

THE LEADING BRITISH PRESS
ON THREE CRISES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
1947 - 1957

by

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A P P R O V A L

This dissertation, entitled
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has been read and approved by

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Date

May 11, 1962

Dedicated
to my dear father

JACK MANDEL

who watched this study in preparation,
but was not spared to see it completed.

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PREFATORY NOTES

1. Although the narrative of this thesis is closely related to historical events, it remains a content analysis first and foremost. In consequence, the historical background has been indicated in just the barest outline, and references have been given to where fuller descriptions are to be found. As far as possible these have been limited to one historical work in connection with each crisis.
2. Proper-nouns and place names appear as they were most frequently rendered in the sources, and not as they may have been rendered by an accepted system of transcription (e.g. Nasser, rather than Nasir).
3. Where there was general agreement on any point, the terms "the papers" or "the press" may have been used. These terms, of course, refer specifically and only to the five papers employed in the study. The study is carefully and heavily footnoted, but in such cases as a reference to "the press" or "the papers" especial attention should be given to the sources of opinion.
4. "Conservative", "Labour", "Socialist" and "Liberal" have all been used in the British (and not American) senses of the words. So too the meanings of all other words and their spellings are British.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXT AND FOOTNOTES

Art.	Article
C.	"Comments" (i.e. editorialised news-items in the <u>New Statesman and Nation</u>).
E.	<u>The Economist</u> .
Ed.	Editorial.
L.Art.	Leading Article.
L.Ed.	Leading Editorial.
L.N.I.	Leading News-Item.
MG.	<u>The Manchester Guardian</u> .
N.	"Notes" (i.e. editorialised news-items in <u>The Economist</u>).
N.I.	News-Item.
NS.	<u>New Statesman and Nation</u> .
ST.	<u>The Sunday Times</u> .
T.	<u>The Times</u> .
<u>Note:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The British conventional system of date references has been used (therefore 1.10.47 = October 1, 1947). 2. Footnote references to sources in the papers are all of the following form:- T, L.Ed., 1.10.47 (i.e. Leading Editorial in <u>The Times</u> appearing on <u>October 1</u>, 1947). 3. All references are anonymous, unless otherwise indicated. 4. Where there is a series of references to more than one newspaper, the following order of priority has been adhered to:-

<u>The Times,</u>	followed by
<u>The Manchester Guardian,</u>	" "
<u>The Sunday Times,</u>	" "
<u>The Economist,</u>	" "
<u>New Statesman and Nation.</u>	

Within this sequence, date order has been

followed (e.g. T, L.Ed., 1.10.47; MG, Ed., 27.9.47;
 MG, Art., 5.10.47; E, N., 3.10.47;
 E, Art., 10.10.47; and NS, L.Art.,
 3.10.47).

INTRODUCTION

"Content Analysis" is a convenient research technique: it can be applied to widely divergent media of communication, and its uses are manifold.¹ The following study derives from a content analysis. The vehicle of communication is the newspaper and our purpose is to describe the appraisals made by the leading British press of three post-World War II crises in the Middle East. We have chosen the British press, since among the Great Powers it was Great Britain which was primarily and directly involved in the crises examined. And we have preferred her quality press in favour of the popular press, as it is the former which gives extensive coverage to foreign news, and which regards its function as being to inform the public of the news and to comment in a serious vein on this news. The popular press limits its horizon mainly to sensationalist news at home, and its purpose essentially is to entertain.

We are interested in the manifest content of these newspapers; for it is the content, and not the writer or the reader, that can be judged most objectively. It will

1. For full discussion of uses and applications of Content Analysis, see B. Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research, (New York, 1952). This book is the standard work dealing with all aspects of the content analysis technique, and it gave most aid in formulating the method employed in what follows (as described in the Supplement to the thesis).

not be considered part of our task to speculate about the motives of those writing the material analysed, as has ^{done} been in other inquiries of this nature. It will simply be assumed that the newspapers publish articles and opinions which in the main accord with their known editorial policies (although the leanings of any particular contributor will be indicated, where they are known with certainty, and if they are relevant to the issue). Similarly, from this inquiry alone, it is not felt that we are competent to deduce definitively the state of leading British opinion (and even less so, of popular opinion) at any time during the crises, since clearly the newspaper is but one of many moulders of public opinion.

The amount of news-space devoted to each crisis and the incidence of opinions expressed by the newspapers will be classified, quantified and described. This will be done in the hope that some light may be thrown on the importance which the newspapers accorded to each crisis, and on the various points of view that were developed and held by the newspapers, which in turn represent diverse trends of political allegiance among the British public. The present writer does not wish to proceed beyond this limited objective. It is indicative in itself of the lines along which leading opinion in the British Isles was

guided during these years; and, in so far as the newspaper reflects its readers, it is also illustrative of what was actually believed.

CHAPTER I

THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL -

February 1947 - May 1948

1. Background until February 18, 1947

In 1917, Britain was the author of the Balfour Declaration, in which she spoke, albeit in ambiguous terms, of a "National Home for the Jewish people" in Palestine. Three years later the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine were allotted to her at the San Remo Conference, and these were confirmed in 1922 by the League of Nations.

This mandate for Palestine gave Britain in subsequent years a deal of trouble and political embarrassment until it came to its end on May 15, 1948. The root of the difficulties lay in the conflict of interests between the various parties involved in Palestine. On the one hand, the Jews motivated by Zionist philosophers of the late 19th century and impelled by the political events of the early 20th century, were eager after 1917 to establish that "National Home for the Jewish people"; on the other hand, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and their neighbours, also fired by a new nationalistic spirit and stimulated by World War I, were opposed to the mass influx of Jews into their land. Britain regarded the whole Middle East region, with the Suez Canal, overland routes to India and abundant supplies of oil, as the linch-pin to her international position. She was

therefore loath to alienate the Arabs, and yet, by the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine, she was bound to encourage the entry of Jews into the area, in the face of Arab disapproval.

