Canal Company, given its long and profitable enjoyment of the original concession from 1888 to 1956. 36

Still, one is hard put to understand why Dulles made his original remarks. Up to that time the United States had refused to associate the Suez Canal issue with the colonial question, preferring to concentrate on securing user rights. Why now did Dulles make this association? Was it simply a colossal blunder? If so, how could a competent Secretary of State make such a blunder? Were his remarks, as Finer has suggested, made intentionally in order to cover the imminent collapse of his policies, and in order to predetermine the conduct of the impending United

36 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 386.
Nations discussions?\textsuperscript{37} Or were his remarks geared to demonstrate to the nations of Western Europe that outside the NATO area they could not expect the United States to back them automatically? That this might have been a factor is hinted in a cable sent by Dulles on October 4, 1956, to American Ambassador to France C. Douglas Dillon and quoted by Eisenhower in another context in his memoirs:

The Western European nations have been preserving their political divisions which keep them weak, partly because they have felt that they could afford this luxury so long as they had more or less a blank check on the U. S. for economic, military, and political support everywhere in the world. This Suez matter is bringing into the open the fact that they cannot count upon us outside the North Atlantic Treaty area automatically and without the exercise of our independent judgement... \textsuperscript{38}

Perhaps, he sought to teach the nations of Western Europe that they could not unreservedly expect American backing, and that this would induce them to greater efforts toward unification. Whatever his reasoning, Dulles obviously felt that he had overstepped himself, and thus he sought to correct his error by issuing the revised transcript.

During his October 16, 1956, press conference, Dulles was confronted by a series of questions concerning the revision of press conference transcripts, which stemmed from the changes of the text of the now famous October 2nd press conference. Dulles was asked whether the reporters could "be assured from now on that what is put out by the Department is a direct quote under

\textsuperscript{37} Finer, \textit{Dulles Over Suez}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 294-295.

\textsuperscript{38} Eisenhower, \textit{Waging Peace}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 372-373.
the heading 'transcript.'" Dulles replied:

No, I am sorry to say you cannot be so assured. I must reserve the right, in case I make a blunder inadvertently which does damage to international relations, to correct those blunders. I do not profess to speak with perfection extemporaneously, and the important thing from my standpoint and from the standpoint of my job is not to damage the international relations of the United States, by seeming to say what I do not intend. Sometimes my words convey a meaning I do not intend to convey, and if that happens, I must reserve the right to correct them so they reflect what I intend. That means that those who carry the exact transcript can say what they want, a "corrected transcript." But I cannot be put in the position of jeopardizing the foreign relations of the United States by being held literally to what I say extemporaneously, and if that is the only condition on which I have to have a press conference, then we have to reconsider the concept of the press conferences. 39

(ITALICS added.)

The reporters present continued to press Dulles on the question of the transcripts, even after Dulles had indicated that he felt it was up to the papers which carried the revised transcript of his remarks whether they called it a "transcript" or "corrected transcript." One of the reporters, indicating the difficulties revised transcripts caused the newspapermen, remarked:

Mr. Secretary...I would like to say that I too have had the feeling many of us are disturbed by the tendency to change the record of a conference and if the changes could be made in such a way as to indicate, either by the title of the transcript or some other designation, that it isn't precisely what is given in a given press conference, I think it would help to give us a feeling of greater accuracy in reporting. We make our first transcript out of the news conference without waiting for the transcript. If it comes out and you, as you say, have blundered in a substantive way—that is, if it is a point of substance rather than an erroneous report as compared to the later account of what has happened. If we could make the distinction clear, we would be very happy. 40


40 Ibid., pp. 655-656.
After observing that in four years of holding press conferences, this was the only occasion when any question was raised about the correction of transcripts, Dulles defended his position, the manner in which the press conferences were held, and the way in which the transcripts were handled. Indicating that he did not believe the purpose of his press conferences was to catch statements he made inadvertently, Dulles concluded his remarks on the subject by observing:

...I believe you all honestly want to know what U. S. policy is and what our thinking is about some of these problems. As far as the initial reporting goes, you are free to report that as you understand it as long as you don't put it in quotation marks, where it becomes in effect a state document, then I must reserve the right to be sure it accurately expresses the policy of the United States.41

In this instance part of Dulles' difficulties arose from the manner in which coverage of the press conferences was handled. Individual newsmen did not wait until release of the official transcript before filing their initial stories. There might be a gap of as much as three hours before release of the official transcript. John M. Hightower has indicated that the release of the official transcript followed the preparation of the initial rough draft, to which reporters had access. The rough draft was submitted to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and normally also revised by Dulles himself. Hightower recalled:

...(I)f there was wording in there which seemed to him to be misleading, he would change it in some way. Actually, his changes were not picayunish. That is, he did not under-

41Ibid., pp. 656-657.
take to dress up his prose or that sort of thing. He stuck basically with what he had said off the cuff, except where he felt there was some point of substance that needed to be clarified or that actually needed to be changed.

Once or twice—I can't give you the specific examples—but I know there were actual misstatements of facts or policy in the heat of the moment, which he changed in such a way as to really change the meaning of what he said. And we were free to report this and did report it.42

Dulles had good reason for insisting on his right to correct the transcripts of his news conferences. He had to guarantee that they represented the official American position, for the Government would have to stand behind its policies. The texts of his news conferences "were sent to embassies and foreign governments....And he just wanted to be sure that the written form, as it finally came out, would reflect the policy as he was prepared to stand on it."43

The attention given to Dulles' blunder, and its later correction, by the press, indicate how carefully the Eisenhower Administration's Suez policy was scrutinized. It also serves to underline why the Administration worked overtime in its ministrations to the press during the crisis. Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty worked very long hours during the height of the crisis period. Usually he left the White House only after the first edition of the papers had gone to press, around midnight or 1:00 a.m. in the Eastern United States. He would return to the White House at 7:00 a.m. Fortunately, he lived only fifteen minutes away from the White

42 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with John M. Hightower, 8 June 1965, p. 23.
43 Ibid., p. 22.
House. At times, he simply slept on the couch in his office or on a bed somewhere else in the White House.44

It bears remembering that the Suez crisis took place at the same time as the Hungarian crisis. This was also the period of the U. S. presidential campaign and election. Hagerty observed:

... (T)hat was the period, as you might suspect, when I said nothing except what I was ordered to say or requested to say. I was not going off halfcocked about what I thought was going on; I had it written out.

Many of the times, the notes or the sentences were written in the personal handwriting of the President, and he said, "Say this." And I'd get up, and say that. There wasn't any answer that I made when I thought I was reflecting the President's viewpoints. The only answers I made were when I knew I was reflecting the President's views.

...There were some in my handwriting on dictation that he gave me.

Sometimes I would say, "What do you want me to say?" He would tell me, and I'd take it down. Or he would scribble it on a pad and hand it to me. He used to have a big supply of them in his desk. He would grab one out, write on it, and hand it to me.

Or he would say, "What questions have you got?" or "What questions do you think you're going to get?" And I would tell him, and I would take down his answers verbally. Sometimes we'd change it or break up sentences or something like that.45

Among the formal channels of communication, in addition to press conferences, were the nationwide radio and television appearances of the President and the Secretary of State. These were held on an irregular basis, when a particular need was felt to address the nation. Formal statements of policy, carefully prepared in advance, were read to the people in these

appearances. During the period of the Suez crisis, there were three major appearances. The first was on August 3, 1956. Following an introduction by President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles reported on the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, on the tripartite London discussions, and on the upcoming London Conference. The second such appearance was on October 31, 1956, when President Eisenhower addressed the nation on the situation in Eastern Europe and the fighting in the Middle East. And the third was on February 20, 1957, when President Eisenhower spoke about American displeasure with the Israeli refusal to withdraw from Sinai, and upon the Administration's willingness to support "pressure" in the United Nations to compel Israeli compliance with United Nations withdrawal resolutions.

Occasionally, President Eisenhower took part in an interview program for the three television networks called "The People Ask the President." The estimated audience was 30 million people. One such interview was held on October 12, 1956. In his opening statement, President Eisenhower announced, "(I)t looks like here is a very great crisis that is behind us."

Thus, the Eisenhower Administration had many formal means of contact with the American press. It employed all of them with great care. Paralleling the formal channels was a network of informal channels which included background briefings, informal discussions, and personal interviews.
The Informal Channels--Background Briefings

A forum which permitted Administration spokesmen a great deal more latitude and freedom of expression than the regular public press conference was the background news briefing, or backgrounder. This was a press conference given to a small group of journalists on a non-attribution basis. While they could use the information, the newsmen were not permitted to indicate from whom they got it.

Backgrounders were not held on a regularly scheduled basis; they were held as the need dictated, as determined by the course of events. Normally background briefings were held at the initiative of the newsmen. They were held usually at one of the hotels, fairly often the Carlton. At times, when he wanted to explain something to the press off-the-record, Dulles would call one of the reporters and ask, "Would you invite me to dinner? Get the crowd together and have me out for a drink." The size of the group varied from 12 to 20 participants. Sometimes the group would be composed only of bureau chiefs, or interpretive writers such as columnists. During the period of the Suez crisis, Dulles held a number of background news briefings. There are presently available to the researcher records of four--these were held on October 5, October 31, December 6, and one in Paris on December 14, 1956.

When the backgrounder was held at the initiative of members

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46 Dulles Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 33. Often there is a twenty-four hour moratorium in force on use of material from background briefings. See: Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

47 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Richard Harkness, 30 March 1966, pp. 55-56.
of the press, a representative of the press (perhaps, Paul Ward, John Hightower, Don Gonzales, or Peter Edson) would contact Carl McCordle or Dick Wilson, and say something like, "We haven't seen the Secretary for a long time. We ought to have a talk. Would he be available for dinner sometime soon?"

If the Secretary were agreeable, the dinner would be held in one of Washington's better hotels. It was a working dinner "held specifically for working purposes." 48

Secretary Dulles spoke rather frankly and openly at the backgrounders, at times releasing information not known to the press beforehand. Reporters were permitted to use the information they received, but they were not permitted to attribute the remarks directly to the Secretary of State. Standard phrases such as, "according to reliable sources" or "informed sources indicate," would be used instead. Richard Harkness observed that the backgrounder has been:

"...a very useful mechanism of reporting. I think maybe the reporters have more to lose, or take more risks than the government officials....They (government officials) can disown it (the report), if it appears. But, by and large, if you have the confidence in the official--this has to be a two-way affair across the table--it can be very helpful, because obviously a man like Foster Dulles or a man in the Pentagon...can talk more frankly. And Foster Dulles was fully aware of taking advantage of this--along with a sense of responsibility--"I can talk to these men and explain things to them." 49

48 Dulles Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.
49 Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness, pp. 58-59.
Suez Crisis Backgrounders

In the course of researching this study, the notes of four backgrounders in late 1956, during the Suez crisis, two in October and two in December, were discovered. The guest lists of the October 30 and December 6 backgrounders are also available. They have been rearranged alphabetically by institution in Table II.* Analysis of this table indicates a number of things. First, an honest effort was made to invite representatives of the major press sources in the country: 1. prominent city newspapers, such as, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, etc.; 2. the news services, such as, the Associated Press, the United Press, etc.; and 3. the weekly newsmagazines, such as, Time, U.S. News and World Report, etc. The national networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, were invited to the October 30th background briefing; however, they were not represented at the December 6th Backgrounder. There appears to have been no special emphasis either on specific reporters invited, or on specific institutions represented, although institutions are represented more consistently than individual reporters. Thus, a given news institution might have been represented by one reporter on October 30, and by another on December 6. Apparently having a representative of that institution was regarded as more important than having a specific representative of that institution. Thus, roughly half of the institutions represented at both background briefings were represented by different members of their staff. Apparently the invitations were extended by the newsmen instrumental in

*Appendix B.
arranging the backgrounders. The manner in which the composition of the group was determined was "sort of handed down from the old Marshal crowd."\(^{50}\)

In the background briefings held during the Suez crisis, Secretary Dulles raised a number of significant points which the Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to place on the record. In hope of shedding additional light on our analysis of press coverage of the Suez crisis (to be covered in greater depth in later chapters), it might prove worthwhile to consider the Suez backgrounders here. An attempt will be made to concentrate the analysis on those matters not brought out in the regular press conferences.

In the opening statement of his background briefing of October 5, 1956, held in New York City, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that he regarded the meeting of the Security Council to consider the Suez Canal issue "from the standpoint of the United Nations, perhaps the most significant meeting of the Council that has been held....(T)he capacity of the Security Council to deal with this will be tested here. The outcome will be very significant for the future of the United Nations."\(^{51}\)

Noting a tendency in recent years for the Security Council to be "by-passed" in favor of the General Assembly, thus causing a shift in their relative roles, Dulles went on to note that in

\(^{50}\)Ibid., p. 56.

this matter the Security Council would be given a chance to "prove its worth" in the way it handled the Suez issue which Dulles regarded as a problem "which can only be effectively dealt with...by a relatively small body."

Dulles proceeded to observe that the meeting of the U. N. Security Council would "go far to determine whether or not there is a basis for negotiations with Egypt." Up to that point in time, the discussions had not developed "a clear basis for believing that Egypt is prepared to negotiate on terms that might be acceptable." At least this time Egypt was present for the discussions, in the past, it had dealt through intermediaries, India and the Soviet Union.

In the question and answer session which followed, Dulles indicated that, rather than looking to closed meetings of the Security Council itself to ascertain Egyptian intentions, he suspected "that there would be more hope in informal talks which will probably take place than there would be in formal meetings of the Council even though restricted." However, he felt there would be some value in at least one restricted meeting of the Security Council.

In Dulles' view, control of the Suez Canal must not be allowed to become the instrument of national policy of any one nation or group of nations. This was the "big principle" that was at stake, and unless that principle could be resolved,

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52 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
53 Ibid., p. 3.
Dulles did "not see much hope in negotiations." 54

Later, one of the reporters observed that, from what Dulles had said, his idea was "that the best that might come out of these Council meetings is a basis for negotiations rather than a settlement." Dulles' reply was brief and to the point. "That's right," he said. 55

Dulles indicated that he did not anticipate that the Foreign Ministers would stay beyond the next week. By then, he felt, "the decisive stage would be over." 56

Dulles reaffirmed the American intention to support the Anglo-French proposal, and not to suggest any alternative American proposal in the event the Soviets would veto it. 57

In response to the question whether the failure of the Security Council to "find a peaceful means of settlement, does that imply that that probably would mean violence," Dulles responded:

No, I don't know what it will mean. But you know there are many sanctions which operate against any nation which defies the principles of justice and international law. Force by no means is the only one. There are moral sanctions. There are economic sanctions. Conceivably there could be forcible sanctions, but forcible sanctions are not the only ones that come to mind. 58

54 Ibid., p. 4.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
56 Ibid., p. 6.
57 Ibid., pp. 8 and 10-11.
58 Ibid., p. 11.
Dulles was careful not to make a statement which could be misconstrued to mean that failure of the Security Council to find a means of peaceful settlement would be justification to use force to solve the Suez Canal issue.

Perhaps, the most enlightening aspect of the October 5th backgrounder was Dulles' revelation of American expectations of the Security Council meetings. At best, all that could be hoped for was the establishment of a basis for further negotiations. Once that was found, protracted negotiations to reach a settlement could be expected to extend over several months.

Even more revealing were Dulles' remarks to the press in the October 30, 1956, backgrounder. The official transcript is not yet available. However, the researcher has had access to the notes of Richard Harkness and of James Russell Wiggins. Harkness' notes, which Wiggins' notes substantiate, will mainly be used for this analysis. Wiggins' notes will, however, be referred to when they appear more complete, or help to better illuminate a particular point. This off-the-record dinner discussion of current events dealt specifically with the anti-Soviet rebellions in Poland and Hungary, and with the invasion of Egypt. In this backgrounder Dulles pulled all the stops. He was very outspoken, and his remarks, as seen through Harkness' and Wiggins' notes, are very revealing.

Harkness prefaced his notes with observations about the "air of emergency" which charged the dinner session. "Mr. Dulles' talk was punctuated by telephone calls reporting the British-French veto in the UN, the Israeli acceptance of the
British-French forces toward the Suez," this latter observation apparently a reference to the Israeli acceptance of the Anglo-French ultimatum.

In his opening statement, Secretary Dulles made a few brief remarks about the developments in Poland and Hungary. He then moved to consideration of the situation in the Middle East and the Anglo-French decision to intervene in Egypt in order to present Nasser with a setback. Dulles briefly recalled the American belief that the British and the French seemed to agree that a return to the canal would be "disastrous," but that France induced Britain to use force. Dulles theorized that the French, already engaged in the Algerian war, believed that they must get the British into North Africa. Dulles argued: "The issue then is NOT Suez, because Suez is 'solvable.' The goal of keeping the canal open on reasonable and efficient terms can be achieved." However, the problem arose out of the Anglo-French determination that the quarrel over the Suez Canal "be settled on terms that represent a setback for Nasser in North Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula."  

60 Ibid., pp. 1-2.  
61 Ibid., p. 2. On the solvability of the Suez dispute, see: Benjamin Nimer, "Dulles, Suez, and Democratic Diplomacy," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 3, Sept. 1959, pp. 795-796. Nimer wrote: "A profound discrepancy...existed between the actual Suez situation and the Dullesian image of it....(I)t can be said that to the British and French politico-strategic values, far more than economic, were at stake.... "Since the central issue of the dispute was politico-
Dulles pointed out that both he and President Eisenhower had reminded the British and French of the recent British experience in the Canal Zone. With 80,000 troops there in 1953, they had to send an additional 8,000 troops to defend them. The President and Dulles argued that reoccupation of the canal zone, in 1956, would be even more difficult and expensive because "the Arabs are now united, Russia is now in the Middle East."

The British replied: "You may be right, but we'd rather go down fighting than be sapped of our strength until we become a second rate power." Dulles, at this point, overstressed Arab unity, which was, in fact, more theoretical than actual at that time. And he granted undue significance to the Russian presence in the Middle East, which was then in its infancy. But, Dulles argued, that weak Russian Middle Eastern presence was a factor likely to contribute to the failure of the Anglo-French venture. At the same time, Dulles was rejoicing at the rebellions in the Soviet satellites, Poland and Hungary. The United States had been hoping for such developments, and had been "exerting pressure in the minor way possible to bring about the uprisings." While the Soviets might suppress the rebellions and subjugate the people, there could be no picture of happy union with the Kremlin.

strategic for Egypt, too, it was not amenable to settlement unless one side would agree to give up very important ground. But the Dullesian image obscured this fact, holding out not merely hope but expectation that all would yet be well, since all that was needed was a practical, business-like give-and-take by each side.

"It being necessary that one side give up vital ground, an Egyptian retreat could only be compelled, not sought. Nevertheless, the image explicitely rejected this method and exalted what was for all practical purposes a thoroughly noncoercive one.

"Finally, because of the importance to them of forcing Nasser to retreat, at the very least, the British and French lost all confidence that satisfactory results would come from the kind of negotiation implied by the Dullesian ground rule of no force...."
Although the U. S. had no intention to press hostile forces to the Russian boundary, Dulles estimated there was a fairly good chance "of getting Polish and Hungarian Governments NOT ruled automatically by Moscow." Later, in this, and in his December 6, 1956, backgrounder, Dulles argued incorrectly that the events in Poland and Hungary indicated that the break-up of the Soviet empire was under way. (see below, pp. 157 and 163-164.) It is difficult to see how Dulles could seriously believe that the Russians, whose empire, according to him, was crumbling, could pose a real threat to the British-French venture in Egypt. There also seems to be a double-standard with which Dulles regarded Anglo-French use of force, and Soviet use of force. Dulles seemed less concerned with Soviet use of force which would expose the unhappy union between Moscow and its satellites. The British and French, on the other hand, had committed the grave error of attempting to gain by force what Dulles believed they could have settled by negotiation.

Dulles argued, despite indications the British, French, and Egyptians were close to agreement on the canal, and that a solution could be reached "by a few days of talk at Geneva... suddenly, the possibilities of a settlement dissolved. There was a blackout of intercourse between the parties." There were later reports of the Israeli build-up, and Pentagon reports of the sixty Mystere jets. Dulles continued:

Last week, becoming deeply concerned, we instructed our Ambassadors in London and Paris to press for information of British-French intentions. We were unable to break

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through British-French silence. What information we could get was misleading. From the Israelis, we heard only vague language. Our conclusion is: The Israeli mobilization did not occur without the knowledge of the British and French.

The Israeli attack began Monday. We informed the British and French that we planned to go to the UN on Tuesday. The British refused to join in our anti-aggression resolution but asked, since we were determined to act, to arrange that the Security Council NOT consider our motion until Wednesday.

In this conversation, neither the British nor French even mentioned an ultimatum (which came on Tuesday). We have three objections to such diplomacy: (1) Not informing us of their plan. (2) Asking us to hold-off UN action until Wednesday, obviously so British-French forces could be in the canal zone when our resolution was considered. (3) The ultimatum was unfair. It would have permitted the Israelis to stay within 10 miles of the canal, but the Egyptians would have had to stop any defensive fighting. In other words, it was an ultimatum drawn so the Egyptians could not possibly comply.

Commenting that he was "philosophizing," Dulles observed that the Anglo-French intervention was a tragedy since it occurred at the very time Russian imperialism not only appeared to be crumbling, "but the Russians are unmasked as imperialists who will use tanks to shoot down subjugated people." In the question and answer session which followed, Dulles elaborated on this point by noting that because of the Franco-British military action, the opportunity was lost to the West to use the Hungarian invasion against Communism. Any Western attempt to denounce Soviet Imperialism in Central Europe would be met with derisive cries of Western Imperialism in the Middle East.

Continuing in a philosophical vein, Dulles indicated that the United States, as a consequence of the British-French action, might have more freedom to act in the international arena. Dulles reasoned: "For many years, we have been in the awkward position of trying to ride two horses--our Western Allies with
their colonial policy, and the nationalism of Southeastern Asia. For the first time, we stand apart from British-French imperialism."

Returning to the different views held by the Americans and the British and French over the ease of conquest, Dulles indicated his doubts that the British and French would be able to easily "reestablish their prestige" in the Middle East despite their belief that the Arabs had "no stomach for fighting." Dulles saw the Anglo-French action as a "desperate gamble," explaining, "The drain on both countries will be terrific. I don't see how their economies can survive." In the following question and answer session, Dulles raised the issue of the impact on Western Europe of the canal and pipelines being closed more than 30 days, indicating probable cut-backs of Western European industrial production. Some countries could buy Western Hemisphere oil because their currencies were strong enough, the British and French currencies were not.

While Dulles had grave doubts of the outcome of the Anglo-French action, he did not see it as fatal to the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, should the British and French reestablish their influence in North Africa, the United States would "deal on that basis. If they fail, we'll find some other basis." Dulles felt that the basic ties between the United States and Western Europe were such that he did not anticipate permanent disruption, regardless of the outcome of the Anglo-

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63 Ibid., p. 3.
64 Ibid., p. 4.
The implication of these rather revealing remarks, however, was that Dulles really had no fundamental objection to the British and French reasserting their authority in Egypt. The moral tone of official statements masked a more flexible, a more pragmatic attitude toward the problem which Dulles held privately. It also indicated a lack of the dedication to principle which the U.S. Government officially maintained. It represented a practical, pragmatic approach to the world situation, and a readiness to attempt to accommodate U.S. policy to political realities.

Although Dulles regarded the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt as a "desperate gamble," he did not fear for the United States position. "The British-French attack can be a disaster for them and not for us. With the Russians diverted in Eastern Europe, there is less chance now Moscow will attack Western Europe. The Reds now have unreliable lines of communications through the so-called satellites. Now, there is what amounts to a buffer line between the Russians and our forces in Europe."

Indicating that the British had told the United States on Monday—the day before—that it was defunct, Dulles observed, "There is nothing left of the Tri-partite agreement of 1950." Furthermore, he saw "no possibility" of American military involvement in the Middle East. Nor did he envision applying


sanctions to the British and French. Earlier, he had indicated that the United States was "disposed to suspend economic aid to Israel until the Israelis pull back." At this point, he noted, "(T)he Israelis," in the U. S. view, "were used as decoys as an excuse for the reoccupation of the canal. We suspect there's a payoff promised--dismembering Jordan. But this is wholly speculation." 67

Dulles reinforced his argument that armed force was unnecessary in the Suez dispute, but that the British and French went ahead anyway. "The policies of Nasser were self-defeating. We estimated that Nasser could last no longer than six months to a year. The British said they could not wait; that they had to get him by Christmas. The sense of urgency was due, no doubt, to the political weakness of both the Eden and Mollet governments." 68

67 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
68 Ibid., p. 4. See also: General Mss., Princeton, Wiggins, "Notes on Conversation between J. R. W. and J. F. D.,” Oct. 30, 1956, pp. 12-13 and 16-17. Wiggins indicated that Dulles reasoned that within a year Nasser would have been discredited. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Morocco were all against him. Dulles added: "I am not advocating Nasser--a wild eyed nationalist, but prefer to try to defeat him by other methods... (T)o attempt it in a few months is a great miscalculation." Later, Dulles admitted that the U. S. would be better off with Nasser out of the way. In response to the question why the U. S. had not proceeded with a firmer policy against Nasser, Dulles asked: "What would you suggest?" He indicated that the U. S. had stopped the Aswan High Dam project, and all relief except that under PL 480. The U. S. had stopped direct trade with Egypt, and had initiated economic pressures which, in Dulles' opinion, would have eliminated Nasser in a year. Dulles claimed that the basic difference between the United States and the British and French was that the U. S. had a policy that would take time; the British and French said they had to move quickly. Dulles concluded: "I cannot think of any economic pressure we could have brought that we did not bring."
In response to other questions—Harkness recorded only the answers—Dulles made an interesting series of replies:

There was more than a coincidence of timing. The Russians were busy in Eastern Europe. There was the assumption that we would be unable, politically, to take action against Israel in the last week of an election campaign. The situation must have made it attractive to work out the current arrangements of an Israeli attack, and a British-French ultimatum.

The Russians still can do all kinds of mischief in the Middle East. They can send in volunteers, arms and technicians, and keep things stirred up.

...The President said we'll do what we think is right regardless of how it affects the election. This is a direct quote by the President: "If they don't want me, let them get somebody else."

The President had made his views known to the British and French more forcefully than any one at this table realizes.69

Dulles was very frank, open and direct in this backgrounder of October 30, 1956. Not only did he indicate the American interpretation of events and probable U. S. actions, but he also gave rather revealing American assessments of Anglo-French and Israeli motivations. But, it must be recognized, that Dulles took considerable risk. Had any of the newsmen present directly quoted him, Dulles' comments would have sparked considerable diplomatic controversy. They could readily have been interpreted by the British and French as giving them the go-ahead in their Suez venture. Nasser would have had confirmation of his suspicions of Dulles, and Arab anti-Americanism could have been thereby inflamed by the Egyptian leader. While it is true that Dulles could have denied authorship of these

69 Ibid., Harkness, pp. 4-5.
remarks, it bears remembering that his earlier attempts to correct his October 2 press conference blunder were scarcely successful. Unfortunately, such denials seldom have the same impact as the original statement which caused them.

The third backgrounder during the period of the Suez crisis was held on December 6, 1956. Analysis of the outline of Dulles' thoughts indicates that, in his opening statement, he intended to defend the American position which was "guided by principle rather than by attachment to or animosity toward any one country."

The United States held to its position despite opposition from within and from her friends abroad. Dulles continued:

...The guiding principle has been that the United Nations Charter, repeated in the First Article of the NATO and our collective security treaties, that the parties will settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means and will refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations.

Had the United States not stood for this principle, the very collapse of the United Nations might have been involved, and justification would have been given "to the charge of the Soviet Union and of some neutralists like Nehru that our collective security arrangements are in fact a cover for aggression."70

Once again, the official text of the backgrounder is not available. The researcher must rely on the notes of a newsman, James Russell Wiggins of the Washington Post, to find out what was said at the background briefing of December 6, 1956.

Wiggins' notes indicate that Dulles modified and expanded his opening statement. Wiggins recorded that Dulles said the following concerning the U. S. position on the Suez crisis:

We face, I think, a very difficult situation—as difficult as any we have faced. This action by the British and French and to a less extent by the Israeli raised the issue of whether we were ready to stand by our principles—in the Charter in Article One—or whether we stand by our friends. We decided to try to stand by our principles even though we knew it would cut across lines of friendship and alliance. We made that decision—the President and I—because we feel that anything other than that would destroy the United Nations and would justify the allegations of the Communist world that our alliances were all for offensive purposes. It was a more difficult decision than Korea. It is easier to go against your enemies than it is to go against your friends. I believe that all the efforts toward establishing a world order, since World War I and II, would have been lost and might have ended in World War III if we had accepted the doctrine that nations are entitled to use force except to defend themselves. If the rule is to be that each nation can judge for itself when it has sufficient provocation to use force we are going to have...finally a world war or general war.71

Dulles' opening statement then paralleled the outline of his thoughts until it reached the point where he claimed incorrectly that the break-up of the Soviet empire was under way, as seen in the events in Poland and Hungary. Dulles' predictions of imminent collapse of the Soviet empire were premature. His longing for the disintegration of International Communism distorted his perception. Far from being an all-destructive quake, the disturbances in Poland and Hungary were mere earth tremors which the Soviet system handily survived. Nevertheless, Dulles' purblind vision of Soviet collapse led him at this

juncture in his remarks to argue unconvincingly that the Western world must continue to abide by principle until the Communist world has collapsed, and the double-standard of international morality—with the Communist world flaunting the United Nations while the Western world complied—would no longer exist.72

In the question and answer period which followed, Dulles repeated his belief that the canal issue could have been solved, but the British and French were “more concerned with teaching Nasser a lesson.”73 Dulles did not acknowledge the possibility that far more important to the British and French than a peaceful settlement was a solution which would enhance their politico-strategic position.

The backgrounder of December 6, 1956, brought out little new about the Suez crisis. Furthermore, one doubts the sincerity of the United States adherence to principle—that nations are to use force only in self-defense—particularly when one remembers U. S. military intervention in Lebanon scarcely two years later. One wonders if this were not largely a dodge to justify a position arrived at on the basis of a cold, hard weighing of facts, figures, and interests. The United States correctly perceived the difficulties the British and French would have both in the Middle East and in the arena of world opinion. The Eisenhower Administration charted America’s course accordingly and probably used the question of principle to justify the policy it intended to pursue all along.

72 Ibid., pp. 2-5.
73 Ibid., p. 7.
In the fourth Suez crisis backgrounder, December 14, 1956, held before his departure from Paris, Dulles indicated that no attempt had been made in the NATO discussions to deal with the Arab-Israel problem. "It was felt that it was better to discuss that in the United Nations." 74

Concerning the clearing of the Suez Canal, Dulles indicated that he thought the canal should be cleared as fast as possible, and that the Anglo-French assurances for withdrawal should be regarded as adequate in order that the French and British salvage equipment be used to clear the canal, an action which General Wheeler had ruled out—without consulting Dulles—until after the withdrawal of the last British and French soldiers. That equipment should be put to use in clearing the southern part of the canal as soon as the downed bridge blocking the way could be removed. 75

**Dinner Parties and Exclusive Interviews**

In addition to background briefings, the Administration, in its relations with the press, had two other informal means of communication: 1. dinner or cocktail parties for small groups held in the home of one of the newsmen 76; and 2. one-on-one discussions between a representative of the Administration and

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76 *Dulles Project*, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.
a member of the press. Dulles used both of these means; Eisenhower seldom did. Eisenhower usually let Hagerty handle meetings of that sort:

Ike's relations with reporters were, as President's go, rather formal. We never saw him alone in private.... He didn't believe in giving anyone an exclusive. He stuck rigorously with that position....Only occasionally were we called into his office for an announcement by him....So our relations with him were mostly based on the news conference....77

Dulles, on the other hand, did give exclusive interviews. In one such interview given on July 2, 1957, to James Russell Wiggins of the Washington Post, Dulles answered Wiggins' two part observation that the two most common criticisms of the U. S. in Europe were: 1. that the French and the British were not sufficiently informed how much the U. S. opposed the use of force in the Suez dispute; and 2. that the Aswan Dam offer "was cancelled rudely and in a way that was certain to provoke retaliation." Wiggins recorded Dulles' response as follows:

As to the first charge the Secretary said that the French might have something there. That he had set forth all the evils that would ensue but that he admitted to such scant hope of talking the French out of military action so suited to their purpose in Algiers that he had not made this a particular objective, relying on the ability to keep the British from going along with them and feeling that the French would not launch a military adventure alone. This worked up till the point that Eden went to Paris and when the French got the British alone they talked them into it. As to the British, they knew very well our views, both through what he had told Eden, Macmillan and Lloyd and through what the President had told Eden...

...it was not an unexpected or precipitate action. Had been forecast by our attitude. Agreed on with British. was not rude or peremptory that in fact he had shown the Ambassador of Egypt a draft of the Statement he intended to release and had suggested to him that if anything in

77 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 34.
the language was particularly objectionable that he would change it and there was no request to do so. Also, he had telephoned to the British Embassy a draft of statement with request that if foreign office had objections they should let him know and he did not hear from them. Also, he recalled that British had applauded his withdrawal of the dam offer at the time and only later blamed us for manner it was done....78

In this exchange we learn about the method Dulles employed in his efforts to avoid the use of force in the Middle East—pressuring the British while hoping they would restrain the French. This might have given the French justification, Dulles acknowledged, for feeling that they did not have ample advance notice of American attitudes of opposition to the use of force in the Middle East. The British, however, in Dulles' view, had no such excuse.

The second factor of interest was Dulles' claim that he offered Hussein the opportunity to suggest changes in the release "if anything in the language was particularly objectionable." According to Dulles, Hussein did not take advantage of his offer to change objectionable language in the State Department release. One wonders why. Perhaps, the whole release was objectionable to the Egyptian Ambassador. Perhaps, he did not wish, in any way, to appear party to the release.

Administration Efforts to Influence the Press

So far we have analyzed the various ways in which the Eisenhower Administration dealt with the press. We have found that a great deal of prior preparation went into all formal press conferences, the daily conferences of the Presidential Press Secretary and of the State Department News Division Chief, as well as the regular press conferences of the President and of the Secretary of State. Through this process of preparation, the policies and information the Government wanted to release was rehearsed, while other policies and information which the Government did not want the public to know was deleted and suppressed.

In addition both the President and the Secretary of State, and their respective press secretaries, reserved the right to censor transcripts of their press conferences. On occasion they exercised this right.

Thus, although the Administration did not, and, in a representative democracy during peace-time, could not control the way in which the press used the information released, it could and did control the the nature and amount of information available to the press as carefully as it could. On this level, therefore, it exercised indirect influence over the press.

These were not the only means available to the Administration. The other means were much more direct. In the event the President or his Press Secretary felt television coverage of news gave a wrong emphasis to Administration policies, Hagerty would usually discuss the matter with the reporter
involved, rather than go to the heads of the television networks. Hagerty could only remember two occasions when he went to see the heads of the networks. He did so on the Japanese question, and on something that happened at Geneva. 79

After the Presidential party returned from Geneva, Hagerty saw the heads of the networks in connection with assigning American nationals to cover the President abroad. Hagerty recalled that he said:

"Look, I'm not telling you who to assign, but I think you're making a great mistake. There are many times on a trip when we want to say something to you people. We're not going to do it unless we have American nationals."

And Hagerty observed:

...from that day on, there's been no trouble, and every President that's traveled, including Eisenhower later, has always had American personnel, American nationals. If they pick up a crew overseas they make sure it's American nationals, as the crew that's covering the President. 80

As Presidential Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty, in addition to dealing with representatives of broadcast journalism, had to cope with representatives of the more traditional forms of journalism—the newspapers and newsmagazines of the nation. On this level, Hagerty had to deal with reporters, columnists and editorialists.

On occasion, reporters would write things which President Eisenhower felt were inaccurate. He would call them to Hagerty's

79 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hagerty, Vol. I, p. 172
80 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
attention. Hagerty would contact the reporter—as a general policy he would not call the reporter's boss—and point out where he thought the reporter was wrong. Occasionally, the reporter would attempt to show Hagerty where he was wrong.\textsuperscript{81}

Concerning treatment of columnists who were likely to be hostile to the Eisenhower Administration, and how he got the President's message to them, Hagerty indicated that sometimes the Administration would invite some of them in for private dinners or background briefings and discuss matters with them.

...You try to straighten them out on the facts. You don't try to change their opinion because they're entitled to their opinion, but they also have an obligation, if they're making their opinions, to at least have their opinions based on the facts rather than what they think are the facts. It's a constant operation in Washington under any administration. I myself used to go to dinners with groups of them, at their homes or at clubs or something, to discuss a given topic. The President always knew when I was going. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't.\textsuperscript{82}

The Administration was also concerned that editorialists base their opinions on the facts. The Administration recognized that the President could not enjoy 100 per cent editorial support across the entire United States. Nevertheless, the President did become annoyed when editorials were based upon what he regarded as a total lack of information, which was often the case with editorials on foreign affairs. When this happened, Hagerty would call the editorial section of the paper. He would then tell either the editorial page editor or the editorial writer, if he were available, that the editorial in question

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 450-451.

\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., p. 454.
was based on wrong facts, and what the correct facts were. Hagerty estimated that this tactic was successful 50 per cent of the time. "Not that they would correct their editorial, but they wouldn't repeat the same mistake in the next one." 83

When Hagerty briefed the press on the facts, he obviously did not tell all he knew, particularly in matters dealing with foreign affairs where vital security considerations were involved. In these instances, the press had to go on what it could learn from American and foreign sources. In the case of the latter, national security considerations influenced the information released by foreign governments. In all such cases, the propaganda content of released information had to be reckoned with.

The U. S. Government not only seeks to inform, it also seeks to win support, both at home and abroad, for its policies. The information released is carefully chosen and doctored to serve these varied needs. Hagerty's efforts, therefore, must be considered not only as attempts to dispel error, but also as steps to win recognition and support for Administration policies, as efforts to influence the press.

The White House sought to give as much advance notice as possible to the news media in order that they would know to assign their experts to cover the story. According to Hagerty, "it resulted in much more comprehensive coverage, in much better written stories." 84 The Department of State used similar techniques to those of the White House.

83 Ibid., pp. 455-456.
84 Ibid., pp. 473-474.
Suez Crisis Impact on Eisenhower Administration Press Relations

The Suez crisis strained the press relations of the Eisenhower Administration. As the primary spokesman for American foreign policy, Secretary Dulles came under particularly strong attack. In early 1957, Dulles' press image was very poor.

In an attempt to account for Dulles' poor public and press relations in early 1957, Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs during the second term of the Eisenhower Administration, cited several factors: 1. that Dulles got off to a poor start during the Joe McCarthy period; 2. that the working press, being more inclined toward a liberal tradition, was not with him ideologically since Dulles was more in the Conservative camp; and 3. that United States foreign policy during the Suez crisis was unpopular. Berding observed:

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85Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 174-178. Rivers indicated that there are more than three times as many Democrats as Republicans among the Washington newspaper correspondents, four times as many among the wire-service and radio-television correspondents, and nearly twice as many among the magazine correspondents. The press corps is predominantly liberal. But the ownership and political commitment of much of the press is Republican. Until 1964, newspapers endorsed Republican Presidential candidates by a ratio of about 3½ to 1. Nevertheless, Rivers found that strong political partisanship had been fading from the 1930's to the early 1960's. The percentage of independent or neutral dailies had grown from 5.8% in 1932 to 31% in 1960. "The figure was 59.5 per cent in 1964, but one wonders whether that was because some publishers were fearful of both candidates (Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater)." Likewise, Washington correspondents, when surveyed in the middle 1960's, indicated a greater independence than in the 1930's when they were surveyed by Leo Rosten. Compared to the 1930's when 60% of the correspondents surveyed indicated that, although their orders were to be objective, they knew how their bosses wanted stories played, less than 10% felt that way in the middle 1960's. In the 1930's, 55% had had stories "played down, cut or killed for 'policy' reasons," in the 1960's, only 7% had.
Now, in 1956, of course, occurred the Suez crisis, and he (Dulles) adopted what I think was the only possible policy for the United States at that time—upholding the United Nations despite the fact that two of our closest allies, Britain and France, were defying the United Nations. But I think that cost him a lot in public opinion in the United States—those particularly who were very pro-British and very pro-French. And to many newspaper men, it seemed almost as if he were aligning the United States with the Soviet Union. It so happened that the Soviet Union and the United States were voting the same way in the United Nations on that issue, but what they forgot was...that he was taking just as strong a stand against the...Soviet Union's threats (to?) Britain and France....He was, likewise, adopting a very strong attitude toward the Soviet Union with regard to Hungary....

But that was October, November, into December of 1956, and when those opening months of 1957 came along...he himself said that his public relations were at a very low ebb....

Another factor which accounted for Dulles' poor public relations was Zionist and Jewish opposition to U. S. Suez policy. This was so not only at the height of the crisis, but also in following months, even when Berding joined the State Department. 86

In order to improve his press relations, Dulles offered the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs initially to Ambassador Philip Kingsland Crowe, who turned the offer down because of poor health following a heart attack. 87 Dulles then appointed Andrew H. Berding in February, 1957. Following Senate confirmation in March, 1957, Berding took over as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, replacing Carl W. McCardle. According to Berding, Dulles offered him the job because “he wanted to make a change, that his public relations were at low ebb, and he felt that a considerable

86 Dulles Project, Interview with Berding, pp. 10-12.
87 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ambassador Philip Kingsland Crowe, 4 October 1965, p. 6.
improvement was necessary." Dulles felt that Berding could do the job. 88

To aid Berding in the campaign to improve his image, Dulles, later in 1957, created the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Ambassador Crowe, who served as special liaison to the press. Crowe was sworn in on November 4, 1957.

In the course of his service, Crowe was at times assisted by the former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Crowe noted that McCardle never held it against Dulles that he had been replaced. He continued to be helpful after he left the State Department. McCardle, who Crowe admitted had a good sense of the newsworthy, often steered Crowe to newsmen whom he had discovered were not sympathetic to Dulles or his policies. 89

While he had served as Dulles' press secretary, McCardle was known for certain talents. Livingston T. Merchant, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, recalled that Carl McCardle had the almost uncanny ability to pick out a sentence from the 13th page of a speech and to determine that it was going to appear in the headlines. McCardle's choice usually surprised Dulles who "had not realized that that was what would catch the professional journalist's eye and make the

88 Dulles Project, Interview with Berding, pp. 6-7.
89 Dulles Additional Papers, Princeton Univ. Library, Crowe, Philip K., 1908-, "Recollections of John Foster Dulles," pp. 59-60. McCardle seemed to prefer to remember that his tenure of nearly 5 years was a record for longevity in that post up to that time. See: Eisenhower Project, Interview with McCardle, p. 7.
headline, make the first paragraph."\textsuperscript{90}

Nevertheless, Merchant did not believe that Dulles ever considered Carl McCardle a substantive adviser, although Dulles was fond of him. Dulles did believe that McCardle should be present at meetings and know what was going on in order to completely discharge his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and thereby be of greatest value to Dulles. Merchant noted that McCardle's successor, Andrew Berding, was used in his field of competence; Dulles respected him, but their relationship was not as intimate.\textsuperscript{91}

When he assumed his duties in late 1957, Ambassador Crowe's own job consisted of having lunch "with publishers and editors in this country and in England and on the Continent--the guys that wouldn't come to Andy's (Berding's) press conferences." When he felt a particular newspaper was not being fair, Crowe would travel to see the publishers or the journalists involved. He was the only one in the State Department doing this sort of thing. In fulfillment of his work, he "saw all the leading publishers in the United States and most of the ones in Europe."\textsuperscript{92}

After 1957, Crowe indicated, his "main job was to see the leading editors and publishers in this country and abroad to explain to them on a person-to-person basis what Mr. Dulles policies were, get their reaction, report back those reactions to the Secretary, attempt to create a more favorable atmosphere

\textsuperscript{90}Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Livingston T. Merchant, 13 March 1965-17 April 1965, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., pp. 8-10.

\textsuperscript{92}Dulles Project, Interview with Crowe, pp. 7-8.
for him and for his writings and for his ideas." 93 In connection with his duties, Crowe saw such figures as James Reston, and Tom Hamilton, both of the New York Times, and in England he saw Beaverbrook and Kemsley. He talked to the press in Denver, Colorado, and San Francisco, and to the Hearst Chain. 94 When in Britain, Crowe saw all of the publishers that were of any importance, and a great many of the individual columnists, some of whom felt that the U. S. really let the British down terribly over Suez. 95

In addition, Crowe's job entailed the following: 1. to explain U. S. policy (On Suez—"if Mr. Dulles had not done what he did do to stop England, France and Israel from taking over Egypt, the UN would have gone down the drain." 96); 2. to help restore relations between the U. S. and her principal allies, Britain and France; and 3. to reach those people who Dulles could not reach through Berding's office, but whose opinions were, all the same, important to Dulles.

Besides talking with publishers and editors, Crowe would bring in to see Dulles columnists who might, by going through Berding's office, have only gotten to see Dulles once in a great while. First, Crowe and Berding would talk things over, and clear it with each other. Then Crowe would arrange for these

93 Ibid., p. 11.
94 Ibid., p. 8.
95 Ibid., p. 18.
96 Ibid., p. 35.
columnists a personal interview with Dulles. "We found this was quite an effective way occasionally—if the guy wasn't too prejudiced against us—in getting our point over."97

As we have seen, Dulles was concerned over European coverage of the U. S. role in the Suez crisis. As might be expected, President Eisenhower was also concerned, particularly over British press coverage. Eisenhower and Dulles were not content merely to leave improving their press relations to the ministrations of Ambassador Crowe. Evidence of this is clearly seen in Dulles' notes on the Bermuda Conference of March 20-24, 1957. On the first day of the Conference, the question of press coverage of the Suez crisis, and the relative policies pursued by the respective governments during the crisis and subsequently, was raised in the dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club. President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Prime Minister Macmillan, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd were all participants. The Continuation of Dulles' Memorandum on the dinner conversation records the following:

Press Treatment. President Eisenhower developed at some length the harm that was done by the press of our countries treating the other as a scapegoat. He felt that we had tried to avoid that very much in the US and there had been very little effort to present the US case as against that of the UK and France. On the other hand it seemed that the British and French press were continuing to abuse the US and US personalities and this was bad for good relations. He thought we should try to keep these matters under control as far as possible.

97 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
(Subsequently, I mentioned privately to Mr. Macmillan that I thought it would be worth his while to check upon the British press on the last few days which according to our reports had made particularly vicious and coordinated attack on President Eisenhower personally.)

It would have been difficult indeed for Eisenhower and Dulles to ignore press criticism, particularly of Dulles. Not only did press dissatisfaction with the Secretary of State appear in print, Eisenhower was also confronted with it directly in his regular press conference during Congressional deliberation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957. John Scali, Associated Press, asked Eisenhower if, in the light of the rather sharp attack from some Democrats who contended that Dulles' Suez policy had been disastrous to America's allies, Britain and France, the President still considered Dulles "the greatest Secretary of State of our time?" And, secondly, did Eisenhower believe Dulles' actions in any way contributed to America's international difficulties? Eisenhower replied:

Let me answer your second question first. Secretary Dulles, to the best of my knowledge and belief--and I keep, I assure you, very close touch--has never taken any action which I have not in advance approved. I insist again that these matters are not taken spasmodically, impulsively. They are not policies developed off of top-of-the-head thinking. They take weeks and weeks, and when they come out and are applied, they have my approval from top to bottom.

Eisenhower then recalled the long Dulles' family association with the office of Secretary of State, how Dulles, at the tender

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98 John Foster Dulles Papers, IX. Conference Dossiers; Special Subjects, 1957-June, 1958, Bermuda Conference, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan--March 20-24, 1957, Continuation of Memorandum of Dinner Conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club.
age of 6 years old, came to regard the office as the greatest position in the world, and how Dulles, through the years, had studied and acquired a wisdom and experience and knowledge that, Eisenhower believed, was possessed by no other living human being. Eisenhower concluded:

Now, all of these critics, I notice this: they don't bring out any particular project. They just talk about great blundering and lack of leadership. I have seen... no constructive proposals for what should have been done with the benefit of hindsight. On the contrary, we just hear these generalized attacks, which I assure you are easy to make. But I have no reason whatsoever for changing my opinion of Secretary Dulles, as I expressed so often to you people.99

Publicly, Eisenhower defended his Secretary of State. Privately, he must have realized that Dulles was bearing the brunt of the criticism over Suez for many policies and decisions which were essentially Eisenhower's own.

CHAPTER III

THE ATTITUDES OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN PRESS TOWARD EACH OTHER

In a representative democracy such as the United States, the press serves many functions. The primary duty of the press is to disseminate accurate news irrespective of its content. The press thus fulfills an educational role. In addition, the press serves as a watchdog of the public interest by holding public figures, their statements, policy proposals, and policies up to public scrutiny. Furthermore, a responsible press assumes the task of investigating fraud, scandal, and malfeasance in office. Regularly it suggests alternative policy proposals and comments critically on programs and policies with a view to their correction and/or improvement. By calling popular attention to the burning issues of the day, the press frequently acts as a catalyst for civic action which often precipitates governmental response. Consequently, in American representative democracy, nearly all levels of government must operate in the environment of a vigilant press.¹

The ease and effectiveness with which the press can perform

its duties depends heavily on the attitudes and the accessibility of the administration in power. Theoretically at least, the more open and accessible the administration, the easier and more effective the press finds the performance of its job. The more closed and inaccessible the administration, the harder it is for the press to function. Conversely, attitudes of the press toward the administration could in large measure determine the attitudes and accessibility of the administration to the press, and, thereby, influence the ability of the press to do its job. The purpose of this chapter is to probe this relationship during the Eisenhower Era in general and with respect to the Suez crisis in particular.

The Administration and the Press
Analysis of Administration attitudes toward the press must take into account the inclination of the news media to concentrate on controversy, on crisis, on the bizarre, on the sensational, while playing down the ordinary, the humdrum, the everyday phenomena of national and individual existence. The Eisenhower Administration was keenly aware of the proneness of the press to overemphasize problems while failing to give as much attention to positive progress. Eisenhower once remarked to Hagerty, "(C)ontroversy makes the news, and...steady progress gets overlooked."¹

The press conference, the major contact point between the President and the press, offered Eisenhower a forum to discuss

and explain his ideas and policies, and an arena to sample American public opinion. Hagerty observed:

...I don't know of any President that did not look upon the Presidential press conferences as a two-way street. He uses it, of course, to express his beliefs and philosophies, his actions of government, but by taking the cross section of questions you get at any given press conference, you have a pretty good idea of what is concerning the American people, on any given week....

While Presidential press conferences served positive ends, Eisenhower, as might be expected, was not always satisfied with them. Murray Snyder, Assistant Presidential Press Secretary, pointed out some of the reasons for the President's dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the Presidential press conference. Snyder indicated:

...(H)is (Eisenhower's) attitude (toward press conferences) varied with the season. At times they were amusing to him..., and sometimes he felt that the best newsmen didn't ask the questions. They'd either sit back, or not come to him. I mean, Walter Lippmann never came to a press conference, nor did he ask questions, which was a shame. But many good ones, like Scotty (James) Reston and bureau chiefs of his type, did....(H)e (Eisenhower) was well aware of the value of it, to the country and to the newsmen. He did not fear the press conference in any way....

During the Eisenhower Era, there were approximately 2,500 newsmen and women in Washington, D.C. It was impossible for the President to know all of them. However, Eisenhower did become acquainted with, and come to like, the basic corps of White House regulars, reporters assigned by the wire services, the networks, and the major American newspapers to cover the White House every day. Hagerty indicated that over the years

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3 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 448.
4 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 29.
a feeling of mutual trust and respect developed between Eisenhower and the White House press corps.\(^5\)

But it cannot be said that Eisenhower was an avid reader of the press. In his May 11, 1960, press conference, Eisenhower admitted that he normally read the Sunday papers only. Regarding his newspaper reading habits and his reaction to unfriendly newspaper cartoons and columns, Eisenhower explained:

Well, I don't know whether you can call it a habit for the simple reason it takes a lot of time if I was going to keep track of all you people say. I take... what I call the important sections of the Sunday papers that review world events, go over the things, and those are the things I study carefully. The kind of things you talk of, cartoons and unfriendly quips, I just can't be bothered with.\(^6\)

Eisenhower's response caused a minor controversy. He did not mean to imply that he never read the daily papers. But he did not read them in any great depth. Snyder indicated that Eisenhower always had on the table behind his desk the old New York Herald-Tribune, and in the house he had the Washington papers, the Post and the Star, and the New York Times. "He wasn't sensitive to what the newspapers said about him or about what he was doing. He read them like a businessman. He didn't devour them, he'd skim them."\(^7\)

Although Snyder indicated that Eisenhower was not sensitive to what was said about him or his policies, we have seen in


\(^6\)Quoted by Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press...," p. 182.

\(^7\)Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 39.
Chapter II that on occasion he did take strong exception to what was written and he had James Hagerty contact the writer of the article, column or editorial to present him with the "facts."

He was aware of domestic press comment; he was also aware of foreign press comment, as indicated in the dinner discussion with Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd during the Bermuda Conference in March, 1957. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by his stand on withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt, and his willingness to support U. N. "pressure" against Israel, the President did not permit adverse comment and criticism in the press to deter him from pursuing unpopular policies when he believed he was right. In this sense, President Eisenhower truly was not "sensitive to what the newspapers said about him or about what he was doing."

Just the same, the Eisenhower Administration was interested in cultivating good relations with the press. Members of the Administration recognized the essential need to deal forthrightly with the representatives of the press in their daily contacts with them. Hagerty noted:

If you're anyone in government, including the President, you can have fine relations with them (newsmen), if you don't try to kid them, if you don't try to lie to them, if you tell them the truth. And if you can't answer their questions, just say you can't answer their questions. Actually in a working relationship with a press secretary, even with the President, some of the questions they ask they know aren't going to be answered, in advance of their asking, but they've got to try. That's part of their job too.8

With reasonable members of the press, members of the Eisenhower White House staff felt it was possible to forge good press relations. Nevertheless, there were some newsmen and women in Washington with whom the Administration had difficulties. Hagerty believed that frequently these people had been favorites of the previous administration, whose sources of news were cut off when the Republican Eisenhower Administration took office. Hagerty paid little attention to them.9

The Secretary of State, too, regarded press conferences as a valuable avenue of communication with the public. He saw the need to keep the public informed of U. S. foreign policy whether he was at home or abroad. Invariably, following a conference of foreign ministers, and before returning to the United States, Dullas would agree to hold a backgrounder for American correspondents concerning the conference "so that he could sum up his impressions of the conference and try to resolve any doubts they might have or fill in some gaps of information." Rarely did Dulles hold a backgrounder "at the beginning of or during the conference, since he did not want to give any impression of conducting his part of the conference in or through public media."

Dulles regarded the formal press conferences as an opportunity to communicate his thinking informally both to the public and to foreign governments. Berding recalled Dulles saying:

9Ibid., p. 453.
There are some things I can say in answer to questions at a press conference which it would be difficult or impossible to declare in a formal statement or note. The latter could follow the press conference answer if necessary, but perhaps it would not be necessary once our thinking had been revealed. It's very useful to have a system whereby I can speak on some issues where ordinary diplomatic etiquette would require that I remain silent. Sometimes I have constructive ideas I'm glad to get across in answer to a question.10

As an example of Dulles' use of this technique to state American thinking while avoiding committing it to a formal communication, Berding cited the September 30, 1958, press conference of the Secretary of State which Dulles employed to indicate to Chiang Kai-shek the U.S. position that Nationalist China should reduce the size of its garrison on the island of Quemoy. This enabled Chiang to take that step while appearing to do so of his own volition.

The formal press conference also gave Dulles the chance to go beyond a simple answer to a question, and to try to expound his philosophy. He felt that this made the press conference more valuable and more useful both to the press and to himself.

Dulles also valued the fact that the New York Times carried the corrected text of his press conference verbatim. "That way virtually every embassy in Washington, most chanceries overseas and many influential individuals will read word for word exactly what I said."11

10 Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
11 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
Dulles did not formulate his answers word for word in advance usually. He sought to "have the substance in mind—not the words but a fairly accurate idea of how to answer." And Dulles objected to someone asking a question based on an old quotation. He regarded this as a poor tactic which served no useful purpose. "It only tries to show a contradiction, to trap me on verbal differences, to show there's no continuity of policy." But Dulles recognized that 90 per cent of the questions asked him were "intelligent, designed to elicit facts." These questions were asked by serious people who sought to gain information either for their own edification or for its newsworthiness.

During his press conferences, Dulles was the picture of poise and confidence. He carried himself well and spoke with an air of authority which some found disconcerting. He seemed at ease, but Berding revealed that the press conference was a strain to him, despite his great experience in public appearances. He quoted Dulles as having said:

Some people have been kind to say I seem to handle a press conference with ease. Actually I'm almost scared to death. My knees knock together when I go downstairs for the conference.

Yes, I've been doing press conferences almost all my mature life. But when you have to speak extemporaneously, and when every word must be chosen to avoid untoward consequences all around the world, you can't but be nervous. You can't be so self-confident that you don't worry about making serious mistakes. I don't think, in fact, I've made many. But you have to think of so many things awfully fast—what will be the impression in New Delhi, or Bonn, or Tokyo, or somewhere else, in addition to the press here—and at the same time give a spontaneous answer. It's difficult.12

12 Ibid., p. 148.
During a crisis, Dulles would back Berding in insisting that he hold his regularly scheduled press conference, over the opposition of area experts who would argue for its cancellation, fearing a slip-up which might aggravate the crisis situation. But Dulles did not have to answer questions dealing with the crisis. He could simply say. "No comment," and avoid controversy. Besides, there would be other matters about which the press would have questions, and about which the public wanted to know and should be informed if the Administration were to obtain support for its policies. "(I)f the conference were cancelled or postponed, the press's conjecturing that this was because of the crisis would make the crisis even more serious than it was." Thus, Dulles would go ahead with the press conference as scheduled; he seldom made any mistakes which would justify the fears of State Department Assistant Secretaries for specific geographic areas. 13

Even though Dulles gave considerable attention to his relations with the press, he did not enjoy great favor with much of the press throughout most of his tenure as Secretary of State. He was severely criticised for much of his six years in that office. Once President Eisenhower observed to Berding that "the sharpest criticism of Mr. Dulles came from politicians and the press, rather than from top-level statesmen and professional diplomats." In the course of his duties as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, and after careful study of public criticism—in which statesmen and diplomats are

13 Ibid., pp. 150-151.
unlikely to engage—and of private conversations between statesmen and diplomats, Berding came to share Eisenhower's point of view. 14 The Secretary of State was subjected to severe criticism, yet Berding reported:

His many years in public life had hardened him to written and oral assault, although on one or two occasions I found he was touched to the raw by something said against him. But to the degree that Dulles evinced any preoccupation, it seemed to me to be based more on attacks against his policies than on attacks against him personally. In any event, no amount of adverse criticism would deflect him from a given policy, if he felt that policy to be in the nation's interest.

