The Dreyfus Affair in Vichy France: An Afterlife

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THE DREYFUS AFFAIR IN VICHY FRANCE: AN AFTERLIFE

Kyra E. T. Schulman

2017–2018 Wolf Humanities Center
Undergraduate Research Fellow

University of Pennsylvania

An Honors Thesis
In History
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Introduction
Memory, Re-Memory, and Forgetting in Vichy Era France:
A Past that Does Not Pass

Three generations of the Dreyfus family: the Dreyfus family plot at the Montparnasse Cemetery in Paris. Alfred Dreyfus’s name appears next to those of his wife, children, and grandchildren.²

In 1982, Renée Hartz gave testimony about her survival of the Holocaust in southern France. As Renée told her story, the interviewer, Nora Levin, interrupted and asked: “In thinking back, do you have any explanation for the fierceness of the French… they hounded the Jews, and really were as ferocious as the Nazis were. Do you have any explanation for that, Renée, or understanding of it?”³ Renée paused and contemplated the question. “Well,” she began, “I think there is certainly an anti-Semitic fiber in the French, you know, which can be traced back...”⁴

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⁴ Ibid.
Levin prompted Renée to expand. “The Dreyfus Affair,” Renée explained, the memory of it, was very much alive during the Second World War in France. She added “you don’t need much to bring it to the surface. I mean, most of these people remembered the Dreyfus Affair.” It was not just the memory of the Dreyfus Affair that haunted the French during the Vichy era. Renée elaborated that the French also “had L’Action Française, the [anti-Dreyfusard] newspaper.”

This thesis will explore the Dreyfus Affair and the ways in which the Vichy regime and its supporters dealt with its memory. In the chapters that follow, this paper argues that the Dreyfus Affair served as a touchstone guiding the actions of journalists, the Vichy Ministry of Education, and Vichy administrative officials in their journalistic and political discourse, elementary school textbooks, and revision of street names in French urban sites. During the Vichy era, these key actors evoked, distorted, and removed the memory of the Dreyfus Affair as a historical event in French consciousness.

The Dreyfus Affair began as a military scandal during the French Third Republic. In 1894, the General Staff of the French military wrongly accused French Jewish captain Alfred Dreyfus of selling military secrets to the Germans. Following his conviction by court-martial, a French Military Tribunal stripped Dreyfus of his military rank in the courtyard of the École Militaire and deported him to Devil’s Island off the coast of French Guiana. In the aftermath of Dreyfus’ conviction and deportation, a military investigation uncovered evidence exonerating Dreyfus and implicating another French military officer, Major Ferdinand Esterházy, as the individual who delivered French military secrets to the German Embassy in Paris. The General

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6 Ibid.
Staff subsequently suppressed this exonerating evidence in the 1896 trial of Major Esterházy. As part of a second military trial of Dreyfus in 1899, the French military introduced falsified documents implicating Dreyfus. A number of leading writers, including Émile Zola in his celebrated “J’Accuse” open letter to the public, accused the French military of a cover-up. While Dreyfus was again convicted in this second trial, the French President Émile Loubet eventually pardoned him. The French military reinstated him in 1906. The Dreyfus Affair, which emanated from these wrongful convictions of Dreyfus, acquittal of Esterházy, and pardoning and reinstatement of Dreyfus into the military, divided France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries into two primary camps: the Dreyfusards who believed in Dreyfus’ innocence and the anti-Dreyfusards who believed in Dreyfus’ guilt. Importantly, these opposing camps had very different values as well as conceptions of what France, as a country, should be. The Dreyfusards valued universalism, justice, and the rights of man. They saw themselves as defenders of the French Republic and its motto of “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” Notably, the Dreyfusards, as self-identified inheritors of the French Republican tradition, understood that being French did not require that one be Catholic but merely a citizen loyal to the Republic and its values. This universalism ideal extended from the French Revolution. In 1789, Count Clermont-Tonnerre, a French politician, gave a speech to the Assembly of Constituents on the question of Jewish emancipation where he declared “we must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews as individuals.” This approach anticipated that Jews leave their communities and assimilate into French society. Nonetheless, the French Republic, through its laws, emancipated French Jews, allowing them to be full citizens. At the turn of the 19th century, the

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Dreyfusards worked to continue this tradition of acceptance and make it possible for Jews, like Alfred Dreyfus, to be members of French society. By contrast, the anti-Dreyfusards valued exclusive nationalism, traditionalism, and order. They held themselves out as the inheritors of the French royalist tradition. The anti-Dreyfusards had a limited view of who was French and openly supported anti-Semitic policies that sought to exclude Jews from French society. Importantly, the anti-Dreyfusards formed their own social clubs, newspapers, bookstores, publishing houses, and political parties that remained active even after the Dreyfus Affair ended. When Dreyfus was officially exonerated, the anti-Dreyfusards, for the moment, lost the debate as to how French society and its citizens should be defined. The French Republic hailed the Dreyfus Affair as a victory over the anti-Dreyfusards and their values. The debate the Dreyfus Affair raised over how to define French society and its citizens did not, however, end in 1906. Following the Dreyfus Affair and the public rehabilitation of Captain Dreyfus, France continued to be divided into two divergent camps – those supporting French Republican values versus those supporting conservative, traditional and, often, anti-Semitic values – and this conflict would motivate the resurgence of the anti-Dreyfusards and their ideology in support of the Vichy regime following Nazi Germany’s defeat of France in 1940.8

Half a century later at the start of the Second World War, the collaborating Vichy government rose to power. Marshal Philippe Pétain, Vichy Chief of State, received full powers through a parliamentary vote in July 1940 effectively ending the democratic Third Republic. After the fall of France, Marshal Pétain found himself leader of a defeated country divided

between two zones: the northern German occupied zone and the southern unoccupied zone.

Notably, in practice, there was little difference between the two zones in terms of anti-Semitic legislation and its enactment. Pétain professed to revive the French nation and undo the harms that resulted from previous democratic Third Republic administrations, including the policies of the socialist government led by Prime Minister Léon Blum, a French Jew. The new motto of France was “Travail [work], Famille [family], Patrie [homeland].” *Travail* referred to a return to the land and “simpler times.” The focus on family valorized “pure” French roots. Lastly, homeland espoused feelings of nationalism. Pétain worked with Vichy officials to create this new French state by agreeing to terms of collaboration with Hitler’s Germany, calling for anti-Jewish legislation, revoking French citizenship from recently naturalized and mainly Jewish citizens, and censuring the French press to exclude dissident voices.

Philippe Burrin, professor of history at the University of Geneva, calls the Vichy government the “régime-mémoire par excellence [the memory regime by excellence].”9 Vichy officials and pro-Vichy actors used the past as a means to inform their present. Many of these figures in fact saw themselves as inheritors of the anti-Dreyfusard tradition. Some of them, such as Charles Maurras, had even been prominent anti-Dreyfusards during the Dreyfus Affair. As such, the inheritors of the anti-Dreyfusard tradition, as well as some key anti-Dreyfusards still living, had another opportunity to put their vision of France in place. These conservative, traditionalist thinkers held positions in the Vichy government, ran state-sponsored newspapers,

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published Vichy and German approved texts, and helped to create and administer the new anti-Semitic legislations.¹⁰

Few historians have explored the ongoing effect of the Dreyfus Affair on Vichy era law and policy and how Vichy government officials and pro-Vichy journalists manipulated the public memory of the Dreyfus Affair as a part of establishing the new social order. Henry Rousso, best known for his seminal work *Vichy Syndrome*, is one historian who has explored the memory of the Dreyfus Affair in France. Of particular interest for the purposes of this thesis, Rousso wrote an article entitled *The Dreyfus Affair in Vichy France: Past and Present in French Politics*, where he argued that the Dreyfus Affair was “preserved [in] the collective memories” of people during the Vichy regime.¹¹ He provided examples of personnel during Vichy who were affected by a memory of the Dreyfus Affair. These included the descendants of Alfred Dreyfus who largely joined the French Resistance and the son of Armand Mercier du Paty de Clam, the man who arrested Alfred Dreyfus in 1894, who became the head of the anti-Jewish Vichy office, Commissariat général aux questions juives. Rousso sees such figures as part of a “direct sequel” to the Dreyfus Affair. Significantly, however, Rousso concluded that there were “too few such direct sequels to the Dreyfus Affair to consider them as decisive evidence of continuity between the two crises.”¹² He added that “[t]he protagonists of the Dreyfus Affair who were still alive in 1940 (apart from, perhaps, Charles Maurras), played a marginal role in Vichy.”¹³

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¹⁰ For more information of Vichy era France see Marrus, Michael and Paxton, Robert. *Vichy France and the Jews*. (Stanford University Press. 1981.)


¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.
point, Rousso claimed that the Dreyfus Affair did not play a significant role in how Vichy government officials acted. This thesis challenges Rousso’s conclusion.

A number of key figures of the Dreyfus Affair played important roles during the Vichy era beyond the individuals Rousso listed. These people include, but are by no means limited to, Léon Daudet, Charles Maurras, Maurice Pojo, Victor Basch, Lucien Pemjean, André Drault, Henri Massis, and Xavier Vallat. Additionally, Simon Epstein provided evidence in his book, *Les Dreyfusards sous l’Occupation*, as to the significant level of participation of the anti-Dreyfusards in the Vichy regime.” Epstein studied over 100 personnel who played a role in both the Dreyfus Affair and the Vichy era. Such continuities of personnel do not constitute decisive evidence as to the continuity of ideology between the two periods, but it does help to explain why the Vichy regime and its supporters often referenced the Dreyfus Affair. As Daniel Halévy, the Dreyfusard turned Vichy supporter, wrote of the Dreyfus Affair, “This year 1898, that young people today ignore, will without a doubt mark us for life… Our lives however will be short.” Importantly, as historian Jean-Pierre Rioux notes, “[u]nder the [German] occupation [of France], men of Vichy exercised an anti-Semitism that many had learned from the anti-Dreyfusard school.” The Dreyfus Affair, as argued in this thesis, was more than simply preserved in people’s collective memories, as Rousso suggested. The Dreyfus Affair was a model and political tool for Vichy officials and their supporters as they developed a new France under the Vichy regime.

Rousso also claimed that:

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14 See chart A1 for a longer list and descriptions of roles.
Whoever delves into the plethora of anti-Semitic texts of the early 1940s, be they Pétanist, collaborationist, clericalist or secular, quickly sees that allusions to the Dreyfus Affair were few and far between… And any mention of the affair by an author or a newspaper was always very brief.\(^{18}\)

According to Rousso, many Vichy officials and pro-Vichy actors saw the Dreyfus Affair as a conspiracy theory created by the Jews. It was therefore not material worth drawing attention to in their anti-Semitic works. Rousso argued that “anti-Dreyfusard nationalism had been consolidated through joint denunciation of the Jews and Germany, the hereditary enemy.”\(^{19}\) Rousso did concede that there were moments when Vichy officials and supporters made direct allusions to the Dreyfus Affair. For example, a collaborationist daily publication of November 3, 1940 read, “The Dreyfus Affair – Never Again!” – in response to the Statut des Juifs law prohibiting Jews from joining the French armed forces, as Alfred Dreyfus had done.\(^{20}\) Additionally, at his post-war trial in 1945 for collaboration, Maurras said that his sentence was “the revenge of Dreyfus.”\(^{21}\)

This thesis directly challenges Rousso’s assertion that pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journals made relatively few references to the Dreyfus Affair. Rousso studied one pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journal, Juifs, je vous haïs, run by Henri Coston, a disciple of leading anti-Dreyfusard Edouard Drumont. The Dreyfus Affair, according to Rousso, is only mentioned once in all the publications of Coston’s journal. Importantly, having only cited one journal, Rousso claimed that


\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
all pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journals ignored the Dreyfus Affair. Based upon research conducted using the Bibliothèque nationale de France’s online newspaper archives (RetroNews), numerous newspaper articles published between 1940 and 1944 contained references to the Dreyfus Affair, providing evidence contrary to the claim of Rousso. Pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journals that mentioned the Dreyfus Affair include, but are not limited to: *Je suis partout*, *L’Action Française*, *La Petite Gironde*, *Le Journal*, *Le Petit Journal*, *Le Matin*, *Paris-Soir*, *Le Petit Marseillais*, *L’Ère Nouvelle*, and *La Dépêche du Berry*. Chapter one will examine the *Action Française*, Charles Maurras’s anti-Dreyfusard turned pro-Vichy journal as one example of the Vichy era newspapers that repeatedly referenced the Dreyfus Affair.

Other authors who have dealt with the relationship between the Dreyfus Affair and Vichy France include Susan Suleiman, Pierre Birnbaum, and Michel Winock. Suleiman argued that one’s position during Vichy France could be “deduced from what had been their stance on Dreyfus.” She made this claim based on the experiences of figures such as Julien Benda, Charles Maurras, Léon Blum, and André Gide. Birnbaum similarly argued for what he called a continuity of “central ideas and personnel between the Dreyfus Affair and the 1930s and 1940s.” Michel Winock, by contrast, argued that the Dreyfus Affair was a unique event that cannot be transposed to other periods. That is to say that the two periods of Dreyfus and Vichy lack a continuity argued by other historians of the subject. Notably, the relationship between these two periods – and, importantly, any causal effect that the Dreyfus Affair may have had on

22 Ibid.
the Vichy regime -- is not a primary focus of the scholarship of any of these authors. This thesis will add to the existing literature by providing both a counter-argument to Rousso and Winock’s scholarship and supplying substantiating evidence to Epstein, Suleiman, and Birnbaum’s arguments. Additionally, and most importantly, this thesis will examine how Vichy officials and their supporters altered the memory of the Dreyfus Affair which, to date, has not been a focus of the Vichy regime scholarship.

The question of memory is central to this thesis. This paper draws primarily on the scholarship of Yosef Yerushalmi, Pierre Nora, and Michael Rothberg in order to understand the intersection between memory and history as well as how memory can be manipulated for political needs. Yerushalmi described memory as, “always problematic, usually deceptive, [and] sometimes treacherous.”

