Putin's Chosen People: Theories of Russian Jewish Policy, 2000-2017

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Abstract
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Keywords
anti-Semitism, Jews, Russia, Putin, international affairs

Disciplines
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ABSTRACT

Despite support from and for right-wing elements and a deep-seeded national history of anti-Semitism, the policies of the Russian government under Vladimir Putin have been markedly devoid of anti-Semitism. Appeals to nationalist, imperialist, and Eurasianist ideologies, pragmatic politics, and foreign policy concerns fail to explain these policies adequately. The biography of Putin himself, which includes influential, positive relationships with Jews, provides a better explanation. The personalized influence of the president on Jewish policy suggests a personalized, hyper-centralized regime generally.
Introduction

The Vladimir Putin government and regime* could be reasonably expected to be officially and virulently anti-Semitic. Both the major regimes that preceded it, the Soviet Union and the Romanov dynasty, were officially anti-Semitic and actively persecuted Jews inside their territory, often singling them about above other minorities for special mistreatment. The Russian population is also widely considered anti-Semitic, thanks in part to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and libels sometimes peddled by the Russian Orthodox Church. The KGB (along with its successor, the FSB), in which Putin achieved both his first real job and his rise to power, were/are notoriously anti-Semitic. Recent scholarship has uncovered the influence and prevalence of right-wing ideologies in Russia, including among some elements of the political elite, as well as Russian support for far-right politics in the West, especially in Europe. Each of these features independently would suggest an anti-Semitic government.

In reality, however, the Putin government is not officially anti-Semitic, and the unofficial anti-Semitism of some of its officials appears to be limited, and a strictly personal, as opposed to part of government policy. This paper will examine the historical precedent of official state anti-Semitism in Russia, contrast this with the Putin government’s policies, and outline possible explanations for those policies using existing research. Several theories are presented and evaluated, including the influence of right-wing ideologies, the Kremlin’s propagandistic use of political ideas, the sociological nature of contemporary Russian popular anti-Semitism, and finally, the influence of Putin himself. While no explanation is perfect, the influence of the

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* For the purposes of this paper, the governments of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev are inseparable from the regime centered around Vladimir Putin that has undoubtedly emerged in Russia. See Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia. The terms “government” and “regime” are used interchangeably.
personality of the president on Russian Jewish policy appears decisive. This is likely the case for other policy domains as well.

**Historical Precedent**

Based on the precedent established by nearly all the preceding leaders of Russia, there would be very little surprising or unusual if Putin were to support anti-Semitic ideas inside and outside Russia. His pre-Soviet predecessors, the Romanov tsars, embraced stridently anti-Semitic policies, including the Pale of Settlement, state-sanctioned or state-enabled pogroms, and exclusion of Jews from many kinds of business and government.¹ The “temporary” May Laws of 1882, which lasted for more than 30 years, were the beginning in a string of legislation designed to exclude Jews from the social and economic life of the Russian Empire. Jewish settlement was frozen to pre-existing towns and agricultural colonies; Jews were forbidden to take out leases or mortgages or hold powers of attorney; and they were mandated to close their businesses on Christian holidays, including Sundays.² “In the following years, Russian officials capped the number of Jewish doctors in the army, limited movement within the Pale, placed strict quotas on Jewish placement in universities, and restricted the activities of Jewish lawyers, among numerous other discriminatory actions.”³ Perhaps most famously, the Russian secret police or Okhrana (Охрана) is believed to have originally fabricated *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.*⁴

Many of these policies were adopted under Alexander III, who sought to revise some of his father’s reforms and reinstate the first governing ideology of Russia, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy,  

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¹ Aaron Levine, "Russian Jews and the 1917 Revolution," *Primary Source* 4, no. 2.  
³ Levine, "Russian Jews.”  
and Nationality” ("Православие – Самодержавие – Народность"). The prioritization of Russian ethnic and Orthodox religious supremacy within the empire naturally led to the persecution of minorities, including the Jews. Official anti-Semitism has older and deeper roots in Russia than any holdover of Soviet ideology, and would not be an incongruous addition to a post-Soviet governing ideology, especially one that defaulted at least in part to the philosophical status quo ante.

Anti-Semitism in Russia was so strong, in fact, that even the cataclysm of the Russian Revolution could only temporarily suppress their expression. Under Lenin, anti-Semitism in Russia was softened, though not eradicated entirely. The key ideological element of anti-Semitism, “The belief or behavior hostile toward Jews just because they are Jewish,” was replaced by Marxist attitudes opposed to religion and national identity more broadly.\(^5\) Many secular Jews rose to great prominence in Lenin’s party, including Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoviev, and Leon Trotsky. Even though Bolshevik policies toward Jews may easily be interpreted as anti-Semitic in effect, aimed at annihilating any particular religious or national identity or tradition among Jews, it was not specifically anti-Semitic in intent: “Lenin measured people – and ethnicities, including the Jews – with the yardstick of party and state…”\(^6\) As was made clear by Stalin’s “Marxism and the National Question,” written during Lenin’s dominance of the party, each nationality was to be allowed to choose its own cultural policies while all political policies would be promulgated by the Communist Party-controlled government.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Lenin's Jewish Question (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).

anti-Semitism of the Lenin era was unique in that it was an unremarkable part of a larger anti-
religious, anti-national, universalist revolution.

Stalin at first pursued similar policies, and in fact promulgated much harsher policies
toward other ethnic and religious minorities in the Soviet Union than toward Jews. The list of
deported nations includes Balkars, Caucasus Greeks, Chechens, Crimean Greeks, Crimean
Tatars, Estonians, Far East Koreans, Ingrians, Ingush, Kalmyks, Karachays, Karapapaks,
Karelian Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Maskhetian Turks, Poles, Romanians, and Volga
Germans. By contrast, despite the creation of a Jewish Autonomous Oblast on the Mongolian
border, Jews were never forcible deported there (though evidence exists that there was just such
a plan at the time of Stalin’s death, which was never carried out).

By the middle of Stalin’s reign, however, official anti-Semitism had crept back into
the Soviet government:

   Anti-Semitism was introduced in the ideology of the Soviet Union in the late 1930s. The
   restrictions placed on Jews – a sort of ‘anti-affirmative action policy’ – soon became
   universal. Following a short respite in the aftermath of the revolution in the 1920s, Russia
   returned to the traditional anti-Semitic policy of the tsars (particularly the policy of the
   last two, Alexander the Third and Nicholas the Second). 8

Notably, the particular ostracizing of Jews returned, along with the requisite ideological tenets,
singling out Jews as a particular threat per se worthy of more attention and more opposition than
other nationalities and religions.

   The open propaganda against Jews jarred with Lenin’s heritage and internationalism. For
   this reason, the Soviet authorities replaced the term Jews with ‘Zionists’. Since Zionism
   was a ‘legitimate’ enemy of socialism, it became possible to carry out an anti-Semitic
   campaign under the guise of the fight against it. The hatred of Jews was so high that the
   Soviet propaganda tended to describe Zionism as a greater evil than the United States,

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8 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible Politician. Does He Imitate Stalin?," *Communist
suggesting that American imperialism was merely a tool used by the Jews to conquer the world.

The anti-Zionist campaigns, which started almost immediately after the Bolshevik victory and intensified in the mid 1920s, were carried out until the final days of the USSR. The ideologues of perestroika, who denounced all the sacred cows of the Soviet ideology, such as the October revolution, Marxism, Lenin and socialism, left the Soviet attitudes toward Zionism intact. By the end of perestroika, in 1990, Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary defined Zionism exactly as was done in the late 1930s: “The typical features of Zionism as an advanced detachment of imperialism are militant chauvinism, racism, anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism”. As a matter of fact, the article in the 1990 edition, published on the eve of Perestroika, was literally a copy of the article ‘Zionism’ in the 1984 edition. The book Zionism at the Service of Anti-Communism by Bolshakov, who worked in the Central Committee, was a typical publication of this sort….

The Soviet state anti-Semitism was particularly heinous, because it was rather an exception to a sort of tolerance cultivated in the Soviet Union toward other minorities. Only Germans, given the heritage of the war, shared to some degree the position of the Jews as the pariahs in the Soviet Empire.⁹

The last days of the Stalin Era also saw the Doctors Plot, a public display of conspiratorial anti-Semitism in which several physicians, most of them Jews, were convicted in show trials of conspiring to assassinate Stalin on behalf of British and American intelligence organizations in conjunction with a secretive international Jewish organization. The plot was symptomatic of Stalin’s fears that Jews were a potential “fifth column” within the Soviet Union, a variation of the ancient “dual-loyalty” libel used against Jews as far back as the Roman Empire. Along with the renaissance of ideological anti-Semitism came the return of anti-Semitic policies, effectively barring Jews from the upper levels of government in the Soviet Union and mandating anti-Jewish quotas in education.

⁹ Ibid., 208.
Such policies would continue through the next four decades of Soviet history. Official anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union became so engrained and institutionalized, in fact, that it altered or colored the meaning of the term in anti-Semitism Russian (антисемитизм):

Under the Soviet regime, anti-Semitism was a state-sponsored policy, reflected in campaigns in the government-controlled press, arrests of Jewish activists and Hebrew teachers, mass refusal of the right to emigrate and discriminatory quotas on admission to higher education and certain prestigious occupations.

The Russian word antisemitizm is therefore understood by many Russian Jews to mean solely the state-sponsored anti-Semitism of the past. When these same people describe anti-Semitic acts committed by non-state actors, they more often than not precede it with the word bytovoy ('day to day' or 'street-level').

Both the Imperial and Soviet history of Russia would tend to support continued anti-Semitism sponsored, endorsed, and enforced by the Russian government, both because of the preexistent ideological templates available to the Kremlin and because of sheer inertia. Surprisingly, official anti-Semitism in Russia is arguable at a multi-century low.

Putin’s relations toward both individual Jews and the Jewish people in Russia has been remarkably warm. Individuals of Jewish background have been among Putin’s closest advisors and allies during his years in power, including Roman Abramovich (Chairman of the Federation of the Jewish Communities of Russia and one of the most visible oligarchs), Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Oleg Deripaska, Viktor Vekselberg, and Mikhail Fridman. (Notable opponents, victims, and scapegoats of the Putin regime have also been Jewish, including Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Hungarian-born American George Soros.)

