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Socratism in Galen's Psychological Works

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Mischungen – die vollkommene Proportion im äußeren Erscheinungsbild ist ein Ergebnis der Eukrasie, ein Ergebnis also der vollkommenen Mischung der Grundbestandteile des lebendigen Körpers. 46

Mit Hippokrates und Polykleter sind die Exponenten der griechischen Erforschung von Körper und Gesundheit benannt. Galen sieht sich als ihr Erbe und als Vermittler dieser großen Tradition im Rom seiner Zeit. Dank seiner systematischen Arbeit kann nun jeder gründliche Kenntnis auf diesem Wissensgebiet erwerben. Das könnten sogar die barbarischen Völker am Rand des römischen Reiches. Sie müssten sich nur entschlüpfen, Galens Buch zur Hand zu nehmen und zu lesen. Damit sind wir bei der Textstelle, die immer wieder zitiert wird, weil Galen hier die Germanen mit wilden Tieren vergleicht:

„Bei den Germanen werden die Kinder nicht gut aufgezogen. Aber ich schreibe dies jetzt weder für Germanen noch für andere wilde oder barbarische Menschen, ebensowenig wie für Bären, Löwen, wilde Eber oder andere wilde Tiere, sondern für Hellenen und alle, die zwar ihrer Abstammung nach Barbaren sind, aber nach hellenischer Kultur streben.“ 47

Dass Germanen seine Gesundheitsschrift tatsächlich würden lesen wollen, daran hat Galen sicher nicht einmal im Traum gedacht. Er spricht also mit rhetorischer Emphase, um seinen Lesern unmissverständlich klar zu machen, dass Fehler in der Pflege der Kleinkinder gravierende Folgen haben. Das richtige Wissen ist aber nicht auf exklusive Zirkel beschränkt, es liegt offen zutage, jedenfalls für die an Medizin interessierten Leser. Wer es aber nicht zur Kenntnis nimmt, läuft Gefahr, so zu leben wie Germanen und wilde Tiere.

46 Gal., De temp. I 9: 566,12–567,9 K.: καὶ ποὺ τὰς ἀνθρώπινες ἐπισκευάζει Πολυσελίτου κανόναν διακόσμημεν, ἐκ τῶν πάντων τῶν μορφῶν ἀκρίβως τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίαν ἔχει δυνάμεις τοιοῦτο τιμῶν. ἦστι μὲν οὖς ἐπὶ πλέον, ἢ νῦν ἡμεῖς ἐπισκέπτομεν, ἢ δὲ κανόνων οὕτως. οὐκ ἄν μὲν γὰρ ὑπόσχομαι τοις ἐπισκέπτοντι καὶ περιπτέσσεται ἐν τῷ μέσῳ καθέστηκεν οὕτως εὐβοικοῦς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαπλακεῖσθαι ἀπίστως τετελεῖται, ίδος οὖς ἐπισκέπτεται τῶν τεταρτῶν εἰσαγωγῶν εὐκρασίας, τάδε τινα δεισδεκατὰ ἀρχὴν ἐπάνω ἐχόμεθα ἀνάθεοι. οὐκότι τὸ γὰρ πάντως ὑπέρGREEKTEXT:

47 Gal., De san. tuenda I 10,17: CMG V 4,2, S. 24,21–25: παρά μὲν γε γιὰ τὸν Γερμανοὺς οὐ πάλιν τρέφεται τὰ παιδία. ἄλλα ἡμεῖς γε νῦν οὐτὲ Γερμανοὶ οὐτὲ άλλοις τισὶν ἄργνοις ή μοῖροις ή ἀνάγκαις ταύτα γράφουμεν, οὐ μελόν ἢ ἀρκτοὶ ή λέοντας ή κάρποις ή ται ὁλίγων ἄρης, ἄλλα Μισσαὶ καὶ ὁσοὶ τὸ γένει μὲν ἔρωσαν βαρβάροις, ἔφθασε δὲ τὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἐπιπτηδεύματα.
idiosyncratically Socratic ideas, but also a number of Socrates' personal qualities and protreptic strategies in the presentation of his own autobiography and moral character. Of all Galen's intellectual heroes, Socrates may well have had the most fully developed, historically credible biography; Plato certainly made him dramatically compelling, and as such, Socrates was an easy character to personalize and even emulate if one was sympathetic to his ideas and comportment.3

A few preliminary words are in order about the term "Socratism". This is not the place to enter into the longstanding debate about how to separate Socrates from Plato or others who deploy him as a character, and in fact some of the work of defining Socratism has been done for us by the contemporary philosophical traditions that influenced Galen — Stoics, Cynics and others who fashioned themselves in various ways as heirs to Socrates. A generation before Galen, for example, the Stoic Epictetus advocated a form of Socratic psychotherapy that evidently interested Galen, as we may infer from the fact that he wrote a treatise about him (On Epictetus, against Favorinus; cf. De libris prorpr. 14,21 (12): p.168,11–12 Boudon-Millot = XIX 44,8–9 K.).4 For the Stoics, of course, as it was for Galen, Socrates was all about ethics, the repudiation of fruitless natural science, and the realization that the first step of a philosophical life is to recognize the limitations of one's own knowledge. Moderation in all one's activities, control of bodily


3 It may seem odd to think of Galen appropriating Socrates as a role model, given what appear to be rather stark differences in their respective temperaments. Indeed, Plato's portrait of Socrates as unvarnished, even serene, seems antithetical to the volatile character that emerges from Galen's own self-description in his writings. See further R. M. Rosen, Galen and the compulsion to instruct, in: Proceedings of the XIIth Colloquium Hippocraticum (forthcoming Leiden 2009). But whether or not Galen was, in his personal life, able to live up to the kind of ideals Socrates traditionally came to embody, there is no reason not to think that his admiration for Socrates was genuine, and that he found in Socrates a particularly effective antecedent for the moralizing stance that he adopted in his ethical treatises.

