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This article is available in Kedma: Penn's Journal on Jewish Thought, Jewish Culture, and Israel:
https://repository.upenn.edu/kedma/vol2/iss5/5
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Nitin Rao

In July of 2019, protests broke out in the Israeli village of Kfar Kama, in the Lower Galilee, over the anticipated settlement of a non-Circassian couple in the municipality.¹ The Circassians are an ethnic group of historic origins in the Caucasus mountains some of whose forebears arrived in modern-day Israel as refugees amid violent disruptions caused by the expansion of the Russian Empire into their ancestral lands during the mid-nineteenth century. In 2019, the Circassians of Kfar Kama protested the introduction of non-Circassians into their homogeneous community as the beginning of a cultural erosion that could erase their generations-long efforts to maintain their identity despite their displacement. As Muslims but not Arabs, Circassians occupy a unique place in Israeli society but have often been overlooked because of their exceptionally small numbers; they number today no more than four thousand in a country of nine million people. Because of their “sympathetic neutrality”² during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Circassians fared far better from the Israelis than the other non-Jewish minorities despite their Islamic faith. These Israeli Circassians have weathered seven decades in Israel without becoming either Jews or Arabs and continue to place a strong emphasis on Caucasian culture and their native language. Indeed, compared to diaspora Circassian communities elsewhere in the Middle East (such as in Turkey and Jordan) and all over the world, the Circassians of Israel have been particularly successful in maintaining their traditional language, culture, and customs.
This paper principally draws on the anthropological literature of Chen Bram, the sociological work of Nirit Reichel, and the military history of Randall Geller, as well as primary source news articles to trace the history and identity of Circassians in Israel. The first section traces the background of Israel’s Circassian community from their roots in the Caucasus through the Ottoman Empire to their settlement in the land of Palestine. The second section focuses on the relationship of the Circassian community with the Israeli government through the lens of military service, the community’s narratives, and the disbursement of national funds to minority communities. The third section analyzes how faith and language combined to insulate Circassians from assimilating forces and how the community continues to insist on its homogeneity. The fourth section compares the Israeli Circassian community to the rest of the Middle Eastern Circassian diaspora. Finally, the paper concludes by linking Circassian exilic narratives to the nineteenth-century Zionist project.

Background

The Circassians are an ethnic group whose ancestors are traced to the region of Circassia in the Caucasus, on the northeast coast of the Black Sea. Known in English as “Circassians,” they refer to themselves as “Adyghe.” The Circassians incompletely converted to Christianity—retaining several pagan elements—between the third and sixth centuries and only adopted Islam through the influence of Crimean khans in the eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century—from 1817 to 1864—Russia fought a protracted war against the tribes and ethnic groups of the Caucasus to annex the region to its empire, creating hundreds of thousands to millions of refugees. The ethnic Circassians of the region fled across the Black Sea to seek refuge amid their coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. They were pushed out of their homeland in deadly forced migrations that modern
Circassian communities now label a genocide. The Ottoman government resettled these Circassians on the fringes of the empire—particularly in regions wracked by Arab, Kurdish, and Balkan separatism—as loyal forces in remote areas. Particularly after the loss of most of the Ottoman Balkan territories in 1878, the Ottoman government in Istanbul moved Circassian refugees into parts of Greater Syria—modern-day Syria, Jordan, and Israel—where Circassian communities still exist today. Indeed, it was Circassian refugees who founded Amman, Jordan’s capital. Around 1878, Circassian refugees founded the town of Kfar Kama in the Lower Galilee, Rehaniya in the Upper Galilee near Safed, and Hirbat Circass in the West Bank. The refugees eventually abandoned the Hirbat Circass settlement because of malaria, with the result that Kfar Kama (pop. ~3000) and Rehaniya (pop. ~1000) remain the only two Circassian communities in Israel today. While initially, the newly settled Circassians were pastoralists who grazed animals as they had in the Caucasus, frequent Bedouin raids encouraged their shift to agriculture. The Circassians of the Golan Heights also came into conflict with the local Druze through the 1880s and 1890s, intermittently skirmishing until a full-scale war broke out in 1895 that required an Ottoman cavalry division to join the Circassians and terrorize the Druze into placidity.