In fact, state anti-Semitism (as opposed to popular anti-Semitism) has almost completely disappeared from the Russian political scene. Jews or so called half Jews hold a large number of high positions in the state apparatus, including the government and leading

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state corporations. The appointment of Mikhail Fradkov as prime minister in 2004 was only one of many of Putin’s appointments that totally ignored the ethnic background of the candidate. No less indicative was the appointment in 2007 of two managers with Jewish backgrounds, Leonid Melamed and Semen Vainshtok, as the heads of two big state corporations, both with multi-billion dollar budgets. One of the corporations dealt with nanotechnology, while the other was building the facilities for the Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi.\footnote{Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 213.}

In particularly stark contrast to the anti-Semitic policies of the Soviet Union, euphemized as “anti-Zionist,” the Russian government under Putin has maintained remarkably close and cooperative relations with Israel. “During Putin’s presidency, Israel has come to play an increasingly significant role in Russia’s Middle East policy. Putin has done more than any other Russian leader to improve economic and strategic ties with Israel.”\footnote{Ilya Bourtman, "Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy," \textit{Middle East Review of International Affairs} 10, no. 2 (June 2006): 2.} As Ilya Bourtman points out, the areas of cooperation between the Putin government and successive Israeli governments have mostly centered on counterterrorism and energy infrastructure and trade.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 2-4.} His analysis perhaps understates the significance of this cooperation: Beyond mere “pragmatism, cynicism, and economic calculations,” energy exports and security – particularly against terrorists – are the cornerstones of Putin’s legitimacy, such as it is. More than any other policies, energy and security determine the fate and true intention of the Putin regime, and their close cooperation with Israel on these matters suggests a sincere respect and affinity that, while not unlimited, would be scandalous for any previous Russian ruler. “In short, for centuries of Russian history, through different political regimes and social conditions, the ‘standing decision’ has been that Jews are to blame for Russia’s problems, and this presumption has resulted in countless incidents...
of discrimination, victimization and violence.” Putin’s cooperation with Israel suggests that decision has been nullified.

This is reflected in his domestic affairs as well.

His overtures to Jews within Russia have been no less unprecedented:

During his stay in the Kremlin, Putin met with rabbis several times. In his last meeting with Russia’s chief rabbi in June 2007, he promised to donate one month’s salary for the construction of a Jewish museum of tolerance. Putin meets regularly with representatives from Russian Jewish Communities and various Western Jewish organizations. In October 2007, he met with a representative of the European Jewish Congress, attended many Jewish religious celebrations (for instance, Hanukkah in 2001) and regularly sent congratulations to the Russian Jews in connection with Rosh Ha-Shanah, the Jewish New Year and Hanukkah. Speaking in Krakow on January 27, 2005, in connection with the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, Putin urged other nations to consider the lessons learned from the Holocaust and warned against anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia worldwide. What is more, he also noted the existence of anti-Semitism in Russia, a statement that none of the Soviet leaders after Lenin dared to make...

While the statements of the president are not always signs of durable and explicit positions of the Russian government, it appears that Putin’s friendliness toward Jews is either being encouraged among other government officials or is voluntarily imitated by them, suggesting a more permanent and official status of pro-Semitic attitudes within the government.

Putin continues to make positive gestures towards Russia’s Jewish community by attending major Jewish events, praising the role of Jews in Russia’s history and contemporary life, and strongly condemning antisemitism. In many regions, it is no longer uncommon to see a mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the community on a holiday. These official gestures have helped to create a more confident climate for Jews in Russia, spurring a continued renaissance of Jewish life in Russia, as evidenced by the growing number of synagogues being returned to the community after decades of government ownership, the increasing media coverage of Jewish communal activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic and international events, and a

16 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 211-212.
† The term “pro-Semitic” is used advisedly, and merely intends to denote the differences between the Putin government and its predecessors. It is only a relative distinction, and is not meant to provide an absolute positive or negative evaluation of the government’s Jewish policies.
rising willingness of Jewish leaders in some parts of the country to stand up publicly for their rights.\textsuperscript{17}

The Putin government is innovating policies in relation to Jews that it seems unwilling or unable to do in relation to the legacy of Stalin. In one sense, that might be expected: The legacy of Stalin has, in some ways, been the central question of Russian politics since Khrushchev’s speech to the XX Party Congress.\textsuperscript{18} However, the history of destalinization is rich in post-Stalinist Russia, providing ample precedent for an anti-Stalinist line. Putin’s statements about Stalin have been of a decidedly mixed and often self-contradictory note, simultaneously rehabilitating the legacy of the former dictator and raising monuments to the victims of his purges and repressions.\textsuperscript{19} The precedent for pro-Semitism is much thinner. The fact that the messaging and policy from the Kremlin is more stable and consistent in relation to Jews than it is to Stalin suggests that choosing a policy on Jews is easier for the Kremlin than choosing a policy on Stalin.

However cynical, the Russian government’s use of accusations of anti-Semitism to slander its foes also suggests a consistent pro-Semitic self-perception. The annexation of Crimea and proxy war in Donbas following the Euromaidan of 2014 have provided several good examples. “The revolutionary change of power in Kiev prompted the Kremlin to view new Ukrainian values as incompatible with those of Russia and Eurasia. In his press conference, Putin

\textsuperscript{17} Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), Antisemitism, Xenophobia and Religious Persecution in Russia’s Regions, 2001 (Moscow: UCSJ, 2002), 1-2.
referred to the Ukrainian events as the ‘rampage of Nazi, nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces.’”

Referring to the Euromaidan protests, he claimed that “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.”

Certainly, the Kremlin has also accused others of its own bad behavior, such as interfering in the domestic politics of other countries. Ordinarily, accusations against other countries by the Putin government bear little ontological weight. Indeed, Kremlin endorsement is often a contrary indicator to verisimilitude. However, given the context of the steady continuation of the Kremlin’s Jewish policies under Putin, these statements might be viewed in another light – not as arch-cynical accusations, but as a way of defining whomever is conceived to be Russia’s enemy as the opposite of Russian. In the Ukrainian case, defining a pro-Western enemy as pro-gay and anti-Semitic (at least relative to Russia) may contain a kernel of truth.

In addition to historical precedent, Putin’s Jewish policies should also be evaluated in terms of their political benefits and costs. If, upon assuming the presidency in 1999 (and in his own right in 2000), Putin had decided to adopt more historically congruous, anti-Semitic policies and rhetoric, the costs would likely have been quite low. Clearly, at least in terms of domestic politics, anti-Semitism did not appear to hurt the political prospects or power of any of Putin’s predecessors.

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The only possible exception was Yeltsin, who, likely because of his dedication to rapprochement with the West and strengthening his democratic bona fides, failed to adopt the pro-Semitic policies of Putin. Rather,

As a builder of democracy and a proclaimed ally of the West, Boris Yeltsin eliminated, considering his cadre policy, even the slightest suspicion that, as a former party regional secretary, he was an anti-Semite. He involved many Jews in his government and administration, but avoided any public demonstration of his break with the old party line, preferring to show, as the known Moscow journalist Radzikovsky observed, that “he is completely indifferent to any national issue.”

Nonetheless, Yeltsin’s example demonstrates – as if proof was needed – that pro-Semitism was not a silver bullet in Russian politics, propelling its first adherent to lifelong power.

Conversely, the all-but-unimpeachable conclusion that Putin holds an unbreakable grip on supreme power in Russia suggests that he could adopt supremely unpopular or otherwise risky positions without encountering a serious threat to his dominance.

The list of troubling features of Russian politics in the 2010s included unfair and fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent political parties with a dominant “party of power” (which was also weak and impotent), heavily censored (and often self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and subnational levels, politically subordinated and shamelessly biased courts, arbitrary use of state economic powers, and widespread corruption. These assessments resonate with numerous critical evaluations of Russia’s politics and governance by domestic and international agencies and experts: despite the huge variety of their analytical frameworks and the use of diverse methodologies, techniques, and approaches, almost everybody agrees that the political regime in present-day Russia is genuinely nondemocratic (although for various reasons some observers, until very recently, hesitated to label it “authoritarian”).

There are, of course, natural limits to Putin’s power, and his government has granted concessions to opposition forces when it felt it was required. Protests against pension reform in 2005, for instance, prompted the government to double the planned increase in pension payments and

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reintroduce free public transportation. After the 2011-2012 Bolotnaya protests in opposition to the suspect 2011 Duma elections and the dubious 2012 reelection of Putin, the Duma amended the constitution to restore local election of regional governors as a democratic compromise. But neither of these concessions seriously threatened his control. Indeed, many governors have been effectively fired in 2017 as the Kremlin has announced its acceptance of resignations they never sent. Others have resigned at the behest of the Kremlin. In other words, the pro-Semitic policies of Putin’s Kremlin cannot be described as political necessities. Putin can, in the long run, adopt any policies he wants – even to the extent that he can de facto change the constitution and rule from the prime minister’s office:

Putin, as the dominant actor of Russian politics, was able to consolidate his monopolist control over the Russian elite, and had relatively little trouble passing the office into the hands of a puppetlike loyal successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2008, while maintaining control over key levers of power as the prime minister.

Moreover, anti-Semitism could have been a powerful political weapon for the Kremlin.

The issue might have been used as a way to drive a wedge through the opposition, much like the 2013 law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values” (“в целях защиты детей от информации, пропагандирующей отрицание традиционных семейных ценностей”) and other measures after the Bolotnaya protests:

First, the Kremlin sensationalised the minor, allegedly sacrilegious performance of the Russian punk band Pussy Riot in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour to bring division into the opposition movement on religious grounds. Second, Russia adopted the so-called Dima Yakovlev Law that banned US citizens from adopting Russian orphan

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26 Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia, 120.
28 Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia, 41.
children in order to divide the opposition on the grounds of Russian nationalism intrinsically characterised by anti-Americanism. Third, it adopted the anti-LGBT propaganda law officially to protect children from ‘information advocating for a denial of traditional family values’, but essentially to splinter the opposition movement exploiting the divisive LGBT issue.  

The same tactic could have been used during the 2017 protests, which spread to hundreds of cities across Russia, in contrast to the Bolotnaya protests, which were primarily localized to Moscow. The geographic distribution of the 2017 protests likely points to a broader cultural appeal, as does their focus. Rather than focusing on abstractions like electoral legitimacy or the rule of law, which resonated in 2011-2012 primarily with the educated, urban class, the 2017 protests were led by anti-corruption politician Aleksei Navalny primarily in response to an exposé he published on YouTube, detailing the corruption of Dmitri Medvedev. Navalny, who has indicated sympathy with nationalists in the past, might have been hard-pressed to disavow an anti-Semitic move by the Kremlin, while the core of his supporters – the same educated, urban veterans of the Bolotnaya – would be scandalized. The fact that the Kremlin used such sensitive subjects as Orthodoxy, adoption of orphans, and homosexuality in a politically utilitarian way, but avoided using anti-Semitism, reveals exactly how committed the regime is to its Jewish policies.