4 See also Galen’s treatise Against Favorinus’ attacks on Socrates (also mentioned in De libris propr. 15,1 [13]: p. 169,16–17 Boudon-Millot = XIX 45,12–13 K.). The work has not survived, but the title testifies well enough to Galen’s special affection for Socrates as a thinker in his own right, able to be conceptualized apart from Plato.

pleasures and a disdain for excessive material goods were also retained as hallmarks of Socratism.5 Galen alluded to or openly embraced all of these at one point or another, but there are other Socratic qualities as well that interested him, largely of a more personal kind. These constitute aspects of Socrates’ personality and temperament that emerge from the autobiography Plato constructs for him in his dialogues, and constitute a paradigm for what a philosophical life might actually look like. In Socrates’ case, this is an unpretentious, homespun sort of life, measured, calm, reflective and self-critical, even philanthropic. Galen was obviously attracted to philosophy as a technical discipline, but he was also interested in the packaging: and the packaging he wanted to claim for himself, I would like to suggest, was pervasively Socratic.

It is interesting, in fact, to see the company Socrates keeps in Galen, where he ranks high, sometimes highest, in Galen’s pantheon of virtuous men. In his Exhortation for the study of the arts, ch. 5 (Protr. 5,1–2: CMG V 1,1, pp. 118,22–120,10), Galen contrasts the followers of Tyche with those of Hermes, and places the most virtuous men in the latter group. These are the most “decorous” (κόσμημα) of all, the men who practice the arts (τέχνης ἔργαται). Galen further subdivides this large band of men into three sub-groups: the first, consisting of geometers, arithmeticians, philosophers, doctors, astronomers and scholars, stand physically closest to the god and form a circle around him; the second sub-group includes painters, sculptors, language teachers, builders, architects and stone-carvers; all the remaining arts are included in a third sub-group. But almost as an afterthought, Galen imagines a fourth group — τέσσαρες δὲ τινά δέχονται ἄθικον ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκκριτῶν:

τοῦτοι ομοίως τῶν χρῶν νοσθῆτος ὑποτεύχων ἐστὶν σθανὸν τέλειας ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκυνήσεις Σωκράτης (θεωρ.) ἐστίν εἰς αὐτόν καὶ ὸμορμή καὶ ἕπτοκρίτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ τούτων ἐρασται, οὗσα ἔστε καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς σέβομεν, οὐκ ἔτεροι τίμης καὶ ἐπιτρεπτέα ποιοῦσιν.

"When you consider what this group is like, you will, I think, not only emulate it but also reverence it. For Socrates is in that group, and Homer, Hippocrates, Plato and all their lovers, whom we revere as equal to the gods, in that they are the god's deputes and servants."

5 See V. T. McKeon, The Socratic origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), p. 369, who lists what she refers to as the "rather uncontroversial features of the historical Socrates . . . Socratic intellectualism; exclusive interest in ethics [a claim nuanced, however, in DeFilippo and Mitsis, see above, n. 2 — R. M. Rosen]; the sufficiency of virtue for happiness; moderation and self-mastery with regard to bodily pleasures and material goods, in private as well as in public life; criticism of politicians and political institutions but commitment to obeying the laws." On the drastically inconsistent ancient portrayals of Socrates (and the implicit difficulty in establishing anything like a stable conception of him to satisfy modern criteria), especially as mediated by philosophers of the Hellenistic period, see A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, Cambridge 1996, pp. 1–34.
The very difference with which he introduces this group ("a sort of fourth grouping, distinct from the others") suggests how important it was for him to identify an even more elite subset of an already virtuous group of men. The first three sub-groups of men who worked in the arts may have been reasonably comprehensive, but they still did not represent the absolute crème de la crème. For this, Galen had to devise a fourth group, the one reserved for Socrates, Homer, Hippocrates, Plato and, as he puts it, their "lovers" (ερασταί). All of the members of this group are favored by the gods, but Galen regards these alone as worthy to be esteemed as gods. Galen's language in this passage— he mentions how we should emulate (ζηλούν) this group of exalted men, and become their lovers — is reminiscent of Diodorus' language to Socrates in her famous speech in Plato's Symposium on ascending to the good. At Symposium 209 c 7–d 4, for example, Diodora describes to Socrates how aspiring to the highest good advance from the love of human children to a love of the incorporeal offspring of "Homer, Hesiod and the other poets," and she mentions specifically how we admire or emulate (again, ζηλούν) such poetic ἐγχώνα:

καὶ πᾶς ἄν ἐξετάζω ἐαυτῷ τοιούτως παιδὸς μᾶλλον γεγονέιν ἢ τούς ἀνθρωπίνους. καὶ εἰς Ὀμηρόν ἀπομόνωσα καὶ Χολόον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παιδίς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἤγξιν, οὐ γὰρ ἐγχώνα εαυτῶν καταλείπουσιν, ἀλλ' εἰκόνις διάπλωσαν κλεὸς καὶ μνήμην παρέχεται αὐτὰ τοιαύτα δίνας...

"And everyone would prefer to have children of this sort rather than human ones, and would look to Homer and Hesiod and the other good poets in emulation of the kind of offspring they left behind, offspring which, since they are immortal themselves, provide for them immortal fame and remembrance."