Vichy officials and supporters revised and erased memory of the Dreyfus Affair in order to fit their political agendas in ways that were, as explained in this thesis, both problematic and deceptive. Occasionally, manipulation of the memory of the Dreyfus Affair was even treacherous when members of the Vichy press used it to justify genocidal actions against the Jews. Pierre Nora’s concept of the lieux de mémoire, whereby memories are attached to concrete sites, is translated in this thesis from its primary focus on monuments and museums to illuminate an understanding of toponymy, the study of place names. Vichy officials encouraged local governments to rename streets named for Alfred Dreyfus and Dreyfusard figures. Nora’s conception of lieux de mémoire helps to explain the political need to rename these streets in order to disassociate Dreyfusards from concrete sites of memory in France.

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Chapter one explores how authors of the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press, literature, and propaganda used the Dreyfus Affair as a touchstone from which to justify and guide their arguments. The chapter is divided into three key sections. The first section devotes particular attention to the study of Charles Maurras’s *Action Française*, as an example of an anti-Dreyfusard turned pro-Vichy press organ. The second section looks at pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors and how they consistently credited key anti-Dreyfusards. Lastly, section three deals with the spoliation of Dreyfusard literature confiscated from Jewish homes in France. During World War II, Vichy officials and pro-Vichy supporters repeatedly sought to use the Dreyfus Affair to justify anti-Semitic policies and the abandonment of the Third Republic democratic principles by altering the historical and landscape memory of the Dreyfus Affair.

Chapter two examines how the Vichy Ministry of Education removed the Dreyfus Affair from the state-sponsored history curriculum for school children during the Vichy era. Based upon an examination at the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris of Vichy textbooks published between 1940 and 1944, the alteration of the French school curriculum textbook to exclude – over time – mention of the Dreyfus Affair positively correlates with the exclusion of Jews from French society during this time-period. Unlike French adults who were re-educated about the lessons of the Dreyfus Affair, the Vichy regime determined that French schoolchildren did not need to learn about the Dreyfus Affair.

Chapter three probes the question of toponymy in urban spaces. Through a study of street names in France, the chapter reveals how the Vichy Department of Interior encouraged local governments to erase street names associated with Dreyfusard figures, including Alfred Dreyfus.
Additionally, the chapter examines how the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press led a campaign to name streets after prominent anti-Dreyfusards such as Edouard Drumont.

In the chapters that follow, the overarching concern is to answer the question: how did Vichy officials and supporters remember, revise, and forget the Dreyfus Affair during Vichy France? In answering this question, this thesis seeks to understand why these actors decided to evoke or suppress the memory of the Dreyfus Affair as well as learn from and celebrate the anti-Dreyfusards who came before them. Henri Rousso famously coined the phrase: “un passé qui ne passe pas [a past that does not pass].” In this quote, Rousso alluded to how the Vichy era continued to occupy French consciousness at the end of the 20th century. This idea that a society can never fully disengage from its history also applies to the treatment of the Dreyfus Affair during the Vichy era in France. Particularly for the pro-Vichy actors, as will be demonstrated in this thesis, the Dreyfus Affair was a past that did not pass away. Its memory continued to haunt, inspire, and guide pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic actors in their daily lives during the Vichy era. As such, the Dreyfus Affair took on an afterlife in Vichy era France.

### Figure A1

#### Key Figures of the Dreyfus Affair Who Played an Active Role in Vichy Era France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>During the Dreyfus Affair</th>
<th>During the Vichy Era</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Léon Daudet</td>
<td>Editor of <em>Action Française</em> and critic of the Republic</td>
<td>Ardent Vichy supporter and writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Maurras</td>
<td>Wrote for <em>Action Française</em>; key anti-Dreyfusard</td>
<td>Wrote for the collaborationist Vichy press; arrested at the end of the war and tried – “This is the revenge of Dreyfus”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Vallat</td>
<td>Read Maurras as a child growing up during the Dreyfus Affair</td>
<td>Director of the General Commissariat of Jewish Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucien Pemjean</td>
<td>Anti-Dreyfusard campaigner and follower of Drumont</td>
<td>Arrested for collaboration in 1944; wrote for collaborationist papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice Pojo</td>
<td>A founder of <em>Action Française</em></td>
<td>Director of daily <em>Action Française</em> in 1942 and tried for collaboration in 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André Drault</td>
<td>Anti-Dreyfusard writer, <em>La Libre Parole</em> with Drumont</td>
<td>Collaborationist and writer for <em>Au Pilori</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henri Massis</td>
<td>Political commentator during the Dreyfus Affair who participated in the <em>Action Française</em></td>
<td>Worked with the Vichy government (notably refused to collaborate with Germans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>André Gide</td>
<td>Dreyfusard writer</td>
<td>Ardent anti-fascist; worked with Louis Martin-Chauffier (key player in the French Resistance who ran a Resistance newspaper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Léon Blum</td>
<td>Dreyfus supporter, Zola trial, wrote <em>Souvenirs sur l’Affaire</em> in 1935 following the death of Dreyfus</td>
<td>Anti-fascist; arrested as a Jew and leader of the Third Republic; frequently attacked by collaborationist press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Héritier</td>
<td>Son of Dreyfusard but swayed to anti-Dreyfusard cause by Drumont’s writing</td>
<td>Collaborationist who wrote for <em>Au Pilori, Je suis partout</em>, and <em>Révolution Nationale</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles du Paty de Clam</td>
<td>Son of Armand Mercier du Paty de Clam (the officer who arrested Dreyfus)</td>
<td>Director for the General Commissariat of Jewish Affairs during Vichy – commentators argued he had no real qualifications for the job besides his surname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatole France</td>
<td>Dreyfusard writer</td>
<td>Anti-fascist writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbain Gohier</td>
<td>Pamphleteer who considered himself an anti-Semitic, Dreyfusard</td>
<td>Editor for <em>Au Pilori</em>, pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreyfus Family</td>
<td>Supported Alfred Dreyfus</td>
<td>Four of Alfred Dreyfus’s grandchildren, two great-nieces, and one great-nephew fought in the French Resistance. His granddaughter Madeleine was caught and sent to Auschwitz where she died. Pierre, Alfred Dreyfus’s son fled with his family to New York in 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Basch</td>
<td>Defender of Dreyfus who rallied pro-Dreyfus forces during the Rennes trial. President of the Human Rights League (organization that grew out of the Dreyfus Affair)</td>
<td>Killed by Lyon Milice in 1944. His assassin, Joseph Lécussan, was condemned to death and executed in 1946 – Lécussan in his trial did not mention “liquidating a symbol of the Dreyfus affair” as a reason for killing the 80-year-old</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One
The Pro-Vichy Anti-Semitic Press, Literature, and Propaganda: Remembering the Anti-Dreyfusards

A poster showing Edouard Drumont resting an arm on his anti-Semitic themed books and reading his anti-Dreyfusard newspaper, *La Libre Parole*.²⁹

The Dreyfus Affair was a seminal moment in French history that continued to divide France into the 20ᵗʰ century. During World War II, pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors repeatedly credited the anti-Dreyfusards and their rhetoric as the Vichy regime sought to eliminate elements of the Third Republic from French society. Charles Maurras, one of the founders of the anti-Dreyfusard journal *l’Action Française*, and Edouard Drumont, author of *La France Juive* and founder of the anti-Dreyfusard journal *La Libre Parole*, were two of the leading proponents of the modern anti-Semitic movement in France. Maurras survived the Vichy era and played an

active role in the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press as Editor-in-Chief of *L’Action Française*. Drumont died in 1917 but his legacy continued during World War II in France. A new generation of anti-Semitic writers flourished during the Vichy era, but, importantly, these Vichy writers faithfully credited the anti-Dreyfusard tradition spearheaded by Maurras and Drumont.

This chapter explores the afterlife of the Dreyfus Affair in the anti-Semitic and collaborationist Vichy literature. Many pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic newspapers grew out of anti-Dreyfusard ones. Additionally, many self-described ideological inheritors of the anti-Dreyfusards who studied the works of Maurras and Drumont created their own journals during the Vichy era. In these pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic publications, writers frequently evoked the culpability of Dreyfus. The chapter is divided into three sections, each focusing on how Dreyfus Affair literature and turn-of-the-century authors affected pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors and actors. The first section examines one journal, *Action Française*, which evolved from an anti-Dreyfusard paper into a pro-Vichy paper under the continuous leadership of Charles Maurras. The second section studies the new generation of Vichy anti-Semitic writers and how key anti-Dreyfusards influenced their work. The third section analyzes how the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors addressed the legacy of Dreyfusard literature.

**Action Française: The Return of Charles Maurras**

When the French Army officially reinstated Alfred Dreyfus into their ranks as Captain Alfred Dreyfus in 1906, the Dreyfus Affair ended. The Dreyfusard journal, *L’Aurore* published an article that read, the Dreyusards have, “triumphed today, through energy and confidence in the invisible force of truth.” For Dreyfusards, Captain Dreyfus’s reintegration into the military

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was “the decisive victory” for the Dreyfusard camp.\textsuperscript{31} While the Dreyfus Affair may have ended, many anti-Dreyfusard authors who gained celebrity during the Dreyfus Affair, such as Charles Maurras, did not altogether disappear. Maurras and his \textit{Action Française} journal continued publishing, although at a notably smaller scale than during the Dreyfus Affair. During the Vichy era, however, authors such as Maurras had an audience again for their writing. The journalist Robert Havard de Montagne wrote an article in the \textit{Action Française} in September 1940 at the very beginning of the Vichy era where he stated: “The revenge of Mr. Maurras is no longer possible. It is probable.”\textsuperscript{32} During World War II, Maurras had a platform to express his ideologies and to denounce Alfred Dreyfus, the man whose conviction initially had garnered Maurras a strong following at the turn-of-the-century but whose rehabilitation ultimately had left Maurras as a discredited reactionary. When the Vichy regime fell with the liberation of France, Maurras again lost his readership as the French interim government forced the \textit{Action Française} to cease publication. In 1945, in response to his conviction by the High Court of Lyon for the crime of “complicity with the enemy,” Charles Maurras announced: “C’est la revanche de Dreyfus [It is the revenge of Dreyfus].”\textsuperscript{33}

During the Vichy era, the motto for \textit{Action Française} was, “all that is national is ours,” an update of Edouard Drumont’s \textit{La Libre Parole}’s maxim, “France for the French.” This French-centric focus sat somewhat uneasily with the Vichy government’s alignment with the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
German occupation forces. As French historian Olivier Dard wrote: “[Maurras was] neither a Germanophile nor a philo-Nazi, and wanted to consider his choice of “France alone” as compatible with his allegiance to Marshal Pétain.”\textsuperscript{34} For example, Maurras considered Prime Minister Pierre Laval a traitor for his close collaboration with the German occupation forces. As Paxton and Marrus observed, Maurras wanted to distinguish his anti-Semitism from that of the “German and French racialists and radical collaborationists who saw anti-Semitism as a means to overturn French society.”\textsuperscript{35} As he often wrote in his \emph{Action Française} journal, Maurras believed that French anti-Semitism was uniquely “French” and, importantly, not merely a replication of German Nazi anti-Semitism. Notably, Maurras’s initial anti-collaboration attitude resulted in the German occupation authorities censuring parts of the \emph{Action Française}. “Censure [censured]” appears over whitel-out passages in a number of \emph{Action Française} articles. However, the German occupation authorities still allowed the \emph{Action Française} to be published due to the journal’s ardent anti-Semitism and pro-Philippe Pétain stance. In 1942, Maurras came to terms with the Vichy-German collaboration, believing it was a means to an end in achieving the renaissance of France. As his hero Philippe Pétain said in August 1941:

\begin{quote}
I have received the heritage of a wounded France. It is my duty to defend that heritage by maintaining your aspirations and your rights. In 1917 I put an end to mutiny. In 1940 I put an end to rout. Today I wish to save you from yourselves. When a man of my age dedicates his person to his country there is no sacrifice that he can evade. His only concern is the public salvation. Remember this: If a beaten country is divided against itself it dies. If a beaten country can unite it is reborn. Vive la France!\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{34} Olivier Dard, "Les Maurrassiens Entre Résistance Et Collaboration," \emph{La Nouvelle Revue D'Histoire}, no. 50 (September/October 2010).
\textsuperscript{36} “Marshal Petain's Address to the French People.” \emph{New York Times}, August 13, 1941.
Maurras professed to understand the necessity for the French people to unite in order to rebuild an occupied France. He, therefore, made a calculated political decision in supporting the collaborationist policies of the Vichy regime in addition to its ideological policies. In sacrificing his anti-German stance and supporting the Vichy regime, Maurras increased the *Action Française*’s readership.37

Maurras was nothing if not an opportunist. He saw the Vichy era as an opportunity to foster his vision of France. During the Dreyfus Affair, Maurras ultimately failed to create the French society for which he and the anti-Dreyfusards campaigned: a society free of Jews and French Republican democratic values. At the start of the Vichy regime, Philippe Pétain announced the end of the Third Republic and created the French Vichy state. Pétain was sympathetic to Maurras’s vision of how France should be. For his part, Maurras willingly accepted the opportunity to help create his vision of France -- under Pétain’s leadership -- as a supporter of the Vichy regime and, ultimately, of its collaboration with the German occupation forces.

