Skill, Luck, and the Multiproduct Firm: Evidence From Hedge Funds

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr.
Evan Rawley
University of Pennsylvania

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Abstract
We formalize the idea that when managers require external investment to expand, higher-skilled firms will be more likely to diversify in equilibrium, even though managers can exploit asymmetric information about their ability to raise capital from investors. We exploit the timing of new fund launches in the hedge fund industry to distinguish between agency and capability effects in firm product diversification decisions, using a large survivor-bias-free panel data set on the hedge fund industry from 1994 to 2006. Empirically we show that diversifying firms’ excess returns are high relative to those of other firms prior to diversification and fall within firm following diversification, but are six basis points higher per month per unit of risk ex post compared to a matched sample of focused firms. The evidence suggests that managers exploit asymmetric information about their own ability to time diversification decisions; yet, the discipline of markets ensures that better firms diversify, on average. The results provide large-sample empirical evidence that agency effects and firm capabilities jointly influence diversification decisions.

Keywords
organizational studies, strategy, financial institutions, investment, economics, econometric dynamics

Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economics | Organizational Behavior and Theory

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We propose that when managers require external investment to expand, higher skilled firms will be more likely to diversify, even though managers can exploit asymmetric information about their ability to raise capital from investors. We formalize this intuition in an equilibrium model and test our predictions using a large survivor-bias-free panel dataset on the hedge fund industry 1994-2006. We show that excess returns fall following diversification—defined as the launch of new fund—but are six basis points higher per month per unit of risk in diversified firms compared to a matched sample of focused firms. The evidence suggests that managers exploit asymmetric information about their own ability to time diversification decisions, but the discipline of markets ensures that better firms diversify on average. The results provide large sample empirical evidence that agency effects and firm capabilities both influence diversification decisions.

1. Introduction

Why do firms diversify? At least since Penrose (1959), scholars have advanced the idea that diversification creates value by enabling firms to apply their unique capabilities across multiple products (Teece 1980, Panzar and Willig 1981). By contrast, the diversification discount literature proposes that managers diversify for private gain, even when doing so destroys firm value (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger and Ofek 1995), a perspective that draws heavily on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). While capabilities and agency theories make different predictions about the effect of diversification on firm performance, they are not mutually exclusive with respect to the causes of diversification. In this paper, we integrate the predictions of capabilities and agency theories into a simple equilibrium model and use the model to predict a broad pattern of returns before and after diversification events. We then
test the predictions of the model, using a series of econometric tests that identify capability and agency effects in the decision to diversify.

The model integrates the predictions of agency and capabilities theories in a straightforward way. Firms are more likely to diversify when they possess unique skills and knowledge in one domain that would enable them to generate higher future returns in a related activity (Peteraf 1993, Farjoun 1998). However, lucky firms are also likely to try to diversify if they can use idiosyncratic performance shocks to extract value from investors (Jensen 1983). We explore the rich interplay amongst skill, luck, performance and diversification and show conditions under which firms will be more likely to diversify. The key insight from the model is that when managers require external capital to expand, less skillful firms always have weaker incentives to diversify given a particular track record. The intuition behind this result is that while managers are able to increase their own compensation in the short-run by diversifying, the attractiveness of diversification depends not only on investors’ current beliefs but also on their expected future beliefs. Since firms reveal their true type through performance over time, and do so even faster when they diversify, as in Cabral (2000), less skillful firms always have weaker incentives to diversify given a particular track record.

We test the predictions of the model, using a large and rich panel dataset on 1,353 hedge funds over the period 1994-2006. The pattern evident, in the data on diversifiers’ performance, is striking. Excess returns are well above the sample mean prior to diversifying and fall rapidly following the launch of a second fund. However, after matching diversifiers to non-diversifiers, based on all the observable differences \textit{ex ante}, diversifiers outperform non-diversifiers. The results suggest that, consistent with the agency cost literature, managers time diversification decisions to exploit asymmetric information about their own ability to private advantage; yet, market forces constrain lower ability firms’ expansion options. Thus, firms launching new funds tend to possess greater investment skill than firms that remain focused, and these firms are able to leverage their investment skill across new funds in a manner consistent with the capabilities literature.
This research integrates and tests the predictions of the two major streams of the diversification literature, agency theory and capability theory. The early empirical literature on diversification focused on describing a fact consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976): diversified firms tend to trade at a discount relative to non-diversified firms (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger and Ofek 1995). The literature that followed explained the diversification discount using Coasian (1937) logic (often implicitly). Given that operating a business unit within a firm is an alternative to operating a business unit on a stand-alone basis, evidence of a diversification discount must be attributable to inefficiencies within the firm. Lamont (1997) argued that inefficiencies in internal capital markets should be a leading cause of diseconomies of scope since diversified firms are clearly suppressing external capital markets. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) linked the idea of inefficient internal capital markets to incentive problems in hierarchies, leading to unproductive rent-seeking behavior and the misallocation of capital. The idea that new businesses can distract managers’ attention from their legacy operations formed another explanation for the diversification discount (Penrose 1959, Schoar 2002).

While the recent diversification discount literature explains why diversification is costly, the other side of the Coasian (1937) calculus, the advantages firms possess compared to markets, has largely remained beyond its purview (Hubbard and Palia 1999, Klein 2001). However, treating firms as if they can only be disadvantaged relative to markets ignores the idea that firms possess specialized skills or resources that can sometimes be exploited more efficiently internally, an idea championed by the early theoretical work on diversification and more recently by the capabilities literature and the empirical literature on product dynamics (Teece 1980, 1982; Barney 1986; Peteraf 1993; Bernard, Redding and Schott 2010). And, indeed, the fundamental basis for the concept of the diversification discount is not simply that diversification is costly; it is that the costs of diversification exceed the benefits. Barring systematic mistakes, for the costs of diversification to exceed the benefits there must be more than just costs of diversification; there must be agency costs as well (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Without agency costs, forward looking managers would evaluate the relative merits of diversification based on the
transferable skills and resources of firm as well the anticipated costs, and, in equilibrium, would choose to diversify when the benefits of diversification exceed the costs. It is only when one considers the possibility that managers may use diversification to take advantage of stakeholders for private gain that the possibility of a diversification discount emerges. Thus, the foundations of the diversification discount literature rest largely upon agency costs.

While recent empirical work on diversification, using matched samples of diversifiers and non-diversifiers and fine-grained micro-data, has cast doubt on whether there is a diversification discount at all (Campa and Kedia 2002; Villalonga 2004a, 2004b), understanding the fundamental tension between agency costs and firm capabilities in the decision to diversify remains an issue of great importance. Our objective, in this paper, is to show that both factors play an important role in the decision to diversify. As in Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004a, 2004b) we use matching and micro-data to test whether diversification, conditional on receiving external capital, creates value on average. However, we also want to show that the fundamental idea at the core of the diversification discount literature has merit; managers do try to exploit asymmetric information for private gain in the context of diversification, even in the absence of a diversification discount. To do so, we not only study the relationship between diversification and ex post performance, we also examine the timing of diversification and ex ante performance, and use the results to show how agency costs and capabilities jointly influence diversification decisions.

In the remainder of the paper, we develop our argument in more detail. In the following section, we introduce our model of diversification and derive the above described predictions. In Section 3, we discuss the hedge fund industry and describe the data. In Section 4, we develop our empirical specification and discuss the results. In Section 5, we offer conclusions.

2. Skill, Luck and the Multiproduct Firm

In this section, we develop a formal model of diversification in the presence of skill and luck that builds on and extends the capabilities and agency cost literatures in the context of diversification. We define skill as in the capabilities literature: skill is an inimitable rent-generating capability (Wernerfelt
1984, Barney 1986, Dierickx and Cool 1989). We also follow the capabilities literature by focusing on the role of skill transference across products in the context of related diversification. For tractability, we tailor the analysis toward the hedge fund industry, though we also discuss how the model generalizes to other contexts. In our context, skill can be characterized as investment ability, a conception of skill that is closely related to forecasting skill, in the sense that firms possess heterogeneous ability with respect to anticipating future payoffs from current investments (McNamara and Bromiley 1997, Makadok and Walker 2000, Durand 2003, Pierce 2009). Skills are transferable across products to the extent that investment ability in one strategy class is correlated with investment ability in another strategy class.

Though we do not explicitly measure relatedness in our empirical work, hedge fund diversification would appear to satisfy any of the standard measures of related diversification.\footnote{Relatedness is typically defined using SIC codes (Schoar 2002) or by evaluating whether the two business units have similar activities, resources, skills, customer groups and physical bases (Rumelt 1974). Our study of new fund launches by hedge funds meets either definition of related diversification.}

The relatedness assumption is important because the capabilities literature has long argued that firm resources, tangible or intangible, are more readily transferable across related products (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988, Farjoun 1994, Silverman 1999). Thus, the logic for why higher skilled firms might expand horizontally into related products is similar to the argument for why firms expand the vertical scope of the firm. By extending their capabilities into related activities upstream or downstream high ability firms can create value by expanding the scope of the firm (Jacobides and Winter 2002). We extend the capabilities literature by formalizing the idea that higher skilled firms are more likely to diversify, in the context of equilibrium formal model that also takes agency costs into account.