Lately, much attention in the academic literature and beyond has focused on the Putin regime’s relationship with far-right nationalist forces, both within Russia and in the West. The influence of thinkers and theorists such as Aleksandr Dugin, Lev Gumilev, Ivan Ilyin, and

Nikolai Danilevski has been brought to light and debated. (There are other suspected intellectual forbearers of the current Kremlin as well; the four listed here will be discussed further in this paper.) Generally, one would expect to find anti-Semitism follows wherever nationalism goes. In Russia, no less, where the stage seems perfectly set for revanchist nationalism, it is particularly strange to find pro-Semitism mixed with Russian nationalism and/or Eurasianism.

Although, as detailed above, many of Putin’s policies are unusually friendly towards Jews, it is necessary to point out that Putin’s Kremlin has also adopted policies and postures that can be interpreted as anti-Semitic themselves, give aid and comfort to anti-Semites, or both.

Unlike Western leaders, he did not openly stand up against the two greatest anti-Semites of our time: the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. In October 2003, Putin attended the meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, during which Mahathir Mohamad talked about the Jews who ruled the world. As Putin’s semiofficial biographer Kolesnikov wrote in his book _Putin Saw Me_, the Russian President said nothing about this rude anti-Semitic tirade, even though he had the opportunity to do so, because he addressed the conference following the Malaysian leader. While chatting with the Russian journalists who attended the conference, Putin did mention that some speeches at the conference were ‘extremist’. What is more, Putin never made critical comments about the appeal of the current [2008] president of Iran to obliterate Israel.32

He has also hosted meetings with groups such as Hamas, which are openly anti-Semitic in ways most similar to Ahmadinejad. On a lesser count, Putin’s government has been firm in opposition to returning the library of the Lubavicher Rebbe Menachem Schneerson.33 The books, seized by the Nazis during World War II, were transported to Moscow after the war, while their original owners, the Lubavich sect of Hassidic Jews, moved their community to New York. Litigation about the matter is ongoing, and the fact that the Lubavichers chose to move to the United States and their use of the American legal system to try to reclaim their former property may be an

inspiration to the Russian government’s opposition. Nonetheless, these policies, consequential as they may be, are deviations from the pro-Semitic norm of the 21st-century Kremlin.

There are several explanations that may account for why Putin’s government has pursued such consistent pro-Semitic policies, including the nationalist ideological tenets of his regime (such as they may be), the Putin government’s pragmatic use of political ideas is propaganda, foreign policy considerations, and Putin’s personal biography.

The Ideology Hypothesis

The support that Putin’s government has given to far-right elements inside and outside Russia would also suggest, prima facie, that the regime would support anti-Semitism. After all, in the West, far-right ideas and groups are ubiquitously anti-Semitic (in addition to a host of other bigotries). Upon first glance, it seems to follow naturally that far-right ideologues in Russia would be anti-Semitic as well: They live in a country with a tradition of popular anti-Semitism at least as long and deep as those of other European countries, and they endorse ideas commonly associated with anti-Semitism, including ethnic or national supremacy.

Those who believe that the Putin regime is influenced by far-right ideas, whether because Putin himself endorses them or because other senior members of the government do, have several examples of particular and influential nationalist and/or Eurasianist theorists who did not subscribe to anti-Semitism as evidence to support their claim. While it is possible that some in the highest positions in the government, including Putin himself, subscribe to Eurasianist and similar ideas, the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Eurasianist ideology is still too great to adequately explain the Putin government’s Jewish policies.

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Aleksandr Dugin

The most prominent face of current Russian far-right thought is Aleksandr Dugin, an autodidact political philosopher and conspiracy theorist with ties to some influential Kremlin figures, including the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Army. “Russia’s salvation, Dugin believed, lay in turning back the tide of democratic liberalism, re-establishing repressive central control, and bringing to power a regime of patriots, beholden to an imperial concept of Russia, a multinational, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, but distinctly Russian and distinctly non-Western geopolitical space – ‘Eurasia’.” In short, he views the irrepresible tide of world history as a conflict between “water powers” – states that grow up around coastlines, develop naval and merchant cultures and economies, free markets, pluralism, and secularism – and land powers, which grow up on the great Eurasian land mass, especially the enormous steppe running from Eastern Europe to western China, independent of coasts, and develop strong land armies, autocracy, omnipotent states, and conservative, spiritual cultures.

In his view, the fundamental conflict of the Cold War was one between Soviet land power and the Euro-Atlantic (or, alternately, Anglo-Saxon, i.e. Anglo-American) sea power. Consequently, the enmity between Washington and Moscow could not and did not end with the fall of Communism because the central issue was not over what sort of political or economic system would dominate the post-imperial world, but over whether water or land civilization would dominate – an altogether larger and more timeless question. (It should go without saying that this view runs counter to most scholarship of the Cold War.)

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Dugin’s conception of Russia is as a dominant cultural and political actor in a larger, united civilization: Eurasia. Eurasia includes, coincidentally, all the former possessions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, including the Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Russian Far East, plus perhaps more. This massive territory, currently comprised of dozens of countries, he identifies as the Eurasian Heartland.
This map of the world, indicating areas of relative geopolitical importance, was first published by Halford MacKinder in “The Great Geopolitical Pivot of History” in 1904 and was reproduced by Aleksandr Dugin in The Foundations of Geopolitics in 1997.36

36 Ibid., x.
The geostrategic importance of the Eurasian Heartland is clearly depicted on the cover of Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997). The subtitle below the map of Eurasia, emblazoned with the “arrow of chaos,” reads, “The Geopolitical Future of Russia.”
To the extent that Jews enter into Dugin’s thinking at all, they play only a very small role. As a rule of thumb, this suggests he is not an anti-Semite. Since Jews have lived for centuries in countries and among civilizations belonging to both of Dugin’s categories, they do not belong more on either side of Dugin’s ledger. They are neither inherent enemies nor inherent allies of Russian Eurasia. In some ways, the epistemological certainty of Dugin’s geographical determinism precludes him from sharing the KGB-style anti-Semitism seen in Putin’s regime.

According to Albats, KGB people believe in the World Jewish Conspiracy… They do believe that the world is run by Jews, that there is some world government, that there is some conspiratorial money or body. There were several cases when these guys were approaching me and saying, “We understand you have a great connections to the World Jewish Congress,” and I was thinking, “Wait a second, you guys don’t know what you’re talking about.” Conspiracy theories are such a common marker of anti-Semitism that they are almost part of the very definition. The U.S. State Department’s webpage “Defining Anti-Semitism” includes:

“Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective—especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.” By contrast, Dugin’s premise that geography is the controlling force of history precludes belief in secret global conspiracies. While not dispositive, this suggests that Dugin’s influence is nationalistic and imperialistic, but not specifically anti-Semitic.

† There is a joke which says, “There are two types of people who are obsessed with Jews: Jews and anti-Semites.” There is some wisdom in this.
37 Interview with Yevgenia Albats.
The most easily accessible statements of Dugin regarding Jews are from a YouTube interview recorded March 6, 2016. In that interview, Dugin differentiates in two ways between the State of Israel and Jews. First, there is a “natural sympathy” for Israeli Jews among Russians, given the large numbers of Russian-speaking Israeli Jews. This is questionable as it pertains to popular opinion, though more than likely this does accurately represent the position of the Russian government. “Being anti-West, anti-NATO, we are not against Israel by principle.” In other words, there is not innate (geopolitical) reason for Russians and Jews, as manifested by their national states, to be enemies. On the other hand, “when we are polite to the Israelis, that doesn’t mean we are going to betray Hezbollah… We have very good relations with Israel, and we don’t want to make these relations worse, but at the same time, [we are] with Hezbollah now as strategical [sic] allies. It’s very important.” Short-term strategy, he seems to imply, compels Russia to support forces bent on Israel’s destruction. Taken together, these statements seem to suggest that geopolitical, long-term relations between Russians and Jews as nations will not always match short-term relations between Moscow and Jerusalem.

Second, within Israel – or, perhaps, within the whole of world Jewry – Russia and the United States are bound to support different interests.

We have completely different goals. For example, if we [the United States and Russia] support two countries or two movements, always, always, by [sic] geopolitical reasons, we are supporting different poles… For example, we [Russia] are supporting one tendency in Israel; American – completely other… We have good relations with Israel; the United States has good relations with Israel; but there are two Israels. There is the geopolitically Atlanticist sea power Israel, represented by Israeli oligarchy, Israeli racism, [the] pro-American, pro-Western core of Israeli society. But there is Israeli traditions [sic], they are different.

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40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
This is the closest statement Dugin makes to anti-Semitism. While he does portray Jews and the evolution of Jewish religion and culture – a process 5000 years in the making – as completely subject to the influences of major outside powers (and, perhaps, teleologically dependent on them as well), he applies this same logic to all peoples, traditions, and histories.

He may easily be called a Russian supremacist and would probably agree that he is a nationalist, but he is not necessarily an anti-Semite because he does not reserve for Jews special fear, hatred, or discrimination. If the Kremlin – or at least one part of it – is truly are enamored of Dugin’s theories, it is possible that they could share his imperialist Russian supremacism without anti-Semitism. The problem, however, is how they could so easily accept Dugin while rejecting his influences and intellectual ancestors.

*Lev Gumilev*

One of Dugin’s primary inspirations, Lev Gumilev, the Soviet ethnologist and historian (of sorts) who championed Eurasianism, expressed more easily identifiable anti-Semitic views, including in his academic work.

Gumilev’s work dealt in abstract concepts like “passionarity” and “ethnos” which were about as clear and socio-scientifically valid as Roman numen. According to Gumilev, “passionarity” was “the powerful impulse which pulls the human towards obtaining some sort of unnecessary benefit, in particular, posthumous honor.”43 Vladimir Putin himself once used the term in a public address, though with a slightly different meaning, suggesting Gumilev also has some posthumous influence within the Kremlin. “Ethnos” translates roughly to what in English

would be an ethnic group, or the definition of “nation” used in the term “nation state.” It is precisely regarding different kinds of ethnoi that Gumilev revealed his anti-Semitism:

Lev [Gumilev], battle-scarred after his academic conflicts, found an odd association with the serious anti-Semitic fringe of the nationalist movement. His antipathy towards Jews appears to have grown over time; while he had always been known to make the odd anti-Semitic remark, many of his childhood friends, such as Gerstein and the Mandelstams, were Jewish and had found it (mostly) harmless. It seems likely that, driven by the trauma of the camps (which nurtured his already horrible temper), his conflict with his mother’s entourage, and his regular association with voluble anti-Semites, Lev’s prejudices grew. In her memoirs, Gerstein calls the older Gumilev an ‘anti-Semite’. Many also regarded a book he published in 1965 on the Khazars (a tribe living in the Caspian region between the seventh and the tenth centuries that had converted to Judaism) as a thinly veiled piece of anti-Jewish propaganda: Khazars were described in the work as a ‘chimera’ or a parasitic ethnos. Meanwhile, the reputation of his associates rubbed off on him, colouring his reputation in scholarly circles.

