Turkey’s Internet Policy After the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance

Bilge Yesil
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Turkey's Internet Policy After the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance

Abstract
In July 2016, Turkey was shaken by a bloody coup attempt. Although the would-be putschists failed, their insurgency led to an unprecedented reshuffling of Turkey's political economic and socio-cultural landscapes. Notwithstanding the critical reverberations on the army, judiciary, law enforcement and civil society, the abortive coup set in motion a massive purge of civil servants, closure of media outlets, arrests of journalists, and blocking of websites and social media accounts.

This report offers an examination of the evolution of internet policy in Turkey from the early 2000s to the post-coup conjuncture. It begins with an overview of internet legislation in Turkey during the 2000s under the AKP government (Justice and Development Party), and proceeds to discuss the deployment of different forms of control between 2013-2016 to contain the fallout from political and security crises and the potentially disruptive affordances of social media platforms. The report then focuses on the emerging policy developments and online restrictions in the aftermath of the coup attempt, which include 1) the closure of the TIB—Turkey's telecommunications authority, 2) direct government control of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and interception of digital communications by way of decree laws, 3) facilitation of social media censorship by means of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube content removals and 4) coordinated online harassment campaigns by pro-government users against alleged coup planners, Kurdish activists and government critics in general.

Keywords
turkey, internet, censorship, coup, internet governance

Disciplines
Communication Technology and New Media | International and Intercultural Communication | Social Influence and Political Communication | Social Media

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Turkey’s Internet Policy after the Coup Attempt:
The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance

An Internet Policy Observatory Publication
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The Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) is a project at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania. The overarching goal of the program is to deepen the reservoir of researchers and advocates in regions where Internet freedom is threatened or curtailed and to support the production of innovative, high-quality, and impactful internet policy research. The IPO facilitates collaboration between research and advocacy communities, builds research mentorships between emerging and established scholars, and engages in trainings to build capacity for more impactful digital rights research and advocacy.

For more information on the IPO, please visit globalnetpolicy.org.

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Introduction

In July 2016, Turkey was shaken by a bloody coup attempt. Although the would-be putschists failed, their insurgency led to an unprecedented reshuffling of Turkey’s political economic and socio-cultural landscapes. Notwithstanding the critical reverberations on the army, judiciary, law enforcement and civil society, the abortive coup set in motion a massive purge of civil servants, closure of media outlets, arrests of journalists, and blocking of websites and social media accounts.

This report offers an examination of the evolution of internet policy in Turkey from the early 2000s to the post-coup conjuncture. It begins with an overview of internet legislation in Turkey during the 2000s under the AKP government (Justice and Development Party), and proceeds to discuss the deployment of different forms of control between 2013-2016 to contain the fallout from political and security crises and the potentially disruptive affordances of social media platforms. 

Following this overview, the report focuses on the emerging policy developments and online restrictions in the aftermath of the coup attempt, which include 1) the closure of the TIB—Turkey’s telecommunications authority, 2) direct government control of ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and interception of digital communications by way of decree laws, 3) facilitation of social media censorship by means of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube content removals and 4) coordinated online harassment campaigns by pro-government users against alleged coup planners, Kurdish activists and government critics in general.

To gain insights into these developments, this report draws extensively on literature both in Turkish and English and is based on the following methods: 1) document analysis of existing internet legislation, Turkish Official Gazette announcements concerning the decree laws, and government officials’ statements, 2) quantitative analysis of open source data on social media censorship (crowdsourced data on banned websites; Twitter, Facebook and Google transparency reports; Lumen database on Turkish court orders; traffic data on throttling), 3) analysis of Twitter activity in the months before and after the coup attempt, and 4) select semi-structured interviews with internet activists and legal scholars.

The key finding of the report is that the AKP’s post-coup strategies concerning the internet are culminating in a distributed network of government and non-government actors using hard and soft forms of control. While the AKP continues to deploy existing Internet Law, Anti-Terror Law and Press Law provisions and further expands its online hegemony by way of decree laws, its post-coup internet policy has also come to rely on the opaque activities of users and groups who are affiliated with government officials, party members and partisan media outlets and whose primary objective is to target and harass government critics on social media, and intimidate those who dissent. As these actors take on the responsibility of online monitoring, hacking and “snitching,” it becomes increasingly difficult for users and activists to trace online restrictions to a specific government agency or legislation and to seek legal remedies.
Overview of Turkey’s Internet Policy


In the early 1990s, internet in Turkey was in the purview of academic and research institutions. Following the creation of a national backbone in 1996 and the consequent rise of a competitive ISP market, internet became a commercial medium in the latter half of the decade, registering steady growth in use and introducing various technological and socio-cultural changes. However, it remained largely unregulated primarily because of the then-coalition governments’ disregard for the need to develop new policies for a new medium, and was primarily managed and controlled by the courts that focused on criminalization of certain online activities. The earliest examples of such court decisions can be traced back to separate cases in 1997 and 2001 when two individuals were prosecuted for their statements on online forums that allegedly criticized and offended the Turkish police and state institutions.2

On the other hand, the first website blocking took place in 2002 when a military court ordered a website to shut down due to the publication of documents concerning alleged corruption within the Turkish Air Force.3 The first mass website blocking happened in 2005-2006 when more than a dozen websites were blocked by the courts on copyright infringement grounds because they provided hyperlinks to downloadable audio files or software to obtain such files.4 These practices of ad hoc criminalization and prosecution in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the absence of a systematic policy-making and public debate concerning the role of the internet in society set the stage for more stringent policies in following years.

II. 2007-2013: Regulation-cum-control

Turkey passed its first internet-specific legislation in 2007, which was titled “Law No. 5651, Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed by means of Such Publications.” It was propelled by fears around moral issues involving teen sexuality, pornography, drug use, video games and violence that swept the nation in the early 2000s, and was therefore designed to protect users from so-called illegal and harmful content. The “Internet Law” as it was commonly known, charged the Presidency of Telecommunications and Communication (TIB in its Turkish acronym) with administrative duties such as monitoring content and mandating hosting and access providers to combat categorical crimes. The law set forth seven categorical crimes (incitement to suicide, facilitation of the use of narcotics, child pornography, obscenity, prostitution, facilitation of gambling, and slandering of the legacy of Ataturk—the founder of modern Turkey), and stipulated that a website could be blocked by court order or an administrative order issued by the TIB if it was found to be committing one of these crimes. It also obliged hosting and access providers to monitor online content that was transmitted through their infrastructure and required them to ban access to illegal content once they were served with a court order or a TIB-issued notice. According to the Internet Law, mass use providers (e.g. internet cafes) were required to obtain “activity certificates” from local authorities and to block access to illegal content by using the TIB-approved filters.