Circassian settlements remained in what became the British Mandate territory of Palestine after World War I and lasted until Israeli independence, even as their inhabitants lived largely as they had in the previous three decades. Chen Bram describes that during the late Ottoman period through the British Mandate for Palestine (1918-1948) “the major division in the Galilee…[was] between sedentary peoples and Bedouin nomads,” and in this atmosphere, “Circassians…easily made ties to the Jewish settlers.” Randall Geller notes that from the first nearby settlements in 1899 through independence in 1948, the village of Kfar Kama had friendly relations and frequent social
interaction with the surrounding Jewish settlements. Dozens of Circassians of Kfar Kama joined the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) after Israel secured the Lower Galilee in August of 1948. Unlike Kfar Kama, residents of the Circassian village of Rehaniya lived in a “basically Arab milieu along the Lebanese border,” supported Arab irregulars during skirmishes and unrest in the late British mandate period (1918-1948), and primarily fought with the Arabs until the village’s capture in late October of 1948. Circassian participation with Zionists in the 1948 war was complicated by contingents of Circassian soldiers in Arab countries, principally serving Syria and Jordan. Thus, at the dawn of Israel’s existence, Circassians found themselves on unsteady ground with their new state: lauded for their support but also doubted for their cross-border ties.

**Israeli Circassians and the State**

Because of Circassians’ service during the independence war in 1948, the Israeli government tended to treat the Circassian minority favorably as a “loyal minority,” often to boost the diverse, tolerant, democratic credentials of the state. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, claimed in 1949 that “In this country there are minorities that are above all suspicion and it is possible to trust them, more or less, like the Circassians and the Druze,” as opposed to Christian and Muslim Arabs. The office of the Custodian for Abandoned Property intended to seize abandoned property in Kfar Kama and Rehaniya after the 1948 war. However, the commander of the Minorities Unit in which Circassians served intervened on their behalf to stop the seizure, citing their reliability as soldiers and the critical need for their political support. Clearly, the early favorable treatment that Circassians received from Israel was both a reward for service rendered as well as insurance for future support. Rehaniya actually continued to be a hotbed of smuggling and foreign espionage through
1955. It was only through the high-profile intercession of the Kfar Kama community—some of whose inhabitants threatened to emigrate to Turkey—that a plan to transfer Rehaniya’s population to Kfar Kama was shelved.15

In part due to the intransigence of Rehaniya, it took ten years before Circassians were included in the mandatory draft into the IDF in 1958—two years after the Druze community. Though initially, they served in minority-exclusive units, the IDF integrated Circassians into Jewish units by 1962.16 In falling under the IDF draft, Circassians became the first Muslims to serve regularly under the Israeli flag, allowing the Israeli government to prove that it was not intrinsically discriminatory towards Muslims, thereby helping to justify its policies towards restive Palestinian Arab Muslims. Geller makes the additional interesting argument that in treating Circassians above other Israeli minorities, the Israeli government hoped to engender the goodwill of highly placed Circassians in neighboring states like Jordan.17