In 1971, he met Sergey Melnik, who was a regular at the VOOPIK [The All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments and Culture] gatherings in Moscow. He introduced Lev to the underground journal Veche, which published fringe articles with anti-Semitic overtones.44

Gumilev’s Eurasianism was not characterized by mechanical geopolitics the way Dugin’s is. His formless ontology of semi-physical psychological forces of social cohesion and half-mythical steppe civilizations allowed him to make normative judgements on the spiritual worthiness of different ethnoi. As Clover plainly demonstrates, he did so with abandon, likely as a response to his own life and circumstances, rather than any sort of deliberate and careful study of the past.

Gumilev may have earned his place among the handful of intellectuals favored by the Kremlin because of his relationship – both biographical and spiritual – with the Soviet Union. Gumilev’s experiences under Soviet rule were, it is not difficult to say, tragic at best. His father, the famous poet Nikolai Gumilev, was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1921 – two years after he

44 Clover, Black Wind, 129.
divorced the even more famous poet, Anna Akhmatova, Lev’s mother. Lev spent a total of 14 years in Siberian prison camps all before the of 60. He generally led a painful, solitary, and frustrated life in which he was deprived of family, friends, and meaningful professional achievement by misfortune, the Soviets, his own shortcomings, or all three.

And yet, despite all of this, his spiritual connection to the Soviet Union was immense.

A staunch anti-communist, Gumilev was nonetheless surprisingly embittered by the collapse of the USSR, which occurred six months before his own death in 1992. Like many of his fellow prisoners, he later became possessed by an odd patriotism – an inexplicable loyalty to the homeland (and even the regime) that had stolen his health, his years and his friends. It was a type of Stockholm syndrome which produced some singularly odd scholarship: paeans to Russia’s imperial greatness, the organic character of the Russian Empire (and later the Soviet Union) as a singular super-ethnos, or civilization, whose many nations willingly joined Russia not as conquests, but as voluntary subjects of the tsar’s imperial greatness. Gumilev even purported to be able to quantify the amount of physical passionarit remaining in Russia, a civilization which, he predicted, was in the middle of its 1,200 year lifespan.45

Putin seems, based on his public proclamations and decisions, to have similar feelings about the Soviet Union, simultaneously appreciating its internal contradictions, weaknesses, and insurmountable flaws, but also pining for its greatness, its sense of purpose, its vast (forced) dominion. He famously called the breakup of the Soviet Union “a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”46 (This statement has also been translated as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century” by non-Kremlin sources.47 The actual words he used were “крупнейшая геополитическая катастрофа века.”48 Although this is a matter open to interpretation, the

superlative form of “large,” “крупнейший,” suggest not only importance but importance above and beyond other things – i.e. “greatest.”

Although that speech was made in 2005, largely before Eurasianist and nationalist influences were noticed in Putin’s rhetoric, the statement may be elucidated by applying to it Gumilev’s and Dugin’s definition of geopolitics: that the collapse of the Soviet Union fragmented the great Eurasian civilization and dissipated its passionarity. In some ways, Putin sees his job as restoring that passionarity – that overarching purpose and devotion which is the raison d’être of the state and civilization. He has remarked that “Anyone who doesn't regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who wants it restored has no brains.”

While Gumilev’s thinking appears to have had an effect (either direct or indirect) on Putin’s rhetoric and possibly also his thinking, there is no evidence that Putin subscribes to his classification of Jews as a parasitic people. Gumilev is one of the better examples of anti-Semitism addressed here, and almost certainly one of the best examples available in the Eurasianist tradition. Nonetheless, the direct inheritance on Putin of that anti-Semitism cannot be found. It is possible that most of Gumilev’s theories can be maintained with internal integrity – such as they have – without anti-Semitism. That is, accepting that Jews are uniquely worse than other groups is not a philosophical prerequisite for believing in ethnoi, passionarity, and the special status of Russians within Eurasian civilization.

However, the mere possibility of ideology à la carte does not suffice to explain why Gumilev’s structure of ethnoi and passionarity have gained traction while some of the substance of his theories – anti-Semitism in particular – has not. Some outside explanation is required.

Ivan Ilyin

If Gumilev was one of the clearest examples of a Eurasianist anti-Semite, Ilyin is the other. Originally from an aristocratic, Moscow family, he studied law at Moscow State University (then Imperial Moscow University), during which time he careened in his political tastes between anarchism and liberalism. After the Bolshevik revolution, he was exiled from the country as a “White philosopher” who disfavored Lenin’s revolution – that much was true – and was therefore undesirable. He then taught in Germany, where he was active in the community of exiled, anti-Bolshevik, Russian intellectuals. As an alternative to Bolshevism, he embraced Eurasianism for its spiritual and quasi-religious dimension which Bolshevism lacked.

For similar reasons, he was a great fan of Mussolini, who he saw as successful in uniting Italians in a deeply historic and spiritually authentic rite of patriotism. When Hitler rose to power in Germany, Ilyin supported him as well (even at one point working for Joseph Goebbels), simultaneously condemning German Jews for opposing him, which he ascribed to uniform support among Jews for Bolshevism.50

Ilyin argue[d] that the Russian state—by which he meant the old Russian Empire and its geographic descendant, the Soviet Union—is a unique geo-historical entity tied together by the spiritual unity of the Euro-Asiatic nations. In his view, Hitler’s National Socialism, Mussolini’s fascism, and the Russian White movement were very similar and “spiritually close.” He described them as sharing a “common and united enemy, patriotism, sense of honor, voluntary-sacrificial service, an attraction to dictatorial discipline, to spiritual renewal and the revival/rebirth of their country, and the search for a new social justice.” An opponent of both Soviet communism and Western democracy, Ilyin envisioned a “special” path for Russia, based on the promotion of the Orthodox Church and traditional values that would bring about a spiritual renewal of the Russian people, who at the moment he believed were under the influence of Western political and social constructs.

Despite the horrors of World War II and the defeat of Germany and Italy, Ilyin did not reject fascist ideology. In 1948, he wrote about the mistakes that Hitler had made, but not about the flaws of his ideology. He still recognized it as a just and healthy national-

patriotic idea, voicing his hope that Francisco Franco in Spain and António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal would avoid the mistakes that Hitler had made and succeed in their own quests.\textsuperscript{51}

Clearly, Ilyin’s passion for fascism has not been inherited by the modern Russian political class. Although some figures marginally associated with the current regime have made use of fascist and Nazi iconography and symbolism, the ideas of fascism and Nazism specifically are utterly lacking from the Kremlin.\textsuperscript{52} The lengths to which the current powers go to define their opponents as fascists and Nazis – especially to the domestic population – suggests the enduring enmity and disgust with which fascism and Nazism are regarded. Similarly, despite Ilyin’s own Wagnerian anti-Semitism, the intellectual legacy of his theory contributes only indirectly to modern anti-Semitism.

Ilyin introduced into the Russian political vocabulary the term “world backstage” ("мировая закулиса"), by which he meant some secret, Western-dominated, conspiratorial cabal, secretly pulling the strings of world affairs. While he never explicitly connected the idea with Jews \textit{per se}, the well-known conspiracy theory of the secret world order often includes Jews as its masterminds: “In the broader sense, this term implies that the officially elected leaders of the West are, in fact, puppets of the world’s true rulers: businessmen, Masonic agents, and, often, Jews. These days, that phrase seems omnipresent in Russian discourse and state-controlled media."\textsuperscript{53}

However, the concept is not original to Ilyin. Its occurrence in modern Russian discourse cannot be directly traced to him. Indeed, as Albats indicated, conspiracy theories in Russia,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{52} Clover, \textit{Black Wind}, 153, 155, 158-159, 161, 164-165, 178, 216, 222, 225, 235, 238, 224, 283.
\textsuperscript{53} Barbashin and Thoburn, "Putin's Philosopher," Hudson Institute.
\end{flushleft}
including or especially among the political elite, are so common in part because in Russia they are sometimes true.\footnote{54 Interview with Yevgenia Albats.} Both the Bolshevik Revolution and the August Putsch that ended the Soviet Union were the results of conspiracies, planned and carried out by a handful of powerful but little-known men in secret to wrest control of government forcefully away from another leader. Every leader of the Soviet Union in between was selected through a process – not of open competition, debate, and popular selection – but of back-room dealing and secret maneuvers at the very heights of power. Had Ilyin not introduced the concept of the “world backstage,” someone would have needed to invent it just to write the Russian news.

Ilyin is considered to be a particular favorite philosopher of Putin’s: He assigned the regional governors of Russia to read Our Tasks (Наши Задачи, also translated Our Mission) over the 2014 winter break.\footnote{55 Barbashin and Thoburn, "Putin's Philosopher," Hudson Institute.} Unlike with Gumilev, it is easy to explain why Putin might revere Ilyin’s work yet not share his anti-Semitism. Ilyin primarily hated Jews because of their connection to – and, he believed, universal support for – Bolshevism. For the former KGB agent who clearly views the U.S.S.R. with nostalgia, this support may be a virtue where for Ilyin it was a vice.

\textit{Nikolai Danilevsky}

Nikolai Danilevsky provides what is likely the best example of the Eurasianist thinking, which, while not incompatible with anti-Semitism, excludes it. His proto-Eurasianist theory was part of a larger effort to distinguish and classify different civilizational types based on cultural and linguistic similarities and differences. This was part of a project of opposing both the Slavophile and Westernizer positions, which advocated for Russia to achieve modernity through
embracing and developing its native cultural and historic traditions, or through adopting and replicating the models of Western Europe, respectively. Danilevsky rejected both on the grounds that they defined “modernity” and civilizational achievement by comparison with the West. According to his taxonomy, Russia’s sense of backwardness compared to the West made as much sense as a snake feeling stunted compared to a giraffe. (Danilevsky was a biologist by training.)

Instead, Russia’s path of development was completely different and incomparable to the “Roman-Germanic World,” and indeed to any of the other historico-cultural types:

Anticipating the later theories of Spengler, Toynbee, and Huntington, Danilevsky distinguished multiple civilisations in the past, of which Romano–Germanic or European was only one. Other historico-cultural types included Egyptian, Chinese, Assyrian–Babylonian–Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Arabian. ‘These types are not evolutionary stages on the ladder of gradual perfectibility … but entirely different plans—plans without any common denominator—in which each entity evolves in a specific and distinct fashion towards the multiformity and perfection within its reach’…).