To penalize online content that fell outside the purview of the Internet Law, Turkish authorities deployed other legislation including the Penal Code to criminalize online speech that insults the Turkish nation, government agencies or the military; the Anti-Terror Law to curb political speech regarding the Kurdish issue and ethnic minority rights; and the Intellectual Property Law to penalize content providers for illegally publishing copyrighted material.

Given the combined use of the Internet Law with the above-mentioned legislation, the late...
Table 1: Number of websites blocked in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>1,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,644</td>
<td>5,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,593</td>
<td>8,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7,012</td>
<td>15,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,082</td>
<td>22,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>17,837</td>
<td>40,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>25,061</td>
<td>65,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>42,236</td>
<td>107,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>8,030</td>
<td>115,805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2000s witnessed the construction of an extensive mechanism of control. Based on the above-mentioned political, social and cultural anxieties, the number of blocked websites grew exponentially, with 93 percent of them blocked by TIB's administrative orders.5

These 93% of blocked websites mentioned above were banned mainly on grounds of obscenity. They were identified via word-based filtering methods and comprised of content related to erotica, dating, and/or LGBTI rights.6 In 2011, the TIB created a list of 138 words that included çıplak (naked), itiraf (confession), escort, hot, anal, etc., and asked Turkish hosting companies to ban domain names including any of these words.7

In addition to websites, Turkish authorities blocked several social networking and/or collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace, Dailymotion, Vimeo, Blogspot, Last.fm) because of a single case of offending content or on the grounds of copyright infringement. While some of these sites were banned intermittently, YouTube remained notoriously inaccessible between 2008 and 2010, and continued to receive more than 30 court orders for closure until 2014.8

Regarding the introduction of filtering systems and the administrative decisions to ban certain domain names, Turkish authorities were especially concerned with the protection of children and families. For example, the Information and Communication Technologies Board (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu, known by its Turkish acronym, BTK), the government agency responsible for the regulation of the telecommunications industry, launched a program dubbed the “Safe Use of the Internet” in 2011. The BTK required all users to install a filtering system in their computers and to choose from four packages (child, family, domestic, and standard). Faced with strong reaction from academics, legal scholars and civic organizations, the BTK modified the program to be non-mandatory and offered two filtering options instead (child and family).9 Although the family filter is optional for individual users, it is mandatory for public access sites such as internet cafes. While the BTK declines to provide a complete list of websites blocked by the family filter, the mandatory filtering software used at internet cafes reportedly blocks more than 1.5 million websites.10

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8 M. Akgül and M. Kırlıdoğan, op. cit.


III. 2013-2016: Tightening the noose

Legal and technological restrictions that were primarily driven by the urge to protect family values and/or national unity during the 2000s began to intensify in the following decade. Faced with two major legitimacy crises, first the nationwide anti-government Gezi protests in June 2013, and then revelations about a massive corruption scandal in December 2013, the AKP government imposed further restrictions to combat the perceived threats of digital communications.

During the Gezi protests, various actors resorted to social media to organize, gather and share news, and express underlying disenchantment with the AKP government.11 The AKP’s response was generally to demonize the internet and social media platforms, as seen in Erdogan’s labeling of Twitter as a “menace” and “a curse on societies” that harbors “all sorts of lies.”12 There were also announcements by government officials about imminent restrictions to be placed on online communications to maintain public safety and order and to prevent so-called cyber-crimes.13

Approximately six months after the Gezi protests, a massive corruption scandal broke out in December 2013 triggering the construction of a sprawling online control regime. The scandal mostly transpired on social media with Erdogan’s opponents sharing transcripts and audio files of illegally wiretapped conversations between Erdogan, his son, cabinet ministers and pro-AKP businessmen. To curb the flow of damning information online, the AKP began to deploy a combination of first, second and third generation controls by introducing stricter legislation, banning Twitter and YouTube, surveilling and prosecuting users, and throttling social media platforms.

The AKP government’s approach to ICTs during this period bears striking similarities to that of the Russian government in the aftermath of the 2011-12 protest movement, also known as the White Revolution. Having noticed the “opportunities for political engagement and mobilization afforded by social media,” the Russian government engaged in a widespread crackdown. It introduced laws to limit political engagement online, “attempted to re-create the state through cyberspace, fostering self-censorship and disempowering publics,” and increased the presence of pro-government forces online creating “distorted communication within the Russian public sphere.”14

In what follows, we examine similar strategies of control that took place in the Turkish online sphere between 2013 and 2016.

1. Legislation

Shortly after the corruption scandal, the AKP-dominated Parliament passed a new law amending the provisions of the 2007 Internet Law. The new law authorized the TIB to issue a blocking order based on a complaint filed for breach of an individual’s right to privacy and to do so without obtaining a court order. Per the new law, individuals and legal entities can directly apply to the TIB and request the removal of offending content. The TIB can then require the ISPs to remove the offending content.

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within 4 hours. The new law also enables a URL-based blocking system, making it possible to block individual posts or all posts from a specific social media user.\textsuperscript{15} If the offending website is hosted domestically, it can be taken down by the TIB; if it is hosted abroad, then the said content can be blocked and filtered through ISPs.\textsuperscript{16} The new law even gave the president of the TIB the authority to block URLs without complaints having been filed at all. Another controversial provision required the ISPs to collect data on users' activities for up to two years and to provide authorities with this data on demand.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to passing a stricter Internet Law, the AKP amended the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization (Law No. 6532) to expand the surveillance of online users. The amendment gives the National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, known by its Turkish acronym, MIT) unfettered access to online and offline “information, documents, data, or records from public institutions, financial institutions, and entities with or without a legal character.” In practice, the new law enables the MIT to obtain citizens' personal data from any public or private institution (banks, schools, hospitals, ISPs) without a court order. Moreover, the new law criminalizes “the leaking and publication of secret official information, punishable by a prison term of up to nine years” and gives the AKP yet another tool to prevent the press and online news sites from reporting on government corruption and official misconduct.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15} Since the blocking of a specific URL on encrypted communications (e.g. websites that start with “HTTPS”) is technically not possible without banning the whole domain name, the amendment included a specific provision that enabled the ISPs to block websites in their entirety. See: E.K. Sözeri, 'Ban against a single blog post leads Turkish ISPs to censor all of WordPress', The Daily Dot, April 1, 2015 http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-wordpress-censorship-block/, (accessed November 27, 2016).