"I pay very little attention to adverse criticism. Criticism makes you mad. I can't afford to get mad. The criticism is probably well-intentioned, but it's made by people who don't know as much about the problems as I do. I'm confident that if they knew as much about a situation as I do they wouldn't make the criticism. Despite criticism I'm encouraged to go ahead by the confidence of President Eisenhower who himself is no amateur in this business. He had many years of experience abroad before, during, and after the war. If he thinks I'm the best fellow for the job, that's encouraging.

"It's highly difficult for a Secretary of State to avoid criticism. It's hard indeed for a Secretary of State to be popular." 15

Nevertheless, Dulles was concerned about press criticism, for he recognized the role the press plays in the formation of public opinion. Dulles was quite interested in public opinion, which he sought to keep favorable to Administration policies. William B. Macomber, Jr., former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, reported that Dulles:

14 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
15 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
...worked very hard on explaining to the public why he was for something. He wasn't trying to get a high majority behind him, but he always thought that no policy--no matter how good it was intrinsically--was going to work if over fifty per cent of the country was opposed to it.

So, he worked always very hard to explain his policies in a way that would prevent a build-up of opposition to the point where they would be overcome and shot down.

Dulles, therefore, sought to educate American public opinion and to explain his policies in order to retain a favorable majority of public support for American foreign policy. Dulles also watched public opinion polls to determine the rise or decline in popularity of specific policies and actions. Macomber indicated that Dulles paid attention to the polls in the following manner:

...He did not pay too much attention to this business of his own popularity. But he did if he thought that the US polls were indicating that public concern and opposition was building up against some policy or action he thought was awfully important. Then, you can be sure, he would look at those polls, and he would chart out some kind of campaign to persuade people that what he was doing was right. So he used them as warning signs and very definitely.

A month after coming to the State Department, Berding discontinued the public opinion polls conducted by the Department, with Dulles' approval, in favor of a new method--"checking editorials and articles in one hundred daily newspapers, the columnists, radio and TV commentators, letters to editors, publications and statements of national non-governmental organizations, speeches in the Congress and throughout the country, and the like." Dulles was quite satisfied with this new arrangement; he took the public opinion analyses prepared by Berding's staff home to read.17

16 Dulles Project, Interview with Macomber, pp. 37-38.
17 Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
While Dulles sought the support of public opinion for Administration foreign policies, he refused to let public opinion dictate policy. On various occasions, he observed to Berding:

I give great importance to public opinion but I can't abdicate to such opinion the leadership I feel I must exercise. My responsibility, under the President, is to choose and carry out foreign policies most likely to contribute to the security and advancement of the American people. I often have to make decisions before the state of public opinion can be ascertained, and often such decisions have to be based on circumstances so complicated that it's next to impossible for the majority of our people to understand them. In other words, you can't make foreign policy on the basis of public opinion polls.18

Although Dulles refused to abdicate responsibility for making foreign policy to public opinion, he believed it was the Administration's duty to attempt to gain majority support, since other nations were more inclined to pay attention to the Administration's proposals or objections if they knew that a "compelling majority" of Americans supported the Administration.19

The Administration as Seen by the Press

An analysis of press attitudes toward Administration spokesmen must take into consideration the suspicion with which newsmen generally receive the public utterances of political men. Political officials are often considered by members of the press as calculating, crafty men who frequently seek to manipulate the press to achieve their ends. It is felt that they regularly use the press to expound their thinking

18 Ibid., p. 139.
19 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
and to gain support for their policies and actions. Public men are thus seen by newsmen as either self-seeking or guarded when they appear before the press.  

While newsmen often regard public men and their statements with a degree of skepticism, this does not mean to imply that newsmen expect constantly to be deceived or misled by political spokesmen. Nor does it prohibit newsmen from making valid and objective judgements about individual Administration figures or about the Administration as a whole.

In reviewing the oral history interviews of journalists in both the Eisenhower Project and the Dulles Project, one is struck by the marked differences with which newsmen often tended to regard the President, the Presidential Press Secretary, and the Secretary of State. Generally speaking, President Eisenhower and Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty were held in rather high esteem, while Secretary of State Dulles frequently received rather harsh treatment.

It was generally conceded by the journalists interviewed that President Eisenhower had rather good relations with the press. With the exception of a few extremely partisan correspondents, Eisenhower was well liked by most of the Washington press corps.  

20 See: Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with James Reston, 23 June 1965, pp. 32-33; and Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.

21 Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press...," pp. 184 and 186. Pollard found: "The correspondents, on the whole, respected the outgoing President, relations between him and them, in the main, had been cooperative and cordial although never intimate."
"congenial and productive."  

While newsmen usually regarded Eisenhower amicably, he did have his critics. Some journalists felt he was a weak President. Kenneth Crawford, manager of Newsweek's Washington bureau from 1955 to 1961, believed that Eisenhower did not handle the press very well. Crawford observed:

Now, of Ike himself, I wouldn't say that he was very good at it (handling the press). The press saw him only at press conferences....He was not very good in his press conferences. His syntax was fuzzy. Instead of answering questions head on, he had a way of circumlocuting whatever he was doing, so that he was jeered at, to a certain extent, by the press. He was called "Bubblehead" by some of the people because he seemed to bumble in his press conferences.  

Concerning Eisenhower's "scrambled rhetoric" in a press conference, Edward Folliard, Washington Post, commented: "(W)e understood him very well when we were sitting there at a press conference. We never had any doubt as to what he meant." It was only afterwards, when looking at the transcript, that questions arose as to Eisenhower's meaning.

Members of Eisenhower's Presidential Press Secretariat realized that occasionally the President "fuzzed up" a reply so that it was not quite clear. Following the press conference, newsmen would approach the Presidential Press Secretary or the Assistant Press Secretary for clarification. Staff members of

the Presidential Press Secretariat recognized that their explanations did not carry the same weight as the President's words. Once the President had made a remark, it was on the record and could not easily be erased.25

James Hagerty held the office of Presidential Press Secretary longer than any of his predecessors. He enjoyed Eisenhower's confidence. Consequently, he functioned not only as the President's spokesman, but he also participated in policy-making decisions, particularly during Eisenhower's second term. He also served as an "advance man" for Eisenhower on trips abroad.26

Hagerty was regarded by the press as extremely competent. He was considered well informed, capable.27 Kenneth Crawford remarked that he thought that "Hagerty manipulated the press much more skillfully than anyone had done it earlier, or has

25 According to a reliable, former member of Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty's staff.

26 Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press...," pp. 185-186.

27 Ibid. Pollard quoted James Marlow, Associated Press news analyst, to the effect that Hagerty's success stemmed from two things which many public relations men never learn: "He paid attention to details and informed himself on problems he had to handle."
were not to make comments to the press unless directed to do so by the President. In this way, it was hoped to avoid possible contradictions of what the President or a Cabinet member planned to say. Only occasionally were requests for interviews with members of the White House staff granted. 32

The press was expected to put their questions through the Press Secretary and to receive their answers from him. Of course, they also questioned the President in his press conferences. Snyder recalled that once newsmen realized how the Administration operated, they did not often approach Hagerty for private talks or interviews. Snyder indicated:

...This was a Jim Hagerty principle...that exclusive stories on major matters of general national interest were not good... (I)nformation which was to be made public belonged to the public domain, belonged to everyone, and there was no advantage to anyone,... to the country, to the President's personal press relations, or to Jim Hagerty to divulge to an individual or to several some special information that everyone wanted, when it was to be made public. And we'd go to great extremes to see that, where possible, these matters didn't leak in advance. So my recollection is that this was accepted. It was what most of the newsmen wanted, a fair shake, rather than to see a special... group or clique of favored newsmen getting special treatment. 33

Concerning this system of channelling news through Press Secretary Hagerty, William H. Lawrence, New York Times White House correspondent, observed that, with rare exception, newsmen could not get a story of substance from Hagerty. The Administration was "good with the hand-out. But you couldn't get much background on why the President had decided this, that or the

32 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, pp. 16-17.
33 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
other, or on anything he was about to decide." Lawrence felt that if one were to review newspaper accounts of the period, one would find them "vague and perhaps misleading." Like any administration, Lawrence believed, the Eisenhower Administration handled good news better than bad.34

As a result of the White House news managing procedure, some White House correspondents never even met some of Eisenhower's chief assistants. Presidential assistants who were asked for an interview usually replied, "See Hagerty." Rivers reported: "One correspondent who arranged an interview with a Presidential speechwriter without going through the press secretary was so elated that he telephoned his editor to say, 'I broke around behind Hagerty!' The important news was not the substance of the interview but the fact that he got one."35

In contrast to President Eisenhower and Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty who enjoyed favorable press relations, for much of his six years as Secretary of State, Dulles did not, although he gave a great deal of consideration to his dealings with the press. Some newsmen objected to what they regarded as Dulles' excessive moralism, his tendency to expound his foreign policy on principle. It was felt that he was insincere in these efforts. For example, Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News Diplomatic Correspondent, was told by Dulles at a backgrounder during the Suez crisis that the big powers by showing "moral restraint" and by going to the United Nations to seek a resolution to Suez

34Eisenhower Project, Interview with Lawrence, pp. 11-12.
35Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., p. 156.
would actually strengthen Britain and France more in the long run than the Anglo-French resort to force. Lisagor indicated:

Now, this is the moralistic judgement of Dulles, and I never thought he meant it for one minute. Because later in the case of Lebanon, we went in to Lebanon for the wrong reason. We made a monumental miscalculation about what happened in Iraq, but we went in there for the wrong reasons and the results were quite salutary.36

Other newsmen singled out Dulles' legalism in handling foreign affairs which they felt stemmed from his Wall Street legal background. Commenting on this Dulles trait, Arthur Krock, formerly of the New York Times, observed that, perhaps, Dulles did in fact imply to Eden intentions about Suez which he did not keep:

...Anthony Eden's book...pretty well demonstrated that Foster implied intentions about Suez that he certainly did not keep. And I think that he may have himself felt that he had gone too far; that he had justified the British feeling—which practically closed relations between Washington and London for months before Suez—that he probably deserved this feeling, this reaction, by Eden. And if you'll read Eden's book, all that is set forth, which Foster never undertook to answer, because I think he was culpable to that extent.

It may have been his legal training, where, as you know, if you write a brief for the Supreme Court, you've rested your case upon seven different points, only four of which you think have got any chance at all of being considered valid. But you put them in because you've put in everything you can in the hope that if one is knocked down, the other will survive. And I believe...this legal training of his...perhaps may be the answer. The United States Government was his client, the President was his client, and the American people were his clients. And so he made the best case he could and in so doing, I think he often stretched a little bit what he was prepared to do.37

Dulles was also regarded by some members of the press as a man who could be very devious when the occasion demanded. Symptomatic of the distrust with which newsmen often regarded Dulles are Peter Lisagor's words about things in the Dulles' period which newsmen did not like: "We always felt there was something slick about it, there was something coony about it...It was too sharply angled. We sometimes felt we weren't getting a straight account because of a purpose that's to be served." 38

Dulles' handling of talks with Eden during the Suez crisis, and his formula for a Suez Canal Users' Association have been cited as examples of his deviousness. The belief in his alleged deviousness might in part account for the widespread credence Eden's argument that Dulles misled the British during the Suez crisis received from members of the American press. Columnist Stewart Alsop argued that Dulles' formula for a Canal Users' Association appeared to the British as a device to keep them quiet, and that Dulles had no intention to support the British position on Suez. "(T)he British then took great pleasure, I am sure, in being devious on their turn, and in closing off all information to Washington, which was an act of extreme stupidity. Nevertheless, this act of extreme stupidity was stimulated in turn by Dulles' method of dealing with the British." 39

Additional opposition to Dulles apparently can be attributed to the ideological gap between Dulles and the "working

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38 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 32.
press." The working press tended to be ideologically liberal while Dulles was ideologically conservative. A meeting of the minds was therefore difficult.

Nevertheless, members of the press recognized that Dulles was very accessible. He held weekly press conferences—for him not to hold them was considered irregular—and numerous backgrounders. "He was available for small dinners, for private conversation, for talks in his office, for meetings at somebody's house, that sort of thing."40 Lisagor commented, "Dulles was never standoffish with the press."41

By contrast, Eisenhower was less accessible to the press than his Secretary of State. Eisenhower held far fewer press conferences than his predecessors, Harry Truman and Franklin Roosevelt. Several factors accounted for this. First, his three illnesses restricted direct contact with the press for extended periods. His numerous trips abroad interrupted his normal news conferences. And, if, in a recent fireside telecast, or in some other manner, Eisenhower felt he had said what he wanted to say, he held no news conference. "(T)he Presidential news conference depended largely upon his whim or judgement."42

Eisenhower held news conferences only a little more than half as often as Truman and not quite a third as often as Roosevelt. (See: Table IV, Appendix D.)

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40 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.
41 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 24.
Chalmers Roberts, Washington Post newsman, theorized that Eisenhower let Dulles compensate for his own infrequent press conferences. Consequently, Dulles was much more available to the press than the President, on both the public and private levels.43

Also, by way of contrast, many newsmen regarded Dulles as highly effective in his handling of backgrounders and formal press conferences; the President was not. Dulles was considered very "frank" in his backgrounders.44 Reston observed:

...First of all, he could say what was on his mind. And he'd put a subject and a predicate and an object together and then he stopped. He wasn't like his boss over in the White House. He spoke in sentences, and he knew how to turn the delicate corners so that he put the proper qualifications, like a good lawyer, into any positive statement he would make. He was awfully good at that.45

Hightower felt that Dulles both liked and trusted reporters. "(H)e recognized and appreciated the function of the press as a channel of communication between individual advocates or national leaders and people, working both ways. He understood this, so he used it."46 While Dulles, it was generally conceded by newsmen, understood the function of the press, it was held by some that Eisenhower did not appreciate it. Harkness indicated:

43 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Roberts, p. 2.
44 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, pp. 21-22; and Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness, pp. 11-12 and pp. 58-59.
46 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.
...This is an interesting relationship in this town (Washington, D.C.)—relations between government officials and news media—the role of reporters in this town. A lot of our people don't understand it...Always his (Eisenhower's) phrase was, "Well, I know you fellows have to make a living." That was his idea. If you bugged him—"Well, it's all right. You've got to make a living." He never did realize the role of the press in this town...."47

Reporters often felt that Dulles used the press to get his point across, to inform the people of his thinking, and to win support for his actions, in a sense attempting to manipulate the press in order to achieve his ends.48 So strong was this impression that reporters often felt that Dulles was not addressing them directly, and they would wonder aloud among themselves to whom he was directing his remarks. Lisagor noted:

...Dulles was rarely speaking to us as reporters asking questions. In fact, we used to meet after his press conferences to decide to whom he was addressing his answers and for what purposes. He spoke to the Russians, to the Communists generally, he spoke to all European allies, he spoke to friends, neutrals and so on. He always answered things with the thought in mind that some American purpose might be served, some message might be conveyed that he wanted to convey, that he couldn’t convey in a diplomatic atmosphere, and he’d do it through the press. We always felt that he was using the press as a vehicle for the promotion of his policies....49

That these were indeed considerations was borne out in Dulles' remarks to Berding, cited above. Dulles used the press conferences to communicate with the American people and other peoples.

47 Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness, pp. 67-68.

48 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, pp. 31-32.

49 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 9; and Eisenhower Project, Interview with Roberts, pp. 4-5. Concerning Dulles' background sessions, Roberts observed that Dulles "always was trying to put over his point of view...And it became something of a game, for the reporter to be sure he wasn't just buying a pig in a poke and becoming just a transmission belt for the administration."
He was very much aware of the potential impact his words would have on U. S. foreign relations, and of the need to weigh his words very carefully with a view to their impact. For this reason, he considered giving extemporaneous answers to questions asked in a formal press conference "difficult."

At least one journalist, Walter Kerr, of the Washington bureau of the New York Herald-Tribune from 1954-1956, felt that, even though Dulles did not mind giving press conferences, it was not the way he preferred to work. Kerr believed that Dulles would rather deal with a few newsmen whom he liked to see on a fairly frequent basis. "He preferred to see someone he knew--a reporter or a correspondent he knew--at his home on a Sunday morning and sit there and just talk for two hours. He preferred that to the press conferences." 50

Despite his accessibility to the press, his solicitude for the press and his capable handling of the press, Dulles' relations with the press were hardly ideal. John Hightower has perhaps best summarized Dulles' relations with the press in the following words:

...(T)hey were very odd. He liked newsmen. He never took offense or...wasted time complaining about things that were written, that involved him. He understood the communications function of the press perfectly. He probably collected more press critics than most Secretaries of State. Part of it may have been simply the natural process of accumulating deficits for a public figure in this country....51


51 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Hightower, p. 30.
Andrew Berding's and Philip Crowe's task of aiding Dulles to improve his press image was not an easy one, for Dulles seldom agreed with their suggestions for toning down the language of his speeches, statements, and the like. Crowe estimated that Dulles had a highly developed sense of public relations and the great importance of communicating his ideas to the public. Nevertheless, Crowe observed:

...I don't think that he was an expert at it. He thought it was important, but there were times, I know, that both Andy (Berding) and I felt he could have expressed something differently and gotten a better reception. He often felt that, if he did this, his point wouldn't be as strong. But I was constantly asking him to tone down controversial things so he'd get a better press—without much success.

Berding, Phleger, Crowe and a few others read all Dulles' speeches carefully, and suggested changes to improve their reception by the press. Crowe noted, "If I saw something that I thought the hostile part of the press would jump on, I'd bring it to his attention. Occasionally I was able to get him to tone it down a little, but not often." Dulles preferred to get his point across clearly and strongly, even though it meant risking unfavorable press reaction.

And there were times when he made mistakes when speaking to the press. Hagerty recalled that when Dulles did get into trouble with the press "it was when he deserted the diplomatic language, when he shouldn't have....Then, he'd act like a school boy. He'd come over with a sort of sheepish look on his face to the White House and say to the President—or stick his head

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into my office—and say, "Did I cause you too much trouble yesterday? I guess I shouldn't have said it just that way, should I?"53

Crowe indicated that Dulles worried in particular about the New York Times. Crowe took James Reston to see Dulles five or six times, because Dulles, although personally fond of Reston, was annoyed at some of Reston's "pronouncements." Crowe also went to New York to speak to various members of the New York Times on different occasions. Dulles' relations with the Times were not very close. Crowe observed:

...The New York Times...is normally a Democratic paper. Scotty (Reston) and he respected each other. Some of the other Times people occasionally would go to see him, but not very often. I know the publisher of the New York Times. I went up to see him twice about Mr. Dulles' policies. I addressed the editors of the New York Times at a private luncheon upstairs on several occasions. I thought they were mildly critical most of the time.54

Walter Lippmann was also regarded as very critical. Crowe arranged to take Lippmann to see Dulles for the first time that he had been to see him "in, literally, years." Crowe mentioned that he had a very difficult time convincing Dulles to see Lippmann because Lippmann was so hostile. Crowe estimated, "I felt that after this time that I did bring Walter to see him that he was a little more mellow in his column—for a few weeks anyway. I thought it had served some purpose."55

In addition to the New York Times and Walter Lippmann, Crowe regarded the New York Post and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

53 Dulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, p. 25.
54 Dulles Project, Interview with Crowe, pp. 13-14.
55 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
as critical of Dulles. 56

However, not every publication was opposed to Dulles’ policies. Friendly to Dulles were the New York Herald-Tribune and the Harry Luce Time-Life publications. Concerning the Herald-Tribune, Crowe remarked:

...we had a very good relation with the Herald Tribune because it’s not only a Republican paper, but was extremely interested in what we were doing. They would call me up often on the telephone and ask what our position was on certain things, and I'd always give it to them. And occasionally there would be a very nice editorial reflecting almost exactly what I'd told them, which they agreed with or they wouldn't have put it in. But the Tribune was on our side.

Crowe regarded the Luce publications as one hundred per cent behind the Administration. He remarked, "I didn't waste any time on Harry Luce and his people, because they were on our side. My job was to take care of the people that weren't." 57

Murray Snyder indicated that Eisenhower showed no partiality toward particular journalists, but that Eisenhower did like some of the White House regulars. Snyder mentioned Marvin Arrowsmith of the Associated Press, Merriman Smith of the United Press, Roscoe Drummond of the New York Herald-Tribune and Cy Sulzberger of the New York Times. These men and others like them appealed to Eisenhower because he regarded them as honest and scrupulously objective. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was not personally close to any of them. "He knew many...editors and publishers personally, and saw them all, of course, as does any President. No, he had no clique of special

57 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
friends, and I think the reason is, he didn't come up through the normal political channels."  

Edward Folliard, Washington Post, confirmed some of Snyder's observations. He indicated that in addition to himself, Merriman Smith, Marvin Arrowsmith, and Pat Morin continued to see Eisenhower at Gettysburg after his retirement. Eisenhower had maintained friendly relations with a number of newspapermen.

Walter Kerr thought that, while he was assigned to Washington, the Secretary of State saw five or six newsmen regularly, including James Reston, Art Sylvester, Roscoe Drummond, on occasion, John Hightower, and himself.

James Reston acknowledged that he liked Dulles, and was close to him. Reston offered a very interesting and perceptive hypothesis to explain Dulles' concern about the New York Times particularly, and his accessibility to Times people:

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58 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Snyder, p. 40.
59 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Folliard, p. 20.
60 Dulles Project, Interview with Kerr, pp. 19-20.
Concerning the Dulles-Reston relationship, Rivers commented: "In the Eisenhower Era, Reston swayed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; some State Department functionaries grew to assume that Reston's writings were State policy. His impact became so pronounced that Eisenhower himself once exploded: 'Who does Scotty Reston think he is, telling me how to run the country?!'" Rivers also noted that Reston is careful to maintain his independence from Government officials. For example, Rivers recalled that, on another occasion, Reston wrote in 1958 concerning Dulles: "'If General Eisenhower had had a theatre commander in the war who lost as much influence among his men and got into as much trouble as Secretary Dulles has in the past five years, he would have fired him.'" Rivers, Opinion-makers, op. cit., pp. 72-74.
...(Y)ou always have to understand the special position of the Times. And the special position of the Times really is two-fold. First of all, it's the one paper that goes into every Embassy in Washington. It is well known to a Secretary of State that, if the Times, first of all, gets things wrong, that's going to cause him an awful lot of trouble, because then every Ambassador whose country is involved in whatever that bit of information is is on top of his department, saying, "You're saying one thing and the Times is saying another."

There is also the great illusion in the diplomatic world that the New York Times is like the Times of London—that, somehow, it's an official or semi-official agency of the American government—which, of course, is not true. Never has been true. But that illusion persists. Therefore, Foster Dulles was well enough aware of the diplomatic world in Washington—the habits of the diplomatic corps here—to know that it was easier to see that we were well informed in advance, than to try to deal with the consequences of inaccuracy in the Times after the event. Therefore, he was very available to us.61

Among Dulles' press friends, Lisagor placed Roscoe Drummond, Marguerite Higgins, and almost anybody from the New York Herald-Tribune. He recalled that Dulles was long acquainted with Herald-Tribune people. As Republicans, they contributed money to Republican campaigns, and, Lisagor surmised, to Dulles' unsuccessful Senatorial campaign in 1949. Lisagor also mentioned James Reston of the New York Times, Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post, Ernest Lindley of Newsweek, John (Jack) Beal (who wrote a biography of Dulles) and Jim Shepley, both of Time-Life. The famous "brinkmanship" article in Life magazine resulted from an interview Dulles gave Shepley and Beal.62

It becomes clear from studying Crowe's remarks and those of newsmen that Dulles had a special regard for the New York Herald-Tribune, and that members of its staff had easy access to him. Therefore, it does not come as a great surprise that

61 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, p. 16.

62 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, pp. 27-29.
during the Suez crisis, following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, that Ogden Reid, former editor of the Tribune, was approached by both British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Israeli Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir. Apparently they were interested in having either the Herald-Tribune or Ogden Reid "clarify their concern in the public mind, perhaps on the editorial page, and that I (Reid) would have some opportunity to discuss their views with the Secretary." At that time, the Administration had taken the position that to meet with the British, French or Israeli Foreign Ministers would appear to the world as if the United States sanctioned aggression. Consequently, Dulles was refusing to meet with the British and Israeli Foreign Ministers. They, therefore, went to see Ogden Reid, who later commented, "I think Selwyn Lloyd went back without seeing Secretary Dulles on that particular occasion." 63

Reid indicated that, following Lloyd's visit, the Herald-Tribune did write an editorial "with reference to some of Selwyn Lloyd's concerns and the importance of the US and UK rebuilding their relationship as early as possible. It was written partly to be in the European edition, prior to a very key debate in the House of Commons." 64

Selwyn Lloyd's and Golda Meir's actions indicate that the foreign diplomatic community recognized the special position of the New York Herald-Tribune during the Eisenhower Administration.

63 Dulles Project, Princeton, Interview with Ogden Reid, 9 May 1967, pp. 11-12.

64 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
and that Britain and Israel sought to exploit it to open alternate avenues of communication with the U. S. Government when normal channels were disrupted following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. As a consequence, the Herald-Tribune became temporarily a part of the foreign policy nexus with which Secretary of State Dulles had to deal.

How The Press Viewed Eisenhower's Relations With Dulles

It was a fairly commonly held opinion among newsmen that President Eisenhower delegated too much power and authority to Dulles. While it was generally conceded that Eisenhower had a good grasp of foreign policy, it was felt that he gave Secretary of State Dulles too much leeway. There was the feeling that Eisenhower, in the early days of the Administration, was unsure of Dulles, and that he tested him before gradually coming to place more and more trust in him. But when Eisenhower fully realized the man he had in Dulles, "a dedicated, hard-working, 24-hour-a-day man,...he just sort of abdicated." So heavily did Eisenhower come to rely on Dulles, in this view, that when Dulles was hospitalized at the height of the Suez crisis, some newsmen felt that, for the first time, Eisenhower realized how dependent he had become upon Dulles—he now had to deal with foreign policy decisions himself, and to bear full responsibility for them. "(H)e had never, up to that point, really come face to face personally with a foreign problem."  

65 Eisenhower Project, Interview with Folliard, p. 38.
66 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, pp. 36-37.
67 Dulles Project, Interview with Mr. and Mrs. Harkness, p. 40.
One consequence of this overdependence upon Dulles, according to Lisagor, was that Eisenhower never fully appreciated the adverse impact that Dulles could have on people like Prime Minister Eden and French Foreign Minister Pineau, that Dulles was "driving (them) ... out of their minds." Thus it was, in Lisagor’s opinion, "that Eisenhower was truly astonished that the British and French closed us out—kept us in the dark about Suez, not knowing that it was a response and a reaction against Dulles, what Dulles would probably do to undermine their game or what they planned to do." 68

In the general view, Dulles was "the informing mind" on the conduct of U. S. foreign policy. 69 In modern American history, he "probably had the freest hand" of any Secretary of State in recent decades. 70 Dulles was discreet in his handling of power over U. S. foreign affairs, "but he never left anybody in any doubt that if he determined what it was that was to be done (with possibly the one exception of the defense of Dien Bien Phu), then President Eisenhower would probably go along with him." Reston concluded that Dulles "was quite justified in his confidence in that." 71

Lisagor seconded this interpretation and theorized about the way Dulles did it:

68 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, pp. 36-37.  
69 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, p. 18.  
70 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 37.  
71 Dulles Project, Interview with Reston, p. 18.
Dulles never did anything, I don't believe, that needed presidential sanction or approval that he didn't get it. I think what Dulles did was to shape the alternatives in such a way that Eisenhower's choices almost inevitably came out the way Dulles would want them to which is something you can do quite easily with a man like Eisenhower whose interest in the real...nuts and bolts of the operation was limited.72

The fact that newsmen considered Dulles primarily responsible for U. S. foreign policy seems to account for the fact that he drew far more severe criticism from the press than did President Eisenhower. Yet, Dulles never displayed publicly any sign of his displeasure with criticism.73 Berding noted that Eisenhower was ultimately responsible for American foreign relations, but that this did not deter opponents of any phase of American foreign policy from holding Dulles personally responsible for it.74 Berding recalled:

I sometimes gathered the impression that the Secretary seemed deliberately to attract criticism to himself so as to deflect it from President Eisenhower. He willingly received personally the venom of the bitter attacks following the Suez debacle and during the sharply contested effort to pass the Joint Resolution on the Middle East through Congress in 1957. I know of no instance when he side-stepped criticism which would then fall upon the President. He was something of a lightening rod drawing the bolts from the heavens into the ground before they could strike the White House.

Far from being discouraged by oral and written criticism,

72Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 36.


74Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 99.
Dulles regarded it positively as having its advantages in that it aroused public interest and discussion from which might develop public understanding and support for his policies. Thus, he was “stimulated” by criticism to work harder on behalf of his policies. 75

Members of the press got the impression that channels of communication within the Department of State, during the tenure of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, did not flow smoothly from the top down. Numerous State Department career personnel “jammed” Dulles’ press conferences. Lisagor surmised that they attended in order to learn what Dulles was thinking. He attributed this to the fact that Dulles tended to regard U. S. foreign policy as his exclusive domain, and did not consult regularly with, nor rely heavily for advise or comment on, State Department professionals. 76

Dulles’ first press secretary, Carl W. McCardle, interpreted the phenomenon of crowded Dulles’ press conferences quite differently. Recalling that, because he believed in the people’s right to know, he had recommended that Dulles hold weekly press conferences, and that Dulles be very complete in his explanations of U. S. foreign policy, McCardle remarked:

There was a sign that the country was waiting for that kind of thing; where previously there’d been only a small gathering of correspondents at the Secretary of State’s press conferences, I (McCardle) had to ask the Secretary that all State Department officials, personnel, stay away from his press conferences, because correspondents were having to stand around the walls. There were not enough seats for them. 77

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75 Ibid., p. 100.
76 Dulles Project, Interview with Lisagor, p. 37.
77 Eisenhower Project, Interview with McCardle, p. 5.
Throughout most of the Suez crisis Congress was not in session due to the fall elections in 1956. Recessing in August, 1956, Congress did not reconvene until January, 1957. Throughout the crisis President Eisenhower maintained contact with Congressional leaders of both Houses of Congress and of both parties, summoning them to Washington at the height of the campaign on one occasion.

Because of the elections and the Congressional recess, Congressional comment on Administration policies was minimal during the final months of 1956. Following the elections and the return of Congress, there was animated comment from the Hill. In addresses from the floor, Senators and Representatives voiced their support or opposition to Administration policies. Particularly hot issues were the questions of United Nations sanctions against Israel and of guaranties to Israel that would insure maintenance of the peace and prevent an Arab return to guerrilla activities and secure open transit of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

To buttress their arguments from the floor, members of Congress would often request that articles and/or editorials from the nation's leading papers—most frequently from the New York Times—be recorded in the Congressional Record as part of their remarks. Usually the newspaper articles reflected the views of the speaker. For example, Senator Knowland, California Republican, used four supportive articles in his speech against the imposition of sanctions on Israel. Senator Knowland regarded this whole matter as illustrative of the fact
that there was a "double-standard of international morality growing like a cancer at the United Nations." Senator Knowland pointed out that: 1. the Soviet Union defied the United Nations in Central Europe; and 2. India failed to respect U. N. resolutions on Kashmir which India unilaterally incorporated into the Indian state—that same India which had at times taken a high moral position in the United Nations. In support of his citing of the Indian contradiction, Knowland requested that four articles be recorded in the Record as a part of his remarks. The titles of the articles give a good hint of their character:

3. "India's Contempt," Washington Star, Jan. 28, 1957; and

Senator Knowland, who opposed the Administration's readiness to impose sanctions on Israel and the movement in the United Nations to do so, concluded his remarks by claiming:

"(I)f we are to have sanctions at the United Nations, they should apply to all nations which defy the resolutions and mandates of that organization. Otherwise the moral foundation of the United Nations is destroyed and a doctrine of 'might makes right' condoned. This issue of principle cannot be brushed aside or avoided." 78

On February 11, 1957, Senator Jacob Javits, New York Republican, joined with six other Senators (Beal, Maryland; Douglas, Illinois; Humphrey, Minnesota; Neuberg, Oregon; Sparkman, Alabama; and Ives, New York) to offer Senate Resolution 77, stating it to be the sense of the Senate:

That our Government should support effective action both in and outside of the United Nations, which will guarantee that there will not be a resumption of border raids and blockade of vital international waterways and other activities which might erupt into new hostilities in the Middle East; and that, pending an effective guarantee that there will not be a restoration of the conditions out of which the hostilities in the Sinai Peninsula came about, our delegation at the United Nations urges measures to assure that the United Nations Emergency Force take up positions to separate the forces of Israel and Egypt and to prevent repossession of bases for the operation of guerrilla bands, and the interdiction of international shipping, including Israel's through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Senator Javits concluded his address by requesting that two editorials be printed at this point in his remarks in the Record. They were:


Senator Javits had begun his remarks by quoting the last sentence of the editorial, "Israel, Egypt and the U. N.,” which ran, "The friendship of the Arab States, if that is what we are looking for, is not worthwhile if it has to be bought by subterfuges and injustice." 79

Illinois Senator Douglas, in his argument on behalf of the effective guarantees sought in Senate Resolution 77, argued that

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"the only real guaranty we can have in such matters is a permanent occupation by a United Nations police force," and a "public pledge" by Colonel Nasser in advance of Israeli withdrawal that Egypt would keep the peace. Senator Douglas then requested that three articles and one letter to the editor in support of his position be included in the Record:


Douglas also included an article opposed to his position, written by Marguerite Higgins, known to be sympathetic to the Eisenhower Administration and privy to Administration thinking. The article was: "After King Saud, the Deluge?" New York Herald-Tribune, no date given, probably February 11, 1957.80

The White House was not insensitive to the expressed sentiments of opposition of members of both parties in Congress. On February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower met with leaders of both parties from both Houses of Congress to discuss the question of U. N. sanctions against Israel. President

Eisenhower failed to win the support of Congressional leaders for sanctions, so, that evening, he took the matter to the nation in a nationwide radio and television address. Unable to indicate that he had the support of Congressional leaders, the President, after mentioning the morning meeting with the leaders of both parties from the Senate and the House of Representatives, took refuge in stock phraseology: "We had a very useful exchange of views. It was the general feeling of that meeting that I should lay the situation before the American people." 81

As in the case of opposition from the press, the Administration withstood adverse Congressional criticism and stuck with its foreign policies. It went over the head of Congress, taking the matter directly to the American people in a play for support.

The Impact of the Press on the Formulation of United States Foreign Policy

United States foreign policy during Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State was arrived at in a variety of ways. Foreign policy decisions were made in consultation with the Cabinet and with the National Security Council and through daily discussions between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles following consultations with their respective staffs.

When the President and the Secretary of State considered policy, they were not impervious to the probable impact upon public opinion and upon the press. Yet, both refused to surrender

to the pressures of either public opinion or the press when making foreign policy decisions. While aware of both, they were nevertheless able to withstand adverse criticism from both quarters when confronted with a crucial foreign affairs matter. Thus, despite considerable unfavorable public opinion, and much criticism from the American press during the Suez crisis, Eisenhower and Dulles adhered to policies which they deemed proper.

One is struck with the small degree of influence the American press seems to have had over foreign policy decisions during the Eisenhower-Dulles years, and during the Suez crisis in particular. The prevalent attitude among members of the Administration to the press seems to have been one of studied respect. The Administration recognized that members of the press were entitled to their opinions. But often their opposing opinions were not taken too seriously because the Administration felt that, since it had far greater access to information than the press, it therefore knew best what to do. However, the Administration recognized the value of the press in informing and making public opinion. Consequently, the Administration sought to use the press as an avenue of communication with the American people and other peoples. While it could not guarantee that the press would always agree with its policies, the Administration did not shy away from the press. Because it could not impose agreement with its policies upon the press, the Administration lived with press criticism.

Therefore, the Administration's reaction to James Reston's front page byline article in the New York Times during the 1956 campaign, after the outbreak of war in the Middle East, which
charged that the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy was bankrupt, should not be surprising. Hagerty remarked:

...I'm not saying that Scotty Reston was part of the Democratic strategy, but this was part of their campaign to discredit everything in the administration. They really didn't have any issues of importance, and not having issues of importance, you have to do the best you can with the issues you decide to go with. Actually, in '56, as I recall it, our foreign policy was pretty good. Our position in Europe vis-a-vis NATO, our position in SEATO, the stand that Mr. Eisenhower made in Suez, certainly were all in much better shape than they are now and have been for some time. I'm sure that Scotty believed what he was writing. I don't think you can plant a political story with a man like Scotty Reston. We had different points of view. And that's about all there is to that.82

One is struck by the conviction with which most Administration spokesmen stood by American foreign policy during the Suez crisis. It is hard to doubt that they really believed they were doing the right thing although their reasoning is not always convincing. They chanced losing a comfortable majority of American public support. And they were willing to risk defeat in the election.

It is difficult to overlook the dichotomy between the version of responsibility for U. S. foreign policy decisions held by the press and that held by members of the Eisenhower Administration. Members of the press tended to charge Dulles with ultimate responsibility, while Administration insiders insisted upon Eisenhower's ultimate responsibility. Members of the Administration repeatedly stressed the close consultation and cooperation between Eisenhower and Dulles to indicate

the President's key role in major foreign policy decisions. They emphasized that Eisenhower did not merely rubber-stamp Dulles' recommendations. Newsmen often argued the reverse.
CHAPTER IV

THE REACTION OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS TO THE SUEZ CRISIS

Preliminary Observations

An attempt will now be made to discern how successful Eisenhower Administration press policies were in influencing American newspaper coverage of U.S. policy during the Suez crisis. This study will concentrate in depth on three major American newspapers—the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. It will consider the degree to which these great newspapers supported American foreign policy, or opposed it, during the crisis. The degree of divergence from support of Administration policies may be taken as an inverse measure of the strength of Administration influence over newspaper coverage. Parallelism of newspaper positions and Government policies could indicate great support for Administration efforts, and/or the success of Administration attempts to influence newspaper coverage of events.

In order to limit the size of the sample to manageable proportions, and in order to cover every day of the publication week without giving undue bias to any particular day of publication, I have deemed it necessary to limit selection by following a rotating sample using a different day each week, in recurring cycles.
Each cycle starts with the Friday, July 20, 1956, issue, which appeared the day after the withdrawal of the American offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam project. It continues through the first full week in March, 1957.

Special attention was paid to editorials—they were checked daily—for they reflect the official views of the newspaper, the policies which it supports and/or advocates. In the editorials are represented the clearest statements of organization support for, or opposition to, Administration policies. Editorials are consequently one of the better barometers for measuring the relationship between the Administration and American newspapers.

In order to determine whether the Times, Monitor, and Journal were representative of the editorial opinion of large American newspapers during the Suez crisis, a study was made of the editorials of four major Mid-Western and Far-Western newspapers—the Chicago Daily News, the Chicago Sun-Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Los Angeles Times. Similarities and/or differences of editorial comment will be appropriately noted in the footnotes.

Withdrawal of the American Offer

The American decision to withdraw from the Aswan High Dam came as a surprise to the American press. Initial newspaper reaction was generally cautious. The American action was regarded as a major policy decision which indicated that Washington, after reexamination of policy, had settled on a "tougher line" in relations with the "neutralist regime" of
President Nasser. 1 The step was also described as a "major shift in American policy and attitude toward Cairo." It constituted a calculated risk which could result in Egypt's turning to the Soviet Union for economic aid for the High Dam, and the subsequent falling of Egypt into the Soviet camp, thereby, greatly complicating and increasing the United States Middle East troubles. 2

The cancellation of the American offer was regarded as striking a blow at Egypt's Nasser, who was "hit" by the American decision, and, thus, placed in the "most perilous and exposed position" he had been in since the ouster of King Farouk. 3

The Times reported that "United States officials said the decision had been taken in full anticipation of angry anti-United States and anti-British reactions in Egypt and throughout the Arab countries where Egyptian influence is high." 4 No mention was made of the possibility of nationalization of the Suez Canal.

The U. S. action was seen as calculated to "deflate" Nasser, causing him to lose prestige, and to place Moscow "on the spot," forcing the Soviets to either help Nasser, or to "incur the

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Egyptian dictator's wrath by refusal." American officials, including John Foster Dulles, it was reported, did not believe that Moscow could help, or would help, with the very expensive project.  

The press repeated the official reasons for Washington's refusal, including Egypt's failure to secure the agreement of other riparian states, and its alleged inability to pay for the project. The American papers reported, however, that the real reasons for the cancellation of the American offer were:

1. Anger over Nasser's dealings with the Communist bloc, as represented in the Czech arms deal;
2. Zionist opposition;
3. Growing Congressional opposition, as represented in the Senate Appropriations Committee's "instructions" to Secretary Dulles not to commit funds to the Aswan High Dam without first consulting the committee; and
4. Distaste for Egyptian efforts to reduce Western influence in the Third World.

The Christian Science Monitor, on July 21, 1956, asked: "But is the kick necessary?" While expressing general support for the American decision to stop "bidding for the privilege of helping to finance the proposed Aswan Dam," the Monitor inquired:

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5 Neal Stanford, "Moscow Placed on Spot," CSM, loc. cit.

...need the turnabout have been advertised so bluntly and so crushingly as has been done? The effect is virtually to challenge the Egyptians to welcome into the Middle East Soviet-bloc aid and influence which both Egypt and the West might find very damaging there. To be sure, a waiting game might have only repeated the pattern of the Czech arms deal. Or could diplomacy have been more diplomatic here?7

The Monitor missed the point entirely. The withdrawal of the American offer was calculated to be as insulting as possible in order to bring about Nasser's fall. This was the opinion of Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank. (see above: pp. 59-60.) Kennett Love, who arrived at the same conclusion, wrote: "(T)he manner of his (Dulles') renege on the High Dam bore all the earmarks of a design to shake Nasser's position."8

Heikal reported that Nasser himself regarded the American withdrawal statement as designed to bring down his regime. (see above: pp. 16-18.)


8 Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., pp. 326-327. Hoopes (The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 344.) offered another explanation for the renege: "...Dulles, bent upon pursuing his own highly abstract brand of global anti-Communism, was only incidentally interested in bringing Nasser down. His principal aim was to expose what he regarded as the pretensions of Soviet economic aid programs. Demonstration that these consisted of unfillable promises would break the momentum of the Soviet drive for 'competitive coexistence'; that it would also humiliate regimes in small countries that had staked their own futures on those Soviet promises would be a salutary, but quite secondary, result...." Hoopes explanation seems too esoteric. The documents currently available tend to support the view that Dulles hoped to precipitate Nasser's fall. (see: Chapters I and II.)
When it became clear that the Soviet Union did not then intend to finance the Aswan High Dam project, the initial cautious reaction gave way to more outspokenly favorable response. American editorialists argued that the Soviets, as predicted, were unwilling to offer funds to Egypt, at that time, and that they were unable to do so due to their own poor economic condition.  

Nasser was described as in great difficulty. It was stated that his position had deteriorated and that Egyptian hopes had been dashed. The Egyptian people could "blame it only on the overweening ambitions and adventurist policies of President Nasser, who has tried to play off the West against the East in the name of national 'independence' and 'positive neutralism' and has landed between the two chairs."  

Because the American press believed Cairo had carefully cultivated the impression that the Soviet Union was ready to finance the High Dam if the West did not, the press felt that Washington's move initially "looked like a daring gamble, and perhaps it was." With the Soviet denial that they were considering financing the venture, the Nasser regime was "disclosed as having run a stupendous bluff--and fallen off it." Events further proved that Egypt could not have both a guns and a butter policy because "the economic strength of that country is such that it probably can have a monumental develop-

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10 Ibid., "The Aswan Dam Project."
ment project like the Aswan Dam or it can have a military machine geared for stirring adventure—but not both."\(^{11}\) Such arguments flew in the face of World Bank findings. Despite Egypt’s conclusion of a second arms deal, the Bank felt Egypt could shoulder the economic burden.\(^{12}\) On a related charge, the alleged mortgaging of Egypt’s cotton crop to purchase Soviet arms, Heikal wrote that Egypt was “not exporting too much cotton to Russia. Nasser insisted that we keep a balance of export, with a third going to the Communist bloc, a third to the non-aligned bloc, and a third to the Western world.”\(^{13}\)

Dulles’ action was also seen by the American papers as giving “notice to ‘Neutrals’” that the United States would no longer permit millions of dollars to be drained from the U. S. Treasury by their playing East off against West. The Russians would now have to help Egypt or remain silent. Judging from the remarks of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov, indications were that the Russians would not help Egypt. This, it was argued, should prove quite enlightening to those other neutral nations which sought to play both sides for money. Despite the risk that Egypt might receive some Russian money, the Journal saw a “tremendous gain” in Dulles’ policy. “Notice has been served


\(^{13}\) Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
that the U. S. will control its own foreign aid program and not let its decisions be made by fear or blackmail. 14

Although these prominent papers displayed concern over the consequences of the dramatic shift in American policy toward Egypt evident in the withdrawal of the offer to finance the Aswan High Dam project, there was little harsh criticism of the step in the week prior to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. 15

The First London Conference

On July 26, 1956, President Nasser of Egypt announced nationalization of the Suez Canal and Egyptian intentions to use canal revenues to finance the Aswan High Dam project. The reaction of American newspapers was predictably very opposed to the Egyptian move. The act of nationalization was labeled a "seizure," a "grab," an "act of official thievary" and a


15 For an exception, see: "Daring Gamble or Foolish Risk," Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Hereafter: SLPD), July 22, 1956, p. 2D. The Post-Dispatch indicated that it would have preferred U. N. multilateral aid for Aswan, and an invitation to Russia to participate. Russia would have been put on the spot, yet if it took part it would have no chance to use aid for Russian national purposes.

Even if Dulles' gamble were to work, and Russia and Egypt were taught a lesson, the Aswan High Dam "which has become a great symbol for all underdeveloped countries, will not have been built. Meanwhile the whole of Asia and the Middle East will have been given a striking demonstration that American aid promises are unreliable. Meanwhile a strong suspicion will have been created that we demand political conformity as the price of aid. How would these consequences balance off against the others?"
"piece of criminality." 16

It was argued that President Nasser, backed into a tight economic corner by the withdrawal of the Western offer to finance the High Dam project, retaliated against the West's denial of aid by nationalizing the Canal. 17 Heikal indicated that there certainly was an element of revenge-taking in Nasser's nationalization of the Canal. Nasser's insulting language was "deliberately calculated" as a reply to the insulting manner in which Dulles withdrew the American offer. 18 The American press regarded the Egyptian nationalization of the Canal as a threat to the free movement of international trade, for it was feared that the Egyptians would use the Canal in pursuit of their own national, political, and economic goals, and that they did not have the technical capacity to run the Canal by themselves. The press did not reflect the Administration's privately-held belief that the Egyptians could manage the Canal. 19 These American newspapers worried that, if Nasser were "allowed to get away with his steal," other Arab States might be emboldened sufficiently to attempt nationalization.


18 Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 93.

("confiscation") of foreign oil company properties.\textsuperscript{20}

The British and French were depicted as "stunned" and taken by surprise by Nasser's action.\textsuperscript{21} Initially, in Britain, there was unified opposition to the Egyptian move. "Laborites joined with Conservatives in demanding that Egypt be forbidden, by force if necessary, from carrying out the move."\textsuperscript{22} A little over two weeks later, however, American papers began to report growing Labor Party opposition to the use of force to settle the Suez matter. The \textit{Christian Science Monitor} welcomed the Labor Party's "wholesome reservation" to its initial endorsement of the Conservative position, and its demands that British military measures be "purely precautionary," and that Suez be taken to the United Nations before resort was made to force. The \textit{Monitor} commented further:

Under the circumstances of the moment it was natural to apprehend that nationalization of the canal by Egypt was a prelude to exclusion or penalizing of British and other Western shipping. But that has not followed.

So long as Egypt allows British and French ships to use the canal, there is no ground for complaint under the international Convention of 1888 and no cause for war.\textsuperscript{23}

Initially, American papers questioned the ability of the Egyptian Government to compensate canal stockholders, to run, to maintain, and to improve the canal, and to direct canal revenues to the High Dam project in view of expected international

\textsuperscript{20}"Beyond the Suez," \textit{WSJ}, \textit{loc. cit.}.

\textsuperscript{21}"British Stunned at Suez Seizure," \textit{NYT}, \textit{loc. cit.}.

\textsuperscript{22}"Suez Canal Seized By Nasser of Egypt," \textit{CSM}, \textit{loc. cit.}.

repercussions. Nasser's statistics were disputed. The $100 million Egypt hoped to receive after nationalization represented an "overstatement" not of the net but the gross receipts. After meeting operating expenses, it was argued, Egypt would be fortunate to realize $3 million clear, or approximately what it was getting before nationalization. For Nasser to obtain the $100 million-a-year to build the High Dam, he would be required to double the canal tolls. "If...he should attempt to double the canal tolls, he would immediately face the question of diminishing returns."

Less than two weeks later, reporting for the New York Times, Harold Callender wrote: "It is now pointed out in both Paris and London that the sterling balances Egypt still owns as a result of credits on Britain during World War II are more than enough to pay the shareholders even at the former market values—to say nothing of the much smaller gold values at which the stock is being retired by the company itself." Callender reported that Egyptian sterling balances totaled $308,000,000, considerably more than the market value of the Suez Canal Company's stock then being calculated at $233,000,000 prior to nationalization. The British Government owned $81,000,000 worth of the company's stock.

Britain, France and the United States convened the Tripartite London Conference to consider steps to regain international control of the canal. To accomplish this and to ensure transit rights of international shipping, the Wall Street Journal advocated that the United States work with the British and French on "economic measures designed to force Nasser to retreat or to make the consequences of his outlawry as painful as possible." 28

Secretary Dulles' August 3, 1956, radio and television address to the nation to announce the first London Conference, which the Three Powers had agreed to convene, was variously interpreted by American newspapers. The Times claimed that the United States was following a policy of moderation in the Suez crisis, and that Dulles was opposed to violent action to settle this issue, a factor which would give little comfort to the "hotheads on both sides of the controversy." Mr. Dulles would rely on mutual consultation and the principles of the United Nations Charter to arrive at a settlement. 29 The Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times both interpreted Dulles' remarks to mean that the United States was opposed to the canal being left in Egyptian hands alone. While the Times interpreted Dulles' words to virtually exclude the

28 "Beyond the Suez," WSJ, loc. cit.; and "Too Late for Protests," Editorial, SLPD, July 30, 1956, p. 56. The Post-Dispatch commented: "Military action to counter Egypt's nationalization of Suez is out of the question...But economic sanctions and...constructive but forceful diplomacy are in order."

use of force in the future, Neal Stanford, reporting for the 
*Monitor*, wrote that "in various ways Mr. Dulles implied that 
force could not be ruled out." Stanford buttressed his argument 
with references to Dulles' remarks. Stanford pointed out that 
Dulles had said that if Nasser got away with seizure of the 
canal, it would "encourage a breakdown of the international 
fabric." Dulles' observations that the U. S. had given no 
commitments "of any kind" in the event of failure of the confer­
ence, led Stanford to note, "It (the U. S.) has neither promised 
to use force, nor has it said it would not use force." Referring 
to Dulles' airport statement, Stanford wrote: "It may be signifi­
cant that...Mr. Dulles did not say 'we will not meet violence 
with violence,' but said 'we do not want to meet violence with 
violence.'" While the U. S., according to Stanford, did not 
rule out the use of force, Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower 
appeared to be counting on the "moral force" of world opinion 
to bring Nasser to the negotiating table.30

The Three Power decision to call the first London Conference 
to seek a peaceful solution to the Suez crisis was welcomed by 
the American press. The United States was regarded as chiefly 
responsible for the turn away from war. "(I)t is no small

30 Neal Stanford, "Dulles Airs Position As Egypt Hits West," 
loc. cit. See: Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 103. On 
Dulles' phrase "we do not want to meet violence with violence," 
Finer commented: "...He (Dulles) still did not exclude the 
possibility that violence would be used, and that the U. S. A., 
on the terms stated, would be by its word obliged to support 
it, but he hoped it would be averted by a conference-made solu­
tion. Egypt was still, in the context of his statement, open 
to an attack, and Dulles may well have deliberately worded his 
statement to keep this possibility open, so that Nasser would 
be sobered and made pliable by its coercive anticipatory effect."
tribute to Mr. Dulles' statesmanship that he has directed the justified wrath of Britain and France into a search for peaceful solutions." The Journal regarded the U. S. effort to secure a peaceful settlement as "one more application of a cardinal principle of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy...a belief that firmness coupled with diplomatic flexibility can both end and avoid wars."31

Twenty-four nations were invited to the first London Conference; twenty-two agreed to attend; Egypt and Greece refused. Prior to announcement of the Egyptian decision not to attend, Osgood Caruthers, New York Times, reported that Nasser was considering going to London to press his demand for a broader conference.32 Heikal later commented that Nasser considered attending the conference until he received a dispatch from the Egyptian Embassy in London, informing him of Eden's remarks during a television appearance: "Colonel Nasser is the enemy, we have no quarrel with the Egyptian people." This, coupled with reports "about Eden's health, temper, and unpredictability," supposedly determined Nasser not to go to the conference.33

A number of Asian countries were invited to the conference. The American papers expected that they would support the Egyptian


33Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 100.
position and use their influence for a negotiated settlement. 34

It was, therefore, welcome news when not all these nations did support the Egyptian position. The Wall Street Journal, in a front page italicized insert, noted: "Among the countries backing the West were five members of the Arab-African-Asian bloc--Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, and Japan." 35

Dulles' journey to London on August 14, 1956, to attend the London Conference was described as "one of the most important missions of his career: namely to try again for a just and peaceful settlement of the Suez Canal problem." 36

Earlier, on August 4, the Christian Science Monitor had expressed doubts about how much the London Conference could accomplish. Would Egypt attend? Would Russia attend? Whether Cairo would attend or not, "(i)t is a fair guess...that the Nasser regime will oppose vehemently the internationalizing of what it had just purported to nationalize." This should not be permitted to happen since half the oil supply of Western Europe passed through the Canal. A good case could be made for Eden's declaration that Britain would not accept any arrangement which would leave the Suez Canal in the unrestricted control of a single national power. 37

The Times argued that Egypt could not be relied upon,

despite President Nasser's promises to maintain freedom of shipping through the Canal. Past experience had shown that Egypt could not be trusted—Israeli shipping was blocked from the Canal and Nasser had broken the terms of the Suez Canal concession. Fears were voiced that transit of the Canal would depend upon the will of the Egyptian Government. Egypt was an untried nation. There were doubts about its ability to run the Canal "with the requisite efficiency and stability." And there were doubts about Egypt's capability of defending the canal "on its own...if the need arose."³⁸

News of unanimity among the British, French, and Americans on the question of international control was greeted warmly by the Christian Science Monitor. Secretary Dulles' conduct at the conference was praised.³⁹

The New York Times argued that it was in the best interests of the world that control of the Suez Canal be internationalized, and that Egypt should accept this. Adequate measures would be taken to safeguard Egyptian interests, and to guarantee equitable payment to Egypt for its part in running and maintaining the Canal.⁴⁰

The adoption of the Western proposal by 18 of the 22 nations

⁴⁰"'Nationalization' In Suez," NYT, loc. cit.
was considered a good omen. It was taken to indicate that the conferees were willing to "rely upon moral rather than physical force" for the implementation of the Eighteen Power recommendations. "The effort of the conferees continues to be to persuade rather than to coerce the Egyptian President. As a result, there is evidence of widespread feeling that the immediate danger of war in the Middle East has diminished." Prospects for achieving a negotiated settlement were increased. "Thanks to the restraining influence of Secretary Dulles, the trend toward war was already diminishing even before the conference began, but the meeting itself served to emphasize the increasing remoteness of the danger." The optimism of the American press was not tempered by recognition that Dulles' refusal to lead the negotiating mission to Cairo might have been an opportunity lost. Eden had requested that Dulles lead the mission as the only man capable of handling the matter. Perhaps, as Hoopes suggested, Dulles felt that "such a course of action would have meant placing the United States in the role of apparent spokes­ man for colonial-imperial interests, and it also carried with it a high risk of failure." Thus, Dulles cabled Eisenhower, "I think it is preferable that we should become less conspicuous."

Even though the Conference could not reach a final solution

to the problem due to Egyptian non-attendance, the Wall Street Journal considered it a success for it presented to President Nasser "a fairly impressive body of world opinion which he can ignore only at some risk to his own prestige."

There was also support for Dulles' argument during the conference that the Suez problem should be removed from the sphere of such concepts as "nationalism," the "East versus the West," and the like, and placed in the realm of the practical. The raising of such questions, the New York Times observed, "has obscured the real problem, and in some cases, was undoubtedly designed to do just that. Colonel Nasser is not the only one who is trying to make political capital out of this thorny question."

Early optimistic reports that Nasser was ready for serious negotiations with the Menzies mission proved false. The failure of the Cairo talks produced calls for patience. "Before the Western nations rush to adopt policies either of appeasement or belligerence, they might do well to explore the possibilities of time and patience. It could be that those are the pressures most likely to put Nasser in a negotiating mood." The failure of the Menzies' mission was not to be used as a justification for resort to force. "(S)o long as negotiations can be maintained, in Cairo, the U. N. or anywhere else, there is some hope

44 "Avoiding Explosions," WSJ, loc. cit.
of an eventual solution."\(^{48}\)

Failure of the Cairo discussions led to calls for debating the issue before the United Nations where "some compromise might eventually be arrived at which would respect Egyptian sovereignty and at the same time give reassurance to Western Europe."\(^{49}\)

There was general support for Dulles' policy of seeking a nonviolent solution to the Suez problem, although the American newspapers favored placing the Suez problem before the United Nations before Dulles was ready to do so. Dulles was seen as the cool headed man who had prevailed over British and French hot-heads, winning them over to peaceful means and staving off the immediate danger of war. In these American newspapers there was a good deal of optimism, at this point, that force could be avoided.

