Jihads and Crusades in Sudan From 1881 to the Present

Heather J. Sharkey
University of Pennsylvania, hsharkey@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/nelc_papers

Part of the European History Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the Near Eastern Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE)

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/nelc_papers/24
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Jihads and Crusades in Sudan From 1881 to the Present

Abstract

This chapter grapples with several difficult questions that arise from the history of conquest, revolution, and colonial rule in Sudan. To what extent was the Mahdist jihad anti-Christian at its inception; to what extent did the jihad reflect, instead, a battle among Muslims over the nature of Islamic government and society? How did Muslim religious sensibilities influence popular responses to British colonialism after 1898? To what extent did jihadist discourses persist among Sudanese Muslims, both in the Anglo-Egyptian period and in the decades following decolonization? Reciprocally, to what extent were British policies anti-Muslim? How did British fears of Muslim “fanaticism” influence colonial policies on education, administration, and public health, and did these policies amount to a series of “colonial crusades”?

Keywords
sudan, mahdi revolt, colonial crusades, British policy, decolonization, fanaticism

Disciplines
European History | Islamic World and Near East History | Near Eastern Languages and Societies

This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/nelc_papers/24
Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from 1881 to the Present

HEATHER J. SHARKEY

The first jihad of modern Sudanese history began in 1881, when a northern Sudanese Muslim scholar named Muhammad Ahmad (1844-1885) declared himself to be al-Mahdi—"the Rightly Guided One"—who would restore justice in an age of chaos before the Day of Judgment. Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, then declared jihad against the Turco-Egyptian regime that had been ruling the region since Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, had ordered a conquest in 1820. Tapping into popular Muslim millenarian beliefs and into widespread grievances against this regime, the Mahdi amassed followers, who defeated Turco-Egyptian forces in a series of battles. The regime collapsed in 1885, when Mahdist armies overtook the colonial capital, Khartoum, and killed Charles Gordon, the British military careerist and devout Christian whom authorities had appointed as governor-general. Gordon's death, in turn, galvanized evangelical Christians in Britain and helped to fuel a burgeoning movement among Protestant missionaries who were adopting the militant rhetoric of the British government in its age of "New Imperialism." Some of these missionaries indeed described their evangelism as a modern crusade.

The Mahdi died from a sudden illness shortly after the fall of Khartoum in 1885, so the task of organizing the Mahdist state fell to his successor, known as al-Khalifa Abdullahi (r. 1885-1898) or simply the Khalifa. Meanwhile, British authorities eyed Sudan from the distance of Egypt, which Britain had occupied in 1882. Drawing on British popular support for retaliation against the Mahdists and responding to the "Scramble for Africa," Britain launched a "Reconquest" of Sudan in 1898 while using new technologies such as railways and Maxim guns to crush Mahdist armies. After contriving a government known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (which reflected an ostensible partnership with Egypt), Britain went on to rule Sudan until 1956. Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian period, British fears of
Muslim “fanaticism” influenced colonial policies toward education, administration, and public health, while arguably also shaping assumptions about Islam among members of the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) missions that streamed into the country on the heels of the colonial conquest.

At decolonization in the mid-1950s, Britain passed control of Sudan—by then consisting of a territory far larger and more culturally diverse than anything the Turco-Egyptians or Mahdists had ruled—to a small group of highly educated and socially elite Muslim Arabic-speaking nationalists, many of whom were sons and grandsons of the Mahdi’s supporters. In 1955 (just months before formal independence), concerns about the transfer of power set off a conflict that many historians retrospectively called the “first civil war” (1955–1972), in relation to what became known as the “second civil war” (1983–c. 2005). Meanwhile, in 1958, following a brief period of parliamentary rule in which factions followed Muslim sectarian lines, a military junta seized power in a coup d’état. Military-backed regimes went on to rule Sudan for most of the half-century that followed. At the same time, postcolonial conflicts variously simmered and boiled, with “rebels” in Sudan’s southern, western, and eastern peripheries resisting the policies of the Khartoum regimes. So complex, long-running, and geographically diffuse were Sudan’s civil conflicts that one historian later argued convincingly for a plurality of Sudanese “civil wars.”²⁵

Sudan’s civil conflicts have been complex and multifaceted. Yet in the postcolonial period, foreign media often portrayed them simplistically, as a single war between a Muslim Arab North and a Christian African South. This portrayal was misleading insofar as it emphasized a kind of religious and ethnic or racial antipathy while minimizing the battles over power and resources that lay at the root of the conflict. Meanwhile, jihadist rhetoric periodically surfaced amid the fighting. Successive regimes in Khartoum, though most notably the ideologically Islamist regime of Umar al-Bashir (r. 1989–present), invoked jihadist discourses to justify central-government attacks on dissidents in the country’s peripheries.

If one thing stands out from this history, it is that jihads and crusades have been self-constitutive acts.⁶ They have been more about affirming or defining the self than about striking at enemies. They have entailed assertions of power and sometimes calls for change, both between and within religious communities. Neither Muslims and Christians within Sudan nor observers outside the country appear to have appreciated fully these aspects of the “holy” wars of modern Sudan.