Following World War I, revolution and unrest, both political and social, in Eastern Europe, was later eclipsed by Hitler's accession to power in 1933, and thus the number of Jews who desired to enter Palestine was greatly increased. This in turn aggravated Arab resentment, which only made things more difficult for the British. Rigid immigration policies were enforced which the Jews challenged and after 1930 resisted as far as they could. But the immigration regulations were not sufficient to prevent Arab riots and attacks on Jews in 1928 and 1929, and an Arab general strike in protest against the British in 1936. As well as these more emphatic expressions of Arab feeling, there were not infrequent Arab acts of violence against the Jews, which the latter for the most part met with a policy of havlagah (self-restraint). The British, in an attempt to keep order and reconcile differences, sent to Palestine in the years before World War II inquiry after inquiry, but their efforts were not successful.

World War II brought an interlude of relative quiet to Palestine, for the Jews were more concerned to support the British in their efforts against the Nazis than oppose their policies in Palestine. However, with the end of the

war, the Palestine problem became very much alive again. It had been in no way simplified by the Nazi operations against the Jews in Europe and the resultant hosts of Jewish displaced persons, nor by the accentuated aspirations throughout the Arab world for independence from British and French protection. The Jewish policy of havlagah had been broken, and Jewish terrorism against the British was on the increase, as were Arab violence, Jewish illegal immigration and the mutually exclusive demands from both Arabs and Jews for a state in Palestine. Britain, now even more dependent on Arab oil and aware of the strategic importance of the Middle East, was still anxious to preserve her standing in the area, but could ill-afford the burden, imposed by a turbulent Palestine, on her army, economy and prestige.

In 1945, the Labour Party, which had previously in official statements, resolutions and elsewhere, expressed sympathy for Zionism, took up office as His Majesty's Government, and set about a solution for Palestine.¹ In the same year the American President, on the advice of Mr. Earl Harrison, who had investigated the condition of Jewish refugees in Europe, suggested to the new British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, that 100,000 Jews from Europe be admitted to Palestine. Consequently, early in 1946 a joint Anglo-American Commission was sent to investigate the problem

1. For the Labour Party's Zionist record, see J.J.Zasloff, Great Britain and Palestine, (Munich, 1952) p.26.

and it later submitted a unanimous report, which suggested inter alia a unitary Arab-Jewish state in Palestine, and the immediate entry of 100,000 Jewish D.P.s into Palestine. President Truman again gave warm support to this last recommendation, but he was cautious about the rest of the report; the financial and military help which Britain had hoped for was not forthcoming.

With Jewish terrorist action becoming more severe, and an Arab League economic boycott on Palestine Jewry, the British Government convened in London a conference on Palestine in September 1946, at which it submitted the "Morrison Plan", offering provincial autonomy to Arab and Jewish areas in Palestine. But the Arabs refused to sit with the Jews, and both sides rejected the Government's proposals as inadequate; and the conference was adjourned. In January, 1947, the conference was reconvened and on February 7, a new plan (the "Bevin Plan") was submitted by the Government suggesting a British trusteeship in Palestine with a promise of independence at the end of five years. Once again, both the Arabs and the Jews rejected these proposals as unsuitable. On February 18, 1947, the Government decided to place the whole question before the United Nations, and to seek that assembly's "advice".

In the days immediately before the British decision to turn to the United Nations, there was little expectation in

the press that the Arabs and Jews would accept the Government's latest proposals. The Times thought that these proposals should be attractive to the Arabs, as they postponed for five years the question of partitioning Palestine, which was being voiced by the Zionists as a possible solution;² and The Sunday Times saw a glimmer of hope in the "Jewish moderates".³ But more obviously there were signs in the press of growing short-temperedness and impatience. The Arabs were charged with an uncompromising attitude;⁴ the Jews had forgotten what Britain had done for them since the Balfour Declaration⁵ and lacked moral responsibility regarding terrorist activities;⁶ the Americans had failed Britain by not offering to help in more than words.⁷ It was the British Government which was criticized most: for its immigration policies,⁸ for the military operations conducted in Palestine against Jewish terrorism and illegal immigration,⁹ and for its tardiness in dealing with the problem effectively.¹⁰

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2. T, L.Ed., 12.2.47. (It should be remembered that partition had been first mooted officially as a solution to the Palestine problem in the report of the Peel Commission in 1937.)
 3. ST, Art., 16.2.47, Lord Altrincham.
 4. ST, N.I., 9.2.47.
 5. T, Ed., 15.2.47.
 6. E, N, 8.2.47.
 7. T, L.Ed., 12.2.47.
 8. ST, Art., 16.2.47, Lord Altrincham.
 9. NS, Art., 8.2.47.
 10. T, L.Ed., 12.2.47; T, Ed., 15.2.47; & N.S., C., 15.2.47.

It was time to go to the United Nations.¹¹ A single dissenting voice in this was The Economist, which felt that the only way to break the deadlock was for Britain to enforce a solution of her own in spite of Arab protests.¹² However, a week later this paper fell into line as well and urged an appeal to the United Nations.¹³ The papers believed that in going to the United Nations, Britain should not go empty-handed, but she had a responsibility as the Mandatory power to lay before the General Assembly some proposed solution.¹⁴

At this point the general agreement ended, for there were differences of opinion regarding the best possible solution in the prevailing circumstances. Three of the papers advocated the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas, as first suggested by the Peel Commission in 1937;¹⁵ they were The Manchester Guardian, The Economist, and the New Statesman. The Times offered a vague plan of its own, suggesting,

"Incorporation [of Palestine] in an Arab federation might allay the fears of the Palestine Arabs about the dangers of subjection to Jewish rule; and internationally guaranteed boundaries would secure the future of the [Jewish] National Home." 16

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11. T., Ed., 15.2.47; MG, L. Ed., 13.2.47; ST, Art., 16.2.47, Lord Altrincham; & NS, C., 8.2.47.
12. E, N., 8.2.47.
13. E, Art., 15.2.47.
14. T, L. Ed., 12.2.47; T, Ed., 15.2.47; MG, L. Ed., 13.2.47; ST, Art., 16.2.47, Lord Altrincham; NS, C., 8.2.47; & NS, C., 15.2.47. The general agreement on this point is significant, as it was to remain a recurring theme during the succeeding months (see below, p. 14 etc.).
15. MG, Ed., 10.2.47; MG, L. Ed., 13.2.47; E, N., 8.2.47; E, Art., 15.2.47; & NS, C., 15.2.47.
16. T, Ed., 15.2.47.