In a similar vein to Dugin, Danilevsky’s model (though not necessarily its implications) is descriptive, not normative in the way Gumilev’s was. He counts the Jewish historico-cultural type as one among many, but does not disparage it nor any other specifically. His proposition that Russia should not try to adopt the development model of a different civilization depends on the proposition that each historico-cultural type can only follow its own unique path, and therefore ought not to try others – not that other paths were inherently, objectively worse.

He developed laws for the development and identification of these types, which are of use in evaluating his theory for anti-Semitism:

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First, it must be noted that the historico-cultural types are precisely what their name implies: historical. They can come and go. At the time Danilevsky was writing, Jews would not have counted as an extant historico-cultural type because they lacked at least one of the necessary points: political independence. (Whether the State of Israel would satisfy that requirement now is an interesting question, but not a germane one.)

Arguments could also be made that Jews in Russia during Danilevsky’s time lacked, in the necessary or relevant ways, all five features of historico-cultural types. Their linguistic foundation, at least in terms of common speech, was not Hebrew but Yiddish, a pidgin with German and influences of Russian and other languages. They had no political independence anywhere in the world. Their most important contribution to human civilization, ethical monotheism, had been adopted by a majority of the world, while they had taken on many of the cultural trappings of their many home countries in diaspora. They had no internal diversity ethnically. (This point is debatable.) Their civilization was evolving, but not growing. In other words, Jews were at most a former civilization, at least an utterly spent historical force.

Danilevsky’s argument provides the best example of the status of Jews in Eurasianist and proto-Eurasianist theories: irrelevance. This is because the context for civilizational theories,

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57 Ibid., 580.
including Danilevsky’s historico-cultural types and Eurasianism, is the defense of Russian culture and civilization (such as it is perceived) against the West, including not only Western states but also Western culture, economic influence, religious institutions, and universalist ideological exports – namely, liberalism.

Putin has adopted this definition of self and enemy in his rhetoric, and he depicts his role as reinvigorating the Russian state and, by extension, its cult of patriotism: “My sacred duty is to bring together the Russian people, unite the people around clear tasks. We have one fatherland, one people and a common future.”58 That fatherland has, in some of Putin’s explanations, a distinctly Eurasianist character, consisting of not just a nation state but a collection of nations united in one overarching civilization, led and dominated by (ethnic) Russians:

About the special character of Russian statehood, Ivan Ilyin wrote: “Do not eradicate, suppress, enslave other peoples [lit. ‘other blood’]; do not strangle a foreign and heterodox life, but give everyone a breath and a great Fatherland of respect for all, reconcile them all, let them all pray in their own way, work in their own way, and involve the best from everywhere in the state and cultural construction.”

The rod that fastens the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian people, Russian culture. Our opponents and all kinds of provocateurs will try will all their might to wrest this rod from Russia – through false conversations about the right of Russians to self-determination, about “racial purity,” about the necessity “to finish the business of 1991 and finally destroy the empires seated on the neck of the Russian people.” Ultimately, to force the people to destroy their own Fatherland with their very hands. (emphasis added)

(Именно об этом особом характере русской государственности писал Иван Ильин: «Не искоренить, не подавить, не поработить чужую кровь, не задушить иноплеменную и инославную жизнь, а дать всем дыхание и великую Родину всех соблюсти, всех примирить, всем дать молиться по-своему, трудиться по-своему и лучших отовсюду вовлечь в государственное и культурное строительство».

Стержень, скрепляющая ткань этой уникальной цивилизации – русский народ, русская культура. Вот как раз этот стержень разного рода провокаторы и наши противники всеми силами будут пытаться вырвать из России – под насквозь фальшивые разговоры о праве русских на самоопределение, о «расовой чистоте», о необходимости «завершить дело 1991 года и окончательно разрушить империю,

сидящую на шее у русского народа». Чтобы в конечном счете – заставить людей своими руками уничтожать собственную Родину.\textsuperscript{59} The Jews, to the extent that they facilitate the spread of European institutions (especially economic ones) are targets of ideological attack by Eurasianists, but unlike their position of evil primacy in the ideologies Nazi Germany or Western neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and skinheads, they are not the prime enemy of Russian civilization. They couldn't be the prime enemy, because they don’t pose a serious threat. The Jews can’t break up the empire. The Jews can’t rob Russia of its culture. The Jews can’t preach about racial purity. They’re only a civilizational, existential threat as the agents of the real enemy: Western, and especially American, global hegemony. Notably, this is directly contradictory to the Soviet-era conception that the West was controlled by a secretive cabal of Jews. While many Eurasianists and other kinds of Russian nationalists and adherents of civilizational theories are often anti-Semites, including Ilyin and Gumilev, the coincidence of the two intellectual trends should be viewed as correlational, not causational. The same people who find quasi-historical theses about geographical determinism and civilizational predestination convincing are likely also those who believe in selective morality – that some people or groups of people have different moral standing than others. However, it is not philosophically or logically necessary to hold anti-Semitic views in order to believe in the world view advocated by Eurasianists. Ultimately, the influence of nationalist and Eurasianist thinking on the Kremlin is helpful but not sufficient in explaining the Kremlin’s Jewish policies. The Kremlin, including Putin himself, appear very supportive of Eurasianist and national-imperialist projects. Danilevsky’s

theory of unique developmental paths, which certainly had influence on later theorists and appears to have some pull on the Kremlin itself, does not require denigration or animosity toward other historico-cultural types. Ilyin’s anti-Semitism can be excised from his larger theories as a coincidence of his time and place – the struggle over Bolshevism is long over. Moreover, Ilyin’s anti-Semitism is inseparable from his primary critique of Bolshevism, which is its total lack of spirituality. This is a critique that the Putin regime appears to share in some part, as evidenced by its close association with the Russian Orthodox Church. It is also possible for the Kremlin (or some of its elements) to embrace Dugin’s ideology and maintain pro-Semitic Jewish policies, as the two are mutually compatible. All of these apparent paradoxes are resolvable – though some more comfortably than others.

The one paradox that cannot be resolved is the Kremlin’s homage to Gumilev’s theories but not his anti-Semitic application of those theories. For those that would argue that the Putin government is more ideological than pragmatic, the selective endorsement of Gumilev would appear to be an inexplicable counterexample. The argument that Eurasianist ideology is influential in the Kremlin, and that it allows room for such policies, does not adequately explain the Putin regime’s policies. Another explanation is required as to why the Putin government would want to avoid anti-Semitism in the first place. The regime’s Jewish policies suggest that it is not as ideological as is sometimes believed.

The “Syringe” Hypothesis

There is considerable debate about the role of ideology, especially Eurasianist ideology, in Putin’s regime. Charles Clover has written extensively on the influence of Eurasianist philosophers on the Kremlin in *Black Wind, White Snow*, and gives ample evidence to suggest that many in the highest echelons of power – though not necessarily Putin himself – endorse
Eurasianist ideas. Alternatively, Anton Shekhovtsov suggests in *Russia and the Western Far Right* that the Putin regime’s only ideology is self-preservation: “It only syringes very specific ideas into the body of the Russian society in order to achieve particular purposes. This is a typical mode of operation for authoritarian, not totalitarian, states that occasionally, rather than permanently, engage in political mobilisation of the society.”\(^\text{60}\)

The possibility remains that Putin personally endorses Eurasianist ideas, that his quotes of Ilyin and paraphrases of Gumilev reflect his true thinking, that he endorses their overall worldview without also adopting anti-Semitism. But it’s also possible that so much sound and fury signifies nothing. To borrow Shekhovtsov’s term, the Kremlin’s use of “ideological syringes” allows for other explanations of its simultaneous far-right sympathies and pro-Semitism.

First, this theory implies the possibility of future change in Kremlin policies. Without ideological commitments, the current position of Putin’s government will only last as long as Putin believes they are useful to him. “Stalin [like] Putin used ideologies extensively for propagandistic purposes and for the legitimization of their personal power. However, given the fact that they were concerned only about personal power, these two leaders were extremely flexible and open to the idea of changing the country’s ideological course in any direction.”\(^\text{61}\) If, for example, a sharp and unexpected economic crisis caused mass protests in the streets on the scale of the Bolotnaya or Navalny protests, the Kremlin, according to this model, would choose an ideology that justified it’s actions and policies and reassigned blame, and “inject” it into the debate. If the threat against Putin’s power were perceived as serious enough, i.e. if Putin believed

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\(^{60}\) Shekhovtsov, *Russia and the Western*, 80.

\(^{61}\) Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 206.
that a color revolution was likely or imminent – there is little reason to doubt that he would use anti-Semitic tropes to blame shadowy finance figures for the crisis.

The “syringe” hypothesis suggests that any idea or ideology that the Kremlin find useful can be injected into the political discourse thanks to the almost total domination of mass media and political speech by state-controlled outlets. If the ideas of long-dead and forgotten minor philosopher like Ilyin could be resurrected, the theory would hold, so then could one of the most successful prejudices in Russian history. This may not be the case.

The first reason anti-Semitism may be of little use to the Kremlin is that, despite the deep historical precedent of official anti-Semitism in Russia, modern, popular or “street” anti-Semitism is not easily connected to politics. Gibson and Howard find that

Our most important conclusion is that anti-Jewish prejudice reflects personality characteristics such as dogmatism and xenophobia, and is essentially impervious to influence from perceptions of external economic and political stress. This latter finding no doubt accounts for the failure of anti-Jewish sentiment to become pernicious in Russia during the 1990s. Throughout the country’s attempt at democratization, economic and political stress have been at high levels; some Russians hold predispositions towards intolerance; but the two factors have not joined forces to produce reactions against Jewish Russians.62

They propose a number of explanations which suggest that anti-Semitism is an unfit tool for political mobilization.

At least one part of the answer is that not enough Russians are predisposed to believe scurrilous allegations against Jews. Like the ‘race card’ in American politics, if racist predispositions are not sufficiently widespread, then the limited response to proffers of racist appeals generates few political benefits. Thus, in some sense our understanding of this problem does indeed rely upon the conclusion that anti-Semitism in Russia is not widespread enough to be mobilized successfully in electoral politics.63

62 Gibson and Howard, "Russian Anti-Semitism," 195.
63 Ibid., 217.
Although Russia’s politics in the intervening decade have become clearly non-electoral in the relevant way, lacking as they do true competition, fairness, and freedom, they still serve as legitimization rituals from which the government draws support and a strange, illegitimate mandate. The uses of anti-Semitism would be more or less the same as in a truly electoral system: to build support and gain a governing mandate. The “race card” analogy still suggests that, so to speak, the Russian people are not buying it.