In our model, managers are classic agents, as in Jensen and Meckling’s (1976); they are purely self-interested and actively seek the opportunity to use asymmetric information to exploit investors. While the model builds on the seminal notion of agency costs, by examining how managers use asymmetric information for private gain, our approach differs from agency theoretic models that assume managers can exploit internally generated free cash flow to fund the firm’s expansion (Jensen 1983). Instead, we
focus on agency costs that operate through asymmetric information managers hold about their own ability when tapping external capital markets.

Investors are perfectly rational in our model. They actively seek out managers who are the most likely to deliver the highest future risk-adjusted returns—managers who are the most skilled—while harboring no illusions about managers’ private incentives and information. Given asymmetric information between managers and investors about a firm’s true ability level, investors make inferences about firm skill based on all available information about the firm; particularly, the information embedded in each of the firm’s funds’ past returns and their previous decisions whether to diversify. Based on their posterior beliefs about quality, investors allocate capital to managers, where the capital allocations are correlated with firm performance. However, only managers know the firm’s true investment ability. Investors only receive a noisy signal of the firm’s ability based on its track record, which opens the door for managers to exploit their asymmetric information for private gain.

Managers know that investors are rational and will use all observable information about the firm to form beliefs about the firm’s underlying ability, expecting that investors update their beliefs in each period. Managers also know investors can be fooled temporarily by idiosyncratic performance shocks, but that diversification reveals more information about the firm by sending multiple signals to investors about the firm’s true ability in any given time period (Cabral 2000). Thus, the manager’s problem is whether and when to diversify, based on the firm’s performance track record and the firm’s true ability, while the investor’s problem is where to invest. The solution to the joint optimization problem delivers several testable predictions about the pattern of returns around diversification events.

A. Model Setup

There are $N$ investment managers, indexed $j = 1, \ldots, N$, and a (representative) investor $I$. In each period, the investment managers produce returns according to:

$$r_{jt} = \theta_j + \epsilon_{jt},$$
where $r_{jt}$ is the period’s excess return above the risk-free asset \(^2\) for investment manager $j$, $\theta_j$ is a firm’s capability level or, specifically, the investment skill of the manager, and $\varepsilon_{jt}$ is a random shock. Further, we assume for simplicity that $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim i.i.d. \text{ with } E(\varepsilon_{jt})=0 \text{ and } V(\varepsilon_{jt})=\sigma^2_\varepsilon$, which means $E(\varepsilon_{jt}, \varepsilon_{kt})=0$ for $j\neq k$ and $E(\varepsilon_{jt}, \varepsilon_{js})=0$ for $s\neq t$.

Each investment manager has zero cost to operate their first fund. \(^3\) If a manager decides to launch a second fund, they pay a cost $c_j$ in the period when the second fund is launched, a decision tracked by an indicator variable:

$$d_{jt} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if a second fund launched in current period} \\
0 & \text{otherwise} 
\end{cases}$$

If a second fund is launched, we denote each of the funds with a superscript $l$ and assume that returns are generated according to $r_{jl} = \theta_j + \varepsilon_{jl}$, where $E(\varepsilon_{jl}, \varepsilon_{jm}) > 0$ for $l\neq m$. \(^4\) Thus, firm $j$’s capabilities are defined by a draw from the underlying distribution of $\theta$, and they are manifest in a within-firm correlation in performance, which we denote $\rho_j$, between funds.

An investment manager’s payoff in period $t$ is simply:

$$u_{jt} = w^1_{jt} + w^2_{jt} - d_{jt}c_j$$

where the $w^k_{jt}$ is the weight $I$ assigns to manager $j$’s fund $k$ in period $t$. If a second fund does not exist in a particular period, then $w^2_{jt} = 0$. In other words, the payoff is increasing linearly in the allocation weight the investor gives to the investment manager’s funds, less the cost of the fund. The equation is intended to

\(^2\) Note, in the foregoing, we will refer to the total return of investment $j$ in period $t$ as $R_{jt}$, the return of the risk-free assets as $R_{rf}$, and the excess return of investment $j$ as $r_{jt} = R_{jt} - R_{rf}$.

\(^3\) We make this assumption that an existing firm has already sunk the costs necessary to operate an initial fund for analytic convenience. Since strategic decisions are conditional on the existence of a firm and its first fund, it has no bearing on the analysis.

\(^4\) To make the model tractable we assume investment skill is constant across funds within a firm. A more general model might allow investment skill to vary within firm based on how closely related the new fund is to the firm’s existing fund. While introducing variation in investment skill would be an interesting extension of our model, our results will continue to hold as long as investment skill is positively correlated between funds within a firm.
be a simple version of a profit function for the investment manager, where the costs are fixed and the
revenues are proportional to assets under management (AUM).

Finally, the investment manager’s multi-period utility function is simply:

\[ v_j = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta^{t-1} u_{jt} \]

Each investment manager’s type is characterized by the pair \( \{\theta_j, c_j\} \) where

\[ \theta_j = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{with probability } p \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \]

and \( c_j \sim h(c) \), where \( h(c) \) is a continuous distribution with associated cumulative distribution function \( H(c) \). Further, we assume that that the two types are drawn independently so that \( Corr(c_j, \theta_j) = 0 \).\(^5\)

The investor has a standard mean-variance utility function. In each period, the investor obtains ex ante utility of:

\[ u_t = w_t^\tau \mu_t - \frac{\lambda}{2} w_t^\tau \Omega_t w \quad (1) \]

where \( w \) is a vector of allocation weights, \( \mu \) is a vector of expectations of excess returns, \( \Omega \) is the variance-covariance of returns the investor faces, and \( \lambda \) is a parameter measuring \( I^e \)'s risk aversion. As with the investment manager, the investor obtains a multi-period utility, which is the discounted sum of the ex ante expected utilities, namely

\[ v_I = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \delta^{t-1} u_{it} \]

In the foregoing, we assume that the investor, in each period, acts myopically with respect to (1). Because investors choose where to allocate their investments each period based on past performance, managers have an incentive not to dilute their track record.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) In this set up, \( \theta \) can be thought of as investment skill—as it measures how effectively a manager generates excess returns for investors; and \( c_j \) can be thought of as managerial skill—as it measures how economically a hedge fund firm can provide its investment skill to investors. As we will see later, these dual sources of uncertainty play a crucial role in the asymmetric information problem between managers and investors.
In each period, the investor solves the problem in (1) and allocates their capital, and the investment manager chooses, at the beginning of the second period, whether to launch a new fund. Therefore, in the 3-period model, the sequence is as follows. In the first period, Nature draws a type for each investment manager \( j \); investor \( I \) chooses a vector of weights \( w_1 \) to each fund; and returns are realized and period payoffs are obtained. In the second period, each investment manager chooses whether to launch a second fund \( (d_j) \); investor \( I \) chooses a vector of weights \( w_2 \) to each fund; and returns are realized and period payoffs are obtained. Finally, in the third period, investor \( I \) chooses a vector of weights \( w_3 \) to each fund and returns are realized and period payoffs are obtained.\(^7\)

**B. Model Results**

To solve this game, we use the equilibrium concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), so equilibrium actions must be sequentially rational and beliefs of the players must be consistent with Bayes’ Rule on the equilibrium path of play. Using this solution concept, we derive three primary results, which we then evaluate empirically. First, firms, which have enjoyed above average performance, are more likely to diversify. Second, we show that \textit{ex post}, firms that diversify perform worse than they did \textit{ex ante}. Finally, we show that given a particular pre-diversification level performance, those with greater investment skill will diversify at a higher rate than those with lesser investment skill. Taken together, the

\(^6\) The results of Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971) show that this reduced form assumption will hold under various conditions (with rebalancing) that could easily be specified here with no material effect on the analysis (see also Campbell and Viceira 2002). It is important to note that in this case, the conditions for myopia are potentially complicated by the strategic aspects of the game for both investors and investment managers. In particular, because there is potential information revealed after each round about the investment manager’s type, it may be possible that investors would shade down their allocations in order to account for the reduced risk introduced by type uncertainty in every round. Indeed, this intuition that investors shade their allocations in early periods because of greater uncertainty and allocate more in later periods is correct, but is captured directly in the model. Here it is reflected in the play of the game since the posteriors—including uncertainty about types—after each round are weakly more precise. That said, there is no additional effect (i.e. holding back capital for the known higher risk-adjusted returns later) since the extant results are invariant to changing opportunity sets (see Campbell and Viceira 2002). The intuition here is that if one knows that future risk adjusted returns will be higher than present ones, one would still like to have more capital to deploy in those later periods—since it will maximize final consumption or wealth. That causes one to optimally take risk given the current period’s opportunity set in a utility-maximization sense.

\(^7\) Note, we adopt the notation that when we drop the subscript \( t \) from \( d_{jt} \), the indicator variable \( d_j \) simply indicates whether a manager has chosen to diversify.
results imply that diversifiers will revert to the mean, but not as strongly as those with the same pre-diversification performance who do not diversify.

In order to derive these results, we start with an analysis of the behavior of the investor. Consider the investor’s problem. Let \( \mu_t \) denote a vector with \( K \) elements indexed by \( jl \), for each fund in the opportunity set, of expected returns in period \( t \) to each fund. Let \( \Omega_t \) be the associated ex ante variance-covariance matrix of the return of the funds in the investors’ opportunity set.