The Sunday Times supported Mr. Bevin's latest proposal of a trusteeship, except that it should be administered "under the aegis of the United Nations".¹⁷

The Manchester Guardian also suggested that while the United Nations was considering the problem, Britain, as an "interim policy" should admit numbers of Jewish refugees from Cyprus, in order to relieve the tension by answering part of the Jewish immigration demands.¹⁸ More significant was a statement by The Sunday Times: Britain was contemplating going to the United Nations merely to solicit advice, for "only in the last resort would there be a question of British withdrawal".¹⁹

From the above, two points stand out. It was being unanimously urged first that Britain should put the Palestine question before the United Nations, and second, that she should offer this body some advice on how to solve the problem.

17. ST, Art., 16.2.47, Lord Altrincham.

18. MG, Ed., 15.2.47. (See below, p.20).

19. ST, N.I., 16.2.47. This is significant as it is argued by David Horowitz in State in the Making (New York, 1953) that Britain never intended to leave Palestine (see pp. 142, 306 et passim). Cf., John Marlow, The Seat of Pilate (London, 1959) p.233; Elizabeth Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy'", St. Antony's Papers, Number 11 (London, 1961) pp.33, 34, and J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., pp. 48, 67. The latter two authors argue that Britain's determination to give up the mandate was consolidated after the murder of two British sergeants in July, 1947 (cf. also E, L.Art., 27.3.48); Horowitz claims that there were factors beyond British control (such as the combined American and Russian support for the UNSCOP majority plan) which forced Britain's hand.

All the papers urged these points with equal earnestness. The positions adopted by the various papers are noteworthy in themselves, for they set the tone of what was to follow. The Times was still propounding new schemes (as the Government had done for years); The Sunday Times, with British interests at heart, could not believe that it was really meant to withdraw from Palestine. On the other side, it later became apparent that The Manchester Guardian's and the New Statesman's support of partition in Palestine was out of sympathy with the Zionists, whilst The Economist's support for the same solution was not.^{20.}

20. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p. 180 below.

2. The Palestine Problem before the United Nations and the UNSCOP Inquiry. February 18, 1947 until September 25, 1947.

The decision to go to the United Nations did not come as a surprise; so much was it taken for granted, that there was scarcely an opinion ventured about it. It was approved by The Times and The Sunday Times.¹ The absence of adverse criticism in the other papers is taken by this writer as tacit approval, bearing in mind their previous desire to put the problem before the United Nations (above). The move did occasion some evaluations of the British record in Palestine: The Sunday Times was quietly proud of this record,² but the other papers were not so convinced.³ The Manchester Guardian called the Government's handling of the Palestine problem an "ignominious failure";⁴ and the New Statesman which was the government's severest critic, said:⁵

"..... Palestine today is an object lesson in the abuse of Mandatory power."^{5A}

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1. T, Ed., 24.4.47; ST, Art., 27.4.47, Scrutator.
2. ST, Art., 20.4.47, The Rt.Hon.L.S. Amery, C.H.; ST, Art., 27.4.47, Scrutator; & ST, Ed., 3.8.47; then later, ST, Ed., 28.3.48; & ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator.
3. T, Ed., 19.2.47; MG, L.Ed., 19.2.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.5.47; E, N., 3.5.47; E, L. Art., 4.10.47; NS, Art., 3.5.47; NS, Art., 24.5.47; & NS, L.Ed., 30.8.47; then later, MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48; MG, Ed., 5.5.48; NS, L.Ed., 1.11.47; & NS, Art., 1.5.48.
4. MG, L.Ed., 19.2.47. }^{5A}
5. NS, Art., 3.5.47. } These two papers were bitterest in their criticism of the Government throughout the whole period analysed (observed below).

Later in the summer, The Times modified its position and did find words of praise for the British Mandatory administration.⁶

For procedural reasons, the First Special Session on Palestine of the United Nations General Assembly did not meet until April 28, 1947, and The Manchester Guardian, impatient for progress and mindful of the continuing Jewish terrorism in Palestine, asked if an appeal to the Security Council would not gain time.⁷ Once the former body convened, The Times followed it closely through its editorial columns: it hoped "preliminary discussions" would be avoided,⁸ and approved its "businesslike" opening;⁹ it supported the Jewish claim that they should be allowed non-governmental representation at the Assembly (for there was no official governmental body to present the Jewish case),¹⁰ and it was in favour of excluding the Great Powers from the proposed United Nations Commission on Palestine;¹¹ further, it was anxious that this Commission (UNSCOP) should produce a clear-cut solution for Palestine.¹²

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6. T, Ed., 10.7.47; T, Art., 12.8.47, Jerusalem Correspondent; & T, L.Ed., 2.9.47; then later T, L.Ed., 27.9.47; T, L.Ed., 18.10.47; T, Ed., 15.11.47; T, Ed., 1.12.47; & T, Ed., 13.12.47.
7. MG, Ed., 4.3.47; cf. E, N., 3.5.47.
8. T, Ed., 28.4.47.
9. T, L.Ed., 3.5.47.
10. T, ibid.; & T, Ed., 10.5.47; cf. MG, L.Ed., 13.5.47.
11. T, Ed., 28.4.47; cf. T, Ed., 24.4.47.
12. T, Ed., 14.5.47; cf. T, Ed., 24.4.47; & MG, L.Ed., 26.2.47.

To this end, it was again urged by all the papers long before the Special Session was convened that Britain should offer some suggestions towards solution, in the light of her quarter-century's experience in Palestine.¹³

The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman continued to advocate strongly partition of Palestine as the only solution,¹⁴ on the grounds that aside of anything else, Britain could no longer afford to maintain the mandate.¹⁵ They argued that if the United Nations decided on some form of mandatory regime ".... we cannot consent to bear the whole responsibility alone."¹⁶ In this The Times concurred,¹⁷ and therefore it was pleased when the British delegate to the Special Session expressed himself to that effect.¹⁸ However, the New Statesman was distinctly displeased with the proviso which the British delegate added:

"that Great Britain would not feel herself bound by any UNO decision which was not acceptable both to Jews and Arabs." 19

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13. See p.9 and footnote 14 above; then T, Ed., 19.2.47; MG, Ed., 1.4.47; E, N., 5.4.47; & E, N., 3.5.47; so too, a year later, after relinquishing mandate, Britain can still advise, ST, Ed., 16.5.48.
14. MG, Ed., 25.2.47; MG, L.Ed., 26.2.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.5.47; & NS, Art., 3.5.47.
15. MG, L.Ed., 26.2.47; NS, C., 8.3.47; & NS, Art., 3.5.47.
16. MG, Ed., 25.2.47; MG, Ed., 1.4.47; & NS, Art., 3.5.47.
17. T, Ed., 28.4.47.
18. T, Ed., 3.5.47.
19. NS, Art., 24.5.47.