Intriguingly, contemporary Israeli Circassians tend to play up their pro-Jewish role during the mandate period, likely as a tactic—conscious or otherwise—of integrating their own community’s history into the Jewish-Zionist narrative of Israel. Israeli Circassian Khoon Shawki, a proprietor of Kfar Kama’s Circassian Museum, noted in a 2012 interview that “there was no Ministry of Immigrant Absorption back then. It was the Circassians who took in those immigrants.”18 While the Circassians of Kfar Kama may have had good relations with surrounding Jewish settlements, Shawki’s claim that Circassians “took in those immigrants” is certainly a stretch in light of the historical record. That is, Circassians might have co-existed peacefully and prosperously alongside Jewish settlements, but the Jewish Agency and similar Zionist organizations did the lion’s share of provisioning and sustaining the immigrants.
Similarly, Kfar Kama elementary school principal Adam Jarhad asserted that “the Circassians defended the Jews” during the Arab revolts of the 1930s. This assertion is far more grounded in fact than Shawki’s hyperbolic assertion and reflects the pride in which Circassians hold their ancestors’ contribution to the Zionist project. While these themes of support for Israel and Yishuv Jews are broadly accurate in reference to the history of Kfar Kama, the struggle to pacify Rehania demonstrates that Circassians, in general, were not unreservedly pro-Jewish during the struggle for independence. In stressing the elements that illustrate their part in the “brave defense” of the land from Arab invasion during Israel’s birth, Circassians have been trying to build a space for themselves in the Israeli mythos, trying to prove that they are as Israeli as any Israeli Jew.

In 1950, Kfar Kama became the first non-Jewish village to receive the designation of “local council,” beginning municipal democracy decades before martial law was lifted from Arab towns. The autonomy and central financial infusions that accompanied local council status allowed the Circassian community (and the Druze) to electrify and develop far more rapidly than the Arabs. However, when Arab villages strengthened their position through political mobilization in the 1980s and 1990s, Circassians began to feel an acute lack of influence with the government and their resulting inferiority compared to the Jewish sector. These feelings strengthened a Circassian perception of having second-class citizenship.

The Circassian community experienced an emotional blow as well amidst the high-profile case of Izzat Nafsu, and this blow shook the community’s sense of Israeli belonging. In 1980, a military tribunal sentenced the Circassian IDF intelligence officer Nafsu to eighteen years in prison on charges of espionage and treason against Israel during his service in the Lebanon War. After seven-and-a-half years in prison, the Israeli Supreme Court acquitted him after revelations that the
Shin Bet—Israel’s internal security service—had perjured itself and tortured Nafsu to extract a false confession. According to Bram, “this case generated heightened consciousness concerning the community’s need to organize itself.”

In 2009, the Forum of Druze and Circassians in Israel staged a month-long protest over the lack of state funding to their communities after the national water company cut off the tap for a handful of indebted Druze villages. The Netanyahu government agreed in 2011 to provide 680 million shekels in funding to the Druze and Circassian communities and tripled the funding to over two billion shekels in 2015. Though Druze leaders fronted the protests—and led a community dozens of times larger than the four-thousand-strong Circassian community in Israel—the protests indicate a quasi-political reawakening in the Circassian community after decades of stagnation. Indeed, the thrust of the Druze-Circassian grievance related to unequal funding compared to Arab and Haredi communities, not uncoincidentally communities which began to flex political strength in the 1980s and 1990s. The story of the Circassians vis-à-vis the Israeli government, then, is one of reward and mutual support in the early decades, followed by inattentive neglect, and now reassertion of equal rights—though largely in tandem with the more numerous Druze.