In 1942, the *Action Française* published a segment from a speech given in 1902 by Maurice Barrès, an anti-Dreyfusard writer and member of the *Action Française* during the Dreyfus Affair. Barrès, a close friend of Maurras, died in 1923. Maurras reprinted the words of his friend previously given during the Dreyfus Affair “exactly 40 years [before], on the 7 February 1902” at an inauguration for *Action Française* “study nights” in 1942.38 In the article, Maurras introduced the speech under the heading, “Do you remember our doctrines?” In the

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speech, Barrès argued about the importance of creating an “ideology” and a “vocabulary” for French nationalists. He says:

After the Dreyfus Affair, which will finish one day maybe by being forgotten, even by us, it is important above all that the truths that have appeared to us because of this tragic event subsist. We have felt that there are French truths (not truths that we invent, but truths that we certify). We want to assure here [at the Action Française] that they are the truths, in ensuring that they please the brains of our school of thought.³⁹

For many anti-Dreyfusards, the Dreyfus Affair raised issues that went well beyond whether Alfred Dreyfus was guilty or not: Who was French? How should France accommodate religious and other minorities? Were the Jews a primary source of French social problems? For Maurras, in 1942, almost half a century later, these Dreyfus Affair era questions remained pertinent. Maurras certainly saw parallels between the two periods and felt that Action Française’s readers could learn from the example of anti-Dreyfusards during the Dreyfus Affair. Importantly, members of the Action Française created an ideology during the Dreyfus Affair, which espoused certain alleged “truths” such as that the Jews are inherently not French and republicanism is a failed concept. These so-called “truths,” among other founding pillars of the Action Française ideology, according to Barrès and Maurras and his fellow editors in 1942, needed to remain in the consciousness of French supporters of the Action Française. Further on in the reprinted speech, Barrès used the example of Germany to show the necessity of remembering Action Française’s ideological pillars. “There was a moment,” Barrès says, “when Germany seemed no more than a geographic expression under a French protectorate, but great Germans like Goethe, in whom a powerful nationalism remained, would show, several years later.”³⁴⁰ This nationalism, according to Barrès, reappeared under Bismark in the “minds of those Germans” who had not

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³⁴⁰ Ibid.
forgotten. Barrès demonstrated that if the French did not forget the lessons learned from the Dreyfus Affair, as the Germans did not forget the works of Goethe, the French would also one day experience the France they “succeeded in creating in themselves.” Barrès stressed that the “badge of 1894” – the year Dreyfus was first accused of traitorous acts – must be taken up again. Maurras reminded Action Française readers in this edition that the France his pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journal hoped to realize in 1942 was a product of the anti-Dreyfusards. In November 1942, the Action Française editors published an article that first appeared in Éclair, a Vichy regime propaganda journal edited by Jacques Delebecque, a friend and collaborator of the Action Française. Delebecque provided a “glance… at recent history.” He wrote that at the end of the Dreyfus Affair, the Republicans:

Had their revenge and it was total. The Dreyfus Affair was the figurative lever that allowed them to regain their strength, then oust their adversaries and take back the Republic in its normal path.

As a result of this total revenge, the “Jews, freemasons, and anti-militarists” took power. They, accordingly, led France into war and allowed France to be invaded by Germany in 1940. Importantly for the anti-Dreyfusards, the Dreyfus Affair caused an “awakening of nationalist spirits.” The Action Française editors wrote that the Dreyfus Affair served as, “the starting off point for the men of the Action Française; finally, the “good will-power” of patriots would find a drive and an intelligence to guide them and unite them.” The Vichy regime under Pétain

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42 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
allowed *Action Française* editors and other writers influenced by the anti-Dreyfusards to help create an ideology that could be put into practice: a post-1940 France without Jews or Republican democratic values. By evoking the Dreyfus Affair as they did, the *Action Française* editors used the Affair as a touchstone to guide Vichy policies. *Action Française* created their ideology the “last time” there was a “Jewish Affair.” Considering the history of the *Action Française*, Maurras felt it only natural that the journal lead the way in creating the ideological underpinning of the new regime. After the earlier failure in 1906, Maurras had a second chance at creating his vision of France in Vichy France.

Maurras along with his fellow-editors and writers frequently evoked Dreyfus’s guilt as a means to further delegitimize the Third Republic and validate the *Action Française*’s anti-republican and anti-Jewish ideology. Editor-in-Chief Maurice Pujo wrote an article in December 1942 entitled “Juiverie [pejorative word for Jewry] et Maçonnerie [freemasons].” The article begins:

The anti-freemason Bulletin of Information published a list of freemason friends and Jews who composed in 1898 the committee of founders of the League for the Rights of Man (or better said, League for the Rights of Jews) whose first goal was to defend the traitor Alfred Dreyfus. Pujo openly questioned the purpose of the League of the Rights of Man. He claimed the French historian Alphonse Aulard created the League not to defend men but to defend Jews and in particular the “traitor Alfred Dreyfus.” Pujo’s article attacked the decision to pardon Dreyfus in 1906 who, for Pujo, was a guilty traitor who was rehabilitated by a “morally-lost” Third Republic. This was a familiar theme for Pujo. Pujo published similar articles accusing Dreyfus

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of being a traitor pre-1906 during the Dreyfus Affair. Thirty-six years later, he recycled the same language to describe Dreyfus as a “traitor” and “dirty Jew.” Importantly, Pujo’s article is one of many examples of Action Française articles labelling Dreyfus a guilty traitor who had been pardoned by – in the view of these Vichy writers – a debilitated Third Republic. Between 1940 and 1944, the Action Française editors published articles directly referencing the “Affaire Dreyfus,” written as such, at least 164 times. All of these articles questioned Dreyfus’s innocence, specifically, and the political legitimacy of the Third Republic, more broadly. In 1944 Charles Maurras wrote in Action Française, “We know, now, we cannot think the fabrication of the innocence and of the martyr Alfred Dreyfus is a story that makes sense.” Maurras presents a document to the readers that he believed, up until then, “unknown and which places this point in history into a new light.” Dreyfus, the “faux innocent [fake innocent],” was, according to this document, only found innocent because of “irregularities that permitted all the cancelling of judicial decisions if Dreyfus were found guilty.” Maurras called the judicial system of the Third Republic corrupt putting Dreyfus’s innocence into question. In a moment of reflection, Maurras wrote:

The men of my generation remember it [the Dreyfus Affair], for having lived it, and those of the new generations must not forget it – the present political state, the present moral state of France is not sufficiently enough explained by the debacle of the last war [World War I] or by the bad treaties [Versailles], or by the years of dissolution that followed… it is necessary to always return to the civil war of the Dreyfus Affair where the denationalization of France begins, operated and obtained by the Jews with the support of a part of the French state… France was no longer French.

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
In calling Dreyfus’s innocence into question, Maurras took his own form of revenge against the Third Republic institutions. The pardoning of Dreyfus – which was the Third Republic’s public declaration of Dreyfus’ innocence – left Maurras both discredited and financially ruined. Maurras struggled for a number of years to retain readership when in 1926 Pope Pius XI condemned *Action Française*. Then two years later, the Pope publicly denounced anti-Semitism. As a result, readership among Catholics declined precipitously. One could no longer be a “good Catholic” and a member of the *Action Française* movement.\(^{51}\) Maurras blamed Dreyfus’s rehabilitation for his financial and journalistic struggles.

Having written extensively in *Action Française* in the early years of the Vichy regime that Dreyfus was guilty and that the Third Republic was corrupt, Maurras began to champion the use of more extreme actions against the Jewish population in France. In 1943, Maurras wrote an article where he called for the extermination of the Jews:

> The Jews are they not responsible yes or no? Has it not been proven that this race is persuaded that the world belongs to them? Has it not been proven that they have only one goal, which is the social decomposition by the corruption of spirits? Has it not been proven that they monopolize finance, radio, cinema, press, industry, commerce, public opinion for the purposes of base politics of intrigue and of national decomposition. If yes: there is only one remedy which is the ghetto, the concentration camp and for those who would continue… the noose.\(^{52}\)

Maurras asked a series of rhetorical questions to the reader: “The Jews are responsible [for our problems] yes or no?”; “Is the Jewish race persuaded that the world belongs to them?”; and “Has it not been proven that the Jews only have one goal, which is social deconstruction through the corruption of spirits?”\(^{53}\) For the first time, Maurras argued that eliminationist policies should be


\(^{53}\) Ibid.
pursued against French Jews. Maurras accepted Vichy’s collaboration with the German occupation forces who by 1943 were also pursuing eliminationist policies against French Jews (even if the extent of the Holocaust and concentration camp deaths was not fully understood). Repeated evocations of the Dreyfus Affair, particularly pertaining to Dreyfus’s alleged guilt that the Third Republic wrongly pardoned, therefore played a double role for anti-Semitic, pro-Vichy writers such as Maurras. For these writers, these evocations delegitimized the Third Republic and justified eliminationist treatment of the Jewish population in France. However perverse and contorted the logic, the memory of the Third Republic’s mistaken rehabilitation of Captain Dreyfus in 1906 led to the weakening of a French nation that had succumbed to a German occupation in 1940.

At the end of World War II, the Free French authorities arrested Charles Maurras and convicted him of collaborationist activities. One could argue, as Maurras said himself, that Alfred Dreyfus had the final revenge. As discussed in the next section, anti-Semitic writers repeatedly credited both Maurras as well as Edouard Drumont in their articles in support of Vichy regime policies. The anti-Dreyfusard works of Maurras and Drumont were a primary impetus for the anti-Semitic, collaborationist Vichy literature that supported implementation of the Final Solution in France. Anti-Dreyfusard words mattered greatly during the Vichy regime.

**Paying Tribute to the Anti-Dreyfusard Leaders**

Journalists, writers, and propaganda makers during the Vichy era did not forget the anti-Dreyfusards who came before them. They cited the anti-Dreyfusards in their works and often
paid direct tribute to them through ceremonies. Some anti-Semitic writers of the new generation believed that Maurras and his contemporaries had been too soft when it came to dealing with the “Jewish Question.” By the end of Maurras’s career with Action Française, these critics were less critical given Maurras’s exterminationist call for the “noose.” Nonetheless, this new generation of anti-Semitic authors, as Paxton and Marrus note, were, by and large, “more radical, more violent and more energetic” than the anti-Dreyfusards who came before them.

Some of the students of Maurras aimed to go a step farther than their ideological master. Lucien Rebëtët, a writer for Je Suis Partout, who, as Paxton and Marrus note, “learned anti-Semitism at Charles Maurras’s knee” found Action Française to be too soft. Rebëtët suggested that the movement and journal be renamed “Inaction Française.” Louis-Ferdinand Céline, the collaborationist and anti-Semitic author, agreed with Rebëtët. In his book École des Cadavres, Céline demonstrated how Rebëtët and other students of Maurras felt more action was needed to deal with the “Jewish Question”:

If you really want to get rid of the Jews, then, not thirty-six thousand remedies, thirty-six thousand grimaces: racism! That is the only thing Jews are afraid of: racism. And not a little bit, with the fingertips, but all the way! Totally! Inexorably! Like complete Pasteur sterilization.

Despite their disagreements, Rebëtët remained on good terms with Maurras and still looked to him as an ideological leader. Importantly, however, the younger generation, for the most part, felt more had to be done. Not all were as forgiving as Rebëtët. In a letter addressed to Jacques Doriot in March 1942, Céline wrote:

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
And those anti-Semites of words? Non-racists? For me they are worse than the Jews! No difference from my measuring rod between Maurras and Jean Zay. Péguy [well known Dreyfusard of the Dreyfus Affair] even, if you will it. So churchy, so Dreyfusard, to be consecrated soon saint Péguy extolled by Monseigneur Lévy.\footnote{Louis-Ferdinand Céline. \textit{Lettres}. (Paris: Gallimard, 2009.)}

Céline criticized Maurras’ “inaction” and initial hesitation to join the collaborationist movement. Importantly, Céline demonstrated in the above letter his belief, however logically flawed, that the required treatment of French Jews – and the need for eliminationist policies – in 1942 was a function of so-called failed Dreyfusard policies in the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.\footnote{Ibid.} Céline, Rebatet, and others of the new anti-Semitic generation felt the so-called “Jewish problem” had gone on long enough and the old mechanisms for dealing with it simply through journalistic campaigns, as demonstrated by the anti-Dreyfusard failure, did not work. In 1939, Pope Pius XII lifted the ban on \textit{Action Française} and French Catholics were again free to read the anti-Semitic diatribes of Maurras and others. This newly-sanctioned logic and rhetoric of anti-Dreyfusards on the eve of the Second World War, when coupled with the goal of Petain’s Vichy regime of discrediting the Third Republic following German occupation in 1940, would soon result in calls for French Jewish exterminationist policies in France.\footnote{Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, \textit{Vichy France and the Jews} (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1996), pg. 51.}

In 1938, Lucien Rebatet wrote an article in \textit{Je Suis Partout} entitled “Les Juifs et Anti-Sémitisme [Jews and Anti-Semitism].” In the article, Rebatet, like his mentor Maurras, questioned the innocence of Alfred Dreyfus. He affirmed that those true French nationals must continue to always fight against the “clan dreyfusard [the dreyfusard clan].”\footnote{Lucien Rebatet. “Les Juifs et Anti-Sémitisme.” \textit{Je suis partout}. April 15, 1938. RetroNews.} Rebatet paid homage to the
anti-Dreyfusards who fought before him such as Maurras and Drumont. Rebatet saw himself as a part of a new generation picking up the anti-Semitic torch of those before them.\textsuperscript{62}

Dr. George Montandon was another member of this new generation who paid homage to the anti-Dreyfusards. Born in Switzerland in 1879 to a well-to-do family of French origin, he moved to Paris in 1925 and became a naturalized French citizen in 1936. That same year, his politics changed. Disappointed with Léon Blum’s Popular Front, he turned to the far-right and became an ardent anti-Semite. In 1940, Montandon published \textit{Comment reconnaître le juif}? [How to Recognize the Jew?]. This pseudo-scientific literary work begins with a history of the Jews in France and then descends into an enumeration of dangerous “Jewish traits,” both physical and social. In the introduction, Montandon cites Edouard Drumont’s \textit{La France Juive}:

> The principle signs from which we can recognize a Jew are therefore: the famous hooked nose, the flashing eyes, the sharp teeth, the protruding ears, the square shaped finger nails instead of rounded, the chest too long, the flat feet, the round knees…\textsuperscript{63}

Drumont’s observations “concord perfectly with the scientific findings” of Dr. Montandon. Montandon later refers to Drumont’s resistance against the Dreyfusards and his famous work \textit{La France Juive}, which Montandon argued received “a success almost unrivaled in literary history.”\textsuperscript{64} At the end of the book, Montandon provided a list of suggested readings for readers to consult. The list included the works of Edouard Drumont and Jean Drault, an anti-Dreyfusard who helped led the “resistance” during the Dreyfus Affair. Montandon, importantly, like others in this new generation of French anti-Semites, was acutely aware of the history that came before

\textsuperscript{62} Marc Knobel. \textit{Les derniers antidreyfusards ou l’antidreyfusisme de 1906 à nos jours}. Published in \textit{L’Affaire Dreyfus et l’opinion publique en France et à l’étranger} under the direction of Michel Denis, Michel Lagrée, and Jean-Yves Veillard. (Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 1995.)
\textsuperscript{63} George Montantdon. \textit{Comment reconnaître le juif}. (De Noël, 1940), pg 65.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
him. He shows that he is aware of the anti-Semitic literature and its French tradition that grew out of the Dreyfus Affair.