The Economist was not impressed by either the Arab or the British showings at the Special Session, as the former tried to frustrate it by raising a series of procedural questions;²⁰ and Britain had not indicated clearly when she intended to withdraw from Palestine.²¹

The Sunday Times now admitted that partition of Palestine seemed the likeliest solution,²² and it was The Manchester Guardian's turn to observe disapprovingly:

"There is still a suspicion that Mr. Bevin is determined to stay in Palestine and that he is merely asking the United Nations to approve his own proposals."²³

Once UNSCOP was appointed and had commenced its task great hopes were put on it.²⁴ Consequently, when the Arabs decided to boycott it in its investigations, there was disappointment,²⁵ and when the Jewish Agency reaffirmed the Biltmore Program of 1942 as its policy, The Economist tried to see in it the "oriental principle";

"... to raise the initial demand as high as possible." ²⁶

20. E, N., 17.5.47.

21. E, ibid.

22. ST, Art., 27.4.47, Scrutator.

23. MG, Ed., 25.2.47; cf., later NS as well: NS, C., 3.5.47 & NS, Art., 24.5.47.

24. T, Ed., 27.5.47; MG, L.Ed., 28.6.47; & E, N., 23.8.47.

25. T, Ed., 27.5.47; & E, N., 21.6.47.

26. E, N., 28.6.47. The Biltmore Program, adopted in New York, May, 1942 by the Zionist Conference urged:

"that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth..." Jewish Frontier, May, 1942, pp.3-4; quoted in

Zaslloff, op.cit., p.21.

During the summer months of 1947, while UNSCOP was conducting its enquiries, there were no changes in the status of Palestine; and less space was devoted in all the papers to Palestine with fewer opinions being expressed (see below, p.177, note (a), re column lengths). Those which were expressed usually backed up points of view that were already held and so little new was added. The three "protagonists of partition", The Manchester Guardian, The Economist and the New Statesman, reaffirmed their belief in it.²⁷ These papers also continued to stress the need for a prompt British withdrawal from Palestine in view of the damage that was being done to British prestige and to her economy.²⁸ The Economist reasoned that since Britain was entirely dependent on Middle Eastern oil, it was not wise for her to remain in Palestine, thereby losing more and more favour in the Arab world,²⁹ and that in any case the strategic advantages of Palestine were not so great as to offset the disadvantages of remaining.³⁰

"And it must be emphasised again that the reason for British advocacy of partition now is not primarily because it is in the best interests of the Jews or the Arabs, or the international community in general;

27. MG, Ed., 1.8.47; E, N., 17.5.47; E, Art., 9.8.47; & NS, L.Ed., 30.8.47.

28. MG, L.Ed., 28.6.47; MG, Ed., 19.7.47; MG, Ed., 1.8.47; MG, Ed., 12.8.47; E, Art., 9.8.47; E, N., 23.8.47; & NS, C., 19.7.47.

29. E, N., 17.5.47.

30. E, Art., 9.8.47.

it is simply because it is in the best interests of the long-suffering British, and is, indeed, their last offer before they remove themselves lock, stock and barrel from an area which is a drain on their resources, a death trap for their soldiers, and a source of degradation, both to the men who are sent there, and the growing number of potential anti-semites at home." 31

The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman, which espoused the Zionist cause,³² would have agreed with the conclusion reached by The Economist in the above quotation, but not with all its reasoning.

During these months in 1947 (mid-February to mid-September) the Jewish terrorist organisations, Irgun and the Stern Gang, pursued a vigorous campaign against the British administration in Palestine. Each outrage evoked horror and protest; so it was in March when the British Officers' Club in Jerusalem was blown up, resulting in twelve deaths;³³ when the appeals by UNSCOP for an end to the violence were seen to have been ineffective;³⁴ and when two British sergeants were hanged on July 31, as reprisals for

31. E, ibid. This outburst of violent language followed one week after the "sergeants' affair" (below), and is indicative of how strongly The Economist - which seldom gave way to passion - felt about the need to withdraw from Palestine at this stage.

32. The Manchester Guardian portrayed the Zionist case as "The Best of Causes" (MG, Cartoon, 8.8.47) and supported it strongly throughout the whole period surveyed, as did the New Statesman, which published many articles by Richard Crossmann, who was a member of their staff, and a publicly avowed Zionist.

33. T, L.Ed., 3.3.47; & MG, Ed., 4.3.47.

34. T, Ed., 27.5.47; & ST, Art., 3.8.47, Scrutator.

the execution of three Irgun members by the British.³⁵ There was no disguising that the situation was grave,³⁶ but as The Times pointed out:

"... it was precisely the terrorists' intention to shock the world." 37

Consequently, as The Economist had observed three months earlier, it was idle to hope that the terrorism would stop.³⁸ And it was not just Jewish terrorists in Palestine who were at fault, but also their supporters in the United States, who were waging a propaganda war against Britain,³⁹ and financing the activities in Palestine.⁴⁰ The British administration and military command were equally to blame for not succeeding in putting an end to the violence. These authorities were accused among other things of being incompetent, lacking in ingenuity, blundering and absurdly lenient.⁴¹

The tactics suggested by the various papers to remedy the situation were interesting. The right-wing Sunday Times

35. MG, Ed., 1.8.47; & ST, Ed., 3.8.47.

36. T, Ed., 21.5.47; & ST, N.I., 17.8.47.

37. T, Art., 12.8.47, Our Jerusalem Correspondent.

38. E, N., 3.5.47.

39. T, Ed., 10.5.47; also later ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator.

40. ST, N.I., 3.8.47; later T, Ed., 28.11.47; & ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator.

41. MG, Ed., 1.4.47; MG, L.Ed., 28.6.47; ST, Art., 3.8.47, Scrutator; E, N., 3.5.47; NS, C., 8.3.47; & NS, C., 22.3.47. Again The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman come to the fore in criticising the Government.