Given these characteristics, in period \( t \), the investor’s optimal allocation is:

\[
\mathbf{w}_t^* = \frac{\Omega_t^{-1} \mu_t}{\lambda}.
\] (2)

This setup has a number of features, which substantially simplify characterization of the equilibrium of the game. Perhaps most notable is a result from the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe 1964): that the weights to managers are independent since manager returns are drawn independently; and there is no full-investment constraint (see Lemma A1, all proofs appear in the appendix). Further, although weights to managers are independent, weights to different funds, provided by the same manager, are not independent because the error in estimating a manager’s skills creates correlated risk across a manager’s funds for the investor. Said differently, the ex ante uncertainty in a manager’s returns are common across all of their funds, since all of the returns are drawn from the same underlying distribution, and is the sum of the error in estimating \( \theta_j \) and the random error in their return generating process. Further, based on our assumptions, returns across managers are uncorrelated, meaning most of the off-diagonal elements of \( \Omega_t \) are zero.

Next, we turn to our results concerning diversification. As with many signaling models, in this model there exists a pooling equilibrium in which no one ever diversifies. This is a straightforward application of the fact that off path beliefs are unconstrained by PBE. Thus, investors could believe that any diversifier is a low type, and that on the equilibrium path the probability that any manager is a high type is \( p \). These beliefs will guarantee that diversification never occurs in equilibrium.
What about equilibria in which some diversification occurs? As a first step in answering this question, we establish a result which must hold in any equilibrium in which diversification occurs. Once we establish these results, we will then turn to the task of establishing the existence of a particular form of equilibrium.

Consider first how such an equilibrium may behave. In particular, one might think that firms with identical track records, in the first round, will make identical decisions about whether or not to launch a new fund. In fact, this intuition is not correct. To see this, consider the calculus behind launching a new fund for a set of managers with a history $(r_d)$, where $r$ indicates the manager’s returns up to period $t$, and $d$ indicates whether a manager has diversified. A manager will diversify if and only if the expected payoff from diversification is greater than the expected payoff from non-diversification:

$$w^1_2(r_1,0) + \delta E(w^1_2(r_2,0)) \leq w^1_2(r_1,1) + w^2_2(r_1,1) + \delta E(w^1_3(r_2,1)) + w^2_3(r_2,1) - c_j.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

The left hand side of (3) is the expected payoff for staying focused: it is the sum of the size of the allocation to the manager’s only fund in the second period and what the manager can expect to be allocated in the third period. Importantly, this latter value will be a function of investors’ beliefs about the manager’s type at the end of the first period and the expected return of the manager in the second period. The right hand side is a similar expression for the expected payoff for a manager who chooses to diversify.$^8$

Rearranging terms, we have the result that if diversification is an equilibrium, a firm will diversify if and only if their costs to launch a new fund are below a critical level $c_{j}^{\text{crit}}(r)$:

$$c_j \leq c_{j}^{\text{crit}}(r_1) = [w^1_2(r_1,1) - w^1_2(r_1,0)] + \delta [E(w^1_3(r_2,1)) - E(w^1_3(r_2,0))] + [w^2_2(r_1,1) + \delta E(w^2_3(r_2,1))].$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

The inequality in (4) illustrates the tradeoff for the manager. First, in order to diversify, the manager must pay a sunk cost, which is captured on the left side of equation 4. Second, because returns are ex ante correlated, the allocation weight investors give to the original fund in the first period will be

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$^8$ Note that incorporated in (3) are any beliefs the investor may have after first and second period returns, conditional on diversification.
unambiguously lower than it would have been in the absence of the launch of a second fund. This is captured by the term $w_2^1(r_1, 1) - w_2^1(r_1, 0)$ in (4), which one might call a *cannibalization effect*: diversification is costly to the firm, on the margin, in terms of lowering investor allocations to fund 1.

There is also a potential for either a lower or higher weight to fund 1 in the third period, depending on the expectation of the weight given $r_1$. Simply put, mean reversion implies that, if $r_1$ is below the manager’s type, then in expectation, the manager’s returns in future periods will be higher, and if it is above the manager’s type, in expectation, it will be lower. Moreover, with the launch of the second fund, the manager should expect to be closer to the mean return (their type $\theta_j$) than in the case where they do not launch a second fund at every point in time in the future. Since investors update their beliefs of a manager’s type based on the additional information embedded in the second fund’s returns, diversification creates a *track record dilution effect*, which is captured by the term $\delta [E(w_3^1(r_2, 1)) - E(w_3^1(r_2, 0))]$ in (4), as in Cabral (2000). Finally, these (potential) costs will be compared with an unambiguous benefit. Because investors are assumed to be unconstrained in borrowing, investors face no tradeoff in allocating to the second fund. Thus, a second fund produces incremental revenue for the firm’s managers and, therefore, managers will always be better off when they diversify, conditional on the cannibalization and track record dilution effects and the costs of diversification. We refer to the unambiguous benefits of diversification as the *scope extension effect*, which is captured by the term $w_2^2(r_1, 1) + \delta E(w_3^2(r_2, 1))$.

Even though managers with identical histories will be treated symmetrically by the investor in period two, managers with lower investment skill will have less strong incentives, for every level of realized returns in period 1, to launch a second fund, because their expectation of future performance depends on their type. The fact that second period performance, in expectation, is lower for low skilled managers means they can expect lower allocations in the third period and, therefore, will be less willing to launch an additional fund. In other words, in any diversification equilibrium $c^*_H(r_1) \geq c^*_L(r_1)$. This conclusion is summarized as:
Lemma 1. Conditional on first period returns $r_1$, in any equilibrium in which there is diversification, the probability a high type will diversify is higher than the probability a low type will diversify.

To pin down our analysis further, we return to the issue of pooling equilibria. One feature of this model is that after the first period, there is no dependence between the equilibria that are played for a given path $r_1$. This means that if separation occurs in equilibrium for some $r$, it could be the case that for an arbitrary small value $\eta$ there could be pooling for $r_1+\eta$. In fact, this leads to the possibility that measures of $r_1$ alternate between pooling and separation; because each unique “slice” of $r_1$ may pool, there are equilibria in which at lower levels managers may separate, then at intermediate levels they may pool, and then at higher levels they return to separation. That said, other equilibria also exist to this game; in fact, as our intent is simply to provide sufficient conditions for the dynamic we describe above, we show there are also equilibria in which low-cost firms diversify and high-cost firms do not.9

Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium in which for sufficiently low costs, managers will diversify and otherwise will stay focused.

We now turn to our primary result, in the appendix we construct an equilibrium such that managers with very low returns in the first period all stay focused, managers with very high level of returns diversify, and managers in the “middle” diversify only when their costs are sufficiently low. Such an equilibrium—along with the fact that higher quality managers in any equilibrium with diversification diversify at higher rates given their track record—allows us to establish the existence of an equilibrium to the game with three testable properties. Result 1, summarizes the characteristics of this equilibrium.

Result 1. There exists an equilibrium to the game in which the following three properties hold:

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9 While the equilibria is not unique, the equilibrium we study is a natural one to study. If we confine the analysis to look at the maximally separating equilibrium, then the cutpoints will be increasing, assuming they exist. The intuition for this result is that both the maximum cutpoints of both types are increasing in $r_1$. Moreover, as we show in the appendix, these can both hold simultaneously, which means maximal separation occurs when cutpoints are increasing.
(i) Diversifiers will outperform non-diversifiers in the pre-diversification period:
\[ E_j(r_1 \mid d_j = 1) \geq E_j(r_1 \mid d_j = 0). \]

(ii) In expectation, the performance of diversifiers will fall after diversification:
\[ E_j(r_1 \mid d_j = 1) \geq E_j(r_2^1 \mid d_j = 1). \]

(iii) Conditional on first period returns, diversifiers will outperform non-diversifiers:
\[ E_j(r_2^1 + r_3^1 \mid r_1, d_j = 1) \geq E_j(r_2^1 + r_3^1 \mid r_1, d_j = 0). \]

At this point, the intuition behind each component of Result 1 follows straightforwardly from the earlier results. The first result that non-diversifiers will under-perform diversifiers, prior to diversification, is driven by two facts: cost cutoffs are weakly increasing in first period returns and the more skillful managers are more likely to diversify conditional on any \( r_1 \). The second result follows from the same set of facts, namely that the probability of diversifying is increasing in the first period return, which in turns means it is increasing in the random shock to a manager’s return. In expectation, therefore, the post-diversification return must fall. Finally, the last component: conditional on first period returns, the returns of diversifiers will fall less in expectation than non-diversifiers follows directly from Lemma 1. Since high-skilled types will be more likely to diversify conditional on first-period returns, they will have a higher expected return post-diversification than non-diversifiers. This, in turn, makes rational investors’ beliefs about the diversifiers. Figure 1 illustrates our three predictions graphically.

Our theory predicts a pattern of returns that is broadly consistent with a set of stylized facts, reported in the literatures on diversification and investment firms. Fund managers’ private incentives influence their strategic choices (Chevalier and Ellison 1997). Legacy business unit (fund) returns fall following diversification (Schoar 2002), particularly when preceded by unusually strong reported performance (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998); yet, firms with the best track record tend to launch new funds and their performance tends to persist relative to a control group (Kaplan and Schoar 2005). Our model explains
these stylized facts in a simple testable equilibrium framework. Neither agency effects nor capabilities alone can explain the full set of results demonstrated. Other theories might explain some of our results, but cannot generate the full set of results predicted either. For example, Roll’s (1986) hubris argument might explain why firms that experience an idiosyncratic performance shock diversify and then suffer declining returns because they develop excessive pride based on their track record. However, hubris cannot explain why diversifiers outperform firms that remain focused.