Jihad, Anti-Christian Sentiment, and the Mahdist Revolution

Contrary to the insinuations of late-Victorian-era British writers, the anti-Christian dimension of the Mahdist jihad was minimal. When Na‘um Shuqayr, a Syro-Lebanese official in the Intelligence Department of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, published
Jughra’{iyya wa tarikh al-Sudan (an Arabic survey of Sudanese history, culture, and geography) in 1903, he listed the factors that had inspired the Mahdist movement and its call to arms. Above all, Sudanese Muslims resented the Turco-Egyptian regime's oppressive and mounting taxation, its efforts to restrict the slave trade (which Sudanese Muslims regarded as part of the Islamic social order and on which many relied for agricultural labor), its crushing of early dissidents, and its favoritism toward particular groups. Economic distress among small-scale farmers and traders, along with dislocations caused by government monopoly systems and the introduction of cash currencies, also contributed to dissatisfaction. Still others objected to what they perceived as the irreligiosity and debauchery of Turco-Egyptian (Muslim) administrators. For example, one writer claimed in 1901, twenty years after the start of the Mahdist revolution, that “Muhammad Ahmad [al-Mahdi] was among the group of religious notables in al-Obeid who were outraged by a marriage ceremony between a man and a young boy, but when they protested to the local Egyptian official they received insulting treatment.”

It made matters worse, in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims, that in the 1870s, the Turco-Egyptian administration had begun appointing European Christian (and Jewish) officers to positions of importance. This policy marked a sharp departure from conventions of Islamic statecraft, which had barred Christians and Jews from bearing arms in Muslim societies. The Turco-Egyptians appointed men such as the Briton Charles Gordon, first as governor of Equatoria province and later as governor-general of the whole territory. In Equatoria alone, Gordon's staff included “two Americans, an Italian, a Frenchman, and three (later five) Englishmen.” Elsewhere in Sudan, the Turco-Egyptians appointed several Americans who had fought for Confederate forces during the American Civil War and who found themselves unemployed afterward. Sudanese Muslims regarded these appointments as further evidence of the mismanagement of the Turco-Egyptian regime.

There is no evidence that the Mahdi had grievances about Charles Gordon in particular or that he even knew much about him. And in fact, Gordon appears to have done a good job as a Sudan administrator. According to one historian, when Gordon was serving as the Turco-Egyptian governor-general from 1877 to 1880, he reversed long-standing Turco-Egyptian policies that had marginalized Sudanese Sufi leaders, adopted a more tolerant attitude toward Sudanese Islam, and included more Sudanese Muslims in his administration. Symbolically, in an effort to make the Turco-Egyptian government more responsive, Gordon even affixed a suggestion and complaint box to the gates of his palace in Khartoum so that the people could express their concerns.

Nevertheless, the appearance of non-Muslims in the Turco-Egyptian regime during the 1870s disturbed Sudanese Muslims insofar as through these men, the acceleration of Western imperialism was becoming visible. By the time Muhammad Ahmad declared himself Mahdi in 1881, fifty-one years had passed since the French invasion and conquest of Algeria, while just six years had passed since an
Anglo-French banking consortium had seized control of Ottoman and Egyptian finances and public debts. A mere four years had passed since Queen Victoria had declared herself empress of India. Meanwhile, Britain was intent on safeguarding the Suez Canal (opened to traffic in 1869) along with maritime routes to India. European powers were calling the Ottoman empire “the Sick Man of Europe,” and the empire was certainly struggling to hold on to its fringes: Greece had been independent since the 1820s, while other Christian populations (such as the Armenians) were becoming more restive. Disquieting news from Muslim traders and pilgrims crossing the Sahara, traversing the Nile Valley or the Red Sea corridor, and returning from Mecca contributed to the flow of information into Sudan on all of these aspects of European expansion. Such news added to the sense of anxiety and malaise that made Sudan a ripe field for millenarianism.17

Even the war that the Mahdists began with Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia) does not support the idea that the Mahdist jihad was explicitly anti-Christian. To be sure, in 1889, when the Mahdists fired a volley that killed Yohannes IV, the Abyssinian emperor, on the battlefield, the Khalifa Abdullahi hailed the emperor's death as a great victory for Islam against Christianity. Yet the Mahdist victory against Abyssinia had practical purposes that transcended ideology; it drew more firmly what had been until then a shaky Sudanese-Ethiopian border while maintaining commercial exchanges and did so at a time when the Mahdists were trying to assert the bounds of their territory vis-à-vis “Muslim” Egypt.18 Indeed, the Mahdists called all of their opponents infidels (kuffar), both Muslims (such as the Turco-Egyptian authorities) and Christians. Invoking jihad against “infidels” justified the seizure of booty and helped to build up the Mahdist treasury at a time when the Mahdist state was increasingly isolated, restricted in trade, and desperate for income.19

Watching from the distance of Mecca as the Mahdist revolution unfolded, a Shafi'i Muslim scholar named Ahmad Zayni Dahlan (d. 1886)—a man who was neither Sudanese nor a believer in the Mahdi—voiced support for its battles. Dahlan expressed hope that the Mahdi and his supporters would strike Western, Christian forces that were beginning to exert themselves in the region and thereby help to bolster the Ottoman empire. But Dahlan was misinformed about the movement.20 Opposition to an incipient Western imperialism was one source of Mahdist activism but only one: at least in the early years of the movement (1881–85), opposition to Turco-Egyptian imperialism was far more important in triggering and sustaining jihad.