Another possible explanation is that Jews are not of sufficient salience in Russia to be easily scapegoated:

Optimism about Russia’s political and economic future seems to be associated with a growth in negative, as well as positive, sentiments towards Jews… finding whom to blame is not necessarily easy or even possible, but for many Russians it is likely to make more sense to blame the Communists, the nomenklatura, the legacy of Communism, oligarchs, the West, etc., than to blame Jews. 

This is likely related to the steep decline in the Jewish population of Russia since the mid-20th century. At the time of the first All-Union Population Census in 1926, there were about 567,000 Jews in the Russian Socialist Republic (out of a total of nearly 2.6 million in the Soviet Union). The number of Jews in Russia had declined only slightly by 1989, to about 537,00. By 2010, that number declined to 230,000 en route to an estimated 110,000 by 2050. The fall of the Soviet Union makes the comparison even stronger. A Muscovite comparing the population of Jews in his country (the U.S.S.R. before 1991 and the Russian Federation thereafter) between

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64 Ibid., 207.
65 Национальный институт демографических исследований (INED), "Всесоюзная перепись населения 1926 года. Национальный состав населения по республикам СССР." [Institute of Demography of the National Research University Higher School of Economics], Демоскоп Weekly, last modified December 31, 2011, accessed November 30, 2017.
66 Ibid.
1926 and 2010 would have seen a 91 percent drop. In other words, there are fewer than one tenth
the Jews in the relevant political entity to exploit for political gain.

Contemporary Russia also appears to be less strongly anti-Semitic than it has been in the
past and that it is widely assumed still to be. Gibson and Howard find that:

some research based on multiple indicators has discovered that anti-Semitism seemed to
be neither widespread nor virulent. For instance, Gibson and Duch conclude that
expressed anti-Semitism among residents of the Moscow oblast ‘is more uncommon in
Moscow [in 1990] [sic] than many (including us) had suspected’. Their findings from a
comparable survey in 1990 in the European portion of the former Soviet Union support
the same conclusion. Moreover, based on his analysis of a survey of Russians conducted
in 1992, Furman writes: ‘Thus, no mass anti-Semitism was revealed by the survey (our
data agree in this regard with the data of other, analogous surveys), and a Jewish pogrom
seems less likely than some sort of “Caucasian” pogrom.’

Discussing their survey methodology, they find hopeful results:

It is noteworthy that a clear majority rejects the anti-Semitic slander in three of the four
measures, with nearly two-thirds of the Russians repudiating the view that Jews more
than others are responsible for the country’s problems. Thus, anti-Semitic prejudice does
not seem to be as widespread in contemporary Russia as might be expected in light of the
country’s history of ill-treatment of Jews.

While Shlapentokh does not go so far, and still considers Russia’s levels of popular anti-
Semitism alarming, he finds corroborating that evidence that they may be lower than is often
thought:

Anti-Semitism in Russia today [2008] is lower than it has been in the last seven decades. Jews in Russia are much less inclined to hide their ethnic origin or their interest in Jewish
culture and religion. According to data cited in Ryvkina’s comprehensive book, How Jews Live in Russia, the proportion of Jews who talked about their involvement in
Jewish culture (considered a taboo in Soviet times) increased by three times in 2004 in
comparison with 1995. In the same period, the number of Jews who declared themselves
as believers in Judaism increased by 50 percent, while the number of regular visitors to
synagogue increased by 11 times and the number of members of Jewish organizations

68 Gibson and Howard, "Russian Anti-Semitism," 201.
69 Ibid., 210-211.
increased by almost 5 times. The number of Jews who suffered from anti-Semitism declined from 75 percent to 55 percent.70

More recent data from the Levada Center paints a similar picture – that anti-Semitism is relatively high compared to other European countries (and, of course, compared to the ideal level, which is none) but relatively low compared to historical standards and Weimar comparisons.

Currently, only 8% of Russians are negative about Jews, but experts point out several levels of anti-Semitic aggression: a stable core of anti-Semitism and xenophobia (8-16% of respondents), those who support anti-Semitic and xenophobic clichés (18-35%), those who believe that ethnic Russians should have advantages over others or that the president should be Russian (40-65%). At the same time, anti-Semitism is very marginalized and is concentrated on the periphery of civil and social life, and anti-Semitic stereotypes and clichés have significantly weakened, but do not leave mass consciousness, the report says. Nevertheless, the "Jewish question" has lost its urgency and relevance, as Russian society is dominated by a calm-respectful or neutral-indifferent attitude toward Jews, experts say. The main threat to the rise of xenophobic attitudes in general and anti-Semitism in particular is the economic crisis, adds Kanner: "That's why we are trying to institutionalize the counteraction system - to conduct research, conferences, to cooperate with the authorities."

(Сейчас к евреям относятся негативно лишь 8% россиян, но эксперты выделяют несколько уровней антисemitской агрессии: устойчивое ядро антисемитов и ксенофобов (8–16% опрошенных), те, кто поддерживает антисемитские и ксенофобские клише (18–35%), те, кто считает, что русские должны иметь преимущества перед другими или что президент должен быть русским (40–65%). При этом антисемитизм очень маргинализирован и концентрируется на периферии гражданской и социальной жизни, а антисемитские стереотипы и клише существенно ослабли, но не уходят из массового сознания, говорится в докладе. Тем не менее «еврейский вопрос» утратил свою остроту и актуальность, в российском обществе доминирует спокойно-уважительное или нейтрально-равнодушное отношение к евреям, констатируют эксперты. Основную угрозу подъему ксенофобских настроений вообще и антисемитизма в частности несет экономический кризис, добавляет Каннер: «Поэтому мы и пытаемся институционализировать систему противодействия – проводить исследования, конференции, сотрудничать с властю».)71

70 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 212-213.
71 “Антисемитизм не в моде”, [Anti-Semitism is Not in Style], Левада центр last updated November 7, 2016, last accessed November 20, 2017.
Quite simply, there don’t appear to be enough committed anti-Semites in Russia to make a significant electoral difference (unless, of course, a direct challenger to Putin for the presidency were Jewish, in which case the popular opposition to a Jewish president would likely make a difference).

Interestingly, the tendency of Russians to believe anti-Semitism conspiracy theories and alternative histories may also be declining. According to a Levada Center survey, respondents indicated Holocaust denial a significantly smaller proportion of the time in May 2015 than in October 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAVE YOU HEARD OF “THE HOLOCAUST,” AND IF SO, DO YOU PERSONALLY THINK THAT AT THAT TIME IN GERMANY AND ITS OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THE JEWISH NATION REALLY WAS EXTERMINATED, OR STORIES ABOUT IT ARE EXAGGERATED?</th>
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<td>At that time the nation was really was exterminated</td>
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<td>(В те годы действительно истреблялась целая нация)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stories about it are greatly exaggerated</td>
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A recent study from the World Jewish Congress and the Russian Jewish Congress supports this trend, and suggests plausible explanations for why.

Russia today has one of the lowest levels of anti-Semitism in the world and the lowest in Europe, according to a survey conducted in 2015-2016 by the Russian Jewish Congress ahead of the first Moscow International Conference on Combating anti-Semitism, co-sponsored by the World Jewish Congress.

The survey found that only 8 percent of respondents expressed a negative attitude toward Jews and that 90% of Russians today are aware of the Holocaust. The study found that Gypsies and Chechens evoked the most antipathetic attitude among respondents, as well as xenophobia toward Americans, Arabs and Azerbaijanis.73

The most likely explanation for this dramatic decline in popular anti-Semitism in Russia may be attributed not only to the dramatic decrease in the Jewish population, but also to the abandonment of a coordinated, mass anti-Semitic program by Russian elites. While the siloviki likely practice employment discrimination in the Russian government, Russian mass media since the 2000 have been devoid of the kind of large-scale anti-Semitic messages characteristic of the Soviet era, in which “In media, novels and movies, Jews were almost never shown in a positive light. A Jewish name could only appear in a negative context.”74 By contrast:

Putin’s close confidant, the famous film director Nikita Mikhalkov, made a movie in 2007 called 12 (a remake of the American movie 12 Angry Men), which denounces

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74 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 208.
anti-Semitism and other ethnic prejudices in Russia. The screening of such a film would be absolutely impossible not only between the 1940s and the 1980s, but even in Yeltsin’s time. According to Moskovskii Komsomolets, in November 2007, Putin invited journalists and gave a public showing of this movie in his residence (Galimova, 2007). He reportedly expressed his high satisfaction with the piece.75

At least some of the credit for the near eradication of anti-Semitism from mass entertainment in Russia could be attributed to Putin, who has exerted direct or indirect control over almost every aspect and outlet of mass information and entertainment in the country since the early 2000s.

Putin could therefore also share the blame for what followed. The consensus based on polling data, which are always subject to skepticism in Russia, is that Jews have been replaced by Central Asians, Caucasians, Westerners (Americans especially), and Chechens as the default scapegoats in Russia. At times, Ukrainians have also occupied a spot high atop the list of perceived enemies of Russia. Crimean Tatars have suffered some of the worst repressions since the annexation of Crimea: They have the unfortunate distinction of being both Ukrainian by (former) citizenship and Muslim by confession, making them targets of persecution twice over. Their status as former victims of mass deportation under Stalin has not forestalled the jailing of several of their leaders – most notably Akhtem Chiygoz deputy leader of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis – under questionable circumstances. An April 2017 pronouncement from the International Court of Justice against persecution of the Crimean Tatars has had little effect.76

It is difficult to conclude the directionality of the regime’s Jewish policies and public opinion. According to the “syringe” theory, the government could use its domination of mass information and political discourse to “inject” anti-Semitism into the population at will. It has

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75 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 212.
76 International Court of Justice, "The Court finds that Russia must refrain from imposing limitations on the ability of the Crimean Tatar community to conserve its representative institutions, including the Mejlis, and ensure the availability of education in the Ukrainian language," news release, April 19, 2017, accessed November 30, 2017.
clearly not done so. If the theory is incorrect, the Kremlin’s options of ideological positions are limited based on what the Russian population is prepared and likely to accept. Rather than manipulating political discourse and culture with complete dexterity to meet its needs, the Russian government may find itself in a position much closer to that of a democratic government, fairly tightly constrained to philosophical and ideological positions that the population is prepared to accept. Based on survey data, the Russian population is historically and increasingly resilient to anti-Semitism since the turn of the millennium.

Alternately, if the theory is correct, then the drop in anti-Semitism since the beginning of Putin’s first presidential term is directly attributable to policies of his government. Consequently, the observed trends are wholly subject to manipulation and could be reversed at any time. The longevity and stability of the Putin government’s pro-Jewish policies therefore requires further explanation. Since Putin took power, the Russian government’s economic policy has changed drastically, as have political rights, the Constitution, the judiciary, Russia’s foreign policy (including perhaps the underlying goals of foreign policy in addition to the policies themselves), and arguably the nature of the social contract. Rhetorical changes from the president and other Kremlin officials have accompanied each of these shifts. The government’s Jewish policies have been one domain of remarkable consistency, which the “syringe” hypothesis cannot explain by itself.