The hedge fund industry is somewhat unique, and so caution should be applied in generalizing the model to other industrial contexts. Hedge fund firms diversify by launching new funds, which are investment products that deliver a stream of cash flows. Thus, hedge funds require new investment to diversify. Furthermore, hedge fund customers are also investors. While hedge fund diversification is similar to product diversification in industrial companies, in the sense that the performance of each new product impacts the firm’s overall reputation (Wernerfelt 1988; Cabral 2000), industrial customers are not typically investors, and industrial investors cannot usually choose which of the firm’s products to invest in. To the extent that product performance is not be as volatile in industrial markets, agency costs associated with market timing around peak performance may be less important. On the other hand, agency costs will tend to be more severe when managers have access to free cash flow and do not have to tap external capital markets to fund their diversification strategies (Jensen 1983). Nevertheless, the model proposed is quite general, and the hedge fund industry is interesting to study in its own right as we discuss briefly below.

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10 The model is, of course, not completely unique. Cabral (2000) develops a related model in which firms extend their existing brands when both quality and returns of earlier products are jointly sufficiently high. MacDonald and Slavinski (1987) provide a general equilibrium model in which some firms diversify and others do not, much like our model. Berk and Green (2004) provide a model similar to ours, in which firms have heterogeneous abilities to generate gross returns and investors rationally invest, however in equilibrium, investment managers’ investment and pricing decisions result in little persistence in outperformance.
3. Data and institutional context

A. The hedge fund industry

Hedge funds are investment vehicles that, like mutual funds, pool capital contributed by investors for the purpose of investing in securities and other assets. As of March 2010, the hedge fund industry managed $1.7 trillion, which is remarkable considering that the industry only managed about $50 billion as of 1990 (Hedge Fund Research 2010). In the United States, the hedge fund industry is regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), but unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are legally constructed to facilitate extensive short selling, leverage (i.e., debt financing) and non-linear performance-based compensation measures. In order to be exempt from the stricter investment and compensation restrictions that mutual funds face hedge funds can only raise assets from “qualified purchasers,” individuals whose net investable assets are greater than $5 million or institutional investors whose net investable assets are greater than $25 million.11 Hedge funds also face limits on the number of investors; however, in practice, this limit is rarely binding as mechanisms exist that allow firms to pool individual investors into limited partnerships that count as only a single investor.

Consistent with the standard definition of diversified firms as multiproduct firms (Teece 1982) and with the literature on mutual fund product diversification (Siggelkow 2003), we consider hedge fund firms to be diversified when they operate multiple funds. With the exception of onshore/offshore and currency twin funds, which we consider a single fund in our sample, hedge funds generally launch new funds with distinct investment objectives and/or trading strategies compared to their existing funds. Thus, diversification is usually distinct from expansion in the context of hedge funds.

The hedge fund industry offers a unique laboratory for studying capabilities and agency effects. Hedge funds are typically owned by the managers who run them, which reduces the potential somewhat that traditional agency costs will obtain between investors and managers in operating the firm ex post.

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11 Although this is the most general case, funds may submit to more significant registration and supervisory requirements. If they do so, investors must be “accredited,” which is a less stringent standard than “qualified purchaser.” For an individual investor to be “accredited,” for example, they must have a net worth greater than $1 million, or have an income of greater than $200,000 for the previous two years.
However, as residual claimants of funds, investors are exposed to managers’ incentives to misrepresent their skill \textit{ex ante} ($\theta$ in the notation above); which managers may take advantage of by raising money to launch additional funds when the firm experiences a lucky streak. Thus, the hedge fund context facilitates a test of \textit{ex ante} agency costs, or timing effects, associated with diversification. Another advantage of the hedge fund context is that firm performance is readily measureable at the product (fund) level over relatively long periods of time, which allows us to separate persistent skill effects from idiosyncratic shocks.

\textbf{B. Data and sample}

Hedge funds are closed to the general public and are not required to publicly report their returns. However, a large number of funds do choose to report their returns to one or more private companies that make their data available by subscription. Our data on hedge funds, from Lipper-TASS (TASS) and Hedge Fund Research (HFR), was provided to us for research purposes by a major financial institution. The data from the TASS and HFR data series begin in 1977, but only includes “graveyard” funds—funds that stopped reporting to the data providers for any reason including fund failure—from 1994. We use the survivor bias free subsample of the data 1994-2006 as our main sample, though our results are robust to using the full sample as well. Taking TASS and HFR together, we have coverage on 3,102 firms over the period 1994-2006, representing approximately 25\% of the firms in the industry.\footnote{Where differences arise between TASS and HFR, we use data from the provider that captures a longer history of returns on a fund by fund basis.}

Amongst all the datasets used in the hedge fund literature, TASS and HFR are considered the most comprehensive (Li, Zhang and Zhao 2008). We believe this is the first paper to integrate these two datasets—most researchers rely on either one or the other—making our dataset the largest survivor-bias free dataset assembled to date on hedge funds. However, the data do have some important limitations. Firms choose whether to report their data to HFR and TASS, presumably out of self-interest; therefore, the data may be subject to selection bias. While we do not know what decision making processes lead firms to self-report their data, based on our discussions with hedge fund managers, we believe hedge
funds are more likely to self-report to TASS and HFR when they are interested in raising capital at some future date for expansion of their existing fund and/or for expansion through product diversification. Thus, although our results may not generalize to hedge funds that do not require external capital to expand, this limitation does not represent a major problem for our research as we are explicitly interested in studying firms that require external capital to expand.\textsuperscript{13}

To make the analysis tractable, we examine the performance of a firm’s first fund before and after the firm’s first horizontal expansion (i.e. the launch of a second fund). Our analysis, therefore, focuses on 1,876 firms that enter the dataset as focused firms, 1,186 firms that remain focused and 690 firms that subsequently diversify,\textsuperscript{14} excluding firms that enter as diversified firms, which we define as becoming a diversified firm within the first twelve months of entering the dataset, and funds that reported less than twelve months of returns or did not report returns continuously. After matching diversified firms to firms that remain focused (described in detail below), our test sample consists of 37,657 fund-months from 1,353 firms, of which 676 are diversified firms and 677 are a matched set of focused firms (there is one tie in the matching process).

\textit{C. Dependent variables}

We test the predictions of the model using risk-adjusted excess returns as our baseline measure of firm performance. Empirically, the appropriate measure of performance depends crucially on the risks against which performance is evaluated. The recent financial crisis has raised questions about how well hedge fund risks are understood. We, therefore, use a range of measures intended to control for systematic and non-systematic risk exposure and show that our results are robust to a wide range of plausible measures of performance. Because there is general agreement in the literature that investors price financial assets controlling for systematic risk exposure, we assume hedge fund investors

\textsuperscript{13} Another potential limitation of the data is that it may be reported inaccurately. While monthly reported returns are generally not audited, annual returns reported to investors are audited, which limits the scope for misrepresentation for most firms.

\textsuperscript{14} For legal reasons, many firms offer identical funds as onshore (U.S. domiciled) and offshore (non-U.S. domiciled) products. We treat these onshore/offshore funds as a single fund. We also treat funds that have identical trading strategies in different currencies as being a single fund.
benchmark performance against broad market indices as a first approximation of fund performance. Thus, we use standard asset pricing models to estimate excess returns in our baseline specification. However, hedge funds may also be exposed to non-systematic risks that are not priced by standard market benchmarks. If funds take on significant non-systematic risks, perhaps through aggressive use of leverage, they may appear to generate higher average excess returns that are really an artifact of model mispricing. We account for the non-systematic riskiness of a fund’s underlying investments using a dynamic version of the information ratio. We also control for biases that may arise due to self-reporting, including serial correlation in the time series of returns using an autoregressive lag one (AR1) correction and for backfill bias by dropping the first reported monthly return.\textsuperscript{15}

Our baseline performance benchmark follows the emerging standard for assessing hedge fund performance (Sadka 2010). The performance measure is developed based on Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) 7-factor asset pricing model, which is specifically designed for pricing risk in hedge funds by controlling for exposures to linear and non-linear equity, bond, commodity and option-based risk factors. We augment Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) model by including a “traded liquidity factor” from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), which controls for a fund’s exposure to illiquidity risk.\textsuperscript{16} Excess returns are the sum of a time-invariant fund-specific term $a_i$ plus a mean zero residual $e_i$ from the regression:

$$R_{it} = a_i + R_{ft} + X_tB_i + e_{it},$$

where $i$ and $t$ index funds and time (in months) respectively; $R_i$ is a fund’s raw return from TASS and HFR and the vector $X$ contains the seven risk factors from Hsieh’s data library and the traded liquidity factor from Stambaugh’s website.\textsuperscript{17} The term $a_i$ is the time invariant component of a fund’s performance and $e$ is the residual. We compute $a_i$ the coefficients on $X$ and $e$ by running 1,876 fund-level longitudinal regressions. Excess returns $Y$ for firm $i$ in any period $t$ are defined as $Y_{it}=a_i+e_{it}$, where excess return

\textsuperscript{15} Posthuma and Jelle van der Sluis (2003) drop the first 36 months of self-reported returns to control for backfill bias. We drop the first month of recorded return data as we found that only the first reported monthly return was significantly different from long-run average returns. Dropping additional months has little effect on our point estimates but it does lead to noisier estimates as most firms in the sample diversify for the first time within the first 36 months of their existence.