It is impossible, of course, to know whether or not Galen was alluding to Diodorus' speech in the passage from the Exhortation quoted above, but it is interesting how he refers there almost instinctively to Socrates as the fore-

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6 In fact, the text shows some signs of haste, almost as if we can hear Galen thinking out loud as he works out this fourth category of special men. With the phrase τούτον οὖσα τῶν χορὸν τούτον, it is not entirely clear whether he is referring to the fourth χορός specifically, or to the large grouping of men who follow Hermes (as opposed to Tyche), which Galen had also introduced as a χορός (Protr. 5.1; CMG V 1, p. 118, 22). E. Wenkebacb, Galens Protreptikosfragment, Quellen u. Studien z. Gesch. d. Naturwiss. u. d. Med. 4, 1945, p. 94, sensed this ambiguity and proposed the addition of μὲν οὖν ὄλων after τοῦτον. I assume in order to make χορός refer to the larger, inclusive, group. But this seems unnecessary, and likely incorrect: immediately preceding that line Galen says of the fourth subgroup that the god "honors and cultivates them above the others, and keeps them around him." (Protr. 5.2, CMG V 1, p. 120, 6: τιμᾶ τι καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχον ἄξιον. It is this band of men, the fourth, that Galen suggests we should emulate, contemplate and revere in the next sentence. With this in mind, Wenkebacb's addition of οὖσα in the next sentence (Σωκράτης ζήλος ἐν αὐτῷ) makes sense, with αὐτῷ referring to the fourth χορός, not the larger band that included all the followers of Hermes.

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most representative of a life that should inspire within us an almost erotic passion for philosophical emulation — the kind of philosophical eros that Diodorus has in mind in her speech in the Symposium.

The passage from the Exhortation serves to introduce a general attitude towards Socrates that Galen fills out more systematically in his Passions and Errors of the Soul. In what follows, in fact, I would like to suggest that this treatise was informed by Plato's Socratic dialogues not only in substance, but also in its narrative form. In particular, as if taking his own advice from the passage in the Exhortation just cited, Galen seems to be attempting to emulate Socrates in openly identifiable ways, adopting a number of idiosyncratically Socratic stances and rhetorical strategies in the service of his here highly Socratic agenda. Galen naturally frames the questions he addresses in Passions in a manner that reflects the grand sweep of philosophical debate up to his own day — in the first chapter alone, for example, he alludes to Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Epicureanism — yet the fundamental moral approach he takes here, and the particular voice he adopts in its service, seem suffused both with Socrates imagined as a historical figure, and Socratism as a way of life.

Very early in Passions, in fact, Galen alludes to a well-known scene from Plato's Apology when he recalls how his own thinking developed in his youth on the question of self-knowledge and wisdom. When he was young, Galen says, he thought that people made too much of the Pythagorean oracle's injunction to "know oneself", since he thought it was not such a difficult task. Eventually, however, as he says, he realized that only the wisest man can know himself fully, and since wisdom of this sort is hard to come by in anyone, there will be great variation in the amount of self-knowledge men will display:

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7 A single work in two volumes, the first concerning the "passions" (τρέφη), the second "errors" (ἀμφιτρέφη). See Galen, De libris prpar. 15.1 (13): p. 169,15–16 Boudon-Millot = XIX 45,11–12 K., where he alludes to the work as ὅν the diagnosis of an individual's passions and errors. On the title, see I. Magnaldi, in: Claudii Galeni Pergameni Περὶ ψυχῆς ταῦτα καὶ ἀμφιτρέφης, hrsg., Rome 1999 (Scriptores Graeci et Latini consilio Academiae Lynceorum edit.), p. VII n.1.

8 In the opening sentence of the work, Galen announces that Passions and Errors of the Soul is a written version of an oral disquisition he had once given to his (anonymous) addressee about a treatise by one "Antonius the Epicurean". At the end of the same paragraph Galen acknowledges the long Greek philosophical tradition of Ἱστορικο κριτηρίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ταῦτα (De propo. animi cuiuslib. affect. dign. et cur. 1,4; CMG V 4,1,1, p. 4,8–11). Galen makes no particular claims to striking originality, and defers to his great predecessors ("it would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did"); καὶ ἔν μιν μέλτων ἐξ ἐκείνων μοναδῶν αὐτότως ἐξετάζειν ἐναντίως τοῦ κειμένου, p. 4,11–12), but he forges ahead on the principle, one assumes, that he can be a useful synthesizer of issues that have an urgency for everyone.
Socrates is not named here, but the allusion to Apology 20 c 8–22 c 6 is difficult to miss. This is the famous passage where Socrates recounts how Chaerophon went to Delphi to ask the Pythian priestess whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. When the priestess answered that there was not, Socrates proceeded to test this claim by questioning prominent Athenians who had a reputation for being wise. In the end he famously found plenty of people who thought they were wise, but little in them he could call sophia, and he concluded that for all his own ignorance, he himself must be the wisest for it, and certainly wiser than those whom everyone else considered wise. With a hint of self-mockery, Galen alludes to a period of youthful brashness when he scoffed at a famous dictum that was always difficult to separate from Socrates, despite the fact that it had become something of a popular cliche by Galen’s time. Perhaps it was an early sign of Galen’s taste for independent thinking, but it is interesting that in this case, Galen eventually acceded to the pull of a basic Socratic tenet.