**Anti-Assimilation and Arab-Circassian Relations**

Though Israeli Circassians practice Sunni Islam like most Israeli Arabs, their shared faith does not unite them with Arab Muslims to any significant degree. Indeed, Circassians are most often grouped with Israeli Druze, as seen in their joint protests led by the Forum of Druze and Circassians in Israel. Circassian Islam has a unique flavor, in part because of their relatively late adoption of
Islam—which occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries—and in part because of the coexistence of traditional Circassian codes and norms alongside Islamic codes and norms. The Adyghe Habze, the ancestral code of conduct of Circassian society, reflects the clan-based honor system by which the Circassian pastoralists of the Caucasus lived until their expulsion by the Russians, and was carried with the Circassian refugees to their exile in the Ottoman Empire. Israeli Circassians actually privilege Islamic law over the Habze, unlike Circassian communities in Syria and Jordan—which Chen Bram traces back as a technique to reconcile cultural differences between the Circassians of the Shapsough tribe (who populate Kfar Kama) and the Abzakh tribe (who populate Rehaniya). However, the Israeli Circassian concept of umma—in traditional Islam, the global Muslim community—refers exclusively to their villages of Kfar Kama and Rehaniya. This act of cordoning off themselves from other Israeli Muslim communities has assisted the Circassians in maintaining the relatively strict endogamy on which their current cultural strength and lack of assimilation has relied. There has not been total isolation; however: Bram notes that, in the 1980s, the young Circassians who mounted an Islamic revivalist challenge to the traditional clan-based political order that dominated Kfar Kama’s local council formed their ideological roots at an Islamic college in the Arab-dominated “Triangle” region of Israel. The success of their political challenge indicates that Circassian Islam is both an important part of Circassian life and also not completely divorced from Palestinian Islam, which imparted the activist-revivalist underpinnings to the Circassian political challengers.

The Circassians’ distinctive educational system has also helped to sustain a strong Circassian identity and while enabling members to advance Circassian interests. In the late Ottoman era Arabic and Turkish became the languages of instruction in a syllabus primarily centered on literacy and
religion. Circassian was only used insofar as students needed Arabic and Turkish lessons translated into Circassian until they developed fluency. Under the British mandate, the authorities replaced Turkish with English and added secular subjects to the curriculum. During the Israeli era, Circassian teachers gradually began to replace Arabs on the school staff. They added Hebrew to the curriculum of Arabic, English, secular subjects, and Quranic studies with Arabic as the language of instruction. Until the 1950s and 1960s, the community had no contact with the broader Circassian diaspora and little sense of Circassian history and literature outside folk traditions. It was not until 1976 that the Circassian language was added to the curriculum—before then it had only been the spoken vernacular—and only then because an American expert by the name of Johann Catford had arrived to teach the elders of the village the Russian Cyrillic-derived Circassian script for the first time.

Additionally, in 1976, the government removed Circassian education from the Department of Arab Affairs, and the Circassian community agreed to change the language of instruction from Arabic to Hebrew in 1978.\textsuperscript{28} That same year, the community added the study of Circassian culture and traditions to the curriculum. Nirit Reichel argues that the government sponsored this strengthening of “Circassianism” at the expense of Arabic to weaken the bridges between the Circassian community and the Arab sector.\textsuperscript{29} To this day, Circassian children study an astonishing four languages—Hebrew, Arabic, English, and Circassian—in school, go off to university equipped with these languages of the nation, religion, globe, and the home, and then return to their villages. The project of Circassian education has both advanced critical skills for Circassians to function in the Israeli economy and also strengthened their sense of Circassian identity amidst the pressure to choose between Hebrew and Arabic.
Despite a successful history of maintaining Circassian identity, the community’s insecurity over demographic assimilation or fusion is apparent. As related at the beginning of this article, in July of 2019, news broke that “a non-Circassian married couple”—one of whom was Arab—had won a government tender to build a home in Kfar Kama, causing Kfar Kama’s mayor to express to his constituents that he would act “to preserve the community’s ‘Circassian character’.”

Circassian petitioners explicitly stated their insecurity, writing that “if we don’t wake up, there will be additional cases, and in a few years, the village will lose its Circassian identity.” Protesters waved signs expressing similar sentiments such as “we’re not against anyone, we just want to preserve our Circassian identity.” Despite seven decades of successful cultural preservation in Kfar Kama and Rehaniya, it seems the Circassian community feels that it will only take one domino to start the cascade that eradicates Circassian culture. A deputy attorney general for the government ruled in favor of the non-Circassian couple at the request of the Arab party Balad’s Member of the Knesset (MK) Hiba Yazbek, who framed the situation as a local mayor acting “in a discriminatory and racist manner towards Arabs.”