The Nature, Goals, and Impact of the Mahdist Jihad

The overarching goal of the Mahdist movement was to reform Islam from within, by purging popular customs and practices deemed “un-Islamic,” and to establish an Islamic government. In this regard, the Sudanese Mahdist movement belonged
to a series of reformist jihad movements that swept through Islamic Africa during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like the earlier jihads of 'Uthman dan Fodio and 'Umar Tall in West Africa (discussed by David Robinson in chapter 12 above), the Mahdi’s jihad largely entailed a battle among Muslims over the direction that Muslim culture and statecraft should take. It also had a strong nativist dimension, insofar as it emphasized the primacy of local Muslim rule.

Sudanese Islam had been evolving for centuries and, like religious cultures everywhere, was a work in progress. Arab Muslim conquerors had reached Nubia, roughly along the present-day Sudanese-Egyptian border, as early as 651—the same year when Arab Muslim armies overthrew the last Sassanian shah of Iran. But compared with Islam in Iran, Islam in Sudan took centuries longer to spread. Christianity persisted in Nubia until the early fourteenth century, that is, until around 1315, when the first Muslim seized the Nubian throne. Two centuries later, around 1500, a Muslim sultanate known as the Funj emerged near the junction of the White and Blue Niles, followed shortly thereafter, around 1600, by another sultanate, led by the Kayra dynasty, in Darfur to the west. The emergence of these two Muslim states helped to foster what historians have described as the consolidation of Sudanese Muslim culture. During the Funj era, this Muslim culture centered on Sufi holy men, who often functioned as amulet writers, healers, fortune-tellers, and even rainmakers. The Funj and Kayra sultanates also provided the kind of political stability that enabled new Muslim pilgrimage and trade routes to flourish. Instead of crossing the Sahara to North Africa’s Mediterranean coast and from there heading by sea to Arabia, West African pilgrims began taking a route across the interior Sudanic belt of Africa, which brought them past Lake Chad through Sudan to its Red Sea port at Suakin, which was just two hundred miles from Jiddah. Indeed, West African pilgrims from the Sokoto caliphate probably transmitted the millenarian ideas and Mahdist expectations that caught on in Sudan.

The reforms that developed out of the Mahdist jihad emphasized the more rigorous implementation of Islamic law, practice, and administration. Important evidence for this change appears in the proclamations (manshurat), fatwas, letters, and warnings (indharat) that the Mahdi (and to some extent the Khalifa) issued in writing. The Mahdi and Khalifa used these texts to justify their leadership, announce appointments, or make stipulations for the functioning of the military, treasury, and other branches of government. Several of the Mahdi’s proclamations also set social guidelines. For example, he issued orders about marriage and divorce (including limits on dowries and bride wealth), musical performance (for example, by forbidding the use of certain instruments but allowing, within limits, the use of copper drums), and social infractions (by specifying punishments for offenses as minor as swearing, for example, by calling a fellow Muslim believer [akh mu’min] a “dog,” a “pig,” or a “Jew,” with the first two of these slurs also connoting a Jew or a Christian). Given the Mahdist state’s attempts to pronounce and enforce matters of Islamic law governing the details of everyday life, it is no
accident that some observers of contemporary Sudan have drawn parallels between the Mahdist state and Sudan's post-1989 regime, the government of General Bashir. The latter touted its Muslim credentials and commitment to Islamic law, while enforcing rules on mundane behavior, for example, by forbidding women from wearing trousers and requiring them to wear a particular style of hijab that covered more hair than the sari-like tobe (thawb) had conventionally done.

The Mahdist jihad also entailed an internal war for Muslim authority and leadership and posed a direct threat to local Sufi orders (tariqas) that had developed clear structures of power. Thus, the staunchest opponents of the Mahdi were the Sudanese Muslim Sufi leaders, who refused to offer fealty (bay'ā). Among these were members of the Mirghani family, leaders of the Khatmiyya Sufi tariqa, who had close ties to Egypt and the Hijaz and who were interested in the kind of Muslim reform that some scholars have described as "neo-Sufism." Tribal and regional differences, along with economic rivalries, also came into play, complicating the Mahdist movement's internal politics. Divisions were visible within the ranks of Mahdist supporters, notably between the awlad al-balad families of the riverine north (some of whom were relatives of the Mahdi) and the Baqqara Arab nomads of western Sudan (some of whom were relatives of the Khalifa). The Mahdi and the Khalifa pursued two strategies to curb their enemies and to stifle dissent. First, the Mahdi declared Sufi tariqas null and void (though this had limited effect, and indeed Sufi organizations persisted and later rebounded). The Mahdi also established specific rituals for devotion, notably by promoting an authoritative prayer book (ratib), that made Mahdist practice somewhat distinct from other Sufi tariqas. Second, the Khalifa tried to erase tribal differences through policies of forced migration (tahjir), urban resettlement (in the new capital, Omdurman), and intermarriage.