At this time, there was also speculation in the American newspapers about Nasser's ambitions. There were charges and countercharges that he was another Hitler, and there were debates over his book, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Some saw it as proof that Nasser had expansionist ambitions for Egypt. "President Nasser by his own words is dreaming big dreams for Egypt."\(^{50}\) He was accused of plotting to found an Arab empire

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\(^{48}\) "Force Is No Solution," Editorial, *NYT*, Sept. 9, 1956, p. 10E. Earlier, the Post-dispatch had commented that the broad sympathy for Egypt's position evident at the First London Conference might encourage Nasser to reject the majority statement. "A rejection itself would not be disastrous if Nasser proved willing to negotiate from there on."


from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. Nationalization of the Suez Canal was seen as merely one step in his quest for empire. On the other hand, occasionally less harsh assessments were made of Nasser and his book:

Some have read sinister meanings into the youthful colonel's short book, "Egypt's Liberation." True, he speaks there of a "role in search of a hero," but he describes it (overtly, at least) as not a role for a personal hero but for the Egyptian people. In his writing is neither the bombast and cynicism of a Mussolini nor the arrant racism and frenzy of a Hitler.51

On the whole, however, American newspaper comment on President Nasser was not sympathetic.

**SCUA and the Second London Conference**

Before the conclusion of the Menzies mission to Cairo, and in anticipation of its probable failure, Dulles sought an alternative plan. While vacationing at Duck Island, he conceived the idea of a users' association. He persuaded the reluctant British and French to consent to support the concept. As agreed by the Three Powers, Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested the immediate establishment of the users' association in an address to Parliament on September 12, 1956.

Hoopes argued that Dulles' conception "possessed a transparently grotesque, unreal quality."52 Finer noted that Dulles refused to face the fact that SCUA was "inefficacious unless he was ready to enforce the passage of the Association's ships

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51 "Nasser: Mussolini or Ataturk?," Editorial, CSM, Sept. 5, 1956, p. 20.

through the Canal." And Love believed that Dulles designed the scheme to prevent Britain and France from taking Suez to the U. N., and to preclude their using the anticipated pilot shortage as a pretext to retake the Suez Canal. Love claimed that "Dulles devised...SCUA...as a temporary answer to both problems, a stalling device if not a solution." Robert Murphy, likewise, was of the opinion that Dulles sought to use SCUA to stall, to buy time to allow European tempers to cool.

The reaction of *New York Times* reporters was reserved and skeptical. Kennett Love, in a front page article on the riotous emergency session of Parliament, observed: "Pending disclosure of additional details, creation of conflicting authorities over canal traffic appeared to raise so many difficulties as to be unworkable." Commenting further on the surprise and doubt expressed both inside and outside Parliament, Love noted: "Observers of several interested countries and various political views at first regarded the project as either completely unrealistic or a plan to provoke Egypt into giving provocation for military intervention."

Homer Bigart, in the same issue of the *Times*, noted that diplomatic sources ascribed the plan for SCUA to Dulles, and that

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55 Murphy, *Diplomat*, op. cit., p. 386.
Dulles was irritated with the way Eden presented it in London. Later in the article, Bigart observed that "the plan closely resembles the Western proposals turned down by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who is almost certain to reject the plan out of hand."\(^57\)

By contrast, the \textit{Wall Street Journal} commented that the legal position on which the plan for SCUA rested was "unassailable," and that there was "no moral reason" why a ship should be denied passage regardless of whether its pilot was employed by Egypt or not. The Journal was quick to note, however, its doubts about Egyptian readiness to cooperate with SCUA.\(^58\)

On September 17, the \textit{New York Times} remarked that the momentary danger that the British and French would use force to keep the Canal open had diminished. The Times then gave credit to Dulles for making the altered circumstances possible. Characteristically administering a backhanded compliment, the Times commented:

\begin{quote}
Secretary Dulles has indeed revealed a flexibility not always characteristic of our diplomacy under his guidance. Not only has he discouraged rash movements in the Eastern Mediterranean, but he has also been willing to modify his plan for a Suez Canal "users' association." All that he was insisting upon as the week began was that craft using the canal must have some choice of pilots, thus ruling out the possibility of American vessels coming under Russian steermanship; and that Egypt must share
\end{quote}

\(^57\) Homer Bigart, Second of two articles under same 3 column headline, "West Plans A Suez Agency to Operate Canal Traffic," \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1 and 10.

complete control of canal traffic, thus ruling out political use of the geographical accident that the canal passes through Egyptian territory.59

But American journalistic misgivings about SCUA increased and multiplied as it became evident that initial U. S. willingness to strongly back the Association financially were tempered by revelations that Export-Import Bank funds would not be readily available to cover the extra cost of rerouting Middle Eastern oil tankers around the Cape. The New York Times observed on September 19, 1956:

...The idea (SCUA), which seemed clear cut at its inception, has since been clouded by backing and filling on the part of the United States and by objections from some of the smaller and poorer countries.

The proposal only appeared feasible if the United States were in a position to finance it in a big way. Secretary Dulles now seems to be saying that we cannot do so....

The impression one gets—and it is an unfortunate one—is that the Western powers are groping blindly in a sort of hit-or-miss fashion for a solution while Egypt is nothing if not consistent. The present London conference has no more important task than to dispel or annul this impression. The issues involved are clear enough and Colonel Nasser should not be allowed to succeed in his designs.60

Despite skepticism about the feasibility of the Users' Association, these American newspapers nevertheless saw positive value in the scheme. It was argued that the Association could serve as an agency for exerting economic pressures on Egypt. In the event of Egyptian refusal to cooperate with SCUA; ships could be sent around the Cape, thereby, boycotting the Canal and

59 "A Suez 'Lift'?," Editorial, NYT, Sept. 17, 1956, p. 26. The Times clearly was unaware of Eden's sentiments that "the American conception of the association was now evolving so fast that it would end as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser." Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 127.

damaging the Egyptian economy. SCUA would at least provide alternative direction for redeployment of tankers and for supply of oil to Western Europe. Reporting on U. S. willingness to provide funds to Europe if the Canal were closed—the U. S. was said to be ready to lend $500 million to defray costs of sending ships around Africa—these American newspapers observed that boycotting the Canal, though expensive, was better than war and better than tolerating Nasser's "highhandedness." Envisioning a "water lift" comparable to the Berlin air lift, financed by the U. S. half-billion dollars, the Wall Street Journal commented, "if it succeeds, it will be far less costly than shooting guns." The Christian Science Monitor saw SCUA as a "declaration of economic war" which set the stage for months, or even a few years, of economic attrition against Egypt.

In the opinion of the American newspapers, every peaceful

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63 "Oil for the Troubled Waters," Editorial, WSJ, Sept. 18, 1956, p. 10. The Post-Dispatch lamented that SCUA seemed "a provocative measure, badly timed and ill considered. For what the plan appears to do is to impose on Egypt a species of international control which the West has been unable to obtain by negotiation." It appeared to the Post-Dispatch to be an effort by tenants to impose the terms of rent on the landlord. "No Place for Peace," Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 14, 1956, p. 2C. See also: "Alternative to Force," Editorial, SLPD, Sept. 19, 1956, p. 2E.
means had to be used to find a solution, but the Canal should not remain exclusively in Egyptian hands. For Nasser's "seizure of the canal was carefully planned and the American refusal to finance the Aswan Dam simply provided him with an excuse to act." After all, his dreams of empire and his penchant for creating mischief for the West were well known. "With Nasser, as with Hitler, appeasement is no answer. On the other hand an armed conflict must be avoided if humanly possible." It was therefore regarded as extremely important that the West demonstrate its willingness "to try every peaceful recourse."65

The outcome of the conference was greeted optimistically. The New York Times was gratified that a majority of the eighteen nations were expected to accept Dulles' plan for a users' association. "This means that the effort to retain and guarantee the internationalization of the Suez Canal is not to collapse, as it seemed in danger of doing in recent days." Dulles was to be thanked for this result. "The Secretary of State has had to face much harsh criticism in the last year or two, but both at the London conference in August and this week Mr. Dulles has been at his best. It is not only that he proved to be an eloquent and skillful pleader for a difficult course. What is truly heartening is that he has had a strong policy and has followed it through consistently and courageously."66 American newspaper accounts did


not reflect the diplomats' skepticism and pessimism about SCUA. Aldrich reported that the Ambassadors in London of the countries participating in SCUA were instructed to complete the organization, but he doubted "if any one of them believed that it could accomplish anything." 67

Before the United Nations Security Council

American newspaper reception of the news that Britain and France intended to take the Suez matter before the United Nations Security Council was mixed. The Christian Science Monitor observed that the controversy was being taken to the forum where it belonged. While recognizing that this did not guarantee a settlement, the Monitor felt that this course created "maximum opportunity for a right adjustment of the problem without resort to war." 68

William Henry Chamberlin, Wall Street Journal columnist, regarded the step as a "futile gesture," and "a dubious idea." He argued that since the big disputes of the post-war era had been solved by nation-states there was little likelihood that reference of the Suez problem to the U. N. would lead to any positive or constructive solution of the Suez dispute. In all likelihood, final settlement of the Suez controversy "will be determined by which side...holds the stronger cards, political and economic, and plays them more skillfully," not by the U. N. 69

Taking a position midway between that of the Monitor and Chamberlin, the New York Times expressed the opinion that there was no reason to be particularly optimistic about United Nations discussion of the problem. After all, there was the question of the Soviet veto in the Security Council of any constructive proposal. "It is in the Communist interest to foment and to prolong instability in the Near and Middle East, and any solution designed to restore a rule of order and to promote peace would naturally be opposed." Nevertheless, the West did right to take the case before the international body. United Nations discussions might "shed light on the broad issues involved and can make it even more clear that there is such a thing as international morality and that it should prevail."

The beginning of talks in the Security Council were seen by the Times as offering "an opportunity...to reach a just solution." Attempts to seek a settlement of the crisis by negotiation were regarded by the Monitor as the United Nations biggest test since Korea.

The New York Times continued to consider Egyptian policy as central to a solution. "The hope of achieving anything solid will lie with a change of heart on the part of President Nasser. If he is ready and willing to negotiate, something can be


accomplished and violence will be avoided." This was, in fact, not the whole reality of the situation. Britain and France had gone to the United Nations to eliminate the last diplomatic hurdle in the path of military action against Egypt. There is no indication that Eden and Mollet had the slightest interest in serious negotiations resulting from U. N. discussions. They were interested in unseating Nasser, and in retaking the Suez Canal. Thus, the policy of America's Anglo-French allies was also central to a settlement, not merely Egyptian policy, as the Times suggested. When the Security Council unanimously passed the Six Principles clearing the way for continued discussion, the prospect of more months of protracted, sterile negotiations was more than Eden and Mollet could bear. They decided the time had come to act.

All of this, of course, was unknown to the Times, which continued to advocate that the United States support Britain and France on the basic issue of the internationalization of the Canal. This question of Anglo-French-American unity

73“Hope for Suez,” Editorial, NYT, Sept. 28, 1956, p. 26; and “Mr. Dulles Speaks,” Editorial, NYT, Oct. 10, 1956, p. 38. The Post-Dispatch argued that compromise would have to be on the basis of not only the London plan but also Egypt's proposal for an international advisory committee and reaffirmation of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. A settlement depended upon the West as well as upon Egypt. "No Gain in a Deadlock," Editorial, SLPD, Oct. 6, 1956, p. 4A.


75Bell, Long War, op. cit., p. 296.

became a controversial issue with these American papers after Dulles' October 2nd news conference blunder. (see above: pp. 135-141.) Reacting negatively to Dulles' faux pas, the Times commented that Dulles had succeeded, "most unwittingly," in confusing the Suez Canal issue. The Times found it surprising that a statesman of Dulles' experience could say anything that he did not mean in a major press conference. "Unfortunately corrections never have the weight of an original statement." Dulles, the Times argued, had puzzled and dismayed America's allies by seeming to link Suez with colonialism. "He could not have meant to do so, because his policies on the canal prove that he never thought of it in terms of colonialism. Evidently it was a piece of clumsiness." The Times hoped that President Eisenhower, in his press conference, would straighten out the confusion caused by Dulles' error. The Suez Canal problem was "confused enough at best without having the confusion worse confounded by thoughtless remarks from the American Secretary of State. What is needed now is some clarity."

Regarding the start of Security Council debate, which Dulles had indicated would be "most momentous," the Times quipped that this would be so "if the user powers stand united and firm on the

77"Confusion Over Suez," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 4, 1956, p. 32. Finer has questioned Dulles' claim that his statement was made in error. Finer theorized that Dulles deliberately made his remarks to cover the imminent collapse of his Suez policies, and in order to predetermine the conduct of the U. N. discussions, scheduled to begin three days later in New York. Noting the careful preparations Dulles put into this press conference, and the possibility that McCardle had planted questions, Finer, like the New York Times, wondered that a seasoned statesman like Dulles could say something he did not mean to say in a scheduled press conference. Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., pp. 288-295.
concept of international control of the Suez Canal." 78

The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, argued that too much was being made of Dulles' blunder and the disunity between the allies which it implied. The Journal recognized that differences of opinion need not totally disarrange the Western alliance. "The future unity of the West is not damaged by the fact that Britain and France disagree with the U. S. over Suez. It might be injured if, in the name of present unity, the differences were bludgeoned into silence." 79 A week later, the Journal reacted calmly to reports of British displeasure with Dulles' remarks, and their expressed fears that he had sold Britain down the river. The Journal did not see British criticism as a breach in the Western alliance. It claimed that the difference in American and British opinions about how to handle Suez--the British believing in the necessity to teach Nasser a lesson, even if that meant war, and the American refusal to become embroiled in a Middle Eastern war--caused and explained British criticism of Dulles. "We suppose our allies would be happier if events did not cause occasional tiffs such as the British accusation that Mr. Dulles is not looking to their interests. But there is one satisfaction in all this, we think. The criticism makes it very obvious whose interests Mr. Dulles is looking to." 80

79 "A Matter of Differences," Editorial, WSJ, Oct. 4, 1956, p. 8. The Journal obviously was totally ignorant of the true impact of Dulles' blunder on Eden who concluded that Dulles' remark, "however unintentionally, was likely to make Nasser believe that if he held fast, the United States would fall apart from France and Britain over the seizure of the canal." Eden, Suez Crisis, op. cit., p. 135.

The question of differences between the allies served as a vehicle for the Christian Science Monitor to reintroduce its concern over Soviet entry into the Middle East. On October 1, 1956, the Monitor had argued that the Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean gave rise to the need for American statecraft to undertake earnestly to explore the question, "How is the position of the West with reference to the Middle East to be improved?"\textsuperscript{81} Later, on October 18, the Monitor saw the differences between the United States and her allies, Britain and France, stemming from their readiness to accept, or not accept, the use of force to solve the Suez problem, and from their respective interpretations of the relationship between Nasser and the Soviet Union. The U. S. argued that the West must deal with Nasser; the British and the French, that Nasser was but a tool of Soviet aims in the Middle East. This British interpretation, in the view of the Monitor, led Eden to warn Khrushchev of British determination to defend their Middle East "life lines" with force, if need be. "Mr. Dulles' rejection of the possible use of force in the Suez has tended to nullify this British warning to Moscow. America's chief allies meanwhile have been trying to preserve the effectiveness of that warning. They may have done this with too little regard for the effect of their policy statements on colonial and neutral peoples. But they are keeping an eye on a main source of the threat to Middle Eastern stability."\textsuperscript{82}


Lindesay Parrott, in a front page article in the Sunday New York Times, October 7, 1956, reported that the U. N. was looking for a basis for negotiations between Egypt and the West on the Suez Canal. Parrott also noted:

Hope that quiet talks might be successful is one of the reasons that the United States agreed quickly to a series of closed-door meetings among the members of the Security Council. One basis for this standpoint is a feeling that if the United Nations proves unable to settle the question, it must revise its opinion of itself as a power of arbitration.83

Parrott's explanation closely paralleled Dulles' interpretation of U. S. expectations at his October 5, 1956, background news briefing. (see above: pp. 150-153.) Parrott's report omitted mention of the fact that the Administration feared the British and French were setting the stage for eventual military intervention at Suez, and that Dulles had actively lobbied for private negotiations.84 Rather, his story tended to reflect what the Administration wanted the American public to know.

U. S. support for private meetings at the United Nations led the Times to comment: "There is nothing wrong in these behind the scenes contacts....Confidential negotiations and private explorations are indispensible. Indeed, they are a basic advantage of the United Nations system." But the Times feared that serious public debate would be "sacrificed or diminished" if private discussions were to serve merely as rehearsal for the public discussions. "That sort of practice cannot educate the

84 Childers, Road to Suez, op. cit., p. 223; and Robertson, Crisis, op. cit., p. 128.
world audience in the realities of international life. It could destroy the sense of wide participation which is absolutely necessary to the U. N.'s success."^{85}

Two days later, the *Times*, seemingly contradicting its earlier observations on the value of open U. N. discussions, greeted the decision to terminate "the so-called 'discussion'" and the beginning of some sort of negotiation. "This need not be carried on in formal and secret meetings of the Security Council. The United States Government is presumably willing to listen informally to any honest proposals from the Egyptian Government and, if they are practicable, to support them with Britain and France." Since nothing much was to be gained from further oratory, the *Times* argued it was time for those interested in a peaceful settlement "to sit down and reason together."^{86}

The *Christian Science Monitor* commented that "only in private can statesmen have the latitude to work out accommodations."^{87}


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^{86}"A Troubling of the Waters," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 9, 1956, p. 34.

"a long step forward since the troublesome days of...July and August." 88 The Christian Science Monitor noted that they "map an area of agreement from which or within which negotiation can proceed." 89 And the Wall Street Journal felt that at least the three foreign ministers had accomplished "that much" in bringing the Six Principles into being. This might result eventually in an agreement which, when it would come, would not be because of any particular speech in the United Nations but because the agreement would be "to the interests of all the disputants. And a Russian veto will not stop it." 90

To these papers, the Six Principles, despite the Soviet veto of the proposal for their implementation, signaled a new phase in the Suez Canal dispute. "The danger of drastic measures in the Suez Canal situation has diminished." The stage was seen as set inevitably for further negotiations. The third principle—that the Canal should be "insulated from the politics of any country"—was seen as the principle "with the teeth in it." 91 It was felt that it might actually represent "a considerable concession on the part of the Egyptians." 92 Despite the principles' acknowledged vagueness and generality, these American newspapers expressed optimism that a peaceful settlement could

92 "Suez and the Veto," WSJ, loc. cit.
be achieved, that the principles could be implemented. "(T)he implementation of the principles should be no impossible task for world diplomacy, even recognizing all the irritating factors which enter the Suez problem." For this, credit should be given to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

While it was recognized that force was not yet entirely ruled out, it was noted that the tension had diminished and it appeared that the gradual approach toward a negotiated settlement continued. It was assumed that a peaceful solution would take a long time and much patience, "so the sooner negotiations get going the better....If the three powers (Britain, France, and the United States) stand fast they should get a settlement in the long run."

Reports from overseas reporters concentrated on the domestic problems of the British and French Governments in gaining support for their policies, of Labor opposition to the Conservative stance, and their dissatisfaction with the torpid pace of negotiations, and on growing Franco-British dissatisfaction with Secretary of State Dulles.

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93 "Six Principles and a Veto," CSM, loc. cit.
95 "Suez Negotiations," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 18, 1956, p. 32. Heikal (Cairo Documents, op. cit., p. 105) reported that, with passage of the Six Principles, "President Nasser estimated that the danger of invasion had dropped to 10 per cent. He virtually ruled it out."
Eden’s mid-October visit to Paris was described as an attempt to work out a common French-British policy towards Egypt and the Middle East. It was reported that the British and French talked about keeping Suez from becoming mired in one conference after another. They discussed further negotiations with Egypt, which they concluded were pointless unless Egypt made meaningful suggestions for implementing the Six Principles. They also considered ways of converting SCUA into an efficient weapon, and they attempted to work out a coordinated policy on the Iraq-Jordan-Israel problem. It is likely that at this meeting Eden gave final agreement to the invasion of Egypt and the secret alliance with Israel. Yet, no mention of this was made in the article, or even hinted. On the contrary, the French were cited as feeling that “the tension in the Middle East had eased.”

Apparently, these American newspapers were unaware of Administration doubts and fears of war in the Middle East, and of the split in the Western alliance. So convinced do these papers seem to have been that the Suez controversy was on the road to a negotiated settlement that it largely dropped from discussion the last week or so before the Israeli invasion of Sinai. Attention was concentrated on the troubles in Eastern Europe.

Nor did American papers surmise the depth of the gap between American Suez policy and Anglo-French Suez policy of which British-French attacks on Dulles were symptomatic. It is therefore little wonder that the outbreak of war in Egypt surprised them so.

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Invasion, The General Assembly, And UNEF

When Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, it was not yet apparent to American newspapers whether this was merely another retaliatory raid, or the beginning of another Middle East war. The Wall Street Journal wrote: "It is still not very clear whether the invasion will resolve into a war or a relatively minor clash."99 Perceptively, the New York Times observed: "The purpose of this action and the precise intentions of the Israeli Government must still be revealed. But on the face of it this appears to be more than a retaliatory raid of the kind that has been always followed by withdrawal."100 Israel's action ("invasion") was seen as a threat of new war stalking through the Middle East, a war "the end of which no man could foresee." The Israeli invasion of Egypt was generally unexpected by these American newspapers. Nor were they aware of the rupture in the Western Big Three alliance which the earlier Anglo-French decision to go before the United Nations represented to Washington. Apparently only after the Anglo-French entry into the war did these American newspapers become fully aware of the breakdown in communications between London and Paris, and Washington. For on October 30, 1956, the New York Times still saw the Middle Eastern situation as "of immediate concern to the United States as well as to Britain and France because they are pledged to maintain the peace in the

100 "Israel and Egypt," Editorial, NYT, Oct. 30, 1956, p. 36.
Middle East.\textsuperscript{101} It is clear that they did not anticipate the Anglo-French ultimatum and their renunciation of the Tripartite declaration of 1950.

While it cannot be said that these American newspapers approved of Israel's action, it must be recognized that they were sympathetic to Israel. Recalling the rivalry between Egypt and Israel, Egyptian threats to Israel's existence, the Czech arms deal, and the increase in border incidents, while not regarding them as sufficient justification for war, these American newspapers noted their provocative character. The \textit{Wall Street Journal} remarked: "A charitable explanation is that insecurity has made the Israeli react out of proportion to the provocation."\textsuperscript{102}

The British-French intention to occupy the Suez Canal Zone and their veto of the American United Nations resolution on October 30, 1956, were broadcast with one inch banner headlines across the entire front page of the October 31 issue of the \textit{New York Times}, along with news of the Egyptian rejection of the Anglo-French ultimatum:

\begin{quote}
BRITAIN AND FRANCE MOVE TO OCCUPY SUEZ;
REBUFF EISENHOWER, VETO HIS PLAN IN U. N.;
EGYPT REJECTS LONDON-PARIS ULTIMATUM
\end{quote}

The British-French invasion of Egypt was referred to by American newspapers as "intervention." Their action was not


\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., "Israel." See also: "Crisis in the Middle East," NYT, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 32.
regarded as based on any legal grounds. Therefore, it was felt, they would seek to justify their actions by arguing that they were taken in order to stabilize the Middle East. The British-French ultimatum and their military action caused fears that "the crisis within the Western alliance overshadowed even the grave events in the Middle East." The rift in the Western alliance was clearly out in the open.

Closely related to American newspaper reaction to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion was its assessment of a proper United Nations response. The American papers expressed shock at the Israeli "invasion" of Egypt, and the British-French "intervention," which came "at a moment when most of the world thought itself at peace and rejoiced in the victories of freedom in Eastern Europe." The Times considered it little wonder that the General Assembly reacted so harshly to their actions.

There was some support for the U. S. Security Council resolution and opposition to the Anglo-French veto. "(I)t seems to us that the United States resolution in the Security Council asking for withdrawal of Israeli forces was in order. For the same reason we cannot see how British and French annoyance with Egypt could justify their vetoes." However,


there was not universal support for the U. S. resolution. Joseph C. Harsch wrote in his front page Christian Science Monitor column on November 2, 1956, that:

The only objective of the resolution was to obtain an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt. There was no provision in it for a settlement which would have protected Egypt and Israel equally. Under these circumstances the resolution was bound to be opposed by Britain and France, and be supported by the Soviet Union.

The United States resolution quite as much as the ultimatum shook the old alliance because had there been no resolution and had the United States supported the ultimatum, then, in all reasonable probability, Western forces would have established a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel which would have protected both and guaranteed the international character of the canal without bloodshed.

Harsch continued his argument by observing that it was easy to say that the resort to force violated United Nations principles and represented aggression, but what if Egypt's Nasser were in fact the "shrewd empire builder" that the British and French believed him to be, "then their actions, however difficult to defend in the context, could be interpreted to constitute not aggression but foresight and resolution in stopping a real aggression in time." In support of his argument, Harsch concluded with the observation that "President Eisenhower was careful to avoid the charge of aggression against his country's two oldest and closest allies. He expressed an opinion that they were 'in error,' but he twinned that with the statement that they were acting within their 'manifest right.'" 106

One is struck by the amount of newspaper support for the Anglo-French position, and the willingness to accept their

reasoning, often at face value. In addition to Harsch's column, one can cite the *New York Times* editorial, "Crisis in the Middle East," of Wednesday, October 31, 1956. According to that editorial:

Fortunately, for the present at least, all the powers are moving in the direction of stopping the conflict before it broadens into something even more serious, though not all are moving along the same route. Thus, following hurried consultations between Prime Minister Eden and Premier Mollet, Britain and France issued a twelve-hour ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to halt all warlike action by land, sea and air and to withdraw their forces at least ten miles from the Suez Canal. Furthermore, they asked Egypt to agree to joint British and French occupation of key positions along the canal on a purely temporary basis in order to separate the belligerents and guarantee free passage through the canal....107

British-French motives were not questioned. Their argument was not probed. The fact Egyptian forces would have had to withdraw across Sinai and to leave the East bank of the Canal to take up position on the West bank in order to comply with the ultimatum was not mentioned.

James Reston correctly reported that no attempt was made in official quarters to conceal American vexation at "the sudden—and what is felt here to be provocative—action of the British and French Governments." American disappointment and concern became "acute" when Britain and France vetoed the U. S. resolution in the United Nations. American displeasure was so great, Reston noted, that American officials "lent some credence to

107"Crisis in the Middle East," NYT, loc. cit. The Times clearly did not know the reality of the situation. The Anglo-French ultimatum had actually been predrafted at Sevres, France, in October when the representatives of Britain, France, and Israel signed the "Treaty of Sevres," which set the terms of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. Hoopes, *The Devil and J. F. D.*, op. cit., p. 371.
reports that the Israeli Government not only had informed the
French and British in advance of the plan to invade Egypt, but
that the Israeli officials were encouraged to believe that they
would have the support of France, and perhaps even of Britain,
if they did move." Reston quoted U. S. officials as giving two
pieces of evidence to support this position: 1. the coolness of
British and French military liaison officers in Jerusalem to
American officials, starting Saturday, October 27; and 2. Israel's
original communique which candidly stated that their objective
was the Suez Canal. Reston also indicated that at least one
high U. S. official, the previous Saturday, intimated that he
knew an Israeli attack was coming and that the French would
welcome it. Therefore, Reston concluded, the Anglo-French
ultimatum did not come as a complete surprise to United States
officials. 108

U. S. displeasure with Israel was reported by Dana Adams
Schmidt, who wrote that Israeli explanations did not dispel the
feeling among American officials "that the Israelis not only
had flouted the earnest entreaties of President Eisenhower but
had rewarded United States generosity and understanding by
embarking on an irresponsible adventure." They recalled that
it was the United States that persuaded France and Canada to
supply Israel with the arms "she was now using against Egypt."
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108 Reston, "President in Plea," NYT, loc. cit. Reston's
estimate that the Anglo-French ultimatum did not come as a
complete surprise to U. S. officials was correct. Aldrich
indicated years later that the American Ambassador to France
sent Dulles advance information on the ultimatum. (see above:
p. 98-100.)

109 Dana Adams Schmidt, "U. S.-Israel Ties Badly Strained,"
NYT, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 5.
President Eisenhower's radio and television address to the nation on October 31, 1956, and his decision to avoid U. S. involvement in the war and to rely on the United Nations to secure the peace, drew front page headlines which accompanied war news headlines. In banner headlines across the entire front page, the *New York Times* proclaimed on November 1, 1956:

**EISENHOWER PLEDGES NO U. S. INVOLVEMENT; BRITISH BOMBERS RAID AIRFIELDS IN EGYPT; U. N. ASSEMBLY CALLED INTO SPECIAL SESSION**

And the *Christian Science Monitor*, in front page headlines spread across six of eight columns, announced:

**WORLD UNREST STIRRED BY ATTACK ON EGYPT; PRESIDENT PINS U. S. HOPE FOR PEACE TO U. N.**

Generally, there was support for Eisenhower's decision to stay out of the Middle East war, to seek to confine it and to end it, and to rely on the United Nations to reinstate the peace. Editorial comment on the speech varied, but it was usually favorable. The *Wall Street Journal*, on November 1, commented that it was the duty of all governments to look after the interests of their people, even though they "may sometimes decide wrongly" about what their interests are. In the case of the United States, "(o)ur purpose in the Middle East from the first has been to keep the peace by peaceable means. That should remain our purpose. But our own national interests dictate that our participation in the Middle Eastern affairs should be confined to that role only. "That role will be difficult enough at best...."³¹₀

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That the U. S. role in the Middle East was, from the first, to keep the peace by peaceful means is, as we have seen, subject to considerable debate. During their first meeting to discuss the Suez dispute, Eden got the impression that Dulles was not totally opposed to the ultimate use of force, should all peaceful avenues fail. Hoopes observed that Dulles "insisted on sustaining a tortured ambiguity. He thought the seizure was legal, but he frowned upon it as bad international practice and so would not give it full countenance. A vague insistence that 'justice' must be done tended to mislead pent-up Tories into thinking that a difference over the means required to dispose of the problem was a relatively minor matter." A similar ambiguity characterized Dulles' early public statements on the dispute. (see above: pp. 69-74.)

The next day, the Journal expressed gratitude for President Eisenhower's decision to keep the U. S. out of war. It hoped that the nation would not overlook the fact that Eisenhower rested his decision on "two principles which are most revolutionary for our times": 1. "that the United States will not enter wars just to try to patch up the world"; and 2. "that henceforth the United States will choose its course by its own lights even if it means walking alone." The Journal regarded this as a positive return to the pre-World War I policy of avoiding entangling alliances. The Journal failed to note

111 Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 349.
that it is impossible to return to the ways of a different era. Prior to World War I, the United States could rest secure under the umbrella of British naval supremacy. In 1956, no such shield existed. The United States itself had to shoulder world-wide responsibility. It could not, however, bear the burden alone. It required the support of, and mutual cooperation with, allied nations around the globe. During the Suez crisis, Anglo-French-American mutual cooperation was tragically lacking. As a result, the Suez imbroglio culminated in a tragic debacle for the nations of the West.

The New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor also endorsed Eisenhower's decision to keep the U. S. out of the war. The Times welcomed the new American policy of non-involvement in the hostilities, and it supported Eisenhower's assertion of the American right to dissent "because we regard the use of force as contrary to the principles of the United Nations and as neither a wise nor proper instrument for the settlement of international disputes." The Monitor found "particularly appealing" Eisenhower's declaration that that "instrument of injustice--war" is no solution for the injustices of peace, and that "there can be no peace without law."

113 "War in the Middle East," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 38; and "The President Reports," Editorial, SLPD, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 2B.

114 "Political Effects of Crisis," Editorial, CSM, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 22; and "A Calm Voice Amid the Clamor," Editorial, LAT, Nov. 1, 1956, part III, p. 4. The Los Angeles Times noted that Eisenhower had observed that all nations involved had suffered injustices, but that "another instrument of injustice--war--" was not the remedy. The L. A. Times made no mention of Eisenhower's argument that "there can be no peace without law." See: Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal Of Power (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 219. Hughes, Eisenhower's campaign speech writer, indicated
Despite U. S. differences with Britain, France and Israel over Suez, these American newspapers agreed with Eisenhower on the need to maintain friendly relations with these nations and to repair the rift in the Western alliance. "To maintain these friendships and alliances is and remains the supreme goal of our foreign policy." 115

The "one major point of agreement" between U. S. Secretary of State Dulles and British delegate Sir Pearson Dixon as they addressed the United Nations General Assembly on November 1, that there should be a permanent Israeli-Arab peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreements, was taken by Mary Hornaday, Christian Science Monitor, to indicate that "the present diplomatic rift...may be ended in a joint effort for an over-all peace settlement in the Middle East." 116 So anxious were some for a return to the accustomed Western unity that they apparently

that on Wednesday, October 31, 1956, he spent one hour with the President to review a draft of a "possible" speech to be delivered November 1 in Philadelphia. Hughes wrote: "He (Eisenhower) generally approves--especially line of argument appealing to 'law' in world community as condemning aggression 'no matter who the attacker, no matter who the victim.' ('We cannot subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be only one law--or there shall be no peace.') With not much enthusiasm, for I know it oversimplifies far too much, I had written out this approach to the crisis last night, for the sad reason that no other reasonable approach occurred to me, to validate U. S. position without vilifying our allies...." Only the Christian Science Monitor commented favorably editorially on this concept. Apparently the other papers studied were not convinced that this was a "reasonable approach...to validate U. S. position"; this may be indicated by their lack of comment on the concept as used in the President's October 31 nationwide radio and television address.

115 "War in the Middle East," NYT, loc. cit.
were grasping at straws for signs of its restoration.

Little wonder then that indications that the split between the United States and Great Britain was narrowing were both anxiously anticipated and eagerly welcomed. Henry S. Hayward, reporting for the Christian Science Monitor, cited British and U. S. support for a United Nations Emergency Force and the serious British reception of the U. N. majority vote in favor of a cease-fire as indications that "(t)he sharp rift between Britain and the United States shows signs of narrowing for the first time since the Anglo-French involvement in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict."\(^\text{117}\)

The New York Times credited Bulganin's note to Britain and France with reuniting the Western allies and concluded: "It is now time to get down to fundamentals. We and the British and the French are the bulwarks of the free world. We cannot stand without each other. We cannot afford to quarrel or to do things that arouse the criticism or mistrust of each other. We must work together in and out of the United Nations. The immediate past cannot be written off....However, as a source of division, this past can and must be written off."\(^\text{118}\)

Initial newspaper reaction to the United Nations Emergency Force was mixed. It tended to parallel the general attitudes of the separate newspapers to the United Nations. Throughout this period of the Suez crisis, the Christian Science Monitor leaned


strongly in favor of the United Nations. The New York Times was less favorable, but not opposed. And the Wall Street Journal was quite opposed to the United Nations, questioning greatly its ability to accomplish anything. It placed greater trust in traditional power politics. 119

The Christian Science Monitor expressed the hope that the United Nations Emergency Force would make the United Nations "a plainly impartial and sufficiently strong force" to be "an effective policeman." 120 The Times argued that the establishment of such a force "would be only a temporary remedy and a preliminary to more enduring measures." It advocated that the United Nations find solutions which would not only allow the Governments concerned to save face, but would also create conditions that would preclude a future repetition of the disastrous events. The Times concluded that such solutions could be found only "in a permanent and guaranteed peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states and a new regime for the Suez Canal, putting that essential waterway under international control." 121 Likewise, the Christian Science Monitor believed that the United Nations must not merely permit the restoration of a "troubled status quo in the Middle East. The U. N.'s duty is to advance lasting solutions toward a durable peace there." 122


122 "Mideast: An Uneasy Cease-Fire," Editorial, CSM, Nov. 7,
Post-Invasion—Anglo-French Pullout

Following Anglo-French acceptance of the United Nations cease-fire resolution, American newspapers busied themselves for weeks with evaluations of the outcome of the brief Middle Eastern war. The British-French operation was seen by American newspapers as falling very short of achieving its objectives. Far from eliminating Nasser, the abortive invasion strengthened his position. The British and French had failed to keep the Suez Canal open. All but one of the pipelines were cut. Nasser remained in power and Egyptian morale had not cracked. Nasser's popularity was not "discredited" by the British-French assault; this alone was interpreted to be "a measure of the erroneous calculations made by the British and French Governments when they decided to launch their attack."\(^{123}\)

It was frequently accepted by the American press that the real reasons for the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt were other than their proclaimed aim of separating the belligerents, Egypt and Israel. It was surmised that Britain and France were interested in eliminating Nasser from power, in checking Soviet incursions into the Middle East, and in retaking control of the Suez Canal in order to ensure that the Canal always remained open. Instead, they failed to achieve their objectives. William Henry Chamberlin, Wall Street Journal columnist, wrote

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1956, p. 26. The Post-Dispatch argued there should first be a cease-fire, troop withdrawals, and formation of a U. N. police force to patrol the area and keep the peace. "Then basic solutions can be undertaken." "From the Danube to the Suez," Editorial, SLPD, Nov. 5, 1956, p. 2B.

that the Soviets had won a "psychological victory" and were well on their way toward establishing themselves as protectors of the oil rich Arab world. Because Britain and France gave the impression of retreating before Soviet threats when they accepted the United Nations cease-fire resolution so soon after receiving the Soviet ultimatum, Chamberlin claimed "they created a situation much more difficult and ominous than the one which existed before they struck." 124

The New York Times noted that the results hardly justified the great risks and the high cost of their joint venture. Not only had the Anglo-French action failed to achieve its objectives, but it had also given rise to a series of undesirable side effects.

On balance...it seems clear that much more has been lost than gained. It will take long to live down the initial blow to the United Nations, the shock to the conscience of the Western world, the renewed conviction of the Arab-Asian world that imperialism and colonialism are still alive and the equally strong Arab conviction that the Western powers were in league with Israel.

We now stand with the Middle East in a state of extreme tension, with the Russian position strengthened, the Western position (including that of the United States) weakened, Nasser as great or greater a menace than ever and the United Nations flouted, though with a partial comeback. A new era begins in the Middle East, one fraught with dangers and difficulties. The Western ranks must be closed again--and quickly.... 125

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In a perceptive article, Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times, argued that the Anglo-French operation was poorly planned, and the immediate military objective—seizure of the Canal—was lost sight of. Retaking the Canal with as little danger as possible became "fuzzed up" with overthrowing Nasser by psychological warfare and bombing. This was further complicated when Eden added the professed objective of separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. "The careful and indispensable weighing of political, economic, psychological and military factors was lacking in the Egyptian operation.... As a result the British and French, and the West in general, are suffering the consequences." Baldwin also noted parenthetically that London and Paris seemed to weigh so lightly economic factors. "They apparently forgot that the Arabs could hurt Britain and France economically more than Britain and France could hurt the Arabs. The Arab economy can revert to dates and camels; Western Europe cannot." 126

Closely related to the evaluation of the outcome of Anglo-French participation in the war was American newspaper review of American foreign policies and their relationship to the war. John Allan May, reporting for the Christian Science Monitor on British hopes for joint Anglo-American agreement on a reasonable settlement of the issue of control of the Suez Canal, commented: "Lack of previous agreement between Britain and the United States

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about aims in the area, while it did not cause the Anglo-French ultimatum, did make it possible." Furthermore, the dangers of new Western divisions would remain as long as the "vacuum in understanding still exists." But the Wall Street Journal argued that American foreign policy, as long as it remained dedicated to a peaceful settlement, not to force, could neither cause the Middle East war alone, nor could it have prevented it alone. And the New York Times observed that the Eisenhower decision to recognize other nations' "manifest right" to defend their national interest while maintaining the United States right to dissent during the Suez War, although it may have caused differences with our allies, "has averted the complete alienation of the free East from the West." The Times claimed that the British Government was now seen moving along lines toward a settlement which approximated those pursued by the United States. This was taken as a good sign for renewed Western unity in NATO and for settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis.

American newspapers were at this time also concerned with evaluating the role of the United Nations in ending the war over Suez and in finding a permanent settlement. The level of expectations depended largely on the individual newspaper's

predisposition toward the United Nations. The Wall Street Journal expected very little of the United Nations. In fact, on November 21, 1956, the Journal acknowledged that the United Nations had been considerably more effective in restoring peace in the Middle East than had been expected. Nevertheless, the Journal felt that despite gratifying initial success in Egypt, the U. N.'s real test as an international peace-keeper under difficult circumstances was just beginning. The article noted further that "the apparent effectiveness of the U. N. police force could be only an illusion, or that it might evaporate in a matter of hours" in a burst of machinegun fire. 130

The Christian Science Monitor was more positive. For the United Nations it envisioned limited goals: 1. withdrawal of foreign troops from Suez; 2. securing a "decent" settlement of the Canal dispute in the interest of canal users; and 3. protection of international shipping rights. 131

130 "U. N. Appraisal," WSJ, Nov. 21, 1956, pp. 1 and 16. For an earlier, guarded reaction to UNEF, see: "United Nations' Big Experiment," Editorial, LAT, Nov. 14, 1956, part III, p. 4. The L. A. Times observed that the U. N. was undertaking a momentous experiment. In Korea, the police action was commanded by the Security Council. But UNEF was the creation of the General Assembly. "How workable can be a police action run by the Assembly where votes of small nations could presumably commit the larger nations to take great risks and make great sacrifices, remains to be seen." See also: "The Alternatives—Major War: World Powers Face Fact That U. N. Must Succeed," Editorial, CDN, Nov. 13, 1956, p. 20.

The New York Times saw the duty of the United Nations to be much broader—to seek a permanent settlement of the great issues in the Middle East—for this was the tacit understanding upon which the Anglo-French withdrawals were ordered. The Times remarked:

Certainly the United Nations police force...must remain in the area until the settlement has been achieved, irrespective of Egypt's contrary claim. Moreover, despite Egypt's wishes, the clearing of the Suez Canal must begin at once with all available technical means and without waiting for the completion of withdrawals. Egypt must give binding understanding to negotiate for a new regime for the Suez Canal which will "insulate" it from President Nasser's provocative policies. Finally, Egypt must recognize the existence of Israel, end the blockade against it, maintained in defiance of the United Nations, and consent to real peace negotiations on a mutually acceptable basis.132

Failure of the British-French invasion of Egypt resulted in the near complete demise of Anglo-French power and prestige in the Middle East, and gave rise to fears of a power vacuum in the area which might be filled by the Russians. The New York Times claimed that it had pointed out three or four years prior to Suez that the collapse of British and French power in the region would result in a power vacuum which would be filled either by the United States or by the Soviet Union. "We have not filled it; the Russians are moving in, and time is not on our side."133

The movement of Russia into the Middle East was later seen by the Times as "one of the great movements of history and a highly dangerous one for our country." Soviet charges of "imperialism"


and "colonialism" were leveled against the United States for warning that any threat to the territory or the independence of Baghdad Pact nations would be viewed "with the utmost gravity," and for expressions of U. S. concern to Syria over "substantial shipments" of Soviet arms. Replying to those charges, the Times commented: "If there was any valid charge against the Americans in these days it has been one of weakness, of taking the easy line that the United Nations would do it all." The United States should serve notice on the Soviet Union that it would not permit Soviet domination of the Middle East nor the elimination of Israel, "the one sure and permanent pro-Western nation in the Middle East." 134

Geoffrey Godsell, Christian Science Monitor, stressed that the United States must act "independently" of Britain and France who had discredited themselves over Suez. The United States must decisively take the initiative if the nations of the West were to "salvage" anything from the "wreckage" of the Western position in the area. If the United States did not act resolutely to fill the Middle Eastern power vacuum, "Soviet influence will not so much thrust itself as be sucked into the Middle East on a scale which will make its recent successes in the area seem insignificant." 135

While recognizing the existence of a Middle Eastern power vacuum which might be filled by Nasser or Russia, the Wall Street

Journal cautioned against excessive pessimism and reminded its readers: "Something of value has already come out of it. This country has acquired a freedom of action in world affairs it has not had in a generation. This is not of value to us alone; it has given reassurances to many uneasy peoples that the choice for the world does not lie in the extremes of being bossed by the Communists or by a Western bloc resting on the power of the United States." 136

Once Anglo-French withdrawal was in prospect, American newspapers turned their attention to securing the clearing of the Suez Canal as quickly as possible. The United Nations should be able to use British-French salvage experts and equipment already at the scene. Clearance of the Canal should not depend on the withdrawal of foreign troops. 137 Egypt should not be permitted to exercise a veto over the Suez Canal clearance operation nor to blackmail the world with its insistence that Israel withdraw before Canal clearance operations can begin. Should Nasser continue to maintain this position, the General Assembly must face its collective responsibility and the United States its duty by leading the United Nations in organizing appropriate action to meet Nasser's challenge. 138

These American newspapers reported on debates in Britain.


137 "Clearing the Canal," Editorial, CSM, Dec. 21, 1956, p. 18; and "Issues in the Middle East," Editorial, NYT, Nov. 28, 1956, p. 34.

over charges of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion, but they did not endorse the charges. They reported Conservative denials and the fact that Labor opposition "remained unconvinced." 139 Editorially, these three great American newspapers took no position on the issue of collusion. 140 Dulles raised the issue in his October 30, 1956, background news briefing. (see above; pp. 156-160.)

Post-Anglo-French Pullout--Israeli Pullout

The new year, 1957, ushered in a series of events which stemmed directly from the abortive Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. The first of these was the resignation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden. American newspapers refused to accept the official British explanation that Eden was resigning for health reasons. The failure of his Suez policy was generally seen as a "major reason" and the "immediate cause of his departure." It was deemed "ironic and sad" that his resignation should have resulted from a question of foreign policy since


140 Western papers were not as hesitant about commenting early on Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. On October 31, 1956, the Daily News observed: "The speed with which the two nations (Britain and France) acted, and their refusal to heed United States pressures toward keeping the peace, suggests that this was not only the opportunity they had been waiting for, but that they also created the opportunity." See: "What Was Israel's Role: Britain and France Risk Everything on Suez Move," CDN, loc. cit. See also: "The Risk of War," CST, loc. cit.; and "What's This War Really About?," Editorial, LAT, Oct. 31, 1956, part III, p. 4.
he had established his political reputation in the field of foreign affairs.141

The appointment of Harold Macmillan as Eden's successor was welcomed by these American newspapers. Reestablishing a good working relationship between Britain and the United States would be greatly aided by the personal friendship of Eisenhower and Macmillan which dated from World War II and the North Africa campaign. Since he had backed the Suez venture, Macmillan's appointment was seen as a signal of British "adherence to Eden Cabinet policies." His inaugural address, in which he declared, "I believe history will justify what we did," was interpreted as indicating that Macmillan agreed with Eden's Suez policy, as was his retention of largely the same Cabinet.142

These three major American newspapers displayed relative unanimity on the questions of Israeli withdrawal and sanctions.143


143 Most of the American newspapers studied opposed sanctions. Only the L. A. Times raised the possibility that Eisenhower's February 21, 1957, suggestion of U. N. "pressure" against Israel might have been an attempt to remove Arab suspicions of U. S. intentions, and to show that U. S. policy in the Middle East was not centered on Israel. It hoped that Eisenhower's speech would make possible private negotiations with Middle Eastern countries—which would be far more satisfying than "the goldfish bowl debates" of the United Nations—and make easier a permanent Middle Eastern settlement. "The President on Israel," Editorial, LAT, Feb. 22, 1957, part III, p. 4.
All three believed that Israel had legitimate grounds to seek guarantees against a return to the status quo ante before withdrawing from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran. The Monitor suggested that the U. N. should administer these areas until a general Palestine peace treaty could be drawn. The Times advocated that mutual guarantees to Israel and Egypt should be negotiated and agreed upon first, so they could be announced "simultaneously" with the Israeli withdrawal.

On the matter of sanctions, the Journal and the Monitor questioned the wisdom of directing them against Israel while not directing them against Egypt, since the latter had provoked the former. Echoing the arguments of Congressional opponents of sanctions, the Journal claimed that considering their use against Israel implied one code for the weak, another for the strong. If sanctions were to be applied to Israel, why not to Russia as well for the Hungarian invasion.

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James Reston found that the vague public threats of sanctions had made the Middle Eastern situation look much worse than it really was. Administration opponents had a bogus issue with which to make headlines. Reston argued that the United States Government had "no intention of going to such extremes in the foreseeable future." According to him, Dulles had taken the lead in efforts to break the deadlock by proposing that the United States should attempt to establish the principle of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Had Israel withdrawn and made common cause with the United States, the weight of public opinion would have been transferred to Egypt. "Unfortunately, this move by Mr. Dulles was not made quietly but publicly, and this turned what promised to be a hopeful diplomatic move into an angry propaganda battle." Nevertheless, it was felt that eventually Israel would withdraw and the Dulles' plan would be tried. This would involve some risk for Israel, but the risk had been exaggerated. "For there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Israelis cannot handle the Egyptians in a test of strength, and if they had to go back to Aqaba and Gaza to regain their rights, they would be doing so with the support, rather than the opposition of the United States and world opinion."\(^{147}\) Reston's prediction of Israeli victory in a future test of strength proved accurate in 1967. Israel won the Six Day War handily. But, the United States did not actively support Israel, although the U. S. did not oppose it. Israel went it alone.

The Times "deplored the one-sidedness" with which both the United Nations and the United States had treated the whole Middle Eastern crisis.\textsuperscript{148} The Times noted that both the United States and the United Nations had largely ignored Egyptian provocations and Nasser's arrogant defiance of both the U. N. and international law. Only in recent days had the U. S. and the U. N. taken account of them and promised Israel some of the assurances it sought. All such moves and promises, however, had been premised on Israel's prior and unconditional withdrawal, and, to a great extent, on Egyptian consent. "Since Egypt has publicly withheld such consent, it would be in a position to restore the status quo ante that gave rise to the recent hostilities." Thus, it was understandable that Israel saw the assurances offered as inadequate. Nevertheless, the Times believed that it would be wise for Israel to withdraw its forces from the last strong points, and, thereby, put itself "on the side of the angels" and place the burden of world opinion on Egypt.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{148}Apparently the Administration was more concerned with U. S. interests in the Middle East than with ensuring equitable guarantees to Israel. Bell, Hoopes and Love maintained that the Administration yielded reluctantly to Third World pressures applied at the United Nations. Dulles and Eisenhower were motivated by a desire to show the Arabs that U. S. Middle East policy was not dictated by American Jewish interests. They also feared Communist gains in the area, as a result of Soviet advocacy of complete Israeli withdrawal, and Soviet support for U. N. sanctions against Israel to bring it about. Thus, in order to retain American influence in the region, the U. S. Administration felt compelled to advocate sanctions. See: Bell, Long War, op. cit., pp. 351-353; Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War, op. cit., pp. 665-666; and Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., pp. 390-391.

Israel's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran was greeted as "excellent news." Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was said to have acted with praiseworthy statesmanship and courage. 150

**Summary Remarks**

Before the Israeli invasion of Sinai, these American newspapers tended to give rather strong support for Eisenhower Administration Suez policies. Dulles' tactics to secure a negotiated settlement seemed to be working. Consequently there was high newspaper praise for the Secretary of State, and great support for his Suez foreign policy. Newspaper positions and American foreign policy showed conspicuous parallelism. Furthermore, the various positions of these three great American newspapers were quite similar.

Following the brief war and the acceptance of a United Nations supervised cease-fire, the degree of divergence of opinion increased noticeably both between the various newspapers, and between the newspapers and the Administration. Criticism of Administration policies by these American newspapers became more pronounced and more outspoken, with the *New York Times* the most critical. Both the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*, for example, supported a quick return to Western unity while the Eisenhower Administration preferred to make progress slowly in that direction. On the other hand, the

Wall Street Journal advocated a position of continued U. S. foreign policy independence, and the avoidance of entangling alliances—this seemed to echo Dulles' October 30, 1956, background news briefing. (see above: pp. 157-158.)

Newspaper discontent with U. S. Suez foreign policy grew in intensity after January 1, 1957. In addition to opposition to sanctions, these American newspapers expressed concern on a variety of matters related to Suez developments. For example, the resignation of Prime Minister Eden sparked some very sharp comment. C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times noted the significance of his resignation to the Anglo-American coalition. "Neither Government can afford indefinitely—as did Washington—to ignore the other's vital interests. Nor can either—as did London—violate the other's trust, regardless of excuse." Unless the United States and Britain learned these basic rules, Eden's would not be "the last political reputation to be sacrificed."¹⁵¹

Throughout the crisis, the Christian Science Monitor had not hesitated to remind its readers that Washington might somehow be partially responsible for Suez. Thus, following Eden's resignation, the Monitor advised that the United States should help Eden's successor to work out solutions to common problems arising from Suez. The Monitor reasoned thus:

It will be wholesome for Americans to recognize... that shortcomings of their own government in the formulation of a foreign policy for the Middle East have contributed to the situation which led the French and British to feel that only desperate measures could suffice against Soviet penetration. Had Washington listened to Sir Anthony early last year and made a declaration comparable to the one now before Congress (the Eisenhower Doctrine), Britain might not now be losing the guiding hand of its most experienced diplomatist.152

However, not all was criticism. President Eisenhower was praised for the courage he displayed by taking an unpopular stand in favor of "pressure" against Israel. And support was readily given to the Administration's argument that aggression should not be rewarded.153

In general, these newspapers tended to react to policy, rather than to precipitate it, during the Suez crisis. They were in the position of reporting rather than initiating. And, as we have seen, their reports were regularly inaccurate. It may be that such inaccuracies are fostered by the Administration to conceal what it actually knows for diplomatic reasons, or to protect itself from sharp and/or damaging domestic criticism. Or they could reflect so-called "trial balloons," unofficial statements issued by American or foreign governmental officials—often in background news briefings—to sample reaction both at home and abroad to proposed government policies and/or actions. When such reports later prove false it could indicate that the


authorities responsible for them have altered their decisions in light of unfavorable response to their "trial balloons."\textsuperscript{154} Such false accounts could also reflect the attempts of individuals or departments to influence Administration policies by stimulating public interest and support for some favored policy or project. Failure of these attempts could be indicated by later invalidation of inaccurate or false reports. Thus, the accuracy of newspapers depends heavily upon the accuracy of their sources. Accuracy of sources in turn depends upon the interests to be served through the release or the withholding of correct information by government officials.

The \textit{New York Times} gave the most coverage to the Suez crisis; the \textit{Wall Street Journal} gave the least. A liberal newspaper, the \textit{Times} was occasionally strongly critical of Administration policies, especially on the question of sanctions. The observation of former Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Philip Kingsland Crowe, that the \textit{Times} was "mildly critical most of the time" of Eisenhower Administration policies was borne out in this analysis. Overall, the \textit{Christian Science Monitor} tended to be somewhat less critical of Administration Suez policy than the \textit{New York Times}. The \textit{Wall Street Journal} was usually pro-Administration during the Suez crisis.

Review of the editorial policies of the four Western papers indicated that the three Eastern papers were generally repre-

\textsuperscript{154} Rivers remarked: "Since background information is never attributed to the spokesman, Eisenhower's assistants...use(d) backgrounders as launching pads for trial balloons. If Congressional or public reaction to a policy announced during a back­ 
grounder was unfavorable, the balloon was hauled down and a new policy formulated." Rivers, \textit{Opinionmakers, op. cit.,} pp. 144-145.
sentative during the Suez crisis. Many of the issues raised by the Eastern papers were also commented upon by the Western papers. However, there were a number of discernible differences. The Western papers tended to be more isolationist, more concerned with domestic politics. They were less anxious to see an expanded U.S. role internationally, and they were more favorably inclined to the United Nations Emergency Force. Also, they were less hesitant about taking up Dulles' charge of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion.

Three of the four Western papers studied were as opposed to U.N. sanctions against Israel as the Eastern papers. The only paper which did not oppose sanctions categorically was the Republican Los Angeles Times.

The Christian Science Monitor most closely approximated the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The New York Times also approached the Post-Dispatch in policy.

The Wall Street Journal was quite similar in approach to the Los Angeles Times. It was, however, more reserved on the probable success of UNEF. The Journal was categorically opposed to sanctions, the L.A. Times was not. Of the seven major American papers studied, the Los Angeles Times most nearly approached total support for U.S. Suez foreign policy, and for the Eisenhower Administration.

The Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Sun-Times, both Knight publications, usually took the same editorial position. Of the newspapers studied, they were the most independent editorially, agreeing, at times, with sentiments expressed by
the liberal papers, the Times, Monitor, and Post-Dispatch, and, at times, with the more conservative L. A. Times, and Journal.

In general, the Eisenhower Administration's policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Suez dispute was popular with the major daily American newspapers studied. The decisions to avoid U. S. military involvement in the hostilities, to seek a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli forces drew praise. With respect to Israeli withdrawal, questions were raised about the method of bringing it about—possible U. N. sanctions—not the goal.

VOLUME II

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CHAPTER V

THE REACTION OF AMERICAN NEWSMAGAZINES, OPINION JOURNALS, AND SCHOLARLY JOURNALS TO THE SUEZ CRISIS

Preliminary Observations

The objective of this chapter is to discern the nature of support for Eisenhower Administration foreign policies during the Suez crisis in selected major American periodicals. The periodicals studied are of three types: newsmagazines, opinion journals, and scholarly journals. To determine the kind of support for Administration policies, an analysis will be made of the manner in which these periodicals reported and evaluated the crisis. A high index of support for Administration policies could indicate the success of Administration efforts to influence coverage of the crisis, or it could merely reflect a favorable predisposition of a particular periodical to Administration efforts. Conversely, adverse criticism of American Suez policies could indicate failure of the Administration to convincingly present its policies, or it could mirror a given periodical's prior ideological position of opposition. An attempt will be made to determine which factor—ideological predisposition or Administration influence—accounted for the nature of periodical coverage during the Suez crisis. This analysis will further test the Administration's belief that it had an unfavorable press during the crisis.
General Remarks on American Newsmagazines

From the standpoint of circulation, the three largest weekly American newsmagazines are *Newsweek*, *Time*, and *U. S. News and World Report*. There is an eight-day gap between the day these newsmagazines send news to press and the date on their cover. Furthermore, there is a five-day gap between the day they appear on the newsstands and the date on their cover.¹

Because weekly newsmagazines appear later after the fact than the newspapers, they possess certain theoretical advantages; the time lag between the occurrence of newsworthy events and the date of publication offers newsmagazines the opportunity to select important and accurate news with greater objectivity. Their newseditors are able to review the news events over a longer time span during which the accuracy or inaccuracy of reports may become more evident. Unfortunately, newsmagazines often do not avail themselves of this opportunity to transmit more accurate news.