and The Economist, which had adopted a position similar to that of the former on the whole question, both advocated a "strong line";

"No surrender to it [terrorism] is thinkable."⁴² Martial law was claimed to be an effective deterrent as it struck at "the pocket of the Jewish community."⁴³ The Times, however, sympathising with the Administration's problems, limited itself to appeals to the Jews to put an end to the terrorism themselves.⁴⁴ Even after the "sergeants' affair", which shocked the British public deeply,⁴⁵ the liberal Manchester Guardian pleaded that there should be no reprisals by the British against the Jews, as this would only worsen the situation.⁴⁶ When a few days later there were anti-Jewish demonstrations in Manchester, Liverpool and elsewhere, The Manchester Guardian devoted an editorial to an outcry against anti-semitism of any form for any reason.⁴⁷ Its attitude towards the Jewish National Home and the terrorist activities was perhaps best revealed in a cartoon which showed an innocent girl (labelled "The Best of Causes") being dragged along by a thug with a pistol (labelled "The Worst of Advocates").⁴⁸ The left-wing New

42. ST, Ed., 3.8.47; cf. ST, Art., 3.8.47, Scrutator.

43. E, N., 22.3.47.

44. T, L.Ed., 3.3.47; T, Ed., 14.5.47; T, Ed., 27.5.47; T, Ed., 19.7.47; cf. E, N., 5.4.47; later The Times suggested the United Nations should exert its influence, T, L.Ed., 3.11.47.

45. See Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p.34; & J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.67.

46. MG, Ed., 1.8.47.

47. MG, Ed., 5.8.47; cf. later MG, Ed., 10.12.47 (expresses real concern for the plight of Oriental Jews at Arab hands).

Statesman published an article a fortnight after the sergeants' affair by Arthur Koestler, the Zionist writer then in Palestine, sympathising with the terrorists and justifying them, while castigating the British and their policies.⁴⁹

During these summer months, Jewish illegal immigration was continuing apace, and things reached a climax with the (now celebrated) "Exodus Incident".⁵⁰ As mentioned above, the Manchester Guardian had suggested in February, 1947, that the British Government allow more Jews to enter Palestine.⁵¹ It had reiterated its suggestion three times in the next few weeks.⁵² The Times could not agree:

"Until the United Nations decides upon the future policy of the Holy Land, Britain has no right, even if she had the inclination, to advance the interests of one community at the expense of the other." ⁵³

By the time the Exodus 1947 arrived at Haifa, loaded with 4,500 illegal immigrants, The Manchester Guardian had changed its mind, and it approved the Government's decision to return the ship to its port of departure.⁵⁴ It agreed that

49. NS, Art., 16.8.47, Arthur Koestler.

50. For a full description of this illegal immigration, including the "Exodus Incident", see Jon and David Kimche, The Secret Roads, (New York, 1955).

51. See above, pp.14/15, footnote 19.

52. MG, Ed., 19.2.47; MG, Ed., 25.2.47; & MG, Ed., 4.3.47.

53. T, L.Ed., 3.3.47.

54. MG, Ed., 23.7.47.

Jewish D.P.s had the right to leave Europe, but did that mean they all had to go to Palestine? To make matters worse:

"There is, moreover, more than a touch of racketeering in this business." 55

When, however, the Government determined at the end of August to send the ship and its "cargo" to Germany, this paper and others were outraged at the inhumanity and folly of the decision.⁵⁶

On September 1, 1947, UNSCOP delivered its report, in which there were two suggested plans for Palestine. The "majority plan" recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states bound by an economic union; the "minority plan" proposed an independent Arab-Jewish federal state. Logically, The Manchester Guardian, The Economist and the New Statesman expressed their approval of the "majority plan";⁵⁷ The Times also cautiously cast a favourable glance at this plan.⁵⁸ However, since the scheme envisaged Great Britain's continued administration of Palestine for the next two years while the partition would take place, these papers were quick to proclaim that Britain could not do the job alone.⁵⁹ The Economist, although

55. MG., ibid.

56. MG, Ed., 22.8.47; MG, Ed., 23.8.47; MG, Ed., 25.8.47; & E, N., 30.8.47; cf. NS, C., 26.7.47 (when the ship was returning to France).

57. MG, L.Ed., 2.9.47; E, Art., 6.9.47; NS, C., 6.9.47; & NS, C., 13.9.47.

58. T, L.Ed., 2.9.47.

59. T, L.Ed., 2.9.47; E, Art., 6.9.47; cf. earlier NS, C., 9.6.47.

supporting partition, was opposed to any British participation in its implementation: she was simply to withdraw.⁶⁰

In all, March to September were not uneventful months, although there were no major upheavals in Palestine. The press followed the problem with interest, as it was laid before the United Nations and as that assembly created UNSCOP. While UNSCOP was conducting its investigation - a time when it might have been expected that the press would have had less to say about Palestine - there was a resurgence of Jewish terrorist activities and illegal immigration; these aspects of the problem were accorded the press's attentions, so that there was no decrease in the amount of space in the papers devoted to Palestine. In September, with the presentation of the UNSCOP report and the imminent re-opening of the Palestine case in the United Nations, there was an increase in the coverage given by the papers to the subject, and with subsequent developments this increase was to expand further.⁶¹

⁶⁰. Cf. earlier E, Art., 9.8.47.

⁶¹. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.182 below. Also see column lengths, p.177 below.