\textsuperscript{16} These data are available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaug/liq_data_1962_2008.txt.

\textsuperscript{17} Hsieh’s data library is available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFData.htm
captures the combination of a fund’s skill and luck relative to a market benchmark. We call the resulting measure “8-factor excess returns.” We then compute the (dynamic) information ratio as excess returns ($Y_t$) divided by the standard deviation of excess returns. Both the information ratio and excess returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to control for extreme values, though doing so has no meaningful impact on our results. We also replicated all of our results using Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) 7-factor asset pricing model without the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor, and using a more traditional passive benchmark commonly employed for evaluating mutual funds, the Fama-French three-factor model (1996) plus a momentum factor (Carhart 1997).

We use excess returns as a dependent variable in our regressions of diversification on performance, and also use excess returns to compute average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), where $CAR = \Sigma Y_t/n$, the sum of $n$ lagged excess returns divided by the number of months the firm was in operation at time $t$, a standard measure of a fund’s cumulative historical performance, in a probit model predicting the launch of a new fund. We use average two-year CAR as our key performance variable predicting the launch of a new fund. Using two years of historical returns to compute average CAR is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. We want to choose a performance measure that captures the firm’s historical performance, but that also gives weight to the firm’s most recent performance since information about the firm’s ability may become stale over time and have less bearing on how the firm is currently perceived in the market. Using a two-year average CAR represents an imperfect tradeoff between including more information about the firm’s historical track record by including longer performance lags and reducing the amount of stale information in the firms track record data. We verify that we obtain similar results with longer lagged CAR measures and measures of CAR that give more recent observations more weight than older observations.

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main sample, including our excess return and information ratio measures. On average, the funds in our baseline sample generated 37 basis points of risk-adjusted (excess) returns per month with a standard deviation of about 4% per month. Adjusting for non-
systematic risk exposure, using the information ratio, the average fund generated 17 basis points of excess return per unit of risk with a standard deviation of about 1% per month.

D. Controls

Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics for the control variables drawn from TASS and HFR, including size, measured by assets under management, investment strategy, time and regional location. The average fund had $100 million of assets under management (AUM), while the average firm held $147 million of AUM. The size distribution of AUM is skewed right with the top 1% of funds growing to $1.9 billion.\footnote{AUMs are reported winsorized at the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 99\textsuperscript{th} percentile, though winsorizing has no effect on the results.} We take the non-normality of AUM into account by using AUM size deciles from the overall distribution of all TASS and HFR funds and firms. Our results are unchanged when we use the log of AUM instead of using size deciles. 11\% of fund-months had missing AUM, which we control for using a missing AUM dummy variable.

19\% of funds reported that they were fund-of-funds that invest in other hedge funds.\footnote{Fund of funds take positions in other hedge funds. Since fund of funds are somewhat different from traditional hedge funds, we verify that they are not driving the results in the paper. We replicated all of the results in this paper excluding fund-of-funds (results available from the authors upon request).} 23\% were long/short funds – a general type of hedge fund that often has no meaningful restrictions on investment strategy. The other 58\% of funds were distributed over 32 additional investment strategy categories, with the largest being equity hedge (9\%), managed futures (9\%), and event driven (7\%) strategies. No other strategy category had more than 5\% of fund-months.

We report the composition of the sample by calendar year in Table 1, but we use periodicity in three ways in our analysis: (i) thirteen year fixed effects control for hedge-fund specific calendar time effects; (ii) market returns for 132 calendar months control for time series variation in market returns in our computation of excess returns; and (iii) thirty-six event time categorical variables control for the time path of returns after the launch of a new fund (or match date) in our matched tests.
The hedge fund industry is a global industry, though approximately two-thirds of the fund-months in our sample are based in the United States. To the extent that regional differences influence diversification decisions, we also control for the location of the firm’s headquarters where appropriate.

4. Empirical specification and results

A. The propensity to diversify

Our first prediction is that diversifiers will outperform non-diversifiers in the pre-diversification period. To generate evidence in support of Result 1(i), we test whether firms tend to launch new funds when they experience unusually strong performance. We drop diversifying firms\textsuperscript{20} from the analysis following the month in which they launch a new fund, while all fund months are included for firms that remain focused, and use the probit model:

$$\text{LAUNCH}^*_{it} = x_{it}\beta + \zeta_{it},$$

where the unit of observation is the fund-month for fund $i$ in month $t$. We estimate the latent variable $\text{LAUNCH}^*$ using $\text{LAUNCH} = 1$ [LAUNCH*$>0$] when the firm launches a new fund; $x$ includes all observable characteristics of firms that might plausibly have an effect on the decision to launch a new fund. The vector $x$ includes two-year average monthly cumulative abnormal returns ($\text{CAR}$), average $\text{CAR}$ for other firms in the same strategy class, ten fund size declines, where size is measured in terms of under management (AUM), log AUM by strategy class, log firm age, 13 time (year) dummies, 10 fund investment strategy dummies, four regional geographic location dummies, and $\zeta$ is an error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance one. Standard errors are clustered by firm.

We show the result of estimates of the probit model (6), using 1,876 firms and 85,428 fund months in Table 2 columns 1-2. Column 1 shows that the marginal effect of $\text{CAR}$ on the propensity to diversify without controls is 0.00079%, compared to a baseline diversification rate of 0.801% (690 new fund launches in 85,428 fund-months), and is strongly statistically significant. In other words, doubling $\text{CAR}$

\textsuperscript{20} Because our tests are performed at the level of the fund for a firm’s first fund only, we use “fund” and “firm” interchangeably in this section.
from the mean increases the probability that the firm will launch a new fund in any given month by
approximately 10%. Column 2 shows the marginal effect of CAR on the propensity to diversify with
controls. The result continues to be statistically significant though the point estimate on CAR is smaller.
Holding all other regressors at their mean values and doubling CAR increases the probability of
diversifying by 0.055%, which represents a 7% increase in the baseline diversification rate. The evidence
suggests that strong performance does indeed increase the probability that a hedge fund firm will launch a
new fund.

We also use the empirical model displayed in Table 2 column (2) as our baseline matching model.
The baseline matching model uses all of the information embedded in returns and other observable
characteristics of firms and funds to identify a valid control group of focused firms against which to
measure performance after diversification. Our objective is to find a matched set of focused firms that are
similar to the set of diversifying firms along all observable dimensions just prior to diversification so that
we can separate skill from luck effects ex post.

We find and exploit a valid control group, using standard propensity score matching techniques.
First, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we calculate the propensity score of the probability of a
fund selecting the binary treatment (new fund launch) in any particular month, using the probit model (6).
Next, we trim the sample at the 1st and 99th percentile of the propensity score distribution and eliminate
firms off the common support of the propensity score of the probability of launching a new fund. Finally,
we match diversifiers to controls, using nearest neighbor matching without replacement, to create a
balanced sample of 676 treated (diversified) and 677 control fund-month observations (there is one tie).
The interpretation of the control group is that for each fund that did diversify, in a particular month, we
have identified the fund that was most similar in terms of all observable characteristics that did not
diversify.

Table 2 Columns 3-5 gives diagnostic measures of the effectiveness of the matching process.
Columns 3(a) and 3(b) show the mean values for CAR for focused and diversifying firms, respectively,
before matching. Column 3(c) tests whether CAR and the means on the control variables are statistically
different between focused and diversifying firms. Before matching the differences in CAR, firm size, age strategy class, strategy size, year and region between focused and diversifying firms are statistically significant, and the overall F-test on the joint significance of the differences in means in very large (>99), which suggests that the two populations are not statistically comparable. Columns 4(a)-4(c) repeats these diagnostic tests for the matched sample. The statistical differences in size, strategy and region are completely eliminated, while the difference in CAR is on the margin of statistical significance. The differences in age and year are reduced, but are still significant at the 5% level, but the joint significance of the differences in the means is eliminated (F=1.23). Comparing the differences in the means in the full sample with the matched sample reveals that matching substantially aligns the ex ante characteristics of the firms in the diversified and focused groups. Figure 3 shows this effect graphically. Figure 3a shows the kernel density plots of the distribution of the propensity scores for diversified and matched focused firms. Whereas the distributions were quite different before matching, after matching (Figure 3b), they are essentially identical.