The American weekly newsmagazine tends to concentrate on descriptive summaries of news trends. Selected facts, dates and figures are often woven together to illustrate the news trends which the newsmagazine is seeking to trace. Consequently, there is far less new news in newsmagazines than in daily newspapers generally. Furthermore, reporting in newsmagazines tends to be highly interpretive. Newsmagazine reports are

often short, pithy accounts, well spiked with descriptive adjectives and value-laden key words which serve as indicators of either the journalist's personal bias or the newsmagazine's editorial policy. Therefore, newsmagazine reports of political events are frequently far from objective, cold analysis of news. This is not to deny that many newsmagazine correspondents are competent men, highly respected in their profession. On numerous occasions, they uncover newer, better, and more important news than the daily newspapers. But, in the mechanics of the daily operations of newsmagazines, the editors ignore the standard practices of conventional news reporting which require telling the reader the source of the news—except in the case of background information, in which case the reputation of the reporter serves as a guide to the authenticity of the news. Unencumbered by observance of such conventions, the newsmagazine editor can publish more readable news. "But the lack of restraint in the newsmagazines often permits the news to look more titillating and more authoritative than the facts warrant, giving the reader little hint as to when the news stops and the editorial titillating begins, or when the facts end and the editorial dogma takes over."

In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyze the coverage of the Suez crisis by four major American newsmagazines: Business Week, Newsweek, Time, and U. S. News and World Report. Study of these four newsmagazines indicates that elements common to all were often obscured by the editorial line of the

\[
\text{\textsuperscript{2}} \text{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 11-12.}
\]
individual newsmagazine. Also, more or less distinct policies emerged to coincide with various phases of the crisis.

**Business Week** was primarily concerned with the financial side of the crisis. Consequently, weeks passed in which little, if any, mention was made of the crisis. A conservative, business magazine, it was usually pro-Administration.

**Newsweek** stood out as the maverick among American newsmagazines. It evidenced no clear-cut or readily detectable ideological line. Commentaries were at times pro-Administration, at times strongly anti-Administration, which further indicated no clearly definable **Newsweek** line.³

**Time** was very pro-Administration. Its articles, with rare exception, parrotted the official view of the Republican Eisenhower Administration.⁴ Editorial comment within articles often panned editorial critics of the Administration's policies. For example, **Time** answered those who warned of a possible Russian assumption of responsibility to help Egypt build the High Dam following the Western pull-out by indicating that there was "strong doubt" that the Russian Communists could afford to build the dam, and that, in fact, by week's end Foreign Minister Shepilov had stated that Russia did not then intend to finance the Aswan High Dam.⁵

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³Ibid., pp. 10-11.


During the Suez crisis, *U. S. News and World Report* was generally pro-Administration, adhering to the policies of its editor, David Lawrence. *U. S. News* quoted extensively, most frequently from sources with whom editor Lawrence apparently sympathized. For example, it regularly reproduced transcripts of the news conferences and public addresses of the President and the Secretary of State. At one point, it carried what appears to be a complete, paraphrased text of Dulles' October 30 background news briefing. Often during the crisis, *U. S. News* quoted the remarks of Prime Minister Eden and other British Conservatives. When, however, an individual whose position did not meet with Lawrence's approval was quoted, his remarks were preceded by a carefully biased introduction. This was the case the one time *U. S. News* reproduced Nasser's remarks during the crisis. *U. S. News* also featured question-and-answer articles dealing with various aspects of the crisis. The answers were very slanted, and, in general, reflected the editor's views.

In this chapter the term American newsmagazines will be

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6Ben H. Bagdikian, "The Newsmagazines: *I--U. S. News and World Report*," *The New Republic*, Vol. 140, Feb. 2, 1959, pp. 13-14. Bagdikian commented: "(T)wo distinct lines appear in *U. S. News and World Report*: (1) Accurate reprints of interviews and public statements, plus first-hand reports by the magazine's own correspondents, many of them unbiased reporting; (2) A selection process of the reprints and interviews which heavily weights them in quantity, number and presentation on the side of Lawrence's personal convictions, and an embellishment of the first-hand reports which carry out the editor's themes in headlines, introductions and other presentations even when these embellishments are contrary to the reports themselves."


used frequently. Specifically it refers to the four news-
magazines of our study.

Withdrawal of the American Offer

Washington's decision to withdraw the American offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam project received generally favor-
able response from these American newsmagazines. Significantly, few new themes were introduced, rather newsmagazine accounts largely echoed in shortened form the reports of the American newspapers studied in Chapter IV.

The decision to rescind the U. S. offer of aid to Egypt was seen as serving "notice on neutrals" that it would no longer be profitable to play East against West to secure economic aid. Underdeveloped countries could no longer count on blind East-West competition for their favor. In the future, the United States would weigh each project and decide its merits without regard to fear of Soviet competition. 9

Newsweek noted that Dulles' patience had been exhausted when he told Ambassador Hussein "curtly" that the U. S. was with-
drawing its offer. 10 Dulles' move was generally applauded. Time was most effusive when it evaluated Dulles' performance in these terms: "On the broad chessboard of international diplomacy, the U. S. moved decisively last week in a gambit that


10 Ibid., "Notice to 'Neutrals.'"
took the breath of professionals for its daring and won the assent of kibitzers for its instinctive rightness.\textsuperscript{11}

In the newsmagazines, there was little of the early newspaper caution over the consequences of the U. S. action. Generally it was assumed that the Russians would not step into the gap left by the American withdrawal from the project. It was believed that the Russians already were preoccupied in their Eastern European satellites, that they would hesitate to shoulder additional responsibilities in Egypt. In David Lawrence's opinion, Washington policy-makers had "wisely decided to call the Soviet bluff." Thus, they forced the Soviets to expose themselves, and, thereby, gave neutralists pause to think.\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Time}, noting that by week's end Shepilov had indicated that the Soviet Union had no intention of financing the Aswan High Dam, observed: "It was highly possible that Chessmaster Dulles had his opponents in check."\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Business Week} editorialized that this was the only way for the United States to deal with Egyptian blackmail and to put an end to the "impossible state of affairs" arising therefrom.\textsuperscript{14}

The reasons given for the U. S. pullout were basically the same as those listed by the daily newspapers. In addition to the official reasons, mention was made of:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} "The Dramatic Gambit," \textit{Time}, \textit{loc. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} David Lawrence, "The Honeymoon Is Over," \textit{loc. cit.} See also: "The Trend: The Only Way to Deal With Blackmail," \textit{Business Week}, July 28, 1956, p. 140; and "Notice to 'Neutrals,'" \textit{Newsweek}, \textit{loc. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} "The Dramatic Gambit," \textit{Time}, \textit{loc. cit.} For Dulles' reaction to this \textit{Time} magazine article, see above: p. 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} "The Trend: The Only Way to Deal With Blackmail," \textit{Business Week}, \textit{loc. cit.}
\end{itemize}
1. The Czech arms deal and growing Egyptian indebtedness to the Soviet bloc;

2. Nasser's efforts to weaken the Western position in the Middle East and North Africa;

3. Egyptian blackmail—playing Washington off against Moscow to obtain the best possible terms for financial aid to the Aswan High Dam project; and

4. The opposition of Southern Senators and of Zionists.15

Of the four newsmagazines studied, Newsweek alone indicated some caution about the U. S. action stemming from factors other than fear of possible greater Soviet commitment to, and involve-ment in, Egypt, which Russian agreement to finance the Aswan High Dam at that time would have represented. Newsweek worried about a "lessening of U. S. prestige for having backed off on a promise" which it saw as one of the calculated risks involved in the American decision.16

The First London Conference

Nasser's nationalization ("seizure") of the Canal was regarded by the newsmagazines as the desperate move of a dictator whose "grandiose dreams" were crumbling, and whose prestige was "slipping fast."17 Nationalization of the Suez Canal was also seen as Nasser's taking revenge for the Western

15 Ibid.; "The Dramatic Gambit," Time, loc. cit.; and "World-


16 "Notice to 'Neutrals,'" Newsweek, loc. cit.

17 "One Dictator Who's In Trouble: Seizing Canal Isn't Cure-

All for Nasser;" U. S. News, Aug. 3, 1956, p. 61; and "'Strong

withdrawal from the Aswan High Dam project. Business Week saw the Egyptian nationalization as proof that Nasser, like so many dictators before him, was "being pushed into foreign adventure by his failures at home." But Egypt must not be allowed to get away with its nationalization of the Canal, for, if it did, other Middle Eastern Governments might be encouraged to nationalize the foreign owned oil companies next.

Adopting a line of argument which it was to repeat often in the next two months, U. S. News and World Report described Nasser as a man who was growing increasingly isolated from his Arab neighbors and his neutralist friends, and about to become more and more unpopular with his own countrymen. David Lawrence, editor of U. S. News, mused on the damage Nasser's action had done to Egypt's future in the name of nationalism. Lawrence noted: "(N)ationalism can become a form of national suicide. It can affect adversely the lives of millions of men and women who, though themselves innocent of wrong, must resort perhaps to bloodshed to get rid of their dictatorship government." Following Lawrence's editorial line, within a month U. S. News saw the "big question...how long Nasser himself will last." Egyptians were reported having second thoughts on Nasser.

While recognizing that Nasser was squeezing the West at Suez, now the West was also seen by the Egyptians as squeezing Egypt.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of Western economic pressure, \textit{U. S. News} proclaimed: "Ousting of Nasser is expected to be a matter of months, not years."\textsuperscript{23}

The Red specter was seen lurking in the Middle East. It was regarded increasingly threatening to the West as a result of Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. \textit{Business Week} charged: "The shadow of Russia hangs over vital Western link now that Egypt has seized the Suez Canal."\textsuperscript{24} Frequent Egyptian consultations with the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at the time of the first London conference were interpreted by Western diplomats, according to \textit{Newsweek}, to indicate that "it was becoming painfully clear that Russia, not Egypt, was calling the moves." This factor did not augur well for the negotiation of a compromise solution to the Suez dispute.\textsuperscript{25}

Referring to Dulles' nationwide radio and television address of August 3, 1956, \textit{Time} took note of the U. S. position of moderation. "In one of the unusual gambles in diplomatic history, the President and the Secretary of State proposed to confront Egypt's President Nasser with the pressures of moral law."


\textsuperscript{24}"Nasser Takes A Big Jump," \textit{Business Week}, loc. cit.

Dulles' moderation was seen by *Time* as having blunted the Anglo-French demands for forceful retaliation against Egypt. The United States thereby had assumed the leadership in the crisis. "Should the force of law bring an effective settlement in the Middle East, the favorable repercussions would be of sweeping significance. But a failure—or any effort to let Nasser go his way unrepentant—would be a tremendous blow to the Eisenhower-Dulles policy and to U. S. prestige everywhere." 26 Time and again *Time* was to echo the Administration's position that settlement of the Suez dispute should be made in conformance with justice and international law.

As *Newsweek* saw it, central to a peaceful solution of the problem was the willingness of all to compromise. The resolution of the first London Conference was seen as a compromise for it was not the "ultimatum" the British and French had first demanded, nor did it accept unrestricted Egyptian control over the Suez Canal. 27 Following the failure of the Menzies mission to Cairo, *Newsweek* feared that: "Compromise seemed possible only on Gamal Abdel Nasser's terms." This resulted in Eden's greatest challenge since Munich. 28

The United States was seen as continuing to strive for compromise following the failure of the Menzies mission, even


27 "If There's 'Reasonableness' About Suez...," *Newsweek*, Sept. 3, 1956, p. 34.

at the risk of some Anglo-French animosity, by proposing the Suez Canal Users' Association. Nasser was depicted as exerting every effort to keep the Canal open and to continue negotiations in order not to provide Britain and France with an excuse to use force. *Newsweek*’s John Madigan was reported to have cabled from Cairo that Western diplomats there were convinced that with proper economic inducements, Nasser might be convinced to agree to a compromise. "The imponderable, they admit, is how far Sir Anthony Eden will—or can—back down." Newsweek alone of the four major news magazines suggested that a solution to the Suez dispute might depend on anything other than for Egypt to give in. While it cannot be argued that Newsweek was anxious to see Egypt "get away with" its nationalization of the Canal, it alone suggested that others besides Nasser might also be ultimately responsible for the conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

The efforts of the Western nations attending the first London Conference were interpreted by *Business Week* and *Time* as offering Nasser an opportunity to conclude a peaceful settlement. As a result of the first London Conference, *Time* argued, Nasser had a chance to own the Suez Canal Company (after appropriate compensation), and the world had a chance for guaranteed freedom of transit through the Canal. "The opportunity was Nasser's, and the onus of refusal his." *Business Week* predicted that

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30 "Where We Fit In," *Newsweek*, Aug. 13, 1956, p. 43.

the Cairo meeting between Nasser and the Menzies committee would not be more than "a negotiation about negotiating." But it should indicate whether Nasser was moving in the direction of a settlement that the West could accept."³² Ultimate responsibility for a settlement was neatly shifted to Egyptian shoulders since the West was depicted as making every constructive effort to achieve a peaceful solution. The onus for possible future failure of negotiations was seen as transferred to Egypt as a result of the first London Conference.

The picture of Nasser drawn by these four American newsmagazines was far from complimentary. Nasser was depicted as "a restless, unstable man intoxicated with vast ambitions."³³ Nasser allegedly dreamed of empire, a great Arab empire extending from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, and in control of the area's vast oil riches. Nasser's attempts to reduce Western influence in the area were all seen as part of his plot to build an Arab empire. As proof, these newsmagazines cited Nasser's Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. And they intimated that Nasser saw himself as the "hero" mentioned in his book.³⁴


³⁴ "Special International Report: Nasser's Real Objective: Arab Riches in Oil," Newsweek, Aug. 13, 1956, pp. 44-49; "The Counterpuncher," Time, Aug. 27, 1956, pp. 21-28; and "One Dictator Who's In Trouble...," U. S. News, loc. cit. Nasser wrote that Egypt's role was dictated by its geographic position. Egypt was at the center of three circles: an Arab circle, an African circle, and an Islamic circle. Referring to the first circle, he wrote: "For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search
Britain and France were described as determined to use force to regain control of the Canal, but, due to the efforts of the United States, they were dissuaded from doing so, at least until after the first London Conference. "The U. S. was willing to join its Allies in a solid front against Nasser, but it was anxious at the same time to avoid any ill-considered step that might lead to shooting." The U. S. was seen as advocating a moderate stand which had "blunted the demands of the British and French for direct, quick retaliation against Egypt." The American role was represented as designed to contribute to the pressure for calm, and to cautiously pursue a policy leading to some form of international control of the Suez Canal.

of a hero,...(I)t seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down...near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it." It was, ostensibly, a collective role, for all of Egypt, to be the hero of the Arab circle. Nasser added that the role was not one of leadership, but one of interaction, "to spark the tremendous power latent in the area." He dreamt of unified Arab opposition to the common enemy--Western imperialism. Nasser felt there were three main sources of Arab strength: 1. "a community of neighboring peoples linked by all the material and moral ties possible"; 2. the Arab land itself and its position on the map; and 3. "oil--a sinew of material civilization without which all its members would cease to function." Nasser discussed the significance of Arab oil--its great reserves and its economical production. He concluded: "So we (Arabs) are strong...when we remain silent and measure the extent of our ability to act; when we really understand the strength resulting from the ties binding us together, making our land a single region from which no part can withdraw, and of which no part...can be defended without defense of the whole." Thus, Nasser dreamt of Arab unity--which is difficult to equate with quest for empire. He dreamt of Arab progress, and of Arab employment of the elements of Arab strength to achieve freedom from Western imperialism. Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Wash., D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), pp. 81-114.

35"'Strong Man' and the Storm Over Suez," Newsweek, loc. cit.
Since Britain, France and the United States had agreed to convene the first London Conference, the odds were "better than even" that there would be no shooting until after its conclusion, unless Nasser were to decide to close the Canal. The greatest danger to Egypt now was seen to be from Russian Communism, not from a Western resort to force. 38

American newsmagazines acclaimed the resolution of the first London Conference as a reasonable starting point for negotiations. A long, tense period of diplomatic maneuvering was envisioned before a final settlement could be reached. 39 Dulles was praised for the way he had handled the conference. The newsmagazines noted how Dulles had won acclaim from European diplomats. Time commented: "He (Dulles) had set an unfailingly conciliatory tone, in contrast to the original hot anger of the French and British, and tirelessly revising his international-control plan to meet the reservations of the new Asian nations, built up the wide backing that would make it harder for Nasser to refuse the heart of the proposal--to insulate the Suez Canal from any nation's politics." 40 Newsweek found positive results in the fact that the Western alliance had survived dangerous stress intact, and that Dulles had won the support of three Afro-Asian nations--Pakistan, Iran, and Ethiopia--for the conference.


proposal. "Even dissenting India, Indonesia, and Ceylon...spoke warmly of the West's 'conciliatory' attitude, and privately urged Nasser to negotiate." It was up to Nasser and his Soviet mentors to decide whether to negotiate on the basis of the conference proposal. 41

The failure of the Menzies mission sparked questions about how Britain and France would react to Nasser's rejection of the London proposal. Economic sanctions were widely anticipated. At the same time, Nasser was reported under great pressure from many quarters to reach a negotiated settlement. 42


The failure of the Menzies mission challenged the West to respond. The Western answer took the form of the Suez Canal Users' Association, brainchild of Secretary of State Dulles. Reaction of the newsmagazines to the scheme varied. Business Week saw the proposal as indication that the United States had moved into the Suez crisis "in a big way--taken over, in fact, the leadership of the Western cause in the conflict." Thus, as it had done so many times before in the post-World War II period, the United States stepped into a power vacuum in order to resist Russian advances. The Suez Canal Users' Association served several vital functions. While threatening to boycott Suez, it

41 "If There's 'Reasonableness' About Suez...," Newsweek, loc. cit.

presented, at the same time, an opportunity for a renewal of negotiations with Nasser. "It offered the West an alternative to war, on the one hand, or a backdown, on the other." 43

Newsweek argued that Dulles had conceived the plan "not so much as a means of achieving international control over Suez but to give the West a common instrument with which to counter Nasser short of war." Newsweek commented further: "No one expects the Scheme to work." It saw SCUA as an instrument whereby the Western nations could pursue "other steps" following the expected Egyptian refusal of passage to SCUA piloted ships. The interpretation made of "other steps" by the United States was detouring Suez. "Britain and France, however, still talk of force." 44

Time noted that the United States, Britain and France, who had seemed to be moving in divergent directions, united and confronted Nasser "with the chance to back down from his West-flouting seizure of the Suez Canal or the risk of exposing his impoverished nation to an economic squeeze." 45

Early in this phase of the Suez dispute, a telling difference of approach emerges between the way Newsweek and Time covered the crisis in the latter half of September, 1956, on into October, 1956, prior to the outbreak of war in the Middle East. It will be recalled that during this period optimistic reports dominated the American newspapers of our study, and that from the middle of October to the outbreak of war Suez ceased to be a matter of pressing concern to them. So too, coverage of the crisis in

44 "At Swords' Point," Newsweek, Sept. 24, 1956, p. 44.
Business Week and U. S. News and World Report was diminished. Newsweek and Time continued regular, though briefer, coverage. During this period, Newsweek tended to stress the forces of disunity among the Western allies—the United States, Britain, and France. While recognizing Dulles' efforts to maintain Big Three unity, Newsweek stressed the continuing threat that the alliance was on the verge of coming apart. Britain and France were repeatedly induced by Dulles to agree reluctantly to work together with the U. S. in his continually changing schemes. Thus, Newsweek contended that Britain and France were persuaded by Dulles to accept a "watered-down" SCUA "which came close to what Nasser has been demanding all along." While U. S. officials optimistically predicted Egyptian willingness to compromise, Newsweek pointed out that Britain and France blamed Secretary Dulles for making Nasser's position even harder to crack. Big Three unity was "under renewed strain." Concerning debates before the United Nations Security Council, Newsweek commented: "The West's problem was not so much how to force Egypt into line, but how to heal the rift in its own ranks." Reporting on the appointment of Eyvind Bartels as Administrator for the Suez Canal Users' Association, Newsweek also noted the disunity of the Western Powers on Suez. The U. S. wanted to work with Nasser to keep the Canal open and to pay him a fair share of the canal dues collected by SCUA. Britain, however, wished to withhold the dues and to use SCUA as an economic weapon.


Newsweek concluded: "Until the West made up its own mind, no Suez solution seemed possible." 48

During this period, Time, which recognized the threat of Western disunity, emphasized that it was repeatedly overcome by Secretary Dulles' efforts. Dulles' plan for a Users' Association was seen as removing the threat of force from the Suez crisis, and as replacing it with a Western strategy of "massive but peaceful pressure." The U. S., Britain and France "came together in a united plan." 49 It reported that the second London Conference was in great danger of becoming mired in irresolution until Dulles softened the plan for SCUA. Then Dulles struck at the crux of the matter by pointing out emotionally that if the use of force was to be ruled out, "nations must join in seeking solutions that are just, as well as peaceful." The speech was effective, Time concluded: "The delegates were impressed." SCUA was accepted. Britain and France agreed to the proposal—which represented a "climb-down... from an admittedly unsteady perch." Time evaluated SCUA thus:

S. C. U. A. remains loose and only mildly binding, but it provides the canal users with a body that can negotiate with Nasser, move on to other concerted action should he block the canal or prove unable to keep it open. It does this in a manner that avoids, so far, acts that plunge the Suez crisis into full deadlock, yet leaves the Westerners free to keep moving, keep trying to make time work for them instead of for Nasser.... 50

49 "The Crisis Turns," Time, loc. cit.
Reporting on activities before the United Nations Security Council, *Time* noted that the U. S. and its Anglo-French allies had not started in step. There were differences over the timing of taking the issue to the United Nations—the U. S. preferring to hold off until SCUA was fully launched. And the U. S. had cast the deciding vote for the Egyptian counter-complaint. "After that, however, diplomats of the three Western powers got together in efforts to seek one common objective in the Security Council—a resolution that will budge Egypt's Nasser back toward internationalization of the control of the canal."51

Even *Time* could not totally overlook the lack of Western unanimity on the proper course of action to pursue in the Suez crisis which was evident in the Security Council debates.52 But results of the United Nations debates and the passing of the Six Principles were regarded by *Time* as the first important breakthrough in the Suez dispute. *Time* regarded Nasser's remarks—"What does Mr. Dulles mean by 'insulating the canal from politics'?"—as casting doubt on the prospects of the Six Principles. Yet, echoing President Eisenhower, it remained optimistic: "The week's events, however, could be counted a broad step toward conciliation and away from the recent angry moment when governments were mobilizing fleets and armies and threatening war over Suez."53

Newsweek momentarily softened its concern over Western disunity, seeing U. S. support in the United Nations of the British-French implementing resolution as indication that "Western unity on Suez had been strengthened." The Russian veto of the resolution made the Council's unanimous approval of the Six Principles anticlimactic. Nevertheless, Newsweek saw "hope that a basis had been laid for further negotiations. President Eisenhower said '...it looks like...a very great crisis is behind us.'" 54

During the period of proposal of the Suez Canal Users' Association and the Security Council debates, these American newsmagazines tended to be somewhat optimistic. U. S. News and World Report observed that the Suez crisis was "settling down into a long tug of war." 55 All parties to the crisis were reported taking a long second look. Nasser was keeping the Canal open. Boycotting Suez could cost the West more than it would cost Nasser. The prospects of getting rid of Nasser, it seemed to U. S. News—in a major shift from its earlier line—was "another idea that no longer looks feasible. It might be hard to do. And Nasser's successor might just continue Nasser's ideas." The only thing left to the West was "a program of slow, mild pressure...on Nasser." 56

56 "Worldgram," U. S. News, Oct. 5, 1956, pp. 79-80. On the argument that boycotting Egypt was unlikely to have the desired results, see: "Is the Squeeze Working?" Newsweek, Oct. 8, 1956, pp. 32-34.
Newsweek foresaw the possibility of compromise resulting in a Suez solution as all sides to the controversy had given themselves over to sober second thoughts. Talk of boycotting the Canal gave way to thoughts of using the Users' Association to provide the foundation for intervention by the United Nations, and Nasser was reported listening to pleas for moderation from India and worried, oil-rich Arab rulers. "The realities of economics and world politics in the atomic age might yet dictate a compromise." However, Newsweek's optimism for a compromise solution was overshadowed by its preoccupation with manifestations of Western disunity.

American reaction to the Anglo-French decision to go before the United Nations with the Suez dispute evoked differing news-magazine interpretations. Newsweek reported that Dulles was very annoyed when the British and French took the dispute to the United Nations without prior American agreement. It indicated that Dulles' aim was to involve the Foreign Ministers of both sides (Britain's Selwyn Lloyd, France's Christian Pineau, and Egypt's Mahmoud Fawzi, Russia's Dmitri T. Shepilov) in private meetings at the United Nations "where chances of compromise were better." 58

Time reported that the United States was surprised at the timing of the Anglo-French decision to go before the United Nations, "but acquiesced." Time continued: "Said Dulles: 'This is an interdependent world and you cannot thrive and prosper if

57 "A Suez Compromise?: Don't Count It Out," Newsweek, loc. cit.
you deny the principle of interdependence.' Taking the case to the U. N. was another way of airing the West's concern, of impressing the world with its urgency and of seeking a settlement by means rooted not in the jungle but in law."59

In the last two weekly editions before the outbreak of war the newsmagazines paid little attention to the Suez dispute. Like the daily newspapers, their attention was attracted to the events in Eastern Europe. Expressions of optimism were common. Only Newsweek made much of the disunity between the United States and its Anglo-French allies. Yet even Newsweek did not predict the consequences of that disunity--war.

Up to this point there were no strong criticisms of Eisenhower Administration Suez policies by these American newsmagazines. Administration efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement were approved.

Invasion, the General Assembly and UNEF, and the Anglo-French Withdrawal

The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt was generally juxtaposed to the Russian invasion of Hungary, by American newsmagazines, in the issues released immediately after the outbreaks of hostilities. All issued instant analyses of the significance of the double eruption of fighting. Opinion varied on the important consequences of these troublesome occurrences. All agreed that they portended highly consequential new developments and set in motion new forces. Business Week exclaimed: "(T)here is no doubt that the whole pattern of the postwar world has been

torn to shreds by the violence in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East and by Eisenhower's reaction to the two events."
The communist monolith had been completely shattered and the Western alliances had been shaken so much by the independent actions of Britain and France that the confidence between London and Washington would not be restored easily.60

Newsweek proclaimed: "The world would not be the same in our time." It found that Hungary proved that "international Communism could no longer be fastened on nationalist-minded nations merely with the devices of political trickery, secret police, and the ever-present threat of force." The British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt showed that "collective security among power blocs based on larger common interests no longer provided a base for common solution of all problems." The United Nations, backed solidly by the United States, was "about the only hope of a peace that could be made to stick."61

Time found Eisenhower "taking a stand for justice and law amid the tangle of a baffling and dangerous double crisis" on election day. But British-French acceptance of the United Nations cease-fire signified that things were returning to normal. Time concluded: "No nation, the free-world had relearned, could afford to divert its attention very long or very far from


the Soviets, always the threat, always implacable, always there."62

U. S. News and World Report argued that since Communism could not give people what they want, explosions were likely to continue convulsing Eastern Europe. A weakened Soviet Russia emboldened others to take strong action, as Britain, France and Israel turned to arms. U. S. relations with Britain and France might be a little strained, "temporarily, but not for long."63 Elsewhere in the same issue, U. S. News found that "alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain no longer amount to much." The Warsaw Pact was a "shambles" and NATO was "on the skids." The United Nations had been given another damaging blow by two charter members, Britain and France. It failed to prevent a Middle Eastern war.64

The Soviet suggestion that the United States join it in intervention against the British and French invasion of Egypt was labeled "unthinkable" by American officials. Time noted that Eisenhower answered Bulganin "in stern and unequivocal language."65 Newsweek found that the President had responded to Bulganin even more bluntly than Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who had first declared the Soviet suggestion unthinkable. Eisenhower pointed out to Bulganin, in a special


65 "Man of the Hour," Time, loc. cit.
White House statement—"made public—as had Bulganis's note—before the diplomatic reply was delivered"—that only after Russia ceased its repression of Hungary and withdrew its troops would it be proper for the Soviet Union to talk of peace.  

Elsewhere Newsweek concluded: "The Kremlin's incredible cynicism was wasted on President Eisenhower" who rejected joint intervention.

Failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion to achieve its objective was attributed to certain basic miscalculations. It was postulated that the British, French and Israelis believed the U. S. would be preoccupied with its presidential election campaign and would take no steps against them. The British and French presumed the U. S. would neutralize Soviet Russia.

Soviet threats to use rockets against Britain and France, and Soviet offers of "volunteers" to aid Egypt sparked debate in the American newsmagazines, in the month of November, 1956, over the likelihood of global war. As we saw in Chapter I, as a former soldier, Eisenhower was not greatly impressed by Russian threats. He apparently chose to let them add to the pressures on Britain, France, and Israel to cease-fire and withdraw. At that time, the CIA leaked reports of Russian

66 "To Stop the Tide," Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1956, p. 36.
military activity which had no basis in fact. 69 The Administration, in all likelihood, used the fear of war to win domestic and foreign support for U. S. Suez policies. Its efforts to exploit war hysteria undoubtedly contributed to press speculation about the imminence of world war. Business Week claimed initially that total war was "not probable." 70 By mid-month, however, it found that "(p)eace literally hung in the balance" as a consequence of Soviet offers to send "volunteers" to Egypt. The Soviet goal in making this offer was to force an unconditional withdrawal of British and French troops and to place the U. N. police force under Nasser's control, thereby, eliminating the Western influence from the Middle East. Business Week concluded: "The real question is whether Moscow is ready to risk war to achieve this goal—or whether it's bluffing." 71

Newsweek seemed obsessed with the fear of World War III. "The world had moved steadily nearer the rim of disaster" as a result of Soviet threats, it theorized. "The Russians held the key." 72 This was hardly the case. Dulles had actually been


70 "Out of Hungary, Suez Disasters, A Rebuilt Western Alliance," Business Week, loc. cit.


72 "Look East for the Decision," Newsweek, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 41; and "The Struggle for Durable Peace," Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1956, p. 29. See also: "Edge of Conflict," Newsweek, Nov. 19, 1956, pp. 42-43, for a sensational account of an emergency Presidential session with top Congressional leaders during which the following was reported to have taken place:
told by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Russians were in no position to act militarily in the Middle East, not even through dispatch of "volunteers." Heikal subsequently confirmed the accuracy of Pentagon estimates. He told of a meeting between Syrian President Shukri al-Kuwatli and Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai A. Bulganin, and Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, in which Kuwatli told the Russians they must intervene. Zhukov unfolded a map in front of him and asked Kuwatli, "Mr. President, here is the map, look at it, how can we intervene?" Since the Russians were unable to intervene in the Middle East, there was no possibility of the Anglo-French invasion leading to a total war. Nevertheless, only in late November, 1956, did Newsweek magazine

"At the closely guarded emergency session, President Eisenhower addressed the 23 most important members of Congress in grave, measured tones:

"'Everything is being done to achieve a peaceful solution (in the Middle East). There will either be a peaceful solution, or a terrible nuclear war.'

"Few of the legislators summoned to the White House Cabinet room Friday a week ago had realized the stark dimensions of the crisis. The President...called on Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to summarize developments Mr. Eisenhower called 'very serious but not alarming.'

"Charles Halleck of Indiana, the Republican House floor leader, broke in: 'I'm glad to hear that it isn't as bad as the picture painted in the newspapers.'

"Soberly, the President replied: 'I'm sorry about my choice of words. The situation is actually more serious than what you have been reading in the papers.'"

While one may doubt the accuracy of this account, it serves to illustrate the emotion Newsweek projected at that period of time--fear of global war.

73 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 186.
74 Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
find that the alleged danger of war had receded, although it had not been removed. 75

Time noted that, by the time widespread fears of world war began to appear in the headlines, diplomats were beginning to think that they had affairs under control. Israel had agreed to withdraw; Britain and France would comply with the United Nations Emergency Force. "The Middle East crisis became a race between the U. N.--trying for peace before the Russians could intervene--and the Russians, hastening to raise 'volunteers' by the thousands (and in entire army reserve units), perhaps to move into the Middle East under the guise of peacemakers." 76

Late in November, Time reported Soviet flights over Turkey to Syria of complete air force units which took up positions around 3 Syrian airfields. Time remarked that for a few strained hours Washington officials did not know whether the United States "would or would not be in a shooting war with Russian 'volunteers' within the next 48 hours." President Eisenhower reacted calmly and instructed Ambassador Bohlen "to make absolutely sure that the Kremlin did not misunderstand U. S. intentions; if the Russians moved troops into the Middle East the U. S. would oppose them with arms." When Russia did nothing, Time concluded: "From all visible signs it seemed the Russians had understood what the U. S. meant...." 77 As we have seen, the Russians had no

intention of intervening. The United States apparently felt constrained to counter Soviet propaganda moves with similar ploys of its own. Thus, it responded to Russian threats by sending Bohlen to the Kremlin and placing U.S. forces on the alert.

U.S. News and World Report argued simply that Soviet Russia, held in check by American threats to oppose introduction of "volunteers" in Egypt, would "stop short of action which can bring World War III." 78

Newsweek alone of these major American newsmagazines indicated any interest in the possibility of a Muslim Holy War (Jihad) against the West and Israel. It alone seemed to find Jihad a real and frightening possibility. With a melodramatic touch, Newsweek opined: "And, in the dark and narrow streets and in the bazaars of Eastern cities, there was a potential that few dared think about--Jihad or Holy War. Troops were moving among the Moslem nations in a way that suggested the worst--now or later." 79 Newsweek later claimed to see in Nasser's survival in power indication that "the threat of Holy War was as pressing as ever." 80

The U.S. decision to oppose the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion and to work through the United Nations received support from Business Week and Time. They pictured the United States as


80 "Passage in the Storm," Newsweek, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 27.
gaining world-wide credit for opposing its allies' aggression, and global recognition for the role it played in ending the hostilities and in restoring stability to the Middle East. Thus, the U. S. gained greater prestige among the family of nations. American Suez policy was seen as protecting the totality of Western interests in the ex-colonial world, and of maintaining working relations with Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.81

A bit more florid, perhaps, than some of the other comments were these remarks of *Time*:

In a sense, the prestige of the U. S. rose as that of its rivals fell. The myth of the Moscow mass man and Marxist benevolence lay buried in the rubble of Budapest.... The British and French...had temporarily lost their credentials for world statesmanship. But in another sense, the U. S. had earned the new regard by its own conduct. In time of crisis and threat of World War III, President Eisenhower had cast U. S. policy in a role to reflect the U. S.'s basic character--its insistence on justice, its desire for friendship, and its hatred of aggression and brutality.82

Although the United States claimed to rely upon the United Nations to restore order and the rule of law in the Middle East, *U. S. News and World Report* argued that it was the United States, not the United Nations, which forced the Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt. *U. S. News* remarked that this proved that the United Nations could be no more effective a force for world peace "than the two major powers, the United States and Russia, choose to

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to make it. Whenever the interests of these two nations collide, the one with the advantages on its side can control the success or failure of any U. N. action." While never expressing direct opposition to U. S. reliance on the United Nations to solve the Suez problem, U. S. News repeatedly expressed misgivings about the United Nations ability and effectiveness. Editorially, David Lawrence took the position that "the United Nations in recent years has become a political body where 'log rolling' and the 'expediency' of opportunism rules the day. Partisanship has superseded objectivity." As an example Lawrence cited the fact that the U. N. had resolved upon the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces and upon the reopening of the Canal itself "without providing a means of dealing with the illegality which was the original cause of the whole tragedy.

"International rights are readily defined. The historic principles of rectitude in international behavior are well known.

"The time has come to establish the rule of law." The United Nations Emergency Force was seen by U. S. News as lacking "real punch." And it feared that UNEF would fall under Egyptian domination if President Nasser's demands were complied with. Later in the same issue, U. S. News observed

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that "under the restrictions set forth for the (U. N.) force, its chances of accomplishing anything looked slim to most observers." U. S. News's fears were not without foundation. On November 19, 1956, Hammarskjold, Nasser and Fawzi approved a formal understanding that: 1. UNEF's presence in Egypt was conditional upon Egypt's consent; 2. Egypt "when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF...will be guided, in good faith,...by the General Assembly Resolution"; and 3. the United Nations "will be guided...by...the aforementioned Resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed." No target date was set for the completion of UNEF's task. More importantly, UNEF was clearly in Egypt at that country's sufferance.


89 When, in 1967, Nasser requested the withdrawal of UNEF, Secretary-General U Thant acted according to the letter of the original agreement. He later claimed to be unaware of an August 5, 1957, Hammarskjold aide-memoire, subsequently released for publication by Ernest Gross, a former U. N. legal adviser, in 1967, after Thant's decision to withdraw UNEF from Egypt. In the aide memoire, Hammarskjold made it clear that he believed UNEF had been set up by bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel. "The consequence of such a bilateral declaration is that were either side to act militarily in refusing continued pressure or deciding on withdrawal...an exchange of views would be called for towards harmonising the position." Quoted by: Walter Z. Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 88-89.
the course of the preliminary discussions, Nasser imposed on Hammarskjold the condition that canal clearance would not begin until all non-Egyptian forces were withdrawn. Hammarskjold also agreed not to station UNEF in the Canal Zone. Egypt gave its commitment to explore with the United Nations concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF in Egypt. The provisions finally agreed to were adopted on the basis of an oral agreement between Nasser and Hammarskjold. UNEF was empowered to arrest suspected infiltrators within half a mile of the truce line, and to open fire on infiltrators in self-defense.

While expressing grave doubts about the role the United Nations could play, David Lawrence did not deny the editorial support of his publication to the Eisenhower Administration. He argued that the strong nations—Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States—had agreed unanimously "to enforce the resolution of the United Nations in seeking to stop a local war." Thereby, the United States was giving support "to a new balance of power in the world." Lawrence commented:

"Whether for any long period of time this can spare the world the horrors of a big war may be debatable, but there can be no doubt of the President's broad objective. It is to apply the principle expressed in diplomacy as a "modus vivendi"—a way to get along or to live with existing problems without a war."

"The entire world will hope and pray that the new balance of power will gain what is most necessary—time."

Time for the Soviet empire to collapse was the sort of time

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90 Finer, Dulles Over Suez, op. cit., p. 450.
Lawrence coveted. Lawrence echoed Dulles' October 30 back­
grounder remarks and anticipated his December 6th remarks that 
the Soviet empire was crumbling. Apparently the events in 
Central Europe in the fall of 1956 led many Americans to presume 
that the collapse of the Soviet Empire was imminent, which, of 
course, it was not.

U. S. News suffered from a special phobia--fear of commu­
nist global expansion and a longing for its destruction. This 
was evident throughout the Suez crisis. For example, despite 
the failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli combined operation in 
Egypt, U. S. News professed to derive satisfaction from the fact 
that a "Soviet plot" had been "foiled." What sort of plot? 
U. S. News interpreted the finding of vast quantities of Soviet 
military hardware in Sinai in this way: "Russia had shipped 
large quantities of planes, tanks, armored vehicles, weapons and 
other equipment into the Middle East. The British now explain 
that these shipments were to be followed into the Middle East by 
Soviet 'volunteers' to operate that equipment. Egypt's Nasser 
then was to become another Soviet puppet.

"Thus, the Egyptian invasion may have choked off this 
Soviet plot." U. S. News was the only American newsmagazine 
which supported this British fabrication. There seemed to be

92 David Lawrence, "The New Balance of Power," U. S. News, 
Nov. 23, 1956, p. 164.

93 "War Russian Style: 10 Days That Spelled Defeat...," 
U. S. News, loc. cit. See also: "War Russian Style: Britain 
Debates Kremlin's Scheme to Take Over Egypt," U. S. News, 
Nov. 23, 1956, pp. 46-48, for Parliamentary remarks of British 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox Boyd, on the 
Soviet "plot."
no factual evidence that such stockpiles existed. Furthermore, the argument overlooked the fact that Russia's arms deliveries to Egypt had been common knowledge for over a year.

Only *Time* endorsed Dulles' charges of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. *Time* found that there was "plenty of evidence to show that the two attacks were planned in collusion....In this conspiracy, France was the instigator, Britain a belated partner, and Israel the willing trigger." This was in essence what actually happened. In September, 1956, France, disenchanted with British hesitation, sought Israeli participation. Israel agreed to attack Egypt in a preventive war, providing France with a pretext to seize the Canal. On October 16, Britain agreed to the Franco-Israeli scheme in closed-door discussions with France. *Time* theorized correctly that Britain made the decision to back Israel, at France's urging, during the October 16 meeting between Prime Minister Eden, Foreign Secretary Lloyd, and Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau. "State Department officials are sure that the British and French callously deceived or misled them from that date onward." When Israel began its mobilization on October 25, *Time* reported, American military attaches noticed that their French and British colleagues no longer talked to them. When Dulles summoned British and French diplomats to get their cooperation on an emergency Security Council meeting, "they stalled." Neither


the U. S. nor the Commonwealth was notified about the Anglo-
French ultimatum until 15 minutes after Eden announced it. From
this combination of circumstances Time deduced "collusion." 96

U. S. News hinted at the possibility of collusion. Noting
that in London one heard only denials of the charge of collusion,
U. S. News commented wryly: "There is no official evidence of
such collusion available in London or in Paris. But the Paris
Government seldom has made any move in the Middle East without
consulting Britain, or at least informing Britain." 97

The British and French had acted independently of the United
States in the Suez invasion, and, consequently, the Western
alliance appeared threatened. From the beginning, Eisenhower had
stressed his intention to preserve and to repair the alliance.
This was picked up by the newsmagazines and supported. At the
same time, it was noted that the U. S. was following an independent
policy in the dispute. 98 Dulles' argument that the Anglo-French
invasion camouflaged Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was also
repeated. It was seen as a "boon" to the Kremlin. "It was a
measure of the betrayal of mankind's best hopes by Britain and
France that the embarrassed West could not cry shame with one
voice" against the Russian invasion of Hungary. 99 This latter

96 "The Conspiracy: How Britain, France and Israel Got
97 "Why Britain and France Went to War in Egypt," U. S. News,
loc. cit.
98 "Man In Charge," Time, Nov. 19, 1956, p. 22; and "Inter-
99 "Danger in the Jungle," Time, loc. cit. See also: "This
Week: A Basic Shift in U. S. Foreign Relations," Business Week,
loc. cit.
remark recalled Dulles' observation, during his October 30 back­
grounder, that because of the Anglo-French military action, the opportunity was lost to the West to use the Hungarian invasion against Communism.

Newsweek assessed the outcome of the Anglo-French-Israeli failure to unseat Nasser negatively. Despite easy military success, they had gained little. Egypt had suffered ignominious military defeat. But extraordinary luck (fortified by Soviet threats, and U. S. pressure for peace) enabled Nasser to rebound from the brink of defeat. Newsweek regarded him the real victor in the dispute. If left to his own devices, Nasser could start new trouble in the Middle East. 100


Generally, Newsweek took no discernible stand--pro or con--on U. S. Suez policies. But Newsweek newsanalyst Henry Hazlitt wrote an extremely scathing criticism of U. S. foreign policy myths. The U. S. got into the Suez crisis because of its post­World War II foreign policy "mishmash of specious slogans, fallacious economic ideas, and pseudo-idealistic assumptions with no counterpart in reality." Among the pillars of post-war American foreign policy, according to Hazlitt, were:

... (1) the reiteration that every step we take must be "short of war"; (2) the program of giving away money and goods to foreign governments all over the globe almost regardless of their internal or external policies; and (3) an announced determination to "act" only through the United Nations.

Hazlitt found Eisenhower's announcement, that he could not "conceive of military force being a good solution," "gratuitous," as was Dulles' that the U. S. did not intend to shoot its way through the Canal. Both remarks "assured Nasser and the Russian leaders that they could commit any aggression of barbarity without fear of reprisal." Hazlitt's remarks were quite perceptive. Heikal has subsequently confirmed the fact that Nasser was encouraged by such imprudent Administration remarks.

Concerning the Menzies mission, Heikal wrote:

... It was an abject failure. It was doomed anyway, doomed by its originator Dulles who, at a press conference in Washington on August 28, had told the world that "the Suez Canal is not a primary concern of the United States." He thus rendered Menzies powerless and President Eisenhower added to Menzies' discomfiture at another press conference on September 4, soon after Menzies had arrived in Cairo. "We are committed," said Eisenhower, "to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else." When Nasser heard of this, he said: "That man puzzles me; which side is he on?"

It was obvious that the Americans were backing down. Eden was beside himself with fury. And Nasser rode high.

The remarks Heikal cited were not the same ones Hazlitt recalled, although in both cases the implications were fairly similar. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine the impact the words Hazlitt referred to must have had on the Egyptians. In all probability, they further confirmed Nasser's belief that time was on the side of the Egyptians, and that by diplomatic means they could fore-

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101 Heikal, Cairo Documents, op. cit., pp. 102-103.
stall an Anglo-French invasion until world opinion would weigh so heavily upon the British and French that they would recognize that force was not an appropriate response.

To Hazlitt, the worst U. S. sin was making a fetish of the United Nations. For Hazlitt believed, as British and French statesmen saw at long last, "that to refer crucial problems to the U. N. is to evade responsibility and invite paralysis." And he hoped that before irreparable harm had been done "we in America will stop putting our conscience and decisions in the hands of other nations, and stop throwing away American principles and Western civilization by turning every critical problem over to the hazards of a vote by African, Asian, and Communist blocs." Until the United States found a way out of the Suez crisis, its economic outlook would "remain obscure." 102

Later in the crisis, Newsweek newsanalyst Ernest K. Lindley argued that "lack of a comprehensive, consistent American policy contributed directly to the recent crisis." But since the United States had demonstrated through its non-support for Britain, France, and Israel, that American foreign policies were controlled neither by Zionism nor by London and Paris, "We have a better opportunity to exert constructive leadership in the Near and Middle East than we have ever had before." In order to take full advantage of the opportunity, Lindley proposed that the United States initiate a three-phase program offering:

1. An Eisenhower Marshall Plan of coordinated financial aid

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for Middle Eastern countries, comprehensive enough to make it unnecessary for any Middle Eastern government to turn to the Soviets for assistance. The plan would call for a coordinated five-or-ten year plan of economic development and resettlement of the Arab refugees;

2. A permanent Suez settlement including the creation of an international zone (under United Nations control) 20 to 30 miles wide. This would permit the digging of a second canal and the laying of pipelines; and

3. A permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Provided the U. N. police force remained in the area, the Arab-Israeli settlement need not be immediate. The U. S. and the U. N. would guarantee the frontiers. Israel might retain control of the Gaza Strip. Jordan might federate with Iraq, with some frontier adjustments in favor of Israel.

Lindley's comprehensive program of economic development would be contingent upon a Suez settlement and Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist. In the context of the Middle East in 1956, Lindley's proposal seems unrealistic. While various Arab States have gladly accepted millions of U. S. dollars, they have repeatedly opposed cooperative economic development schemes. This was the case when the Eisenhower six-point proposal was made during the Lebanon crisis scarcely two years later. (see below: Chapter VI.) Egypt was highly unlikely to surrender its control of the Suez Canal Zone to the United Nations. In fact, Nasser refused to permit UNEF to be stationed in the Canal Zone,

and to accept UNEF administration of the Gaza Strip. Would he have been likely to surrender the Strip to Israel? Considering Egyptian opposition to Hashemite Iraq, Nasser probably would have resisted its federation with Jordan. Israel would not have been the only opponent to such action.

Following the first issue in December, newsmagazine coverage of the Suez dispute diminished until after the first of the new year. Attention was given to the progress of the Anglo-French pullout, to the supply of oil to Europe, and to clearance of the Canal. The British withdrawal was seen as signaling the end of an era. British Prime Minister Eden was described as a "tired" man who had succumbed to the pressures of the invasion.

Post-Anglo-French Withdrawal--Israeli Withdrawal

Unlike the American newspapers, the American newsmagazines expressed no criticism of U. S. Suez policy as a contributing factor to the retirement of British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden--"the victim of failure and illness." Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, was expected to make strenuous efforts to restore the Anglo-American alliance. In this, the "half-American" Prime Minister would be aided by his long-standing friendship with President Eisenhower, and by Eisenhower's reputed determin-

The fate of Nasser's Egypt was also of concern to these newsmagazines. They wondered how long Egypt could withstand Western economic pressure before becoming bankrupt. The Egyptian economy was reportedly in great difficulty—"economic ruin is staring Nasser in the face." But they also noted that the low standard of living prevalent in Egypt and the early imposition of rationing of goods by the Nasser regime made it unlikely there would be a rapid collapse. Nasser, paradoxically, was seen as stronger than ever and, in all likelihood, well able to withstand domestic plotting and intrigue. There was little chance that he would be overthrown. Greater fears were expressed that Egypt would become a Soviet satellite and Nasser a Russian puppet as Egypt came to rely more and more on Russian economic support to survive.

Of greatest concern to these American newsmagazines was Israeli refusal to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran without guarantees, and the resulting threat of United Nations sanctions to compel Israeli compliance with U. N. resolutions. Newsweek saw the Israeli decision as placing the United States and the United Nations "in a precarious spot."


for the Afro-Asians demanded "immediate action" against Israel and Egypt warned that U. N. failure to act might result in an indefinite shut-down of the Suez Canal. And Israel was digging in "for a long stay" in the Gaza Strip. "It would take strong words and heavy pressure to avert another Egyptian-Israeli blowup." 109

*Time* noted that Israeli defiance of the United Nations was "fateful not only for Israel and the Middle East, but for the U. S., the U. N. and for world peace." Intransigence fed intransigence for it was reported that Nasser had been "deliberately delaying" U. N. canal clearance operations and would not allow the canal to be reopened until the last Israeli left Egypt. *Time* concluded: "If there is no early settlement in the Middle East, the standing of both the U. S. and the U. N., as peacemakers, will suffer a severe blow. Even more serious is the prospect that the exchange across the Gaza Strip might once again shift from words to bullets and bombs." 110

Dulles' assurances to Israel that the U. S. would keep the Tiran Straits open and pressure the U. N. to post forces along the Israeli-Egyptian border were seen as a "determined effort" to end the deadlock. *Business Week* interpreted these steps as indication that "(t)he U. S., in effect, is getting out from behind the U. N. on this issue. It is offering to use its own

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power to force a settlement." Its efforts could spark a showdown with Egypt.¹¹¹ *Time* argued that United States diplomacy, while working outside the United Nations "as long as it could hope to be effective," was "not in conflict" with the United Nations.¹¹²

When Dulles' assurances to Israel did not bring about the desired results, President Eisenhower decided to make his nationwide radio and television address calling upon Israel to withdraw, and hinting at U. S. support for United Nations "pressure" if Israel did not. The President's address was variously interpreted. *Business Week* saw the address as giving Israel "a last chance to back down." It noted that the practical effect of sanctions was unclear. Administration backing of sanctions could shake Congressional support for the Eisenhower Doctrine, and failure to "push Israel into line" could dim American hopes of bringing Nasser to terms on the Suez Canal and on an Arab-Israel settlement. Thus, the Administration faced a real dilemma.¹¹³ Later in the same issue, *Business Week* expressed the belief that the President's speech "was meant to convince all quarters that he means business about (1) getting Israel to withdraw from Gaza and from the Gulf of Aqaba; and


(2) enforcing a rule of law against any belligerence in the area."\(^{114}\)

*Newsweek* saw the President's address as indication that:
1. "To all intents and purposes, present U. S.-Israeli negotiations on the working level are at an end (though they could be resumed)"; and 2. "The President has left the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations free to press for economic sanctions against Israel."\(^{115}\) But *U. S. News and World Report* regarded Eisenhower's address as an effort "to head off new troubles in the Middle East."\(^{116}\)

According to *Newsweek*, Israeli refusal to withdraw upset the Eisenhower Administration's timetable toward achieving a peaceful settlement for "the troubled and long turbulent Middle East," which would have been the crowning achievement of President Eisenhower's international career. President Eisenhower's own and U. S. prestige were on the line because he had staked them on his ability to dislodge Israel. Support of moderate Arabs would be lost if he failed. But he kept at it until Israel agreed to evacuate Gaza. Thus, "(b)arring some last-minute hitch, the path to an honorable compromise seemed to be opening at last."\(^{117}\)

\(^{114}\)"International Outlook," in *ibid.*, p. 159.


Both Time and Business Week foresaw deeper U. S. involvement in the Middle East as a consequence of the Israeli agreement to withdraw following American assurances. The United States had emerged from the Suez crisis to play the dominant role in the Middle East as the U. S. moved to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East.118

Following the Israeli agreement and withdrawal, several of these American newsmagazines expressed the belief that the United States would turn its pressure on Egypt to "exact from Nasser assurances" toward Israel, to settle the future of the Suez Canal, to bring about a permanent "truce" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to start oil flowing to Europe.119

Summary Remarks on Newsmagazines

Three of the four weekly newsmagazines, Business Week, Time, and U. S. News and World Report were clearly pro-Administration. Criticism by them of Eisenhower-Dulles Suez policy was so rare as to be almost non-existent. Their position was clearly one of near total support for Administration policies.

Newsweek's ideological position throughout the crisis was indeterminate. It was neither strongly pro-Administration, nor strongly anti-Administration. It tended to present the facts of Administration policies with interpretations of their


significance, without taking any particular stand on them. The strongest expression of criticism of U. S. Suez policies during the entire crisis appeared in *Newsweek* newssanalyst Henry Hazlitt's feature, "Business Tides," on December 17, 1956. Hazlitt attacked U. S. foreign policy myths in that issue. Normally, however, during the crisis, Hazlitt supported the notions of the rule of law in the international community and the sanctity of contracts, both positions with which the Eisenhower Administration was in general agreement. 120

Thus, by and large, the Eisenhower Administration enjoyed an overwhelmingly favorable press among the weekly American newsmagazines, in contrast to the daily newspapers, which were often quite critical of Administration actions. Consequently, the Administration had little cause to fear hostile press reaction from the newsmagazines.

**Opinion Journals and the Suez Crisis**

Some of the most critical comment on United States foreign policy during the Suez crisis appeared in American opinion journals, such as, *Commonweal*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, and *The Reporter*. The editorial positions of these four journals on U. S. Suez policy will be analyzed briefly, for they are representative of the adverse criticism to which the Eisenhower Administration was subjected over its Suez policy. Two of these

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opinion journals--The Nation and The New Republic--were highly critical of Secretary of State Dulles. Our analysis will concentrate on editorials which appeared in the four journals at the time of the crisis. While articles on the crisis appeared occasionally in these journals, they were few in number, and they generally conformed to the editorial position of the journal in which they were printed.

Editorial comment on the crisis appeared irregularly in the four journals. Weeks, and in one case months, passed without mention of crisis-related events. Our analysis will probe these opinion journals' reflections on U. S. Suez policy. Some of them offered novel, and, it must be said, not too realistic--in the context of the times--suggestions for alternative foreign policies. Each of the four journals advocated independent editorial policies; there were, however, some points of convergence, which will be noted appropriately. Of the four journals to be studied, three are weekly publications--Commonweal, The Nation, and The New Republic--and one--The Reporter--is a biweekly publication. The term opinion journals will be used frequently in this chapter to refer specifically to these four journals.

Commonweal saw in the withdrawal of the Western offer to help finance the High Dam and the subsequent Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal, an illustration of the "perils"
inherent in "changing policy in mid-flight." While recognizing that Nasser was not an easy man for the West to deal with, Commonweal could see nothing to be gained through the imposition of economic sanctions on Egypt and it regarded as "folly" expectations to dislodge Nasser by force of arms. It feared the possibility of Egypt turning to the Russians for aid. The U. S. should have stayed with its original offer of financial assistance "regardless of Soviet blandishments and Nasser threats." And it expressed for the first time its concern over a decline in U. S. prestige and power in the Middle East. 

"(W)e now have the satisfaction of knowing that by backing out on Aswan we have alienated large segments of the Arab world." ¹²¹

In its August 28 issue, Commonweal expressed the belief that it was not in the United States interest to participate in any British objective of "cutting Nasser down to size" for the means which Britain had discussed "either threaten our interests in the Middle East or contain the seeds of the third world war." Therefore, the United States "cannot lend present support" to this objective of British foreign policy. ¹²²

In its September 28 edition, Commonweal voiced concern that American support for the Anglo-French policy of concerted economic pressure on Egypt was "shortsighted" for, far from achieving a return to international control of the canal, this policy would merely solidify anti-Western sentiments in much


of the Arab world and would alienate most of the uncommitted nations. "Moreover, such a policy simply opens wide the door to Russian dominance in the Middle East." While it is questionable that the entire area would have come under Soviet dominance in such an eventuality, it is probable that Egypt would have been pushed further in that direction. The effectiveness of such tactics in compelling Egyptian acquiescence to Western demands is open to question, for Egypt was then, even more than now, a predominantly agricultural society, not greatly affected by the international market. Commonweal did not sufficiently analyze the options available to the West in the Suez dispute. Essentially, they were three in number: 1. economic sanctions—of doubtful utility; 2. force; and 3. protracted negotiations. To compel Egyptian compliance with Western wishes, only the first two had any chance to succeed. Protracted negotiations were unlikely to result in a settlement satisfactory to Britain and France since the longer negotiations lasted, the more likely Nasser was to win his case by default. Because there was little chance economic sanctions would be effective, force, the only option remaining to them, had great appeal to Anglo-French leaders. Their error was not to follow through once they had initiated military action.