For another example, André Broc, an anti-Semitic writer and Vichy civil servant, paid homage to the anti-Dreyfusards. During the Vichy era, Broc worked in the Jewish Affairs section of the Paris police and considered himself a close friend of Dr. Montandon. In 1943, he published a book entitled, *La Qualité de Juif* [The Quality of the Jew]. In the book, Broc, as an authority in the Paris Police Department, provided a French definition of a Jew, which is distinct from the German definition. He boasted that the French definition is “ stricter” than the German definition. In Broc’s bibliography, he cited Jean Drault and Edouard Drumont as sources. Drumont, notably, figured as a key source in Broc’s chapter on the “Jewish Question” providing a framework on how to view the Jew.65

Even Louis-Ferdinand Céline, author of several anti-Semitic works and doctor to the Vichy collaborating government, saw a need to look back to the Dreyfus Affair and key anti-Dreyfusard figures in his literature. Céline used the Dreyfus Affair to place his political and ideological goals into historical context. In a letter dated May 9, 1941, addressed to Lucien Combelle, a member of Maurras’ *Action Françaises* in the interwar years and a supporter of Vichy collaboration, Céline wrote: “Dreyfus is the victor of the century. The uncontested king. Amen.”66 Céline’s sarcastic comments demonstrate an awareness for the history of the French modern anti-Semitic movement. Céline calls Dreyfus a “king” because of the attention the Vichy regime accorded to the Jews though anti-Semitic laws. Céline presented the Dreyfus Affair as a cause for Vichy era anti-Semitic actions.67

65 André Broc. *La qualité de Juif*. (Presses universitaires de France, 1943.)
67 Ibid.
Importantly, pro-Vichy anti-Semitic authors participated in a series of memorial events celebrating the life and work of Edouard Drumont. In September 1941, Captain Sézille, the director of the Institut d’Études des Questions Juives [Institute for the Study of Jewish Questions] organized celebrations in the memory of Drumont. He received approval from the German Embassy in Paris to place a commemorative plaque on the home of Drumont: “Here lived Drumont. The immortal author of La France Juive, who since 1886 predicted the malady from which France would die.” Additionally, he hosted a ceremony in honor of the anti-Dreyfusard at the Palais Berlitz, which held the anti-Semitic exposition Le Juif et La France from September 1941 to January 1942. Sézille even gave a bouquet to the wife of Drumont at the ceremony.

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69 Marc Knobel. Les derniers antidreyfusards ou l’antidreyfusisme de 1906 à nos jours. Published in L’Affaire Dreyfus et l’opinion publique en France et à l’étranger under the direction of Michel Denis, Michel Lagrée, and Jean-Yves Veillard. (Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 1995.)
70 Ibid.
In April 1942, a group of authors who “remained faithful to the author of *La France Juive*” held a celebration for the 50th anniversary of *La Libre Parole*, the journal Drumont began in 1892 that helped launch the Dreyfus Affair in journalistic discourse.\(^7\) In October 1942, these pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors inaugurated the “Maison des journalistes antijuifs [House for Anti-Semitic Journalists]” in the presence of Drumont’s widow.\(^2\)

Members of the French Milice and journalists gather at the grave of Edouard Drumont for the 100th anniversary of the author’s birth in 1944.\(^3\)

Again, in 1944, for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Edouard Drumont, journalists and members of the French Milice, the French version of the Nazi S.S., honored Drumont at his grave. They met at the cemetery on a snowy day in February and laid wreaths and flowers next to the headstone, which read, “Edouard Drumont: Man of Letters.” Two months later in April,

\(^7\) Marc Knobel. *Les derniers antidreyfusards ou l’antidreyfusisme de 1906 à nos jours.* Published in *L’Affaire Dreyfus et l’opinion publique en France et à l’étranger* under the direction of Michel Denis, Michel Lagrée, and Jean-Yves Veillard. (Presse Universitaire de Rennes, 1995.)

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Journalists and Milice gathered around Drumont’s grave. Mémoiral de la Shoah. Paris. 1944.
the Cercle Aryan [The Aryan Circle] held a dinner in honor of Drumont. Paul Chack, author and supporter of Vichy collaboration, gave a speech. Henri Coston, the new editor of Drumont’s *La Libre Parole*, revived in the 1930s, also attended. The event not only celebrated the anti-Dreyfusard author but also brought his works into contemporary discussion. His works, as Montandon and other anti-Semitic writers of the new generation demonstrated, were still relevant.\(^\text{74}\)

In an undated article entitled “If the Yellow Star Had Been Imposed before the War,” the author Claude Jeantet, a journalist from the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press, discussed how in order for French people to understand the current state of France, they needed to pick up a copy of Drumont’s *La France Juive*. He explained:

> The decision making it obligatory for the yellow star to be worn by Jews incites us to reread Edouard Drumont, the great Frenchman who since the end of the last century, was undertaking the fight against the improvements to our country that the Jewish intoxication and internationalization was already gnawing at.\(^\text{75}\)

Jeantet saw Drumont as a prophetic visionary who understood before anyone else did the dangers the Jews posed. For this reason, he counselled his readers to “re-read” the works of Drumont as that would help clarify the present and future state of France, a country victim of its own generosity to the Jews. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press repeatedly credited key anti-Dreyfusards such as Drumont for the anti-Semitic policies adopted by the Vichy regime.

The Vichy propaganda services also repeatedly acknowledged the works of anti-Dreyfusards such as Edouard Drumont. In February 1944, the Propaganda Service of the Commissariat général aux questions juives (Vichy government's office in charge of Jewish

\(^{74}\) “Fonds Sylvain et Fonds France.” Memorial de la Shoah. (Paris, 1944.)

\(^{75}\) Claude Jeantet. "Si l'étoile jaune avait été imposée avant la guerre." Publication source unknown. 1942-1944.
affairs) sent a letter to the Éditions Flammarion (the publication house that produced Drumont’s *La France Juive*). An employee of the Propaganda Service wrote:

> Following our telephone conversation, I ask for the Department of Purchases to make a regular order for: 50 copies in two volumes of: “La France Juive” by Ed. Drumont.

Following this request, the propaganda service thanked the Éditions Flammarion for their “kindness” and support and agreed to provide the publication house with more paper for them to continue their work. Anti-Dreyfusard works continued to matter during the Vichy regime.

A letter sent in February 1944 from the Propaganda Service of the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs addressed to Éditions Flammarion, asking that 50 copies of Drumont’s *La France Juive* be sent to their office.

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77 Ibid.
The anti-Dreyfusard movement and its characterization of the Dreyfus Affair – both the rehabilitation of an alleged traitor and the acts of an allegedly corrupt and democratic Third Republic -- played a central formative role in the work of the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic writers. This new generation of writers understood that the vision of France free of Jews and Republican democratic values came from the work of their anti-Dreyfusard predecessors. They used this anti-Dreyfusard logic to justify the Vichy collaborationist policies with the German occupying forces. Under this logic, the Vichy regime was not betraying French national interests by collaborating with the Germans. On the contrary, the Vichy regime was using the Franco-German collaboration as a means to re-order French society in ways that the original anti-Dreyfusards would both recognize as well as approve.

**Limited Vichy Regime Reclamation of Dreyfusard Literature**

While pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors drew from and extensively credited anti-Dreyfusard literature and literary figures, these Vichy authors occasionally sought to repurpose and reclaim Dreyfusard authors. For example, George Montandon in *Comment reconnaître le juif* argues that Émile Zola, author of “J’Accuse” published in *l’Aurore* in defense of Dreyfus, was in fact anti-Semitic, a redeeming quality for Montandon. Montandon wrote: “The great naturalist writer Zola paints a portrait of this king of the bank.” The “king of the bank” is a Jew. Accordingly, Montandon reclaimed Zola as a French author who simply fell astray during the Dreyfus Affair. François Vinneuil, a journalist for the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic journal *Je suis partout,* wrote of Zola:

78 George Montandon. *Comment reconnaître le juif?* (De Noel, 1940), pg 67.
But despite what we can think, Zola, with his spice of summary sexuality, the increase of glory that earned him his Dreyfusism in the democratic republic, was read in the smallest hamlets. He represents for three-quarters of the French people the accomplished image of the great writer.\textsuperscript{79}

Vinneuil decided to ignore Zola’s Dreyfusism arguing that few really knew him for it. French people, therefore, according to the \textit{Je suis partout} journalist, should excuse Zola for his Dreyfusard transgressions. Maurras’s \textit{Action Française} was less forgiving of Zola’s Dreyfusism. In an article published in 1943, Maurras demanded to know “why the hideous bust of Émile Zola” remains at the Bouvelard de Versailles in Suresnes when the bells at the Suresnes Church have been taken down.\textsuperscript{80} Maurras asked if the material from the “confiscated bells” removed for the war effort would be used to create busts of, “Zola, Dreyfus… of their kind of people [Dreyfusards], composing a perfect symbol of the Republican regime.”\textsuperscript{81}

While pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors had mixed responses towards the re-incorporation of Zola into the pantheon of great French writers, they did not share the same hesitancy when it came to Léon Blum’s book \textit{Souvenirs sur l’Affaire} on his memories of the Dreyfus Affair or even Alfred Dreyfus’s publication \textit{Five Years of My Life}. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press made no mention of these works past the start of the Vichy era. These books did not, however entirely disappear during the Vichy era. Mentions of them appear in spoliation records kept by French and German authorities who entered Jewish homes.

Following World War II, the French Reparations and Restitution Committee under Director Marcel Coignard compiled a list of properties stolen during the Vichy era.\textsuperscript{82} Coignard,

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\textsuperscript{79} François Vinneuil. “Naturalisme pas mort.” \textit{Je suis partout}. July 30, 1942. RetroNews. \\
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{82} M. Coignard. \textit{Répertoire des biens spoliés en France durant la guerre de 1939-1945. Tome VII. Archives, manuscrits et livres rares.} (Paris: Ministère de la Culture, 1949.)
\end{flushright}
notably, created the list within a decade following the war when French collaboration and the Holocaust more generally remained taboo subjects. As an introduction to his list of stolen items, Coignard wrote: “During the war the Germans have looted a number of important archives, manuscripts and books.” German occupation forces were not the only ones to loot French property. Given that the French police were involved in many French Jewish arrests during World War II, the French police looted a significant amount of Jewish property when they rounded up Jews for deportation. Property taken during these arrests ranged from books to furniture to money to artwork. Sometimes policemen kept items for personal gain, but in other instances, they removed material considered dangerous or anti-Vichy. As the spoliation lists suggest, Vichy officials and the policemen acting for them viewed the Dreyfusard literature as anti-Vichy propaganda.

When police raided private Jewish libraries, they often explicitly noted taking books on the subject of the Dreyfus Affair typically written by known Dreyfusards such as Léon Blum or Bruno Weill. Pierre Dreyfus, the son of Alfred Dreyfus, appears on the list of Frenchmen whose property the “Germans” stole. According to Coignard’s list, Pierre lost a collection of books on the Dreyfus Affair, many of which his father had signed and annotated. The men who raided Pierre’s home made a conscious decision to remove these books thus ensuring that the new tenants to move-in to the now vacated Dreyfus apartment would not have access to these Dreyfusard books. The police left other items, such as furniture, behind showing a calculated decision on the part of some French policemen versed in Vichy teachings to remove texts that

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did not fit with the new regime’s values and teachings. Twelve other direct examples chosen from a much longer list examples of French policemen removing Dreyfusard literature can be seen in Figure B1.

A number of factors may have contributed to the policemen confiscating Dreyfusard books. Perhaps, like Xavier Vallat, they grew up reading the anti-Dreyfusard literature of Drumont and Maurras. It is important to note that journalists writing for Maurras’ *Action Française* journal frequently denounced Dreyfusard accounts of the Dreyfus Affair. For example, in March 1937, G. Larpent, a contributor to the *Action Française*, wrote an article exposing the errors in Léon Blum’s book on the Dreyfus Affair – *Souvenirs sur l’Affaire* (1935). Larpent writes, “Not a judgement that he [Blum] makes was not founded on an error.”

The criticisms of the anti-Dreyfusard-inspired Vichy press, in short, may have influenced the French police to remove Dreyfusard literature. Alternatively, it is possible that the Vichy Department of the Interior or another Vichy department encouraged or ordered the French police to remove Dreyfusard books. However, there is little direct evidence to support this. For whatever reason, the large number of documented instances of policemen removing Dreyfusard literature suggests that at least members of the Vichy French police understood Dreyfusard written accounts of the Dreyfus Affair to be counter to Vichy goals. Like Larpent, these police would have viewed Dreyfusard accounts as impermissible “mis-memory” of the Dreyfus Affair.

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In 1945, Charles Maurras lost his seat in the Académie Française, a French institution charged with the defense of the French language that honors French citizens for their contributions. Unlike Marshal Pétain, however, who also lost his seat following the Liberation, the Académie chose to leave Maurras’s seat vacant. Maurras’s now-vacant seat at the Académie was a curious combination of rebuke and intellectual respect. As David Drake writes in his book entitled Paris at War, for the first quarter century after the war “one historical narrative held a virtual monopoly – the Gaullist myth, that Paris and France resisted and liberated themselves.” For de Gaulle, national unity and reconciliation was more important than socially-divisive truth-seeking criminal trials. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Académie chose to leave Maurras’s seat vacant.

The anti-Semitic literature created in the Vichy era ultimately helped to justify anti-Semitic actions taken by the Vichy state in collaboration with the Germans. The Final Solution and French involvement in the Final Solution was framed as a just and necessary cause given the long history of the “Jewish problem” in France. In the view of the anti-Semitic Vichy writers, past actions taken against French Jews, as demonstrated by the anti-Dreyfusard loss, were not successful. For these writers, new approaches demanding the removal of Jews from French society and advocating their annihilation were required.