There are several noteworthy aspects of the Galenic excerpt. First, Galen adopts here (as he does throughout this work) an autobiographical narrative that parallels Socrates’ own in Phaedo 96 a 5–3, where Socrates recounts his youthful interest in natural science as a means of understanding being and becoming, and his subsequent disillusionment with such an approach; and it is a narrative that gets Galen to the point where he essentially identifies with the famously paradoxical Socratic position of self-knowledge and ignorance. Like Socrates, Galen concludes that much of his knowledge really consists in an awareness of his own ignorance; only the “wisest man” can have true self-knowledge, and everyone else must concede varying degrees of self-ignorance (De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 2,3: CMGV 4, 1,1, p. 5,4–5: τῶν δ’ ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ἀκριβῶς μὲν οὐδεὶς, ἥττως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτερος ἔτεροι). Further, in the larger context of Galen’s work, knowledge that the soul’s passions need diagnosis and treatment puts one already a step ahead of those who claim to have wisdom but deny that they suffer from pathê. For, as he says at Passions 3, 3, “... 11 all men make thousands of errors every day, and act under the influence of the passions, though they don’t quite realize it.” (De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 3,6: CMGV 4,1,1, p. 8,18–20: ... ἀπαντάς ἄνευ κατηγορίας καὶ ἐκάθετην ἡμᾶς μεν ἄμαρτόν τοι κατὰ τάς ἑαυτὸς τρόπως, οὐ μην αὐτοὺς γὰρ παροσκολουθητοῖς). As he proceeds to argue in the same passage, taking a leaf from the Stoics: only the wise man is completely perfect, and such god-like perfection is exceedingly rare, if not impossible.11 Galen, like Socrates, freely admits his shortcomings, but by doing so openly and (most importantly) striving to do something about them, portrays himself as far wiser than most others.

Both Socrates and Galen thus face a logical problem: if one is going to profess ignorance about oneself, how can one acquire self-knowledge, correct one’s flaws and so live a better life? As Galen puts it at Passions 3,2, how can one go about purging oneself of one’s passions if one is unaware of having them to begin with (De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 3,2: CMGV 4,1,1, p. 7,7: πῶς οὖν ἐν τις ἐκάθεται ταύτα μη γνῶνοι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἑαυτῶν;)? The entire pedagogical thrust of Galen’s Passions in fact addresses this problem, and offers a method which, while it is unquestionably Stoic (perhaps even specifically Epictetan)12 in its self-help orientation, wears its

9 Galen would certainly have encountered the Pythian injunction through any number of his philosophical studies, but the fact that in the passage quoted above he mentions it in the context of “the wisest” men, suggests that he does, in fact, have the Socrates of the Apology on his mind here. See also Galen’s Exhortation, where he mentions several famous examples where the Pythian god addressed men, and begins his list with Socrates: “This was the god who told Socrates that he was the wisest of all men (Protr. 9,3: CMGV 1,1, p. 152,22–23: ἄνθρωπον ἀπάντων σοφότατον).”

10 The transmitted genitive τάς ἑαυτός is difficult here with κατά; de Boer prints Marquardt’s emendation. Others have changed the preposition, or the case of τάς ἑαυτός (see Claudii Galeni Pergamiensis Peripateticus philosophi testimonia et fragmenta (n.7), p. 13 apparatus ad loc.; Magnalidi prints κατά τὰς τάς ἑαυτός), though the sense is clear enough.

11 Cf. De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 3,7–8: CMGV 4,1,1, p. 9,7–12. Galen’s complicated relationship with Stoicism is frequently discussed. On points of detail, he can be vitriolic in his disagreements, e.g. in his famous attacks in De placentis Hippocratis et Platonis II–V, though elsewhere he can appear to align himself intellectually with Stoic thinkers. See now C. Gill, Galen and the Stoics: mortal enemies or blood brothers? Phronesis 52, 2007, pp. 88–120, esp. pp. 90–98, which offers an excellent, nuanced discussion, with further bibliography, of Galen’s fraught relationship with Stoicism. Much of Galen’s disagreement with Stoics concerned the nature of the soul (see, in addition to Gill, R. J. Hankinson, Galen’s anatomy of the soul, Phronesis 36, 1991, pp. 197–233, T. Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus on the soul: argument and refutation in the De Placitis books II–III, Leiden, New York, Köln 1996 [Philosophia Antiqua 68], pp. 264–273, and idem, Galen’s psychology, in: Galen et la Philosophie, ed. by J. Barnes and J. Jouanna, Vanderweerden – Geneva 2003 [Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique 49], pp. 151–161), but the question of the identity of a “wise man” was likely less controversial and allowed Galen to synthesize both Platonic and Stoic attitudes.

12 See A. A. Long, Epictetus. A Stoic and Socratic guide to life, Oxford 2002,
connection to Socrates rather transparently. Socrates routinely claimed that he was unsuited to dispense substantive knowledge, but instead was happy to interact with individuals, asking pointed questions, making observations, and putting to the test the things his interlocutors would say. Galen’s prescription is similarly interpersonal, individualized and elenctic. Galen would encourage everyone to find someone who could perform what amounts to a Socratic elenchus on them, not only to point out their debilitating passions, but also to engage them in a discussion about these passions, to cross-examine and counter-argue, especially if they refused to believe the criticisms leveled against them:

... ἄλλα ὑπὸ τούτου πρῶτον φιλοσόφημα τὸ καρτερείν ἐπιρρεαζόμενον. Ὑστερον δὲ ποτὲ κατεσταλμένων ἰκανῶς (τῶν) συστατοῦ παθῶν αἰσθήμων ἐπιχειρησιών ἁπλώς ἄλλοτε τι αὐτοῦ συναντών ἢ τοὺς συναντών ήτοι πεισθῆν ἐκεῖνον ἁμείνον γιγνόσκειν ἢ μετὰ τελεοῦν ἠξέτασεις εὐρής αὐτοῦ ἢ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐγκέφαλων (δέντα).

(De propri. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,10: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 10,7–14)

"... this is the first rudiment of philosophy, to put up with unfair criticism. Later, as you observe a reasonable decline in your affections, you will try to justify yourself against malicious attacks - but never in a harsh or argumentative way, never from a competitive spirit or a desire to do him down. You will do it for your own benefit. If his reply to your self-justification is plausible, you will either be convinced of his superior awareness or on further examination, find that his accounts are unfounded."