3. The United Nations' Decision to Partition Palestine.
September 25 until November 29, 1947.

The United Nations General Assembly reconvened after its summer recess on September 17, 1947; eight days later the first meeting of the United Nations ad hoc Committee on the Palestine Question took place. From that time until the vote was eventually taken in the United Nations General Assembly in favour of partitioning Palestine, there was conducted, by all the parties vitally concerned with Palestine, two months of labyrinthine manoeuvring, negotiating and chicanery over plans and revised plans, proposals and counter proposals.¹

The British position was put by Mr. Arthur Creech Jones on September 26, 1947, and it remained substantially unchanged throughout the following months. Essentially it was that Great Britain would only implement a scheme which was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews; if it was not thus acceptable, an authority other than Great Britain would have to implement it. He did not commit Britain in favour of either one of the UNSCOP plans. This position was supplemented by Sir Alexander Cadogan on November 13, 1947, when he stated that Great Britain would withdraw her troops from Palestine by August 1, 1948, and until then she alone, without incursions from any body (even the United Nations), would be

¹. For a detailed description of the developments during these months, see David Horowitz, op.cit., Part III.

responsible for the maintenance of law and order. In response to questioning, it became clear that:

"Great Britain was obviously determined to take no part in the implementation of partition." 2

There was little or no praise in any of the papers for Britain's policy and her conduct of it at the United Nations. In so far as Britain had indicated her intention to withdraw from Palestine, every paper could now approve,³ although, be it noted, The Sunday Times one month before had still questioned the wisdom of the proposed British withdrawal on the grounds that Palestine was a valuable strategic asset,⁴ but it too in these weeks conceded to public opinion which favoured the evacuation. And this was all; for the rest there was just adverse comment, especially from The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman.

The Manchester Guardian had long appealed for a clear statement of British policy;⁵ when it came, it was disappointed.⁶

"It is one of complete, thorough and whole-hearted non-co-operation. ... a grudging and niggardly statement."⁷

2. J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.73.

3. T, Ed., 15.10.47; T, L.Ed., 18.10.47; T, Ed., 22.11.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.10.47; ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator; E, N., 20.9.47; E, L.Art., 4.10.47; NS, C., 4.10.47; & NS, C., 18.10.47; also later MG, L.Ed., 13.12.47. The only other instance of such unanimity of opinion was earlier when it was decided in February to go to the United Nations.

4. ST, L.N.I., 21.9.47.

5. Earlier MG, Ed., 19.7.47; MG, Ed., 12.8.47; & later MG, L.Ed., 6.11.47.

6. MG, L.Ed., 27.9.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.10.47; & MG, L.Ed., 6.11.47.

7. MG, Ed., 22.11.47.

The New Statesman, equally hurt, felt the same way.⁸

"The British delegation has not made a single positive proposal of its own at Lake Success." 9

The main grievance was that Britain had declined to help the United Nations to enforce any decision which was not acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs.¹⁰ These two papers felt more emphatically than the others that Britain should co-operate with the United Nations, both at Lake Success and in Palestine.¹¹ Eventually, as Britain proceeded unyieldingly along her set course, The Manchester Guardian exclaimed:

"In other words, since we will not help, will we please not hinder." 12

The Times, The Sunday Times and The Economist were able to justify the Government's policy,¹³ on the grounds that:

"While the Mandate lasts Britain is bound to refrain from prejudicing the position of Arabs or Jews by countenancing preparations either for partitioning Palestine or for establishing a unitary state, and for this reason cannot devolve her responsibility upon any other authority."¹⁴

8. NS, C., 4.10.47; NS, Art., 22.11.47; & NS, C., 29.11.47.

9. NS, C., 8.11.47.

10. Cf. above p.9-11, footnote 14, and pp.23-24.

11. MG, L.Ed., 25.9.47; MG, L.Ed., 27.9.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.10.47; MG, L.Ed., 15.10.47; MG, L.Ed., 6.11.47; NS, Art., 22.11.47; & NS, Ed., 29.11.47; also E, L.Art., 4.10.47.

12. MG, Ed., 19.11.47.

13. T, L.Ed., 27.9.47; T, Ed., 15.10.47; T, Ed., 28.11.47; ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator; & E, N., 8.11.47.

14. T, Ed., 22.11.47.

But this justification scarcely amounted to whole-hearted support. Meanwhile, it was felt that the other member nations of the United Nations, especially the United States should now lend a hand in Palestine.¹⁵

While the debates continued in the United Nations over the two plans put forward in the UNSCOP report, it was noteworthy that all the papers inclined in favour of the majority plan, (i.e. partition).¹⁶ However, The Manchester Guardian and The Economist were doubtful about the precise form of partition set out in the UNSCOP plan. They both felt that the boundaries were too unbalanced in favour of the Jews; and, said The Manchester Guardian, the plan was extraordinarily complicated as well as impracticable in economic terms, (economic unity between the would-be Arab and Jewish states was envisaged).¹⁷

It was recognised that since the Arabs had refused to countenance both UNSCOP plans and as the Jews had rejected the UNSCOP minority plan,¹⁸ whichever plan the United Nations voted for would be unacceptable to both Arabs and Jews. Britain, therefore, if she was to hold to her declared policy,

15. T, L.Ed., 13.10.47; T, Ed., 18.10.47; T, L.Ed., 3.11.47; T, Ed., 15.11.47; ST, N.I., 25.9.47; & ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator.

16. T, L.Ed., 27.9.47; MG, 25.9.47; ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator; E, N., 4.10.47; & NS, Art., 20.9.47, R.H.S. Crossmann.

17. MG, L.Ed., 25.9.47; & E, N., 22.11.47; cf. MG, L.Ed., 2.9.47 (immediately after UNSCOP report was published).

18. See J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.65.

could not implement either scheme, and it was soon being recommended by all the papers that the United Nations should establish an international force to implement its decision.¹⁹ The papers took their lead from the American delegate, Mr. Hershel V. Johnson, who cautiously suggested such a force on October 11, 1947, although the New Statesman had anticipated the same suggestion six weeks earlier.²⁰

Whilst there was some praise in the press for this American suggestion,²¹ the same was not to be found in their reaction to the rest of American policy as outlined by Mr. Johnson. For some months before this declaration of policy there had been indications of dissatisfaction (especially in The Economist) over American reticence to give a lead by offering financial and military help in Palestine.²² Mr. Johnson, in his declaration on October 11, although favouring partition and mentioning a possible United Nations force, was careful not to commit the United States to contributing to this force. This was interpreted as further American shirking of responsibility, and The Times, The Sunday Times and The Economist did not hesitate to say so.²³ As time went on,

19. T, L.Ed., 13.10.47; T, L.Ed., 18.10.47; T, L.Ed., 3.11.47; T, Ed., 13.11.47; MG, L.Ed., 15.10.47; ST, L.N.I., 12.10.47; E, N., 8.11.47; E, N., 22.11.47; NS, C., 18.10.47; & NS, C., 15.11.47.