Having explored how the anti-Semitic Vichy writers and Vichy regime consistently credited the anti-Dreyfusards, the next chapter will focus on how the Vichy Ministry of Education removed descriptions of the Dreyfus Affair from state-sponsored history textbooks.

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**Figure B1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Property Taken</th>
<th>Date Taken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georges Cahen-Salvador</td>
<td>20 books on the Dreyfsus Affair as well as manuscripts by Joseph Reinach</td>
<td>February 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Dreyfus (son of Alfred Dreyfus)</td>
<td>Books and documents related to the Dreyfus Affair. Several of these had been signed by the authors or contained personal notes penned by Alfred Dreyfus himself.</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Léon et Fanny (née Hertz) Gorodiche</td>
<td>2500 volumes taken in all. Large collection on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>January 24, 1944 by the Gestapo at Mandelieu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre and Julie Goujon</td>
<td>Owned a library of 4500 books. Police took all books on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stéphane Lebantial</td>
<td>Professional library pillaged including books on Judaism and the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>12-14 March 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Manuel</td>
<td>A personal library of 1000 books including religious texts in Hebrew, and documents on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>June 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mme. Oiffer</td>
<td>Books on the Dreyfus Affair taken.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Reinach</td>
<td>Several books on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond and Solange Rosenmark</td>
<td>A complete collection of works written on the Dreyfus Affair as well as the history of Joseph Reinach.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Weil Family</td>
<td>3000 volumes stolen in total including a large number on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruno Weill</td>
<td>Weill was an author of books on the Dreyfus Affair. Personal copies taken.</td>
<td>23 June 1944 by a “German general commandant” who occupied the Paris apartment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serge Weill-Goudchaux</td>
<td>4000 volumes stolen, many volumes on the Dreyfus Affair.</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Two
The Vichy Ministry of Education and the Dreyfus Affair:
Learning to Forget in History Class

French school children returned to the classroom in September 1940 to receive brand-new history textbooks. They no longer studied from the existing *Malet-Isaac* history textbook, edited by a leading French Jewish historian and Dreyfusard. The Vichy Ministry of Education

87 Cep. “No. 9.” *La Semaine, hebdomadaire illustré*. 12 September 1940.
declared this textbook “Jewish” and accordingly banned it from French classrooms. Instead of the *Malet-Isaac*, the Ministry commissioned the creation of new textbooks that detailed a version of French history acceptable to the new Vichy regime. They commissioned new textbooks again in 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944. Notably, the Ministry of Education removed the subject of the Dreyfus Affair from these textbooks, a subject of extensive review in the French Republican history curriculum.

Since the end of the 19th century, the French education ministries sanctioned a version of French history known as the *roman national*. The *roman national* or national narrative was a nation-building product of the late 19th century. Following the Franco-Prussian War and the events of the Paris Commune, French leaders sought to unify the country, and the *roman national* was an outgrowth of this process. The *roman national* had two key objectives. First, it aimed to organize the nation around a shared national narrative. For example, the first chapter in French history textbooks is typically called “Our Ancestors the Gauls.”89 The use of the word “our” functioned as a politics of inclusion that paradoxically excluded the history of minority groups in France. According to the *roman national*, all French citizens, no matter their actual roots, descended from the Gauls. Second, the *roman national* aimed to form a national identity of which the French people could be proud. Importantly, the *roman national* is shrouded in myths that appeal to the French national conscience and qualify French collective memory.90

The French education system is standardized. Therefore, all French students receive the same *roman national*, and, in theory, they receive it from the same state-designated textbook, which the Ministry of Education periodically updates. In the 1930s, for example, the *Malet-Isaac*

was the textbook that students most widely used.\textsuperscript{91} Beginning in September 1940, the Vichy regime replaced the \textit{Malet-Isaac} textbook with new history textbooks that offered a different version of the \textit{roman national} that supported Philippe Pétain’s \textit{Révolution Nationale} and its motto: work, family, and homeland. The \textit{Révolution Nationale} aimed to rebuild and rejuvenate a broken France by returning to basic French values. These values meshed with the ideology of the French far-right movement, led by anti-Dreyfusard leaders such as Charles Maurras. The Vichy Ministry of Education had two key goals in reforming the French education system: (1) to reject the Third Republic, its reforms, and education ministry personnel and (2) to rebuild a broken France that, according to Vichy leaders, had fallen victim to German occupation in part due to the flaws in the Third Republic education system.

This chapter will explore how the Vichy Ministry of Education taught French students to forget previous Ministry of Education sponsored history curriculums and their textbooks. In order to avoid unnecessary further divisions in French society as a part of Philippe Pétain’s \textit{Révolution Nationale}, the Vichy Ministry of Education virtually excluded the Dreyfus Affair in all textbooks it commissioned. Accordingly, the Ministry slowly but surely phased out the Dreyfus Affair from the official history taught in French public schools.

\textbf{Vichy Ministry of Education: Reforming the \textit{École de la République}}

During the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the French education system underwent a series of reforms. In 1833, the Guizot Laws, named after Minister of Education François Guizot, made secular

\textsuperscript{91} Jean-Michel Barreau, \textit{Vichy, Contre L’École De La République: Théoriciens Et Théories Scolaires De La "Révolution Nationale"} (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), pg. 60.
primary education available to all. In 1850, the Falloux Laws, named after Minister of Education Alfred de Falloux, created a “mixed system of education” whereby some primary schools were public, secular, and controlled by the state, while others were Catholic and run by Catholic groups.\footnote{Yves Morel, \textit{Pétain Et L'école: Théories Et Réalité (1940-1944)} (Anet: Atelier Fol'fer, 2013), pg. 14.} The most extreme prior changes to the education system, and most odious to the Vichy Ministry of Education, however, took place during the Third Republic. The famous Ferry Laws established free education for boys and girls in 1881 and then mandatory secular education in 1882. The Ferry Laws formed the basis of the \textit{école de la République} [school of the republic]. It was this \textit{école} that the Vichy Ministry of Education worked to undermine and ultimately overturn during the Vichy era. According to Charles Maurras, Jules Ferry was an “intellectual villain” who had “demoralized,” “denationalized,” and “protestantized” France while simultaneously decreasing literacy rates.\footnote{Jean-Michel Barreau, \textit{Vichy, Contre L'École De La République: Théoriciens Et Théories Scolaires De La "Révolution Nationale"} (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), pg. 60.}

During the Third Republic, the \textit{Cercle} [Circle] Fustel de Coulanges prefigured the roots of the Vichy Educational Ministry’s rejection of the \textit{école de la République}. The Circle served as a unit of mobilization for intellectuals particularly during the interwar years. Fustel de Coulanges was a historian in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century who was best known for his writing advocating the return of the lost French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. In 1905, at the 75\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Fustel’s birth, nationalists staged a celebration for the historian. Notably, the Circle Fustel excluded anybody deemed “tainted by Dreyfusard associations” from this event.\footnote{Jean-Michel Barreau, \textit{Vichy, Contre L'École De La République: Théoriciens Et Théories Scolaires De La "Révolution Nationale"} (Paris: Flammarion, 2001), pg. 60.} According to historian Robert Tombs, for “Barrès, Maurras, and other champions of the royalist organization \textit{Action}
François, founded at the height of the Dreyfus Affair... the French civilization glorified by Fustel was racially superior, royalist at its core and intensely nationalist."95 Henri Boegner and Georges Cantecor, two Lycée professors close to the Action Française, founded the Circle Fustel de Coulanges in 1926. The Circle organized itself around three key problems within the French education system: (1) the official teaching of “utopian pacifism,” (2) the de-emphasis upon classical studies, and (3) the école de la République of Jules Ferry.96 By 1935, the Circle counted 1,400 members among its followers. Key members of the Circle included Charles Maurras, Albert Rivaud (future Minister of Education during Vichy), Abel Bonnard (future Minister of Education during Vichy), André Bellessort (a writer who frequently contributed to the anti-Semitic journal Je suis partout and aligned himself with the Action Française), and Pierre Boutang (considered the successor to Charles Maurras).97 The group regularly published a journal called the Cahiers. Cahiers detailed the Circle’s opinions on the current state of French education and helped to develop a solid ideological structure for the group. When Albert Rivaud became the Vichy Minister of Education in June 1940, he quickly incorporated the teachings of the Circle in order to drive his attack against the Third Republic and its école de la République.98

The école nationale [national school] replaced the école de la République during the Vichy era. According to Philippe Pétain, the école de la République “was, under the banner of unity, a school of divisions, of social clashes, and of national destruction.”99 And so, Pétain

99 Philippe Pétain. La Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 août 1940.
announced the creation of a new school system, the école nationale, designed, alongside the Révolution Nationale, to return France to its traditional strengths. In July 1940, Philippe Pétain said to the American Ambassador to France, William Bullitt, “France has lost the war because the reserve officers had Jewish socialist teachers.” These “Jewish socialist teachers” Pétain refers to are the members of the National Ministry of Education under Léon Blum’s socialist government. Notably, in 1940 a French Military Tribunal sentenced Jean Zay, Léon Blum’s Minister of Education, to the same sentence Alfred Dreyfus received in 1894: lifetime deportation and degradation for “desertion in the presence of the enemy.” Zay received this sentence in no small part because of his role in the Ministry of Education as a Jew, socialist, and Freemason, a triple crime of identity during the Vichy era.

Pétain was at the center of the new school system. Every school classroom had a photograph of the Marshal. André Montagnard and Charles Courtioux composed the famous “Maréchal, nous voilà [Marshall, here we are]” in 1941, which all students sung on arrival at school. The chorus went:

Marshall, here we are!
In front of you the savior of France.
We swear, we, your guys,
To serve and follow in your path.
Marshall, here we are!
You have given us hope again
The Homeland is reborn!
Marshall, Marshal, here we are!102

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102 André Montagnard and Charles Courtioux. Maréchal nous voilà. 1941.
The last lines of the final verse conclude: “Because Pétain is France, France, it is Pétain!” As Léon Werth, a French Jewish intellectual and author of *Déposition, Journal 1940-1944*, wrote in his diary on December 6, 1940, “[t]he new school program introduces God to the primary school… But this God of primary school, which is it? The God of Pétain or the God of Voltaire?” In a sense, as Werth’s comments suggest, Pétain was the God of the *école nationale*. To further underline the omnipresence of Pétain in the classroom, the Ministry of Education required that teachers write the commandments, so to speak, of Pétain’s *Révolution Nationale* on the blackboard of their classroom every morning. To cite Léon Werth again, “[e]very morning at school, one had to write on the blackboard: Work, Family, Homeland.” In effect, the school classroom became a laboratory experiment for the introduction of the *Révolution Nationale*.

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103 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
In August 1941, a month before students returned to their classrooms, Philippe Pétain gave an address to the French people where he explained his project of the Révolution Nationale and the école nationale:

I have received the heritage of a wounded France. It is my duty to defend that heritage by maintaining your aspirations and your rights. In 1917 I put an end to mutiny. In 1940 I put an end to rout. Today I wish to save you from yourselves. When a man of my age dedicates his person to his country there is no sacrifice that he can evade. His only concern is the public salvation. Remember this: If a beaten country is divided against itself it dies. If a beaten country can unite it is reborn. Vive la France!  

For Pétain, it was necessary to recreate France and French history with it. Similarly, the August 1942 edition of the Revue de l’État Nouveau, a monthly review the Vichy regime published to keep people informed on the reconstruction of the new and improved French state, dedicated a section to the “Reform of French Education.” Henry Mavit, a frequent contributor to Vichy journals and reviews, wrote: “And for this devastated, wounded country, education for the youth has become an essential problem… We have foreseen our own ruin.” The Education Ministry, with its ideological roots in the Circle Fustel de Coulanges, oversaw the reformation of the French education system during the Vichy era.

On September 28, 1940, the German occupying forces released the “Otto List.” Named after Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador in Paris during the war, the list banned all books

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deemed anti-German or written by or with the assistance of Jews.\textsuperscript{109} The Vichy regime followed the Germans’ lead and created their own list of banned books. The Minister of National Education was left responsible for approving the new textbooks acceptable for use in French schools.

The head of the Ministry of National Education changed six times during the Vichy era. Jérôme Carcopino and Abel Bonnard were two of the most notable Ministers of Education. Named National Minister of Education in February 1941, Carcopino applied the Vichy anti-Jewish legislation with rigor and limited the number of Jews who could enter French universities to three percent of all entrants. Jules Isaac, the Jewish author of the famous \textit{Malet-Isaac} textbook, described Carcopino as the one, “who put, in the service of the \textit{Révolution Nationale}, the most authoritarian temperament and the roughest grip.”\textsuperscript{110} Abel Bonnard took over the post of minister after Carcopino resigned in April 1942. Bonnard was an ardent supporter of the Vichy regime and the \textit{Révolution Nationale}. In November 1942, he created a new position at the Sorbonne, the chair of the history of Judaism. Bonnard gave the role to Henri Labroue, an anti-Semitic historian. Bonnard had a zero-tolerance policy when it came to Jewish authors and historical understandings that did not match the \textit{roman national} devised by the Ministry of Education. On November 13, 1942, in reference to the French Jewish historian Jules Isaac described below, Bonnard wrote in \textit{Gringoire}: “It is not acceptable that the history of France be taught by an Isaac.”\textsuperscript{111}

While the Vichy Ministry of National Education officially banned textbooks written by Jews or displaying anti-German sentiment, in practice teachers and students occasionally did continue to use them. For example, one student at the Lycée Racine in Paris wrote in his diary on November 9, 1940:

Naturally the Germans [Boches] did not want us to buy the book of History, because it is Isaac. But, Madame Pontabry, our professor, told us: ‘My children, buy a book, whichever one and I have not given you a name; but you understand me…’ We understood and we all bought the Isaac book.112

The “Isaac book” was the famous Malet-Isaac textbook. Ministry of Education during the Vichy era completely discredited Jules Isaac, the Jewish, Dreyfusard, Inspector General of Public Education (1936) and President of the Jury of Aggregation of History (1939). The French and German occupying authorities did not destroy all of Isaac’s books and some remained in circulation. However, Isaac lost his place as the historian of the French roman national. The Vichy Ministry of Education ordered that French official history be taught by French historians acceptable to the Vichy regime.