\textsuperscript{18} K. Roth, ‘Turkey’s Tyrant in the Making’, Foreign Policy, May 12, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/12/

2. Social media bans

To control online flows of information, the AKP has also resorted to banning social media platforms. Whereas the earlier bans in late 2000s were prompted by content that allegedly threatened national unity, family and moral values, etc., those that have taken place since 2014 are part and parcel of the AKP’s broader initiatives to curb the dissemination of news and information about the corruption scandal, foreign policy failures, Kurdish issue and/or security crises. For example, the TIB blocked access to Twitter in March 2014 citing a court order based on privacy invasion complaints that had been filed by citizens, however the ban was actually motivated by the AKP’s need to limit the dissemination of critical news and information ahead of the local elections.\textsuperscript{19} A month later, an Istanbul court asked Twitter, YouTube and Facebook to remove the images of a prosecutor being held at gunpoint arguing that these images were helping to “spread terrorist propaganda.” Facebook complied with the court decision, removed the said images before the deadline and averted the ban. Twitter and YouTube remained unavailable for several hours, but they too complied and removed the images afterwards.\textsuperscript{20}

3. Content removal

Since 2013, the AKP government has banned social media sites promptly and without hesitation. Yet even in the absence of specific incidents, it pursues tight control over the flow of information by filing content removal requests with social media companies on a regular basis. As can be seen in transparency reports issued by Facebook, Google and Twitter, Turkey ranks among the top countries with the most removal requests.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Z. Tufekci, op. cit.


Table 2: Number of content removal requests by Turkish courts or administrative entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Google</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12,122</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13,965</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>2,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,366</td>
<td>6,574</td>
<td>10,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important point to note here is the inclination of these companies to comply with Turkish authorities’ requests to avoid a total ban, loss of users and advertising revenues in Turkey’s ever-growing digital market. For example, since March 2014 Twitter has used its “country-withheld content policy” tool to block certain users or tweets from being seen in Turkey. Facebook has repeatedly shut down pages of Kurdish politicians and newspapers, general interest pages about Kurdish music and culture, and pages with pro-Kurdish content simply based on “community complaints.” According to a leaked internal guideline, Facebook prompts its editors to block any content that allegedly insults Ataturk or supports the Kurdish militia group PKK.

Internet and free speech activists in Turkey describe Twitter’s policy as hypocritical considering its position on global free speech. A prominent activist and legal scholar notes that since most content that is readily removed by Facebook and Twitter is specifically about political expression, the already-existing fears among dissidents, activists and journalists are worsened. According to members of Turkey Blocks, an independent group that identifies and verifies reports of internet censorship, also note that Twitter, Facebook and Google are “on board” with Turkey’s censorship practices because they collaborate with the authorities and hold Turkey to different standards in terms of content removal requests. They note that “Especially in the post-coup period, Twitter readily complies with Turkey’s demands” which has “emboldened” Turkish authorities.

Other enablers of government restrictions are the domestic ISPs. In 2008, upon TIB’s request, the ISPs agreed to install DNS servers that sync directly with TIB’s central server facilitating the automatic updating of list of websites to be banned under “catalog crimes” (such as child pornography or obscenity). In 2014, the TIB expanded this infrastructure by introducing deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies and had the ISPs agree to maintain detailed traffic logs of their customers. The use of DPI also enabled the TIB and by proxy the government, to use more opaque tools to censor online content, such as blocking individual URL addresses instead of banning the entire domain, wholesale banning of news topics instead of banning news websites, and throttling access to social media platforms instead of nationwide bans.
4. Surveillance of users

In addition to first and second generation controls, Turkish authorities have begun to deploy third generation controls, such as surveillance and hacking. For example, the Turkish National Police used online intrusion tools and services provided by Hacking Team, an Italian surveillance company, between 2011 and 2014. Turk Telekom—the largest ISP that owns 80% of internet infrastructure in Turkey – has also been found to have procured deep packet inspection tools from Procera Networks, a U.S.-based company. Turk Telekom also used to work with Phorm, a targeted advertising company, and deployed its deep packet inspection tools in violation of privacy laws. Additionally, there are other unspecified government clients that have used (and/or continue to use) mass surveillance services provided by Asoto, Netclean and Nokia Siemens Networks.

5. Prosecution of users

An important tool in the Turkish government’s arsenal to suppress critical online speech is the prosecution of social media users based on their posts that allegedly insult the state and state officials and disseminate propaganda for terrorist organizations. According to the Penal Code, insulting state officials is punishable by a prison sentence of one or two years, whereas insulting the president (i.e. Erdogan) can lead to a prison sentence of up to four years (Article 125/3a and Article 299). The Ministry of Justice statistics show that 1,953 individuals were prosecuted in 2015 on charges of insulting Erdogan, and 49 on charges of insulting state officials. According to news reports, 34 of these cases involved social media posts by members of opposition parties, lawyers, academicians, journalists, and members of NGOs. Four users were handed 10-month prison sentences each; three placed under judicial control, and fourteen arrested pending trial. The rest were detained pending prosecution or summoned for questioning. Among the high-profile cases are an anchorwoman, a former editor-in-chief, and a columnist who were prosecuted for allegedly critical tweets concerning Erdogan, the state or state officials.

In addition, state institutions and private companies have begun to take legal action against

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30 It was in July 2014 when Turk Telekom’s contract with Procera Networks was revealed. However, Procera released a statement noting that its activities were in accordance with the new Internet Law and the specific provision that required ISPs to store users’ activity logs for two years. See W. Zeldin, op. cit., T. Fox-Brewster, ‘Is An American Company’s Technology Helping Turkey Spy On Its Citizens?’, Forbes, October 25, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2016/10/25/procera-francisco-partners-turkey-surveillance-erdogan/, (accessed November 27, 2016).
social media users, exploiting Turkey's vaguely-defined defamation laws. In 2015, the state-run news agency, Anadolu Ajansı, sued more than fifty artists and journalists on charges of libel.37 In 2016, Turkcell, one of Turkey's largest mobile network providers, sought 10,000 Turkish liras (USD 3,500) in damages from each Twitter user that tweeted the hashtag #TecavuzCell (“Rape Cell”) as a means of protesting the company's sponsorship of a government-linked foundation embroiled in child abuse allegations.38