In the late twentieth century, Sudanese historians were still debating the success of the latter policies. Some argued that the Khalifa's policies successfully generated unity through amalgamation and muted tribal consciousness. Others maintained that his policies left Sudanese Muslim communities more divided and more mutually hostile than ever and that they helped to foster a culture of Muslim sectarianism. Certainly, the Khalifa's occasional use of brutal collective punishments signaled his own continuing recognition of clans and tribes, rather than individuals, as social units.

In an age when literacy rates were minimal and when movable-type printing and railways had not yet reached the country, how did the Mahdi and the Khalifa spread their messages of jihad and reform at the grassroots to rally popular support? It appears that panegyric poetry, recited and sung, was the Mahdist movement's mass medium. The Mahdi and the Khalifa sponsored panegyrists, and while a few wrote their compositions down, most appear to have recorded them in their own heads. Some of these praise poets passed their Mahdist compositions down to sons and grandsons, whose continuing commitment to Mahdist faith
arguably represented its own form of Sufi “tariqa loyalty.” In the mid-twentieth century, a Sudanese scholar named Qurashi Muhammad Hasan interviewed the grandsons of Mahdist praise poets and recorded their compositions. Qurashi Muhammad Hasan later suggested that Mahdist praise poetry in the 1880s had entailed a “jihad of the pen” and that it had been just as important as the “jihad of the sword” in accomplishing revolution. He recognized, in other words, that the Mahdist jihad had had a strong rhetorical dimension.

After Jihad: The British in Sudan

In 1898, a joint British-Egyptian army overthrew the Mahdist state. At the battle of Karari just outside Omdurman, eleven thousand Sudanese Mahdist soldiers died, and sixteen thousand were wounded, compared with just 49 dead and 382 wounded among the Anglo-Egyptian forces. In The River War, Winston Churchill, who had been a young war correspondent covering the invasion, noted the technological supremacy of British weapons and called the battle of Karari “the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians.” However, it took nearly a year for Anglo-Egyptian soldiers to catch up with the Khalifa Abdul-lahi, who had retreated. Later, British sources publicized a photograph of his corpse, which was splayed on the prayer mat where soldiers had killed him. In 1932, one writer called the Khalifa’s death “the end of Mahdism,” but history was already proving that claim wrong. After 1898, Mahdist faith persisted among humble families that had supported the movement, while in the years following World War I, some sons and grandsons of the Mahdist elite came to lead a mainstream political movement that sought to negotiate Sudanese independence from Britain and Egypt. Often called neo-Mahdism, this twentieth-century movement became a central player in Anglo-Egyptian-era nationalist activities and in postcolonial Sudanese politics.

Initially, after 1898, British authorities pursued a strategy of quarantine vis-à-vis the surviving family members of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, and their emirs (leading military commanders). They exiled many sons of these Mahdist elites into a kind of prison-cum-house arrest in Egypt and kept the two surviving sons of the Mahdi under close watch in Khartoum. But within a few years, they were revising their policy, by providing the sons of Mahdist elites (including sons of the Khalifa) with modern educations and hiring them into the Anglo-Egyptian colonial bureaucracy as agricultural inspectors, civil engineers, district officials, and the like. The policy of co-opting elites had already served Britain well in India, and it became highly effective in Sudan, too.

The greatest fear of British officials in Sudan was that they might do something to stimulate Muslim “fanaticism” and to provoke a new jihad. So they took special pains to cultivate Muslim elites, particularly those, such as members of the Mirghani family, that had resisted the Mahdist movement. Meanwhile, British
authorities set out to cultivate a new quiescent class of ulema who could keep a
system of Islamic law courts running. Worried that al-Azhar, in Egypt, would
introduce Sudanese students to Egyptian-style, anti-British nationalism, the au-
thorities founded in 1912 a new Sudanese institute for Islamic education, called
al-Ma'had al-'Ilmi, in Omdurman. At the same time, at Gordon College in Kharto-
mum (named in honor of General Charles Gordon and founded in 1902), British
authorities trained some elite Muslim boys for a future as moderate qadis (while
training others as accountants, schoolteachers, and the like).44

World War I prompted the British to accelerate their efforts at co-opting elites.
When the Ottoman government of the Young Turks sided with Germany and
declared the war against the Entente powers to be a jihad, Britain feared that
Muslims throughout the British empire would rise up in waves of resistance. Brit-
ish fears were compounded when leaders of the Sanusiyya movement in Libya
staged an attack on Egypt's western flank in 1915–16 and when 'Ali Dinar, sultan
of the quasi-autonomous region of Darfur, sensed an opportunity and declared
jihad against the British in 1916 (prompting British authorities in Sudan to
invade, conquer, and annex Darfur in return).45

Rather than confirming fears of widespread Muslim hostility, World War I pro-
vided an opportunity for Britain to cultivate new alliances with powerful Muslim
individuals and groups. Britain countered the Ottoman invocation of jihad, most
famously, by wooing Sharif Husayn of Mecca and orchestrating the Arab Revolt
from the Hijaz to Syria. In Sudan, the British made new overtures to Sayyid 'Abd
al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885–1959), the posthumous son of the Mahdi, who agreed
to declare support for Britain and its allies. In return, as a demonstration of their
goodwill, the British enabled Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman to build up large cotton plan-
tations in the budding Gezira Scheme, with some officials calculating that by
making him rich, they might also make him complacent. Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman
used the opportunities wisely and benefited from the free farm labor of the Mah-
dist faithful who settled on his land and paid him alms in return for his baraka
(blessings). In fact, many of his faithful laborers were “Fellata,” or Hausa-speaking
immigrants from northern Nigeria, who headed toward Sudan with the goal of
fulfilling millenarian expectations, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and
finding economic opportunities.46