**The Foreign Policy Hypothesis**

*Israel*

In contrast to each theory discussed so far, another theory explains Putin’s and his government’s pro-Semitic policies as facets of a larger foreign policy. Yevgenia Albats suggests
that, to some extent, the Russian government’s relationship with its Jewish population is dictated by its geopolitical posture in the Middle East:

Russia pretty much lost its relationship with Arab countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Israel came on the map, partially because there is a huge Russian-speaking population in Israel, partially because there are a lot of Jews – powerful Jews – in Russia who have some aspirations for Israel, partially because Israel is a developed nation. It’s a great start-up nation and it was pragmatically better for Russia to do [business] with Israel relevant to its ends. So definitely it was connected to its foreign policy.77

This proposition is unique among analyses of Putin’s Jewish policies, and warrants more research. It’s implications, based on what is already known of Russian foreign policy, are significant. As Albats alluded, the nature of the Russian-Israeli relationship is multifaceted, and Israel could play any of several different roles in the foreign policy of Putin’s government.

The first facet of Russian-Israeli relations is the large number of Russophone Israelis. As of 2016, there were about 1.5 million Russian-speaking Israelis, the vast majority of whom had immigrated from Russia or Ukraine.78 According to Agnia Grigas’s work on Putin’s use of “compatriots” in foreign policy, Russian-speaking Israelis may be a sizeable and important compatriot community.

The present-day concept of the Russian compatriot both stems from and relates to a broader understanding of the Russian nation… The first conception emphasizes the [Soviet] Union (or imperial) identity… According to this conceptualization of Russian nationhood, Russian compatriots would include all former citizens of the USSR and their descendants. A second way to conceptualize the Russian nation is to include the entire community of Eastern Slavs… The third conception of the Russian nation inclines instead to a broader vision, including all who use Russian as their first or habitual language, regardless of their ethnicity.79

77 Interview with Yevgenia Albats.
78 Amanda Borschel-Dan, "25 Years Later, Russian Speakers Still the ‘Other’ in Israel, Says MK," Times of Israel, last modified September 1, 2016, accessed November 30, 2017.
79 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea (n.p.: Yale University Press, 2016), 63-64.
Jews are definitely excluded from some of the definitions of Russian compatriots. Indeed, Grigas argues that one of the definitions “is aimed above all at excluding Jews and people from the Caucasus and Central Asia.”

The first and third conceptions of compatriots, however, apply perfectly well to Russophone Israelis, many of whom were born in the former Soviet Union and use Russian as a first and habitual language. For the purposes of Russian soft power, this makes Russian Jews a potentially useful group. For the purposes of Russian expansionism and neo-imperialism, which Grigas identifies as the primary goals of contemporary Russia compatriot policies, the Russophone Israeli population may play a weaker version of the role played by analogous populations in the former Soviet Republics: They give Russia a reason to claim legitimate political interest in a country or region. While this will likely not lead to military intervention in Israel as in Georgia and Ukraine (and possibly other countries in the future) it may help Russia legitimate a resurgent Middle East policy, making up for its lost Arab allies. As an added benefit, Putin’s government may also hope that Russian-speakers in Israel may be a politically malleable voting bloc – an especially useful asset in a country that has historically been one of the closest and most strategically important allies of the United States. Whether or not this is possible has yet to be tested. Given the Russian government’s influence campaigns in elections in the United States, the cleavage between Russophone and native “Sabra” Israelis may be exactly the kind of social schism open to exploitation.

Courting Russophone Israeli Jews would be significantly harder for a regime that persecuted Jews at home – or, at least, for a regime that gained a reputation for doing so. Putin’s

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80 Ibid., 63-64.
pro-Semitism may be partly motivated by an effort to gain influence with Jews in the Middle East, which is a region of strategic importance in which Russia has lost significant influence in the past quarter century.

The second facet of Russian-Israeli relations that Albats lists appears on its surface less sinister. Russian businessmen and oligarchs – Jews and non-Jews alike – have interests in many wealthy, Western, first-world countries, as do magnates and tycoons the world over. As dissident journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza put it,

    They want to rule inside Russia like it’s a third-world dictatorship, violating basic human rights and freedoms, but they themselves want to use the privileges and the opportunities that the Western world offers for themselves and for their families. They want to steal in Russia and spend in the West.  

Maintaining the opportunity to flex soft power with Israel’s Russophone minority may be a way to preserve Israel as an outlet for spending and education by the Kremlin elite outside Russia. Israel has one of the most promising Western economies that has not yet passed a Magnitsky Law designed to curtail the ability of Kremlin-linked siloviki-cum-oligarchs who have abused human rights to spend money in and travel to Western countries. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Lithuania have such laws. While avoidance of Magnitsky sanctions cannot explain Putin’s Jewish policies before 2012, when the American Magnitsky Act was signed, it may explain the continuation of such policies and their relationship to Russia’s close relationship with Israel.

*The Western Far-Left*

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Beyond Russia’s relationship with Israel in particular, there are other blind spots regarding Russia’s foreign policy that warrant further investigation. Péter Krekó’s research regarding the Putin government’s support for and relationships with Western far-left parties and forces suggests that the recent work of Clover, Shokhovtsov, and others warrants equally thorough, complementary work on the other end of the spectrum.

The specific opinions and policies of European far-left parties regarding Jews is often difficult to discern. One illustrative example is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the most prominent far-left party in Czechia and, according to Krekó, one of the most successful in Europe. The party takes a very critical approach to the Israeli policies regarding the West Bank and Gaza and questions the legitimacy of the State of Israel per se, but stops short of further, explicit anti-Semitism.

One of the methods Krekó identifies that the Kremlin uses to elicit sympathy with European far-left parties is anti-fascism:

Just as Putin’s regime simultaneously warns of the rise of the far right and supports (and is supported by) far-right parties in Europe, the radical left’s anti-fascism is often selective and one-sided. While radical left players usually share Putin’s concerns over the hyperbolism of the “fascist junta in Kyiv” and criticize the EU for being ignorant, they do not see such problems on the side of the pro-Russian “rebels”. Prominent members of the European left all echo this view. Tsipras, in March 2014, said that the European Union supports “a government with far-right and fascist elements, which violates the Constitution of the country (...) And it goes into a malformed Cold War with Russia. Pablo Iglesias, leader of Podemos, added: “the EU supported the illegal change of power in Ukraine and the coming of a neo-Nazi party to the Ukrainian government. Some European leaders, together with neo-Nazis, took part in public events in Ukraine, and this is too far from European values.” But at the same time, a Die Linke delegation went to Eastern Ukraine to have a friendly meeting with notoriously anti-Semitic leaders of the Donetsk Republic.

85 Krekó and Győri, Russia and the European, 8.
Though Die Linke may prove to be an exception, it is possible that Putin’s government believes – and perhaps rightly – that notorious, official anti-Semitism may weaken its ability to win support for its causes among the Western far-left. The origins of European unification lie in the conflagration of World War II, including the Holocaust. The European Union and its predecessor organizations were largely formed to prevent another war. For the Kremlin to adopt policies resembling Nazi Germany would severely undercut its ability to label its enemies as fascists and garner support for its international objectives.

Concurrently, it would also hamper the Kremlin’s abilities to create symmetry between itself and its European enemies.

For radical left politicians, who have more inhibitions about praising Putin and his regime directly, a typical and more subtle argumentation is to talk about aggressors on both sides. For example, without even mentioning the occupation of Crimea, a statement by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia called on "the parties" to respect the Helsinki Accords one day before the referendum, as if Ukraine were not occupied only by Russia – but by the EU and the US as well.86

While many far-left parties center their platforms on opposition the Washington consensus of free trade and market capitalism, the Nazi comparison might prove too much for Western far-left parties to associate themselves with Russia.

According to Krekó, the Putin government relies on a modicum of reasonableness to secure support from the European far-left. “The left’s affiliation with the Kremlin is better explained via the ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ principle, such as selective anti-imperialism, anticapitalism, and anti-Americanism. Likewise, the state-controlled economy,

86 Péter Krekó and Lóránt Győri, "Don’t Ignore the Left! Connections between Europe’s Radical Left and Russia," oDR: Russia and Beyond, last modified June 13, 2016, accessed November 30, 2017.
which promises to keep ‘big capital’ in check, is an attractive model for many anti-capitalists.”

Although some far-left parties may not see anti-Semitism on the part of the Russian government as reason to sever or degrade ties with or support for Russian positions, there may be enough other groups that would choose to disassociate themselves that they could diminish influence with the leftist bloc writ large. It is possible that, if enough far-left parties were to diminish their support for Russian goals, the rest would follow for the sake of bloc unity: “radical left forces are traditionally more willing to cooperate with one another on the international and European level than the far right. This further increases their importance.” That support is important for the Putin government’s foreign policies, often giving it the sheen of legitimacy that allows its foreign interventions to succeed. “The radical left group European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament supports the Kremlin with words and votes (in 78% of the cases), in the Council of Europe, and OSCE general assemblies — especially when it comes to issues on Ukraine and Syria.”

Radical left parties in Europe and the West more broadly may be fringe forces for now, but by definition their ultimate purpose is to gain political power. They cannot rely exclusively on Russian support to achieve that goal; eventually they will have to achieve popular support. Anti-Semitism on the part of the Putin government might lose them popular support, which would diminish their utility to the Kremlin either by causing them to pull away from the Kremlin or by diminishing their influence domestically.

These theories are little more than speculation compared to what is now known about the Kremlin’s courtship of the Western far-right. More research regarding the Putin government’s

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87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
courtship of the far-left will provide a more detailed, full depiction of how Russian policy has been shaped in response to Western institutions and political forces, and how those institutions and forces have in turn responded to Russian policy.