In addition to defamation charges, in 2015 Turkish authorities have accused more than 13,000 individuals with “disseminating terrorist propaganda” in relation to expression of political opinions or coverage of the Kurdish conflict.39 That same year, 36 journalists and newspaper distributors were imprisoned on charges of terrorist propaganda.40 Although official statements did not specify how many of these cases involve social media posts, news reports stated that Kurdish journalists Idris Yılmaz and Vildan Atmaca were prosecuted for their pro-PKK Facebook pages, while Hayri Tunc was held in pre-trial detention for his Twitter and Facebook posts, and Hamza Aktan was detained for retweeting a BBC post regarding military operations in Southeast Turkey.41

6. Throttling and DNS poisoning

During the 2013-2016 period, the AKP government began to use new tools to limit the flow of news and information in the online public sphere. The first is bandwidth throttling, the intentional slowing down of internet service at the ISP level. According to Turkey Blocks, there have been at least seven cases of throttling since 2015.43 As seen in the table below, the AKP government blocked URLs (including news sites) and throttled social media platforms at times of major political events and security crises to suppress critical reporting and to prevent citizens from mobilizing.44

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41 During the pre-coup period, Turkish officials refrained from openly referring to social media posts as evidence of “terrorist propaganda.” In the post-coup period, however, officials have made explicit references to social media posts and stated that these posts can potentially be used as evidence in investigations.
44 This table is based on information presented in Freedom House’s “2016 Freedom of the Net: Turkey” and Turkey Blocks reports. Note that on July 15, 2016, the night of the coup attempt, social media was throttled as is generally the case, however this decision was promptly overturned in order to disseminate President Erdoğan’s call to his supporters to take to the streets and resist the putschist soldiers. See: E.K. Sözeri, ‘Why Turkey issued a social media ban during a coup attempt—and promptly lifted it’, The Daily Dot, July 17, 2016, www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-coup-social-media-ban-lift, (accessed November 27, 2016).
Table 3: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the pre-coup period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Content restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2015</td>
<td>Istanbul prosecutor taken hostage</td>
<td>166 URLs blocked including news articles, and Facebook, Twitter, YouTube content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 2015</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Suruç</td>
<td>173 URLs blocked including 38 news websites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 2015</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Ankara</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Istanbul</td>
<td>Government issued media blackout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 17, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Ankara</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Ankara</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter throttled, 214 URLs blocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Istanbul</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter banned for 24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack at Istanbul airport</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 2016</td>
<td>Military coup attempt</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter briefly throttled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second tool deployed by Turkish authorities is DNS poisoning, a form of hacking or blocking social media sites by surreptitiously redirecting users to incorrect IP addresses. In March 2014, Turk Telekom hijacked Google DNS servers, which the Internet Society described as a “man-in-the-middle” (MiTM) attack performed to “comply with [the] government’s banning of [Twitter and YouTube]” by “giving users false information.” Not only were users blocked from their intended destination, but also the “IP addresses of [their] devices attempting to reach the two services using foreign DNS servers” were also logged by the government.

IV. July 2016-present: Post-coup developments

As shown above, the AKP constructed a sprawling surveillance-control-censorship regime during 2013-2016 mainly in response to the political fallout from Gezi protests and the corruption scandal as well as security-related incidents such as terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of the failed coup, the AKP’s internet policy was similarly shaped by political anxieties which ultimately expanded and fortified the existing online control regime.

In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup, the AKP government under the leadership of President Erdogan declared a State of Emergency, and embarked on a massive purge of security officers, civil servants, educational and media workers it accused of being affiliated with the religious movement of Fethullah Gulen—the alleged mastermind of the coup. Given the severity of the potential threats the coup would have caused had it succeeded, a “national consensus” emerged, uniting the AKP, opposition parties and various political actors and engendering the (false) belief that the State of Emergency would be used only to root out the coup planners. However, it soon became clear that Erdogan and his government would deploy the SoE to repress other perceived enemies, especially the Kurds, to consolidate their hegemony and stifle any remaining opposition—both online and offline.
In what follows, we focus on measures taken by the AKP in the post-coup period and their implications on online communications.

1. Legislation via decree laws

One of the unchecked powers granted by the State of Emergency is the ability to rule by decree. Since the coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP government passed fifteen decree laws (as of this writing) that enabled the reconfiguration of political, economic, social and cultural fields as per Erdogan's political priorities. Including, but not limited to the massive purge of tens of thousands of civil servants without due process, closure of hundreds of print and broadcast outlets, arrests of journalists, writers and members of the parliament, decree laws have also been deployed to impose further restrictions on the rapidly-deteriorating digital public sphere.

The passing and application of decree laws are supposedly limited to coup-related matters, however in practice they have resulted in digital surveillance of users and the shutting down of internet service at times of so-called security operations (see below). For example, Decree Law 670 enables the interception of digital communications of all users as part of the coup-related investigations and the collection of private data from all state institutions and private companies. Decree Law 671 amends the Law of Digital Communications and allows the BTK to overtake any privately-held digital communications company including cable or cellular network providers to “[maintain] national security and public order; prevent crime; protect public health and public morals; or protect the rights and freedoms [of citizens].”

Last but not least, and in a blow to personal privacy online, Decree Law 680 amends the Code of Police Conduct and enables the Department of Cybercrimes to gather and intercept internet traffic on any cyber-related investigation, and to obtain personal information from ISPs without a court order.

2. Closing of the TIB

One of the significant developments in the aftermath of the coup attempt was the closing of the TIB by decree law. Claiming that the agency had been infiltrated by Gulenists and served as a hub of illegal wiretapping over the years, the AKP government transferred the TIB’s duties and responsibilities to the BTK. However, the closing of the agency responsible for the blocking of more than 100,000 websites and banning of social media platforms on various occasions is not necessarily good news for internet users, activists and digital rights lawyers in the country. As Yaman Akdeniz notes, the BTK is driven by the same “aggressive blocking mentality” as the TIB was. Akdeniz also underlines the partisan character of the BTK since it operates under the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications, and its staff are government appointees.

3. Throttling

In the post-coup period, the AKP government has continued to use throttling as a measure to restrict certain types of content. As table 4 shows, social media platforms and on certain occasions private messaging applications are throttled to limit online communications in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, security and military-related incidents.

4. Internet Shutdowns and Cloud/VPN Restrictions

During the post-coup period, the AKP not only escalated the implementation of its customary strategies (i.e implementation of legal restrictions, throttling, prosecution of online users), but also deployed internet shutdowns, cloud and VPN restrictions—drastic forms of control that are generally associated with dictatorships.

First came the internet shutdown in September 2016 as elected mayors in predominantly-Kurdish cities were physically removed from their posts.