By the time World War I ended, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was beginning
to sponsor early nationalist activities among young elite literati. One of his most
important ventures was funding Hadarat al-Sudan, a weekly newspaper started in
1919. This newspaper consciously supported “modernization” programs such as
the extension of piped water systems in Omdurman and the opening of new
schools, but it also took two approaches that reflected the evolution of a Mahdist
worldview. First, it attacked “un-Islamic” or superstitious customs and called for
their reform through education. Second, it supported the idea of Sudanese inde-
pendence from both Britain and Egypt and became associated with the nationalist
slogan of “Sudan for the Sudanese” (Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin).47
Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman was charismatic, politically astute, and unflaggingly hospitable to British guests; he also proved skillful at organizing the Ansar (followers of the Mahdi) behind him while insisting to the British that his intentions were peaceful. By some accounts, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman transformed the Mahdist movement into a twentieth-century Sufi organization; certainly, the Ansar contributed to a political and social landscape of Muslim sectarianism. Before and after World War I, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman also voiced steadfast support for the Anglo-Egyptian government in the face of a series of rural protests that evoked the Mahdi. These protests were called Nabi 'Isa (Prophet Jesus) movements, because their leaders claimed to be 'Isa, or Jesus, returning after the Mahdi but just before the Day of Judgment in the face of the “Antichrist” (al-Dajjal), which they interpreted to mean the British government. In the words of one historian, “With the exception of the war years, hardly a year passed during the first generation of Condominium rule without a Mahdist rising” or Nabi 'Isa movement, and yet these rural uprisings failed to rally much support. These revolts, which were the closest the British came to facing the popular jihad that they feared, proved to be very local and easily suppressed.

Colonial Crusades?

Did jihadist discourses in modern Sudan inspire reciprocal colonial crusades? Bernard Lewis has argued that the late-nineteenth-century translation of European history books into Arabic inspired new Muslim interest in the Crusades (c. 1096–1271) and thereby kindled an oppositional interest in jihads. However, within the specific local context of Sudan, it may be possible to argue the reverse, namely that the assertion of Muslim holy war discourses within the Mahdist movement encouraged the articulation of Christian equivalents, particularly within British missionary circles.

Certainly, in the 1880s, around the time Britain occupied Egypt, British and, to some extent, American evangelicals were beginning to place a strong emphasis on the evangelization of Muslims worldwide, from Morocco to Southeast Asia. In this period, British missionaries were adopting the kind of strong-arm rhetoric that mirrored the aggressive language of British imperialism, while in Britain itself, popular imperialism and popular nationalism both maintained strong evangelical Protestant dimensions. In responses to the Mahdist revolution, missionaries adopted particularly strident tones and did so at a time when some were envisioning a contest for souls between Islam and Christianity. By 1898, British and American missionaries were cheering on the advance of Anglo-Egyptian forces into Mahdist Sudan, while British missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) expressed a desire to evangelize Muslims as a way of avenging the death of Charles Gordon many years earlier. In sum, although British colonial authorities never declared an official crusade in the manner that the Mahdi declared a jihad, some Britons in Sudan,
particularly missionaries of the CMS, freely invoked crusader discourses at the turn of the century. They did so, in large part, to rally support among evangelical Christians in the home churches who provided missions with the bulk of their funding.

Perhaps it was an awareness of this militant Christian rhetoric that prompted anthropologist Janice Boddy to argue that British policies in Sudan after 1898 amounted to a series of “colonial crusades.” Boddy attributes a spirit of crusaderism not only to Christian missionaries but also to all British colonial functionaries in Sudan and suggests that Christian agendas shaped the regime. She argues that British efforts began with a crusade against Mahdism and evolved in the early twentieth century into crusades against Sudanese customs, among them the widespread practice of female genital cutting. Equating Christianity with civilization, British officials in Sudan fancied themselves as “knight-administrators,” Boddy contends. They engaged in a struggle that amounted to a “clash of moralities” and deployed workers, such as government educators and midwives, as if they were “secular missionaries.”

Boddy’s arguments are too sweeping, however, insofar as they ignore the divergent views and mixed motives of British protagonists in Sudan.

In fact, high-ranking British colonial authorities, including Lord Cromer and Sir Francis Wingate, regarded Christian missionaries as a nuisance and believed that their evangelical agendas toward Muslims would stimulate popular resistance. Thus, they were often lukewarm or skeptical toward missionary claims, even if deference to domestic British opinion inhibited them from airing their views in public. In the end, British officials after the Reconquest officially forbade Christian missionaries to proselytize among Sudanese Muslims. They allowed them to remain in northern towns with the understanding that they would either cater to Christian expatriates (notably Copts, Greeks, and Ethiopians) or provide social services to Muslims without trying to convert them. CMS missionaries resented this curtailment and did their best to evade it on the ground in Sudan. Meanwhile, as early as 1910, at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, their supporters criticized British policies toward missionaries in Sudan and in northern Nigeria. CMS missionaries in the Nile Valley were also annoyed that British officials approved only the teaching of Islam at Gordon College and that they approved the use of “grammar books [that] deny the Christian faith.”