Commonweal saw the United States as at least partially responsible for the situation in the Middle East and for the outbreak of war. It charged that the United States had followed a "policy of no-policy" which helped prepare the ground for the

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crisis, and which accounted for a decline in American power and prestige in the area. It accused the Eisenhower Administration of a failure "to design a policy which would be clear to ourselves, to our allies and to the nations of the Middle East." Unclear U.S. foreign policy resulted in war over the Suez Canal because the U.S. had managed to frustrate and to alienate all parties to the conflict. There was little for Americans to do but "to wax indignant and condemn those actions which we had helped to bring about." It was now impossible to hide the failure of U.S. foreign policy. The only thing left for the United States to do was to learn a lesson from these events. "In a shifting world the nation must have a firm yet flexible foreign policy." While pointing out the need for a "firm yet flexible" U.S. foreign policy, Commonweal did not indicate how this was to be brought about.

Later, on the question of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran, Commonweal indicated that the United States had taken a too rigid stand on withdrawal and was later forced to back down and to concede the need for some sort of guarantees to Israel against fedayeen raids and blockade. Reported U.S. willingness to support a proposal to use the U.N. police force in Egypt to protect Israel was seen as sure to encounter Arab-Asian opposition within the U.N. The U.S. anti-Israel stand, after all, had just won Arab-Asian favor.

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which the U. S. should want to keep. "One can only trust that this whirlwind turn of events has taught those shaping our foreign policy that all-or-nothing decisions are usually hard to live with." 126

Fearful that the wholehearted imposition of sanctions could set off a new outbreak of the clearly superior Israeli armed forces, Commonweal suggested three policy alternatives which the Administration might pursue, any one of which seemed to it to offer "greater possibilities than the present White House formula":

1. The American Navy could assume responsibility for keeping the Gulf of Aqaba open to shipping bound for Israel;

2. The U. S. could support some "largely pious" U. N. resolution regardless of Arab displeasure; and

3. The U. S. could encourage establishment of a series of U. N.-policed buffer zones to effectively separate the Middle Eastern combatants. 127

The U. S. was reluctant to incur Arab displeasure by supporting a "largely pious" U. N. resolution as a means of avoiding the complexities of the situation. During the Suez crisis, the U. S. sought to minimize Arab and Third World suspicions about the purity of American motives. Commonweal's suggestions that the American Navy should guarantee Gulf of Aqaba shipping open passage to Israel, and/or that the U. S. should encourage the establishment of U. N.-policed buffer zones

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to effectively separate Middle Eastern combatants, had little merit. The former implied a greater degree of U. S. involvement in the Middle East, and a willingness, if necessary, to use force to enforce such guarantees. The difficulty with the latter was that it would have required an even greater degree of U. S. support for the United Nations, and a further renunciation of U. S. independence of action. Both courses of action would have, in all likelihood, met with Arab opposition, for the general thrust of Arab foreign policy was to reduce to a minimum foreign involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. Both steps would have required that the Eisenhower Administration court Arab displeasure. But Washington sought to curry Arab favor, and deemed U. S. prestige on the rise in the Middle East. However, by the summer of 1957, as Finer observed: "The vaunted rise in American prestige in the Middle East, expected by Dulles and State Department officials as a reward for the Administration's enmity towards the allies' attack on Suez, was dissipated (if it had ever existed)." In June, 1957, Nasser attributed the Anglo-French cease-fire to several causes: the allies had not won a quick victory, the Egyptians were prepared to continue fighting, the Egyptian army still existed, although in retreat, and world opinion was adverse to allied action. Nasser reduced credit to Russia, and omitted thanks to Dulles and Eisenhower.\(^{128}\)

Having ignored the crisis editorially since July, in October, prior to the outbreak of war, *The Nation* predicted that Eden had discovered that gunboat diplomacy was "obsolete"

for "(n)either domestic opinion nor world opinion will sanction 'gunboat' tactics in situations where the danger of provoking a general war is implicit." It found that economic sanctions were also obsolete in a bi-polar world in which a rival power bloc existed, and from which the boycotted nation could obtain, "often at a premium, the supplies and materials it needs to survive." Sanctions could only be effective if backed by all major powers, East and West, through the United Nations. 129

Because the Department of State had granted permission to a number of U. S. ship pilots to leave for Egypt to work as Suez Canal pilots, The Nation concluded that the users' association was "not a policy but another of Mr. Dulles' nifty improvisations--this one designed to forestall any decision on Suez until after November 6." 130

Like Commonweal, The Nation considered the United States at least partially responsible for the Suez crisis. The Nation held Dulles principally to blame for the crisis, for it was he who had kept the West from inducing Nasser to negotiate. As a result of U. N. negotiations, and the mediation of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, Britain and France were moving "in a positive direction" with the agreement to the Six Principles. "To do this, they had to remove a lot of deadwood, mostly of


American origin." A Russian veto killed the proposals of the first London Conference, "in which Mr. Dulles played an important part." And the Suez Canal Users' Association, "which Dulles dreamed up," and which now was largely a "dead duck," was subject of new Washington efforts to give it "some semblance of life in modified form." The Nation quipped: "Britain and France, in short, are for a time on their own and they will probably do much better that way." 131

The outbreak of war in Egypt gave rise to optimism on the part of The Nation, which foresaw the deterioration of the Cold War power blocs that had been a major hindrance to United Nations effectiveness. Their disintegration might make possible greater cooperation between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. "which could transform the United Nations." The Nation was all in favor of the United States utilizing the United Nations as a major channel for directing U. S. foreign policy. It saw U. S.-U. S. S. R. alignment in the United Nations on the Suez question and on the U. S. resolution as a good omen, for, after a decade of bypassing the World Body and of weakening it by mutual defense pacts, "we now find ourselves freshly appraising it as the soundest possible structure within which to adjust great-and-small power relationships and to seek solutions for world problems." The great powers might resolve their differences through the U. N. by channeling their power safely through it. And Israeli military action might force the great powers to press for a lasting Middle Eastern peace between Arabs and

Israelis. "Time is clearly on the side of peace if this brushfire war can be stamped out quickly." Technology was rapidly altering the significance of the Suez Canal. The Nation predicted that within a year super-tankers and British nuclear power stations would place the Suez issue in a different perspective. Furthermore, the lessons of the previous six months would teach Third World leaders that there were easier ways to secure funds for huge development projects "than to stage tantrums." The Nation, abandoning all touch with the reality of power politics, prophesied:

In the manner of the Egyptian legend, a phoenix is being consumed in the flames of the Sinai pyre. The phoenix that is dying is a symbol of a world that is dying, a world of power politics, military alliances, gun-boat diplomacy, curt ultimatums, irresponsible aggressions, a world of national states dedicated to the mutually destructive position that war is the prime instrument of national policy. A new phoenix will arise from these ashes.132

The words of the oracle were trampled in the dust as the United States and Great Britain jointly practiced gunboat diplomacy scarcely two years later in Lebanon and Jordan.

The Administration, according to The Nation, had acted wisely in taking the Suez and Hungarian crises to the United Nations. Eisenhower made no blustering statements and he avoided taking the issue from the U. N., "where it belongs," to a Big Power conference. The Suez crisis liberated the U. S. from too close association with Anglo-French policies. The

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U.S. won prestige in colonial areas by its support for the United Nations Charter and its refusal to back its allies' military action. While U.S. policy might have earned some Third World dividends, the impact was temporary, at best. Third World leaders were not so easily weaned from their suspicions of the Super Powers. As noted, by the summer of 1957, any increase of American prestige in the Arab countries, which might have occurred as a result of U.S. Suez policy, was dissipated. (see above: pp. 342-343.) Furthermore, The Nation incorrectly assessed the temporary U.S. expedient of independence from its allies and dependence upon the United Nations as a significant development portending long-range consequences. Thus, The Nation rejoiced:

The Administration's policy in dealing with both crises holds promise of strengthening the U.N. At long last American policy-makers see that since this country must, because of its position, keep a number of different forces in some kind of balance at all times—support for Israel, good relations with Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, long-range good relations with the Arab world, avoidance of a direct clash with the Soviet Union, etc.—American power can be applied most wisely and effectively through the U.N. Hence, there is a good chance that the world organization will become the major pivot of American policy....133

In reality, there was little chance of such an eventuality.

Nevertheless, The Nation persisted in insisting that only through the United Nations could the United States hope

to avoid direct entanglement in the "ruinous" decisions of Britain and France, jeopardy to Israeli security, or alienation of the Asian-African bloc. Not that the U. N. should be the sole reliance of the Eisenhower Administration, but that "(i)f American power is to be used to back any mandate, that mandate must be U. N.-sanctioned." 134

In choosing to support the United States on the question of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Tiran, in the view of The Nation, President Eisenhower was looking to safeguard the long-term interests of Israel as well as the United States by strengthening the United Nations. But he was not helped in this regard by Secretary Dulles who prematurely talked of sanctions and the proposal to test the right of "innocent passage" in the Gulf of Aqaba. "Nor was his (Eisenhower's) burden lightened by reason of the fact that Mr. Dulles is now distrusted in the Senate, by the leaders of both parties, to almost the same degree that he is distrusted at the U. N. and in most capitals." 135

The Nation intimated that while Mr. Dulles might be "one of those unhappy creatures who was born with his foot in his mouth," he was now too old to change. He was depicted as having a talent for creating enmity, distrust and irritation on both sides of Congress as well as abroad. Eisenhower's "continued insensitivity to the maladroitness of his Secretary


of State" had placed Eisenhower himself "on the spot." The President's continued loyalty to Dulles, according to The Nation, was unacceptable, whether it was based on understanding or misunderstanding of what his righthand man was doing.136

Thus, The Nation, which was extremely critical of U. S. Suez policy before the outbreak of war, supported U. S. reliance upon the United Nations and President Eisenhower's efforts to arrange an Israeli withdrawal. Throughout the crisis, it remained hypercritical of Secretary Dulles and his efforts.

The Reporter also held the United States accountable for its alleged part in causing the Middle East war. It found: "The Administration's diplomacy drove Britain and France to such a point that, for their own salvation, they felt compelled to do a thing that was slightly against the still hazy principles of the United Nations, and more than slightly risky." While Britain, France and Israel had to be brought to account for their actions, the U. S. would have been wise to recognize in the U. N. General Assembly that the three nations had been guilty "of a sort of international misdemeanor, not a major crime." Furthermore, the Administration should have urged immediately that "something radical" be done to solve the Middle Eastern "mess." The Reporter continued: "As this magazine has suggested, the only way to reach any real result is to have the whole region neutralized, and to negotiate that neutralization..."

with Soviet Russia." 137 This suggestion had been made by The Reporter several weeks before the outbreak of war, and had been repeated, with some regularity, throughout the Suez crisis. 138 Editor Ascoli, originator of the suggestion, failed to indicate how the neutralization of the Middle East could be achieved at the height of Cold War tensions. Thus, his idea had about it an air of unreality. In this latest editorial, Ascoli charged that the Eisenhower Administration was reluctant to recognize the Russians' role in the area and to negotiate with them—"that would be appeasement." To avoid appeasement, The Administration was said to be following the Russian lead, and to be acting as a "Russian satellite." Ascoli noted that the Administration did this "for high principle. There is nothing it will not do for principle—including being unmerciful to the allies on whose strength we depend." 139

Following the announcement of Israeli agreement to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran, The Reporter handed out accolades to the principal participants—to Premier Ben-Gurion ("for wise moderation at the final moment"); to Secretary-General Hammarskjold ("because of whose stewardship the U. N. has not been wrecked by too many burdens that have been imposed on it"); to Premier Mollet and Foreign Minister

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Pineau ("(a)s proven friends of Israel, they helped convince Ben-Gurion that he could trust the word of our Administration"); and to Secretary Dulles ("for once...not the victim of his own guile"). In retrospect, The Reporter saw the greatest hazard of the Gaza-Aqaba impasse "that it erupted constantly from the tables of negotiation into the diplomacy of the front page" where there was always the danger that men would be lead "into taking up public positions from which there later may be no retreat." Fortunately the principals realized before long that appeals to the "world sounding board" were not achieving the desired results and they determined to return to the "art of diplomacy."\(^{140}\)

From the first, The New Republic argued that a negotiated settlement was indicated and that it could best be found in the "middle ground" between the Anglo-French position and the Egyptian position. Since Egypt was not in attendance, the first London Conference could not settle the issue. Therefore, a second conference such as that suggested by the Soviet Union and by Egyptian President Nasser might be needed "to lower the tensions, and bring world opinion to bear."\(^{141}\)

In its debate on U. S. Suez policy, The New Republic indicated that the West had shown no willingness to consider giving up anything in order to reach a compromise with Egypt.

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over Suez. At this point, it made the novel suggestion that the United States submit the Panama Canal to discussion by its users. The New Republic asked: "If Mr. Dulles still has hopes that Nasser might agree to some kind of international control over the navigation rights in the Suez Canal, would he not be wise to propose voluntarily a similar arrangement for the Panama Canal, and to do it now when such an offer would impose maximum pressure on the Egyptians?"  

In a later issue, The New Republic indicated the unlike-lihood that boycotting the canal would accrue to the West's benefit. It claimed that "Mr. Dulles should move far beyond his present position. His policy of sufficient unto the day is not sufficient." It then repeated its argument that the scope of discussions should be broadened to include talks about the future of the Panama Canal. Thus to solve a complex international issue, The New Republic suggested that the issue could be cleared up by making the discussions more complex. Compounding matters still further, The New Republic continued:

...Along with this Mr. Dulles would be wise to suggest that present discussions be broadened to include reconsideration of methods for financing the high dam at Aswan, a project that could dramatize our desire to improve the daily lives of Egyptians and their neighbors. And finally, is it not time for the U. S. to suggest the possibility of some co-operative method for exploiting the oil resources of the Middle East, so that the natural wealth...could be diverted from...a few pashas to the liberation of the people...from economic degradation?

It must also be noted that The New Republic which offered

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such expansive suggestions for policy alternatives was ironi-
cally, of the four opinion journals studied, the most critical
of Secretary of State Dulles. Earlier in the same editorial, The
New Republic observed caustically that, following his "clumsy"
withdrawal of the American offer to help build the High Dam,
Dulles' "talent for fancy footwork" had never been better demon-
strated than during the Suez crisis. "He is here, he is there, he
is everywhere. When Colonel Nasser complains that he does not
'really know what the Americans are after,' Dulles may take it as
a compliment. For the Secretary has meant to keep all sides off-
balance; he is playing for time." While The New Republic was
willing to acknowledge Dulles' flexibility, it was not ready to
credit him with vision, for, in its view, Western leadership was
characterized by its "too limited response, 'being compelled to
concede...when concessions can no longer save the day.'"143

Predictably, The New Republic was not satisfied with U. S.
reliance upon the United Nations, and suggested that American
initiative in the Middle East would be necessary after the cease-
fire and military withdrawal, if a permanent settlement for the
area were to be reached. Were the United States to have seriously
sought to further a permanent settlement, there is nothing in
the record to indicate that such efforts would have been success-
ful. Nasser, having survived the Suez fiasco, was not in any
mood for compromise. Without his cooperation, there was little
chance to reach a Middle Eastern solution.

143 "John Foster Pimpernel," The New Republic, Vol. 135,
Realistically, The New Republic envisioned only two strategic alternatives open to the United States: 1. to work with the U.S.S.R. to neutralize the Middle East; or 2. to align itself with one or more Arab countries to counterbalance Russian penetration and the political maneuvering of President Nasser. Other proposals for U.S. assumption of the initiative were made later. For example, The New Republic suggested that the U.S. might support guarantees to Israel of her right of innocent passage through the Tiran Straits, and of security—"both ways"—of the Israeli-Egyptian border.

When Israel agreed to withdraw, The New Republic acknowledged Secretary-General Hammarskjold's role in concluding the successful negotiations. Dulles was blamed for nearly overturning Hammarskjold's plan when, following a "skeptical" Israeli response to his February 11 assurances, "Mr. Dulles, angered, threatened to support immediate sanctions. Only domestic political opposition and the appeals of our European allies saved us from a decision which would have made a settlement all but impossible." The New Republic closed the editorial with the fervent hope that Dulles would keep his thoughts to himself, and would not claim a great diplomatic victory for himself and the Administration before the television cameras. "In the weeks ahead, harmony will be best achieved if Mr. Dulles plays a

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pianissimo acompaniment to Mr. Hammarskjold."

Considering its obviously negative opinion of Mr. Dulles, it is little wonder that earlier *The New Republic* had suggested that it might be time for Mr. Dulles to retire. It argued that Dulles was "guilty of gross neglect" since his chief executive remained ignorant of the planned Anglo-French attack against Egypt. Dulles was "disliked" by our "estranged" European allies, "distrusted" by Asian and Middle Eastern leaders. *The New Republic* concluded by asking:

> Is the man in whom our NATO associates have little if any confidence the man whom we can trust to restore confidence?...The President has not yet made use of his traditional privilege of reshuffling his Cabinet. Would it not be wise for him to begin by replacing his Secretary of State?\(^\text{147}\)

Dulles bore the burden of criticism during and after the Suez crisis, frequently for policies and decisions which were not his own, but Eisenhower's. For example, it was Eisenhower who decided: 1. to seek a peaceful settlement to the Suez dispute; 2. to react harshly to the Anglo-French attack; 3. to press for cease-fire and withdrawal; and 4. to pressure the allies through economic means. While the decision to withdraw from the Aswan High Dam project was primarily Dulles', most subsequent, major Suez decisions were Eisenhower's. While Eisenhower claimed never to have doubted the wisdom of cancellation, he later entertained thoughts that the way it was handled "might have been


undiplomatic," and so indicated to Dulles. In a letter dated September 15, 1956, Dulles responded: 1. telephone conversations, of which the U. S. had intelligence, indicated "that the Egyptian Government knew that when they came, as they did, to get a definitive reply it would be negative"; and 2. if he had not acted as he did, "the Congress would certainly have imposed it on us, almost unanimously."148a

Since Eisenhower knew that Dulles was absorbing the brunt of the criticism, whether deserved or not, he must have been reluctant to bow to public pressure for Dulles' replacement. As we have seen, Eisenhower was acutely aware of European criticism of U. S. Suez policy. Nevertheless, the President retained Dulles, in whom he had great faith, although he undoubtedly realized that the close association of the Secretary of State, in the public mind, with U. S. Suez policy would make his post-Suez assignment of restoring European confidence more difficult.

It bears remembering that comments like these were made by journals committed to the American system of democratic capitalism, not by socialist publications, such as Monthly Review, which interpreted U. S. policy of seeking a peaceful solution to the Suez dispute as geared to "propping up...an outworn system" and as intended to reap big profits from the export of Latin American

148a Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 33. Hoopes noted that a year later Dulles replied to a similar inquiry from the President with a wholly new defensive argument. On October 30, 1957, Dulles wrote Eisenhower: "President Nasser has since said that he planned for nearly two years to seize the Suez Canal Company, but was waiting for a good occasion. He knew that if he pressed for a decision from us when he did the result would be negative because the Congressional action (the report of the Senate Appropriations Committee) had been announced. Nevertheless he pressed for a definitive answer, and I suspect he did so in order to create the occasion for which he was looking." Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 343.
oil to Europe in the event of a canal closing. Far from it, the opinion journals studied were part of the American mainstream. Commonweal was more moderate in its criticism. The Reporter and The Nation were more critical, and The New Republic was the most critical. All detected partial U. S. responsibility for the Suez crisis. All doubted the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Egypt and of boycotting the Suez Canal. All opposed sanctions against Israel.

Scholarly Journals and the Suez Crisis

A sampling of scholarly journals published during the Suez crisis revealed that, excepting law journals, the crisis was little treated by them. The journals sampled were:

American Journal of International Law
American Political Science Review
Current History
Foreign Affairs
Harvard Law Review
Journal of Politics
Middle East Journal
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Western Political Quarterly

The American Political Science Review and the Journal of Politics carried no material on the crisis.


ments," in its November issue, Current History featured:

1. "Suez Canal Users' Association"—texts of the declaration of the establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association, and of a statement issued by the second London Conference on the Suez crisis; and


In the December issue, under the heading, "Statements on the Middle East," Current History reproduced the following documents:


2. "French Statement on Egyptian aid to Algeria"—text of French representative Bernard Cornut-Gentille's statement presented to the U. N. Security Council on October 29; and

3. "British-French Resolution on the Suez Canal Users' Association"—text of the French and British joint resolution on the Suez as presented to the Security Council on October 5. 150

Foreign Affairs carried an article by Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, "The West In Disarray." To Spaak, the Suez crisis indicated that the "insufficiency" of the United Nations as then constituted had never before stood out so clearly. Spaak called for modifications of the Charter to

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eliminate the caricature masquerading as U. N. justice which rewarded those nations bold enough to accomplish the most reprehensible act "but which very cleverly stops short, not of violence, but of open war."

Secondly, the Atlantic Alliance had failed during the Suez crisis. The Western alliance must be reconstituted. "The principal partners need only to have a little more trust in one another, to be more deeply aware of their fundamental unity." And the West must respond to the global challenge of Communism which threatens the very survival of Western civilization.

And thirdly, Western Europeans might consider unity more favorably in light of the recent crisis. There were already indications of a growing thrust toward European unity evident in the then upcoming agreements on the Common Market and on Euratom, the European project for the peaceful development of atomic energy.151

The Middle East Journal, in its Winter, 1957, issue carried a section, "Developments of the Quarter," under which it featured comments and chronology which ran to 28 pages. The chronology was preceded by comments in which it was observed that not since the 1947-48 Arab-Israeli war had the United Nations played such a prominent role in the many difficulties of the Middle East. The Journal theorized:

With much more unanimity than then (1947-48), the U. N. has taken a stand, not so far to solve the questions, but to restore a deteriorated situation to the status quo ante....

The same events which have made an early settlement more necessary than ever have also rendered the prospects of that settlement more unlikely. These events have tended to coalesce the Palestine and Suez questions... into one, and thus to make both less susceptible of rational examination. They will certainly not be solved in any grand, over-all coup, but at least the necessary disentangling process has begun.152

In the same issue, under the title, "Documents," the Middle East Journal featured: "U. N. General Assembly Resolutions on the Recent Hostilities in Egypt."153

In the Spring, 1957, issue the Middle East Journal, in its "Documents" section, carried the following:

1. "UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) Resolution of 2 February 1957"; and

2. "Israeli Foreign Minister's Address of March 1, 1957."154

The Western Political Quarterly ran an article by Khosrow Mostofi, "The Suez Dispute: A Case Study of a Treaty," which analyzed the development of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 historically and attempted to assay the impact of the Suez crisis on it. The article concluded that following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and their subsequent withdrawal, the Constantinople Convention was no longer relevant. "(T)here is today no principle of international law governing

153 Ibid., pp. 92-94.
the Suez Canal except that which assigns it to the exclusive sovereignty of Egypt. Under these circumstances the appropriate course is to negotiate a new multilateral treaty for international use of the Canal, rather than to rest upon the icy corpse of the Constantinople Convention."  

The remainder of the indexed articles appeared in law journals late in the crisis or in the month of April, 1957, the month after Israeli withdrawal. They were concerned primarily with the legality of Egyptian nationalization of the canal, the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, and the question of compensation of stockholders.

Opinion varied on the Egyptian right to nationalize the Suez Canal. Thomas T. F. Huang, writing in the *American Journal of International Law*, argued that the contention that the concession agreements of the Suez Canal Company form an integral part of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, because they were referred to both in the preamble and in the text, was not supported by the *travaux préparatoires* respecting the 1888 Convention.

However, Huang proceeded, it is arguable that the December 1, 1873, Declaration of the Ottoman Porte established *per se* the "objective international status" of the Suez Maritime Canal Company and thus formed sufficient basis for the application of public international law. "Consequently the company was no longer within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of Egypt, and

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its nationalization was a violation of public international law." 156

On the other hand typical arguments used at that time to support the claim that the Egyptian nationalization was illegal were struck down by Harvard Law students in a Harvard Law Review article, "Notes: Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company." The students found that Egypt's apparent desire to use canal profits to finance construction of the Aswan High Dam project, "which is intended to benefit the entire population," did "not render the nationalization illegal." They also argued that since the canal was "unique within Egyptian territory" nationalization did not discriminate against foreigners and was therefore not illegal. In addition, they found that the special international status of the company, or of the canal, did not invalidate Egyptian jurisdiction to cancel a concession since this argument did not distinguish between cancellation of the concession and nationalization of the company. Further, "there is clearly no rule in international law that such utilities cannot be operated directly by states but must be in the hands of private groups." Both the Kiel and Panama Canals have always been under national control. 157

On the question of adequate compensation, the students found that most authorities agree that a state which nation-


alizes the property of foreigners is required to make "adequate, effective, and prompt" compensation. The students then reviewed Egyptian offers of compensation: 1. to pay the price of the stock on the Paris exchange on the day before Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal; and 2. to pay the average exchange price for the preceding five years. The students indicated:

...both (offers) assume Egypt's right to the assets of the company held abroad and would be withdrawn if that right were not recognized. Egypt's claim to these assets is unlikely to be upheld by the courts of those nations in which most of the assets are located unless their governments have indicated recognition of the extraterritorial effect of the nationalization. Such recognition will probably not be granted unless an arrangement for compensation is concluded by treaty or international agreement, and under such an arrangement the problem of adequacy would no longer exist.

Following this line of reasoning, the students suggested that, should a case arise before any national policy is decided, the court should "dismiss the cause as involving a 'political question.'" For any final disposition of Canal Company assets "might hamper the Department of State in future negotiation and would be, in effect, a determination of our foreign policy in a critical area."158

An additional matter of concern to American legal journals was the question of the legality of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. Quincy Wright, in an article in the American Journal of International Law, argued that unless their actions satisfied one of three possible defenses, they were guilty of illegal aggression. The three defenses were: 1. action taken in pursuance of a United Nations decision or recommendation;

158 Ibid., pp. 486-489.
2. action taken by necessity of individual or collective defense; and 3. action taken by consent or request of the invaded state.

Wright found that Israel was not justified in its invasion of Egypt despite *fedayeen* raids, and Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The *fedayeen* raids did not constitute sufficient threat to the "territory, official agencies, or perhaps the lives of the citizens of the state." Concerning the stoppage of Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, Wright argued that these "(a)lleged violations of other rights involve a dispute justifying presentation of claims or protest, but not military intervention."

Regarding the case of Britain and France, Wright found that none of the several justifications for Anglo-French acts withstood analysis, and the one that might have, if Israeli invasion of Egypt had been found justifiable, i.e., "collective self-defense" of Israel, the British and French had taken pains to avoid its use. "They denied any co-operation or collusion between themselves and Israel."

The claim that the measures taken were justifiable because they stopped Soviet penetration and Egyptian aggressiveness, Wright found to be in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter both of which *forbade* the use of force to settle a dispute. Concerning the Anglo-French insistence that they acted to separate the belligerents, Wright asked pointedly why they vetoed the U.N. cease-fire order. "Great as the hazards to British welfare may have been in the nationalization of the canal, these hazards were more distant and
speculative than those which international law deems a justification for military acts of self-defense." The same could be said for French interest in preventing Egyptian propaganda from inciting Algerian nationalism. Thus, the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt could not be justified legally, "and probably not politically." 

Generally the law journals took no deliberately favorable or unfavorable position on the matters involved in the Suez dispute. They seemed to seek to preserve their objectivity and to base their conclusions on solid legal precedent.

It cannot be said that scholarly journals posed any threat to the Administration's Suez policies during the crisis. In them, the crisis went largely unmentioned. The reaction of the scholarly community to the Suez crisis rolled in months and years later as more facts became known and articles were published after the fact.

Some Summary Remarks

Indirect efforts of the Eisenhower Administration to influence the American press during the Suez crisis appear evident in the surprise with which the outbreak of war was greeted. The press had been led by optimistic Administration statements to report that a negotiated settlement was in prospect. The Administration withheld information about Anglo-French-Israeli mobilization for war, not so much to deceive the American people apparently, but in the hope of

dissuading the British at the eleventh hour.

At this point, it is difficult to see where Administration efforts had any significant direct impact on press--newspaper and periodical--interpretation of events during the Suez crisis. It appears that support for, or opposition to, Administration policies reflected, in large measure, the ideological predisposition of a given publication or journalist. Liberal publications and journalists often seemed to oppose the policies of the conservative Eisenhower Administration on principle. Conservative publications and journalists tended to support the Administration on principle. This simple dichotomy, however, broke down on the question of U. S. reliance on the United Nations to settle the Suez dispute--liberal publications often supporting the Administration; conservative publications often questioning the probable effectiveness of U. N. efforts--and on the question of sanctions against Israel--the Administration drew criticism from all sides on this issue.

But it must be recalled that stepped-up Administration efforts to directly influence the American press came only after the Suez crisis. (see above: pp. 172-180.) To find the degree of success of those efforts, it would help to examine press coverage of U. S. foreign policies during a later Middle Eastern crisis, the Lebanon crisis of 1958. If, at that later date, from traditional centers of opposition, criticism of Administration foreign policies is muted, one might detect the effectiveness of Eisenhower Administration efforts to win a more favorable American press.
Concerning the impact of the American press on United States foreign policy for the Middle East, there is one area in which the press might have played a role. American press pressure, as a reflection of popular sentiment, called for a review of United States foreign policy, particularly U. S. policy toward the Middle East. This pressure may have been a factor in the Administration decision to propose the Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957. This matter deserves further investigation.
CHAPTER VI

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON DURING THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

Preliminary Remarks

The Lebanon crisis will be considered to extend from early May, 1958, when violent disturbances shook the tiny Middle Eastern country, following the assassination of the leftist editor of the daily al-Talegraph, Nassib al-Matni, on the night of May 7, until October 25, 1958, when the last contingent of U. S. troops was withdrawn. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze U. S. policy during the crisis, and to compare and contrast it with U. S. Suez policy, in order to determine whether there had been any significant alterations in Eisenhower Administration thinking on the Middle East, and on the question of direct intervention by Western nations in that area. Changes in allied attitudes and differences in the level of allied cooperation in the two crises will also be noted, as will differences in the amount and character of inter-allied communication.

Some Causes of the Lebanon Crisis

Late in 1956, the Eisenhower Administration began to realize that its policy of dissociating the U. S. from Britain and France had caused unforeseen consequences. Soviet Russia
was making unprecedented gains in prestige in the Arab World.\textsuperscript{1} Having miraculously survived Suez, Nasser was rapidly becoming the undisputed hero of radical Arab nationalism, which sought untrammeled national independence and broad social change.

Eisenhower and Dulles were aware that the abortive Anglo-French venture had effectively swept Britain and France from the area, and had sharply increased Arab hostility to the West. The American leaders feared that the Soviets would attempt to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the collapse of Anglo-French influence. They decided that the United States must fill the void. Without consulting the nations of the Middle East, the European allies, or the United Nations, they sought to secure advance Congressional approval for a policy to deter Communist penetration of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{2}

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower delivered a special message to a joint session of Congress. In his address, Eisenhower requested a joint Congressional resolution granting three major provisions for American assistance of Middle Eastern nations:

1. Authorization to cooperate with and assist Middle Eastern nations in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of their national independence;

2. Authorization to undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with Middle Eastern nations desiring such aid; and


\textsuperscript{2}Hoopes, \textit{The Devil and J. F. D.}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 405-406.
3. Authorization "to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."³

Following heated Congressional debate, legislative support for the Eisenhower Doctrine was given in the Middle East Resolution (Public Law 85-7)—later popularly referred to as the Eisenhower Doctrine—approved on March 9, 1957. The key provisions of the joint Congressional resolution were:

...That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. (Italics added.) To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.

³"The Eisenhower Doctrine: Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, January 5, 1957," Committee on Foreign Relations, A Select Chronology, op. cit., p. 148. The Eisenhower Doctrine did not become firm policy—and was not even mentioned by Eisenhower himself—until it had first been tested as a trial balloon in a background dinner. It had been signaled earlier in a James Reston exclusive story on December 28, 1956, after Dulles grudgingly affirmed a Reston hunch. The story upset Dulles' timetable for leaking the doctrine. So he invited a small group of correspondents to his home. There, Dulles outlined the doctrine. No source could be mentioned by the newsmen. Since reaction to the doctrine was favorable, it took on firmer proportions. While Dulles was leaking the doctrine, Eisenhower was playing golf in Augusta, Georgia; the President had not yet spoken a word on the subject publicly. Rivers, Opinionmakers, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
Provided, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.4

When Congress authorized what President Eisenhower requested, it included an unrequested bonus—the underlined sentence—which was to play a crucial role in the Administration's policy justification during the Lebanon crisis in 1958.

The Eisenhower Doctrine, as embodied in the Middle East Resolution, was designed to fill the Middle Eastern power vacuum, and to counter Soviet penetration into the area. As such, it was tailored to serve American foreign policy objectives. It was a unilateral declaration issued over the heads of the people upon whose cooperation it depended for success. The Arabs objected to the Eisenhower Doctrine for several reasons. First, the Arabs, who favored a policy of positive neutralism, believed that to accept the Doctrine, now that there was no significant Western presence in the Middle East, would be to concede the U.S. right to employ armed forces in the region to prevent its falling to the Soviets. The Arabs would involve themselves in military entanglements on the side of the U.S. against the Soviet Union, and, thereby, destroy Arab neutrality in the Cold War. Second, the Doctrine attempted to bypass the United Nations. The Arabs believed that the United States, which had recently

4"Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East," State Dept. Bul., Vol. XXXVI, No. 926, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481. H.J. Res. 117 was passed on January 30, 1957, by the House of Representatives by a vote of 355 to 61; H.J. Res. 117, as amended, was passed on March 5, 1957, by the Senate by a vote of 72 to 9; and the House accepted the Senate version on March 7, 1957, by a vote of 350 to 60.
worked through the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in Egypt, now sought to circumvent the U. N. through a plan which called for U. S. military intervention without consultation with the United Nations. Third, the Doctrine failed to condemn armed aggression from all sources; it merely singled out Soviet aggression. There were no Russian troops in the Middle East then. But Israel had only recently invaded the Sinai, and was, in fact, in military control of much of the Peninsula when Eisenhower addressed the Congress on January 5, 1957. The Arabs were, consequently, more concerned with possible future Israeli aggression than with Soviet aggression. Since the Eisenhower Doctrine failed to mention the Arab-Israeli dispute, many Arab leaders felt that the U. S. was "casting a protective mantle" over Israel. For these reasons, the Eisenhower Doctrine was coldly received by the Arabs.

Only Lebanon, of all the Arab States, subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957. Lebanon's action was very unpopular both at home and in neighboring Arab countries. Cairo and Damascus radio aired highly volatile propaganda broadcasts against the Chamoun Administration for its adherence to the Doctrine. Inside Lebanon, Opposition leaders considered the Administration's action repudiation of the National Pact of 1943, which provided for neutrality in international relations and cooperation, but not union, with sister Arab States. Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen by the Opposition as violating the neutrality provision of the National Pact.

5Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., pp. 115-117.
It was rumored that President Chamoun intended to seek a second term, which would have required a constitutional amendment—for a long time, Chamoun did not deny the rumors. And charges of unfair parliamentary elections, in which several prominent Opposition leaders were defeated, increased tensions in Lebanon. The overwhelming victory at the polls by Chamoun supporters was viewed by the Opposition as paving the way for Chamoun's reelection for a second six-year term following passage of the necessary constitutional amendment. Passage of the amendment, which would require a parliamentary majority of two-thirds, was considered a foregone conclusion, given the large majority of Chamoun supporters recently elected.

On the night of May 7, 1958, Nassib al-Matni, leftist editor of the daily al-Talegraph and a critic of Chamoun, was assassinated on the streets of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. His killers were never found, but the Opposition blamed his death on the Chamoun Administration. Al-Matni's death triggered riots and strikes, and the Opposition voiced demands for Chamoun's immediate resignation.6

U. S. Pre-Intervention Policy Towards Lebanon

President Chamoun inquired of the British, French and American Ambassadors what their Governments' actions would be if he were to request their assistance. Britain and America agreed to cooperate in responding to the Lebanese situation, a point emphasized by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in his memoirs, but scarcely mentioned by Eisenhower in his memoirs. Macmillan rejoiced in the fact that the Americans had "learned a lot" since Suez. Quoting from his diary, Macmillan indicated that, following a long discussion on May 13, 1958, the British Cabinet agreed to join with the United States in saying to President Chamoun that, if he decided to ask for military assistance to "preserve the independence" of Lebanon, the Anglo-American allies would give it. According to this early agreement, Britain was to provide the smaller force, and the combined operation—"probably airborne"—would be coordinated so that the allied forces would "come in together." When, however, President Chamoun did call for Western intervention, the Americans decided to "go it alone," and requested that British forces be held in reserve for possible use in Jordan. Anglo-American cooperation throughout the contemporaneous Lebanese

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7 Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, op. cit., pp. 414-415.
9 Ibid., Macmillan, p. 506.
10 Ibid., pp. 511-514; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 273. Hoopes indicated that the American decision "was taken unilaterally and without contemplation of British participation.... Immediately after the decision was taken, on July 14, he (Eisen-
and Jordanian crises of 1958 was in sharp contrast to the lack of mutual cooperation during the Suez crisis, scarcely two years before.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, later recalled that, when the question of intervening in Lebanon was considered, the association of France with the operation was discussed. But, since France had been the mandatory power in both Lebanon and Syria prior to World War II, it was the judgement of the State Department and U. S. Intelligence that the association of France with the intervention would make it totally unacceptable to the Lebanese, and to the Syrians, in particular, and the entire Middle East, in general. Consequently, the operation was set up as a joint Anglo-American venture, and France was not invited to participate in it.11

In his memoirs, Eisenhower indicated that on May 13, he met with Dulles and others to discuss Chamoun's request, and that Dulles noted the grave possible consequences of United States intervention in Lebanon. The pipeline across Syria might be cut, the Suez Canal blocked, and the Iraqi and Jordanian Governments restrained from cooperating by popular resentment to the American action. The possible Soviet reaction must also be considered. Eisenhower wrote: "This point did not

11 Eisenhower Project, Columbia, Interview with Andrew J. Goodpaster, 1967, p. 94.
worry me excessively; I believed the Soviets would not take action if the United States movement were decisive and strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operations.  

Following discussions with his advisors, Eisenhower informed Chamoun that the United States would respond favorably under certain conditions. First, the Administration would not send American troops to Lebanon to achieve an additional term for the Lebanese President. Second, the Lebanese request should have the concurrence of some other Arab state. Third, the mission of U. S. troops sent to Lebanon would be twofold: protection of American lives and property, and assistance to the legal government of Lebanon. 

Public statements by Administration figures during May, June, and early July, 1958, laid the groundwork for justification of possible future American intervention in Lebanon. In his news conference of May 20, Secretary of State Dulles indicated the line of reasoning U. S. policy was to take during the crisis. In response to a question whether he would clear up the confusion over the applicability of the Eisenhower Doctrine to the Lebanon case, Dulles commented that, by the Eisenhower Doctrine, he assumed the newsman meant the March 9, 

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12 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 266.

13 Ibid., p. 267.

14 Hoopes commented: "Despite the dearth of evidence that Lebanese independence was threatened by a Middle East country 'under the control of International Communism,' Dulles and the President quickly construed their authority under the Eisenhower Doctrine as broad enough to provide emergency assistance if Beirut should appeal for help. Dulles announced this finding on May 20; but preparatory actions had been taken three days
1957, Middle East Resolution adopted by Congress. Dulles indicated there were several provisions to that resolution. It authorized the United States to assist Middle Eastern nations economically and militarily. It said that the independence and integrity of the nations of the area are "vital to world peace and the national interest of the United States." And it authorized the President to send forces to resist, upon request, an attack upon a Middle Eastern nation by a country under the control of international communism. Dulles continued:

Now we do not consider under the present state of affairs that there is likely to be an attack, an armed attack, from a country which we would consider under the control of international communism. That doesn't mean, however, that there is nothing that can be done. There is the provision of the Middle East resolution which says that the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter.

Among the types of possible action the United States might take Dulles mentioned the right to assist in the protection of American life and property at the request or with the consent of a foreign government. There was also the program of military assistance, whereby the United States provided many countries, including Lebanon, military equipment and training in its use. However, Dulles averred, the United States was not looking for a pretext to introduce American troops into Lebanon. "We hope and believe that that will not be called for, and the situation, to date, does not suggest that it would be called for."

Before accelerated deliveries of military equipment to Lebanon were ordered, the marine contingent with the Sixth Fleet was doubled, and a number of transport aircraft were dispatched from the United States to Germany, ostensibly to stand by for the evacuation of Americans from Beirut." Hoopes, The Devil and J. F. D., op. cit., p. 433.
Later in the press conference, the following exchange took place over Dulles' interpretation of the Middle East resolution:

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up one point on this Middle East doctrine... You said that there is a provision in the resolution which states that the independence of the countries of the Middle East is vital to... the peace and security of the United States.

A. Yes. That's the so-called Mansfield amendment.

Q. Yes. Then you said that that surely is a mandate to do something if we think that the peace and security of those countries is threatened from any quarter. Does this represent a broadening by interpretation of the possibility of action to be taken under that resolution? The reason I ask is that I think most of us had always believed that the authority of the resolution applied almost exclusively to actions against international communism.

A. You recall that, as the resolution was sent up to the Congress by the President, there was not in the resolution the particular sentence to which I refer; that was introduced by the Congress itself. And I assume that the introduction of that resolution had a meaning and had a significance. You cannot, as a matter of legislative history, assume that when you put a new sentence into a resolution, it is utterly meaningless. We assume that the Congress does not do things that are utterly meaningless.15

Dulles' interpretation of the Middle East Resolution caused some heated Congressional comment. Senator Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, took exception to Dulles' reference to the so-called Mansfield amendment, indicating that what Dulles referred to as the Mansfield amendment was, in fact, a modified version of an amendment—originally submitted by Mansfield, but rejected in committee—reintroduced by Minnesota Democrat, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. Senator Mansfield maintained that the Mansfield-Humphrey amendment had only one objective—"the clarification

of the constitutional question of the division of powers as between the President and the Congress," an issue which the Eisenhower resolution had "obscured."

Senator Mansfield suggested that it was time for the United States to propose in the United Nations "the extension of the United Nations Emergency Force to the borders of any country in the Middle East which is concerned with aggression from a neighbor and which asks for that safeguard." 16

Oregon Democratic Senator Wayne Morse associated himself with the remarks of Senator Mansfield. Morse indicated that, if Dulles acted upon his interpretation, "the Secretary of State would be overstepping the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch of the Government." 17 Congressional protests against the extremely broad interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine were ignored by the Administration. 18

Thus, in his news conference of May 29, the President reaffirmed the Secretary of State's position in response to a question from James Reston, New York Times, inquiring whether the President now had a different interpretation of the Middle East resolution from what it was originally. Eisenhower replied:

I don't think it is different from what we finally felt it was after the thing was passed... (T)here was an amendment passed that we had a very long study about

17 Ibid., pp. 9289-9290.
around here. We felt that as long as it was a friendly
government, one with which we have associations like
military assistance and so on, there were probably certain
actions that we might be able to take that were beyond just
a mere overt aggression from a communist controlled state.19

When reading the statement in question in its original context
in the Middle East Resolution (see above: pp. 370-371.), it is
difficult to escape the impression that the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration interpreted it out of context. Apparently the Adminis-
tration took the liberty of utilizing this statement to justify
actions which it intended to take with or without this rather
convenient amendment. Around this, it built much of the official
justification for American intervention in Lebanon.

In his news conference of June 17, 1958, Secretary Dulles
indicated that the United States continued to watch the situ-
tion in Lebanon with concern. In response to a question about
the U. S. attitude to a larger United Nations force in the
Middle East, Dulles indicated: "The United States would be
disposed to support...any action along those lines which com-
mended itself to the Secretary-General." That such U. S. support
would be both diplomatic and "physical" for any such U. N.
action. That if called upon by the United Nations, the United
States would respond. Asked if that implied that the only
possibility of an American military action in Lebanon would be
in response to a United Nations call, Dulles replied: "No, there
are other possible contingencies." He did not elaborate on this

19 "The President’s News Conference of May 28, 1956,”

20 "Secretary Dulles’ News Conference of June 17,” State
remark. But, the world was put on notice that the United States would intervene militarily in Lebanon, under certain unspecified conditions, to save the pro-Western Chamoun regime. Furthermore, Dulles' words signaled a significant departure from U.S. policy during the Suez crisis. The Administration would not feel bound to consult the United Nations before taking action in the Middle East.

This remark caused immediate response from Congressional critics of the Administration's foreign policy. Senator Mansfield admired Dulles' "candor and honesty," although he disagreed with his statement. Mansfield expressed his hope that the United States would exhaust all possible peaceful alternatives before acting "unilaterally" to preserve Lebanon's independence. Among the possibilities for action which Mansfield mentioned were:

1. a special meeting of the United Nations to consider an embargo against countries (unspecified) carrying on aggressive activities against the Republic of Lebanon;
2. diplomatic sanctions against those same countries; and
3. the expansion of the United Nations Force to the borders of Lebanon. 21

Senator Sparkman, Alabama Democrat, took the opportunity to press the Administration to encourage its U.N. representatives "to take aggressive leadership in favor of establishing such a United Nations peace-maintaining force." Both Senator Mansfield and Senator Sparkman agreed that such a force would cost a fraction compared with the cost of a single day of actual war, and, Senator Mansfield was quick to add, with the

possible shedding of American blood.\textsuperscript{22}

Republican Senator Dirksen strode to the Administration's defense by observing that it could not be said that either President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles were "insensible" of the fact that the United Nations Charter provided for an international police force. But because it involved the cooperation of other countries, establishing such a force was a "delicate matter indeed," Therefore, Dirksen stated that he would rather see the matter remain in the hands of the Administration which had daily working knowledge of the whole foreign field than to see it become "the product of so many minds of men" in the Senate who were not so informed.\textsuperscript{23}

On May 22, 1958, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the situation arising from alleged United Arab Republic intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Security Council met on May 27 to consider the Lebanese complaint but agreed to adjourn for one week in order to permit the Arab League to consider the issue. The Arab League, however, was unable to agree on a resolution. The Security Council was reconvened. On June 11, a U. N. Security Council resolution established the United


\textsuperscript{23}"The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11455.
Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL) to determine the extent of external intervention in Lebanon. The Group commenced its activities in Lebanon on June 13, 1958.

Senator Mansfield greeted the Security Council resolution and American support for it as "a step in the right direction." Mansfield argued that it was an important "initiative for stability" in the highly volatile Middle Eastern situation. And he repeated his proposal for the extension of the United Nations Emergency Force to any Middle Eastern country which felt itself threatened with aggression from a neighbor. 24

In his July 1, 1958, press conference, Secretary Dulles revealed that he did not think that it would be practical for the United Nations to seal the borders of Lebanon if so requested by the Lebanese Government nor did he believe that it would be required. He opined that the very presence of UNOGIL would have a practical effect in stopping movements across the border.

Dulles gave further indication of how the Administration regarded possible American armed intervention in Lebanon in response to the following question:

Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind the role we played in discouraging...the invasion of Suez, is it realistic to think that we would participate in any kind of military intervention in Lebanon except under the most extreme circumstances.

A. I don't think that there is any analogy whatsoever between the situation in Lebanon, where the lawful Government is calling for assistance, and the Suez case,

where the armed intervention was against the will of the Government concerned. There is no parallel whatever between the two cases. We do believe that the presence in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable—and it is thoroughly justifiable from a legal and international-law standpoint—is not as good a solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution themselves. It would be...a sort of measure of last resort.25

Throughout the crisis, the Administration was careful to repeat its position that the American intervention in Lebanon was different from the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 because the United States was acting upon the request of the duly constituted Government of Lebanon. Therefore, the United States maintained, it was not guilty of aggression.26

Upon his return from a diplomatic and fact-finding mission to the Middle East on behalf of UNOGIL, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold stated, at a news conference on July 3, 1958, that there was no evidence of "mass infiltration" of men and arms into Lebanon.27 On July 4, release of the UNOGIL preliminary


26 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 271. Eisenhower wrote: "The present (Lebanese) case, from a legal viewpoint, was far different from that of the British-French attack on Egypt. Our intervention would be a response to a proper request from a legally constituted government and in accordance with the principles stated in the Middle East Doctrine. But, Foster warned, many people would not get the distinction and some domestic opposition could be anticipated."

Concerning the Administration's position, Goold-Adams noted: "Dulles and Eisenhower were proposing direct intervention in the Middle East, to a degree which appeared to deny much that Dulles had said in public during the previous few months. In reality this was not quite the case, since the essence of the Eisenhower Doctrine was that intervention should take place only at the invitation of a government on the spot." Goold-Adams, Time of Power, op. cit., p. 249.

report indicated that there was "little doubt" that the "vast majority" of rebels was composed of Lebanese. The Lebanese Government was not pleased with the Hammarskjold and UNOGIL findings. In his memoirs, Chamoun wrote:

"...Le groupe d'observation vint au Liban avec à sa tête, un délégué péruvien. Son arrivée avait été précédée de celle du Secrétaire général Dag Hammarskjold. De mes conversations avec l'un et l'autre, je recueillis l'impression qu'ils prévenus contre le Liban et que rien d'utile ne serait accompli par leur mission....Sous le prétexte que presque toutes les frontières étaient contrôlées par les rebelles et que ceci constituait un obstacle insurmontable à l'accomplissement de leur tâche, ils passèrent un grand parti de leur temps sur les plages et dans les receptions mondaines. Leurs rapports (presque négatifs) ultérieurs furent à peine plus étoffés. Ils n'avaient pourtant qu'à bien regarder pour voir. Les «volontaires» égyptiens, syriens et palestiniens étaient au Liban par centaines, par milliers. De même, il ne leur arriva jamais de se demander qui avait fourni à l'armée rebelle ses armes et ses munitions, qui s'était chargé, des mois durant, de leurs dépenses, et de leur entretien...."

Although the Eisenhower Administration made no official

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29 "...The Observation Group arrived in Lebanon with a Peruvian delegate at its head. Its arrival was preceded by that of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. From my conversations with the former and the latter, I received the impression that they were prejudiced against Lebanon and that nothing useful would be achieved by their mission....Under the pretext that nearly all the frontiers were controlled by the rebels and that that constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the accomplishment of their task, they spent a great part of their time on the beach and at social gatherings. Their later reports (always negative) could scarcely have been more substantial. Yet, they only had to look to see. The Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian 'volunteers' were in Lebanon by the hundreds, by the thousands. However, it never occurred to them (UNOGIL) to inquire who furnished the rebel army its arms and munitions, who took charge, during those months, of their expenses, and of their maintenance...." Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, op. cit., pp. 416-417.
statement on the preliminary UNOGIL report, privately U. S. officials regarded it as inconclusive and misleading. They gave the following reasons: 1. the Observers had only been functioning in Lebanon for a short while; 2. the rebels excluded the Observation Group from much of the Syrian-Lebanese border; 3. the Observers engaged in little night-time observation, if any; and 4. radio agitation—which Washington considered the most effective type of U. A. R. interference—was beyond the scope of the U. N. inquiry. UNOGIL headquarters in Beirut contradicted the last point with a press release stating that the U. N. Observers were listening to Middle Eastern radio broadcasts.30

Nevertheless, the Administration was reluctant to intervene in Lebanon because of possibly grave international consequences. Since Lebanon had internationalized the conflict by taking its complaint to the United Nations, the United States hoped to give the U. N. time to settle the crisis. "(B)y the end of June, the United States was assuming a wait and see policy, staying the hand of Camille Chamoun, discouraging him for the time being from requesting United States troops."31

U. N. efforts in Lebanon were making progress. In early July, 1958, it seemed to the Administration that the Lebanese would find their own solution, and that Western military involvement would not be necessary.32 Pre-intervention statements by

30 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 172.
31 Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, op. cit., p. 197.
Administration spokesmen reveal an interesting picture of the Eisenhower Administration's official view of the Lebanese crisis. It was regarded as primarily a domestic dispute, with some infiltration of supplies and men from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. Extremist, nationalist elements inside and outside Lebanon were held to be aided and abetted by violent propaganda broadcasts from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus. The aim of the dissident opponents of the Lebanese Administration was to overthrow the pro-Western Chamoun regime. Communists, while not responsible for the disorders, were seen as exploiting them. The Soviet Union, through inflammatory Arabic language broadcasts, was said to be exacerbating the situation in Lebanon. The hand of Soviet influence was detected in United Arab Republic propaganda against the Chamoun Administration. 33

In his June 17, 1958, press conference, Secretary of State Dulles acknowledged the fact that, at that time, the disturbances assumed, in part, the character of a civil disturbance. Nevertheless, Dulles argued that the Lebanese situation was covered by the 1949 United Nations resolution on "indirect aggression," which denounced the fomenting of civil strife from without. 34


34 "Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 17," loc. cit.
The American Intervention in Lebanon

The violent overthrow of the pro-Western Iraqi government by the forces of Brigadier General Abdul Karim al-Kassem on July 14, 1958, caught the West by surprise. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had only one vaguely worded prewarning from some of the men captured when King Hussein put down an army rebellion against his Jordanian Government. This piece of intelligence was passed to the Iraqi Government, which did nothing with it.35

President Eisenhower was "shocked" by the news, which awakened American fears for the worst and led to the decision that steps be taken to restore order and stability in the Middle East. Eisenhower wrote: "This somber turn of events could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East. Overnight our objective changed from quieting a troubled situation to facing up to a crisis of formidable proportions. Lebanon again came into our conscious concern because of the internal conflicts in that country and the pressures exerted by Syria."36 The decision was made to send in the Marines.

35 Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story, op. cit., p. 76.

36 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 269. Qubain listed the following objectives for the dispatch of U. S. troops to Lebanon: "(1) to serve notice on the Soviet Union that the United States is willing to go to war to defend the Middle East if this became necessary; (2) to 'call the Russian bluff'; and (3) to demonstrate to the Arabs conclusively that the Soviet Union would not go to war to defend them, and that its threats were intended only to win it friends among them. To be sure, in view of the Soviet threats, this involved a great risk, but in army jargon, it was a 'calculated risk,' for both the Pentagon and the State Department were reasonably certain that Soviet threats were what they proved to be--threats for propaganda purposes." Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon, op. cit., p. 129.
The American decision to intervene in Lebanon was made in haste. Although the question of what an American show of force in the Middle East should be had been pondered beforehand, when the climax came in Lebanon, a quick decision was made to intervene militarily. President Eisenhower was personally responsible for the decision—he had apparently made up his mind even before meeting with his advisors. The United States would have to move into the Middle East "to stop the trend toward chaos." An additional factor in Eisenhower's concern was the large number of American citizens living in Lebanon whose lives might be endangered.

Joseph J. Sisco, former Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs, indicated that, at the time of the Lebanon crisis, the general feeling in the Office was that sufficient consideration had not been given to how the American action could be defended politically. The Office prevailed upon Dulles "to make a simultaneous move in the U. N. at the very time we were scheduled to land our Marines."

37 Dulles Project, Interview with Murphy, p. 49.
38 Dulles Project, Interview with Karl G. Harr, Jr., 14 Jan. 1966, p. 53; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., pp. 269-270; and Dulles Project, Interview with Hagerty, p. 25. Hagerty recalled that Eisenhower told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General White, at 5:16 in the afternoon of July 14, to send in the Marines. Hagerty reminisced: "I had to sit on that all night and not make a statement until nine o'clock in the morning when we knew the troops had hit the beaches and we knew what was happening. It was one of the longest nights that I've spent."
39 Ibid., Eisenhower, p. 270.
The Marines landed in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, at 3:00 p.m. local time (9:00 a.m. New York time). A Presidential press release, timed to coincide with the landing, was read by Press Secretary James Hagerty. The statement noted President Chamoun's request for U. S. forces to help maintain security in Lebanon, and it emphasized that Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all members of the Lebanese Cabinet. The key elements of the statement were contained in the following paragraphs:

In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.

The United States, this morning, will report its action to an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.42

Without ever referring specifically to Article 51, the Administration detached a phrase from it to validate American intervention in Lebanon, and to claim the U. S. action was in conformity with the spirit of the U. N. Charter. Article 51 reads:

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41 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 274.
43 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 182.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, the inherent right of collective self-defense applied only in the case of armed attack against a U. N. member. There was no such armed attack against Lebanon.\textsuperscript{45}

In his message to Congress that same day, Eisenhower repeated the arguments of his morning press release. He added that the events in Lebanon represented "indirect aggression from without" which endangered the independence and integrity of Lebanon. (Article 51 makes no mention of "indirect aggression.") The United Arab Republic was responsible for the troubles in Lebanon, for it encouraged the revolt there through inflammatory radio broadcasts, through shipments of "sizable amounts" of arms, ammunition, and money, and through the infiltration of personnel. Eisenhower argued further that events in Iraq


\textsuperscript{45} Wright commented: "The United States can justify its intervention in Lebanon on the ground of 'collective self-defense' only if the Lebanon was the victim of 'armed attack' and if the de jure government, which requested such aid, was not so pressed by internal revolt that it was incapable of representing the state. Neither of these conditions seems to have existed." Quincy Wright, "United States Intervention In The Lebanon," \textit{Editorial Comment, American Journal of International Law}, Vol. LVIII, January, 1959, pp. 112-125.
demonstrated that Lebanon could not combat the "ruthlessness of aggressive purpose," which these events represented, "without further evidence of support from other friendly nations." Therefore, the United States sent in the Marines, and would augment them "as required." United States forces would be withdrawn as rapidly as circumstances would permit. To facilitate the early withdrawal of American forces, Eisenhower encouraged the United Nations to take "further effective steps designed to safeguard Lebanese independence."\footnote{"United States Dispatches Troops to London: Message to the Congress," \textit{State Dept. Bul.}, Vol. XXXIX, No. 997, Aug. 4, 1958, pp. 182-183.} The evening of July 15, 1958, the President delivered a nationwide radio-television statement to the American people in which he repeated these arguments on behalf of U. S. armed intervention in Lebanon.\footnote{"United Stated Dispatches Troops to Lebanon: Radio-TV Statement (White House press release dated July 15)," in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 183-186.}

Following the landing of the first wave of U. S. Marines in Lebanon, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a two-pronged diplomatic offensive--open debate in the United Nations, and negotiations on-the-scene in Lebanon, directed by Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy.