Although the baseline matching model is effective at generating a valid counterfactual group against which to measure the performance of diversifying firms, the statistical significance of the difference in our key variable CAR is not completely eliminated. Furthermore, the fact that calendar time differences continue to remain between the two populations might create problems for an estimation approach that seeks to separate luck from skill effects ex post if the level of CAR required for a firm to diversify changes over time. To be sure that our ex post results are not being driven by ex ante differences in CAR, and that time-varying CAR thresholds are not driving our results, we use an alternative matching model where CAR is interacted with covariates that, in theory, might have a marginal effect on the relationship between performance and diversification including firm size and calendar year. Columns 5(a)-5(c) shows that the alternative matching regime eliminates the statistical differences between CAR and the calendar year fixed effects, and slightly improves the F-test on the joint significance of the means. We show below that our results are robust to this alternative matching regime.
B. Within-firm changes

Our second key prediction, Result 1(ii), is that the performance of diversifiers will fall after diversification, a result that is evident even in a simple time-series plot of excess returns. Figure 2 shows the relationship between fund performance and diversification graphically, plotting first fund average excess returns for the 676 diversifying firms in our test sample. As Figure 2 shows, firms tend to diversify when excess returns are very high, and excess returns fall precipitously almost immediately following diversification. We estimate within-firm changes in performance more precisely, using:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \lambda_i + DIVERSIFIED_{it} + T_t + X_c \beta + \epsilon_{it},$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $i$ and $t$ index funds and time (in months), respectively, for all first funds in firms that eventually diversify for five years before and after the diversification event; $Y$ represents firm performance measured by excess returns and the information ratio; $\lambda$ is a fund fixed effect; $DIVERSIFIED$ is a dummy variable that is equal to one when a fund is part of a diversified firm and zero otherwise; $T$ is a vector of thirteen calendar year dummies; and $X_c$ is a vector of controls including the log of firm age, the log of assets under management (AUM) by market segment (“strategy”) and then fund size dummies measured by deciles of AUM, plus a dummy for missing AUM; and $\epsilon$ is the residual. Standard errors are clustered by fund.

Table 3 columns 1 and 2 show the results of the within-fund estimator (7). Excess returns are 14 basis points per month lower, following diversification. The effect is only significant at the 10% level, but the p-value is 0.054. Using the information ratio, performance is 4 basis points per month per unit of risk lower following diversification, and the point estimate is reliably different from zero. Altering the time window around the diversification month had no meaningful effect on the results.

Performance falls in hedge funds following diversification. However, we know from the prior literature that the relationship between diversification and performance should always be evaluated conditional on the selection process firms undergo when choosing to launch a new business unit or fund (Campa and Kedia 2002, Villalonga 2004b). Table 3 and Figure 2 both show that returns are higher prior to the launch of a new fund, which might suggest that better performance causes hedge funds to launch new funds. If true, then we would expect returns to naturally revert toward the mean following
diversification. To understand if hedge fund returns fall following diversification because diversification causes returns to fall, perhaps due to managerial distraction as in Penrose (1959) or Schoar (2002) or whether skilled firms diversify when they are lucky as our model predicts, we need to benchmark diversifiers against a control group to establish a valid counterfactual. In particular, we need to specify a control group that experienced a similar pattern of *ex ante* returns, which we can use to control for mean reversion from an unusually high baseline around the event window. To do so, we use the matched sample of focused firms identified by our matching model.

**C. Matched sample *ex post* performance**

We compare *ex post* performance for diversifiers relative to firms that remain focused beginning from the diversification or match date for the 1,353 unique funds identified in our propensity score matching algorithm. We call the period in which these funds launched a second fund or were matched “the event,” and refer to the periods around the event in terms of event time. To construct our matched test sample, we examine the event (at time zero) and the thirty-six months after the event (0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., 35). Altering the number of months in the regression following the event has no meaningful effect on the results. We estimate the difference in *ex post* returns between diversifying firms and the matched set of focused firms, using the pooled OLS model (8):

\[ Y_{it} = \alpha + DIVERSIFIED_{it} + T_t + X_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it} \]

(8)

where i indexes firms and t indexes calendar time; performance \((Y)\), *DIVERSIFIED* and \(T\) are as above in (7); and \(X\) includes log firm age, log of assets under management by strategy, and fund size dummies as in (7). We also include in \(X\) five region dummies that control for location specific effects, and eleven strategy-type dummies to control for strategy-specific return patterns, as well as a vector of event time (month) dummies for the thirty-six months after launching a new fund (or match date for the control group) to control for the pattern of mean reversion following the event as predicted by our theoretical model; and \(\epsilon\) is the residual. Standard errors are clustered by fund.

Table 3 shows the matched sample 8-factor *ex post* returns in columns 3 and 4. Following diversification, excess returns are 18 basis points per month higher, and the information ratio is 6 basis
points per month higher per unit of risk, in the first funds of diversified firms compared to a matched sample of non-diversifiers, and the coefficients are reliably different from zero. The interpretation supports our contention that diversifying firms outperform firms that remain focused \textit{ex post}, conditional on being similar across observable dimensions \textit{ex ante}.

\textbf{D. Robustness checks}

We are concerned about four types of threats to our inferences about the roles of skill and luck in diversification decisions: (1) the results may be sensitive to the measure of performance; (2) self-reported returns may be manipulated in ways that bias our results; and (3) firms might launch new funds and use them to subsidize their legacy funds; and (4) the results may be sensitive to the matching process. In this section, we discuss each of these issues in turn.

The results are robust to alternative measures of performance. As shown in Table 4, in the alternative “alternative performance measures” panel, we find very similar results using 4-factor and 7-factor models, respectively, to measure performance. We also found similar results using simple raw returns (not shown).

We are also concerned that moral hazard may lead firms to manipulate their self-reported returns. Even if external audits forced hedge funds to value assets at their true market values at year end, firms might manipulate monthly returns within a year for strategic reasons in ways our model cannot pick up; for example, inflating performance just before diversifying and then deflating it several months after diversification. Since we do not know when or if firms manipulate their returns, we must rely on our empirical design to control for these effects, or at least to sign the bias associated with return manipulation. Fortunately, the most obvious self-reporting bias is not a problem for our tests on firm skill, since strategic manipulation in anticipation of diversification would bias the results against our third prediction (e.g., returns would fall more after diversification than without manipulation). However, inflated \textit{ex post} returns in diversified firms is problematic for skill tests as is \textit{ex ante} manipulation in tests for agency effects. We address this issue by (i) using multiple years of lagged excess returns as our \textit{ex ante} performance measure, which firms could only manipulate through more aggressive multi-year
fraudulent behavior and (ii) eliminating firms whose self-reported risk adjusted return profile lies in right tail of the distribution. While we cannot rule systematic earnings manipulation for any given fund, given the empirical design, it seems unlikely that this effect is driving our results.

If firms launch new funds and use them to subsidize their legacy funds, then legacy returns might increase even as overall firm returns remain flat or decline, a result that would be at odds with our skill-based explanation for the results in Table 3. To test whether our results are sensitive to cross-subsidization across funds within a firm, we aggregate returns to the firm level and evaluate the relationship between diversification and aggregate performance relative to the matched control group. The firm-level results, shown in Table 4 in the “firm-level performance” panel, are consistent with the fund-level results in Table 3 for both equal weighted and value weighted firm-level performance, which suggests that cross-subsidization is not at work in the context of hedge fund diversification.

Matching plays a central role in our empirical design. We, therefore, wish to evaluate whether our results are sensitive to different matching regimes. We are particularly concerned that: (i) the results may be sensitive to the way CAR is measured; (ii) \textit{ex ante} variation in CAR could be driving the \textit{ex post} results in Table 3; and (iii) that the effect of returns on the decision to diversify might be heterogeneous over time. We found that the results are not sensitive to including a longer data series of lagged returns to compute CAR, and/or by weighting more recent returns more than older returns (in event time). For example, using a weighted average of sixty months of historical returns to compute CAR, where the weights are given by the inverse number of years between realization and the focal date, generates precise point estimates that are similar to our baseline estimates (please see Table 4, “alternative matching regimes” panel). To address concerns about \textit{ex ante} differences in CAR and asynchronous matching, we use an alternative matching model that forces \textit{ex ante} returns to be more similar between diversifiers and non-diversifiers, and controls for the precise pattern of \textit{ex ante} returns by calendar time. Table 4 shows that the alternative matching model generates second stage coefficient estimates on \textit{DIVERSIFIED} that

\footnote{We replicated all of the tests in this paper after dropping firms in the top 1\%, 5\% and 10\% of the information ratio distribution, and found that the results were qualitatively unchanged.}
are similar to the baseline model, and precisely estimated, though the point estimate on excess returns is smaller at 0.102.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{E. Discussion of results}

The overall pattern of evidence is consistent with a theory of diversification that takes both agency costs and capabilities seriously. Managers time their diversification events around idiosyncratic performance shocks, but on average better firms diversify. Neither agency costs nor capabilities alone can explain the full set of results observed, but together these theories explain the rich pattern of evidence observed in this study and in the literature more broadly. The results herein exploit revealed skill \textit{ex post} to show how agency effects and capabilities influence strategy decisions \textit{ex ante}. Thus, the key causal inference is that skill and luck cause a firm to diversify in a predictable manner, with skill effects dominating luck effects.

While the results are consistent with the prior theoretical and empirical literature on diversification and with our model, there are some limitations to the interpretation of skill and luck as drivers of a selection effect into diversification. Most importantly, we cannot completely rule out the alternative hypothesis that diversification itself is a causal mechanism driving improved performance. However, we note that the interpretation of skill as a selection effect is trivially true if, conditional on luck, skill effects induce firms to launch new funds because they are better at identifying new investment opportunities that create economies of scope. If true, diversification is the result of selection on unobservable investment skill (to the econometrician), which is consistent with our interpretation. Another consistent interpretation of the matched sample result is that some firms are better able to exploit latent synergies across investment strategies. However, the latent synergies interpretation is just another way of describing potential economies of scope based on firm capabilities. If product diversification enables one firm to capture synergies that other firms cannot capture, the more capable, or skillful, firm will diversify, while the other firm remains focused. While it would be ideal to separate selection on skill effects from selection based on latent skills, both interpretations are consistent with our skill-based theory of selection.