However, British authorities such as Wingate had other plans for Christian missionaries. They diverted them south, pointing to wide-open fields of endeavor, and “urged a mission to the Pagans.” Through another neat maneuver, British authorities managed to get missionaries to shoulder costs and responsibilities for providing southern Sudanese peoples with some schooling. At the same time, in remote and thinly governed areas of southern Sudan, British officials were able to use missionaries as proxies and relied on them for training southern Sudanese men for employment as government clerks.

Missionaries were already describing southern Sudanese conversion to Christianity as a “mass movement” in 1932, with one CMS missionary recalling how at
Yei, "Huge crowds surged round the car demanding books, baptism, confirmation and more teachers." Yet even in the south, British officials occasionally found missionaries to be a nuisance. Around 1938, they deported one CMS missionary, Richard Jones, who held very fiery revival meetings where he urged sinners and backsliders to repent. British officials apparently deemed his style too inflammatory, but some southern Sudanese borrowed and adapted this "Jones Revival" style, with its ecstatic worship and faith healing, so that its impact persisted for years afterward.  

Relative to the total southern Sudanese population, Christian conversions appear to have been demographically minute during the colonial period. Nevertheless, the southern Sudanese products of mission schools became political organizers when civil conflict broke out in 1955, after an army mutiny at Torit, months before Britain staged its official ritual of decolonization by lowering the Union Jack in Khartoum. Mission converts also functioned as the nucleus of a Christian community that expanded dramatically in the late twentieth century, leading some to argue in the 1990s that Christianity in war-torn southern Sudan had indeed become a mass movement and a vehicle for collective resistance.  

During the Anglo-Egyptian period in northern Sudan, British missionaries had persisted in evangelizing among Muslims, covertly and as opportunities arose, notwithstanding the colonial government ban. By 1956, the CMS northern Sudan mission claimed to have "won" just one convert from Islam in its half-century of work in the region. Yet its mission still made an impact, in social if not religious terms, by providing models for the earliest formal girls' schools in northern Sudan, including some schools that welcomed girls of slave origins. 

Occasionally during the interwar period, rumors surfaced suggesting that missionaries may have converted orphan Muslim children to Christianity. Such stories galvanized northern Sudanese Muslims in three ways. First, Sudanese Muslims began by the 1920s to establish independent, community-supported popular (ahliyya) schools as an alternative to Christian mission schools (since British government schools were very limited in number and often restricted to Muslim elites). Second, Sudanese Muslim women began to establish neighborhood "Needlework Homes," where girls could learn the art of homemaking before getting married. One Sudanese writer also claimed that opposition to Christian mission education prompted Muslim women to organize a public protest in 1946, a protest that helped to inspire the foundation of the Sudanese Women's Union, an important feminist and women's advocacy organization, in 1952. Third and finally, such stories confirmed among some Muslim thinkers the belief that British colonial rule allowed and therefore abetted Christian missionary efforts to evangelize among Muslims. 

Here is where the discussion of "colonial crusades" arises again. Colonial policies and missionary activities sometimes stimulated Muslim resistance, with the case of female genital cutting, and missionary- and government-supported efforts to eradicate it, offering a good example. Beginning in the late 1920s, British
authorities had funded the establishment of a midwifery training college in Omdurman under the leadership of two British sisters, Mabel and Gertrude Wolff. These two women taught hygienic techniques and encouraged the modification of an operation of genital cutting that was almost universally practiced among northern Sudanese Muslim women at the time. This operation (sometimes called "infibulation" in English) entailed excision of the clitoris and labia and restriction of the vaginal opening, and it required surgical intervention at childbirth.67

In 1946, the Anglo-Egyptian government, urged on by the wife of the British governor-general, declared a ban on the operation of infibulation, known in Arabic as "Pharaonic circumcision" (al-khitan al-fir'awni).68 Muslim leaders, such as Mahmud Muhammad Taha (who went on to found the organization known as the Republican Brothers), organized an antigovernment rally to protest this ban on an accepted practice. His resistance, which appears to have enjoyed considerable popular support, landed him in prison.69 Yet it is worth noting that prominent Muslim scholars and leaders at the time issued opinions or published statements supporting the ban and calling for the reform of female genital cutting as it was usually practiced. In a newspaper statement, for example, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi declared that "Pharaonic circumcision is a shame and a degradation to women apart from being contrary to the authenticated sunna [practice of the Prophet Muhammad]." The mufti of Sudan published a statement that went further, suggesting that even the custom of clitoridectomy had dubious Islamic grounds.70 Were Muslim leaders like these pressured by Britons into supporting the ban, did they support the ban to curry British favor, or did they genuinely believe in its aims as they related to the pursuit of Islamic practice? Historians should not discount the possibility that these prominent Muslim critics of female genital cutting genuinely supported the ban, since Sudan has furnished ample evidence in its modern history to indicate the diversity of Muslim opinion.