20. NS, L.Ed., 30.8.47.

21. MG, L.Ed., 15.10.47; & ST, L.N.I., 12.10.47.

22. E.g. earlier E, N., 5.4.47; E, N., 20.9.47; E, L.Art., 4.10.47; & NS, Art., 3.5.47; cf. ST, N.I., 19.10.47 (refers back to Mr. Truman's reaction to the joint Anglo-American Commission).

23. T, L.Ed., 13.10.47; ST, L.N.I., 12.10.47; ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator; & E, N., 18.10.47.

it became clear in subsequent statements made by Mr. Johnson that America hoped Britain would remain in Palestine to enforce the partition plan, and that America would not need to share in a United Nations force since she was afraid this would mean Russian troops too would be given the opportunity to enter the Middle East; and this was something she did not view with favour.²⁴ But in the meantime, the three last named papers continued to denigrate the United States for failing to play a constructive role.²⁵ The two "pro-Zionist" papers The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman, were conspicuous in their lack of criticism of the United States; apparently they were content to see America supporting partition, if nothing else.²⁶ However, it was not long before these also felt unable to withhold adverse comment regarding the American stance at the United Nations.²⁷

24. See J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.70.

25. T, L.Ed., 3.11.47; ST, N.I., 2.11.47; & E, N., 8.11.47; also cf. NS, C., 29.11.47.

26. Cf. MG, L.Ed., 13.10.47 (welcomes American policy).

27. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see below, p.184.

4. Developments at Lake Success and in Palestine.
November 29, 1947 until February 24, 1948.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of partitioning Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states bound by an economic union. This decision was received quietly by the papers, all of which were unsure of the likely consequences of the decision. The Manchester Guardian had misgivings about the actual form of partition chosen,¹ and The Economist, which also had supported partition all along, now greeted the vote with displeasure, as it saw in it a guarantee of open conflict between Arab and Jew in Palestine.² The Times said Britain "will do everything in her power" to co-operate during the transitional period.³ The Economist was correct in its forecast; and The Times proved to be wrong.

Strife between the Arabs and the Jews now rose to an unprecedented level, and the Jewish terrorists stepped up their activities against the British. Britain, meanwhile, clung to her policy of neutrality. She would not allow the United Nations Palestine Commission to enter Palestine early in 1948 that they might prepare the way for the partition;

1. MG, L.Ed., 1.12.47; & MG, Ed., 2.1.48. Cf., above, p.26 these papers' reservations regarding the "majority plan" when it was first presented.

2. E, N., 6.12.47.

3. T, Ed., 1.12.47.

she refused to open a seaport to facilitate Jewish immigration as requested by the above Commission; and she would not allow the Haganah (the Jewish Militia) to train or arm itself,⁴ although the Arab states outside Palestine were preparing for war.⁵

The Times, as it had done consistently, tried to support the Government's policies, defending them during these months by praising the Government's consistency and its impartiality between Arab and Jew.⁶ The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman were decisively of a different mind. They both observed that Britain's "neutrality" had brought the United Nations to its present difficult pass, of having chosen partition without being provided with the means of enforcing it,⁷ and that Britain's "impartiality" in reality favoured the Arabs.⁸

America was still unwilling to involve her troops in any United Nations force, and she was further censured on that account.⁹ What is notable is that by this time (i.e. mid-December onwards) The Manchester Guardian and

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4. This was recommended by the United Nations Palestine Commission and was welcomed by The Manchester Guardian (MG, Ed., 31.1.48).
 5. For full description of British policy at this time see J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., Ch.V., pp.80-97.
 6. T, Ed., 13.12.47; T, Ed., 2.2.48; T, L.Ed., 18.2.48; & T, Ed., 20.2.48; cf. E, Art., 6.12.47; then later, T, Ed., 10.3.48.
 7. MG, L.Ed., 1.12.47; & NS, C., 6.12.47; then later, MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48; cf. still later ST, L.Ed., 30.5.48.
 8. MG, Ed., 21.1.48; MG, Ed., 31.1.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; MG, L.Ed., 21.2.48; NS, C., 3.1.48; & NS, C., 31.1.48; also see below, p.42.
 9. MG, Ed., 26.1.48; E, Art., 6.12.47; E.N., 17.1.48; NS, C., 13.12.47; NS, C., 20.12.47; NS, C., 3.1.48; & NS, Art., 17.1.48.

especially the New Statesman had joined in reproaching America; the latter spoke of "American spinelessness", and the "duplicity of American policy."¹⁰

In these circumstances, with Britain and America refusing to co-operate, confidence in the United Nations' chances of success in Palestine evaporated.¹¹ Even The Times, which to this date had been least willing to suggest that the Government's policy was ill-advised, called upon the Government to co-operate with the United Nations Palestine Commission and permit it to enter Palestine to make the necessary arrangements for partition.¹² The Manchester Guardian and The Economist agreed emphatically.¹³

As indicated above, conditions in Palestine after the United Nations decision of November 29, 1947, deteriorated rapidly. The Arab League set itself to oppose the decision by force, and then early in 1948 armed bands of Arabs from neighbouring countries had entered Palestine.¹⁴ Their presence and acts of violence were not received happily.¹⁵ Nor were the Jewish acts of terrorism, which had proceeded

¹⁰. NS, C., 20.12.47; & NS, C., 3.1.48.

¹¹. MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; ST, Ed., 4.1.48; & E, N., 7.2.48.

¹². T, L.Ed., 31.12.47; T, Ed., 2.2.48; & T, L.Ed., 18.2.48.

¹³. MG, L.Ed., 1.12.47; MG, Ed., 31.1.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; & E, N., 7.2.48.

¹⁴. See J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., pp.88-91.

¹⁵. T, Ed., 24.2.48; MG, L.Ed., 2.1.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; & ST, Ed., 4.1.48; cf. also T, Ed., 1.12.47 (defiant mood of Arabs).

relentlessly against the British, viewed any more favourably.¹⁶ The Manchester Guardian pleaded for restraint from the Arabs and in particular from the Jews, whose proposed state had United Nations' backing, and who could therefore only do damage to their cause by pursuing it with violence.¹⁷

But such appeals were insufficient and in January 1948, The Economist suggested that:

"If Washington could restrain the Zionists, there would still be hope of London's restraining the Arabs."¹⁸

On the same date the New Statesman also suggested that Britain should attempt to restrain the Arab League.¹⁹

It occurred to some of the papers that since the United Nations was not equipped to enforce its scheme, and as conditions were so bad in Palestine, further pressure might be put on the British administration to remain in charge. Such pressure had to be resisted at all costs; Britain must withdraw.²⁰ As time went on, therefore, the demands for a United Nations force to take charge of the

16. T, L.Ed., 12.12.47; MG, Ed., 17.12.47; MG, Ed., 2.1.48; ST, N.I., 28.12.47; ST, Ed., 4.1.48; & E, N., 20.12.47; also later, after the massacre at Deir Yasin, MG, Ed., 13.4.48; & NS, Ed., 17.4.48; then ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator.