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Table 4: Types of content restrictions imposed by the Turkish government in the post-coup period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Content restriction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 20, 2016</td>
<td>Bomb attack in Gaziantep</td>
<td>Facebook and Twitter throttled for six hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25, 2016</td>
<td>Unknown reason</td>
<td>Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled for seven hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 2016</td>
<td>28 elected mayors removed from office in the Kurdish-majority Southeast</td>
<td>Landline and mobile internet access cut for 15 cities, for approximately 12 million citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 7, 2016</td>
<td>Unknown reason</td>
<td>Twitter intermittently throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8, 2016</td>
<td>Email archive of Energy Minister leaked</td>
<td>Google Drive, Drobox, One Drive and GitHub blocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 26-31, 2016</td>
<td>Co-mayors of Diyarbakir (Kurdish-majority city) detained</td>
<td>Landline and mobile internet access intermittently cut for 11 cities in southeast region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 2016</td>
<td>Pro-Kurdish party (HDP) co-chairs and deputies detained</td>
<td>Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and WhatsApp throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4, 2016</td>
<td>Unknown reason</td>
<td>Access to popular VPN services banned permanently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 2016</td>
<td>Unknown reason</td>
<td>Wikipedia temporarily throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 2016</td>
<td>Unknown reason</td>
<td>Access to Tor Network banned permanently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 19, 2016</td>
<td>Assassination of Russian Ambassador to Turkey</td>
<td>Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled; Dutch broadcaster NOS banned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 22, 2016</td>
<td>Release of ISIS video on Turkish soldiers’ execution</td>
<td>Facebook, Twitter and YouTube throttled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 2017</td>
<td>Armed attack at Istanbul nightclub</td>
<td>Temporary gag order including social media and news websites (no throttling)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

under the State of Emergency rulings. The AKP government via the BTK shut down internet service in ten cities to suppress the dissemination of news and information regarding possible civil unrest in the region. According to Turkey Blocks, internet access through landline and mobile telephony was unavailable for about 4-6 hours, affecting approximately 12 million people. This very first internet shutdown, albeit regional, was repeated in October 2016 when the co-mayors of Diyarbakir, the de facto capital of the Kurdish community, were arrested on charges of terrorism. This second shutdown affected approximately six million people in 11 cities in the southeast, and lasted two days (in Diyarbakir, the duration was five days).49 As Rebecca MacKinnon notes “localized disconnection and restriction” is a tool used by governments to “ensure that people cannot use the internet or mobile phones to organize protests” in times of crisis.50

On November 4, the crackdown on Kurdish politicians, as 11 members of the parliament from the Peoples’ Democratic Party (known by its Turkish acronym, HDP) were arrested in midnight house raids. Instead of a regional internet shutdown, the government implemented a nationwide throttling of Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, as well as WhatsApp (the first time an instant messaging service was restricted) justifying it as a “temporary security measure.”51

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throttling of social media and instant messaging services was indeed temporary, however the BTK ordered Turkish ISPs to block popular VPN services and Tor Network to enable the full implementation of throttling and banning orders. Experts note that the decision to block Tor access will most likely be permanent as part of the government’s broader plan to not only execute censorship orders but also to enable easier surveillance of users.

Considering the above-mentioned developments, it is fair to argue that the Turkish government’s post-coup internet policy is different from the pre-coup period in terms of both the types of measures (e.g., regional internet shutdowns) and the types of incidents that trigger these measures. For example, the blocking of online communications that occurred in July 2015 was prompted by a cross-border military operation in Southeast Turkey, whereas those in September-November 2016 were specifically aimed at limiting (potential) civilian protests in the same region. Likewise, social media throttling in the pre-coup period transpired at times of security-related incidents (see Table 3), whereas in the post-coup period it was prompted by the leaking of damaging emails and information, and was complemented with the blocking of cloud drive services, VPN services and Tor access. This widening of the net and tightening of the mesh, so to speak, occurred in October 2016 when the government blocked access to drive services (Google Drive, Dropbox, Microsoft One Drive) and the software repository GitHub in response to the leaking of the email archive of Berak Albayrak, the Minister of Energy and Natural Sources, and Erdogan’s son-in-law. The decision to block said services was prompted by the publication of 57,000 emails that laid bare the relationships between the AKP, and business and media circles, as well as details about Albayrak’s private life.

5. Internet sovereignty and data localization initiatives

Another step Turkish authorities have taken in the post-coup period is the building of “a domestic search engine and email service compatible with national culture and values.” Similar to Russian, Chinese and Iranian efforts at creating digital borders and launching country-specific social media platforms (China’s WeChat and Russia’s VKontakte), the key objective of internet sovereignty is to control the flow of information that emanates from outside Turkey. In addition to online traffic control, Turkish authorities are also motivated by enhanced surveillance of online communications, as seen in the official statement pointing to the “need to store user data within Turkey’s borders and ensure that communications could be fully analyzed domestically.”

To incentivize the establishment of local data centers, the government will provide favorable terms in regard to land use, corporate taxes and electricity costs. According to Decree Law No. 678, published in the official gazette in November 2016, the government’s plan is to encourage Google, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to establish data centers in Turkey and consequently make them


In July 2015, mobile internet access was cut in most of southeast Turkey for 60 hours during the aerial bombardment of ISIS and PKK positions in Northern Syria and Iraq. According to local news reports, the service interruption was based on an order issued by the Office of the Prime Minister. See, E.K. Sözeri, ‘Turkey cuts internet access to Kurdish towns, removes elected mayors’, The Daily Dot, September 11, 2016, www.dailydot.com/layer8/turkey-internet-access-kurdish-towns/ (accessed January 14, 2017).


subject to local laws. According to reports in pro-
government newspapers, data localization is part
of a broader plan to store user data in order to
“accelerate the process of identifying social media
users that praise and provoke terrorism, closing
their accounts, and blocking content.” As members
of Turkey Blocks note, these initiatives signal a trend
towards a “walled garden” model that denies access
to foreign internet services and instead encourages
local search engines and social media platforms,
and is therefore isolationist in nature.

6. Prosecution of social media users and the
institutionalization of “snitching”

The prosecution of social media users is not a
new phenomenon, however, in the post-coup period
it has escalated both in terms of its pervasiveness
and severity. According to the Ministry of Interior
Affairs, 3,710 people were detained for questioning
between July and December 2016 with 1,656 of them
arrested, 1,970 released, and 84 under detention
as of this writing. Charges included “inciting the
public to hatred, animosity and agitation,” “praising
terrorism,” “engaging in terrorist propaganda,”
“insulting state officials” and “undermining state
sovereignty and public safety.” In addition, as per
the statement of a member of the parliamentary
commission on security and intelligence affairs,
the government purportedly set up a “Social Media
Monitoring Unit” which is currently in the process
of preparing legal investigation notices for 17,000
users and finding the addresses of another 45,000.