The Lingering Discourse of Jihads and Crusades

When the conflict that later became known as the first civil war erupted with a military mutiny at Torit in southern Sudan in 1955, northern Sudanese politicians in Khartoum looked upon missionaries as enemies who had undermined national cohesion by propagating Christianity among southern "pagans." Thus, in 1957, the Khartoum government began to nationalize mission schools, and in 1964, it deported all foreign missionaries. A government memorandum issued at the time described missionaries as an obstacle to national integration and accused them of sheltering, supplying, or otherwise abetting southern "mutineers" and "outlaws."71 These measures forced the rapid indigenization of southern Sudanese church leadership and confirmed the assumption among political analysts that Muslim-Christian conflict would either become or remain a perennial theme in modern Sudanese history.
This first civil war abated in 1972, with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, but it flared up again, more intensely, after 1983, when President Ja'far Numayri proclaimed shari'a law. During the second civil war, as the post-1983 conflict became known, Muslim ideology played an important role in the central government's discourses. To rally popular support and justify military drafts among northern Muslims, Khartoum regimes portrayed the civil war as a jihad and proclaimed that its war dead were martyrs. By the mid-1990s, the government had set up large murals of "martyrs" along major streets in the capital and was inculcating militant Islam even in girls' elementary schools, where uniforms were made out of camouflage fabric.

After 1983, Khartoum politicians found jihad to be politically expedient in other ways, too. Jihadist rhetoric enabled the regime to draw more support from other Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, which helped the government with its Islamization programs by offering money to construct mosques and Islamic schools in remote and largely non-Muslim regions. More generally, northern politicians gave lip service to shari'a law and Islamic values as a way of appealing to Muslim populations who were otherwise disillusioned with the corruption, mismanagement, and factional infighting of successive postcolonial regimes.

After its rise to power in the coup of 1989, the Bashir regime proved willing to invoke jihad for internal wars, not only against assumed non-Muslims in the south (where many Muslim families also lived, particularly in towns) but also against Muslims elsewhere. The latter proved true in 1992, when government forces bombed dissent Muslim communities in the Nuba Mountains of Kordofan and apparently sold thousands of survivors as slaves to the Arab tribal militias that backed the regime. According to French analyst Gérard Prunier, the Bashir regime's readiness to invoke jihad against Nuba Muslims presaged policies that it would later pursue in Darfur following the outbreak of war there in 2003.

By emphasizing the religious dimensions of civil conflicts, the Sudanese government tried to distract attention from the deep economic and political grievances that had been propelling these wars from the start. Many southerners, along with other non-Arab Sudanese peoples (including Muslims from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills region), resented the way Arabic-speaking Muslims of the northern riverine Sudan had monopolized power and resources. They were disgusted, in other words, with a history of underdevelopment and neglect in the country's peripheries (a history that went back to the Anglo-Egyptian period). By 1983, many southerners opposed the regime's Jonglei Canal project, which proposed to drain the south's White Nile tributaries in order to feed the main Nile going into northern Sudan and Egypt. They feared the local environmental consequences that the canal would have. Demand for Nile water, spurred by the development of agricultural industries and the Aswan Dam's hydroelectric power plant, was growing, so that "hydropolitics" functioned as an important issue for Sudanese-Egyptian diplomacy. Much the same later applied to "petropolitics," which centered on the oil that the Khartoum government began to
extract from the southern Sudan (with help from Chinese, Malaysian, Canadian, and other companies) in 1999. On top of this environmental and economic exploitation, the regime's attempts to foist Arabic and Islamic culture onto non-Arabs or non-Muslims amounted to what some dissidents described as a new, internal colonialism.\(^{78}\)

After 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M), which was the main southern opposition force, called for secular government and official recognition of Sudanese pluralism. The SPLA/M, which spread its organization into the Nuba Mountains and included both Muslim and Christian supporters (including Nuba Muslim commanders such as Yousif Kuwa Mekki),\(^{79}\) did not resort to crusader discourses even though Christianity was becoming increasingly influential as a cultural force among much of its rank and file.\(^{80}\) Amid war and displacement, international Christian organizations claimed to detect the rapid expansion of Christianity among refugees and even among soldiers, citing, for example, a sharp rise in the number of SPLA Christian chaplains by 2000.\(^{81}\) One anthropologist ascribed the dramatic spread of Christianity to two things: first, Christianity helped southern Sudanese to overcome ethnic divisions, which had led to intense internecine fighting; and second, it offered them a "sturdy ideological opponent" against the official Islam of the Khartoum regimes.\(^{82}\) Yet the SPLA/M retained both Muslim and Christian supporters, and this internal diversity reinforced the movement's commitment to cultural pluralism.

The so-called second civil war was brutal. In 1998, some fifteen years after this bout of war had begun, the U.S. Committee for Refugees was estimating that some 2 million southern Sudanese people had died from war-related causes and more than 80 percent of the southern population had experienced displacement.\(^{83}\) However, this second civil war appeared to end in 2005, when the government of Sudan (representing the Bashir regime in Khartoum) and the SPLM (representing southern interests) met in Naivasha, Kenya, to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). After so many years of strife, southern Sudanese people—both in Sudan and in the diaspora—drew hope from the CPA's claim that following a transitional period of government partnership, southerners would have the chance to vote in a referendum on national unity in 2011.