\textsuperscript{22} We also found very similar results matching only on CAR.
Consistent with the capabilities literature, we interpret product-level performance as a measure of a firm’s underlying ability. The idea that product-level skill is indicative of a firm-level capability has received recent support from large sample empirical work on product dynamics (Bernard, Redding and Schott 2010), and seems natural in the hedge fund industry, where product-level (i.e., fund) skill is tantamount to investment ability. However, it is important to note that the mapping between product-level skill and firm capabilities may not always generalize well to other settings. Thus, some caution is in order in applying the methodology used in this paper to other settings.

5. Conclusion

This paper integrates agency and capabilities theories into a simple equilibrium framework that yields rich predictions about the pattern of returns before and after diversification, and then tests these propositions in the context of the global hedge fund industry 1994-2006. The evidence supports agency theory’s prediction that diversification decisions are influenced by manager’s private information and the predictions of the capabilities literature that horizontal firm growth is enabled by unique firm capabilities that can be leveraged across products within the firm. Our key findings are that when firms need external capital to expand they will tend to diversify when they experience a positive idiosyncratic performance shock that raises their performance above their peers and above their long-run average; but, better firms diversify in equilibrium, even though firms appear to exploit asymmetric information about their true ability to time the market. Thus, at least in the context of hedge funds, market discipline constrains lucky but lower skilled firms’ horizontal expansion choices.

This paper sheds light on two of the most important explanations for why firms diversify: agency costs and capabilities. We provide an equilibrium explanation for how agency costs influence the firm’s decision to diversify even when diversification creates value on average, and present evidence consistent with these effects. Moreover, we address one of the major criticisms of the capabilities literature—that it is tautological and inherently untestable (Williamson 1999)—by providing large sample, well identified evidence that capabilities influence diversification choices in a predictable manner. Finally, we show
how agency and capabilities theories are complementary perspectives in the context of diversification, and offer a road map for identifying the impact of both on diversification decisions.
References


Figure 1: Skill, luck and performance

1. Diversifiers outperform firms that remain focused

2. Diversifiers perform worse after diversification

3. Focused firms with the same *ex ante* returns, do even worse than diversifiers *ex post*

Legend

- **Diversifiers and matched sample of non-diversifiers**
- **Diversifiers**
- **Unmatched non-diversifiers**
- **Matched sample of non-diversifiers**
This figure shows average raw returns (vertical axis) for the first fund from all diversified hedge funds in our sample versus event-time on the horizontal axis. Event time is measured in months around the event (e.g., diversification) at time 0. The chart shows the time path of returns from thirty-six months before diversification to thirty-five months after diversification for 33,421 fund-months from 676 diversifying firms.
Figure 3: Propensity score predicting diversification before and after matching

**Propensity scores before matching**

**Propensity scores after matching**
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the main (matched) sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=37,657 fund-months from 1,353 firms</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw returns (%)</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>-70</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-factor monthly excess returns (%)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>-11.18</td>
<td>13.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of excess returns (%)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>13.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-factor information ratio</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversified (fraction)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund assets under management ($M)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm assets under management ($M)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing AUM (fraction)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (months)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1994</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1995</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1996</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1997</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1998</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 1999</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2000</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2001</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2002</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2003</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2004</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year: 2005</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year: 2006</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 1: Fund of funds</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 2: Long/short fund</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 3: Equity hedge</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 4: Managed futures</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 5: Equity market neutral</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 6: Event driven</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 7: Emerging markets</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 8: Global macro</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 9: Convertible arbitrage</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy 10: Fixed income arbitrage</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other strategies</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters in USA</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main (matched) sample includes the fund-months from the diversification date (or match date) until thirty-five months after diversification (or match date) for 676 diversifiers and 677 matched focused firms (there is one tie).
Table 2: Predicting diversification and matching statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predict. diversification</th>
<th>Comparison of means in matched an unmatched samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unmatched sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marginal effects %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avg. 8-factor CAR</strong></td>
<td>0.079* (0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avg. strategy</strong></td>
<td>-0.033 (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size controls</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age control</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy fixed effects</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy size control</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year fixed effects</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region fixed effects</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unique funds</strong></td>
<td>1,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>85,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F-test on the joint difference in means: >99* 1.23 1.12

*Significant at the 5% level.  † Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

1The unmatched sample is the full survivor-bias free sample of ﬁrst funds from ﬁrms in TASS and HFR 1994-2006
2The baseline match sample is derived from 1:1 nearest neighbor matching on the propensity to diversity using model (2) (there is one tie).
3The alternative match sample modiﬁes model (2) by including interaction effects on CAR with year and size (there are two ties).
4T-tests are reported on individual differences in means. F-tests are reported on tests of the joint differences in means.
5Size controls include own-fund size decile dummies (by AUM) and a dummy for missing size, (except in the alternative match where size enters continuously).
6Log age, where age is measured as months from founding date
7Strategy fixed effects include dummy variables for the ten largest self-identified investment strategy types shown in Table 1 (by number of funds)
8Log AUM for all ﬁrms in a strategy
9Year fixed effects include dummy variables for each year 1994-2006
10Region fixed effects include dummies for ﬁrms domiciled in the: USA, UK, continental Europe, Asia, and all other locations
11Interactions include: Avg. 8-factor CAR interacted with: log AUM, (log AUM)^2, missing AUM, and the year fixed effects.
Table 3: Diversification and performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Within-fund changes in performance</th>
<th>Matched sample performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8-factor excess returns</td>
<td>8-factor information ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event window (in months)</td>
<td>-36 to +35</td>
<td>-36 to +35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVERSIFIED</td>
<td>-0.136*</td>
<td>-0.037*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log age</td>
<td>-0.102*</td>
<td>-0.044*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log AUM by strategy</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 size fixed effects</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 year fixed effects</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 event time fixed effects</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 region fixed effects</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 strategy fixed effects</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>676 fund fixed effects</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>33,421</td>
<td>33,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 5% level, + Significant at the 10% level

Standard errors are clustered by fund.

The “within-fund changes in performance” sample includes the fund-months from thirty-six months before diversification until thirty-five months after diversification for 676 diversifiers.

The matched sample includes the fund-months from the diversification date (or match date) until thirty-six months after diversification (or match date) for 676 diversifiers and 677 matched focused firms (there is one tie).
Table 4: Robustness checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression description</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Excess returns</th>
<th>Information ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative performance measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-factor performance</td>
<td>37,657</td>
<td>0.144 *</td>
<td>0.054 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-factor performance</td>
<td>37,657</td>
<td>0.177 *</td>
<td>0.059 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firm-level performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal weighted 8-factor firm performance</td>
<td>37,657</td>
<td>0.184 *</td>
<td>0.065 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value weighted 8-factor firm performance</td>
<td>37,657</td>
<td>0.183 *</td>
<td>0.065 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative matching regimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted 60-month CAR 8-factor performance</td>
<td>37,501</td>
<td>0.123 *</td>
<td>0.052 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative matching regime 8-factor</td>
<td>35,784</td>
<td>0.102 *</td>
<td>0.064 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at the 5% level, + Significant at the 10% level
Coefficient values for DIVERSIFIED are reported. Standard errors are clustered by fund or firm.
All regressions contain the same controls as in Table 3.
The “first stage” of the alternative matching regime model includes CAR interacted with the full set of year dummies, size (log AUM), missing AUM, and size² (as shown in Table 2)
Appendix 1: Proofs of results

Lemma A1. The investor’s optimal weight to fund manager i has the following properties:
   (i) is independent of the weight to fund manager j \( \forall i \neq j \);
   (ii) is decreasing in \( \mu_i \), and therefore is decreasing in \( q_i \);
   (iii) is decreasing in the variance (diagonal element of \( \Omega_i \));
   (iv) is decreasing in \( R^2_i \) where \( R^2_i \) is from the regression of the returns of manager i on the returns of the other managers.

Proof of Lemma A1. Results (i)-(iv) follow from Sharpe (1964) and (3).

Proof of Lemma 1. Assume an arbitrary posterior estimate conditional on play of the game to that point that the investor holds about managers with a particular history. Given these beliefs, as in (3), a manager will diversify iff
   \[ w_{i2}(r_i, 0) + \delta E(w_{i3}(r_i, 0)) \leq w_{i2}(r_i, 1) + w_{22}(r_i, 1) + \delta E(w_{i3}(r_i, 1)) + w_{23}(r_i, 1) - c_j. \]
Rearranging, we have the condition that
   \[ c_j(r_i) \leq w_{i2}(r_i, 1) + w_{22}(r_i, 1) + \delta E(w_{i3}(r_i, 1)) + w_{23}(r_i, 1) - w_{i2}(r_i, 0) - \delta E(w_{i3}(r_i, 0)). \]
Since \( E(w_{i3}(r_i, 1)) - E(w_{i3}(r_i, 0)) \) is lower for a low type than a high type, it must be the case that \( c_H(r_i) \geq c_L(r_i) \). Since \( c_j \sim h(c) \) is the same for low and high types and is atomless, and \( \text{Corr}(c_j, \theta_j) = 0 \), this implies that
   \[ \Pr(d_j = 11 | \theta_H, r_i) = \Pr(c_j > c_H(r_i)) \geq \Pr(d_j = 11 | \theta_L, r_i) = \Pr(c_j > c_L(r_i)) \quad (A1) \]
The remainder of the result follows trivially from (A1).