At the emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, the morning of July 15, 1958, Ambassador Lodge presented the American position to the United Nations. Generally, Lodge repeated Eisenhower's main points. He did, however, add a new item when he expressed the U. S. hope that the U. N. Observation Group would continue to pursue its work "in the most effective
and energetic way possible," and he indicated that the U. S.
forces had been instructed "to cooperate with it (UNOGIL) and
to establish liaison immediately upon arrival."48 The Observa-
tion Group announced in Beirut that it would establish no liaison with U. S. forces except when "strictly required" to
fulfill its Security Council mandate.49 UNOGIL, thus, refused
to take action which might be construed to legitimize U. S.
intervention in Lebanon.

Clearly, the U. S. did not accept U. N. Secretary-General
Dag Hammarskjold's statement that there was no foundation for a
judgement of massive infiltration of men and arms into Lebanon.
Nor did it accept the UNOGIL preliminary report that there was
"little doubt" that the vast majority of rebels were Lebanese.
(see above: pp. 384-385.) As a matter of fact, the American
United Nations Representative, Ambassador Lodge, actually argued
that since the revolt in Iraq the infiltration of arms and per-
sonnel into Lebanon had become "much more alarming."50

The American position was made more difficult when Lodge's
argument was challenged by the U. N. Secretary-General on
July 16. Hammarskjold announced to the Security Council that
UNOGIL had cabled a report that it had, as of July 15, access to
all parts of the Lebanese frontier. It was purely coincidental
that these results were achieved by the Observation Group on

48 "The Lebanese Complaint in the Security Council: Statement

49 Thomas J. Hamilton, "Legality Queried; Authority For
Action Doubted--Observers to Shun Marines," NYT, July 17, 1958,
pp. 1 and 8.

50 "The Lebanese Complaint in the Security Council: Statement
of July 15," loc. cit.
the same day the Security Council renewed debate and the U. S. landed units in Lebanon. UNOGIL's success was a result of its previous efforts. Hammarskjold concluded that "the Observation Group is fully equipped to play the part envisioned for it in the total United Nations effort, with the general purpose of insuring against infiltration and smuggling of arms." The Secretary-General hoped that "no later developments," i.e. the American intervention, would cause a setback for UNOGIL, and that it would retain its key position.51

On July 17, in response to Hammarskjold's remarks, Lodge noted that only the day before did the Secretary-General tell the Security Council that the Observation Group had "finally" reached agreement with rebel forces granting it access to all of Lebanon's frontiers. Lodge continued: "That agreement was only reached on the day...that our forces landed. And with great respect I submit that our efforts may have already been helpful to the work of the United Nations." With this argument, Lodge sought to justify the need for American intervention. Then, he claimed that since UNOGIL now had access to all Lebanon's frontiers, it was in a much better position than it had ever been to go ahead with its activities. Lodge concluded his remarks by stating, rather unconvincingly, that if the United Nations could not deal with indirect aggression, the U. N. would break up. "This could surely be the rock on which this organization could

founder." Thus, American spokesmen repudiated U. N. findings and insisted upon maintaining charges of "indirect aggression."

On July 16, 1958, Ambassador Lodge introduced the American draft resolution in an attempt to encourage the United Nations to take over from American forces responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in Lebanon through an expanded United Nations Observation Group. In the major provisions of the U. S. draft resolution, the Administration suggested that the Security Council: 1. Invite the Observation Group in Lebanon to continue development of its activities based upon the June 11, 1958, Security Council resolution; 2. Request the Secretary-General to make necessary arrangements, including the contribution and use of military contingents, to protect Lebanese territorial integrity and independence and to guard against infiltration of personnel or supplies; 3. Call upon all Governments concerned to co-operate in implementation of the suggested resolution; 4. Call for the immediate cessation of illegal infiltration and of inflammatory media attacks upon the Government of Lebanon; and 5. Request the U. N. Secretary-General to report to the Security Council "as appropriate."

The threat of a Russian veto did not deter the United States in its efforts. On July 16, Ambassador Lodge expressed the United States hope that the United Nations Observation Group


would not be suspended, as had been suggested by the Swedish representative to the United Nations. On July 17, 1958, Lodge indicated, in the Security Council, for the first time, that the American forces in Lebanon would not remain if their withdrawal were requested by the lawfully constituted Lebanese Government. Not surprisingly, the American draft resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on July 18. The vote was 9 to 1 (U.S.S.R.), with 1 abstention (Sweden).

On July 18, Ambassador Lodge was the first speaker after the final vote on the American draft resolution. Since the Soviet Union had mentioned, on July 17, the possibility of calling for an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly, under provision of the "uniting for Peace" resolution, Lodge was constrained to submit a similar U.S. resolution. But, he requested that the U.S. resolution be withheld in order to permit the representative of Japan to introduce a resolution in the Security Council. Miller has indicated: "The United States was not at all anxious to have the issue moved to the General Assembly, and this step was delayed until it was known that the Soviet Union would introduce a resolution calling for the move if the United States did not act quickly. The United States did not want to put Asian and African governments 'on the spot' by asking them to vote for a United States resolution, and the United States did not know whether it could muster the necess-


The Japanese resolution, which the United States supported, requested the Secretary-General to make arrangements which would enable the United Nations to fulfill the purposes of the June 11, 1958, resolution (which established UNOGIL), and which would "serve to ensure the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon." On July 22, the Soviet Union, which demanded immediate withdrawal of all U. S. forces from Lebanon, vetoed the Japanese draft resolution. The hopelessly deadlocked Security Council then adjourned sine die, and without calling out the General Assembly.

Thus, in July, 1958, the U. S. failed in its efforts to persuade the United Nations to expand the role of the United Nations Observation Group, and to induce it to assume the U. S. self-appointed task of policeman in Lebanon. The U. N. Security Council did not sanction American intervention in Lebanon; the Soviet Union vetoed pro-American resolutions. But, the U. S. had, at least, succeeded in postponing an emergency special session of the General Assembly.

The second prong of the American diplomatic offensive was the dispatching of Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Lebanon. Eisenhower described Murphy's mission in these terms:

56 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 189.

“to achieve the best possible coordination between the United States officials on the spot and the Lebanese authorities.”58

The first thing Murphy did in Lebanon was to call on President Chamoun at his official residence. There, he found "a tired and worried man, who for sixty-seven days had been a self-made prisoner. Apparently he had not so much as looked out of a window during that time, and this undoubtedly was wise as his chances of assassination were excellent." After this initial meeting, Murphy met with Chamoun once or twice daily. He was usually accompanied by the American Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert M. McClintock. He also held daily conversations with Admiral Holloway, the man in charge of the American force. Murphy noted:

...The close cooperation between the diplomatic and military sides of the American house contributed greatly to the success of our Lebanese undertaking. We agreed that much of the conflict concerned personalities and rivalries of domestic nature, with no relation to international issues. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection, although Communists no doubt hoped to profit from the disorders, as frequently happens when there is civil war. The outside influences came mostly from Egypt and Syria....(Italics added.)59

Murphy concluded from his talks with Chamoun, Holloway, McClintock and others that arrangements for the immediate election of a new Lebanese president should be made. He hoped that such an election would reduce tensions and permit the early withdrawal of American forces. In pursuit of this goal, Murphy visited with Chamoun, with the head of the Lebanese parliament, 

59 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., pp. 400-404.
and with Opposition leaders. To rebel leaders, he stressed that the American forces were not in Lebanon to perpetuate the administration of President Chamoun. On July 31, 1958, General Fuad Chehab was elected president of Lebanon. Murphy, who had an understanding with the Department of State, left Lebanon on the eve of the election "in order to minimize charges of American interference in the voting."

Shortly before the election, President Chamoun had "finally" told Murphy that he would not seek a second term. To Murphy's great surprise, Chamoun added that he felt General Chehab was the only possible choice to succeed him. Murphy recalled that, from that moment, he knew "the worst was over." Murphy's mission to Lebanon had taken about a month.

At the height of the Lebanese crisis, Dulles gave a background news briefing at the home of NBC radio and TV newsman Richard Harkness.* The backgrounder was held at Dulles' request. Dulles asked Harkness to gather a small group of columnists, bureau chiefs, and interpretive writers. The background session—the first which Dulles had ever asked Harkness to convene—took

60 Wright commented: "Applying the test of international law, in order to justify its intervention in Lebanon, the United States would have to prove that the troubles in that country inducing President Chamoun to request that intervention were primarily due to 'subversive intervention' (indirect aggression) from outside. The change in the Lebanese Government which took place during the intervention, resulting in a military government including several opponents of the Chamoun regime, suggests that this would be difficult to prove." Wright, "United States Intervention In The Lebanon," loc. cit.

61 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 407.

* For a list of the guests, see: Appendix C.
place on Monday, July 21, 1958. Harkness's notes of the back-
 grounder provide interesting insights into Dulles' thinking
during the early days of the American intervention. As was his
custom, Dulles began his remarks with a brief, general state-
ment--this particular one dealt with the reasons for the American
intervention in Lebanon. The reasons given in this off-the-
record statement--made for the correspondent's general under-
standing, but not to be reported in any form--differed signifi-
cantly from the official public reasons given by the White House,
and by Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations. This is how
Harkness recorded Dulles' opening remarks:

First, let me make clear that the decision to send
troops to Lebanon was based on the plea by Chamoun, and
for that reason alone. We were convinced that, if we
did not respond, not one of the relatively weak free
countries in that part of the world from the Atlantic to
the Pacific would feel--and be--safe from indirect aggres-
sion and assassination. We acted to give a feeling of
stability to such governments so they would not collapse
almost automatically; so they would feel that being a
friend of the U. S. is NOT a liability; so they would
feel that being our ally is not a threat to the very
lives of their political leaders.

The fall of Iraq caused consternation across that
great area, so we had no choice but to comply with
Chamoun's plea.

Until the Iraqi rebellion, we believed military
assistance was not needed. The plot in Baghdad changed
the situation. It became important that we preserve
morale in that perimeter. We responded without hesita-
tion. We do not think that our response solves any Mid
East problems. We recognize that, in some respects, the
problems are now more difficult. But we had one over-
riding consideration: to let little countries know that
they are not all to become subjects of civil strife
fomented from without. 62

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62 Dulles Additional Papers, Princeton Univ. Library,
Harkness, Richard, comp., "Memoranda and Notes on Visits and
Interviews with John Foster Dulles...," Off-the-record memo,
These remarks differ significantly from the collective self-defense theory advanced in the official statements issued at the time. Official statements tended to stress the specificity of U.S. objectives, limiting them to Lebanon. In the July 21 backgrounder, Dulles’ opening statement echoed more traditional objectives of power politics. The U.S. acted to preserve its interests, not only in Lebanon, but throughout the Third World. It was an effort to demonstrate the reality of U.S. power, and the Administration’s willingness to use it to defend American influence and prestige. Yet, in its hasty decision to intervene in Lebanon to prevent the alleged spread of chaos beyond Iraq, the Administration demonstrated that “consternation” was not limited to the “relatively weak free countries.” Thus, the Administration overreacted to the Iraqi revolt by dispatching troops to Lebanon, which it feared could also fall in an anti-Western coup.

In his notes, Harkness observed that Secretary of State Dulles’ explanation was “somewhat broader than but not neces-

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63 See also: John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings... of J. F. Dulles, B. Addresses and speeches, Aug.—24 Sept. 1958, in folder: Off-the-Record Talk before the AFL-CIO Executive Council, Bushkill, Pa.—August 19, 1958, pp. 8-10. Dulles offered a similar explanation of U.S. policy in his background remarks to the AFL-CIO Executive Council:

"(G)oing in was bad, but, in my opinion, not going in would have been very much worse. That would have undermined the competence of a score or more of governments running all the way from Morocco on the Atlantic to Korea on the Pacific as to whether we really had the courage and resolution to act on the appeal of a small government which wanted to defend its independence. And if we had found excuses for looking in the other direction and turning our back, the prestige and influence of the United States through all that part of the world—Asia, Africa—would have been gone."
sarily contradictory of the explanation" given to him earlier by Dulles' brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles. Allen Dulles had told Harkness that the first revolutionary plot was uncovered in Jordan, and that it was linked to the Iraqi rebellion. After Iraq, the next target was Saudi Arabia. To prevent these governments from being "bowled over like ten pins," the United States decided to intervene in Lebanon.

Subsequently, Ambassador Robert Murphy surmised that Dulles' objective in the Lebanese intervention was to make an impact "on not only...Lebanon, but the entire Middle Eastern picture, which had been in a state of ferment, and to bring about a stability and...a peaceful settlement of some of the issues that were involved." 64

In the question and answer session which followed his opening statement, Dulles remarked that there was "no doubt" that the anti-Chamoun rebels were directed from outside. For Robert Murphy had reported from Lebanon that the rebels were receiving their "instructions" over open telephone lines from Damascus. 65

Asked about the probable length of stay of U. S. troops in Lebanon, Dulles indicated that he could not give an exact figure, but that he did not think of this operation in terms of

64 Dulles Project, Interview with Murphy, p. 53.

65 Murphy, Diplomat, op. cit., p. 402. Murphy wrote: "(W)hen our Marines tapped the telephone line between the capital of Syria and the (rebel controlled) Basta at Beirut, it was proved conclusively that the Basta rebels were receiving outside support." It must be noted that there is a vast difference between "support" and "instructions," which Dulles had charged.
years. The United States had no intention—or desire—for a prolonged stay in Lebanon, which could only result in shooting incidents between Lebanese and American troops. Since the United States no longer had confidence that observers on Lebanon's borders would be effective following events in Iraq, the length of stay of U.S. troops in Lebanon would depend upon "our ability to work out the transition from use of our troops to what both we and Lebanon consider necessary, stronger UN representation than is now represented by UN observers."

Concerning Japan's compromise resolution, Dulles expressed the hope that Russia "might abstain and thus let it pass." He did not believe the Russians would support it.

If the Security Council should prove incapable of action, Dulles indicated the United States would go to the General Assembly, where he thought the U.S. could muster the votes, but where he admitted the vote would be "close." Dulles saw the principal difficulty in the General Assembly to be the reluctance of small nations to pay their share of the bill to finance the cost of UN action to preserve Lebanese freedom, a step which many of them otherwise would favor.

Before withdrawing from Lebanon, Dulles indicated that the Administration would insist upon certain minimum requirements from the U.N. "We will insist (upon?) the taking by the UN of measures which reassure the government of Lebanon that it is not likely to be liquidated by a revolutionary movement from without or an Iraqi-type coup. That means more than observers." Before determining the strength of any United Nations force, it would be necessary to have the advice
of men on the scene, such as Murphy, on how many would be needed, and the types of weapons they would require. One is struck by the apparent lack of sophistication of Dulles' argument. How, for example, could any international force ensure that there would not be an Iraqi-type coup? Effective counter-measures under these circumstances of army revolt would require a sufficiently large counter-force on the scene, or readily available, and capable of taking affirmative action. It would have been extremely difficult to obtain United Nations agreement to such a large force, as seen in General Assembly reluctance to form a United Nations police force.

In apparent contradiction of his earlier remarks, that the Lebanese rebels received instructions from Damascus, Dulles proceeded: "This United Nations force will be a novelty, something different, never tried before, and it will be a difficult one because it will be dealing with internal strife." Internal strife, Dulles argued, not indirect aggression as officially charged. Furthermore, Dulles commented, the U. S. believed that the mere presence of the U. N. would be "a considerable deterrent to the rebels, especially in a small country such as Lebanon." 66

Next, Dulles indicated that he recognized that the initial popular reaction over most of the world to the U. S. intervention in Lebanon was unfavorable. But, privately Governments

had indicated their support for the American action. Dulles said that he could not name these Governments, for to do so might risk their being overthrown politically. "The Prime Minister of Sudan showed amazing courage in supporting our use of troops. He may pay with his life... they are after him now."

On U. S. estimates of Russian intentions, Dulles made these remarks:

We operate American foreign policy on a basic intelligence estimate. That is that the U. S. S. R. does not want to take any action that might involve a general war. With our landings in Lebanon, nothing has changed as far as that estimate is concerned.

Russia undoubtedly will wage a considerable war of nerves now. It may seem that we are close to a general war. The Russians are likely to make hostile gestures. But they will not deliberately provoke a general war.

How could Russia justify a war? Lebanon and Jordan—they are not great assets. As property, you couldn't give Jordan away. Our presence in the Mid East is no threat to anybody. The idea of a general war is grotesque.

Apparently, Dulles was not always so sure of Russian intentions. General Nathan F. Twining, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told of an animated discussion with a doubt-ridden Dulles, one night around eleven o'clock, before the landing of the Marines. Dulles told Twining that some of

67 J. F. Dulles Papers, I. B., "Off-the-Record Talk Before the AFL-CIO Executive Council," op. cit., p. 10. Dulles indicated to the AFL-CIO Executive Council that, excluding the United Arab Republic and Iraq, every Government in the Middle East and North Africa had expressed privately support for U. S. intervention in Lebanon. "Publicly they do not dare to do it; because their public opinion is so inflamed by the radio and press subversion...."

his people in the State Department were telling him that the United States was making a terrible mistake by sending in the troops. To do so would run the risk of bringing the Russians "down on top of" the U. S., causing real trouble in the Middle East. Twining then told Dulles that, as long as the Administration felt that the landing was a politically sound thing to do, the Secretary of State had nothing to worry about, since the United States was clearly superior to the Russians militarily at that time. Twining recalled that he also indicated to Dulles that the Joint Chiefs thought it was the right thing to do, and that he was willing to call them in to confirm it. A reassured Dulles replied, "No....That's okay. I feel better. We'll go." Twining observed that Dulles was "real worried" about the Lebanese landing, and that he was about to go to see Eisenhower about calling it off. 69 This is another example of Dulles entertaining second thoughts after a crucial decision had been taken. He displayed similar qualms after announcing the American decision to withdraw from the Aswan High Dam project. (see above: p. 61.)

From the very beginning of the American intervention in Lebanon, President Eisenhower informed the appropriate Congressional leaders that he did not desire an all-out national debate on the wisdom of the U. S. action.70 Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Congressional reaction to

70 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 183.
the American intervention took the form of general support, with calls for national unity. Leading the debate in the Senate, Majority Leader Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Texas Democrat, expressed the conviction that "the American people will close ranks and will be united. We will make it clear to the aggressors that this country is determined to maintain freedom in this world, at whatever cost." Those who backed the intervention largely restated the Administration's views in formulating their remarks. The President was right in intervening in Lebanon. The Eisenhower Doctrine, at least its "spirit," did apply. In order to preserve the friendly Lebanese Government's independence, President Eisenhower had the right of collective self-defense to combat indirect aggression. Furthermore, the President had the right to defend American lives and property. Maryland Republican Senator J. Glenn Beall argued that he would go one step further and say that "now is the time for us to take a firm position against the encroachment of communism." Senator Jacob K. Javits, New York Republican, commented that "(i)f legally we cannot define this aggression in Lebanon as being Communist inspired, certainly the people of the world understand that without the backing of the Soviet Union, President Nasser would not be running the risk he is running..." Nasser was

72 Ibid., Remarks of Senator Javits, p. 13777.
73 Ibid., p. 13783.
behind the disturbances, in this view, and attention was called to the fact that he had the support of the Communists. American action could ipso facto be construed as containing Communism.

Other arguments on behalf of the Administration included Senator Javits' reminder that one of the problems with the United Nations Security Council was that "it may not always be able to act in time." And the junior Democratic Senator from Oregon, Richard L. Neuberger, saw the Lebanese situation as "essentially the same dilemma which confronted President Truman in the Korean crisis." (He failed to mention that, by contrast, there were no teeming hordes of Communists openly attacking Lebanon.) And Senator Neuberger called upon his fellow Democrats to make no "political capital" on the crisis, as had some partisan Republicans during the Korean war. Neuberger advocated a course of "statesmanship and nonpartisanship."

In the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House would entertain only favorable comments upon the U. S. intervention. An obvious move to muzzle dissent is registered in the Record. The following exchange took place between Representative Emanuel Celler, New York Democrat, and the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, Texas Democrat:

Mr. Celler. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The Speaker. Not if it is controversial. The Chair is not going to recognize Members to talk about foreign affairs in this critical situation.

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74 Ibid., p. 13777.
75 Ibid., p. 13778.
Assured that Celler's comments were favorable, the Chair recognized Celler's right to speak. Celler indicated that he felt the President had "seized time by the forelock. The situation in the Middle East brooked of no further delay." 76

In the Senate, however, no such gag-rule applied. Senator Mansfield indicated his belief that the American action was not taken under any of the specifications of either the Eisenhower Doctrine or the Tripartite Declaration. He noted that he had made his position known in the White House conference of Congressional leaders with the President the day before, July 14, 1958. "However, the President, in his constitutional capacity as Commander in Chief, and based on the reserved powers contained therein, has made a decision which in his opinion, affects the security of our country. That decision having been made, I will do my very best as a Senator to support the action taken." 77

A minority of Democratic Senators were unwilling to express their support. Senator William Proxmire, Wisconsin Democrat, protested Eisenhower's failure to prevent the development of a situation which, in his judgement, necessitated sending American troops into Lebanon. He argued that henceforth it would be "virtually impossible for friends of the West to enjoy popular support or political power in the Near East." Therefore, the U. S. should press for the United


77 "Landing of United States Marines in Lebanon," Congressional Record, July 15, 1958, p. 13769.
Nations to step into the controversy, and for the U. S. to step out "at the earliest possible moment." 78

The senior Democratic Senator from Oregon, Wayne Morse, was the most persistent critic of U. S. intervention in Lebanon. Morse argued that the Administration had no authorization under the Eisenhower Doctrine to send troops into Lebanon, since the doctrine authorized intervention only in the case of aggression by international communism. This could not be shown in Lebanon. "We can be sure that they (the aggressive forces) are anti-West. But that is not sufficient to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine." In his opinion, the only justification for sending in American troops was in answer to a petition from the Lebanese Government for the protection of American lives and property until the troops could bring them out of Lebanon.

Morse continued:

...While that (U. S.) flag is there, the senior Senator from Oregon will back the President of the United States, as commander in chief, behind the flag, although I believe the President has made a sorry and historic mistake this morning. That flag should come out; and United Nations forces should go in to keep the peace under the United Nations doctrine, not under the Eisenhower doctrine.

Morse opposed spending American blood for oil, which might be needed in Europe or anywhere else in the world. And Morse did not believe the United States had any right under international law to intervene in a Lebanese civil war. 79

78 Ibid., p. 13777.
79 Ibid., pp. 13778-13779. Oil was, indeed, an important consideration, at least as far as U. S. support for British intervention in Jordan was concerned. In his July 21, 1958, backgrounder, Dulles rather candidly revealed that in his talks with Lloyd the matter was raised. Dulles stated: "We dealt, in
Later, on July 17, 1958, Senator Morse continued his attack upon the Administration's foreign policy in Lebanon. Morse suggested that Dulles be replaced as Secretary of State by Walter Lippmann, who showed such depth of understanding for Middle East foreign policy issues. In support of his arguments against U. S. intervention in Lebanon, Morse requested that the following Lippmann articles from the July 17, and 22, 1958, issues of the Washington Post be printed in the Record as part of his remarks: 1. "The Marines in Lebanon"; and 2. "Time For Diplomacy." Generally, Lippmann's remarks paralleled those of Senator Morse in these instances. 80

Thus, the decision to intervene in Lebanon caused dissent and criticism from some Democratic Senators. 81 They were in the minority.

large part, with logistics in Jordan. Jordan is now virtually cut off from access to the outside world. Oil is the most important item. We had to think what the situation would be if the Iraqi oil pipelines got into unfriendly hands. That is no great concern as long as other Middle East producing centers such as Iran stay in friendly hands. (Italics added.)

"Iraq probably will not stop selling oil to the West. Old Mossadegh tried that in Iran. We merely stepped up our production, and Iran hurt only her own economy. Iraq also must sell oil—and cannot exact exorbitant terms. In fact, we know of certain plots to blow up the pipelines out of Iraq, but higher forces stepped in and countermanded the plot."


81 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., p. 183.
The On-Again, Off-Again Summit on the Middle East

Even before the adjournment of the deadlocked United Nations Security Council on July 22, 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev wrote Western leaders on July 19, to protest U. S. intervention in Lebanon and British intervention in Jordan, and to suggest a summit conference of the Heads of Government of the U. S. S. R., the United States, Great Britain, France and India, with the participation of the United Nations Secretary-General, to meet in Geneva on July 22 "to take urgent measures to stem the beginning military conflict."

Further aims of the Soviet proposed conference could be consideration of the question of discontinuing arms deliveries to the Middle East. In the Soviet view "this summit conference should work out concrete recommendations to end the military conflict in the Middle East and submit them to the Security Council so that this United Nations body would study them with the participation of representatives from the Arab states." 82

Thus began what Eisenhower later referred to as "a voluminous and largely fruitless exchange of correspondence between Mr. Khrushchev and the West, particularly the United States." 83 Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev's letter by defending the legality of the U. S. intervention in Lebanon. Regarding the Russian summit proposal, Eisenhower indicated that in the U. S. view what Khrushchev proposed amounted, in effect, to five

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nations, without the sanction of the United Nations and without conformity to its Charter, reaching "recommendations" which would then be submitted to the United Nations Security Council. "(I)n reality such so-called 'recommendations' would be decisions and the process would in effect make the United Nations into a 'rubber stamp' for a few great powers." Eisenhower suggested that, if the Soviet leader seriously believed there was an imminent threat to world peace, he could take the matter to the Security Council where Russia could represent a member nation. "If such a meeting were generally desired, the United States would join in following that orderly procedure." 84

Thereby, the U. S. bowed to public opinion in Europe (including Britain), and in Asia, and acceded to Macmillan's public suggestion on July 27, 1958, that an emergency summit be held at the Security Council. Dulles resisted a summit on the model of the 1955 Geneva summit. He supported the Macmillan proposal largely because it entailed smaller risks in the event the conference failed. 85

It was reported at the time that the United States had agreed to attend what the President and his principal advisers profoundly and unanimously believed to be "the wrong meeting at the wrong time and place on the wrong subject," and that the Administration agreed to the summit in the face of strong British pressure from public and parliamentary opinion. The U. S.


would have preferred a summit meeting which was: 1. carefully prepared in advance; 2. dealt with the unresolved European issues left over from the previous summit; and 3. offered reason to believe progress could be made. 86

A second exchange of letters followed, in which the Soviet Union, on July 23, 1958, repeated its desire for a five power conference, which it now indicated it was willing to hold within the United Nations Security Council in New York. 87 And on July 25, 1958, the United States repeated its readiness to adhere to the U. N. Charter, and to the conditions which it lays down for participation in the Security Council by non-members of the Council, under arrangements made by the Secretary-General. 88

American agreement to a summit, of sorts, within the United Nations Security Council, was welcomed by Congressional supporters and opponents of the intervention in Lebanon. Senator Javits was pleased that the President appeared to seek more than a superficial summit meeting on the Middle East. Senator Hubert Humphrey repeated his belief that the United Nations was "peculiarly well adapted to the needs of a summit meeting and a meeting of the heads of state." And Senator Mansfield saw no reason to fear a summit conference, if the Administration

were prepared to move along constructive lines. 89

But on July 28, 1958, Khrushchev repeated his proposal for a five-power conference. He withdrew his readiness for such a conference to be held in New York, where he now argued the United States would have difficulties ensuring the safety of the Heads of Governments. He suggested that the proposed conference be held in Europe—a point with which, Khrushchev noted, French President Charles de Gaulle was in agreement—at Geneva, Vienna, Paris, Moscow, or any other place acceptable to all participants. 90 De Gaulle had formally accepted Khrushchev's proposal to convene the Summit at Geneva. The West was openly divided. 91

The United States, in its August 1st reply, repeated its earlier insistence that a special meeting of the Security Council be held. Eisenhower indicated that such a meeting, in the U. S. view, could be held elsewhere than New York City, but not in Moscow, where a recent demonstration resulted in damage to the U. S. Embassy. Eisenhower indicated that he had instructed the U. S. Permanent Representative to the Security Council to seek a special meeting on or about August 12, 1958. This would permit direct discussions between Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers. Eisenhower stated his intention to personally attend the special meeting, and his hope that


Khrushchev would likewise attend. 92

In his news conference of the day before, Secretary of State Dulles stated what he thought could be accomplished by a summit conference on the Middle East held under United Nations auspices. He indicated that he felt it would "dispel the false allegations" of United States and United Kingdom aggression in the Middle East, and it would show the danger there of "indirect aggression." Thereby, it would tend to stabilize the political situation and make possible the more easy development of economic programs. 93

Dulles also indicated that he did not think it feasible, at a conference of that sort, to deal, "in a definitive way," with the larger problems of the Middle East. This would require a considerable amount of preparation. By dealing with the charges of U. S. and U. K. aggression, and the problem of indirect aggression, Dulles argued, "the foundation for dealing with the broader problems" would be laid. 94

Later in the news conference, Dulles indicated that the election of a new Lebanese President dispelled allegations that the U. S. intervened in Lebanon to assure the reelection of Chamoun. He repeated the United States intention to withdraw from Lebanon when requested to do so by the duly constituted Government of Lebanon, whether or not the United States


94 Ibid., p. 266.
thought it was wise to withdraw at the time. But the Administration hoped there would be "a greater measure of political stability when we came out than was the case when we went in." 95

Following a visit to Communist China, Premier Khrushchev sent another letter on August 5, 1958, to President Eisenhower, accusing the United States and Great Britain of evading the convocation of a five power conference, and noting the previous inability of the Security Council to assure a solution of the situation in the Near and Middle East. Khrushchev claimed that the United States had transformed the Security Council into an organ "consisting principally of countries belonging to NATO, the Baghdad Pact, SEATO, and in which the place of the lawful representative of the great Chinese People's Republic is occupied by the representative of the political corpse Chiang Kai-shek." Therefore, Khrushchev insisted, the Security Council was "not capable of taking any decision independent of the will of the United States of America." Consequently, the Soviet Government had instructed its U. N. Representative "to demand the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly of the UN for the discussion of the question of the withdrawal of the troops of Great Britain from Jordan." 96 The State Department sighed with relief when Khrushchev cancelled the summit. 97

95 Ibid., p. 271.
On August 5, 1958, the White House released a statement by President Eisenhower acknowledging the Soviet letter announcing its intention to seek a General Assembly session on the Near and Middle East. Eisenhower welcomed Khrushchev's "agreement" to place the Middle Eastern problem again before the United Nations, and he expressed regret that the Soviet leader "did not accept the Security Council with the Heads of Government present as the appropriate forum in view of his alleged concern over the threat to peace." Recalling that Ambassador Lodge had, on July 18, 1958, proposed such a procedure to the Security Council, Eisenhower indicated that the U. S. found the General Assembly "completely acceptable."98

In his August 6th news conference, President Eisenhower indicated his willingness to participate personally at the United Nations General Assembly meeting on the Middle East, if he found it "necessary or desirable," although there were at that moment "no plans...and no particular intention" for him to do so.

The President noted that the United States, as it had stated in several notes it had sent, would seek, in the General Assembly meeting, to discuss "the general problems of the Mid-East with their underlying causes...(Y)ou couldn't possibly confine anything just to...Lebanon, because the causes of the difficulty are so much wider than are to be found merely within that area...You would have to discuss the problems."

Eisenhower apparently bowed to pressure from within the White House staff, from other domestic critics, and from abroad, that Dulles' July 31 news conference remarks were too negative. (see: Chapter VII.) From within the Administration, then Vice President Richard M. Nixon, C. D. Jackson, a special consultant on the Middle East, and Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty reportedly urged a more positive approach. Thus, the President overruled Dulles, who, on July 31, had expressed the wish to confine the discussion to questions of "aggression" and "indirect aggression" (see above: pp. 416-417.), and broadened the scope of discussion. And Eisenhower repeated the U. S. intention to withdraw from Lebanon when requested to do so by the Lebanese Government. 99

On August 8, 1958, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold introduced his three-point plan, which called for: 1. extension of U. N. activities in Lebanon and Jordan; 2. reaffirmation of Arab non-interference in each other's domestic affairs; and 3. cooperative Arab efforts in joint economic development. (see above: p. 40.)

The Secretary-General's plan buttressed the position of the group within the Administration which advocated a positive approach. On August 13, President Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly in the third emergency special session. In a move which represented a compromise victory for those U. S.  

officials advocating a positive approach, Eisenhower outlined a six-point American plan for peace in the Middle East. The U. S. proposal expanded on the Secretary-General's provision for Arab joint cooperation in economic development, despite published reports that American officials recognized that Hammarskjold had never been able to arouse much Arab interest in the project. (see: Chapter VII.) The Eisenhower plan called for:

1. U. N. General Assembly consideration of measures to assure the continued independence and integrity of Lebanon;

2. General Assembly expression of United Nations interest in preserving the peace in Jordan;

3. The reaffirmation by the General Assembly of the United Nations policy against inflammatory propaganda broadcasts across national frontiers and the monitoring of radio broadcasts directed across Near Eastern borders;

4. General Assembly action toward the creation of a standby United Nations peace force;

5. The establishment of an Arab development institution on a regional basis—to be run by the Arabs themselves—to assist and accelerate improvement in the living standard of the Arab people; and

6. The establishment of a U. N. body to see what arms-control arrangements could be worked out to avoid a new arms-race spiral in the Middle East.

100 Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

In his news conference of August 20, 1958, President Eisenhower made a realistic response to John Scali, Associated Press, who, noting that reports indicated little chance for approval of Eisenhower's proposal for a U. N. peace force, asked whether the President intended to press this proposal later as a matter of urgency. Eisenhower replied:

I don't believe you can keep the thing on the urgent basis too long.

This thing has always been up to the fore, most people believing that if the United Nations is going to be truly effective in many instances, it ought to have something of that kind. Also, there was the hope that if that could develop then possibly there would be lesser need for security forces and the armament race. But it is one of those things that I think has to develop and to come about with the growth of commonsense and a little bit greater tolerance among nations. I think it is a very fine thing. I think it is one of those things that probably will not be done exactly at this moment.102

On the question of U. S. withdrawal from Lebanon, Eisenhower recalled that the U. S. had said that it would leave Lebanon as soon as the local government said it did not need the U. S., and "when and in the event that the United Nations say they are prepared to take the responsibility for peace and order."103

But the United Nations was not prepared to take over the U. S. position in Lebanon. On August 21, 1958, the General Assembly passed unanimously a resolution sponsored by ten Arab countries--Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi

103 Ibid., p. 624.
Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen. The Arab Resolution: 1. welcomed the renewed assurances of the Arab States to respect the systems of governments in member States of the Arab League and to abstain from any action to change them; 2. called upon U. N. members to mutually respect each other's territorial integrity, and sovereignty, and to follow principles of non-aggression and of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and 3. requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan. The Arab resolution invited the Secretary-General to continue his efforts on behalf of an Arab development institute. Finally, it requested member cooperation in carrying out the resolution and invited the Secretary-General to report not later than September 30, 1958.104

In his General Assembly comments on the Arab resolution, Secretary of State Dulles compared it point-by-point with the Norwegian resolution, noting the great similarity between the two. Dulles observed that the Arab resolution omitted reference to the consideration of a standby United Nations peace force by the then upcoming Thirteenth General Assembly. Dulles indicated that the U. S. took "much satisfaction" from the

104 "Text of (Arab) Resolution (U. N. doc. A/Res./1237 (ES-III))," State Dept. Bull., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1003, Sept. 15, 1958, pp. 411-412. Miller remarked: "The Arab resolution was a mild setback for the position of the United States...Yet the United States shared Members considerable relief over the way the issue had been resolved, and other Member states were too jubilant over the happy ending to consider whether the United States succeeded or failed in achieving its objectives." Miller, Dag Hammarskjold, op. cit., pp. 205-206.
fact that the countries directly involved in the controversy—
the Arab countries—found it possible to agree on action to
settle the issues in the Middle East. 105

In a background press conference at the Waldorf Towers,
August 21, 1958, at 7:15 p.m., Secretary of State Dulles gave
his appraisal of the joint action of the ten Arab States in
formulating the Arab resolution. Dulles stated that he thought
the Arab resolution was a reaction to the Norwegian resolution,
for which the U. S. had the necessary two-thirds voting majority.
It would have been a close vote, with a favorable margin of two
or three votes. Support for the Norwegian resolution would
have come largely from Latin America, Western Europe, and ten
members of the Arab-Asian bloc, without the support of the
principal Arab States. Thus, in Dulles' estimate, the Arabs
thought it was better to do a "re-write job" on the Norwegian
resolution, and to make the dissenting Arabs agree. Dulles
gave United Arab Republic Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi,
most of the credit for the success of this maneuver.

Dulles noted further that dealing with this Middle East
problem in the Third Special Emergency Session of the General
Assembly was much better than dealing with it in a summit
meeting. Dulles expressed his fears of a summit conference
in which the Heads of Governments, confronted with issues,
either have to agree or disagree, often with very dangerous

105 "Statement by Secretary Dulles (U. S./U. N. press
release 2983 August 21)," State Dept. Bull., Vol. XXXIX, No. 1003,
op. cit., pp. 409-411. Eisenhower wrote: "Fundamentally, this
action in the United Nations (passage of the Arab resolution)
terminated the Lebanon crisis, although American troops were to
stay there for another two months." Eisenhower, Waging Peace,
op. cit., p. 288.
consequences. Then, there was the problem of the big powers imposing their will on others. In the present situation, the Arabs had come up with their own solution.  

Asked whether he thought the Arab resolution had any real meaning, in terms of the relationship between Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, Dulles replied that he thought it would. He based his reply on informal talks he had had with Fawzi, in which Dulles had emphasized that, if the Arab resolution was passed and the situation remained the same, "we" would be made to look very foolish, particularly if the resolution were presented by the Arab League. Thus, the Arabs were seen by Dulles as prisoners of their own policy.

Dulles indicated that he did not discuss with Fawzi the question of Cairo Radio's inflammatory broadcasts, but that he, nevertheless, anticipated that there would be change for the better.

Dulles remarked that the interregnum in Lebanon—with Chamoun on the way out; Chehab on the way in; thus, neither having full authority—would be a "little" obstacle in working out the withdrawal of American troops. But, Dulles indicated that there was a good chance to arrange some troop reductions.


107 Ibid., p. 2.

108 Ibid., p. 3.
by Lebanese inauguration time, on or about September 22, 1958. It would depend on the situation in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{109}

In response to a question whether he was satisfied that the Assembly resolution made progress on the six points outlined by President Eisenhower on August 13, 1958 (see above: pp. 419-420.), Dulles replied, "No," because much of the President's plan could only be dealt with at the Regular General Assembly, not in an Emergency Session of the Assembly. The problems, mentioned in Eisenhower's plan, which Dulles believed could only be dealt with at the Regular Session, were: 1. a standby United Nations police force; 2. an Arab economic development fund; and 3. the monitoring of radio broadcasts.

Therefore, this special emergency session of the General Assembly was not an adequate response. It dealt with only three of the basic points in the Eisenhower proposal. Dulles felt there was a disposition to deal with the other points during the Regular Session, although there was sharp divergence of opinion, particularly about formation of a United Nations peace force. The Indians were "violently" opposed to the standby force because, Dulles surmised, they feared it might some day be used in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{110}

In reply to a question whether he was surprised at the rather hostile attitude of the Arabs toward the United Nations taking the initiative in an economic development scheme for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[109] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 4.
\item[110] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 6-7.
\end{footnotes}
the Arab States, Dulles indicated that he was not surprised. Both he and the President were aware of Arab suspicions and attempted to deal with the matter "rather delicately." It was not the American intention to dominate the bank; rather, the Arabs would have to control and direct it. Dulles concluded:

The idea that this was something that they would all fall over themselves to grab was never an idea that we entertained. We have always been aware of their extreme sensitivity that this might in some way be a scheme for getting economic control and through that maybe political control of the area. You know these countries have had for so long had to struggle against colonialism, foreign domination—the Ottoman empire, the British and the French have been there and the British are still there in various points around the Arabian Peninsula—they are extremely cautious about anything which emanates from the West.

With the passage of the Arab resolution, the American diplomatic offensive over Lebanon came to an end. There remained but to withdraw American troops. On October 25, 1958, the final contingent of American troops was withdrawn from Lebanon.

Concluding Observations

Sherman Adams, former Presidential chief-of-staff, commented that the Lebanon situation was a frustrating and an unhappy experience for Eisenhower, who, in retrospect, had "overestimated the gravity of the Lebanon situation and the effects of his intervention in that Middle East brushfire."112

111 Ibid., p. 7.
In his November 7, 1958, news conference, Dulles indicated that two major things were accomplished by the American intervention in Lebanon and the British intervention in Jordan. It was demonstrated that small countries could get help when they felt imperiled. And the actual situation in the Middle East had, in his opinion, been improved, although it was far from perfect. 113

It is true that following the Anglo-American intervention in the Middle East in 1958 the area was quiet, for a while, and Western interests in the area were preserved. However, it cannot be said that the American diplomatic offensive in the United Nations met with any great success. The United Nations did not sanction American intervention by assuming the role of the Marines. A U. N. peace force has not been created to this day. And President Eisenhower’s six-point program for the Middle East was still-born. Does it, therefore, follow that the United States suffered a diplomatic defeat during United Nations debate of the Lebanon crisis? Not necessarily.

A review of United States United Nations Security Council statements, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of letters, American General Assembly statements, and Dulles’ background observations on United Nations General Assembly actions makes it difficult to conclude that the United States seriously expected, or wanted, to achieve diplomatic agreements through

the United Nations during the Lebanon crisis. For example, in the Security Council, the United States, following the expected Soviet veto of the American resolution, did not envision Russian acceptance of the Japanese resolution. Although Lodge withdrew an American request for a special meeting of the General Assembly in order to allow the Japanese to put their resolution forward, the best the U. S. hoped for was that Russia would abstain in the voting. And when Eisenhower made his six-point proposal to the General Assembly, the Administration expected Arab opposition to the economic development scheme and widespread opposition to the establishment of a U. N. peace force. Nevertheless, the American program was put forth.

The impression grows that U. S. action in the United Nations was meant to lend an air of diplomatic respectability to U. S. military intervention in Lebanon and to ensure support on the homefront by appearing conciliatory, reasonable, and generous. U. S. efforts to win U. N. sanction of American power politics by its assuming the American role do not appear to have been serious. Furthermore, one has the distinct impression that the Eisenhower Administration anticipated many of the results U. S. actions brought. The one big surprise to the Administration, apparently, was the Arab resolution.

The Eisenhower Administration, essentially, overreacted to the Iraqi coup. It intervened in the Lebanon to forestall the spread of the Iraqi revolt to neighboring Arab states. The American decision was taken unilaterally. The United Nations
was informed belatedly, on the heels of the American troop landings.

In the Lebanon crisis, in contrast to the Suez crisis, the U. S. chose not to rely on the United Nations to achieve its goals in the Middle East. Believing in the need for a quick response, the U. S. decided upon direct action. In so doing, it cast doubt on the sincerity of its Suez posture. Former United Nations Official, Andrew W. Cordier, indicated that while Dulles had a reasoned regard for the worthwhileness of the United Nations, on the Lebanon question, the Secretary of State did not place much faith or reliance in the U. N. 114

During the Lebanon crisis there was a noticable decrease in the amount of U. S. moralistic argumentation by American officials when compared to U. S. statements during the Suez crisis. The need to justify and defend its power politics found the United States leaning on broad, legalistic interpretations of national and international law. The American intervention did not comply with the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, 115 the Tripartite Declaration, or Article 51 of the


115 Wright commented: "An extension of the concept of individual self-defense...to permit armed intervention when called for by the Monroe Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, or other unilateral declaration of foreign policy, clearly cannot be justified by the Charter. States may declare such policies and support them by diplomatic representations and other peaceful methods. But such policies do not constitute part of the 'self' of a state, and do not of themselves justify armed intervention in foreign territory. They justify such intervention only insofar as they are declaratory of the justifications recognized by international law." Wright, "United States Intervention In Lebanon," loc. cit.
United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, the Administration sought to legitimize its exercise of power politics by claiming it had the authority to act. It based its contention on rather broad interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Article 51. Apparently aware of the weakness of its legal position, the Administration avoided the appeals to a higher morality which it had made during the Suez crisis.
CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN PRESS REACTION TO THE LEBANON CRISIS

Preliminary Observations

The Lebanon crisis of 1958 was much shorter in duration and much less complex than the earlier Suez crisis. Fewer nations were directly involved in Lebanon—primarily the United States and Lebanon itself. The American press—largely the newspapers and newsmagazines—were mainly interested in the crisis from mid-May until the unanimous passage of the Arab resolution by the United Nations General Assembly on August 21. Secretary Dulles' comments during his May 20 news conference signalled publicly the distinct possibility of direct U. S. involvement in Lebanon. Prior to that, occasional articles on the Lebanese revolt appeared in the American press. But, after May 20, the amount of coverage and editorial comment increased. United Nations passage of the Arab resolution was generally interpreted as signaling the end of the Middle East crisis. By August 25, the expanding Quemoy-Matsu controversy between Mainland China and Formosa swept Lebanon from the front page of the newspapers, and very nearly from the inner pages as well. Occasional articles and editorials appeared after that date. Generally, they dealt with the success of the Chehab successor regime, and with the progress of American troop withdrawals.

The amount of total American press coverage of the Lebanon
crisis was less than that of the Suez crisis. The shorter
length of the Lebanon crisis and its greater simplicity
apparently contributed to determining the amount of coverage
given it by the American press.

American Newspaper Coverage of the Crisis

This study of American newspaper coverage of the Lebanon
crisis will concentrate on three major American newspapers—the
Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, and the Wall
Street Journal. The purpose will be to see whether there was
greater support of Administration policies by these American
newspapers during the Lebanon crisis than during the Suez crisis.
A further aim will be to determine whether the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration kept the American newspapers better informed than it did
during Suez. An attempt will be made to discern how successfully
the Administration was able to influence newspaper coverage of
events. And finally, an effort will be made to measure possible
improvement of the Administration's press image in the area of
foreign affairs—particularly that of Secretary of State Dulles
whose press staff had undergone significant changes in 1957
with the express purpose of improving his Suez-shattered public
image.

The sampling method will be the same as that employed in
Chapter IV to analyze the Suez materials. (see above: pp. 223-
224.) Special emphasis will again be given to editorial comments
because they reflect the official views of the newspaper and the
policies it supports. The study will concentrate on American
newspaper coverage of the period May 20, 1958, to August 21,
1958. Once again, in order to determine whether the Eastern
papers studied were representative, a check of the editorial policy of 4 Western newspapers was made. Similarities and/or differences will be appropriately noted in the footnotes.

The Pre-Intervention Period

Reporting on the May 20, 1958, news conference of the Secretary of State, all three major American newspapers duly noted Dulles' pro forma remarks that the United States would not be deterred by Soviet threats from undertaking, anywhere in the world, what the U. S. thought to be right and its duty. In his byline, filed May 20, New York Times correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt merely mentioned without comment that Dulles had said it. On May 20, Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor, observed that the United States had thereby "served notice on the Soviet Union that Soviet threats and bluster will not stop it (the U. S.) from going to Lebanon's support if help should be requested and considered necessary." And on May 21, the Wall Street Journal regarded Dulles' observation as a "not so veiled warning" to Nikita Khrushchev and Gamal Abdel Nasser "to quit stirring up riots in Lebanon." 1

Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor, commented that, in his interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, i.e. the Middle East Resolution of 1957, Dulles had disclosed that it "is broader in scope than generally has been understood." Previously, according to Stanford, it was believed that the

Congressional resolution applied only to armed assistance, if requested, to a Middle Eastern country threatened by aggression from a country controlled by international communism—if the U. S. President determined its necessity. But now, according to Dulles' interpretation, the Doctrine was "apparently...being extended to cover practically any situation." Stanford noted that Dulles had mentioned that Congress had inserted the sentence which supposedly gave the Administration the authority to act in Lebanon. Thus, in Dulles' view, "Congress gave the President more than he wanted in his Eisenhower Doctrine and now if the occasion arises the President may decide to use this additional authority." Dana Adams Schmidt, New York Times, noted: "Mr. Dulles had declared that the Eisenhower Doctrine was 'not just one thing,' that it was not confined to laying down policy in case of attack by a nation controlled by international communism." And the Wall Street Journal observed that Dulles told his press conference that the main authority for possible U. S. intervention in Lebanon was "a generally overlooked provision" of the Middle East Resolution. All three newspapers recorded Senator Mansfield's "vigorous reply" to Dulles' interpretation of the so-called Mansfield Amendment. All noted Dulles' remark that he did not believe direct U. S. involvement would be necessary in Lebanon.²

Neither the New York Times nor the Christian Science Monitor immediately commented editorially on Dulles' broad interpretation.

of the Eisenhower Doctrine. But, subsequently, both supported the American military intervention in Lebanon. In contrast, the Wall Street Journal took a strong editorial position of opposition to Dulles' interpretation. The Journal expressed doubt that such "an amorphous 'mandate'" was intended by Congress. "It seems more likely that the words about Middle East independence being vital were thrown in as pious platitudes to introduce the quite specific kinds of cases in which we might intervene in the Middle East." Since Congress did insert the "loose language" (a reference to the Congressionally amended sentence: "Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East."), and since Dulles was interpreting that language "in a broad way," perhaps Congress would clarify the point that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not meant to empower the Executive to rush troops into countries—that were not even being attacked—to support Governments that the U. S. might prefer. "Otherwise there will be no limit to the messy involvements we will be getting into." 3

3 "Loose Language Loosely Interpreted," Editorial, WSJ, May 23, 1958, p. 6. The Post-Dispatch regarded Dulles' interpretation as "new and radical." Continuing its earlier support for the United Nations, the Post-Dispatch commented: "Unilateral intervention surely can be only a last resort. Preservation of Lebanese sovereignty obviously is the concern of the United Nations." See: "For U. N. Rather Than U. S.," Editorial, SLPD, May 21, 1958, p. 2D. The L. A. Times expressed concern over Dulles' use of the Eisenhower Doctrine to support the Chamoun regime. The loophole Dulles found in the Doctrine enabled the U. S. to take action (sending police equipment) which won a short-term victory. But, as a consequence, the U. S. was "revealed to the Arabs as the 'imperialist' power they suspected it was all along, determined to settle the local quarrels of the Middle East in its own interest." See: "The 'Mandate' That May Undo Us," Editorial, LAT, May 25, 1958, part II, p. 4.
When Lebanon filed its complaint of U. A. R. intervention, William R. Frye theorized, in a Monitor article, that Lebanon had won the first round in the intricate diplomatic battle with President Nasser. The United Nations Security Council decided to adjourn to await the results of Arab League consideration of Lebanon's complaint. This meant that "the threat of a public airing was left hanging over President Nasser's head." It could be invoked if Lebanon were dissatisfied with the results of the closed-door sessions of the Arab League. Frye noted that prospects for a resolution of the Lebanon dispute outside the United Nations were considered "good enough" that there was little likelihood of a public debate. June 3, the date scheduled for a resumption of Security Council debate of the issue, was merely seen as an added element of pressure on Nasser. Frye's assessment was proven altogether wrong by events. Qubain later argued that the Chamoun Government was not seriously interested in solving the matter at the Arab League sessions. By way of explanation, he noted: 1. Since Arab League members were so divided, and since the League's past record did not inspire confidence, there was little reason to anticipate League success in solving the Lebanese issue. Thus, Lebanon went to Bengazi, Lybia, expecting failure; 2. Lebanese Foreign Minister Dr. Charles Malik did not attend the Bengazi sessions; he went directly to the Security Council meeting in New York; 3. The Chamoun Government was interested in exposing Nasser at the highest international forum; and 4. Chamoun and Malik hoped for foreign intervention with the resulting possibility of

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Chamoun's remaining in the Lebanese Presidency for a second term, thereby, dealing a double blow— to Nasser and to the local Lebanese Opposition. There was, therefore, little likelihood for a resolution of the Lebanese dispute outside the United Nations.

Throughout the Lebanon crisis, the *New York Times* maintained a strongly anti-Nasser position. When Lebanon placed its charge of massive infiltration by the United Arab Republic, the *Times* remarked that the Lebanese had every right to be heard, and that they would be heard sympathetically in most of the free world. But, the *Times* doubted that any specific resolution would be offered when the debate took place because of the expected Soviet veto of any resolution which held Nasser guilty as charged, and which called upon him to desist from his action. "Naturally Nasser would like to bring Lebanon into his orbit by one means or another, but that he can do so flying in the face of the world's opinion is doubtful..." Besides, the *Times* theorized, Nasser would not care to see the Eisenhower Doctrine invoked.

The nature of the internal strife in Lebanon was variously interpreted by the major American newspapers, which, in turn, was reflected in their respective attitudes toward establishment of the United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL). Prior to passage of the Swedish resolution calling for creation

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5 Qubain, *Crisis In Lebanon*, op. cit., p. 91.
of the Observation Group, the Christian Science Monitor, which could not make up its mind as to the character of the revolt, commented that only a U. N. observation group could determine whether the virtual warfare was an expression of indigenous hostility to the Chamoun regime, or whether it signified a U. A. R. design "to close in on the most Western-minded republic in the Middle East and take it over?" The paper hoped that the Secretary-General would be able to make arrangements for "a really sizable observer corp, since nothing less can do the job. And it is needed in a race against time." Following passage of the Swedish resolution by the Security Council, the Monitor, on June 12, welcomed the U. N. decision to set up an Observation Group to report on any illegal infiltration of personnel, arms and materiel into Lebanon as "highly significant." The paper considered it the "most logical way" of checking on Egyptian claims of non-interference in Lebanese affairs.

The Times, which did not share the Monitor's hesitancy about assigning blame for the Lebanese revolt to external causes, welcomed the "gratifying decision" of the Security Council to send the Observer Group to Lebanon "to stop interference in its affairs by President Nasser's Soviet-backed United Arab Republic." According to the Times, this decision became possible when Nasser withdrew his opposition to the Swedish resolution because he was "unable to refute the 'irrefutable evidence'" of U. A. R. inter-

7 "Eyes for the UN in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, June 8, 1958, p. 20.
8 "Lebanon: The UN Steps In," Editorial, CSM, June 12, 1958, p. 20. For a similar view, see: "Why Fight In Lebanon," Editorial, SLPD, June 17, 1958, p. 2B.
ference in Lebanese affairs. 9 Later, on June 16, 1958, the New York Times commented that there was no reason to believe there would have been bloodshed in Lebanon if the Middle East were not generally in turmoil, and "if there were not pressures from Cairo, Moscow and perhaps elsewhere." Lebanon was democratic and pro-Western, which irritated the Soviets, who "invited the active opposition of President Nasser, whose United Arab Republic would be better rounded and more viable if Lebanon could be driven into the fold." 10

Of the Eastern papers studied, only the Wall Street Journal maintained throughout the crisis that the Lebanese situation was largely an internal revolt, although it acknowledged the evidence indicating Nasser's support for the rebels. The Journal argued that part of the reason for the revolt was Chamoun's intention to seek a constitutionally forbidden second term as President. 11

11 "And If We Do--," Editorial, WSJ, June 27, 1958, p. 4. Like the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News argued that there was not much doubt that the rebellion had been encouraged by the United Arab Republic, which supplied the steadily expanding rebel ranks with weapons. It welcomed the Security Council vote to send observers as a vote to localize the struggle. Like the Journal, the Daily News regarded the rebellion as an internal revolt. The Daily News commented: "The presence of a handful of U. N. observers is obviously not going to bring the civil war in Lebanon to a sudden halt. But the restraints applied to Nasser...should have some quieting effect." The U. N. vote could also release the U. S. from the embarrassing dilemma of insisting that the civil war be localized while continuing to send war equipment for police purposes, in the Daily News' opinion. See: "Lebanon Hot Spot," Editorial, CDN, June 13, 1958, p. 10.
Following the election of General Chehab as President, the Journal weighed the possibility of a return to order in Lebanon. It noted that Chehab was the one candidate upon whom both Government and Opposition forces could agree, and that he ought to be able to restore order to a country in which all factions were weary of the revolt. As a potential threat to Lebanon’s safety, the Journal cited possible subversion from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. “That this was ever a serious threat has not been satisfactorily shown; the United Nations observers did not think it was.”

Both the Times and the Monitor stressed the need to preserve and defend the integrity of tiny Lebanon. The Monitor commented that the Security Council action of establishing UNOGIL was hopeful toward achieving that end. To obtain its objective of adequately policing the Lebanese-Syrian border against infiltrations.

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12 "In the Wake of Lebanon’s Election,” Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 1, 1958, p. 4.