Shortly after the release of this information, a high-
profile incident of social media-related prosecution
occurred. Barbaros Sansal, fashion designer, LGBT
activist and outspoken government critic became
the target of pro-government trolls upon sharing
a video message that included allegedly offensive
remarks concerning the AKP, the Turkish state and
society. Sansal was immediately extradited from
Northern Cyprus to Turkey, only to be physically
assaulted by angry mobs at the airport apron, and
finally detained and arrested the next day.

While online trolling played a role in bringing
Sansal to the attention of law enforcement and the
courts, there is no publicly available information as to
how many of the above-mentioned detentions and
arrests were initiated by police surveillance versus
citizen informants. In a worrisome development, in
December 2016 the Turkish National Police (TNP)
lunched a smart phone app and a dedicated
webpage that allow citizens to report social media
posts they consider to be terrorist propaganda. In its
public announcements, the TNP has urged citizens
to share all available information concerning the
harmful content, the user, and to take a screen shot
of the content in case it is deleted. The news of
the app was welcomed by pro-government media
outlets, journalists, pundits, and online users, who
wholeheartedly encouraged fellow citizens to report
the alleged “social media terrorists;” becoming a
symbolizing indicator of the government’s changing
internet policy and the ways it is implemented.

58 B. Simsek, ‘Sosyal medya terorune kotken cozum
tr/yasam/2017/01/04/sosyal-medya-terorune-kotken-
59 Skype interview with two members of Turkey Blocks,
60 “Sosyal medyada buyuk gozalti,” Cumhuriyet, January
turkiye/650063/Sosyal_medyaya_büyüyük_gözaltı ... 10
bin kişiye sorusturma açıldı.html, (accessed January 14,
2016).
61 “Sosyal medyaya büyük operasyon,’ Cumhuriyet,
siyaset/660327/Sosyal_medyaya_büyüük_operasyon_17
bin kişi hakkında fezleke hazırlandı_45 bin kullanıcı

62 E. Toksabay, ‘Turkish fashion designer arrested:
article/us-turkey-security-designer-idUSKBN14N1PW,
(accessed January 14, 2016).
63 ‘Sosyal medyada teröre destek verenler nasıl ihbar
yenisafak.com/teknoloji/sosyal-medyada-terore-destek-
verenler-nasil-ihbar-edilir-2585434, (accessed January 14,
2016).
Figure 1: Message from Turkish National Police issued in July 2016: “Turkish National Police Warns Citizens: You can report social media profiles and pages that support terrorist activities and include criminal content by sending an email to the following accounts with links and screenshots.”

Figure 2: Tweet posted by A Haber, a pro-government television channel: “Report the terrorists to authorities by using your cellphone. New app from the police. ‘Online reporting’”

7. Pro-government presence online

Previous sections have documented various types of online restrictions that range from throttling to prosecution of users. Although the majority of these restrictions are not formally acknowledged or announced, they are nonetheless based on official decisions made by the government and carried out by the BTK and the courts. However, as this section details, there has been a palpable increase in pro-government presence online and consequently higher levels of intimidation and harassment against anti-AKP journalists, pundits and users.

a) Trolls

In the immediate aftermath of the Gezi protests in 2013, the AKP government became aware of the protestors’ use of Twitter in mobilization and organization, and thus decided to form its own social media team. The initial objective of the 6,000-member team, comprised of anonymous pro-government influencers, was to promote a positive image of the government. However, this team soon came to be known as “AK Trolls” because their online activities turned abusive, harassing and threatening critical journalists. In 2015, their online affiliations with government officials and pro-government journalists were revealed, as were their attempts at organizing physical attacks targeting independent news organizations and journalists.

As documented by the International Press Institute (IPI), “government supporters and nationalists” were already using “threats of violence, verbal abuse, technical interference and legal threats” well before the coup attempt to either incite physical acts of violence against journalists or to simply “question their credibility or to silence them.” On Twitter, it was common practice for pro-AKP accounts to label journalists as “traitors”, “terrorists,” “supporters of terrorism” and “kafir” (infidel). The IPI notes that in the post-coup conjuncture, the Turkish National Police’s social media reporting program, coupled with the ongoing State of Emergency, has only strengthened government supporters’ harassment of journalists and granted them continuing impunity.

In addition to online harassment, the pro-AKP social media teams launched an online propaganda scheme aiming to boost the morale of young (male) Turks while intimidating Kurds in response to the flaring up of armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK. Opening new accounts under pseudonyms such as “special force” and using the Turkish flag in their profile pictures, these pro-government trolls shared images of dead bodies, purportedly of Kurdish militia, emblazoning them with nationalist slogans. It was later revealed that one such Twitter account was owned by none other than an AKP-affiliated governor in the region. By the time “anti-terror” operations concluded and the government declared that the region had been cleansed of terrorists, all such Twitter accounts were curiously shut down.

To illustrate the pro-government presence online, we conducted an analysis of Twitter activity in the months before and after the coup attempt. Based on information collected by the DMI-TCAT, the following graphs show Twitter activity by different user groups.

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69 IPI, op. cit.
Graph 1: Pro-government accounts engaged in communication, propaganda campaigns

Graph 2: Pro-government trolls

Graph 3: Pro-government journalists
Graph 4: Human rights activists

Graph 5: Independent journalists

Graph 6: Foreign journalists based in Turkey
Graph 7: Gulen-affiliated journalists

Graph 8: Pro-HDP accounts

Graph 9: Random users
As seen above, the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 is certainly the most significant incident in the period we analyzed, prompting a strong reaction amongst almost all Turkey-based Twitter users, but especially pro-government trolls (Graph 2) and pro-government journalists (Graph 3). The top-tweeted incidents by pro-government communication and propaganda accounts, on the other hand, include the ouster of Prime Minister Davutoglu (May 5, 2016), PKK attacks (August 18, 2016), and the beginning of Turkish military operations in Syria (August 24, 2016) (Graph 1). This is because these accounts were carrying out communication and mobilization campaigns to garner popular support for Erdogan and his government’s policies regarding these political, security- and military-related developments.

Pro-government trolls were most concerned with the coup attempt, Erdogan’s massive rally (on August 8), PKK attacks, military operations in Syria, and the arrests of Kurdish deputies (in November) (Graph 2), whereas pro-government journalists tweeted most about the coup attempt and the arrests of Kurdish deputies (Graph 3).