Even the Haaretz headline first breaking the news reads “Galilee Mayor Objects to Arab Joining Town, Vows to Keep its ‘Circassian Character’” (emphasis added). Despite the Circassians’ clear expression that they had no ill will towards any ethnic or religious group, merely a desire to maintain the homogeneity of their town—“we’re not against anyone, we just want to preserve our Circassian identity”—both an Arab politician and a mainstream Jewish newspaper portrayed the issue as one of discrimination against Arabs in particular, ignoring that one member of the couple was not Arab. Perhaps that development signifies a perception of Jewish-Circassian equality—that is, if Circassians are capable of discriminating against Arabs like Jews are then Circassians are on a higher footing than Arabs, perhaps even on an equal footing with Jews in the
view of the Arab MK. Or, perhaps the pluralist Israeli left does not and will not tolerate segregated multiculturalism, portending an end to the distinct Circassian identity if those values ever dominate the mainstream.

The Middle Eastern Circassian Diaspora

In Syria and Jordan, Circassians have proven themselves as formidable martial communities and have integrated themselves into the military-political power structures, albeit at the expense of their distinct culture and community. In Syria, French mandate (1920-1943) authorities and later Arab nationalists suppressed Circassian concerns and aspirations, though Circassians continued to be overrepresented in the military and other security institutions. Many Syrian Circassians came from the Golan Heights, so that community suffered particularly after Israel’s seizure of the Heights during the Six Day War. This devastation dissolved one of Syria’s largest Circassian communities and precipitated an exodus to places like Damascus, Europe, and the United States, with many of these emigrants and refugees later losing the cohesive Circassian community of their fathers and grandfathers. In Jordan, Circassian refugees founded the modern capital of Amman and profited from the Ottoman Sultan’s construction of the Hejaz Railway, which aimed to facilitate and protect the passage to and from Mecca for Muslim pilgrims. Though they were fervently loyal supporters of the Turks during World War I, the Circassian community of the new British Mandate for Transjordan threw their support behind Britain’s chosen ruler, Emir Abdullah, and supplied the men for his royal guard. To this day, Circassian soldiers in their distinct bandolier-strapped, thick woolen suits and fur hats protect the King of Jordan. Jordan’s political organization and land reforms privileged the Circassian community with legislative overrepresentation and title to their
Ottoman-era lands, transforming Jordan’s Circassian community into a wealthy landed class. As a result of their integration into the Jordanian high class, many Jordanian Circassians no longer speak Circassian and have assimilated into Arabic-speaking communities. Living among other Muslims in a basically similar Arab milieu as their Ottoman-era ancestors, the Circassians of the Arab lands have been less successful than their Israeli counterparts stopping assimilation. In a way, living in the Jewish state has assisted Circassians in preserving their culture because unlike their kin who assimilated into the Arab Muslim mainstream of surrounding states, Israeli Circassians had little to no chance of assimilating into the Zionist Jewish mainstream.

The “Turkification of post-independence Turkey eroded the distinct culture of the Circassian Turkish minority, who were forced to suppress their traditions and language. After World War I, the Turkish nationalist government under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk closed all Circassian schools and newspapers prosecuted Circassian parents who did not give their children Turkish names and exiled prominent Circassians like Çerkes Ethem. Persecuted for any expression of non-Turkish identity, most Circassians lost their language and “became” Turks. Of the five million citizens of Circassian descent in Turkey, only two million identify themselves as “Circassian,” and fewer than one million can speak the language. Indeed, a 1972 Jerusalem Post article discusses the return of a handful of Circassian families. They had left Israel for Turkey in the mid-1950s only to be disappointed by the quality of life for Circassians in Turkey. Despite these developments, during the 1970s a Circassian revival occurred, with some activists—termed Dönüşçü (returnists)—seeking to repatriate to their traditional homeland in the North Caucasus. However, the 1980 Turkish military coup suppressed ethnic aspirations and organizations soon after. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many obstacles to cross-Black Sea transportation and communication lifted, and Turkish Circassians either returned to
extant Caucasian Circassian communities in small numbers or established regular contact with the community in their homeland. This awakening in Turkey reflects a larger interest among Circassians in their global kin.