French Official History Textbooks from 1932 to 1944: A Positive Correlation between the Inclusion of the Jews in French Society and the Dreyfus Affair in French Education

Henry Rousso argued that the Dreyfus Affair was “preserved [in] the collective memories” of people during the Vichy regime.113 Yet, there is a virtual absence of the Dreyfus

Affair in the Vichy Ministry of Education’s commissioned textbooks. Rousso attempted to explain this absence by arguing that references to the Dreyfus Affair would have been viewed as anti-German given that the Germans were an enemy of France during the Dreyfus Affair. This explanation is problematic as Marshal Pétain’s military prowess against the Germans during the First World War is frequently evoked in both the Vichy history textbooks as well as contemporary speeches and newspaper articles. For example, Pétain compared his role in 1940 to his role in 1917 fighting against the Germans: “[i]n 1917 I put an end to mutiny. In 1940 I put an end to rout.”

Furthermore, it was in no small part because of Pétain’s reputation as the “Victor of Verdun” that the French parliament voted to give him full powers in the summer of 1940 following the defeat of France. As General Weygand said that same summer, “[o]nly the Marshal can realize the union of France. It is a flag, a flag a bit stained and a bit spoiled, but a flag all the same.”

So, if not to appease the Germans, why did the Vichy Ministry of Education remove the Dreyfus Affair from the textbooks during the Vichy era? They did so as a means to unify the bulk of the French people after defeat. As the Third Republic did following the Franco-Prussian War, the Vichy Ministry of Education created its own *roman national* to organize the nation around a shared national identity and a history of which all could be proud. The Dreyfus Affair was a divisive issue. It continued to divide the French and not just those of the Jewish faith. As discussed in the last chapter, the anti-Dreyfusard press formed a central organ of collaborationist discourse. These newspapers often portrayed Dreyfus as guilty. For the central government, however, the job was to unify and not create unnecessary further divisions. So, when it came to

educating a new generation of French youth, it was best to avoid the discussion of the Dreyfus Affair altogether and instead indoctrinate French schoolchildren on the merits of regenerating France under the banner of Pétain’s *Révolution Nationale*.

The Vichy Ministry of Education did not issue any public reasoning, and no one has located contemporaneous notes, explaining the changes to the French history curriculum which eliminated the study of the Dreyfus Affair. While under these circumstances, where there is an absence of public and private declarations, no firm conclusions may be drawn. Nonetheless, the motivation for removal of the Dreyfus Affair from the Vichy school textbooks appears to be consistent with a Vichy policy of excluding Jews from the national community. The remainder of this section two examines the validity of this Vichy policy motivation vis-à-vis French education to schoolchildren.

We can divide the French textbooks from 1932 to 1944 into three key periods of textbook narratives that reflect the politics of the time. The varied presence and absence of the Dreyfus Affair in these narratives, as will be shown, correlates with the then-current French historical picture. The first period extends from 1932 to 1939. This period in French history was one of general openness, immigration, and liberal, even socialist, governments. With the minor exception of the Stavisky Affair in 1934, there was a dearth of politically-charged battles between the left and right during this period which reflected the Third Republic’s socially-inclusive values and freedoms. The second period extends from 1940 to March 1942. In these

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116 The Stavisky Affair was a financial scandal in 1934 centered around the Jewish-Russian immigrant embezzler Alexandre Stavisky. Edouard Daladier’s center-left government was accused of corruption. As a result, mobs of right-wing factions in French society including the *Action Française* and the French fascist party went to the streets to protest. Fifteen demonstrators were killed when French police shot at the crowds. The risk of a right-wing coup-d’état was unlikely given the minimal organization between right-wing groups; however, it did make clear
early years of the Vichy regime, Pétain launched his *Révolution Nationale*, signed off on anti-Jewish legislation, and erected the framework of ideological and economic collaboration with the Germans. During this period, the French police arrested and interned the Jewish population but no mass deportations had yet left France for Central and Eastern Europe. The final period extends from April 1942 to the liberation of France by Allied troops in the summer of 1944. During this period, Vichy anti-Semitism reached its apogee. Combined Franco-German collaboration deported approximately 76,000 Jews from France to German concentration camps. Thousands of others died in French internment and concentration camps such as Gurs and Drancy. Notably, while the Germans occupied the southern previously “free zone” in November 1942, the Vichy Ministry of Education retained control over the French education system. Significantly, during these two Vichy periods, there is a strong positive correlation between the Vichy policy of ousting Jews from French society and the removal of the Dreyfus Affair from French textbooks and history education.

**Period I. Dreyfus in the Books: An Inclusive French Society**

In the first period from 1932 to 1939, the Dreyfus Affair was a key event in the French *roman national* taught to students in the *école de la République*’s history classrooms. The inclusion of the Dreyfus Affair in these textbooks reflects the environment of relative openness and inclusion in accordance with the Republican ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. The Dreyfus Affair was an example of a Republican victory, which in turn valorized an increasingly diverse French society whereby a Jew could be French.

that the French Republic was not exempt from the threat of an ultra-conservative trend already present in Nazi Germany.
The *Malet-Isaac* publication was the main textbook that French schoolchildren used in Republican classrooms in the period from 1932 to 1939. The *Malet-Isaac* textbooks were part of an ongoing franchise of updated textbooks over time. The franchise began in 1902 when Éditions Hachette first published an Albert Malet textbook. Jules Isaac and Albert Malet, however, never met. Malet died in 1915 fighting in World War I. When Isaac began revising Malet’s textbooks, Hachette required that Isaac list Malet as a co-author, fearing that the textbook would not sell well in Catholic circles with a Jewish name.\footnote{André Kaspi, *Jules Isaac ou La Passion De La Vérité* (Paris: Plon, 2002).} Isaac’s Jewish identity, as it transpired, however, did not hinder sales.\footnote{Ibid.} Notably, Isaac was a known Dreyfusard during the Dreyfus Affair. He maintained that this was not because he was Jewish but rather because he supported Dreyfus’s “liberating qualities of truth.” Furthermore, Isaac saw himself as French first and Jewish second. He went on to become the Inspector General of Public Education in 1936 under Léon Blum’s socialist government where he worked alongside the likes of Jean Zay, the French Jewish Minister of Education. As Inspector in 1936, Isaac explained his belief that his Jewish identity played little to no role in affecting his work: “I was a Jew. I did not boast about it and I did not hide it; it was a fact.”\footnote{Ibid.} In 1939, Isaac became President of the Jury of Aggregation of History. The French educational community respected Isaac as a French historian and entrusted him to oversee the teaching of French history to French children.

The *Malet-Isaac* textbook gave ample attention to the Dreyfus Affair. The textbook described the Dreyfus Affair as a significant political disturbance involving a clash of modern and traditional political values, extreme anti-Semitism, and, ultimately, a Republican victory celebrating the strength of Republican socially-inclusive ideals. Isaac wrote:

\footnote{Ibid.}
The political and religious passions were not abated. The Dreyfus Affair woke these passions, more alive than ever before and, as a result, further defined the respective forces.\(^{120}\)

The Dreyfus Affair accordingly signaled an, “explosion of passions… inserting divisions into political groups, into social relations, even into the intimateness of family life.”\(^{121}\) On the one side of the aisle stood the, “intellectuals supported by the anti-militarists.”\(^{122}\) On the other side of the aisle stood the, “major party of officers and clergymen, supported by the royalists and the nationalists – the old boulangists.”\(^{123}\) This political divide, Isaac explained, was the backdrop for the anti-Semitic campaign that came to define the Dreyfus Affair. Isaac wrote: “The Dreyfus Affair was the next natural step of a violent anti-Semitic campaign led for several years already by the journalist, Drumont.”\(^{124}\) Isaac described Alfred Dreyfus as an “Israelite captain” employing the new language of Israëlite, meaning a French person of Jewish faith, as opposed to a juif, signifying a foreign Jew.\(^{125}\) He presented Dreyfus as a French victim of an anti-Semitic attack. Lastly, the Malet-Isaac textbook includes facsimiles of newspaper cutouts from the Dreyfus Affair. Isaac gave Émile Zola’s defense of Dreyfus in L’Aurore a third of a page. The caption below the cutout praises Zola as a great Republican. The section of the Dreyfus Affair concludes with a description of Zola’s ashes being transferred to the Pantheon, where celebrated French heroes are laid to rest. Isaac presented the Dreyfus Affair in a methodological format that

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\(^{120}\) Albert Malet and Jules Isaac. *Histoire contemporaine depuis le milieu du xixe siècle.* (Librairie Hachette, 1932), pg. 384.

\(^{121}\) Albert Malet and Jules Isaac. *Histoire contemporaine depuis le milieu du xixe siècle.* (Librairie Hachette, 1932), pg. 384.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.

\(^{123}\) Ibid.

\(^{124}\) Ibid.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.
points to a linear curve in history towards progress. For Isaac, the Republican victory and its inclusive values is progress.

Other textbooks used during this period similarly presented the Dreyfus Affair as a Republican victory worthy of valorization. In 1934, D. Moustier, a primary school inspector published a textbook entitled, *Histoire de France et Notions d’Histoire générale*. Moustier discussed the Dreyfus Affair in his chapter, “The Triumphant Republic.” He wrote:

Condemned as a traitor, Captain Dreyfus was sent to Devil’s Island. When we realized that he had been improperly tried, France divided into two camps: some were for and other against the captain. The unrest was enormous. A long time after, in 1906, Dreyfus would be declared innocent by the Court of Law and reintegrated into the army with the grade of commandant.¹²⁶

Moustier stressed that the Dreyfus Affair created a new party: “nationalism” and that, in this instance, the Republic was “triumphant.”¹²⁷ At the end of the chapter, Moustier gave a summary of the Third Republic. Moustier referred to the Dreyfus Affair, in this summary, as an important event that, “profoundly troubled the country.”¹²⁸

Additionally, Léon Brossolette published a fifth edition of *Histoire Temps Moderne* in 1936 that demonstrated the same glorification of the Republic and its inclusiveness through the lens of the Dreyfus Affair. In his chapter on the Third Republic, Brossolette discussed two key “anti-Republican” events that took place in the late 19th century, which ultimately resulted in victories for the Republic. The second of the two Republican victories was the Dreyfus Affair. Describing the Dreyfus Affair, Brossolette wrote: “Nationalism (1897-1899) surged around a judicial affair that had repercussions for the hero of the story, an Israeliite officer, Captain

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¹²⁷ Ibid.
¹²⁸ Ibid.
Dreyfus.”\textsuperscript{129} Brossolette described Alfred Dreyfus as an “Israelite hero” in Brossolette’s text.\textsuperscript{130} Dreyfus becomes the embodiment of Republican values of inclusivity and justice. The overturning of Dreyfus’s original sentence is referred to as a “Republican victory.”

The pre-Vichy period’s textbooks demonstrate how the Ministry of Education during the Third Republic viewed the Dreyfus Affair as an integral part of the \textit{roman national}. Educators used the Dreyfus Affair to teach French school children Republican ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood. At the height of the Dreyfus Affair, the French Military Tribunal that wrongly accused Dreyfus denied him all of these ideals. By the end of the Dreyfus Affair, according to the narrative, the French Republic liberated Dreyfus and made him equal to other Frenchmen. The French Republic accepted him as a valued member of society.

Following the surrender of France to Germany in 1940, the Vichy Ministry of Education rejected all three of these Republican-era textbooks. The \textit{école de la République}, according to the Ministry of Education allowed itself to be overtaken by “Jewish logic.” As the \textit{Action Française} described it:

\begin{quote}
The Jew has a false spirit and creates his own logic. The Jewish or ‘Jewified’ historian becomes a sort of theoretician who searches in facts sorted to his convenience the justifications for theories suited to him.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

Accordingly, Jules Isaac, the French Jewish historian, took the brunt of the Vichy Education Ministry’s attack on the \textit{école de la République} and the Third Republic’s education system. During the Vichy era, the “Malet-Isaac” became symbolic of the perceived decline in French history education and the decadence and immorality of the Third Republic. As quoted above

\textsuperscript{129} Léon Brossolette. \textit{Histoire Temps Moderne.} (Delagrave, 1936), pg. 77.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
RetroNews.
from Abel Bonnard, the Vichy Minister of Education from 1942 to 1944: “It is not acceptable that the history of France be taught by an Isaac.”\textsuperscript{132} The Vichy Ministry of Education also attacked Brossolette’s textbook for the history it told. The propaganda department of the German military administration first banned the book in the occupied zone in August 1940. The Vichy government banned the book throughout France a month later.\textsuperscript{133} As the anti-Semitic, collaborationist press organ \textit{Je suis partout} crudely put it: Léon Brossolette… Léon Blum’s old boot licker… with a Jewish library.”\textsuperscript{134} The Vichy Ministry of Education no longer accepted the texts of these three men, each containing a detailed history of the Dreyfus Affair, as French history after the surrender of France to Germany in 1940.

\textbf{Period II. A Gradual Eclipsing of Dreyfus: An Exclusive French Society}

In the second period, the Dreyfus Affair still existed in the textbooks commissioned by the Vichy Ministry of Education; however, the Vichy Ministry of Education sponsored textbooks provided few details and omitted references to the victory of Republican ideals. Notably, in this second period of study which covers the beginnings of the Vichy era, the Ministry of Education experienced frequent turnovers resulting in inconsistent approaches that matched the inconsistent ministry leadership. These variances are apparent in a quote taken from Léon Werth’s journal from March 14, 1941:

Chevalier [Minister of Education from December 13, 1940 to February 23, 1941] reintroduced God to school. Carcopino [Minister of Education from February 23, 1941 to April 18, 1942] said that there was no place for God [at school]. They [the Vichy ministers of education] play with God a hey there here a hey there there…”\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{133} Eric Alary and Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon. \textit{Dictionnaire de la France sous l'Occupation}. (Larousse, 2011.)
\textsuperscript{134} “Sans encombre.” \textit{Je suis partout}. October 2, 1942. RetroNews.
This instability in leadership initially undermined the formation of a coherent policy on the presentation of the Dreyfus Affair. Werth’s commentary demonstrates how this second period was a period of transition and coincided with the transition in anti-Jewish laws Pétain promulgated, which gradually excluded Jews from French society and stripped them of the rights Jews previously held as citizens of France. Importantly, in this period, the Jews in France did not yet have to wear yellow stars as badges of identification. Neither had Jewish deportations begun in earnest. On March 27, 1942, at the very end of the second period, the first transport of Jews left France from Drancy camp to Auschwitz. This transport contained Jewish men without French citizenship and, therefore, the Vichy government presented it as action against enemy aliens. It was a period of transition whereby the Vichy regime ousted Jews from society in the public sphere, but not yet entirely from France in the way they would be in the third Vichy period. The changes administered in the textbooks commissioned by the Ministry of Education reflect this period of transition. The new French textbooks significantly minimized the coverage of the Dreyfus Affair in the new French textbooks and, in a comparable way, the Vichy regime ousted Jews from most, but not all, of French society. The Dreyfus Affair remained visible in this period of transition but, soon enough, would not merit any mention in the next batch of French history textbooks.