13 "Lebanon: The UN Steps In,” CSM, loc. cit. Both the Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Sun-Times noted that it was in the United States best interests that Lebanon continued to be governed by the party sympathetic to the West, but the U. S. would not be justified in sending in the troops to maintain that party in power. The best justification the U. S. could have for such action would be the Eisenhower Doctrine, which would require that Lebanon be threatened by a communist-dominated nation. The United Arab Republic was not communist-dominated. Thus, the task was one for the U. N., “not for outside interveners, be they the U. S. or the U. S. R.” See: "Truce in Lebanon,” Editorial, CST, June 21, 1958, p. 15; and "'Doctrine' Carries US To Brink: Don't Send U. S. Troops To Quell Lebanon Crisis,” Editorial, CDN, June 20, 1958, p. 10.
tion, the Monitor claimed that an observer corps of "possibly several thousand" would be needed, and that it should be given police powers against gun running. "The United States should support the authority of such a force in the UN councils, should contribute transportation equipment and, if necessary, manpower to it." (This phrase echoed Dulles' June 17 press conference remarks. (see above: pp. 380-381.)) Action through the United Nations should be "positive and strong" in order to keep the disturbances in Lebanon from erupting into a full-scale war. Referring to Secretary Dulles' concluding remarks at his June 17 news conference, the Monitor noted: "Mr. Dulles has spoken realistically in reserving a decision as to what the United States would do in case of 'other contingencies.'" 14

On June 15, the Times had observed: "If Lebanon can be held for democracy the march of anti-Western fanaticism may be stopped." 15 Later, commenting on Secretary-General Hammarskjold's observation that "only Lebanon can save Lebanon," 16 the Times remarked, on July 5, that unfortunately the Lebanon crisis was not restricted to Lebanon, but was international in scope. "(I)f Lebanon falls, what remains of Western democratic influence throughout the Arab world will be shattered." But, if Mr. Hammarskjold should be proven wrong by events in Lebanon, by an upsurge in U. A. R. pressure, and by the situation becoming intolerable, despite the "almost insuperable difficulties," a

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15 "Lebanon's Hour of Trial," Editorial, NYT, June 15, 1958, p. 8E.
new U. N. emergency force should be considered, as should the
idea of a permanent U. N. security force, even though "further
off" and "more unrealistic," for "this would not be the first
instance of accomplishing the impossible when a crisis of the
times demanded it."\textsuperscript{17}

The \textit{Wall Street Journal} advocated a position diametrically
opposed to that of the \textit{New York Times} and the \textit{Christian Science
Monitor} on the question of preserving Lebanese independence.
The \textit{Journal} decried the American tendency to engage in what at
one point it termed "unlimited intervention." Following Dulles'
June 17 news conference, the \textit{Journal} lamented the prospect of
another police action, to which Dulles had all but committed
the U. S. Whether the United States would feel compelled to
take such action, the \textit{Journal} found, was less a matter for the
U. S. to decide than it was the decision of "Chamoun, or Nasser,
or even Khrushchev, whose hand has also been evident in the
Lebanese situation." Therefore, the \textit{Journal} explained that the
Administration should "go slowly, carefully and deliberately"
along the policy road it had chosen.\textsuperscript{18}

Prior to the U. S. intervention in Lebanon, the \textit{Journal}
argued against such action by raising the question of what the

\textsuperscript{17}"Report From Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 5, 1958, p. 16. Earlier the \textit{Times} had observed: "The most logical positive move
that could be devised would be in the direction not of unilateral
intervention on the part of the United States but establishment
of a new United Nations border-control force along the lines of
the one that has proved so successful on the Egyptian-Israeli
frontier." "A U. N. E. F. For Lebanon," Editorial, NYT, July 1,

U. S. moral position would be. The revolt was largely internal. President Chamoun had violated the Lebanese constitution by seeking a second term. And there was little to indicate that Chamoun represented majority feeling. Besides, Chamoun could not be trusted to remain pro-Western since Lebanese politicians were well known for changing sides while trying to survive among greater powers.  

In the same issue, the *Journal* commented that the trouble with a "policy of global intervention" lay in its basic premise that no Communist gain, or development which the Communists might exploit, could be permitted because it might endanger American security. "The truth is that further losses can be tolerated if necessary, or if the price of preventing them is too high. The loss of Lebanon—in this case not even to Communism—could be borne. So could that of Indonesia... India..."  

The *Wall Street Journal* was silent editorially on the question of a U. N. peace force. Both the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* supported a United Nations peace force before the Eisenhower Administration was ready to suggest the idea publicly. Both expressed support for the concept prior to the American intervention in Lebanon. The Administration only advocated the concept in the General Assembly, four weeks after the Marines had landed in Lebanon. In response to Hammar-

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19."And If We Do--,” *WSJ*, loc. cit.  
skjold's optimism about UNOGIL ability to avert war, the Monitor voiced doubts that "anything less than a UN emergency force" would be adequate in Lebanon, but it hoped Hammarskjold's optimism would prove justified. 21

Both the Times and the Monitor expressed early support for UNOGIL. Neither failed to remind its readers that, in the event of United Nations failure in Lebanon, the United States stood ready to act. The Monitor wrote: "The possibility must never be absent that the Sixth Fleet will answer a call from President Chamoun for help under the Eisenhower Doctrine if UN efforts fail to avert a threat to Lebanese independence and general peace." But every effort should be made to assure U. N. success and to guarantee that it possessed every needed strength to preserve international order. Thus, the United States and Britain should get together with other U. N. members to oppose Soviet efforts to extend a communist foothold in the Middle East. The U. N. membership should call the Communist bluff and defend the right of an independent nation "to be secure within its borders from the indirect aggression of imported revolution." 22

Following Lebanon's appeal for a U. N. emergency force to seal off its frontiers against infiltration of U. A. R. "volunteers," the New York Times noted that the appeal came amid indications that the Lebanese rebels were preparing a showdown

21 "Will Observers Be Enough?" Editorial, CSM, June 28, 1958, p. 18.
22 "Back the UN in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, June 26, 1958, p. 20.
battle. "Should the pro-Nasser forces win they could well precipitate a landslide that would put the whole Middle East under Nasser's, and thus indirectly under Soviet control." To meet this threat, the *Times* found that the Observer Group then in Lebanon was "no longer adequate." The United Nations, which had saved Nasser during the Suez crisis, now faced a crucial test—could it stop him in Lebanon? The threat of a Soviet veto in the Security Council of a proper response to the Lebanese appeal would place the responsibility on the General Assembly to take action. Should the United Nations fail to act, the only alternative left to Lebanon would be to invoke Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. "This would mean a call on the West as well as on the Baghdad powers for armed support, which could have wider repercussions than anything done under United Nations auspices." In this editorial, the *Times*'s inclination to assess blame for the Lebanese revolt upon Gamal Abdel Nasser is again clearly evident. It is equally clear that the *Times* was unwilling to await the findings of UNOGIL regarding the degree of U. A. R. interference in Lebanese affairs. Was it actually necessary for the United Nations to stop Nasser in Lebanon? The preponderance of scholarly findings holds that, although there was infiltration of men, arms and materiel from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic, the Chamoun Government exaggerated its significance. Scholars have confirmed the findings of the first UNOGIL report that the majority of

rebels were Lebanese, and that the rebellion was largely of internal origin. Therefore, there was no legitimate need for the U. N. to stop Nasser in Lebanon. Since the Lebanese revolt was primarily an internal affair, and since there was no indication of overt aggression from neighboring Syria, Article 51 of the U. N. Charter did not apply.

On the whole question of possible U. S. intervention in Lebanon, Dana Adams Schmidt reported in the *New York Times* that Eisenhower Administration policy-makers were in a "quandary" over when, and under what conditions, the United States would commit troops to Lebanon. Schmidt indicated that almost all State Department officials considered the insurgent movement in Lebanon a clear threat to United States interests. "If the insurgents win,...Nasser wins, they believe. If he wins in Lebanon...he may soon follow up with similar victories in Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia." State Department officials, according to Schmidt, were doubtful that the U. N. Observer Group would be effective, or that a U. N. police force could be formed to act in time. There were two schools of thought on intervention in response to a Lebanese Government request. One school contended that the U. S. must intervene rather than see America's friends "submerged." The other school was "horrified" at the prospect of U. S. troops being used in the Middle East. Both

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schools of thought were agreed that the Eisenhower Doctrine—which Secretary of State Dulles had sought to "stretch" to cover broader contingencies—was "a poor guide." It provided for U. S. intervention in the Middle East against Communist aggression. "No aggression that could be so identified is in prospect." Hoopes found evidence of State Department distrust of Nasser and antipathy towards his Pan-Arabic aspirations. He pointed out that in June, 1958, Nasser summoned the American Ambassador and suggested proposals for ending the Lebanese dispute—Chamoun should complete his term, then give way to General Chehab as the strongest candidate acceptable to both sides. The rebels should be granted complete amnesty. Dulles passed Nasser's proposals to Chamoun without endorsement, and Chamoun took no action on them. Hoopes felt: "In retrospect, Dulles' refusal to see these proposals as the ingredients of a reasonable settlement, and to use them as the point of departure for a serious negotiation between Chamoun and the rebels, perhaps with UN mediation, was rather clearly a missed opportunity. The final settlement consisted almost precisely of these terms, but there remained in Washington a basic antipathy to Nasser's Pan-Arabic aspirations, a state of mind which preferred military intervention to mediation." While there was no indication that Nasser's United Arab Republic was under Communist control, according to Hoopes, Dulles was convinced "that Nasser was, wittingly or not, the principle agent of Soviet Communist expansion in the Middle East." Still, it would have been 

stretching the Eisenhower Doctrine to maintain its applicability in the Lebanon situation.

In keeping with its anti-intervention stand, the Wall Street Journal noted Dulles' July 1 news conference statement that U. S. intervention in Lebanon would be "a measure of last resort," and that the U. S. expected the United Nations would be able to cope with the situation. The Journal pointed out that Dulles had recalled that the U. N. Charter recognized the right of collective self-defense. "The top U. S. diplomat thus attempted to calm speculation over possible U. S. moves in Lebanon while leaving himself room for maneuver in case that country's Western-oriented government gets in even deeper danger than it is at present. In a sense, Mr. Dulles was trying to dampen down fires he himself kindled...(when) Mr. Dulles declared that the United States would send troops into Lebanon under certain conditions."

For about ten days preceding the U. S. intervention, American newspaper attention to the situation in Lebanon was greatly reduced. Articles were fewer in number and there were even fewer editorials, which apparently reflected the quieted situation following the introduction of UNOGIL, and the release of its first report on the progress of its mission. The Christian Science Monitor did feature one editorial on the significance of

27 "Dulles Sees U. S. Troops In Lebanon Only A Last Resort," WSJ, July 2, 1958, p. 4; "Last Resort," Editorial, CDN, July 2, 1958, p. 14; and John S. Knight, "The Editor's Notebook: It's a Strange Revolution, But Lebanon Is U. N.'s Job," CDN, July 5, 1958, p. 8. Knight argued: 'Having blundered our way into a situation which apparently we do not fully understand, Mr. Dulles should now leave the fighting to the Lebanese and the problem in the hands of the United Nations where it belongs.'
the first report of the United Nations Observation Group which found no evidence of massive infiltration. The editorial was published on July 14, 1958, the day before U. S. military intervention in Lebanon. In light of that action, the findings of the Monitor editorial are most amusing. For it found that the U. N. Observer Group report cut the ground out from under Western efforts to keep Chamoun in power for the balance of his term. This was the effect, despite widespread sentiment that the U. N. team's observations "were limited and inconclusive." For the West to intervene—even at Chamoun's request—would be to interfere in an "officially proclaimed civil war" and would result in a wave of Arab anti-Western feeling which could lead to sabotage of British and American oil installations. The only hope for the West was that the Lebanese army could preserve Mr. Chamoun in power until the end of his term, while the Lebanese Parliament could select a new President satisfactory to Chamoun supporters and the rebels. "This would give Lebanon a President to whom the United States was not explicitly committed, while removing from the scene the rebels' chief target." When Nasser suggested a similar series of proposals, Dulles, as we have seen, failed to take positive steps to implement them. Yet, following the Marine landings, it was substantially this arrangement which Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy

28 "Crisis in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, July 14, 1958, p. 16. Earlier, on July 7, the Post-Dispatch claimed that the first UNOGIL report warranted a serious reappraisal of U. S. Middle Eastern policy. The Post-Dispatch found that U. S. policy was subject to two serious faults: 1. Attempting to maintain particular governments in power; and 2. The assumption that every movement against a Western-backed government was inspired and supported exclusively by Nasser whose every move supposedly was inspired and supported by Russia. See: "No Room for Intervention," Editorial, SLPD, July 7, 1958, p. 2B.
concluded with the two sides in the Lebanese dispute.

In the pre-intervention period, of the Eastern papers studied, only the Wall Street Journal took a clearly anti-intervention position. But it did not express support for United Nations actions. Its attitude seemed to be: "Let events take their own course."

While both the Times and the Monitor preferred United Nations action, they were not averse to Western intervention on behalf of the Chamoun regime. Since both supported the concept of a United Nations police force to meet such emergencies as Lebanon, they agreed with such Congressional opponents to Administration Lebanon policy as Senators Mike Mansfield and Wayne Morse. (see above: pp. 378-382.) These Senators preferred a United Nations response, perhaps through the extension of the United Nations Emergency Force to Lebanon's borders, to a unilateral U.S. military intervention. But, the Administration was reluctant, at this point, to lend support to a policy designed to further creation of a United Nations police force, possibly because it did not believe that such a policy could succeed.

The American Intervention and Security Council Debate

Since the Eisenhower Administration had amply prepared the American press and public in advance for a possible Lebanese intervention, it came as no surprise to the American newspapers that the Marines had landed in Lebanon. Both the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor supported the Administration's action. Of the two, the Times was most outspokenly favorable in
its reaction. The Times commented that, in the prevailing circumstances, the landing of Marines was the right move. Either the United States (and the democratic West) had to renounce hope of preventing the entire Middle East from falling into hostile hands or it had to do something. The U. S. was, therefore, acting to contain the Nasser-inspired revolt in Iraq. Noting the Administration's prior hope that the United Nations observers would be able to handle the Lebanon situation, the Times indicated that the intervention represented "an abrupt change in American thinking." However, the Iraqi revolution had altered all previous calculations. Since the United States was responding to a Lebanese request for assistance to preserve its sovereignty and independence, and since the United Nations Charter recognized the "inherent right of collective self-defense," helping Lebanon was a defensive step. Furthermore, the fate of the Middle East could have been involved. "If the West lost its access to the Middle East's oil or were barred from using the area as the strategic crossroads to Europe, Asia and Africa, the result could be to make the Soviet Union by far the greatest power in the world." Thus, the Times concluded that the debarkation in Lebanon was "a calculated risk worth taking." 29

The next day, July 17, the Times argued that, as one of the world's two great powers, the United States could not refuse to act like a great power. For to ignore appeals from supporters like Lebanon "would be to abdicate the role that history and our

wealth and energy have thrust upon us." For either the United States must defend countries like Lebanon and Korea, or return to isolationism and "become a second-rate power, without allies and in danger of losing the liberties we do possess." ³⁰

Neal Stanford, Christian Science Monitor, indicated that diplomatic authorities in Washington, D. C., discounted the possibility of armed Russian intervention in the Middle East, despite Moscow's belligerent note on the American debarkation of Marines in Lebanon. The Russians, it was felt, were not willing to risk war "to pull...Nasser's chestnuts out of the fire." Stanford observed that the White House "had made the grave decision that to do nothing at this critical moment was bound to be worse than doing something, however fraught with unknown consequences." Washington acted to prevent not only the loss of the Middle East, but also the eventual collapse of peripheral areas, such as, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and free institutions in Asia and Africa. ³¹ In his background news briefing at the home of Richard Harkness on July 21, 1958, Dulles made the same points. (see above: pp. 399-405.) Years later, in his memoirs, Eisenhower repeated much of this argumentation. Eisenhower commented that in Lebanon "the question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World) and in doing so to risk general war with the Soviet Union


or to do something worse—which was to do nothing.\textsuperscript{32} Referring to this statement, Hoopes noted that Eisenhower "set out a balance sheet of pros and cons that, to say the least, did not seem self-evidently persuasive in favor of intervention."\textsuperscript{33}

In the same issue of the \textit{Monitor}, Joseph C. Harsch argued that Washington acted to forestall Nasser's move to achieve "what might be called a new Cairo caliphate." He foresaw the collapse of all resistance to such a project within days had London and Washington not deployed their forces in Lebanon and Jordan. Harsch saw the real purpose of the American mission in the Middle East not merely to save a friendly government in Lebanon, but "to restabilize" the Middle East.\textsuperscript{34}

The \textit{Monitor} commented that, given the situation, national leaders could "reasonably" have concluded that no lesser response to the Lebanese appeal would be "adequate or appropriate." The \textit{Monitor} found the following positive aspects to the American action:

\begin{quote}
It has told the Soviet Union that there is a point beyond which the United States will not be pushed in maneuverings to extend Communist influence into the Middle East.

It has served similar notice to President Nasser... that the independence and integrity of Lebanon are of vital concern to the United States, not to be sacrificed to indirect aggression.

It has shown that an American promise of support to a country whose elected officials wish aid in its defense is not an empty pledge.

The action is the more creditable in that it has been taken in consultation with Britain, whose support to King Hussein in neighboring Jordan may also be important.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32}Eisenhower, \textit{Waging Peace}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 274.

\textsuperscript{33}Hoopes, \textit{The Devil and J. F. D.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 435.

While it was regrettable that Washington acted in advance of a presentation to the Security Council, and that it ordered American troops to do more than protect American nationals, it bore remembering that a Russian veto was "altogether predictable" and that the Syrian border facilitated the munitioning of Lebanese rebels. This latter observation implied a belated acceptance by the Monitor of the charges of massive infiltration from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic.

Following the landing of the U. S. Marines in Lebanon, the Wall Street Journal maintained its earlier opposition to intervention. In a penetrating editorial, the Journal attempted to determine what it was the U. S. was fighting against in Lebanon. While recognizing that the U. S. was in a sense "opposing Moscow," it pointed out that this was only because Moscow had "shrewdly and opportunistically" allied itself with Middle Eastern forces which the U. S. opposed. "In no sense is this a battle against Communism as an ideology, or, as in Korea, a war against Communist imperialist aggression." Rather, what the U. S. was combatting in the Middle East was "a rising tide of the people's deep emotions"—Pan-Arabism. The Journal then attempted to indicate what the U. S. was fighting for, and it found the answer in the oil fields of the Middle East. If Middle Eastern oil was, in fact, what the United States was fighting for, then the American intervention was "not a crusade against Communism and aggression...but a frank power drive of precisely the kind we

have so long deplored in others." Such a policy of retaining control of Middle Eastern oil by force of arms was self-defeating, for it foreclosed the U. S. from any other policy. The Journal did not think that in the long run the United States could gain by a policy that made it necessary to use force.\(^\text{36}\) Such rationale did not take into account the fact that the Administration did not attempt to justify its action by calling attention to the need to retain control of Middle Eastern oil. A reading of the documents available leads one to conclude that far greater concern to the United States was the restoration quickly of order to the region and the maintenance of the Western position in the area. Eisenhower disclosed that Dulles cited the probability that the pipeline across Syria would be cut, and use of the Suez Canal impeded or denied.\(^\text{37}\) Nevertheless, Dulles had been prepared to recommend intervention,\(^\text{38}\) if Eisenhower had not already decided to send in the Marines.

Earlier, on July 18, the Journal found that the American intervention endangered U. S. prestige, for there were signs that many nations long friendly to the U. S. saw the United States as using its forces to prop up unpopular governments and of compelling foreign countries to accept the American


\(^{38}\) Dulles Project, Interview with Harr, p. 53.
concept of order. As the Journal saw it, not only did the Administration miscalculate the reaction of America’s friends, it incorrectly evaluated the impact of U.S. intervention in Lebanon. Although the Administration evidently envisaged advantages in a show-of-force, things did not work out that way. Popular resentment in Lebanon to the American action had lost the U.S. supporters there and had strengthened the hands of the rebels. The Journal’s position contradicted reports such as that filed earlier, on July 16, by Christian Science Monitor reporter Harry B. Ellis to the effect that the Marines’ mission was beginning to succeed in Beirut itself. For the first night in nine weeks, not a shot was fired there, as rebel leader Saeb Salam issued orders to the rebels not to fire on the Lebanese army.

All three major Eastern newspapers agreed that U.S. forces should be withdrawn as soon as a reliable successor could be elected President and the country stabilized. Both the Times and the Monitor advocated a U.N. peace force be established to assume the U.S. role. Both recognized the difficulty of getting Soviet and Afro-Asian support for the idea, but they felt the effort should be made. The Times noted that Administration insistence on this point represented a "reversal" of its earlier

position of support for Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold who contended that nothing more than an Observation Group was necessary in Lebanon. The Monitor claimed that there was a need for a stronger organization than the 135-man U.N. Observer Group. What was called for was a U.N. Emergency Force comparable to the one along the Gaza Strip between Egypt and Israel. "The authorization of a body to assume the responsibility which the United States says it is willing to yield could be one of several important recent steps towards a reliable world order." In a later issue, the Monitor argued that the United Nations must face its responsibility by providing a force with weapons and the authority to use them. This would "warrant" the withdrawal of troops by both the United States and Great Britain. "Only when the members of the UN shoulder their share of the responsibility for peace and security can America and Britain step aside from the stand they have taken."


43 "The UN's Role in Lebanon," Editorial, CSM, July 17, 1958, p. 20. The Post-Dispatch expressed its conviction that: 1. the U.S. had forfeited the high moral ground of its Suez position; 2. Article 51 did not apply; and 3. Eisenhower had substituted his own judgement for that of the U.N., whose Observers had indicated that Lebanon's troubles were largely internal. Then, the Post-Dispatch concluded: "In view of all these factors, it is fortunate that the President is asking the U.N. Security Council to authorize an emergency force...If the Security Council fails to act, he is honor bound to go to the General Assembly, just as he did in the case of Suez. And if the Assembly fails to authorize international police action, he is honor bound to accept that body's collective judgement as to just what should be done." See: "The Decision to Intervene in Lebanon," SLPD, loc. cit.

The Wall Street Journal, unlike the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, did not advocate a United Nations assumption of the American role in Lebanon. Rather, it looked to developments in Lebanon to provide the way out. Thus, it felt that the July 31, 1958, election of President Chehab "should prepare the way for a rapid American withdrawal." 45

The New York Times observed that United Nations Security Council debate was destined to end in frustration by the disposition of votes and the veto powers. While the Times found that the right in international law of the American and British interventions was generally acknowledged, it believed that the terms on which the diplomatic battle was fought were "fogbound." The real power politics and economic factors behind the actions could not be used to their full value. "Everyone knew that the basic issues were whether the Middle Eastern countries still independent of Nasser's domination were going to remain independent, and whether the priceless sources of oil were going to be jeopardized and perhaps lost to the West." There was also the question of U. S. prestige. Thus, the votes on the American and Russian resolutions were predictable. The Japanese resolution, although more logical, was being put forward too late. "It seems unlikely to have any better success than the other resolutions." Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly should be given a chance to deal with the Middle Eastern issues. 46

45 "In the Wake of Lebanon's Election," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 1, 1958, p. 4.
Throughout the period of United Nations Security Council debates and the later General Assembly debates of the American intervention, the Christian Science Monitor echoed Dulles' pre-intervention statement that Lebanon was not like Suez. (see above: pp. 383-384.) In Lebanon, the United States was responding to a request for help from the duly constituted government. At Suez, the British and French were not invited by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Monitor observed: "The difference between intervention by invitation and without an invitation may sound like a technical and legalistic distinction but to the soldiers on the beach it made the difference of being greeted by machine-gun fire or by a wave of the hand from civilian bathers." The New York Times also stressed the legitimacy of the U. S. action without comparing it specifically with the Anglo-French action at Suez. And the Wall Street Journal continued to question the need for the intervention and its effectiveness.

47 "Lebanon Is Not Suez," Editorial, CSM, July 28, 1958, p. 14; and "The UN's Role in Lebanon," CSM, loc. cit. By contrast, the Western papers could see little difference between the Suez and Lebanon crises. The Post-Dispatch charged: "The unhappy truth is that the United States has forfeited the high moral ground which it took in the Suez crisis." See: "The Decision to Intervene in Lebanon," SLPD, loc. cit. The Daily News claimed that the Marine landings were "an error nearly comparable in magnitude with" the Suez landings. See: "A Major Blunder....," CDN, loc. cit. The L. A. Times commented: "(T)he bitter reality of the intervention obtrudes. Most Americans, along with their government, denounced the British-French-Israeli attack on Suez two years ago. The irony, the tragic irony, is that our intervention now is not very different....(A) disinterested observer might fairly say that we are warmongering." See: "What Are We Doing Anyway?," LAT, loc. cit.
The Abortive Summit Conference and United Nations General Assembly Debate of the Lebanese Intervention

Before the United Nations Security Council debate of the Middle Eastern interventions had ended in deadlock, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent his first letter to Western leaders suggesting a five power summit conference on the Middle East situation. (see above: pp. 412-418.) Even before the Eisenhower Administration reluctantly agreed to a summit conference under United Nations auspices, the New York Times expressed its opinion that a summit conference could be used to define just what the United States would yield and would not dare to yield "for fear of the everlasting loss of our freedoms." Clear definition of these parameters might enhance prospects for international peace. 48

American agreement to convocation of a summit meeting in the U. N. Security Council was welcomed by all three major Eastern American newspapers. The Times was gratified that "the risk of a hot war" following the debarkation of the Marines was lessened. 49


49 "The Struggle in the U. N.," Editorial, NYT, July 23, 1958, p. 26. Not all American newspapers, however, responded favorably to American agreement to convene a summit meeting. To the L. A. Times, the Lebanon intervention, "an impulse of the moment," had confounded Dulles, who had skillfully evaded a summit conference for many months. Dulles had opposed a summit "on the sensible ground" that it would be impossible to come to any agreement with the Russians. But because of the Lebanon intervention the U. S. must have such a conference, "with Mr. Khrushchev editing the guest list." See: "Arrangement by Mr. Khrushchev," Editorial, LAT, July 25, 1958, part III, p. 4.
The Wall Street Journal expressed its conviction that the President acted correctly in going along with the summit proposal. It found that the determining factor was the attitude of U. S. friends and allies, including Britain, who had looked more favorably than the U. S. on a summit meeting. The United States could not afford to deny the desires of other Western nations. "So we go reluctantly to the summit." 50

This and other reports at the time that the United States was reluctant to go to the summit conference, and that the U. S. was using delaying tactics in the hopes of postponing the conference were accurate. Richard Goold-Adams found that the Western powers were not prepared to be stampeded into a summit conference such as Khrushchev proposed, at which they would be placed on the psychological defensive. On July 22, Macmillan proposed that a summit be convened at a special session of the U. N. Security Council in New York. The Eisenhower Administration, after twenty-four hours of intensive consultation, expressed willingness to accept the Macmillan proposal "if such a meeting were generally desired." Dulles had not meant to go that far. When, on July 23, Khrushchev accepted the Macmillan proposal with the specific suggestion that the summit begin on July 28, Eisenhower stated that that would be "too early for us." Goold-Adams remarked: "Dulles had in fact yielded reluctantly to the idea of a summit, in order to avoid another rift between London and Washington, but since he never wanted it, so long as American

troops were in Lebanon, he managed to stall successfully."  

In the contemporary American press, fears were expressed that the summit meeting should be little more than a propaganda battle between the Russians and the West, and, the press explained, therein lay U. S. opposition to the talks.  

Both the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor argued that rather than retain official U. S. reluctance to attend a summit conference, the Administration should take full advantage of the occasion to present a clear case for the West. The Times argued: "The summit conference should be looked upon as an opportunity, not an ordeal." The meeting should be faced with "confidence." With proper conduct by the American press and public, the proposed summit conference need not be a Communist victory, according to the Monitor, which noted that some sections of the press were charging it would be.  

Concerning the Eisenhower-Khrushchev public exchange of letters on the summit conference, the Christian Science Monitor's Josephine Ripley observed poignantly: "The sparring has been sharp, but not without some restraint. In other words, it has been directed as much to the world at large as to the official


to whom the notes have been addressed."^55

Unlike Administration reluctance to attend the summit, which was opposed by the Eastern papers, U. S. delaying tactics were, at times, actually endorsed. For example, the New York Times, on July 24, 1958, quipped that it seemed as though no day or night was complete without a new Khrushchev offer, or acceptance, of a summit conference. "The trouble has been recently that Mr. Khrushchev has named dates too near for comfortable preparation, has attached conditions not always easy to meet and has accompanied his offers of peace with language not ordinarily associated with polite diplomacy." What was Khrushchev's goal—a new propaganda line, or an earnest desire to talk peace? "A little time is needed—perhaps more than four days—to clear up these points."^56

Neal Stanford interpreted Administration delaying tactics as an effort by John Foster Dulles to expose the lacunae in Khrushchev's efforts to "stampede the West into a summit on his terms." And Stanford concluded that Dulles' tactics might pay off for "(h)is 'stop-look-and-listen' signs are beginning to impress more and more diplomats!" This in turn might explain why the tone in Khrushchev's letters became "shriller and their flow faster."^57


Reacting to Eisenhower's explanation for dispatching troops to Lebanon, the *Wall Street Journal* commented on the clear implication of the President's reasoning—that the United States might henceforth intervene in any country whose government felt itself threatened from whatever quarter, Communist or non-Communist. The *Journal* cautioned that this was a strange position for a nation with a revolutionary past to take, and that the United States would have its hands full if it let the Lebanese precedent "establish the principle of unlimited intervention." 58

When the United States seemed to momentarily have won Soviet agreement to a summit conference under U. N. auspices, the *Times* commented that, while earlier it seemed Khrushchev was winning on points in the propaganda battle, "President Eisenhower, obviously in cooperation with Secretary Dulles, won back some of the lost ground" by suggesting the summit be held in the Security Council. Thus, if Khrushchev came to the United States for a U. N. summit conference, he would be subject to certain U. N. rules of order. He would not be able to dictate who would be present, or what procedure would be followed, or when the meeting would be held. 59


The Lebanese election of President Chehab to replace Camille Chamoun raised hopes of stabilization in Lebanon. The reaction of the American newspapers to the election varied. The *Wall Street Journal* argued that, coupled with the comparative calm in Iraq, it created the best conditions for American withdrawal. Prompt recall of United States troops would strengthen the American position at any summit conference on the Middle East by eliminating the basis for Soviet charges of U. S. aggression. The fact that the new Chehab government would certainly be less pro-West than the Chamoun government would make it difficult for Khrushchev to convince many that the U. S. intervened in Lebanon "to preserve a 'puppet.'" But the U. S. could not make as good a case for its charges of attempted Soviet subversion of small countries as long as American troops were still in Lebanon.60 In contrast, the *New York Times* did not regard the Lebanese election as sufficient grounds for the early withdrawal of American troops. The *Times* felt that the problem of internal security should be settled, and there should be assurances that Lebanon would be able to maintain its sovereignty and independence. These conditions should have first been met before the U. S. withdrew its troops. Too hasty withdrawal might give the impression of a retreat under Soviet and Egyptian pressure, or that the U. S. intervened to impose a President of its own liking in Lebanon.61


On July 31, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles gave a news conference in which he explained what he thought could be accomplished by a summit under U. N. auspices, and what should be the topics of discussion. Dulles indicated that the summit should be limited to charges of U. S. and U. K. aggression and the problem of indirect aggression, thereby, laying "the foundation for dealing with the broader problems." (see above: pp. 416-417.) Dulles' comments sparked some heated comment both at home and abroad. Examples appeared in Wall Street Journal editorials. On August 5, 1958, the Journal reminded its readers that the American case for indirect aggression in Lebanon was "not especially impressive in terms of international politics." While the U. S. talked about Soviet indirect aggression, the Soviets would be accusing the Americans of direct aggression in Lebanon. "The charge is baseless, but the presence of American troops in Lebanon makes it seem plausible to many people in the world." 62 On August 8, the Journal cautioned that before the United States injected discussions of indirect aggression into international conferences, it would be well advised "to say exactly what we mean, and learn precisely what others mean, by a term that is so unlimited as to be almost meaningless." 63

63 "Indirect Aggression," Editorial, WSJ, Aug. 8, 1958, p. 4; and "Better None at All," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 5, 1958, p. 2B. The Post-Dispatch argued that if the summit were to develop along the lines Dulles suggested, "it would be better...not to hold a conference at all." Furthermore, it noted that for the U. N. to deal with indirect aggression it would have to first identify it.
When, following his trip to Peking and his discussions with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev backed out of the summit conference and called instead for a special emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, on August 6, the *New York Times* observed candidly: "(O)n our Government's part it would be less than honest to make believe that we were anxious for a summit meeting at the Security Council, or anywhere else. This had become, in fact, the meeting that nobody wanted. Mr. Khrushchev's letter merely delivered the coup de grâce." The *Times* found the decision to go to the U. N. a positive factor for the U. S. and Britain. Their case was a "good one," their legal position was "strong," Western Middle Eastern policies were "more defensible" than Russia's--the West was interested in protecting the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the Arab states and in their peaceful development. Dulles would have an opportunity to air his complaints about "indirect aggression" by Russia and the United Arab Republic. And the U. S. could put forward a constructive economic program for the area. 64 On August 8, the *Times* saw the call for a

64 "The Summit Recedes," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 24. Western newspapers were not very pleased with the American agreement with Khrushchev to go before the United Nations General Assembly. The Post-Dispatch argued that Eisenhower had done well to accept a General Assembly meeting. "Just what the Assembly can accomplish remains in doubt." It hoped the debate would be helpful. See: "Noise, Not Negotiation," Editorial, SLPD, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 2C. The Daily News claimed that the move to the General Assembly represented a Russian propaganda victory. "In the U. N. Assembly, there is every chance that debate can be prolonged until Russia feels that the last drop of propaganda has been milked." See: "Khrushchev's U. N. Strategy: Russ(ian) Switch to Assembly Keeps U. S. on Defensive," Editorial, CDN, Aug. 6, 1958, p. 22. The L. A. Times lamented: "So here we are...maneuvered into the most futile kind of a conference, a parliament of cuckoos." See: "A Parliament of Cuckoos?" Editorial, LAT, Aug. 7, 1958, part III, p. 4.
special U. N. General Assembly emergency session as evidence that the danger of war was "receding." The U. N. was the only forum available for such talks, which demonstrated once again its "indispensability." 65

The controversy resulting from Dulles' July 31 news conference led to widespread reports of demands within the Eisenhower Administration to broaden the scope of discussions at the United Nations. Critics within the Administration were reported to feel that Dulles' remarks were too "negative" and had alienated opinion abroad. Those urging the fresh approach were then Vice President Richard M. Nixon, C. D. Jackson, a Time-Life official and one time psychological warfare adviser to the President, who had returned to serve as consultant on the Middle East, and White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty. 66 The President himself, it was reported, would present the new American approach in a "dramatic" personal appearance in the U. N. General Assembly. The new U. S. plan was to lend support to the approach advocated most recently on August 8, 1958, by U. N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. The Hammarskjold proposal called for joint action by the Arab States themselves in improving their own economic development. As the Times observed: "The difficulty with the Hammarskjold plan is that

65 "Calling In The Assembly," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 8, 1958, p. 18.

he has never been able to arouse much interest in it among the Arab states, (American) officials... noted."

Editorial reaction to the President's United Nations General Assembly proposal (see above: pp. 419-420.) was generally favorable. The Christian Science Monitor hailed the proposal as representing "several forward steps" in U. S. policy. The regional economic development institution—the "heart" of the plan—moved beyond direct binational agreements, which many countries feared tied them too tightly to American purposes. The Eisenhower plan stressed U. N. sponsorship of the multinational organization, which would be administered by the Arabs themselves—"its goals must be Arab goals." The Monitor hoped that it would receive "a thoughtful hearing and careful consideration in the Middle East." The New York Times found that the Eisenhower proposal was "a good, constructive framework which offers the Arab nations what they should be wanting, which stays within the principles of the United Nations Charter, and which safeguards United States interests." The American plan was "high in its aims" and "admirable" in content. While recognizing that it would be difficult to win Middle Eastern agreement to the economic development institution, and that creation of a U. N. peace force was at best a task requiring

67 Ibid., Kenworthy and Stringer; and "Eisenhower to Appear at UN Today to Present U. S. Plan for Achieving Permanent Peace in Middle East," WSJ, Aug. 13, 1958, p. 2.

a good deal of time, and that restricting arms flow to the
Middle East could not succeed as long as the Russians insisted
on including Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in a disarmament plan,
the *Times* argued that the U. S. plan deserved "serious and
thoughtful consideration from the General Assembly, and espe-
cially from the Arab members." The *Wall Street Journal*
found that the President's six points did contain "some germs
for further discussion." The Arab administration of the eco-
nomic development institution was a step in the right direction,
since it renounced the "tired" notion that the U. S. could win
Arab friends or solve Arab problems merely by handing out U. S.
foreign aid. The development of a U. N. peace force was
"probably a prerequisite" to a U. N. solution of the real
problems in the Middle East, such as defining and enforcing
boundary security. Furthermore, by making this proposal, the
President had "rescued the U. S. from the posture of being
stubbornly 'anti-Arab.'" Eisenhower's plan was only a begin-
ning--"a working paper"--for the U. S. and the U. N. "But in
any problem so difficult as the Middle East a working paper
is a necessary beginning."  

69 "The Eisenhower Doctrine," Editorial, NYT, Aug. 14,
1958, p. 28; "Fine Statement of U. S. Aims: Ike's Mid-East
Plan Is Superior Statecraft," Editorial, CDN, Aug. 14, 1958,
p. 18; and "Ike Speaks For Peace--Khrushchev Balks," Editorial,
CST, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 43.

and "More Steps Forward Than Back," Editorial, LAT, Aug. 14,
1958, part III, p. 4.
The Wall Street Journal questioned the validity of Eisenhower's equating the Lebanese intervention with U. S. actions against clear Communist aggression in Iran, Greece and Turkey, the Berlin blockade, Korea and the Formosa Straits. The Journal observed that there was "very considerable doubt" that Communist aggression, direct or indirect, was a factor in Lebanon, and that U. A. R. infiltration played any significant part. "Primarily, the trouble seems to have been a mixed-up political situation within Lebanon itself." The difference between Lebanon and the other cases of U. S. intervention explained why U. S. involvement in Lebanon "was not applauded in the world," and why the Soviets had been able to exploit it to promote war hysteria. "(T)he unhappy fact is that in this case the United States, because it was on uncertain ground, gave the Soviets a sizable propaganda opportunity." Concerning Eisenhower's reservation of the U. S. right to intervene on behalf of small nations, the Journal wished that this had been clarified to refer to nations "menaced" by Communism. "It is one thing to resist Communist aggression, open or disguised. But as Lebanon suggests, the United States will find itself in formidable future difficulties if it acts without being absolutely sure exactly what it is opposing." While the Journal was thus urging caution, the Times was hailing the President's reservation of the U. S. right to intervene on behalf of small nations as "a milestone in the development of American foreign

policy which further commits us to the cause of peace and freedom."  

When on August 18, 1958, the Norwegian resolution calling on the United Nations Secretary-General to work out arrangements to ease Middle Eastern tensions was put forth, the Christian Science Monitor noted that the United States and Great Britain, although not among the formal sponsors, "had a leading part in drafting the proposal and were prepared to give it full support."  
The Norwegian resolution was supported editorially by both the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor, which respectively found it a "wholesome, constructive and practical plan," and a "reasonable course toward resolving the impasse." Both recognized the difficulty of getting the necessary two-thirds majority for passage in the face of strong opposition from the Communist bloc, and members of a split Asian-African bloc.  
The Wall Street Journal ignored the Norwegian resolution editorially.  

United Nations General Assembly unanimous passage of the Arab resolution (see above: pp. 421-423.) was variously interpreted by the three major American newspapers. The Christian Science Monitor was enthusiastic in its assessment of the resolution. The Monitor found that once again the United Nations had shown its "usefulness as a forum in which international

problems which contain the seeds of war can be resolved by bringing together the interested parties in an atmosphere of mediation." The Arab resolution, which the General Assembly adopted unanimously, constituted a significant "triumph" for peaceful negotiation. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal were more skeptical. Noting the "surprising climax" which the passage of the Arab resolution represented, the Times commented that it was the best available solution at the time—"if it will work." The United Nations had assumed the grave responsibility of guarding Middle Eastern peace and security, and "one can only hope that it will prove equal to it." The Journal regarded the Arab resolution as "so couched in generalities as to leave many of its meanings unclear." Nevertheless, the United Nations had accepted the Arab pledge to refrain from attempting to change established systems of government. Since the U. S. had also voted to accept the Arab resolution, the Journal concluded that the U. S. should begin to withdraw its troops from Lebanon. "Now we can withdraw with good grace and, very likely, with the respect of the world. Otherwise it may well be a long voyage home."
The adoption of the Arab resolution effectively ended the Middle Eastern crisis. American newspaper coverage of the situation all but stopped, except for an occasional backpage article or editorial dealing with the progress of the Chehab regime and of the American withdrawal.

Summary Remarks On Newspaper Reaction To The Crisis

During the Lebanon crisis, both the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor supported the American intervention and most of the Administration's United Nations moves. The Wall Street Journal opposed the intervention, and was largely silent on U. S. United Nations diplomatic efforts, but mildly supported U. S. agreement to a United Nations summit conference. Both the Times and the Monitor favored United Nations assumption of the American role in Lebanon, and the retention of U. S. troops in Lebanon until the United Nations acted to replace them. The Journal favored an indigenous Lebanese solution to the problem, and the early withdrawal of U. S. troops not dependent upon any U. N. action. Thus, during the Lebanon crisis, the Journal retained its opposition to Western intervention in the Middle East, as evident during the Suez crisis. Although both the Times and the Monitor had opposed the Suez invasions, both later supported the American intervention in Lebanon. Both argued that the U. S. acted in response to a lawful request from the legitimate Lebanese Government; during the Suez crisis there had been no such invitation from the Egyptian Government.

During the Lebanon crisis, of the Eastern papers studied, the Times and the Monitor were less representative of major
American newspaper reaction to the crisis, than they were during the Suez crisis. All Western papers studied opposed U. S. intervention in Lebanon, and most were not favorably disposed to a U. N. General Assembly session.

Prior to U. S. intervention, most Eastern and Western papers favored a U. N. solution in Lebanon; after the intervention, the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor supported the Administration—the rest of the papers did not.

All papers reacted favorably to Eisenhower's six-point proposal to the United Nations General Assembly. The Western papers reacted more favorably to the Arab resolution.

The Los Angeles Times most nearly resembled the Wall Street Journal, except on the question of pre-intervention support for the United Nations.

In its support for the United Nations, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch approximated the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor. In its opposition to U. S. intervention, it agreed with the Wall Street Journal.


In conclusion, during the Lebanon crisis, the Wall Street Journal was the most representative of American newspaper coverage among the major Eastern papers studied.
American Newsmagazine Coverage of the Lebanese Crisis

Compared to coverage of the Suez crisis, there was much less newsmagazine coverage of the Lebanon crisis. Peak coverage came in the months July and August, 1958. Our analysis of American newsmagazine coverage will concentrate on the issues beginning the last week in May, when news of Secretary Dulles' May 20 press conference might be expected to appear, until the last week in August/first week in September, when news of the Arab resolution appeared. There were occasional articles on the Lebanese revolt in the mid-May issues of the American newsmagazines. Following publication of news of the unanimous passage of the Arab Resolution by the United Nations General Assembly, the American newsmagazines featured occasional articles on the restoration of order to Lebanon and the progress of U. S. troop withdrawals.

Newsmagazine Pre-Intervention Coverage

The four American weekly newsmagazines of our study--Business Week, Newsweek, Time, and U. S. News and World Report—all saw the hand of United Arab Republic President Gamal Abdel Nasser as an important factor behind the revolt in Lebanon. Opinion varied on the degree of Nasser influence. Business Week took the extreme position that the Lebanese revolt had been "inspired and supplied from neighboring Syria--partly by Soviet agents and partly by stooges of the United Arab Republic's President Nasser."

Earlier it had charged that the Lebanese revolt was part of the broader movement for Arab unification.

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backed by Nasser who had Soviet support for his endeavors.  

U. S. News and World Report's John Law reported that the Lebanese rebels were showing greater strength due to a "steady" flow of men, money and weapons across the border from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. Law noted that "the buildup...is being masterminded by Gamal Abdel Nasser."  

Newsweek charged: "A volatile Moslem opposition, incited by inflammatory propaganda and subversive agents from Egypt and Syria, had turned a wave of local strikes and riots into a nationwide, armed insurrection." Time took a more moderate position by arguing that the Lebanese revolt had been "indeed...aggravated by the shrill symphony of hate orchestrated from Radio Cairo," and the Lebanese rebels had been "mischievously bolstered" by men and arms infiltrated from Nasser's Syria, but the solution to Lebanon's troubles was "still to be found inside its own border."  

Closely related to the question of U. A. R. involvement in the Lebanese revolt, was American newsmagazine analysis of the causes of the revolt. Business Week argued that the "immediate" cause of the rebellion was the alleged intent of President Chamoun to run for a second presidential term after obtaining


81 "The Middle East: Pulling the Trigger," Newsweek, May 26, 1958, p. 44.

the amendment of the Lebanese constitution by the Lebanese Parliament. But "(t)he real cause was the effort of disgruntled feudal chiefs and ambitious political bosses to align Lebanon closely with Nasser’s Pan-Arabic movement." The primary objective of the Opposition was "the substitution of a pro-Nasser government for the Chamoun-led government that has tried to make Lebanon a meeting ground between East and West." 83

Newsweek tended to regard the division within Lebanon as along primarily religious lines of Moslem versus Christian, revolving around "Christian" President Chamoun’s "plan" to amend the Lebanese constitution to assure his reelection. 84

U. S. News regarded the struggle as primarily between the pro-Western Chamoun government and pro-Nasser anti-government rebels who were vying for control of the tiny Middle Eastern republic. A rebel victory could convert Lebanon into a "Nasser satellite." 85

Time first attributed the Lebanese rebellion to the struggle between pro-Western Chamoun, a Christian, who had claims upon U. S. good will because he "led his little country from its Swiss modeled neutrality...to all out espousal of the Eisenhower Doctrine," and the rebel politicians, "some of them professional Moslems who have been photographed in the forefront of practi-
cally every Arab nationalist gathering that Nasser has assembled over the last few years in Cairo." Between the two sides was the largely Christian-officered Lebanese army which opposed any outcome other than compromise. 86 Later in the crisis, Time leveled scathing charges at Lebanese President Camille Chamoun who "insisted on turning Lebanon's internal troubles into an international crisis." Time found Chamoun to blame for Lebanon's difficulties because he upset the traditional political balance at a time when Nasser was launching his drive for one united Arab nation. Chamoun "abandoned Lebanon's traditionally neutral foreign policy," he amassed a three-fourths majority in Parliament through corrupt elections. And his friends planned to force a Constitutional amendment through Parliament enabling Chamoun to run for a second term. And in the eyes of his outraged opponents, both Christian and Moslem, he sought to use U. S. support to achieve his political goals. 87

Generally the American newsmagazines assessed prospects of a rebel victory as a threat to Western influence in the Middle East. Business Week feared a rebel victory "would be interpreted as a major decline of U. S. influence in the Middle East." 88 Time, backing Dulles' June 17 contention that there were "other contingencies" for U. S. intervention in Lebanon


besides under United Nations auspices, felt that it was a last resort that neither Lebanon nor its friends could overlook. "If Lebanon's pro-West regime were to fall, the whole U. S. position in the Middle East would be jeopardized." 89

Despite the supposed dangers to Western interests in the Middle East, the American newsmagazines all hoped for a peaceful settlement. U. S. News commented earliest on the possibility of a compromise resulting from the "standoff" between Government and Opposition forces. It saw a chance that the revolt would be settled by politicians rather than armies. 90

Newsweek reported that the intensity of the rebellion was reduced. Factors contributing to the lessening of violence were: 1. The Moslem revolt was "stalled"; 2. The nationwide antigovernment strike had failed; and 3. Moslem "fanatics" were disillusioned by Syrian disenchantment with membership in the U. A. R. The Arab League had found no answer, and the United Nations Security Council "offered little hope." Newsweek concluded: "Everything pointed to an internal solution." 91

Time questioned the usefulness of all-out U. S. aid to the Chamoun regime. For U. S. police equipment and tanks seemed "unlikely to promote order where order finally depends on a balance between religious, social and political forces none of

91 "Crumbling Revolt?," Newsweek, loc. cit.
which is strong enough to dominate the country." While Dulles publicly supported Chamoun's claim of Nasserite interference in Lebanese affairs, privately, the Department of State hoped that Lebanon would not press its complaint before the United Nations. Time saw in reports that Chamoun was showing some inclination to agree to a peace-making government headed by Army Chief Chehab hope that "the fundamental U. S. objective of maintaining an independent Lebanon in delicate Moslem-Christian balance, would be better served than by widening the chaos."92

Business Week reported that U. S. officials, who refused to talk about the conditions which might lead to direct U. S. intervention in Lebanon, were hopeful that U. S.-British intervention could be avoided. The officials hoped that the United Nations would be able to seal Lebanon's rugged border by organizing a special police force, thus, creating a military stalemate in which a political compromise could be arranged. Business Week noted Administration reluctance to become involved militarily in Lebanon because of further Arab antagonism against the West, and because of concern that the U. S. might collide with the Soviet Union. There seemed, however, little hope of effective Security Council action because of "an almost certain veto from Moscow." Business Week concluded: "Still, at midweek you couldn't rule out the possibility that the rebels would force the Chamoun government to ask for direct U. S. help, and get it."93


All four of these American newsmagazines expressed grave doubts that the United Nations Secretary-General and the Observation Group could find a solution to the Lebanese situation, and adequately police Lebanon's 180 miles of mountainous border with Syria. *Time* and *U. S. News* carried estimates that to successfully police the Lebanese border a 5,000-man United Nations force would be needed. The handful of men currently assigned the task could scarcely succeed in doing it. *Newsweek* did note, however, that similar symbolic action had succeeded in "quieting" the Egyptian-Israeli frontiers at Gaza. 94

In the pre-intervention period, *Newsweek* offered an interesting assessment of official U. S. interpretation of Nasser's alleged motives in Lebanon. When Lebanon earlier made its charges of massive infiltration from Nasser's United Arab Republic, *Newsweek* reported that Washington disputed Lebanon's claim that U. A. R. intervention was massive enough to invoke the Tripartite Declaration. "But none doubted that Nasser's United Arab Republic, aided and abetted by the Communists, was capitalizing on Lebanon's explosive political crisis. Nevertheless, Washington did not believe that Nasser seriously wanted "to absorb Lebanon with its large Christian population." 95 Later, following establishment of UNOGIL, *Newsweek* reported that Washington believed that all Nasser wanted was a "'less unfriendly"


95 "The Middle East: Pulling the Trigger," *Newsweek*, loc. cit.
Lebanese Government." It also believed he was anxious to keep Moscow from rushing to his side in the dispute with aid he didn't want but could hardly refuse." Newsweek saw the problem now revolving around whether Nasser could stop the rebellion, or "was the situation out of control?" It cited battles in Beirut and Tripoli as indication that things were indeed getting out of control, and that "Lebanon's rebels clearly were determined to have at least one last go—even if they now had to go it alone."96

Business Week and U. S. News and World Report were apparently not much impressed by the remarks of U. N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold on July 3, that there was "no foundation" for a judgement of U. A. R. massive infiltration into Lebanon, or by the first UNOGIL report that the "vast majority" of rebels were Lebanese. (see above: pp. 384-385.) Neither newsmagazine mentioned them.

The remarks of the Secretary-General and publication of the UNOGIL report were followed by a pronounced change in Newsweek's interpretation of the character of the Lebanese revolt. Previously, Newsweek had argued that the "Moslem" opposition was "incited" by U. A. R. agents and propaganda. (see above: p. 477.) Following Hammarskjold's statement upon returning from the Middle East, Newsweek noted: 1. Lebanon's crisis was "essentially a domestic matter—even though...Nasser's Soviet-supported United Arab Republic has been subverting

96 "Double Cross in the Middle East?: Pro-West Lebanon Aflame," Newsweek, loc. cit.
Lebanon's Moslem elements and providing military aid for the rebels." U. A. R. interference and other (unspecified) international implications appeared to have been "exaggerated";

2. President Chamoun's following had "dwindled"; and 3. Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief, General Fuad Chehab, refused to commit his troops against the rebels. Newsweek opined that there was little chance of Anglo-American intervention--except in the "unlikely eventuality" of invasion or danger to America's "5,000"--twice as high as most other estimates--nationals resident in Lebanon. Newsweek commented:

The U. S. and Britain were aware that as goes Lebanon so might go Jordan, Western-allied Iraq, and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms that supply most of free Europe's oil. They planned to continue aid to the Lebanese Government. But the Western Powers hardly could dispatch troops just to save Chamoun from Lebanon's opposition, even if that opposition might be more pro-Nasser than pro-Western. Any such move would all but destroy Western prestige in the Afro-Asian world. And Moscow, Western chancellaries believe, is spoiling for any blowup that would harass the West, increase Nasser's dependency on the Soviets, and divert world attention from a likely Kremlin showdown with Poland.

Thus, Western strategy now was to support the actions of the United Nations, whose Secretary-General believed that a 100-man observer team, aided by helicopters, could adequately quarantine the Lebanese border. 97 Newsweek's claim that a Western dispatch of troops to Lebanon would all but destroy Western prestige in the Afro-Asian world seems a bit overdrawn. The Administration recognized that its action would incur deep

resentment of most of the Arab world (and some of the rest of the Free World). Nevertheless, the impact of such action would be, in all likelihood, temporary. There was also a tendency to overproject the consequences of the fall of the Lebanese Government. There was no guarantee that other Middle Eastern nations would follow suit. Western strategy of support seemed to stem from the realization in Washington that the quarrel between Government and Opposition leaders in Lebanon was essentially a domestic one. The U. S. could not totally discount infiltration, nor could it ignore the continuous U. A. R. broadcasts inciting the Lebanese against Chamoun. Nevertheless, since Lebanon had internationalized the conflict by going before the U. N. Security Council, the U. S. wanted to give the United Nations a chance to find a solution. By late June, 1958, the Administration had adopted a policy of watchful waiting, restraining President Chamoun and discouraging him, temporarily, from requesting United States troops.

A week later, Newsweek reported on Lebanese and American adverse reaction to the first UNOGIL report. Chamoun and his supporters were deeply bitter. Even U. S. officials, "still chary of Western intervention," privately disputed UNOGIL's

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98 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. cit., p. 274.
observations and claimed that there was significant U. A. R. interference, "though mainly psychological." Hammarskjold's stand had "closed the legal door" to intervention by either the United Nations or the United States. Western officials were reportedly convinced that General Fuad Chehab was the best choice to head a compromise government until the Lebanese Parliament had a chance to elect a new President. These same diplomats feared that pro-Nasser rebel success before the expiration on September 23, 1958, of pro-Western Chamoun's term would look too much like a defeat for the West. "Privately, U. S. officials gloomily concede that neither side is strong enough to break the stalemate and that a compromise regime (i. e. a less pro-Western one) is the only peaceful solution in sight."

Time supported Dulles' contention that the U. N. presence in Lebanon had slowed infiltration of arms and men from the United Arab Republic.

Dulles' observations during his May 20, 1958, news conference on the extension of the Eisenhower Doctrine to encompass the Lebanon situation went unreported by these American news-magazines. Nevertheless, it was clearly evident to all four that there existed a clear possibility of Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon. It cannot be said that any of the four

100 "Torn Lebanon--Stalemate Now?," Newsweek, July 14, 1958, p. 35.

major American newsmagazines opposed the concept of U. S. intervention in Lebanon. No editorial opposition was expressed, and only Newsweek seemed to feel that the Hammarskjold statement and UNOGIL report precluded an Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon. All four newsmagazines were hostile to U. A. R. President Nasser and saw his influence at work in Lebanon. All claimed to see a threat to U. S. Middle Eastern interests in a rebel takeover of Lebanon. Perhaps, for these reasons, they did not oppose a possible Anglo-American intervention.

Newsmagazine Post-Intervention Coverage

All four American newsmagazines supported, in varying degrees, the American intervention in Lebanon. Few words of editorial dissent were uttered by them. American newsmagazines referred to the Administration decision to intervene unilaterally in Lebanon as a "calculated risk," a "desperate risk," or a "calculated gamble," but all agreed that it was a step worth taking.

Time, which had been before the American intervention so highly critical of President Chamoun's regime, dropped its criticism of the Lebanese President. During the Suez crisis Time had supported American foreign policy almost without question (See Chapter V). So too following the Lebanon landing,

103 "Where Do We Go From Here," Newsweek, July 28, 1958, p. 15.
Time staunchly supported Administration policies. Thus, Time now parrotted Administration claims of assistance to a friendly government. Time noted that "the U. S. had moved swiftly to answer the cries for help from the friendly government of a small nation--Lebanon--that stood in imminent danger of overthrow from subversion." Echoing Secretary Dulles' background remarks of July 21, 1958 (see above: pp. 399-405.), Time reasoned that U. S. policy-makers believed that permitting the crisis to spread through Lebanon and Jordan would weaken the West's whole system of alliances and also the security of small pro-Western governments from Morocco to the Pacific. Time concluded: "Under the circumstances...the President's duty to act promptly was clear. So was his duty to act with enough force to handle any eventuality in the area." The next task envisioned by U. S. policy-makers was to extricate U. S. troops from Lebanon, transferring the "fireman function" to a United Nations force.¹⁰⁵

Newsweek, which during the Suez crisis had taken no clearly favorable or unfavorable position on Administration foreign policy, following the American intervention in Lebanon, was very obviously in agreement with the Administration's actions. Newsweek reported that the American mission in the Middle East, then in its second week, had thusfar been successful. In both Lebanon and Jordan, previously in danger of being "delivered into the eager hands of Egypt's empire-hungry Nasser," stability had been restored. "(D)isaster had been averted with not a

moment to spare." Newsweek theorized that the mission, a "desperate risk," had deterred "war and conquest by subversion—which was its larger purpose." Thus, Newsweek contradicted its pre-intervention position that the Lebanese crisis was "essentially a domestic matter," and adopted the Administration's argument of "indirect aggression," or, in Newsweek's words, "conquest by subversion."106

Business Week and U. S. News and World Report offered similar explanations for the American intervention. Both argued that the Administration acted: 1. to check the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East; 2. to halt Nasser's move to gain control of the area; and 3. to stop the spread of chaos signified by the Iraqi coup. The United States was faced with a choice between the complete loss of Western influence in the region or firm action to maintain some Western control. "U. S. world leadership itself was at stake" as the Allied, uncommitted and neutral countries of Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Communist bloc watched to see what action the U. S. would take.107

Editorially, Business Week took the frank position that in as much as the U. S. intervention was dictated by "purely" national interest, "Eisenhower's move is strictly power politics."

106"Where Do We Go From Here," Newsweek, loc. cit.

It argued that Americans should not cringe at the thought of employing power politics in international affairs. Such tactics were justified so long as the Soviet Union pursued its goal of world power, for the U. S. must be prepared to halt further erosion of the free world. "By our intervention in Lebanon, Washington has warned Moscow that we intend to keep both the Middle East and Africa out of Soviet hands."¹⁰⁸

U. S. News editor David Lawrence found that Anglo-American action in the Middle East was "a step in time."¹⁰⁹ In the same issue, U. S. News charged that as a result of the Lebanon crisis the United Nations faced its greatest challenge since Korea. The United States and Great Britain were compelled to order in the troops in order to halt the indirect aggression and subversion known to be taking place. It was U. N. "refusal" to do anything about this aggression which forced the Americans and the British to act. The question was "how long the U. N., as the world peace organization, can survive failure on a crucial test in the Middle East." On the positive side, U. S. News welcomed Anglo-American cooperation in the current Middle Eastern crisis. There was no trace of the former U. S.-British split over the Suez invasion. To indicate how closely the two Governments were working, U. S. News noted correctly:

Joint U. S.-British planning is the rule, almost on a minute-to-minute basis.