The Biographical Hypothesis

Putin’s remarkable pro-Semitic policies may be inspired by his own biography, which includes benevolent interventions by many Jews. One example is the Jewish family that shared Putin’s communal apartment in St. Petersburg:

An elderly couple shared one room in the apartment; an observant Jewish family, with an older daughter, Hava, shared the other. The younger Vladimir, the only child in the communal home, remembered the elderly couple fondly, and spent as much time with them as with his parents. They became surrogate grandparents, and he knew her as Baba Anya. She, like his mother, possessed deep religious faith.90

An early religious experience of Putin’s may also have impressed on him that Jews are not a threat to Orthodoxy or Russian culture as he may perceive other religions to be:

As Vladimir would later tell the story, on November 21, when he was seven weeks old, Baba Anya and Maria walked three blocks through the winter chill to the Transfiguration Cathedral, a yellow, eighteenth-century monument built in the neoclassical style of many of the city’s churches, and there they secretly baptized the boy.91

Another figure who appears to have had a great impact on Putin’s life – by his own admission – was his first judo coach: “He talked about his Jewish wrestling coach Anatolii Rakhlin as a person who ‘probably played the crucial role in my life.’ The coach had attracted him to serious sports and drew him away from a dangerous life on the streets.”92 The influence of judo, and therefore of Rakhlin, on Putin’s life cannot be underestimated:

91 Ibid., 12-13.
92 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 211.
The discipline and rigor of sambo, and later judo, intrigued the boy [Putin] in a way nothing else had. The martial arts transformed his life, giving him the means of asserting himself against larger, tougher boys. “It was a tool to assert myself in the pack,” he would say. It also brought him a new circle of friends, especially two brothers, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, who would stick by him throughout his life. The martial arts gave him an orthodoxy he found neither in religion nor in politics. It was more than mere sport, he believed; it was a philosophy. “It was sports that dragged me off the streets,” he once recalled. “To be honest, the courtyard wasn’t a very good environment for a kid.”

The influence of sports and the discipline of martial arts on Putin’s life can be seen as an influence on Putin’s priorities and policies once in office, most significantly the dedicated effort to host the Olympic games in Russia. The seemingly illogical choice of a sub-tropical city for the 2014 Winter Games can be ascribed to Putin’s personal intervention and determination. The city was a favorite of his, perhaps even surpassing that of his native St. Petersburg:

By now he spent more time in the presidential compound [in Sochi] than in any of the Kremlin’s other official residences outside Moscow. It was here that he frequently held meetings with foreign leaders, including one the day before with Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schröder of Germany, the “troika” who had publicly opposed the American war in Iraq. 

On behalf of his beloved Sochi, he vigorously worked to lobby the International Olympic Committee: “‘He was nice,’ Jean-Claude Killy, the French ski champion and a member of the International Olympic Committee, explained after the vote. ‘He spoke French—he never speaks French. He spoke English—he never speaks English. The Putin charisma can explain four votes.’” Although Putin learned German as a second language to fluency as a young man, and lived in Dresden as a KGB officer, he had, indeed, never spoken French or English in public (with the exception of some public singing). He most likely learned those sections of his address

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93 Ibid., 15-16.
94 Ibid., 243.
95 Ibid., 325.
phonetically, an indicator of his determination to impress the committee and secure the Olympics for his adopted city and his country.

That determination is inseparable from his political aims: “As an avid sportsman and fitness obsessive, a judoka, a skier, and a swimmer, Putin loved the Olympics; as a leader, he saw hosting them as the means to affirm Russia’s return to its rightful place on the world stage.” As is characteristic of Putin’s personalized rule, the status of the country is inextricably linked with the status of its ruler. His priorities are its priorities, and his achievement is its achievement. The Sochi Olympics were to Putin what the Field of the Cloth of Gold was for Francis I (or, perhaps, for Henry): a feat of splendor and athletic prowess intended to impress rivals and display the grandeur of the nation and its sovereign. This is exactly how the event was described by government officials, Putin included, when it was announced that Sochi had been selected:

When [Putin] returned triumphantly to Moscow, he stepped out of his jet and met assembled reporters at the VIP hall of Vnukovo Airport. “It is, beyond any doubt, a judgment of our country,” he declared. Only in a country desperate for affirmation could the choice of an Olympics have loomed so disproportionately large. “Russia has risen from its knees!” German Gref declared in Guatemala City.

The Sochi Olympics, despite their often critical foreign coverage for sub-par accommodations, vast corruption, and the attendant doping scandal, were a feather in Putin’s cap domestically. Immediately after the Olympics, his approval rating inside Russia spiked to 85 percent. (Of course, public opinion surveys in Russia are always subject to skepticism, and the effects of the Olympics alone are almost impossible to separate from the effects of the almost

96 Ibid., 323.
97 Ibid., 325.
simultaneous invasion and annexation of Crimea within days of the closing ceremonies in February 2014.) In this way, some of Putin’s most notable political success – both the beginning of the serious, focused part of his life and his greatest international spectacle – are the result of early guidance by a Jew, Rakhlin, whom Putin admires immensely.

The other formative experience in Putin’s life was his career in the KGB, which was made possible by his early study of German. This was encouraged and mentored by Vera Dmitrievna Gurevich and later continued by Mina Yuditskaya (now Mina Yuditskaya Berliner). Berliner is Jewish, and now lives in Tel Aviv in an apartment Putin bought for her as a demonstration of his appreciation for her teaching many years before. Putin bought the apartment for her while on a state visit in 2005, although it was not disclosed for some years. The private nature of the gesture (Berliner was the one who revealed it), as well as its substance, indicate the genuineness of the gratitude that motivated it. “She [had] a deep influence on him, and he would remember her decades later with a sentimental fondness.”

Many of those personally close and important to Putin are rewarded with expensive gifts, sometimes including multi-billion-dollar businesses, as in the cases of Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, who jointly control SGM group and have over $1 billion in assets each, thanks to their friendship with Putin stemming from their shared dojo in St. Petersburg. The Rotenbergs are also of Jewish ancestry.

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100 Myers, The New Tsar, 19.
While Putin appears to have very close relationships with many Jews and does not appear to discriminate against Jews per se, it bears mentioning that the same cannot be said of his administration at every level. Although the scholarship on official state anti-Semitism in Russia has been lacking recently, Evgenia Albats believes the prevalence of siloviki, or to use her term, “epaulettes” in the Russian government has caused some backsliding toward the Soviet-era anti-Semitic policies. This has been especially pronounced during Putin’s third presidential term, and can be attributed to those in Putin’s inner circle who don’t share his pro-Semitic tendencies.\textsuperscript{103} For example, Igor Sechin and Sergey Ivanov are both anti-Semites in the KGB tradition, which considers all Jews potential “fifth columnists” and inherently untrustworthy. (These are the opinions of Albats, though detailed evidence is, of course, difficult to find.\textsuperscript{104}) According to her, “It’s harder for Jews to get into these governmental structures – the Kremlin, the administration, etc. That would be because the most important decision-making sphere of the country are controlled by KGB people.” This makes Putin an exception, having served for years in the KGB and its successor, the FSB, but apparently having not bought into its pervasive anti-Semitism.

Albats’s analysis squares with other theories of power distribution in contemporary Russia, which recognize that the concentration of power in Putin’s hands also concentrates power in the hands of those around him, who by necessity have some degree of autonomy – autonomy which has increased, especially regarding the FSB, since Putin’s return to the presidency. “In 2008, President Putin could influence a several government organs completely independent from him; his power even encompassed the great and terrible fire supervision authority. But in 2016-2017, president Putin is unable to influence a number of bodies

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Yevgenia Albats.
independent from him. (Вот в 2008 году президент Путин мог повлиять на ряд совершенно независимых от него органов, его могущество даже распространялось на великий и ужасный пожарный надзор. А в 2016–2017 годах президент Путин не может повлиять на ряд независимых от него органов.)”

This followed closely on the heels of the prosecution of director Kirill Serebrennikov, to which Putin expressed his opposition publicly, but which continued and even intensified nonetheless:

Shortly after the initial questioning of Serebrennikov in May, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, was asked about the incident by an actor at a Kremlin reception. He responded: “Fools”, apparently referring to the investigators. This was seen by some as a sign from the Kremlin to stop the campaign against the director; instead, Russian authorities have intensified it.

If the statements were a true reflection of Putin’s policy preferences, this could be another example of subordinate bodies – particularly the FSB – acting against Putin’s wishes, potentially embarrassing the president (though in retrospect this seems unlikely, and it’s equally possible that Putin was intentionally portraying himself as the good tsar surrounded by bad boyars).

The extent to which Putin’s pro-Semitic policies find their foundation in his personal relationships with Jews also necessarily depends on the nature of Putin’s rule in general, including the degree of autonomy which he delegates to those around him, how tolerant he is of opposition and dissent within the inner circles of his regime, and the relationship between his personal biography and preferences and his rule. If the most convincing explanation for Putin’s pro-Semitism lies in the particular facts of his biography, then it would be reasonable to infer

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that other aspects of Putin’s rule and others of his policies are also inspired by his personal experience, rather than simple managerial pragmatism or deep ideological commitments.

**Conclusions**

No single hypothesis presented above completely explains the Putin regime’s Jewish policies. Any satisfactory explanation of the policy choices of a regime such as Putin’s must address both personal and institutional causes and contexts. Consequently, a combination of these theories is more likely to be a satisfactory explanation, or at least the beginning of one.

To create a truly robust account of the Russian Jewish policy under Putin – and, indeed, the political context and structure surrounding it – further research is imperative. Biographies of Putin are available in English, and can be quite useful in interpreting his policies, but they are necessarily incomplete. Undoubtedly, Putin warrants further treatment by historians after his death, when his life and effects on Russia can be evaluated wholly, even if the depth of those effects may not be fully realized for years. Many of the works of the Eurasianist philosophers are not available in English, including most notably Ilyin’s *Nashi Zadachi*. He and the other philosophers mentioned were prolific, and their work should be made available for political scientists working in English. Their work should also be evaluated for its Jewish-related content, which can further illuminate the debate about the ideological nature of the Putin regime. Lastly, and perhaps most urgently, the relationships between the Russian government and far-left forces and parties in the West should be at least as extensively researched as the corresponding relationship on the right. Péter Krekó is almost alone in pursuing this immensely important facet of international affairs.

The most convincing existing evidence suggests that the Jewish policies of Putin’s government are primarily motivated by his personal attitudes toward Jews, based on his
biography, which includes several notably influential and positive Jewish friends, mentors, and role models. A fuller explanation of Russian Jewish policies will depend on theories of political organization and influence within the Putin government, which can account for degrees of autonomy granted to high-ranking officials in the ministries, the administration, the Duma, and state-controlled corporations.

Possible future changes in Jewish policy in Russia may help elucidate which theory best explains the Kremlin. A change in Jewish policy – which may already be underway, quietly, unofficially – may shed light on how policies are made, implemented, and changed in the Putin government. They may also support or refute theories about the ideological or pragmatic nature of the Kremlin regime.

Beyond the implications for understanding Russia and similar regimes, evaluating these theories may also shed light on the nature of anti-Semitism itself. Explaining the Putin government’s Jewish policies can provide a case study for the relationship between anti-Semitism and politics in other countries. Hopefully, the 21st-century Russia will prove to be a significant example of anti-Semitism being eradicated in the very place in which it recently thrived.
Works Cited


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