We can see the receding coverage of the Dreyfus Affair exemplified in the “programme officiel de 1941 [the official program of 1941].” In the textbooks commissioned as a part of this new education initiative, the Vichy Ministry of Education ensured that the Dreyfus Affair was mentioned but without description or qualification. This is the case in the Cours d’Histoire textbook published directly by a team of scholars the Vichy Ministry of Education hired. In a section entitled “The Constitution of 1875,” the authors divide the Third Republic into six key
periods. The third period, known as the “troubled period,” extended from 1885 to 1899. It included: “Boulangism, the Panama Scandal, anarchist terrorist attacks, and above all the Dreyfus Affair.” ¹³⁶ This is the only mention of the Dreyfus Affair in the textbook. There is no description, explanation, or any further detail. It would have been left to the discretion of a teacher to teach French school children about the Dreyfus Affair or not. The Vichy Ministry of Education, furthermore, expected teachers to teach only what was written in the textbooks provided to them. Georges Ripert (the first Vichy Minister of Education from September to December 1940) introduced this policy. Léon Werth commented in his journal on October 23, 1940 that for Ripert, “it would no longer be tolerated that opinions expressed outside [of school] by the instructor be in disaccord with the teachings” of the French education system.¹³⁷ Given that the Vichy Ministry of Education was conducting a thorough purge of instructors deemed “unacceptable” for reasons ranging from religious identity to political affiliation, few teachers risked their positions by teaching about the Dreyfus Affair.¹³⁸

One of the main goals of the Révolution Nationale was to reunite the French people. A focus on past divisions would have harmed this initiative. As argued in chapter one and highlighted in Henry Rousso’s article, The Dreyfus Affair in Vichy France, the divisions of the Dreyfus Affair were very much alive forty years after the fact.¹³⁹ The Vichy Ministry of Education intended to unite schoolchildren to support Vichy regime ideals without dwelling

¹³⁶ Une équipe des professeurs. Cours d’Histoire. (École Universelle, 1941.)
upon prior, Republican and Dreyfusard reasons for differences. The Ministry therefore opted for minimal discussion of the Dreyfus Affair.

Importantly, Jérôme Carcopino was Minister of Education during this second period. Carcopino was best known for the Carcopino Reform of August 15, 1941, which established a “conservative version” of the Republican school. As far as Vichy Ministers of Education went, Carcopino was a moderate who set the stage for the extreme reforms that characterized the latter end of the Vichy era. In Spring 1943, Carcopino resigned as Minister of Education when Pierre Laval returned to the political scene as Prime Minister. Notably, this second Vichy period was merely a period of transition leading into the third and final period where anti-Semitism and conservative education would reach their apogee under Vichy Minister of Education Abel Bonnard.

Period III. Dreyfus Forgotten and the Expulsion of the Jews

In the third period between 1942 and 1944, the absence of disclosure about the Dreyfus Affair positively correlated with the Vichy regime policy to expel the Jews from France. Abel Bonnard assumed leadership of the Vichy Ministry of Education at roughly the same time as France and its German occupiers began to deport the Jewish population in France. Beginning in June 1942, Jews in the northern occupied zone had to wear the yellow star. In the southern unoccupied zone, Philippe Pétain resolved that the Jews would not have to wear the yellow star but would have the word “juif” or “juive” stamped into their identification cards. By July 1942, the French were deporting Jewish men, women, and children.

141 Ibid. pg. 158.
Raphaël Zysman (top row, left) wearing the yellow star as a schoolboy in Paris in the summer of 1942. Zysman went into hiding soon after this photo was taken.\textsuperscript{142}

Schoolchildren experienced changes in the classroom both in the makeup of the room and in the material in the textbooks. Jewish children came to school one day wearing the yellow star and then never returned. In an interview with French 24, Yvonne Ducroz, a French Catholic schoolgirl, was 16 years old in the summer of 1942 described a disappearance in her classroom:

> I particularly remember Fleurette Friedlander. One day, she was gone. She wore the Jewish star. She was a very clever girl who worked hard. At the time we didn’t know what was going on, we had no idea.\textsuperscript{143}

Coinciding with the disappearance of Jewish children from French classrooms, the Vichy Ministry of Education entirely removed the Dreyfus Affair from the textbook curriculum. In 1943, the Ministry commissioned Martial and Simone Chaulanges to write *Histoire de la*

\textsuperscript{142} Class photo of Raphaël Zysman. From the Mémorial de la Shoah Foundation collection in Paris. 1942.

\textsuperscript{143} “If I Ever Come Back.” (Paris: France 24, 2017.)
France.144 The text does not contain a single reference to the Dreyfus Affair. The absence of the Dreyfus Affair from school textbooks matched the increasing disappearance and deportation of Jews from France.

The treatment of the Dreyfus Affair in this third period is understandable. Abel Bonnard, the Vichy Minister of Education during this period, previously was a member of the Circle Fustel de Coulanges and rejected the “Jewish text” that was the Malet-Isaac.145 While Bonnard certainly would have associated himself with the anti-Dreyfusard movement, the inheritors of which heavily supported the Circle Fustel de Coulanges, he was also an ardent supporter of Pétain’s Révolution Nationale. For Bonnard, the rebirth of France would require reunification of the French people. In a speech given at the Sorbonne in June 1942, Bonnard explained the position that the Ministry of Education was put in by the defeat in the summer of 1940:

The defeat has placed us in a position where we must either forfeit or be reborn. The latter door holds great possibilities that only depend on us to realize.146

This “latter door” offered as much an invitation for French innovation as for French unification. The “rebirth” accordingly could not be done without French people coming together and uniting as a homogenous people. As Bonnard so bluntly put it a year prior, “We do not have the choice between two paths, but rather between a path and a hole.”147 Bonnard ensured that the approach of the Vichy Ministry of Education aligned with the position of the Vichy executive branch, Marshal Philippe Pétain, and Pétain’s Révolution Nationale. While the Vichy collaborating and anti-Semitic newspapers continued to denounce Dreyfus as a guilty traitor and the Third

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144 M. and S. Chaulanges. Histoire de France. (Delagrave, 1943.)
Republic as a corrupt government that had previously pardoned a traitor, the Ministry of Education elected to avoid all mention of divisive Third Republic issues, such as the Dreyfus Affair, in the school curriculum. For the Vichy regime during this third period that coincided with anti-Semitic policies that removed the Jews, it was necessary to avoid divisive history such as the Dreyfus Affair in the teaching of French children.

When the newly formed Vichy government removed Jules Isaac from his role of Inspector General of French National Education in December 1940, he wrote a letter to Marshal Pétain. The letter read:

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\text{We read the newspapers yesterday: ‘The Cabinet continued looking at clarifying the status of Jews.’ With this simple phrase, I find myself instantly excluded from the French national community, and along with me – French to the marrow of my bones – so many others, from Bergson, who taught us all, down to the classes of ’38 or ’39, who have served France with all their genius, or all their blood.}
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Isaac understood early on what Pétain’s anti-Jewish measures meant. They meant that the new regime was going to remove Jews from the national community and with them their scholarship and historical understanding. The \textit{école nationale} would replace the \textit{école de la république}. A \textit{true French} historian would replace Jules Isaac. At the same time, the Jews would be removed from France and the Dreyfus Affair would be removed from French textbooks. The Vichy regime next addressed the issue of city landmarks and streets named for past Dreyfusards and even Alfred Dreyfus himself. This issue will be explored in the next chapter.

Chapter Three
An Anti-Dreyfusard Toponymy of Terror:
Changing Street Names in Vichy Era France

Intersection of *Place Alfred Dreyfus* with Avenue Émile Zola in Paris’s 15th arrondissment.149

« *Passant, souviens-toi!* »150

Today, the *Place Alfred Dreyfus* is in the 15th arrondissement in Paris. It begins at the Avenue Émile Zola, named for the French writer and journalist who defended Dreyfus’s innocence in his impassioned article “J’accuse,” and ends at the Rue du Théâtre. From the *Place Alfred Dreyfus*, if a pedestrian turns from Rue Émile Zola onto Rue Violet, takes a left at Boulevard de Grenelle and then walks two blocks, that pedestrian will reach the former site of the Vélodrome d’Hiver, the public arena where French police arrested and subsequently deported over 13,000 Jews to their deaths in July 1942. Within four Parisian blocks, passersby traverse

150 An expression often inscribed on French monuments and street signs reminding passersby to remember events that occurred where they walk.
four decades from the Dreyfus Affair to the genocidal horrors of the French Holocaust. On a topographic level, French history is written into the streets of modern Paris.

Pierre Nora was the first person to coin the term *lieux de mémoire*, which literally translates to “sites of memory.” The concept of *lieux de mémoire* is that a memory derived from a historical event roots itself in a concrete form. Nora wrote:

> Our interest in *lieux de mémoire* where memory crystallizes and secretes itself has occurred at a particular historical moment, a turning point where consciousness of a break with the past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn-but torn in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists.\(^{151}\)

Nora’s idea of a *lieux de mémoire* has expanded since he first conceived of it. While initially, Nora intended *lieux de mémoire* to refer to “only monuments and museums… [now it] also [is employed to discuss] novels, cities, personages, symbols, and more.”\(^{152}\) This thesis builds upon Nora’s idea of a *lieux de mémoire* by applying it to the realm of French toponymy -- meaning the study of place names – during the Vichy era. Frédéric Giraut defined toponymy as a “political founding act [for which] the renaming is also politically important.”\(^{153}\) Generally speaking, the names given to roads have three functions: symbolic, memorial, and practical. In short, names provide a means for people to orient themselves politically, historically, and spatially.\(^{154}\) This chapter examines why the Vichy Department of the Interior encouraged local authorities to rename streets associated with Dreyfusards and why the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press and the


privately-owned Institut d’études des questions juives (IEQJ or Institute for the Study of Jewish Questions) launched a campaign to have streets named after Edouard Drumont, one of the leading anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusards.

**Vichy Law and Order: Getting the Dreyfusards off the Streets**

During the Third Republic, regional governments named a number of streets after Alfred Dreyfus and his Dreyfusard supporters. Rue Émile Zola and Rue Jean Jaurès became common streets names in towns across France. The year 1937, in particular, saw a surge of streets being named after Alfred Dreyfus. For example, in January 1937, in the Parisian suburb of Crosne, the Municipal Council of Crosne announced that it would rename two streets as Rue du Capitaine-Alfred-Dreyfus and Rue Émile-Zola. The commune hosted a day of festivities in celebration at the end of January including a reception, a banquet, an official inauguration ceremony, and a conference on the Dreyfus Affair. Alfred Dreyfus’s living relatives attended the event along with several prominent Dreyfusards including Armand Charpentier, a vocal advocate of Dreyfus’s right to a retrial, and Georges Pioch, a Dreyfusard journalist. Prominent government officials came to speak at the event including French Undersecretary of State to the Council of the Presidency, François de Tessan. Tessan concluded his speech:

> Peace in the heart of the individual, social peace in the Republic, peace of France with other people: those are our supreme goals. We will deploy all of our energy to reach this goal. Our ambition is only to realize this triple peace. It will be the best way to prove to those for whom we honor the memory of today that we have understood them and that the dignity of their lives is prolonged in our private and public acts.

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In naming streets after Dreyfus and Zola, the people of Crosne, according to Tessan, demonstrated their support for the French Republic that Dreyfus and Zola represented. Similar ceremonies took place in other regions of France. For another example, in July 1937, the Department of Mulhouse named a street after Alfred Dreyfus. According to the League of the Rights of Man’s bulletin:

The name of Captain Alfred Dreyfus has been given to one of the principle roads of the city. The office [of the League of the Rights of Man] is delighted and heartily congratulates the department of Mulhouse.

The street in Mulhouse was centrally located and residents of Mulhouse would walk down Rue du Capitaine Alfred-Dreyfus daily as they went about their activities. It was a part of the local topography. Notably, the streets named after Dreyfus and his supporters became lieux de mémoire. That is to say, the historical event of the Dreyfus Affair rooted itself into concrete street signs throughout France. Similarly to how Third Republic school textbooks contained detailed accounts of the Dreyfus Affair, local governments during the Third Republic created public memories of the Dreyfus Affair through adoption of Dreyfusard street names. These local governments did not seek to hide the Affair but, rather, to celebrate and remember it. Importantly, these streets names did not survive long after the rise of the Vichy regime in 1940. As soon as the Vichy regime came to power, the Department of the Interior began work to remove these lieux de mémoire street signs that memorialized the Dreyfusards and their Third Republic values.

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158 See figure C1.
Beginning in September 1940, the Vichy Ministry of the Interior formulated a campaign to encourage regional governments to change the names of streets that did not represent the Vichy government’s _Révolution Nationale_ and the new French state. According to Marcel Peyrouton, a radical-socialist politician and early Secretary of State to the Interior for Vichy, the

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need to change the names of French streets was “entirely ideological.”

In a tract circulated to all French prefects in October 1940, Peyrouton claimed “[i]t is inconvenient and paradoxical that this kind of public homage [street names] continue to be made to the memory of those who, by their errors or transgressions, contributed to the fall of our country to ruins.”

Many of the prefects from the regional governments took Peyrouton’s toponymic complaints seriously. Notably, the Prefect of Gard expressed a similar feeling in regards to Nîmes, a municipality under his authority, where there, “still existed in the city… too many roads, boulevards, or places that honor men who, in the present like in the past, by their actions or their writings, contributed to the ruin of France.”