(transl. Singer, p. 105)

Galen’s method is explicitly mediated by the Stoic Zeno, but the procedure is essentially Socratic, and there are other indications in the work to suggest connection to elements of the early Stoic doctrine. On Stoic conceptions and use of the elenchos, see L. Repici, The Stoics and the elenchos, in: Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Symposium zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer, Bamberg 1.–7.09.1991, hrsg. v. K. Döring, Th. Ebert, Stuttgart 1993 (Philosophie der Antike 1), pp. 253–270, and F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Naples 2000 (Elenchos 30), pp. 281–286, with further bibliography. It is worth noting, as Repici points out, that the Stoic elenchos came to look quite different from the Socratic elenchus, especially that of the early Parodic dialogues. Galen’s prescription for moral self-improvement seems to involve a little of both methods; that is, he has an assured sense of what constitutes good and bad behavior, but seems to believe, like Socrates, that dialectic is the most persuasive way for individuals to find their way to the good.

He continues in the next sentence: “This was the formula approved by Zeno to ensure good conduct: that in all we do we should imagine that we shall shortly after have to justify our actions to our teachers. That was what he called the mass of people who are ready to offer unsolicited criticism of their fellows” (transl. Singer, p. 105, modified: De propri. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 10,14–18: οὕτω γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἦμοι ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῶν ἀσφαλῶς, ὡς ἐπιλογογραμμένως ἔλγων (ὑστερον τούς παραγγελόμενος). διόμηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνήρ τούς παλύνοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄνθρωπον οὕτως τὸς πείλας ἐπιπέμπω, καὶ μηδεὶς αὐτοῦς παρακαλέτοις."

13 On Stoic conceptions and use of the elenchos, see L. Repici, The Stoics and the elenchos, in: Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, Symposium zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer, Bamberg 1.–7.09.1991, hrsg. v. K. Döring, Th. Ebert, Stuttgart 1993 (Philosophie der Antike 1), pp. 253–270, and F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Naples 2000 (Elenchos 30), pp. 281–286, with further bibliography. It is worth noting, as Repici points out, that the Stoic elenchos came to look quite different from the Socratic elenchus, especially that of the early Parodic dialogues. Galen’s prescription for moral self-improvement seems to involve a little of both methods; that is, he has an assured sense of what constitutes good and bad behavior, but seems to believe, like Socrates, that dialectic is the most persuasive way for individuals to find their way to the good.

14 He continues in the next sentence: “This was the formula approved by Zeno to ensure good conduct: that in all we do we should imagine that we shall shortly after have to justify our actions to our teachers. That was what he called the mass of people who are ready to offer unsolicited criticism of their fellows” (transl. Singer, p. 105, modified: De propri. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 3,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 10,14–18: οὕτω γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἦμοι ἐπίσκεψις ἡμῶν ἀσφαλῶς, ὡς ἐπιλογογραμμένως ἔλγων (ὑστερον τούς παραγγελόμενος). διόμηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀνήρ τούς παλύνοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄνθρωπον οὕτως τὸς πείλας ἐπιπέμπω, καὶ μηδεὶς αὐτοῦς παρακαλέτοις."

may have been a purveyor of *mythoi*, but for Socrates these *mythoi* could have as much philosophical import as those he famously tells in other Platonic dialogues. It is often noted that the Aesopic tradition was appropriated in the Hellenistic period by Cynics and other thinkers with Socratic inclinations, so it is possible that Galen’s allusion to Aesop’s fable of the two walnuts is more directly mediated by contemporary writers of that sort. But it is also curious that Galen proceeds to explain the meaning of Aesop by quoting a passage from Plato’s Laws, a passage on a theme identical to one in Galen’s Passions, self-love, even if Socrates is no longer an actor in the narrative. Plato’s Athenian here states that the greatest of evils for men is an “excessive love of oneself”, which blinds the lover to the errors (ἀμαρτήματα) of his beloved, i.e., the self, and leads him to esteem his own subjectivity over the truth:

"At this is what they mean when they say that every man is by nature a friend to himself and that it is appropriate for him to have to be like this. But in truth, at any rate, the cause of all errors (ἀμαρτήματα) for an individual on every occasion can be traced to the excessive love of oneself. For the lover is blind when it comes to the object of his love, so he’s a poor judge of what’s just, good and beautiful, thinking he should always honor his own self rather than the truth. For someone who aspires to be a great man does not need to love himself nor anything pertaining to himself, but rather just things, whether they happen to be done by himself or – even more so – by another."

For Galen, the dilemma can only be resolved, as we have seen, by offering ourselves up to an elenchus by others, those who can see what is in those wallets strapped over our backs. It is interesting, then, that Galen draws out the moral of the Aesopic fable by way of Plato: “For it seems that Aesop’s fable and Plato’s account show that discovering our own errors is really quite hopeless” (transl. Singer, p. 102, modified; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 7,8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 6,12–14; πολλὰ γὰρ ἠποκεῖτο τῷ του Ἀισώπου μύθῳ καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνος λόγῳ ἀνεπιστοτέρων ἤμων τῶν ἰδίων ἀμαρτήματός ἐμείς ἐποφαίνει). Like Socrates in the Phaedo passage, Galen here draws a distinction between the *mythos* of Aesop and the *logos* of philosophy, but in the end the two work together, both in the

Phaedo and in Galen’s Passions, to serve a didactic purpose. Galen seems very much, therefore, to have bypassed explicit reference to any contemporary sources for this passage, and instead wants his reader to think back to its Classical origins in Plato. This is not the only place in Passions where Galen seems to have the opening scene of the Phaedo on his mind, and where he seems quite self-consciously to be modeling himself on the Platonic Socrates. At the beginning of Passions 8, in a passage that has become well known even outside of Galenic studies, Galen once again shifts into autobiographical mode, describing how he came to develop his attitudes about anger and other dangerous emotions. The language is Socratic, with its reference to the Delphic motto about self-knowledge, and the analogy Galen draws between his own parents and the married couple Socrates and Xanthippe most revealing:

"Εγώ τών, ἂτος μὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔχων, οὐκ ἔχω φάναι (τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γνώσει χαλεπόν ἔστι καὶ τοῖς τελείοις ἀνδρῶι, μή τι γε δὴ τοῖς παισίσι), εὔφρακτα δὲ μεγάλην εὐτυχίαν, ἀργοτάτουτα νῦν καὶ δικαίατα καὶ χρηστότατα καὶ φιλοσοφότατα ἔχων πατέρα, καὶ γὰρ δάκρυνε μὲν ἐνείπε τὸ νεφελώτατα, ἀτείχε δὲ κεραυνοίς τε καὶ μάχαι τοῦ πατρὸς μέλλων ἢ συνβεβηκέν καὶ ἐκαθαρίσθη Σωκράτη. Παραλλήλα δὲ ὑποστάθηκε τοιαύτη πάθησις μητρὸς ἑπί τ])))

Despite a conspicuous, even infamous, anecdotal tradition about Xanthippe after Plato, her only explicit appearance in Plato is in the opening of the Phaedo (60a 9–b 1), where Socrates ordered her removed because of her emotional behavior: “Some of Crito’s people led her away lamenting and beating (βοῶσαν τε καὶ κοππώμενήν) her breast.” The lines of comparison are clear: Galen’s father is to Socrates as his mother is to Xanthippe; Galen observed his parents closely, and in comparing the two tried always to imitate his father’s example, and avoid his mother’s. Insofar as Galen lived his life in imitation of his father, then, his alignment with Socrates is all but explicit here. The rest of this passage confirms that Galen idealized his father, whether consciously or not, as a figure with a good number of decidedly Socratic qualities: he never grieved (νυκτίωνες) at misfortune, he was philosophic-

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16 For a detailed discussion of this appropriation, see Adrados (n. 15), vol. I, Leiden and Köln 1999 (Mnemosyne, Suppl. 201), pp. 604–644.

17 Galen may well have had Epicureus’ portrait of Socrates as fundamentally untruffle-
ally curious and the ecletic, but always wary of committing to any one sect, and he urged on his son the pursuit of the canonical virtues that obsessed Socrates as well, *dikaiosyne, s sophrosyne, and andreia*, as well as *phronesis*. As Galen sums up a few paragraphs later, in a passage that puts the finishing touch on the portrait of his father as a Socrates figure, “my father accustomed me to disdain reputation and honor, and to respect only truth” (De propr. animi cuisl. affect. dign. et cur. VIII 8: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 29,18–19: δόξην τα και τιμήν το πάθητι είσινε με κατορροένεις ἀληθείαν μόνην τιμώντα.) To be sure, we would probably call at least part of his father’s background “Platonic” or “Aristotelian”, rather than “Socratic” – Galen notes, for example, at De propr. animi cuisl. affect. dign. et cur. VIII 5: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 28,19–20, his father’s training in geometry, arithmetic, architecture and astronomy, and this hardly sounds particularly Socratic; or at least not Plato’s Socrates. This training, passed on as it was to Galen, informs especially the second half of this work, Errors, and accords well with his notorious commitment to empirical argument and logical demonstration. But even Galen’s concerns in Errors are not incompatible with the Socratic emphasis on knowledge – even technical knowledge derived from natural philosophy – that advances human virtue and goodness. Recent scholarship has emphasized, for example, that the mature Socrates seems to have embraced even some aspects of natural philosophy, provided it was directed towards the good of humans, and avoided the fruitless complaints about the autobiographical section of Phaedo. At the end of the able in mind here as well; cf. Epic., I 12,14: το πρότον δε ταύτα και μάλιστα ἕως Χαράκτους ὑπέδοτε παραξενώσασθαι εν λόγῳ, ὑπέδοτε λαὸδρον προενεκ- κακαίαν ὑμεῖς, ὑπέδοτοι ὑφήστατον, ἄλλα τῶν λαὸδροον άνέγερσαν καὶ παύ- μεν λόγῳ (“This was the first, most idiomsyncratic thing about Socrates, that he never lost his cool in conversation, never offered anything abusive or violent, but put up with others when they were being abusive, and ended [conversational warfare”].

18 De propr. animi cuisl. affect. dign. et cur. VIII 2,6: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 28,4–6. 25–30, 6. It may not be mere coincidence, in a passage that may already allude to the Phaedo (118 a 15–17), that Galen here sounds as if he has the last sentence of that work in mind, where Plato refers to Socrates as the “best, wisest and most just man he ever met”: “Ἡδε δε τελευτη, ο έξερετει, το έπίαρον ήμιν έχειντε, ἀνδρός, ὡς ήμεις φαϊμεν έν, τότε ὑπεράσπεσαι ἁρπαστον καὶ σύνισταπτον καὶ δικαιοπτοτον.”

19 See above, n. 2, on the Stoic portrait (which amalgamates both Xenophon and Plato) of a Socrates who acknowledged a philosophical role for natural philosophy in ethical inquiry; and see next note.

20 See e.g., P. A. Vander Waerdt, Socrates in the Clouds, in: The Socratic Movement (n.2), pp.84ff. in discussing Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ fraught attitude towards natural philosophy: “This account [Xenoph., Memor. IV 7,4–5] of the mature Socrates’ attitude toward natural philosophy makes it clear that study even of its more technical disciplines should be pursued insofar as the knowledge in question confers some practical benefit upon its possessor, though knowledge is not to be pursued for its own sake . . ., there can be no doubt that he relies on a very definite conception of the cosmos and mankind’s place in it in formulating his own substan- tive moral doctrines.” See also DeFilippo and Misri (n. 2), pp.252–271, who discuss how the Stoics reconciled their interests in natural philosophy with a Socratic foundation that might at first glance seem incompatible with them.