In 2003, a new Sudanese civil war broke out in the western Sudanese region of Darfur, pitting "rebels" and settled civilian populations on the one hand against government forces and nomadic Arab militias on the other. By 2005, at the peak of the violence against Darfurian civilians, some analysts were suggesting that the westward shift of war toward Darfur was no accident, insofar as the Khartoum regime was using war as a machine for survival in the aftermath of signing the CPA with southerners. Regardless, the war in Darfur illustrated that peace for southern Sudan was and could only be a partial resolution of Sudan's civil conflicts, since popular grievances extended into the Muslim-majority regions of the country's eastern and western peripheries. The Darfur war also illustrated the limits of using religion—and in this case, the ostensible Islamic ideology of the Bashir regime—as
an explanatory device for political behavior. Indeed, Sudanese and non-Sudanese analysts alike agreed with reference to the Darfur war that notions of race and ethnicity (involving Arab rather than Islamic ideology) were intensifying and complicating the conflict.  

Conclusion

In 1974, the Sudanese folklorist Qurashi Muhammad Hasan argued that praise poetry—which he called the “jihad of the pen”—had been more important to the success of the Mahdist revolution than the “jihad of the sword” involving soldiers in combat. Yet historians of Sudan have remembered the “sword fights” more than the “pen fights,” by emphasizing the importance of battles such as the “Fall of Khartoum” in 1885, the Battle of Karari (Omdurman) in 1898, or the Torit Mutiny in 1955 (the event that by many accounts set off the “first” Sudanese civil war). Fewer have examined the discursive evidence of conflict, found in proclamations, panegyrics, memoranda, personal letters, memoirs, newspaper articles—the list goes on and on. Such discursive evidence can tell us how, amid the claims for jihads and crusades, Muslims and Christians in Sudan have mobilized supporters, attacked opponents, and justified proposals for change, even while defining themselves.

Fulfilling provisions that the CPA of 2005 had set out, southern Sudanese people had the opportunity to vote in a referendum on national unity that occurred in January 2011. The referendum yielded clear and dramatic results: nearly 99 percent supported southern secession. Secession occurred in July 2011, and a new country, the Republic of South Sudan, was born. With South Sudan now a state apart from Sudan, possible conflicts still loom large, conflicts involving natural resources (oil and water) and the treatment of religious minorities (Christians in Sudan and Muslims in South Sudan). However—to a degree much greater than in earlier periods of Sudanese history—external powers are likely to intervene in these disputes for the sake of advancing their own diverse interests. These external powers will include Egypt, China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Uganda. As this chapter’s study of Sudanese history suggests, for better or worse, jihadist or crusader discourses may well continue to provide a vehicle and a flexible vocabulary for advancing agendas, claims to power, and calls for change.

Notes

3. Illustrating this trend, for example, is W. A. Rice, Crusaders of the Twentieth Century, or the Christian Missionary and the Muslim: An Introduction to Work among Muhammadans (London: Church Missionary Society, 1910).

4. Use of the title khalifa to mean "successor" indicated an awareness of and a sense of continuity with Islamic history, insofar as the Prophet Muhammad's successors had used this title. Yet Abdullahi's use of the title also reflected his bid for political legitimacy.


10. Rudolf von Slatin and Eduard Schnitzer (a.k.a. Emin Pasha) had Jewish mothers and fathers but were baptized as Christians. Both had ambiguous religious identities and were said to be Muslims at different points in their lives.


14. Holt, The Mahdist State, 35. Some of these men, such as Rudolf von Slatin, Eduard Schnitzer (a.k.a. Emin Pasha), and Romolo Gessi, later left memoirs or inspired biographers.


17. One of the best surveys to connect events in Sudan to the rest of the Muslim world in this period is John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Boulder: Westview, 1982).


34. Consider the experience of the Batahin (a Baqqara tribe), "sixty-seven of whose kinsmen had been publicly hanged or mutilated in Omdurman [in 1888] by the Khalifa because of their subordination." Holt, The Mahdist State, 177.
36. This suggests, in turn, that Arabic oral culture exceeded the movement's literary (written) culture in importance even if historians have generally privileged the latter. Of course, the tangibility of written sources and the near irretrievability of oral sources make this tendency understandable. A compendium of Arabic sources, including those from the Mahdist period, appears in R. S. O'Fahey, ed., The Arabic Literature of Africa, vol. 1: The Writings of Eastern Sudanic Africa to c. 1900 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).
37. For an important example of a written text, see Haim Shaked, The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi: A Historical Study of Kitab sa'dat al-mustahidi bi-siirat al-Imam al-Mahdi (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1987). The author of this text was Isma'il ibn 'Abd al-Qadir al-Kurdufani.
47. Sharkey, "A Century in Print."
Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from 1881 to the Present


62. Ibid.

63. Sharkey, "Christians among Muslims."


66. Consider, for example, Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim Nasr, Al-Idara al-Baritaniyya wa al-tabshir al-Islami wa al-Mashih fi al-Sudan (Khartoum: Wizarat al-Tarbiyya wa al-Tawjih, 1979).

67. Boddy, Civilizing Women.


72. I witnessed the martyrs' murals and the camouflage uniforms during a visit to Khartoum in October 1995.


Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads

Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges

EDITED BY SOHAIL H. HASHMI