Due to Twitter’s limitations on data collection, the pre-coup period is under-represented for other groups analyzed for this research. However, activities of other groups during the post-coup period nonetheless give us some insights into the events they tweeted about. Independent journalists, for example were interested in sharing information about various developments, but most importantly the coup attempt, PKK attacks, closure of independent media outlets, and crackdown on Kurdish politicians (Graph 5). Likewise, foreign journalists based in Turkey tweeted most about the coup attempt and arrests of Kurdish deputies (Graph 3).

Human rights activists’ and pro-HDP accounts were most concerned with the arrests of Kurdish deputies (Graph 4).

Another important insight provided by this analysis is the overwhelming presence of pro-government users, be it communication and propaganda accounts, partisan journalists or trolls. Comparing the number of tweets posted by various groups, one can observe that pro-government users are the top tweeters regardless of the event in question. Obviously, their objective is to “overwhelm [their] adversaries” with too much information, and to “mobilize their supporters and bind them to the state.”

Finally, a curious finding is related to the spike in tweets posted by pro-government users in relation to the U.S presidential election. Soon after Donald Trump was elected, Turkish social media was suddenly flooded with fake news concerning an alleged pedophilia scandal that involved the Clinton campaign. Known as Pizzagate and originally promulgated by Trump supporters in the U.S, this non-scandal proved to be popular amongst pro-AKP users for a couple of reasons. For example, the AKP supporters sought to dilute the ongoing debate in Turkey concerning a draft bill that would decrease sexual assault sentences, drown out critics’ concerns about “child brides,” and hoped to divert attention from the closure of an NGO that focuses on children’s rights.

b) The Pelikan network

In May 2016, a curious blog post, titled the “Pelikan Dosyasi” (in a reference to the Hollywood movie Pelican Brief) made headlines in Turkish media

74 Previously, pro-AKP media outlets depicted Trump in a negative light because of his Islamophobia and xenophobia. However, in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, the portrayal of Trump suddenly turned positive based on the assumption that, if elected, Trump would be willing to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the Muslim cleric whom the Turkish government accuses of masterminding the coup attempt. See, E.K. Sözeri, ‘İktidar medyası, İslamofobik Trump’ı nasıl ve neden destekledi’, P24 Blog, November 13, 2016, http://p24blog.org/yazarlar/1851/iktidar-medyası--islamofobik-trump-i-nasil-ve-neden-destekledi, (accessed January 14, 2017).
thanks to its unabashed criticism of the then Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu.\textsuperscript{78} Penned by a journalist close to Erdogan, the post exposed the ongoing power struggle between the two men. Shortly after the publication of the Pelican Brief, Davutoglu resigned and an Erdogan-loyalist ascended to the premiership. In addition to the intra-party struggles, the blog post also revealed the existence of a network of pro-Erdogan operatives on Twitter—one that is separate from the larger cadre of AK Trolls. Based on the leaked emails of Energy Minister Berat Albayrak, researchers were able to disclose the connections between these operatives, a pro-government columnist and a partisan think-tank, Bosphorus Global.\textsuperscript{79} This newly-discovered network of online operatives were found to be running various public communication and information projects via 23 different Twitter accounts, and associated Facebook pages and websites. Most of these projects involved some sort of fact-checking service in several languages that aimed to correct critical coverage of the AKP government found in international media. They also targeted certain journalists and media outlets by “name and shame” tactics, as can be seen in following examples.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{78} M. Akyol, ‘How mysterious new Turkish blog exposed Erdogan-Davutoglu rift’, \textit{Al-Monitor}, May 3, 2016, \url{www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/05/turkey-rift-between-erdogan-davutoglu.html}


\textsuperscript{80} ‘We condemn the international media organs and journalists that support military coup in Turkey. Here is a list of them:’, \textit{@FactCheckingTR on Twitter}, July 16, 2016, \url{https://twitter.com/FactCheckingTR/status/754412571323723776} , (accessed January 14, 2017).

\textsuperscript{81} Alev Scott’un “AK Parti Mültecileri Muhafiz Şehirlere Gönderiyor” Yalani, @gununyanlanlari on Twitter, April 7, 2016, \url{https://twitter.com/gununyanlanlari/status/718166702945472513} , (accessed January 14, 2017).

\textsuperscript{82} ‘Politico falsely claims that AK Party government houses refugees in opposition towns’
Figure 5: @FactCheckTR_AR, the Arabic version of the government-linked fact-checking service claims the Politico article in question is “a lie”\textsuperscript{83}

One might argue that these Pelikan-affiliated fact-checking services are doing what any government would naturally do, that is communicating its own version of the events. However, in Turkey, these pro-government operatives who run these social media accounts and the so-called fact-checking services are not merely trying to set the record straight. They are also aiming to harass and intimidate journalists as seen in the detention of Dion Nissenbaum, Wall Street Journal’s Turkey correspondent. In December 2016, an ISIS video in which two Turkish soldiers were burned alive began to circulate on social media. The AKP government questioned the veracity of the video and prohibited media outlets from reporting even its existence. However, Nissenbaum had shared a screenshot of the video in a tweet and was soon targeted by a member of the Pelikan network. This pro-government operative reported Nissenbaum to the Turkish National Police demanding his “immediate deportation.”\textsuperscript{84} A week later, Nissenbaum was detained for three days without access to lawyers. Upon his release, he left Istanbul on his own volition.\textsuperscript{85}

c) Bots

The flooding of the Turkish Twittersphere with pro-government messages to push away dissidents also relies on the use of bots. According to Norton, Turkey has the highest bot population in the EMEA region (Europe, Middle East, Africa) with Istanbul and Ankara as cities with highest levels of bot infestation. In terms of bot density, Turkey ranks fifth with one bot per every 1,139 internet users.\textsuperscript{86} Norton’s data does not specify the percentage of bots that are linked to the AKP, however, in 2014 two researchers discovered 18,000 bots that were tweeting pro-AKP messages during the local election campaign.\textsuperscript{87} Pro-government accounts have used bots on other occasions as well, such as after bombing attacks,\textsuperscript{88} primarily to drown out critical users from online conversations and to push pro-

\textsuperscript{83} «ندملا يف نيئجاللا ُنِكْسُت ةيمنتلاو ةلادعلا بزح ةموكح :ءاعداةضراعملا http://factcheckingturkey.com/ar/refugees/224 @AlevScott @POLITICOEurope»,


\textsuperscript{84} ‘Wall Street Journal’ın temsilcisi katliam görseli RT’leyor. Türkiye’deseye derhal sınır dışı edilmeli!’ @DionNissenbaum @EmniyetGM, @Filiz_Gunduz on Twitter, December 22, 2016, https://twitter.com/Filiz_Gunduz/status/812043102588456960, (accessed January 14, 2017).