22 See, for example, the exchange between Callicles and Socrates at Plato, Gorg. 491 d–495 b, where Socrates claims that the kind of life advocated by Callicles – unlimited gratification of the bodily pleasures – looks more like that of the *charadrius* bird, which immediately excretes whatever it ingests, or the “frightly shameful and miserable” life of the instable catamite (494 ε–4). Galen too, in his persistent advocacy of *sophrosyne*, remains fixated on food and excessive consumption in general: “For it is not sufficient to lead a life free of anger; one must purge oneself also of luxuriousness and lasciviousness, of drunkenness, idleness, and envy” (transl. Singer, p. 114; De propr. animi cuisl. affect. dign. et cur. 6,11: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 21,11–12: Errors, in fact, there may just be a hint of the Socrates from Phaedo, when Galen tells the story of the two philosophers arguing the question of whether wood was heavier than water. They call on an architect (perhaps not coincidentally, Galen’s father’s profession) who, exasperated at their empty philosophical speculations, chastises them for wasting time on things beyond the cosmos that cannot be known, while remaining clueless about practical matters that could be successfully explained even to a bystander (De animi cuisl. pecc. dign. et cur. 7,5: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 66,16–19: τα μεν έξω του κόσμου γνωστηκευν οίδουμεν περο ον εικασται μεν ιστην ενδεχόμενον, γνω- ναι ε’ έπιστημονικον ουκ έγγορέι, τα δε τοιαύτα και τοις τιμούν ενιοτε γνωσκόμενα παντότατας γνωσούντες). What aligns the two treatises combined as Passions and Errors, then, is the fundamentally Socratic idea that one’s beliefs – whether those opinions we have about ourselves and our behavior, or about the material world around us – should be testable by some mechanism that will bring us closer to the truth. Galen probably came to his promotion of the elenctic method through recent Stoics, who looked to Socrates and Socratic method with similar admiration. Long, for example, has recently discussed Epicetus’ debt to the Socratic elenches, especially as it was formulated in the Gorgias, where so many classic Socratic positions are articulated. 21 Galen’s emphasis on finding suitable people to test one’s character and beliefs can be found also in the Discourses (cf. Epic. II 26; Long. Epicetus [n. 12], pp.74–75); and it is likely enough that Epicetus’ particular interest in the Gorgias directed Galen to that dialogue as well. There are many links between Galen’s overall moral project in Passions and Plato’s Gorgias, such as Galen’s emphasis on the importance of regulating bodily appetites through *sophrosyne* (De propr. animi cuisl. affect. dign. et cur. 6,11–16: CMG V 4,1,1, pp.21,11–22,24), and the futility and shame of
succumbing to bodily addictions (ibid. 7,2–5: CMG V 4,1,1, pp. 24,10–25, 11); even Galen’s special concern in this work for managing emotions, which owes much to the Stoic background, has Socratic roots traceable to the Gorgias.23 But there is one aspect of Passions that suggests a very specific connection with the Socrates of Gorgias, namely Socrates’ counterintuitive prescription for self-improvement in this work. By “counterintuitive”, I mean that when Galen says that everyone, himself included, should actively seek out someone who will assess and criticize one’s own faults, it is doubtful (and he knew it) that most people would find this an appealing course of action. But adopting counterintuitive positions is a famously Socratic strategy in general (we need only think of him recommending in the Apology, 36 d, that his “punishment” be free meals in the Prytanenum), and a running motif in particular in the Gorgias. At 480 b 7ff., for example, Socrates reaches the climax of his conversation with Polus by concluding that if we are to use rhetoric for anything at all, it should be used to indict ourselves when we commit injustice. And what seems even more absurd to his interlocutors, people should admit their wrongdoing and voluntarily seek punishment so their soul can be healed of its sickness. From the start, Socrates recurs to the language of medicine: it is important to treat the psychic disorder sooner rather than later, lest it eventually become incurable: ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρωμηθῇ τὸ νόστημα τῆς ἄδειας ὑπολογοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν ποιητεί καὶ αὐτότο (Plato, Gorg. 480 b 1–2). Socrates waxes increasingly eloquent in his next speech urging the unjust person to “grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cataractization and surgery, pursuing what’s good and admirable without taking account of the pain” (transl. Zeyl, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 6–8: παρέξεις μάστασιν ἐν καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ὀπτέρ τέμνει καὶ καέιν ἱπτρό, τὸ ὠγαθόν καὶ καλόν διώκοντο, μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ὀγλευτόν). In a final flourish Socrates makes his famous pronouncement that “... if his unjust behavior merits flogging, he should pres-

23 Socrates’ rhetoric at Gorgias 507 a–508 c has a particularly Galenic ring to it, but the entire dialogue is infused with the central themes of Galen’s Passions and Errors — the importance of submitting oneself to elenchus, of controlling the appetites and checking anger through vigilant σέβημα, to name the most conspicuous.

ent himself to be whipped; if it merits imprisonment, to be imprisoned, if a fine, to pay it; if he will be exiled; and if death, to be killed” (transl. Zeyl, modified, p. 825; Plato, Gorg. 480 c 8–9: ἐὰν μὲν γε πλήγην ἢ ἄθροισιν ἢ τύπτειν παρέξουντα, ἐὰν δὲ βεσμον, δὲν, ἐὰν δὲ ἠμώς, ἀποτελοῦντα, ἐὰν δὲ πυγής, φευγόντα, ἐὰν δὲ ἀνάπτως, ἀποδεμόκοντα). Polus replies that the whole thing seems “absurd” (Plato, Gorg. 480 e 1: ἀστοτα), even as he feels compelled to agree that their discussion has led them to this conclusion.