¹⁰⁸ "The Trend: Facing the Middle East Crisis," Business Week, July 19, 1958, p. 120.
¹⁰⁹ David Lawrence, "A Step In Time," U. S. News, July 25, 1958, p. 120.
Transatlantic phone calls between Washington and London are keeping top officials in unusually close touch, much as during World War II.

Within hours after the Iraq coup, U. S. and Britain agreed on a plan. The decision was made then that U. S. troops would go to London, that Britain's forces would be deployed and alerted for possible moves elsewhere.110

Alone of the major American newsmagazines, *U. S. News* charged that the Middle East crisis of 1958 was caused by United Arab Republic President Nasser, who emerged as an Arab hero, and a Soviet ally, following his salvation during the Suez crisis by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States had helped Nasser get his start when it stopped the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion in 1956. Therefore, Suez was the place where the Lebanon crisis started.111 *U. S. News*'s charge was based on an inaccurate perception of the origin and character of the Lebanon crisis. Most scholars have subsequently agreed that the Lebanese revolt was primarily indigenous. Its origins lay mainly in Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and his quest for an unconstitutional second term as President.

While it is true that Nasser encouraged the Opposition through inflammatory propaganda broadcasts, he did not cause the revolt.112 The issues were so volatile, in terms of Lebanese politics, that there would probably have been a revolt even without U. A. R. agitation. The second term of the Presidency of Beshara al-


Khouri—made possible in 1948 by a constitutional amendment— was prematurely ended because of domestic opposition in 1952, before the ascendancy of Nasser. Chamoun, a leader of the opposition to al-Khouri, assumed the Presidency. While U. S. Suez policies elevated Nasser's prestige in the Middle East, it seems exaggerated to claim that Suez was the place where the Lebanon crisis started.

The American newsmagazines saw the danger that the U. S. Marine landings could involve the United States in a wider war caused by Soviet counter-intervention. This threat, however, was discounted. Soviet rocket rattling was regarded correctly as a propaganda gesture which would not be matched by appropriate action.

United Nations Security Council debate of the American and British landings went largely unreported by these American newsmagazines. All four were more concerned with analyzing the impact of the landings on the Middle East, and with discussing the motivations for the American action.

News of the Soviet invitation to a summit meeting was received skeptically. Business Week, Newsweek, and U. S. News and World Report were not very enthusiastic about the prospects for a meaningful summit conference in which concrete solutions to Middle Eastern problems could be reached. All three expressed

113 Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 400-408.

114 "Washington Outlook," Business Week, July 19, 1958, loc. cit.; and "Where Do We Go From Here?" Newsweek, loc. cit.
fears that Soviet Premier Khrushchev would turn the conference into a major propaganda spectacle. He was looking for an opportunity to pose as a champion of the Arabs and of world peace. Yet, all three saw hope that the summit would prove an opportunity for the West. Business Week envisioned that it could lead to a temporary stabilization of the Middle Eastern situation, despite the fact that Khrushchev was "riding high," and that Dulles would be on the defensive due to his failure "to develop positive U. S. policies for dealing with the West's declining influence in the Middle East with the rise of Soviet world prestige." Furthermore, Business Week editorialized, President Eisenhower prevented a split in the Western camp when he agreed to a summit conference. "We took a firm, even righteous, position against the British and French when they landed troops at Suez. This time we were on the defensive——since many people in Europe saw Lebanon as a parallel to the Suez affair." This threatened a split which Khrushchev had hoped to exploit. Newsweek hoped for positive results based upon President Eisenhower's insistence that he would not tolerate "a radio-televised bawling out by Khrushchev over the Middle East crisis." It was the United Nations responsibility to see that this did not happen. U. S. News editor David Lawrence

115 "International Outlook," Business Week, July 26, 1958, p. 73.
continued his anti-Communist mission by reminding his readers that Khrushchev was guilty of murder on a grand scale in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and by questioning the intention of the Soviet Union to adhere to any agreement Khrushchev might conclude. Lawrence maintained that the U. S. should assure the personal safety of the Soviet Premier, but the American people "should din in his ears daily the case against murder and tyranny." "Kinsmen of the patriots of the captive states" should parade flag-draped coffins down New York streets to remind Khrushchev that Americans do not glorify murderers. "Let the placards read: '"Welcome," Murderer!'" 118

*Time* alone saw no indication of a Russian propaganda victory and saw nothing to fear in a summit conference, for the U. S. had managed to: "1) placate U. S. allies, 2) keep the Middle East crisis from slipping out of the Security Council's hands, and 3) put upon Khrushchev the burden of either rejecting the summit meeting or accepting on U. S.-U. N. terms." While it was "undoubtedly true" that the Administration was reluctant to agree to a summit conference, a meeting within the Security Council on the terms set forth by President Eisenhower, "need not bring the U. S. any discomfort." 119 Later, *Time* supported Dulles' efforts to restrict the summit talks to aggression in the Middle East. 120

It cannot be said that American newsmagazines regretted the Russian decision to withdraw from the summit conference, which the Soviet Union had initially proposed. Business Week envisioned that the upcoming General Assembly session would accomplish "little," and that the talk would be "mostly propaganda." U.S. News could not decide who was ahead in the propaganda battle over the Middle East. It foresaw "more words, more crises short of war," and predicted that "trouble aplenty" remained for the West in the Middle East. Both Newsweek and Time were more optimistic in their assessments. Both saw Soviet withdrawal from the summit conference as an advantage for the United States. Time chided pundits who "dimviewed" the special General Assembly session as a "mere propaganda brawl" in which the U.S. stood to gain nothing. Time reminded its readers that, in his August 6, 1958, news conference, President Eisenhower had "made it clear...that the U.S. will strive to get the 'underlying causes' of Middle East disorder discussed in the Assembly, will urge economic programs to deal with those causes. 'Troops are never going to win the peace,' said he." Newsweek predicted accurately that the U.S. could be expected to express its hearty agreement with the Hammarskjold plan. "It seems probable that the U.S. proposals will take the form of implementing the Hammarskjold outline, particularly

123 "Foreign Relations: K's Bad Week," Time, Aug. 18, 1958, p. 11.
in the economic field. This can be expected to take precedence over Dulles' brief against Soviet 'indirect aggression'--a stand which some Administration advisers have feared might provoke an angry and inconclusive wrangle." 124

Generally, these American newsmagazines supported President Eisenhower's program for the Middle East as put forth in his United Nations General Assembly address of August 13, 1958. (see above: pp. 419-420.) Business Week saw the President's efforts as "a dramatic bid" to have the United Nations assume responsibility for building a lasting peace in the Middle East. The U.S. plan was "obviously" an attempt to persuade the Arabs, Nasser included, that their aspirations for independence, unity and economic development could best be assured by cooperation with the West. Business Week regarded the Eisenhower plan as "a last desperate effort" to save Western interests in the area without resorting to "outright" power politics. It was hoped this could be done by removing the taint of colonialism by having the United Nations take over from the United States in Lebanon, and from Britain in Jordan, and through the adoption of an Arab-run Arab development organization, which might remove Arab fears of Western economic control. 125

Newsweek regarded the American position, as set forth by Eisenhower, as "both hopeful and conciliatory." Noting that the

124 "Now Hopefully--Face-to-Face," Newsweek, Aug. 18, 1958, pp. 34 and 36.

President had put aside recrimination, Newsweek opined that he concentrated his efforts on "a widely heralded but dramatic development in U. S. policy." Newsweek noted that reaction to the speech was mixed, with Western European nations favorable, while the Arab states and the 28-nation Afro-Asian bloc were unable to adopt a common approach. Concerning Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's remarks to an aide--"God help me from my friends"--Newsweek observed that Eisenhower's plan was so close to Hammarskjold's own that the Secretary-General "feared his status as an impartial mediator might be compromised." But, by the weekend, it was clear that the General Assembly was again preparing to transfer its burden to the Secretary-General.126

Time argued that in the space of his 30-minute address Eisenhower had regained diplomatic ground lost in the exchange of letters with the Soviet Union, which had left all parties "somewhat soiled." Following Eisenhower's speech, the U. S. reemerged, not as guardian for the Middle East status quo, but as a power "devoted to orderly international evolution." In the process, the Soviet picture of the U. S. and Britain as aggressors in the Middle East was modified, and the General Assembly was returned the task of finding a solution to the problems that led to the Anglo-American landings.127 Elsewhere in the same issue, Time noted that it was predictable that the General Assembly would not adopt any comprehensive program for


implementing the U. S. proposals. All the Eisenhower Administration expected was an Assembly resolution which would: 1. call for a U. N. "presence" in Lebanon and Jordan; 2. mention favorably other points in the U. S. program, however vaguely; and 3. instruct Secretary-General Hammarskjold to examine practical possibilities. Time felt that the U. S. could achieve it in the United Nations in the week ahead. Beating loudly the drums for patriotism, Time concluded that the real value of Eisenhower's program lay in the fact that: "the President set forth, in terms whose echoes should linger long, the U. S. stand in the world: firmness in the face of 'ballistic blackmail,' steadfast opposition to aggression, loyalty to the U. N. Charter, friendship toward other nations and readiness to help them achieve their real and legitimate aspirations." 128

U. S. News and World Report carried the text of the Eisenhower General Assembly address, accompanied by the usual carefully worded introductory comments. These announced the President's proposal for an Arab development institution as "a program more ambitious than any ever before attempted," and depicted reception of the U. S. proposals in this way:

In Nasser's Egypt, leader of the Arab nations--the cold shoulder.
In most countries of the free world--a warm welcome.
Soviet Russia's reaction? Communists did everything they could to try to jam radio broadcasts spelling out this U. S. program. 129

The American newsmagazines were divided in opinion about the suddenly offered Arab Resolution which caught them all by surprise. *Business Week* and *Newsweek* reacted somewhat favorably. *Business Week* stated that the Arab "gentlemen's agreement" to not interfere in each other's domestic affairs would give Secretary-General Hammarskjold "a free enough hand" to obtain Arab acceptance of a United Nations peace force, and to initiate action on an Arab economic development institution, which seemed a "long way off," pending withdrawal of Western troops and the establishment of a U. N. "fire brigade." 130

*Newsweek* noted that the surprise "go-it-alone agreement" of the Arabs "saved everyone's face--except Russia's." For Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko had been demanding the immediate withdrawal of British and American troops, while the Arab delegations were busy formulating their resolution. The Arab resolution "evoked heartfelt sighs of relief from Western delegates who had feared a bitter stalemate." *Newsweek* credited Nasser with doing most to make the Arab resolution possible, for, *Newsweek* theorized, he stood more to gain by diplomacy than through subversion and indirect aggression, which had only provoked Anglo-American intervention, stirred Arab hostility towards the U. A. R., and brought unwanted Soviet interference. Still unanswered was how the U. S. and Britain would react to Nasser's new tactics, for "Nasser's objectives--control of the West's Mideastern oil supplies--had not changed." 131

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This was an apparent reference to Nasser's *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*. (see above: pp. 302-303, footnote #34.)

*Time* and *U. S. News and World Report* were not very enthusiastic about the Arab resolution. *Time* regarded it as a "shrewd blend" of the Norwegian resolution and of Dag Hammarskjold's plan for the Middle East. The Arab resolution contained "something for almost everyone." Arab pledges of non-interference in each other's internal affairs were a "sop" to U. S. and British concern over indirect aggression. *Time* recorded the Israeli complaint that the Arab resolution made "the Middle East's prime troublemakers--Nasser and the Arab League--into its policemen."

Following its rhetorical question why anyone should put any faith in Egypt's reaffirmation of pledges it had previously broken systematically, *Time* noted:

...Some diplomats thought that Nasser would think twice about inheriting the creaky state of Jordan if he felt that Israel would fight to keep Jordan out of his hands. Nasser's economic and political difficulties in absorbing Syria may also have persuaded him that out-and-out annexation of the Arab countries is a poor idea. Provided that he can bring the rest of the Arab world under his sway--as he has already done in Iraq and Saudi Arabia--the Egyptian dictator might be content with a loose federation of Arab States rather than one imperial Egyptian-run nation. These were the reassuring possibilities.

*Time* did not share the diplomats' optimism. What miffed *Time* was that it appeared that the West had decided to no longer fight Arab nationalism, but to help "legitimate" it. "The trouble is that the controlling interest in Arab nationalism is now owned by Nasser. In winning a breathing spell in the Middle East, the U. S. and Britain had all but conceded hegemony of the Arab
world—at least during reasonably good behavior—to a man and a nation steeped in hostility to the West." 132

U. S. News found that the big powers had produced little more than "an Arab-dictated stopgap" which relieved the tension but solved nothing. Among the deficiencies noted by U. S. News were that: 1. Little remained of Eisenhower's program; 2. The idea of a U. N. peace force was "all but dead"; 3. Plans for a regional economic development institution were "barely breathing"; and 4. Monitoring of inflammatory radio broadcasts was ruled out by the General Assembly. In their place was the resolution drafted by the Arabs themselves, which "made it plain that they want to settle their own affair—with the help of Mr. Hammarskjold." Few "realists expected Hammarskjold to arrive at any lasting formula. 133

Thus, following American intervention in Lebanon, these four American newsmagazines generally supported U. S. military action in the Middle East, and U. S. diplomatic efforts in the United Nations. During the Suez crisis, Newsweek commentators were, at times, quite critical of Administration policies. But during the Lebanon crisis, Newsweek commentators reacted very favorably to Administration policies. Ernest K. Lindley, who, Lisagor noted, saw Dulles frequently (see above: p. 209.), was a strong supporter of Administration Lebanon policy. Concerning the landing of American troops, Lindley observed: "(T)he President acted very late. But he may have acted in


time to save not only Lebanon but at least temporarily several other weak nations threatened by the same aggressors." ¹³⁴
Later, Lindley backed Eisenhower's efforts for a summit conference under United Nations auspices, noting that the U. N. was "the right forum" for a high-level meeting on the Middle East. According to Lindley, the U. S. objective should be to persuade the U. N. to take responsibility "for stopping the aggression against Lebanon and assuring its future as an independent nation." The U. S. should also encourage formation of a U. N. police force.¹³⁵
Following Eisenhower's General Assembly address, Lindley argued that the President's six-point proposal was "sound and constructive." Lindley regarded as "no less important" Eisenhower's "reaffirmation that the U. S. remains determined to resist aggression and reserves the right to answer the appeal of any nation threatened by aggression, direct or indirect."¹³⁶

Another Newsweek newsanalyst, Raymond Moley, noted that the American intervention conformed to a foreign policy pattern of preventing Communist domination of the world, which was established in the days of the Truman Administration. Whether the landings were premature or belated, there would have to have been a stand somewhere. Otherwise, the Eastern Mediterranean

and the Middle East might have been lost entirely by the Western powers. Moley felt that the West must take the risk that the Anglo-American landings would precipitate a general war. Moley also expressed some sentiments which were undoubtedly fairly common at the time among supporters of U. S. Suez policy:

Now we may know that the President and those, including this writer, who believed him right in the Suez crisis were wrong. For Nasser, we now know, is a man capable of arousing millions of Arabs, backed as he is by Soviet conniving. He might have been erased if we had not stopped Britain and France in 1956. The British Conservatives who passed under a cloud then will now enjoy a big political boost.137

Opinion Journal Interpretations of the Lebanon Crisis

As they had done during the Suez crisis, the American opinion journals of our study—Commonweal, The Nation, The New Republic, and The Reporter—published some of the most critical comment on Administration Middle Eastern policy during the Lebanon crisis. As in Chapter V (see above: pp. 337-357), our analysis will concentrate on editorials which appeared in the four journals. While articles on the Lebanon crisis appeared occasionally, they were few in number and generally conformed to the editorial position of the journal in which they appeared.

As during the Suez crisis, editorial comment on the Lebanon crisis appeared irregularly in the four journals. Weeks might pass without mention of crisis related events. All four journals were once again strongly critical of Administration foreign policy. The Nation and The New Republic remained very critical

of Secretary of State Dulles. Although there were points of convergence, which will be noted, each of the four journals continued to pursue independent editorial positions. At times, the individual journal advocated policies quite similar to those it advocated during the Suez crisis. For example, Commonweal repeated its earlier accusations that there was no clear cut U. S. policy for the Middle East, and reiterated that such a policy was needed. And The Nation maintained its strong support for the United Nations, and declared the necessity for American cooperation with the United Nations. All were again opposed to Western military intervention in the Middle East.

Commonweal analyzed the Lebanese revolt as stemming from a variety of factors: the identification of the Chamoun regime in the popular mind as pro-American; news that Chamoun supporters were seeking a Constitutional amendment to enable Chamoun to run for a second term; the assassination of a prominent anti-Chamoun journalist; the infiltration of men and arms from the U. A. R.; and inflammatory U. A. R. radio broadcasts. All of which were aggravated by the religious issue.

The Lebanese troubles, Commonweal commented, implied that Americans erred by presuming that substantial financial aid would be enough to "offset Communist, pan-Arab, and neutralist pressures among peoples who are swept along by authentic desires to have their place in the reawakening Arab world." At best, the most that could be expected, in future, from trade and aid programs with Lebanon would be "to strengthen the possibilities of its independence." The U. S. would have to lower the level of its expectations because of the developments in Lebanon. "It is
hard to see how Americans can any longer hope for anything beyond the continued independence and genuine neutrality of heavily threatened Lebanon.\textsuperscript{138}

Following the American intervention in Lebanon, \textit{Commonweal} rebutted the major arguments in defense of the Eisenhower Administration's action. It found the assertion that Lebanese independence was menaced from without was "unfortunately not supported by much real evidence." The fact that previous Lebanese requests for support were denied, reduced the force of the argument that the U.S. was responding to a legitimate request.

\textit{Commonweal} commented that the American intervention weakened the American position in the Middle East. Anti-Western feeling had increased. "Whatever moral leadership the United States once exerted, in the Middle East, in the U.N. and throughout the world, has been seriously impaired." If the U.S. were to escape total reliance upon armed force, it must withdraw its troops from Lebanon. The basic American problem in the Middle East had been "the lack of any clear or consistent policy." Confronted by the rivalries of various factions, the U.S. had vacillated between support for first one group, then another. In future, the U.S. must stop "'allowing matters to develop'; it must adopt a Middle Eastern "commitment" which would be not only "rational and coherent but true to our nation's conception of itself." A U.S. policy which contradicted America's beliefs in freedom, justice and self-determination could "hardly be right, has assuredly not

been successful." 139

News of the proposed summit induced Commonweal to observe that the Middle Eastern crisis had enabled Khrushchev to "pose as a great peacemaker." Consequently, Commonweal anticipated the summit meeting "with small expectation and little enthusiasm." Because U. S. intervention in Lebanon had placed the U. S. in such a critical position, it might be better that a summit conference be held. For an American refusal to participate, even under unfavorable conditions, could be more damaging than an unsuccessful summit conference. It might not be too late for the West to fashion a policy for the Middle East which would contain measures that would withstand "the pressures of the future as well as immediate harsh criticism." The summit should discuss the Middle Eastern crisis in the large context--Communist penetration of the Middle East, Arab nationalism, Nasserism, the export of oil, and Arab-Israeli relations. Western policy should also come to grips with these issues. "The summit meeting will reveal to all that the West has a consistent, developed policy which can contain and accommodate these issues, or it will confirm the makeshift policy which has, apparently, been ours to date." 140

Commonweal greeted the "shift" to the General Assembly and noted that the delay in the meeting was definitely to Western advantage. Commonweal was highly critical of Dulles' expressed


intention to attack the "indirect aggression" of both Nasser and the Communists, noting that the term presented "grave if not insuperable obstacles." How was "indirect aggression" defined? How was it substantiated?

Should the West succeed in initiating a U. N. plan, it would undoubtedly take the form of U. N. observers and commissions which would assume the policing job in the Middle East. This would be at best "a temporary measure." But Commonweal did find cause for hope in President Eisenhower's remarks at his August 6th press conference:

...Sounding like one of his own critics, he (Eisenhower) stated that "troops are never going to win the peace. We have got to do something positive, and this must be in the field of moral and spiritual and economic strengthening of all these areas." After all this time it is too much to expect that a full-fledged positive program will emerge at the Assembly. But the beginning of a foreign policy which corresponds to the President's statement would be as welcome as it is long overdue.141

Later Commonweal attacked Eisenhower's six-point proposal because it was not integrated in an over-all policy for the Middle East. The regional economic development scheme had already encountered Arab opposition because it was "very similar to plans advanced years ago by the Arabs themselves." Nowhere in the Eisenhower plan was there clear indication of the nature of the U. S. "stake" in the Middle East. "What... is our attitude toward Arab nationalism, whether or not it is shaped by Nasser? How far will we go in order to maintain Jordan? Or to ensure Israel? To what extent are the armed

forces a proper extension of policy in dealing with the problems of Middle Eastern countries?" Such questions were largely uncon sidered in the Eisenhower proposal, but, according to Common- weal, a policy for the Middle East must ultimately cope with them.\textsuperscript{142} Commonweal's insistence upon clearly defined policies on such critical issues does not appear realistic. If the Administration had yielded to such criticisms and defined the American position on these issues, it would have robbed itself of policy options and imposed a rigidity on U.S. Middle Eastern policy which could well have clashed with American national interests in the future.

With passage of the Arab resolution, according to Common- weal, the United Nations General Assembly emergency session concluded with results much better than had been expected. The surprise Arab resolution broke the Great Power deadlock. The Middle Eastern situation itself, which had deteriorated so far, augured well for the effectiveness of the Arab resolution, for the nations involved, by virtue of self-interest, would require the restoration of order. Nevertheless, the United States should reevaluate its policies for dealing with Arab nationalism. Current policies had not been very successful. "Meantime, it is right, even essential, that the Arab nations themselves take the lead in working out the problems of their own region. If they do not, the Middle East will become even more of an East-West battleground, and the United States will find itself deeply involved in something which cannot be solved by sending

in the Marines.\textsuperscript{143} While theoretically it might have been desirable for the Arabs to be sole masters of their own affairs, \textit{Commonweal} apparently wished to overlook the harsh reality that there was little chance that the United States could leave the Middle East to its own devices in the face of the quite obvious increase of Soviet involvement in the area since 1955. The fragmented and divisive character of inter-Arab relations invited great power interference. As one of the two Super Powers, the United States could be expected to seek to perpetuate its interests in the region, and to balance, or offset, Soviet advances there, through use of the military, if the Administration deemed it necessary. It would do so even at the risk of total war.

\textit{The Nation} was incensed at the prospect that Mr. Dulles was "hankering" for an invitation to intervene in Lebanon under the Eisenhower Doctrine, "that leaky umbrella" which Dulles had attempted to extend over the entire Middle East. To apply the Doctrine to Lebanon "would require twisting it into a military-diplomatic pretzel." The Eisenhower Doctrine, as originally promulgated, was to apply in cases of aggression from nations controlled by international Communism. For all its gun-running, the U. A. R. could not be construed as Communist-dominated. Nor was the situation in Lebanon a clear-cut case for intervention. U. S. compliance with a request to intervene would look like "one of the Marine Corps landings in Central America in the days of 'dollar diplomacy.'" Thus,

The Nation regarded the United Nations as offering "the best way out," provided the American Secretary of State did not attempt to tell the Secretary-General what to do. The U. S. should support UNOGIL efforts to patrol the Lebanese-Syrian border, and, upon request, properly provide equipment such as helicopters and liaison planes. "But our Marines should stay on their ships." 144

Rejoicing at the Hammarskjold report that there was "no foundation" to the Lebanese charges of "massive infiltration," The Nation opined that "prompt and skillful action" by the U. N. had reduced Lebanese tensions to the point that direct British-American intervention seemed "most unlikely." Thus, Mr. Dulles has once again been "rescued from the brink of disaster." Once again, as during Suez, the United Nations had shown that it was the only instrument that could be applied in many contemporary crisis situations. "Despite the limitations of its charter and the half-hearted support it receives from the great powers, the U. N. remains the world's indispensable institution." 145

Following the American intervention in Lebanon, The Nation, like Commonweal, advocated the early withdrawal of Western troops from the Middle East. The Nation commented that the first phase in ending the Middle Eastern crisis was to withdraw the troops. This should be worked out through the

United Nations. If the Security Council could not reach agreement, then the U. S. should be prepared to accept U. N. General Assembly recommendations. The Nation commented wryly: "'Under the circumstances,' the editorials drone on and on, the President had no alternative to intervention. And so he didn't—if he was to adhere to the course which Mr. Dulles had set for American policy in the Middle East. Military intervention was the logical end result of that policy." But by sending the Marines into Lebanon, the U. S. did more than threaten world peace, it struck a severe blow at the United Nations and the principle of collective security. "No 'armed attack' had taken place and nothing in the General Assembly's 'Peace Through Deeds' resolution authorizes unilateral action against indirect aggression." How did the United States find itself in the position of negating its own values, "of citing specious reasons in the U. N. to justify the crassest power politics?" The Nation apparently chose to overlook the fact that power politics has often been as much a part of the American tradition as the more noble reasons for which Americans have struggled. Often the baser motives have been strangely intermixed with the higher. What must have been particularly perturbing to The Nation, and others, was that the American action came so close on the heels of what it considered to have been the proper American response to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. The Nation found a partial explanation for this enigma in the refusal of American policy-makers to accept the proposition that stability in the Middle East depends upon Arab self-government. To meet the Middle Eastern challenge, the U. S. must formulate a new
policy for the region. Although Commonweal also made this point, The Nation offered a more detailed proposal:

1. The U.S. should recognize Arab nationalist legitimate aspirations to unify, as long as Arab unity was "freely-negotiated";

2. Legitimate Arab aspirations (which did not include Israel's destruction) should be encouraged to identify with American policies;

3. The U.S. should encourage Arab neutrality. "We will only continue to spread Soviet influence in the Middle East if we elect to support a collection of rickety sheikdoms, dynasties and emirates that are destined for the dustbin of history";

4. The U.S. should apply American power and influence primarily through the United Nations as the safest American Middle Eastern policy. The U.S. should encourage the U.N. to attempt to solve Middle Eastern problems, such as the refugee issue;

5. "A limited accord with the Soviet Union, recognizing its legitimate interest in the region and implementing the Soviet suggestion for an arms embargo, would help"; and

6. The U.S. should encourage the utilization of oil wealth for Arab development.

In future, The Nation argued, the primary test of the legitimacy of governments should be popular support. Like Commonweal, The Nation was concerned to know how, with our revolutionary background, the U.S. could launch "a holy war"
against revolution in the Middle East. 146

The Nation argued that adoption of the Arab resolution represented a defeat for the West. United Nations approval was not given to the “armed occupation” of Lebanon and Jordan. U. N. support was not given to Dulles’ charge of “indirect aggression.” A U. N. peace force was not established. U. N. guarantees of “the permanence of existing states and the regimes in power” were not forthcoming. Instead, the United Nations recognized the Arab states’ “first responsibility in Middle Eastern affairs, and calls upon the Secretary-General to secure an ‘early withdrawal’ of the occupational forces.” The one plus that The Nation found in the Arab resolution was the renewed emphasis and support given to the concept of a regional economic planning and development institution under United Nations auspices. 147

Responding to a charge by columnist Joseph Alsop that the Administration had betrayed its friend, President Chamoun, The New Republic argued that the American mistake was not reluctance to rush troops to aid Chamoun, but “official reluctance to recognize that Chamoun’s defeat need not be a defeat for the West.” The Lebanon crisis resulted from Dulles’ “mania for ‘firm allies’” in the Middle East, rather than friendly states. The Lebanese President and his Foreign Minister had been “too good friends of the US for their own good—and


ours." By actions such as accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine, they cut off their domestic sources of strength. The New Republic took hope from the knowledge that the Secretary-General had denied a Lebanese request for a U. N. police force, and that the Pentagon had let it be known that it opposed unilateral U. S. military involvement. "The Eisenhower Doctrine has not been heard of in many weeks. The West thus refrains from taking on additional commitments from which it could only beg off later." 148

Following the American intervention in Lebanon, The New Republic denounced the "nearsightedness" of U. S. leadership, and its "limited understanding" of world events. In the case of Dulles, there was "that persistent itch to moralize about events, rather than to work to turn those events to the best account." The New Republic acknowledged, with Dulles, that force was an indispensible tool in the struggle to maintain U. S. security.

...But, unilateral military intervention, whatever its legal or moral justification, requires practical justification. "Limited war," as Henry Kissinger has commented, "is no better an instrument of policy than the political environment from which it springs and the political goals toward which it leads, and in both these respects...our action in Lebanon has been deficient."

The New Republic, which did not believe the U. S. intervention morally or practically justified, argued that the U. S. action had given Khrushchev "another opportunity to star in the role of defender not only of Arab nationalism but of world peace." Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's stature had also

been enhanced. Fortunately, the Lebanese themselves would eventually provide the circumstances for U. S. departure, for the Lebanese could not afford to quarrel too hard lest their country fall apart. The rebellion had been stalemated before arrival of the Marines. The rebels had achieved their purpose of preventing Chamoun's reelection. A U. N. observer corps was already at work. Thus Ambassador Murphy found all factions ready to be "cajoled" into electing a compromise President. The New Republic commented further:

Regrettably...a parallel is bound to be drawn in the UN and elsewhere between the Anglo-French endeavors to justify their intervention in Suez in terms of principle (recall their claim that they were acting on behalf of the United Nations) and our dependence upon a somewhat forced interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter--which recognizes "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain peace and security." It is more than awkward that the United Nations Observer team had failed to find evidence of substantial outside intervention in Lebanon before we sent the Marines. We should not be surprised if a large part of mankind takes as evidence of our hypocrisy the fact, also, that our intervention was timed by events in another country, i.e. Iraq, and that after calling a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the crisis we professed to see developing, we did not wait for the meeting before we acted on our own. (The New Republic's italics.)

Like Commonweal, The New Republic anticipated that little of "lasting or profound value" could be achieved by a summit meeting in the framework of the United Nations Security Council. 149

The New Republic, like Commonweal, was not thrilled with Dulles' charges of "indirect aggression." The New Republic

charged that when Dulles made such charges and demanded that
Khrushchev and Nasser stop it, he cast the U. S. in the role
of "the bawling child who insists on winning a losing game." The game to which The New Republic referred was the Cold War in which both sides obviously resorted to bribes, subversion and propaganda—"indirect aggression." The best that could be said of Dulles' "hypocritical gambit" was "that the Adminis-
tration had nothing else to use." When it became clear that
the United States would have few supporters for this line in the United Nations, Dulles "soft-pedalled 'indirect-aggression.'" Both Nasser and the Soviet Union generally, when they were successful, went where they were invited by dominant public opinion—where they could practice good politics in contrast to U. S. political ineptitude. The United States must, to be successful, learn to play the politico-economic game. When the game has been lost, the U. S. must recognize that to rush in the Marines only makes matters worse. "And finally, when it has been lost, we must learn not to bawl—as we are doing when we belabor self-righteous charges which, as Walter Lipp-
mann points out, 'amount to a demand that in the weapons of the Cold War, our adversaries shall disarm.'" In line with its anti-intervention stand, The New Republic argued that the last "flimsy bit" of an excuse for the presence of U. S. Marines in Lebanon would "disappear" when President-elect Fuad Chehab assumed office on September 24.

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The Reporter, like the other opinion journals, was opposed to the American intervention in Lebanon. Prior to the intervention, The Reporter argued: "Life would be much gayer for the Communist leaders if there were massive United States military action in the Middle East," for it would draw world attention away from their own internal problems. Hopeful that U. S. leaders had learned from their mistakes during the Hungarian uprising and the Suez fiasco, The Reporter was encouraged by the fact that the U. N. role was vastly different than it had been in 1956. In the Lebanon case, it had no function other than to observe. As a result of its observations, UNOGIL might have concluded that Lebanese politics was "a stinking mess." The Reporter then intimated its hope that the U. S. Embassy in Beirut had also concluded that Lebanese politics was "a stinking mess," and had "suggested to the State Department that the tenure in office of President Camille Chamoun is not indispensible to the cause of freedom." Like The New Republic, The Reporter did not consider the preservation of Chamoun rule as essential to U. S. interests.

Max Ascoli, editor of The Reporter, regarded the American intervention in Lebanon as the "latest traumatic experience" since the end of the fighting in Korea. It was caused not by lack of action. "Rather, we have found ourselves acting in Lebanon as if in a trance." For there was no basis for the Americans to intervene. The Lebanese were on the verge of

reaching a compromise. Ascoli was taken aback by the unanimous approval given by responsible Americans to the Eisenhower decision. "It was a case of patriotic support given for patriotism's sake to an action that had been taken for action's sake." 153

In a later issue, editor Ascoli found that "the paramount factor in the present Middle East situation is Russian non-intervention rather than Anglo-American intervention." In taking military steps, the U. S. appeared to the world like a hopelessly decaying colonial power defending its empire—an empire which the U. S. never had—while Khrushchev was enabled to pose as the champion of peace. "(C)lever inaction paid infinitely better dividends than impulsive action." 154 How convincing Khrushchev's posture as a champion of peace was, in view of the then recent executions of various leaders of the Hungarian uprising, is difficult to say. It is equally hard to accept Ascoli's analogy that the U. S. appeared to the world to be "a hopelessly decaying colonial power defending its empire—an empire which the U. S. never had." U. S. colonialism, in the classic sense of direct rule, was shortlived. But, the phenomenon of American economic imperialism has long been a subject of discussion. That U. S. intervention could have been construed as an effort to protect American economic investments in the region is not unlikely. In addition to


economic interests, such factors as the preservation of free institutions, power politics, and military-strategic considerations were also involved. That this U. S. move paid pooded propaganda dividends, in some quarters, is not easy to gainsay. The question is, how lasting was the Soviet propaganda victory? In all probability, it was temporary, since many Third World leaders are, with reason, extremely skeptical of the actions and intentions of both Super Powers.

All four American opinion journals studied regarded the Lebanese revolt as largely an internal matter in which "indirect aggression" was not the most significant factor. All implied that rather than intervene the U. S. should have let the Lebanese work out their own solution.

The Scholarly Journals and the Lebanon Crisis
During the Suez crisis, it was found that the American scholarly journals analyzed gave comparatively little attention to the crisis. Even less coverage was given to the Lebanon crisis by the same journals. Only the American Journal of International Law, Current History, and the Middle East Journal made any mention of the crisis.

In the American Journal of International Law, Pitman B. Potter gave editorial support to the Administration's action by finding the American intervention legally justified. The "most plausible ground" for the U. S. intervention was the invitation of the Lebanese Government, for: 1. there was no evidence of American pressure on the Lebanese Government to invite U. S. intervention; 2. there was evidence of external
aggression; and 3. there is no right of revolution in the absence of illegal action on the part of the established government. The second plausible basis for U. S. intervention was the protection of U. S. nationals and their property. "(T)here seems to have been actual and serious danger to United States citizens and their interests, and some inability, though not unwillingness, on the part of the Lebanese Government to protect them." The U. S. position that it was acting for collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the U. N. Charter encountered the difficulty that Article 51 referred to "armed attack," which could not be alleged in the Lebanon situation. Therefore, the U. S. intervention was justified in two of the three cases. 155

*Current History* featured a series of crisis related documents which were introduced by a brief statement that repeated Administration explanations for U. S. intervention, i. e. it was at the request of the pro-Western Chamoun government to strengthen its position against pro-Nasser infiltration. The documents included were:

1. "The Iraqi Coup Announcement"—text of the announcement of the fall of Faisal's government and the establishment of the Iraqi Republic;

2. "U. S. Troops Ordered to Lebanon"—text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress announcing dispatch of U. S. Marines to Lebanon;

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3. "Statement of the Baghdad Pact Nations"—text of the declaration of Baghdad Pact nations meeting in London, July 28, 1958, as signed by Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Great Britain and the U. S.;

4. "The Peiping Communique"—excerpts from the joint Sino-Soviet communique of August 3, 1958, following discussions between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Chinese Communist Chairman Mao Tse-tung; and

5. "Eisenhower's Middle East Program"—section from Eisenhower's August 13, 1958, address to the special emergency session of the U. N. General Assembly listing the six points of his proposal. 156

And the Middle East Journal featured comments and a chronology of developments of the quarter. In the comments, the Middle East Journal found that the Arab resolution indicated: "As initiators of policy, the Arab states have rejected the role of passivity, so important a psychological factor in the imperial-colonial relationship. To use the words of Senator Styles Bridges, it marks 'the emergence of the Arab people as masters of their own destiny.'" Another striking factor, as seen by the Middle East Journal, was the fact that the Arab resolution was worked out through the Arab League, which many had long considered a moribund institution. 157


Summary Remarks

A number of things become apparent through study of the American press during the Lebanon crisis. First, there was an appreciable difference in levels of newspaper support for the Eisenhower Administration's policies during the Suez and Lebanon crises. During the Suez crisis, most newspapers tended to support Administration policy, most of the time; during the Lebanon crisis, they did not. Second, three of the four newsmagazines supported U.S. Suez policy; all four backed American Lebanon policy. Third, the opinion journals opposed Administration policies in both crises.

Of the publications studied, only the four newsmagazines, the New York Times, and the Christian Science Monitor supported the American intervention in Lebanon—it might be significant that they all were published in the Eastern United States. The Western newspapers, more isolationist than their Eastern counterparts, opposed the intervention, thereby, conforming to their earlier Suez postures.

There seems to have been a greater degree of contact between the Eisenhower Administration and the American press—daily newspapers and newsmagazines, in particular—during the Lebanese crisis than there was during the Suez crisis. The American press apparently was better informed of U.S. intentions. This is evident both in the amount of prior knowledge of pending U.S. actions—such as, the Eisenhower General Assembly address—and in the accuracy of prediction as to the content and form of U.S. policy. This might be accounted for by the greater
degree of direct U. S. responsibility for events in Lebanon than in Suez, where the United States was a reactor to policies of other governments, more than an initiator of its own actions and a determiner of events. Consequently, it had less to fear from a too open courting of the press. Perhaps, too, the Administration had recognized the liability of an improperly informed press during the Suez crisis. Regarding press relations of the Department of State, it bears remembering that there had been a changing of personnel with the express purpose of improving relations with the press. Exemplary of the new policies pursued by Dulles' new press secretary and his staff might have been maintenance of closer contact with members of the press during the Lebanon crisis.

It bears noting that Secretary of State Dulles was not attacked as much during the Lebanon crisis. A factor which might account for this phenomenon was the apparent success of Berding's and Crowe's efforts to improve Dulles' image.
CONCLUSION

The relationship between the American Government and the American press is complex. The Government and the press are dependent upon each other; they serve and influence each other. On the one hand, the press—particularly in the realm of domestic affairs—provides the Administration with useful information about the effects of governmental policies and actions, and public reaction to them. On the other hand, the press depends upon the Government to supply it with much of the news it prints. The Government generally decides how and what information in its possession is released to the press, or is deleted and suppressed—excluding, of course, unauthorized leaks. During the Suez crisis, for example, the Government used its power to withhold news when it did not reveal to the American press its concern over the widening British, French and American rift. Consequently, the press was surprised by the Anglo-French involvement in the hostilities in the Middle East.

The fact that the Government is a major source of news has a direct impact upon the accuracy with which the attitudes and aims of national political leaders are transmitted by the press to the American people during international crises. Both the nature and the volume of information the Administration releases have a bearing on the workings of the press and its reactions. Because the Eisenhower Administration kept it better briefed,
the American press reflected Administration attitudes and goals more accurately during the Lebanon crisis than it did during the Suez crisis.

But, the Administration usually did not attempt to control the manner in which information was used and interpreted by the press. However, the Administration did not hesitate to contact members of the press when it took strong exception to the way the press presented the "facts." In such cases, the Administration sought to enlighten the newsmen in question, and to obtain more favorable press coverage for their policies. Nor did the Administration shrink from making direct contact with representatives of the press in order to improve the press relations of Secretary of State Dulles. (see above, pp. 168-179.) Such efforts apparently bore fruit, for Dulles was less harshly criticized by the American press during the Lebanon crisis than he was during the Suez crisis. Nevertheless, during both Middle Eastern crises, the American press demonstrated considerable independence from governmental influences. There was ample press criticism of Administration Middle Eastern foreign policies. In neither crisis was there any indication that the American press either voluntarily restricted its freedom to criticize national policy, or was censored in order to further national unity in the achievement of foreign policy goals. In both crises, the American press presented the issues on their merits, as each publication interpreted them.

The Administration was not impervious to press coverage and criticism. Press reaction to U. S. Suez policy and Secretary Dulles' conduct of it was instrumental in forcing the replacement
of Carl W. McCarehe by Andrew H. Berding in March, 1957. Although the Administration was capable of functioning for a considerable period of time in the face of adverse press coverage, it could not indefinitely ignore an unfavorable press. Concessions to press and Congressional critics were apparently made during both the Suez and Lebanon crises; the first, the Eisenhower Doctrine; the second, Eisenhower's six-point proposal to the United Nations General Assembly.

In both the Suez and Lebanon crises, however, the press knew mainly what the Administration wanted it to know. So effective was the system of news management (see above: pp. 122-135 and 196-198.), that little information was leaked. Press reports and editorial comments were replete with references to the public and background statements of fact and interpretation made by administration spokesmen. Thus, for example, Time magazine (pp. 325-326.) and Western newspaper editorials (p. 279, footnote #140.) echoed Dulles' charge of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion raised during his October 30, 1956, backgrounder. And Lindesay Parrott's explanation of U. S. hopes for the United Nations Security Council session on the Suez dispute, put forth in his October 7th front page article in the New York Times, closely paralleled Dulles' interpretation of U. S. expectations at his October 5th backgrounder. (p. 254.)

Because of its lack of inside knowledge of the normal functioning of the Eisenhower Administration and the Dulles-Eisenhower relationship, press comment on U. S. policy often missed the mark. During the Suez crisis, Dulles was caught between Eisenhower's desire for a peaceful settlement of the
Canal dispute and Eden's bid for a violent solution. Dulles, who apparently was less opposed than Eisenhower to the ultimate use of military force to secure a satisfactory resolution of the issue, had a difficult time reconciling the orders of his Chief Executive with the requirements of his Allies. He grasped at stratagem after transparent stratagem (SCUA) to delay the day of reckoning in the futile hope of preventing its ever taking place. Dulles' diplomatic gyrations on that account incurred much press criticism. And, in the end, all Dulles' inventive efforts failed. But the American press never detected Dulles' dilemma; it blamed him indiscriminately for U. S. Suez policies, even when he was not responsible for them, but was merely attempting to implement Eisenhower's decisions. (see: Chapters I, IV and V.) Long after the dust of Suez had settled, journalists persisted in their beliefs of Dulles' nearly complete responsibility for U. S. foreign policy. (pp. 211-213.)

Without possessing inside knowledge of Administration functioning, the American press attacked the symbol of U. S. foreign policy--Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Even the public statements President Eisenhower made in defense of the beleaguered Dulles (pp. 178-179.) did not shake the opinions of the press during the Suez crisis. The ultimate result was not difficult to predict--calls for Dulles' replacement, such as that made by The New Republic. (pp. 355-356.)

It must be recognized that not all press criticism of Dulles for U. S. foreign policy decisions was misdirected. Dulles was primarily responsible for the decision to renege on the American
offer of financial assistance to the Egyptians for construction of the Aswan High Dam project. Press criticism of Dulles for this decision was justified, as were the fears of some pressmen that the move would result in increased Soviet influence in Egypt. (see above: pp. 224-227.) Furthermore, Dulles compounded his difficulties with the American press by making imprudent public statements of policy, such as his proclamation that the U. S. did not intend to shoot its way through the Canal, and his declaration that the U. S. would send its ships around the Cape if Nasser were to block the Canal. Within two weeks, Dulles had to admit that Western non-use of the Suez Canal would not adversely affect the Egyptian economy. (pp. 79-83.)

Dulles did not always understand the potential impact of his words on the press, or which would make the headlines. (pp. 174-175.) And he was not often willing to soften his remarks to win a more favorable press. He preferred to make his point strongly (p. 205.), and appeared willing to suffer the consequences.

Some members of the press distrusted Dulles' moralistic judgements and suspected him of deviousness. (pp. 198-200.) When one contrasts the stark realism of Dulles' October 30, 1956, background remarks with the moralistic argumentation of his December 6, 1956, background statements, it is easy to understand why some newsmen felt the way they did. In his October 30 backgrounder, Dulles cool-headedly analyzed the effects of Anglo-French-Israeli collusion upon U. S. future ties with the three powers. He rejoiced in the U. S.'s newly won ability to pursue independent foreign policies, free from the taint of European
colonialism. In his December 6 backgrounder, Dulles defended U. S. adherence to principle and its support for the United Nations during the Suez crisis. (see above: pp. 153-165.) During the Lebanon crisis, a similar contrast was evident in the public statements of Administration spokesmen at the time of the intervention and Dulles' background remarks at the home of Richard Harkness on July 21, 1958. Public statements of U. S. spokesmen tended to stress the point that the United States was responding to a legitimate request for assistance from the Lebanese Government. Dulles' background remarks emphasized more traditional power politics rationale. (pp. 388-405.)

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of Administration news management of facts in the crucial area of foreign affairs during these two Middle Eastern crises left the American press no alternative but to second guess the Government. It was necessary to interpolate the "facts" in order to derive underlying causes and to critically interpret Administration policy rationale. The impressive thing is that the press, taken as a whole, performed its task so well.

American press interpretations of the two crises appear to have been only marginally influenced by the Eisenhower Administration. In this realm, the press exercised considerable independence of judgement. The degree of parallelism of press interpretation and official explanation often seemed related to the ideological predisposition of the individual publication to the Eisenhower Republican Administration. This did not guarantee unquestioning support for Administration policy, however,
among the favorably inclined, as press reaction to United Nations sanctions against Israel and the response of some American newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times, to the Lebanon landings indicate.

American press evaluations of Administration policies during the Suez and Lebanon crises covered the gamut, from near unquestioning support to harsh opposition. Press objections to U. S. policy were voiced by friends of the Administration and foes alike. For example, during the Suez crisis, U. S. News and World Report, a newsmagazine usually favorable to the Administration, objected to the Administration-backed United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which it feared would accomplish little if President Nasser's demands were complied with. (see above: pp. 321-323.)

During both crises, newsmagazine reaction to Administration policies was generally favorable. The daily newspapers tended to be much more critical, particularly during the Lebanon crisis. The opinion journals were highly critical during both crises. Scholarly journals scarcely made mention of the crises at the time they occurred.

Newspaper journalists often displayed considerable independence of interpretation from the editorial positions of the papers in which they were published. Their reports often contained more realistic assessments than the more optimistic, more pro-Administration editorial comments of their papers. Thus, the initial reaction of New York Times reporters Kennett Love and Homer Bigart to the Suez Canal Users' Association was skeptical. But the initial editorial response of the Times
credited Dulles' flexibility and willingness to modify SCUA with eliminating the danger that force would be used to keep the Canal open. (see above: pp. 243-245.) The Christian Science Monitor gave editorial support to the American cease-fire resolution in the United Nations Security Council, while, in the same issue, Joseph C. Harsch bemoaned the fact that the U. S. did not support the Anglo-French ultimatum, which, according to him, would have permitted the West to establish a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. (pp. 261-262.)

The American newsmagazines tended to overreact to the brief Suez War, and to overproject its long-range implications for the Western alliance. They overstressed the danger of total war inherent in the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt; they were taken in by Administration rhetoric and Soviet propaganda. (pp. 312-319.) As we saw in Chapter I, despite the evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Soviet Russia would be unable to intervene in the Middle East, even by way of dispatch of "volunteers," Dulles and Eisenhower both encouraged war alarmism, apparently to increase the pressures on the British, French and Israelis to cease-fire and withdraw, and to stimulate domestic support for their policies. The newsmagazines took up the cry, which serves to indicate the impact and sometime effectiveness of Administration efforts to orchestrate news coverage of events.

Administration and press protests during the Suez crisis that Nasser should not be allowed to get away with his seizure of the Canal, and that the Canal should not become the instrument of the politics of any one nation or group of nations, were basically empty. While both the Administration and the American press
outspokenly supported a peaceful Suez solution, they apparently failed to perceive that such protests effectively eliminated the possibility of achieving it. For, in order to obtain Egyptian compliance with Western schemes, at least the threat of force should have been retained. Hazlitt perceptively noted the gratuitous character of Eisenhower's and Dulles' imprudent statements of peaceful intent. He observed that such comments were likely to encourage the Egyptians and the Russians in the pursuit of their policies. Years later, Heikal confirmed the accuracy of Hazlitt's concerns. (see above: pp. 327-329.)

The cries of the American press for U. S. reliance upon the United Nations during both the Suez and Lebanon crises often appeared myopic. Frequently, the press failed to recognize that the United Nations could be no more effective a peace-keeping force than the two Super Powers, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., would permit it to be. U. S. News alone noted that the U. N. succeeded at Suez because the United States backed its efforts. (pp. 320-321.)

Prior to the Marine landings in Lebanon, segments of the American press tended to overemphasize Nasser's role in the revolt, blaming him for starting it and keeping it going. They also exaggerated the amount and significance of Soviet involvement. The New York Times and the newsmagazines, Business Week and U. S. News and World Report, were particularly guilty in this regard. (pp. 437-439 and 476-479.) While at the same period of time, the Western newspapers, the Wall Street Journal, Time magazine, and the opinion journals were presenting a more accurate picture of the true character of the Lebanese revolt
as largely an internal struggle. (see above: pp. 435, 439-440, 448-450, 477-479, and 504-519.) *Time* did an interesting about-face following the U. S. intervention. (pp. 487-488.)

Despite the handicaps Administration news management imposed on the functioning of the news media, the American press published some rather telling critiques of Administration policies. The newspapers performed a particular service by pointing out the probable impact that the renege on the Western offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam project would have on Soviet-Egyptian relations, forcing Egypt closer to Russia. (pp. 224-227.)

*U. S. News* clearly foresaw the danger that UNEF could come under effective Egyptian control and would, therefore, ultimately fail. (see above: pp. 321-323.)

The Western newspapers and the opinion journals pointed out the contradictions between American Suez policy and American Lebanon policy. Agreeing with the earlier policy of Western military non-involvement in the Middle East, they condemned the U. S. Marine landings in Lebanon. But the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the newsmagazines supported the Administration's actions. There was a clear difference of press opinion on the propriety of the U. S. move in Lebanon. The divisions within the press over U. S. Middle Eastern policy were even greater during the Lebanon crisis than they were during the Suez crisis.

While the press was regularly correct in its predictions of the consequences of certain policies, it bears recognizing that the long-range policy alternatives advocated by segments of the
press (see above: pp. 329-331, 342-343, and 351-353.) were as little likely to be effective as the very policies they criticized. For they frequently assumed powers—which the U. S. does not have—to control other nations and events. And they often incorrectly assessed the politics and needs of Middle Eastern states, and the probable areas in which agreement could be reached.

Although the Administration, in the words of Senator Dirksen (p. 382.), had daily working knowledge of the whole foreign field, that did not keep it from erring during both crises. Not only was the Administration remiss in projecting the possible consequences of its withdrawal of the American offer, it was grossly unprepared to counter the Egyptian reaction—nationalization of the Suez Canal. The Administration did not adequately grasp the importance of the maintenance of a strong Anglo-French presence in the area to the perpetuation and strengthening of America's own global power. By refusing to support the Anglo-French invasion the Eisenhower Administration hastened the decline of European influence and weakened the world position of its Allies. In the process, the long-range interests of the United States were damaged. While many members of the press expressed dissatisfaction with U. S. Suez policies, none of the publications studied suggested that the United States should have supported the Anglo-French action. Only Joseph C. Harsch lamented the folly of the hasty U. S. cease-fire resolution and voiced the fear that the British and French would consequently be unable to establish themselves along the Canal. (pp. 261-262.)

During the Lebanon crisis, the Eisenhower Administration overreacted to the Iraqi coup d'état. Without sufficient know-
ledge of the Lebanese situation (see above: p. 389.), the Administration rushed in the Marines. It attempted to justify its action by leveling charges of "indirect aggression" against the United Arab Republic. The newsmagazines, and the New York Times and the Christian Science Monitor echoed Administration charges. But the Western papers, the Wall Street Journal, and the opinion journals voiced serious reservations about the validity and propriety of such expansive accusations. The New Republic summed up the matter when it labelled Dulles' allegations of U. A. R. indirect aggression a "hypocritical gambit"—the best that could be said for it was "that the Administration had nothing else to use." (pp. 515-516.)

Despite many telling observations on the weaknesses of Administration policies, press optimism was clearly evident during both crises. At times, obvious efforts were made to look at the bright side. Thus, U. S. Suez policy independence often was said to have preserved Western interests in and ties with the Third World (pp. 274, 319-320, 342-343 and 346-347.), and Eisenhower's six-point address to the United Nations General Assembly was widely praised. (pp. 469-470 and 496-499.)

All of which leads to the two central questions: 1. How successfully did the Eisenhower Administration manage the news?; and 2. How well did the U. S. press perform its self-appointed task of informing the citizens of our representative democracy?

While the Administration had rather effective control of both the amount of information and the manner in which it was released, it was not singularly successful in fostering favorable
press coverage for its Suez and Lebanon policies. During both crises, many aspects of Administration policies were severely criticized, although the broad outline of U. S. Suez policy at least had general support.

Within the informational limitations that it operated during the Suez and Lebanon crises, the American press, viewed as a whole, made valient efforts to expose the several sides of the crises to the scrutiny of the reading public. However, no one publication, including the highly respected New York Times, presented an accurate, unbiased account of the crises and/or the motives and intentions of the nations and national leaders directly involved. Nevertheless, by reading a broad cross section of the American press, the informed American citizen could obtain a reasonably accurate picture of the crises and their complexities.
TABLE I

FORMAL AND INFORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE 
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN PRESS

I. Formal Channels:

A. Daily press conferences of:
   1. White House--held by Press Secretary Hagerty or 
      by Assistant Press Secretary at 10:30 a.m. and 
      4:00 p.m.
   2. Department of State--held by News Division Chief 
      at 12:30 p.m.

B. Regular press conferences of:
   1. Secretary of State--held on Tuesday mornings at 
      11:00 a.m.--usually weekly
   2. President--held on Wednesday mornings at 10:30 a.m.

C. Radio and television addresses--held on an irregular 
   basis--three held during the Suez crisis
   1. August 3, 1956--Dulles' report on nationalization 
      of canal and tripartite London conference
   2. October 31, 1956--Eisenhower's report on Eastern 
      European and Middle Eastern situations
   3. February 20, 1957--Eisenhower's report on Israeli 
      refusal to withdraw forces from Sinai and on 
      U. S. readiness to support "pressure" in U. N.

D. "The People Ask the President"--held irregularly

II. Informal Channels (used by Presidential Press Secretary 
    Hagerty and Secretary of State Dulles):

A. Background briefings--held irregularly on a need basis
B. Dinner and/or cocktail discussions--held irregularly 
   on a need basis
C. Personal (exclusive) interviews--held irregularly:
   1. Initiated by Administration
   2. Initiated by newsmen
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guest Lists of Dulles' Backgrounders, Oct. 30, and Dec. 6—Rearranged Alphabetically by Institution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 30, 1956:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Broadcasting Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Rendell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Beal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Daily News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Lisagor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Stringer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Koop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International News Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Singer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Broadcasting Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Harkness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Herald Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roscoe Drummond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Reston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Brandt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Shepley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Gonzales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. News &amp; World Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John R. Fleming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Evening Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben McKelway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earl Voss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chalmers Roberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Russell Wiggins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 6, 1956:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Beal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowles Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dick Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International News Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Herman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Lindley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Herald Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roscoe Drummond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Reston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Phillips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scripps-Howard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank Ford</td>
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<td>Time-Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Shepley</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lyle Wilson</td>
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<tr>
<td>U. S. News &amp; World Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Lawrence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Evening Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben McKelway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Russell Wiggins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from mimeographed guest lists included in the John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings of J. F. D., H. Engagements...1596, 1957.
## APPENDIXES

### APPENDIX C

**TABLE III**

GUEST LIST OF DULLES' JULY 21, 1958, BACKGROUNDER AT THE HOME OF CORRESPONDENT RICHARD HARKNESS—REARRANGED ALPHABETICALLY BY INSTITUTION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Broadcasting System</td>
<td>Ted Koop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
<td>John Hightower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore Sun</td>
<td>Paul Ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Daily News</td>
<td>Pete Lisagor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Sun Times</td>
<td>Fred Kuh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland Plain Dealer</td>
<td>Jack Leacocous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>William Stringer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City Star</td>
<td>John Cauley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville Courier Journal</td>
<td>Robert Riggs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Broadcasting Co.</td>
<td>Richard Harkness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark News</td>
<td>Art Sylvester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Enterprise Assn.</td>
<td>Peter Edson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>Ernest Lindley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Herald Tribune</td>
<td>Roscoe Drummond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>Edwin Dale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence Journal</td>
<td>Fred Collins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridder Newspapers</td>
<td>Walter Ridder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Post Dispatch</td>
<td>Raymond Brandt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time, Inc.</td>
<td>Jack Beal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Press International</td>
<td>Stew Hensley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Information Service</td>
<td>Eugene Staples</td>
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<tr>
<td>U. S. News and World Report</td>
<td>Charles Folty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>John Gibson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Evening Star</td>
<td>Earl Voss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>Chalmers Roberts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Compiled from mimeographed guest list included in the John Foster Dulles Papers, I. Writings of J. F. D., H. Engagements...1958, 1959; undated,
APPENDIXES

APPENDIX D

TABLE IV

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Months In Office</th>
<th>Yearly Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>81.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>41.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>190*</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>23.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A discrepancy exists as to the number of Eisenhower news conferences. The figure used here is based on a letter from Press Secretary Hagerty to James E. Pollard on May 9, 1960. Richard Friedman, in Editor & Publisher, Jan. 14, 1961, p. 14, gave the number up to then as 191. With the final one on January 18, 1961, the total would be 192. But both the New York Times and Herald-Tribune gave the final number as 193.


<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1953</td>
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