The Prefect of Gard subsequently requested that changes be made to “forget these harmful men.” Similarly, in November 1940, two weeks after receiving Peyrouton’s initial tract, Pierre Olivier de Sardan, the Prefect of Hérault, circulated a message to the mayors in his department, demanding that the matter of street names be addressed.

Accordingly, the regional governments purposefully removed from public view the honorary street designations given to key Dreyfusards.

The Vichy Ministry of the Interior inspired movement to remove Dreyfusard names from the French streetscape took a number of forms. Many French local governments first targeted roads named for Alfred Dreyfus as a part of their street name purges. For example, on June 15, 1941, the authorities of the Commune of Crosne renamed the recently inaugurated Rue du

162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
Capitaine-Alfred-Dreyfus. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press also pressed for the renaming of streets that memorialized Dreyfusards. Charles Maurras wrote an article in *Action Française* in February 1941 where he discussed street names in his hometown of Aix-en-Provence, a city-commune in the South of France. Maurras condemned the naming of roads after three figures: Émile Zola, Anatole France, and Jean Jaurès. All three were outspoken and politically active Dreyfusards. To name a street after Zola, according to Maurras was a “living insult to national dignity and piety… [they know] what this signifies…” For Maurras, Zola, the author of “J’accuse,” was a Dreyfusard first and foremost. The editors of *Je suis partout* agreed with Maurras. They published an article in April 1940 on the 100th anniversary of Zola’s birth where they described Zola as the “immortal author of ‘J’accuse.’ It is not the questionable author of *l’Assommoir* or the *Contes à Ninon* who, in the eyes of the pure, had the right to immortality… It is the author of ‘J’accuse.’ It is the Dreyfusard.” According to the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press, the Dreyfus Affair had tainted Zola. As for Anatole France, Maurras denounced the Dreyfusard simply as an “inconnu [nobody]” not worthy of being remembered or honored.

Lastly, Maurras wrote that the real scandal that local officials in Aix did not understand was “in the inscriptions and the monuments to the glory of Jaurès.” Maurras described Jaurès as “the personal enemy of the French army and the most exalted and tortured of the Dreyfusard leaders.” In short, Jaurès’s identity as a Dreyfusard as well as a socialist made him unfit to have a road sign in his honor.

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170 Ibid.
Even in Vichy-run French Algeria, the Prefect of Algiers ordered the Council of Algiers to rename “the public streets and edifices bearing names of those who, by their transgressions or their errors contributed to the precipitation of our homeland to ruin.”\textsuperscript{171} The Algerian newspaper, \textit{Echo d’Alger} listed the streets and their new names in an article published in December 1940:

Edouard Drumont replaces Rue Guesde; General Marchand replaces Rue Zola; Jean Chiappe replaces Rue Jean Jaurès; Boulevard de France replaces Boulevard Anatole-France. Finally, the name of Marshal Pétain will be given to the current Boulevard de la République.\textsuperscript{172}

Jules Guesde, Émile Zola, Jean Jaurès, and Anatole France were all well-known and vocal Dreyfusards. The Council of Algiers replaced the streets named in their honor with those deemed more suitable including the anti-Dreyfusard Drumont, the Napoleonic War General Marchand, and \textit{Action Française} supporter Jean Chiappe. The Council painted Pétain’s name over that of the French Republic Pétain ended. Councils throughout France and its colonies removed street signs honoring Dreyfusards from public view. During the Vichy era, Dreyfusard \textit{lieux de mémoire} disappeared in numerous French cities and villages as these were at odds with Vichy values: Pétain’s anti-democratic \textit{Révolution Nationale} and the new anti-Semitic Vichy legislation that supported an anti-Dreyfusard, rather than a Dreyfusard, vision of France free of Jews.

\textbf{An Anti-Dreyfusard Occupation}

During the Vichy era, the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press along with the IEQJ, and the widow of Drumont campaigned for local councils to name streets after Edouard Drumont. For example, \textit{Le Matin}, the anti-Dreyfusard turned collaborationist newspaper, published an article

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
on September 27, 1941 entitled “When will Edouard Drumont’s name be given to a road?”^173 In the first line of the article, the editors complained that there are “too many roads in Paris named after Jews: Erlanger, Daniel-Stern, Halévy, Meyerbeer…” The editors recommended that those responsible for the street name act with the urgency the situation requires. To begin the purge of Jewish street names, the editors suggested for the local Paris government: “To start with Edouard Drumont who was the pioneer of the [current] struggle against the Jews and in favor of whom we could rename some of the large Jewish roads.”^174 The editors even counseled the Prefecture of the Seine (the prefecture responsible for the city of Paris) on which roads to change first, such as the “Boulevard Pereire” named for the Jewish banking family Pereire. In this new France under Vichy, the editors of *Le Matin* viewed the anti-Dreyfusards such as Edouard Drumont as men worthy of being honored on the public stage. Drumont lead the campaign against Dreyfus and inspired a new generation of anti-Semites under Vichy. The editors of *Le Matin* aimed to create an anti-Dreyfusard occupation of the city in the form of street names with Drumont’s name at the center. They intended to form *lieux de mémoire* in honor of anti-Dreyfusards such as Drumont.

The IEQJ also advocated for local governments to name streets after Edouard Drumont. The IEQJ was a privately-owned organization that worked to promote anti-Semitic propaganda and publications. One of the IEQJ’s principle accomplishments during the Vichy era was the exposition “Le Juif et la France [The Jews and France],” an anti-Semitic display at the Palais Berlitz in Paris in no small part intended to prove “anti-Semitism was authentically French…

^174 Ibid.
[rather than] derive[d] from German inspiration.”

In late September 1940, the IEQJ released a statement:

The institute is intervening beside the Prefect of the Seine in order to attribute to Edouard Drumont the boulevard and place that held the name of the Jewish banker Pereire. The institute regrets, at a moment in time when France and above all Paris are conscious of the danger of the Jew that those who have, with more talent and energy, denounced this [Jewish] danger not be honored, while roads still bare the names of Jews.

The IEQJ, as a part of its mission to prove anti-Semitism was authentically French, portrayed Edouard Drumont as the pioneer of French anti-Semitism, an anti-Semitism that he formed during the Dreyfus Affair. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press supported the IEQJ in its mission to name streets after Drumont. The editors of *Le Matin* published another article entitled “The Name of Drumont at the Boulevard Pereire” and republished the IEQJ’s statement as part of its article. The editors of *Le Matin* expressed their wish that this act of “abolishing the memory of unworthy Semites of the glory of Paris and replacing them with great French men” become a greater trend. Ultimately, the Prefecture of the Seine renamed Rue Pereire as Rue Edouard Drumont. Perhaps ironically, the French word used to signify the renaming of a street is “débaptiser,” which means both to change the name and to rechristen. Unwittingly or not, the loose religiousity of French renaming – almost a Christian re-baptism – Jewish street names as Catholic street names accorded with Pétain’s *Révolution nationale*

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The wife of Drumont in an interview about her late husband and his desire to have a road named after him.\textsuperscript{178}

Interestingly, during his lifetime, Drumont expressed interest in having his own \textit{lieux de mémoire} in his honor. His widow shared with several journalists from the pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press a conversation she had with her husband, “the pioneer of the [contemporary] anti-Jewish fight.”\textsuperscript{179} Madame Drumont recalled:

I remember he said to me one day following the death of a great man: “you see, me too, I will go to the Pantheon!” “What?” I responded, “because of some mean Jews you denounced?” “But of course… You will see!” He entertained a dream: to see the Passage Andrieux [a road in Paris], where he had written \textit{La France Juive}, become the Rue Edouard Drumont\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
Drumont, who died in 1917, did not live to see the new France of the Vichy era which adopted many of his anti-Third Republic and anti-Semitic views.

On a number of occasions, Philippe Pétain famously accused the French people of having “short memories.”¹⁸¹ In the case of street names that celebrated Dreyfusards, these French “short memories” were aided by efforts of the Vichy regime to rename – and erase -- unwelcome elements of the Third Republic past. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic press and the independently owned IEQJ supported the Vichy government’s efforts in campaigning for roads named after Edouard Drumont and other anti-Dreyfusards to replace lieux de mémoire named for Jews, Alfred Dreyfus, and Dreyfusards. For the Vichy regime and its supporters, it was important to eliminate vestiges of the Dreyfus Affair and its Third Republic values. In a very concrete sense, Vichy lieux de mémoire in the form of street names literally covered over Third Republic lieux de mémoire during the period of 1940 to 1944.

Conclusion
The Wandering Statue: A Statue that Does Not Settle


In 1983, French President François Mitterrand commissioned artist Louis Mitelberg (known as TIM) to create a statue in honor of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Over 12-feet tall with cartoon-like features, the statue, as TIM intended it, serves as a reminder of the mass media campaign, which produced overly exaggerated, anti-Semitic political cartoons of Dreyfus. The Dreyfus statue holds a broken sword symbolizing the sword broken at the real Dreyfus’s degradation in the courtyard of the École Militaire. The sword covers half of the statue’s face

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182 Picture taken by Kyra Schulman.
imitating the sculpture of Synagoga, a medieval Jewish figure posing in humiliation, on the back façade of the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris.\textsuperscript{183} TIM completed the statue in 1986. For the next eight years, the Dreyfus statue wandered around Paris as French officials debated where to put it.

TIM proposed to install the statue in the courtyard of the École Militaria in the spot of Dreyfus’s degradation. Charles Hernu, the French Minister of Defense, rejected the request. He argued that, since the École Militaire was not open to the public, it would be better to place the statue where it would receive more traffic.\textsuperscript{184} François Mitterand was equally against the idea of placing the Dreyfus statue in the École Militaire. He argued: “It is necessary to give soldiers an example, not something to remorse over.”\textsuperscript{185} Hernu suggested that the statue instead stand at Dreyfus’s old school, the École Polytechnique. The École Polytechnique rejected the statue. After these first two failed attempts to secure a home for the Dreyfus statue, a rumor spread that the statue would be moved to the Place Dauphine, a public square opposite the Palais Justice where the French Court of Cassation rehabilitated Dreyfus in 1906. In 1988, the statue finally found a home in the Tuileries Gardens. As Dora Polachek wrote:

Not until 1988 was the Dreyfus statue given a home: the Tuileries Gardens. But as anyone who has searched for it there will attest, finding it becomes not an insignificant undertaking. First, it has been relegated to a site near a side entrance of the Tuileries. Secondly, in spite of the statue's enormous size, the choice of location dwarfs its physical and symbolic monumentality: it stands overshadowed and overpowered by the massive trees that surround it.\textsuperscript{186}

That same year, TIM made a second cast of the statue for the courtyard of the Musée d'Art et d'Histoire du Judaïsme in Paris. This latter statue remains in the museum courtyard today. In

\textsuperscript{183} Lorraine Beitler and Maya Balakirsky Katz, \textit{Revising Dreyfus} (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pg. 7.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
1994, for the 100th anniversary of Dreyfus’s arrest, Jacques Chirac moved TIM’s Dreyfus statue for a final time from the Tuileries to Place Pierre-Lafue in the sixth arrondissement of Paris. Notably, contemporary news sources described the difficulty in finding a location for the Dreyfus statue as “no more than a mini-affair.”187 The Dreyfus Affair, as demonstrated by the wandering statue, was still very much alive in French collective consciousness and memory dividing the French along old paradigms. As Didier Sicard wrote in regards to the TIM statue:

The story of Alfred Dreyfus will never end. It is the only visible face of an anti-Semitism still strangely present, inscribed in a human being at a given moment in history. And it is this incarnation always to come which must keep us in an extreme vigilance. As soon as a human being is overwhelmed and the word "Jew" appears in his revolting complicity, whether in contemporary or past history, the mind should pull itself together and wonder about this tragic link, Jewish / guilty, always at work, so destructive to our sense of belonging to the same human community.188

The Dreyfus Affair and its memory is a “past that does not pass.”189 In 2002, unknown culprits defaced the Dreyfus statue, at this point located at the Place Pierre-Lafue. The vandals covered the statue in yellow paint, reminiscent of the yellow stars worn during the Vichy era. They wrote “dirty traitor” and drew Jewish stars of David on the statue.190 The Paris Police did not find the culprits.

Ultimately, the memory of the Dreyfus Affair continues to haunt France today. The far-right Front National party of the Le Pen family has adopted elements of the anti-Dreyfusard

189 Henry Rousso, Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Harvard University Press, 1994).
tradition. For example, the political party continues to use the mantra of Drumont’s anti-Dreyfusard journal *La Libre Parole* – “la France aux français [France for the French].” At party rallies, Front National supporters chant “bleu, blanc, rouge, la France aux Français [blue, white, red, France for the French].” In French textbooks, the French Ministry of Education still does not devote significant attention to the Dreyfus Affair in the same way that the *Malet-Isaac* textbook did pre-Vichy. The French Ministry of Education sponsored the publication of a French history textbook in 2013 where there is no mention of the Dreyfus Affair.\(^1\) Finally, in 2000, the Mayor of Paris sponsored the renaming of a square in the 15\(^{th}\) arrondissement to *Place Alfred Dreyfus*.

As Georges Didi-Huberman, a French philosopher and noted art-historian, observed in *Le Monde*: “Imagination recomposes our legacies, redistributes the treasures of our memory. It recomposes them by composing them with the urgency of our present anxieties.”\(^2\) The memory of the Dreyfus Affair in Vichy France was just that, composed with the “urgency” of Vichy’s contemporary anxieties. The pro-Vichy, anti-Semitic authors revised the Dreyfus Affair and honored the anti-Dreyfusards who came before them while denouncing the Dreyfusards. The Vichy Ministry of Education forgot the Dreyfus Affair, erasing it from government sponsored textbooks. The Vichy Ministry of the Interior encouraged local governments to rename places associated with Dreyfusards and supported a campaign in the pro-Vichy anti-Semitic press for the creation of streets named for prominent anti-Dreyfusards. Contemporary anxieties drove expressions of memory towards the Dreyfus Affair and continue to drive them today.

\(^{1}\) Dimitri Casali. *Histoire de France: De la Gaule à nos jours*. (Broché, 2013.)

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