Galen for his part likewise recommends self-indictment at Passions 7,4, just after he has suggested that we find an older person to point out our vices. Although Galen here focuses on afflictions with fewer public consequences for the individual than those imagined by Socrates in the Gorgias, his phrasing is strikingly similar to Socrates’:

... πρῶτον αὐτὸν κάρμα μὲν γνώμαι παρατυπεῖ, χειρισθέντα δὲ διασκεδάζεται κατὰ μόνας ἕκαστος ἐπιπληθοῦσθαι ἐκκέντρον τε περισσομένου τὸ πάθος. ὃς ἔχει τὸν μὴ φαίνεισθαι τοῖς ἄλλωσι μόνον, ἀλλ’ ὅστε μηδὲ δίαν ἐκκέντρον ἐπίσκεψιν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀσκομένῳ τῷ ὑπολογιζόμενῳ καὶ αὐτῷ τῇ ὀγισθή. (De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 7,4–5: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 25,4–11)

"... we must first of all thank him [sc. our senior advisor who has assessed our faults] immediately, and later, contemplate in solitude, applying criticism to ourselves and attempting to excise the affection — not merely to the point where it is no longer apparent to others, but in such a way that its actual root is removed from the soul. For it may grow back, nourished by the evils of those around us. It should be cut out in the early stages of growth, before it has grown so large as to be incurable." (transl. Singer, p. 117)

Galen has no Polus at hand to comment on whether or not such a prescription is absurd, but in an earlier passage, he offers an amusing anecdote that may, in fact, allude to Socrates’ notion of giving oneself over to voluntary punishment for unjust behavior. At Passions 4,9–12, Galen tells the story of a friend of his from Crete who nearly killed two of his slaves in a fit of rage over some lost luggage. Galen saved the slaves, he says, but his friend was so ashamed of his behavior that he “took me by the hand, led me into a house somewhere, offered me a strap, stripped off his clothes, and ordered me to beat him for what he had done under the influence of — in his own words — his accursed anger” (transl. Singer, p. 108 [modified]; De propr. animi cuisul. affect. dign. et cur. 4,12: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 14,19–22: ὃ δὲ φίλος ὁ Κρής ἔστιν καταγωγοῦσα γεγονός εἰπάθει με λαβομένοι τὴν χειρὸς εἰς οἶκον τινα, καὶ προσόδοις ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀποδεμόκοντος ἐκέλευε μαστίγοις αὐτὸν ἑρ᾽ οὔ τρέφεται ὑπὸ τοῦ καταράτου ζημίας βιασεῖτο). This begins to sound much like what Socrates was after in the Gorgias passage discussed above. It is curious, however, that Galen was amused by the whole scene; he told his friend as much, but the friend was adamant and kept begging him to whip
him. As Galen says, “the more earnest his entreaties to be flogged, the more he made me laugh” (transl. Singer, p. 108; De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 4,12: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 14,24–25: μᾶλλον ἔτοιμε με γελάν, δοξώ μᾶλλον ἐνέκειτο μαστίγος ἑρθος δέομενος).

Could it be that this is Galen’s own response to Socrates’ iconoclastic position in the Gorgias passage that people who have committed injustice should voluntarily offer themselves up for punishment? In that passage, not long after Polus said that he found Socrates’ position absurd, Callicles too had to ask Chaerephon whether or not Socrates was simply joking (481 b 6–7). There is, in the end, something amusing and counterintuitive about Socrates’ position, and when confronted with an actual example of it, Galen corroborates this response. But Galen does not leave it at this: he does not want to dismiss completely the idea that people should seek to correct their flaws. Rather, it seems, he ends up offering a more practical, realistic spin on Socrates’ advice – a spin that he derives ultimately from Socrates himself. For the story of his Cretan friend ends with Galen getting him to agree that his punishment should not be the whip, but logos, and the logos he proceeds to offer him concern the regulation of one’s anger by words, rather than whips. Whereas it may be unreasonable, and even a little silly, to think that people will routinely submit themselves voluntarily to physical punishment for their bad behavior as Socrates advocates in the Gorgias, Galen points out here that it is hardly unreasonable, and far more practical, to imagine that a kind of punitive logos (indicating here both rational argument and just plain conversation) can actually have a therapeutic effect on an individual’s soul. This, of course, is a decidedly Socratic recommendation as we often find in other Platonic contexts. It certainly worked for Galen’s Cretan friend, who, Galen says, became much improved after a year of careful attention to his behavior: ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ἔνθα ἐνεπερσθένος ἔστω τοῦ πολὺ βελτίων ἐγένετο (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 4,14: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 15,6–7).

Galen’s goal in writing Passions and Errors, was, as he states early in the work, modest and almost self-effacing. He notes near the end of ch. 1 that many philosophers have written on the subject before, and he mentions Chrysippos, Aristotle and Plato by name. He then tells the person who requested the work from him that “it would have been better to learn these things from them, as I did” (De propr. animi cuiusl. affect. dign. et cur. 1,4: CMG V 4,1,1, p. 4,11–12: καὶ ἂν μὲν βελτίων ἐξ ἑκεῖνον μενυθήνειν σύμφατε, ὀντὶ στις κάργῳ), which I take to mean, among other things, that he made no special claims to originality in this treatise. So we are certainly prepared from the start for the mix of Stoicism, Aristotelianism and Platonism that we end up with in the work. But Galen’s philosophical allegiances were, of course, closest to Plato, and in his ethical works, at any rate, the Platonic Socrates often seems a looming, if not always explicit, presence. It may always be