Proof of Lemma 2. Note that (3) and Lemma 1 are a result of the manager’s decision problem, and therefore are met in any non-pooling equilibrium. Note further, from (3) it is clear that if a manager with cost \( c_j \sim h(c) \) chooses to diversify, then all managers \( k \neq j \) of the same skill type \( \theta \), initial performance \( r_i \) and \( c_j < c_k \) also diversify. Because the distribution of \( c \) is atomless, we can then define the decision for all managers as defined by the thresholds in \( c \) at which diversification occurs.

To specify an equilibrium, we have to define beliefs of the investor \( \phi(d, r_i) = \Pr(\theta_k = \theta_H | d, r_i) \). For convenience, we suppress parameters and refer to beliefs using the following simplified notation where the meaning is clear: \( \phi(d, r_i) = \phi \), \( \phi(1, r_i) = \phi_1 \), and \( \phi(0, r_i) = \phi_0 \). Because the payoffs in (3) do not depend on \( r_i \), but rather on investor beliefs \( \phi \), we can define the best response functions of the managers given arbitrary beliefs of the investor as \( c_\theta(\phi_1, \phi_0) \). Given those beliefs and \( H(c) \) the share of types \( \theta \) that diversify is \( H(c_\theta(\phi_1, \phi_0)) \).

Next, note from Lemma 1, that if \( \phi_1 = \phi_0 \) then \( c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0) \), and strictly so if \( c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) > 0 \). This implies
   \[ E(w_{i2}(r_i, 1) + w_{22}(r_i, 1) | \theta_H) - E(w_{i2}(r_i, 1) + w_{22}(r_i, 1) | \theta_L) > E(w_{i2}(r_i, 0) | \theta_H) - E(w_{i2}(r_i, 0) | \theta_L). \]
In any separating equilibrium, beliefs of the investor in the second period are governed by Bayes rule and the best responses of managers:
   \[ \phi_1 = \frac{H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0))q(r)}{H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0))q(r) + H(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0))(1 - q(r))} \]
\[
\phi_0 = \frac{(1 - H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0)))q(r)}{(1 - H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0)))q(r) + (1 - H(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)))(1 - q(r))}
\]

where \(q(r) = \Pr \theta_H | r_i\), or the share of managers with return history \(r\) who are high types.

The above beliefs form a mapping over beliefs of the investor that are consistent with the best responses of managers. All interior equilibria are fixed points of this mapping. However, to show existence of a diversification equilibrium, we define the following modified mapping:

If \(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\):

\[
\phi_1 = \frac{H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0))q(r)}{H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0))q(r) + H(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0))(1 - q(r))}
\]

\[
\phi_0 = \frac{(1 - H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0)))q(r)}{(1 - H(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0)))q(r) + (1 - H(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)))(1 - q(r))}
\]

Otherwise:

\[
\phi_1 = q(r)
\]

\[
\phi_0 = q(r)
\]

This is clearly a continuous mapping. To show existence of diversification we need to show that that same mapping is defined over the set \([0,1]^2\) where \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\) (i.e. a convex and closed, compact set). If \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\) and \(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\) it maps to another pair where \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\). If \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\) and \(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) < c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\) it maps to \(\phi_1 = \phi_0\). So, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem we have a fixed point in the set \([0,1]^2\) where \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\). By the argument in Lemma 1 and above \(\phi_1 = \phi_0\) is not an equilibrium so it is not a fixed point, so it must be that \(\phi_1 \geq \phi_0\). So this must also be a fixed point of the unmodified problem above.

It is also a partial pooling equilibrium such that some, but not all, of both high and low managers diversify for all \(r_i\). Namely, note that \(\phi_1 = 1\) is not an equilibrium, because then there would be no updating so the return from diversifying for high types and low types are the same, but the returns from not diversifying are weakly higher for high types so we would have, \(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) < c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\), but that implies that \(\phi_1 < 1\), so that some low type managers diversify. Since \(c_H(\phi_1, \phi_0) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\) then some high type managers also diversify.

\[\blacksquare\]

**Lemma A2**: Define \(\bar{c}\) such that a high type manager with cost type \(\bar{c}\) is indifferent between diversifying and staying focused if the investor has beliefs \(\phi_1(\bar{r}) = q(\bar{r}), \phi_0(\bar{r}) = 0\), then for all \(r_i > \bar{r}\), there exists an equilibrium where all high type managers diversify and some low type managers diversify. Further \(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\) is weakly increasing in \(r_i\); strictly increasing over \([\bar{r}, \hat{r}]\), where \(\hat{r}\) is defined such that a low type manager with cost type \(\bar{c}\) is indifferent between diversifying and staying focused if the investor has beliefs \(\phi_1(\hat{r}) = q(\hat{r}), \phi_0(\hat{r}) = 0\); and \(c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)\) is constant above \(\hat{r}\).
Proof of Lemma A2: Given $c$ and $r_1 > \bar{r}$, diversification is a best response for all high type managers. This implies that $\phi_1 = \frac{q(r_1)}{q(r_1) + H(c_L(\phi_1, 0))(1 - q(r_1))} \geq q(r_1), \phi_0 = 0$. Since the return from staying focused is zero for low types, $c_L(\phi_1, 0) = E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0)$, where we denote the manager’s payoff as $\pi$. Note that $\phi$ is decreasing in $c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)$ within the range $[q(r_1), 1]$, and $c_L(\phi_1, 0)$ is increasing in $\phi_1$. It follows that a unique equilibrium exists. By construction, for $\hat{r}, c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0) = \bar{c}$. All that remains is to show that $c_L(\phi_1, \phi_0)$ is increasing over $[\hat{r}, \bar{r}]$.

The equilibrium defines thresholds as functions of $q(r_1)$:

$$E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0) - c_L^* = 0$$

$$\frac{q(r_1)}{q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1)))} \phi_1^* = 0$$

where the asterisks indicate equilibrium quantities. From the implicit function theorem, we have:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial c_L^*}{\partial q(r_1)} \\ \frac{\partial c_L^*}{\partial \phi_1^*} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & \frac{\partial E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0)}{\partial \phi_1^*} \\ \frac{q(r_1)(1 - q(r_1))}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \frac{\partial H(c_L^*)}{\partial c_L^*} & -1 \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \frac{H(c_L^*)}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \end{bmatrix}$$

which can be rewritten

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial c_L^*}{\partial q(r_1)} \\ \frac{\partial c_L^*}{\partial \phi_1^*} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 + \frac{q(r_1)(1 - q(r_1))}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \frac{\partial H(c_L^*)}{\partial c_L^*} \frac{\partial E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0)}{\partial \phi_1^*} \end{bmatrix} \times$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0)}{\partial \phi_1^*} \\ \frac{H(c_L^*)}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \end{bmatrix} \frac{H(c_L^*)}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \frac{H(c_L^*)}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} .$$

Since

$$\frac{\partial E(\pi \mid \theta_L, d = 1, \phi_1, 0)}{\partial \phi_1^*} > 0,$$

$$\frac{q(r_1)(1 - q(r_1))}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} \frac{\partial H(c_L^*)}{\partial c_L^*} > 0$$

and

$$\frac{H(c_L^*)}{(q(r_1) + H(c_L^*(1 - q(r_1))))^2} > 0$$
\[
\frac{\partial c^*_L}{\partial q(r_l)} \frac{\partial \phi_l}{\partial q(r_l)} > 0. \]

**Lemma A3.** There exists an equilibrium with diversification such that the derivative \( \frac{\partial c^*_k}{\partial r_l} \) is weakly positive everywhere and strictly positive over some range.

**Proof of Lemma A3:** This proof is by construction. For \( r_l > r \) take the equilibrium defined in Lemma A2. For \( r_l \in [r \in \bar{r}] \) take the equilibrium shown in Lemma 2, where \( r \) is chosen such that the thresholds are non-decreasing. Finally, for \( r_l < r \), take the no diversification equilibrium, i.e. where beliefs are such that \( \phi_1 = 0, \phi_x = q(r_l) \). Note that since the equilibrium identified in Lemma A2 has the highest thresholds for an equilibrium for the given \( r_l \), by continuity, there must exist \( r < \bar{r} \).

**Proof of Result 1:** Part (i). Since the cutpoints \( \{c_k\} \) are weakly increasing in \( r_l \), and that \( c_j \) is independent of \( r_l \), this implies that conditional on \( \theta_k \), the probability of diversification is increasing in \( r_l \). Further, by Lemma 1, we have that \( c_H(\phi_1, \phi_2) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_2) \). Using the fact that we have \( \Pr(r_{ii} > r | \theta_H) > \Pr(r_{ii} > r | \theta_L) \), we have the result. Part (ii). This follows directly from the fact that the cutpoints \( \{c_k\} \) are weakly increasing in \( r_l \). Part (iii) follows directly from Lemma 1 in that \( c_H(\phi_1, \phi_2) \geq c_L(\phi_1, \phi_2) \) and strictly so for returns where we have non-diversifiers.