In 1991, meanwhile, Israeli Circassians organized a delegation to the first Circassian national congress in the Caucasus. Izzat Nafsu—the falsely convicted IDF soldier—recounted that on a 2016 vacation to Turkey, a Circassian taxi driver inquired about the story of Nafsu on realizing that his passengers were Israeli and “[nearly fell] out of the taxi” after Nafsu replied that he was Izzat Nafsu. From the IDF’s early mid-century attempts to secure the goodwill of Jordanian Circassians by treating Israeli Circassians well to Nafsu’s 21st-century vacation, Circassians have continued to be invested in the well-being of their brethren across borders.

Conclusion

Despite their small size and isolation, the Circassian community in Israel has managed to retain its traditions, language, and culture after seven decades of Israeli rule in the Galilee and seven previously under the Ottomans and British. In many ways, living in the Jewish nation-state has conferred anti-assimilative advantages on the Circassians of Kfar Kama, and Rehaniya, who have not been pressured into becoming Jews like their Turkish and Arab brethren have become Turks and Arabs because of the basic incongruity in religion and the character of state. The irony for Israel’s Circassians is their own exilic status in a country very literally founded to give a home to exiles. Having grown up in a country that represents the fulfillment of the Zionist project, some Israeli Circassians now express a desire for a Circassian state to which the international Circassian diaspora
can return. Even Circassians who do not intend for them or their descendants to return to Circassia speak fondly of their homeland despite the circumstances in which their ancestors left, often treating it in terms that evoke a mythic promised land of milk and honey. In the present, the limited goal of genocide recognition has wide currency among Circassians: about one hundred Israeli Circassians protested in 2014 in front of the Russian embassy in Tel Aviv to demonstrate their opposition to the erasure of their culture in Sochi—the historical capital of Circassia—during the Winter Olympics there. After one hundred fifty years of Russian and Soviet cultural erasure, however, Kfar Kama and Rehania may well be more “Circassian” than present-day Circassia itself. Though the recent Kfar Kama protests portend poorly, Circassians in Israel have had one hundred and forty years of success in preserving their unique culture. They will continue to do so because their corner of the Galilee has become as much of a realized homeland to the small community as their traditional homeland in the Caucasus.

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Endnotes
1 Noa Shpigel, “Galilee Mayor Objects to Arab Joining Town, Vows to Keep Its ‘Circassian Character,’” Haaretz, July 14, 2019.
8 Ibid, 255.
11 Geller notes that around two dozen Rehaniya men joined the Circassian unit of the IDF sometime several weeks after the Kfar Kama enlistment in mid-August of 1948.
15 Ibid, 391.
16 Ibid, 393.
17 Ibid, 395.
18 Kessler, “Circassians Are Israel’s Other Muslims.”
20 Bram, “Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society,” 8.
26 Bram, “Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society,” 11.
27 Ibid, 9.
28 Bram notes that the Circassian Islamic revivalists of the 1980s and more religious elements of the town heavily opposed this in 1978, indicating that Circassians are not monolithic with regards to cultural policy and maintenance.
30 Shpigel, “Galilee Mayor Objects to Arab Joining Town.”
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 Shpigel, “Galilee Mayor Objects to Arab Joining Town.”
35 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 120-123.
36 Ibid, 123-126.
37 Kaya, “The Circassian Diaspora in and outside Turkey,” 56.
38 Richmond, The Circassian Genocide, 130.
40 Kaya, “The Circassian Diaspora in and outside Turkey,” 55.
41 Bram, “Muslim Revivalism and the Emergence of Civic Society,” 16-17.
42 Leibovit-Dar, “The Interesting Life of Izzat Nafsu.”
43 Kessler, “Circassians Are Israel’s Other Muslims.”