\textsuperscript{86} https://uk.norton.com/emeabots


government hashtags to the top of Trending Topic lists.\textsuperscript{89}

d) White hat hackers

In January 2017, the BTK announced that it would set up an “army” of white hat hackers to safeguard Turkey from cyberattacks, and organized an online contest to select qualified candidates.\textsuperscript{90} Although the TIB established the National Intervention Center against Cyber Attacks (known by its Turkish acronym USOM) in 2014 and the Ministry of Telecommunications already employs 372 “cyberattack intervention crews,” the BTK maintains that there is still a need for an additional “cyber army.”\textsuperscript{91} However, it is not clear if these white hat hackers will engage in activities other than securing the country’s information and telecommunications infrastructure. Given the expansion of online surveillance and suppression in recent years, the absence of a clear-cut job definition does indeed raise concerns.


Conclusion

In their analysis of censorship and control of the internet around the globe, Deibert and Rohozinski discuss first, second and third-generation controls. First-generation controls consist of internet filtering and blocking; second-generation controls involve the passing of legal restrictions, content removal requests, technical shutdown of websites, and computer-network attacks; and third-generation controls include warrantless surveillance, the creation of “national cyber-zones,” state-sponsored information campaigns, and/or direct physical action to silence individuals or groups.92

As the preceding overview of Turkey's internet policy between the late 1990s and the present shows, there has been a marked shift from the use of first to third-generation controls, and from (more) formal and direct controls to (more) informal and indirect practices of suppression. This transformation is largely the result of the Turkish authorities' need to adapt to emerging digital technologies and their affordances such as public deliberation and political engagement. As March Lynch notes in his “authoritarian persistence” thesis, states adapt to the changes unleashed by new communication technologies and learn how to use the new powers of the internet as they go. In response to emerging cultures of critique and new forms of interaction between citizens and the state, authoritarian regimes work constantly to contain the mediated public sphere, and complement their existing filtering, blocking, surveillance systems with new strategies that de-centralize and distribute control across platforms.

Between 2007 and 2013, a period when so-called harmful online content and communications largely transpired on websites, blogs, and social networking and collaborative sites (e.g. YouTube, MySpace, Dailymotion, Vimeo and Blogspot), Turkish courts and administrative entities relied largely on first and second-generation controls. However, in the aftermath of Gezi protests and the corruption scandal in 2013, the AKP government became acutely aware of the role of social media platforms in political engagement and civic mobilization, and in building and expanding of online/offline solidarities.

Similar to authoritarian regimes that consider the free flow of information a threat to their hegemony and continuously adapt their media and information management strategies to confine the networked public sphere, the Turkish government too resorted to third-generation controls. In the aftermath of the abortive coup in 2016, the AKP has intensified its attempts at controlling and taming the online public sphere by way of regional internet shutdowns, cloud and VPN restrictions, throttling, data localization schemes, online “snitching” and prosecution, and finally, covert but coordinated propaganda and trolling operations.

The shift from formal, direct, hard forms of control (e.g. legal and technical restrictions) to informal, indirect, soft ones (e.g. throttling, snitching, government-sponsored propaganda campaigns) also points to the emergence of a decentralized and distributed network of online censorship. In the 2000s, online controls were implemented by a centralized group of identifiable entities (TIB, BTK and courts) via identifiable (if not always officially acknowledged) strategies such as banning websites, forbidding words from domain names, and denying access to certain social media content. Beginning in 2013 and escalating since 2016, online controls have been carried out by a decentralized group that includes the BTK, the courts, citizen informants and government-affiliated trolls.

As noted above, the increasing agility and diversity of internet controls is a necessity on the part of authoritarian governments around the globe to maintain and bolster regime stability in the face of new political developments. In this regard, it is important to discuss the recent changes in Turkey's internet policy with reference to those in China and Russia—two authoritarian regimes (to varying degrees) whose online control strategies serve as a blueprint for budding autocrats around the world.

Analyses of China's ICT policies show that Chinese authorities rely on “public-private partnerships” with the technology industry and a combination of control, surveillance and activism. The deployment of paid users to assist the government in “monitoring content, making favorable comments, and pushing discussion toward pro-Party lines” is an indication of the emergence of a proactive censorship

92 Deibert and Rohozonski “Control and Subversion"
regime as opposed to a reactive one.93 Similarly, Russia has moved beyond “strategies of ‘negative control’ of the internet [i.e blocking, censoring, and suppressing the flow of communication] toward strategies of proactive co-optation [i.e. a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation on social media].”94 As Gunitsky notes, the Russian government, prompted by the anti-government protests in 2011-2012, resorted to use social media to maintain regime stability, and to this end, it mobilized its own supporters (military and business elites, regular citizens) and disseminated online propaganda, both of which have complemented each other and enabled the “planting of false information, monitoring of opposition websites, harassment of opposition members, and the shaping of online discourse and public consciousness.”95 Russian authorities also formed “web brigades” of hundreds of thousands of paid users to write positive comments about the government, and thus created a mechanism to “control the boundaries of acceptable online debate” not simply by “blocking dissent but by manipulating it.”96

93 S. Chestnut Greitens, 2013, “Authoritarianism Online: What Can We Learn from Internet Data in Nondemocracies?” Political Science and Politics, 46:2, p. 265
94 Gunitsky, p. 42
95 Gunitsky, op. cit., 46
96 Gunitsky, op. cit., 47

As our analysis has shown, the Turkish government also opted for a more decentralized set of controls in the post-Gezi and post-coup conjunctures. Not content with the legal, financial and political silencing of critical voices in print and broadcast media, the AKP government directed its attention to the last bastion of free speech in the country, that is the networked online sphere. Buttressing its existing “negative” strategies implemented via the BTK and the courts, it began to devolve responsibility for internet control to partisan journalists, pundits and trolls. Additionally, it secured the active engagement of the Turkish National Police, partisan media outlets and NGOs, and its own voter base to monitor online communications and to file complaints against critical or dissenting websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter users. In the post-coup period, the AKP has opted not to develop its new censorship and silencing mechanisms into laws and regulations, a strategy that resonates with the Russian experience.97 By maintaining a high-level of opacity to administrative and judicial decisions concerning the blocking and banning of content, and the prosecution of users, it has engendered a sense of uncertainty and uneasiness in the online public sphere.