17. MG, Ed., 10.12.47; MG, L.Ed., 13.12.47; & MG, Ed., 17.12.47.

18. E, N., 17.1.48.

19. NS, Art., 17.1.48; cf. later T, L.Ed., 5.4.48.

20. T, L.Ed., 12.12.47; T, Ed., 31.12.47; ST, N.I., 7.12.47; ST, Ed., 4.1.48; & NS, Art., 17.1.48.

situation became more and more insistent.²¹ Likewise, The Manchester Guardian resumed its refrain that partition was the only possible solution,²² for it was fearful that this decision might be annulled.

These months (December, 1947, through February 1948) were in their way a critical pause and testing-time. The United Nations had voted for partition, but had not provided the means of enforcing it. The Arabs and Jews now showed their mettle: the former were as determined to frustrate the decision as the latter were to see it effected. Great Britain did not waver from her policy of neutrality. While on the one hand America and other nations at Lake Success may have wished that Britain would continue in Palestine, the British determination to withdraw was staunchly and vociferously supported by her press. In the meantime, there was near-war in Palestine.²³

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21. T, L.Ed., 18.2.48; T, Ed., 24.2.48; MG, Ed., 2.1.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; ST, Ed., 4.1.48; E, N., 7.2.48; & later NS, L.Ed., 28.2.48.
22. MG, L.Ed., 13.12.47; & MG, L.Ed., 16.2.48; then later, when the United States had begun to back down from partition, MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48 (see below p. 34).
23. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see below, p. 185.

5. The Establishment of the State of Israel.
February 24, 1948 until May 15, 1948.

In mid-February 1948, the United Nations' Palestine Commission reported to the Security Council that the scheme to partition Palestine could not be effected:

"unless military forces in adequate strength are made available to the Commission when the responsibility for the administration of Palestine is transferred to it." 1

On February 24, the Security Council met to consider this request.

The United States recognised the truth of the Commission's statement, and being still loath to implicate her troops in Palestine, began to withdraw her support for partition. At the Security Council's first meeting, Senator Warren Austin argued that it was beyond the United Nations' Charter to enforce solutions: the Security Council was only entitled to use force to meet threats to peace. Therefore it would be ultra vires for the Security Council to enforce partition in Palestine.² This shift in the American position did not come entirely as a surprise, as The Manchester Guardian and The Economist reported rumours beforehand that it was imminent.³ But these rumours did little to "soften the blow.". The Times questioned the logic of

1. Quoted in J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.96.

2. For full description of the debate and subsequent events, see J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., Chaps. VI & VII, pp.98-128.

3. MG, L.Ed., 21.2.48; & E, N., 21.2.48.

Mr. Austin's argument;⁴ The Manchester Guardian reprimanded America for "almost incredible irresponsibility";⁵ The Sunday Times saw in it a manoeuvre to keep Britain in Palestine;⁶ and the New Statesman decried "American double dealing."⁷

On March 3, the Security Council paused, and narrowed those discussing the problem down to its permanent members. But the strife in Palestine did not abate, and the papers revealed impatience, reminding the United Nations that time was short, (it must be remembered that Britain had stated she would lay down the Mandate on May 15, 1948).⁸ Just at this time, on March 19, the United States before the Security Council reversed its position and completely withdrew its support for partition. Understandably, The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman were deeply affronted by this American vacillation,⁹ but the other papers welcomed the volte-face as a concession to reality.¹⁰ There was an innuendo of "we-told-you-so" in these latter papers' reactions, and both The Sunday Times and The

4. T, Ed., 10.3.48.

5. MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48.

6. ST, N.I., 29.2.48.

7. NS, L.Ed., 28.2.48.

8. T, Ed., 22.3.48; MG, Ed., 19.3.48; & ST, Art., 21.3.48, Scrutator.

9. MG, L.Ed., 22.3.48; MG, L.Ed., 27.3.48; & NS, C., 27.3.48.

10. T, Ed., 22.3.48; ST, N.I., 21.3.48; ST, Art., 21.3.48, Scrutator; & E, L.Art., 27.3.48.

Economist put America's erstwhile support of partition down to Zionist pressure in the United States.¹¹

As an alternative to partition, the United States suggested a temporary United Nations Trusteeship in Palestine. Reactions to this were mixed. The Times thought that "the American proposal for a temporary trusteeship is on the right lines",¹² and requested that the plan be described in more concrete terms.¹³ The Manchester Guardian insisted that it did not see in the new scheme sufficient reason to halt the partition decision which was not annulled simply by America's change of policy.¹⁴ The Sunday Times contradicted itself: for in a news-item it claimed that a trusteeship also would require enforcement, and so the proposal did not solve the real difficulty;¹⁵ while in an article on the centre page it welcomed the suggestion because it would establish the United Nations Trusteeship Council as the authority for Britain to hand over to when she withdrew.¹⁶ The Economist, which had by now also withdrawn its support from partition,¹⁷ turned a cartwheel for Britain as well, saying if now American military and

11. ST, loc.cit., & E., loc.cit.

12. T, Ed., 22.3.48; & T, Ed., 27.3.48.

13. Ibid.

14. MG, L.Ed., 22.3.48; & MG, Ed., 3.4.48; also later, MG, L.Ed., 24.4.48; & MG, L.Ed., 15.5.48.

15. ST, N.I., 21.3.48.

16. ST, Art., 21.3.48, Scrutator.

17. See above, p.34, footnote 2.

financial support was assured, then it was conceivable that Britain too would about-face and not withdraw. But it admitted that this was most unlikely.¹⁸ However, when it became apparent that the Americans were still hoping Britain might remain in Palestine, without the need arising to send American troops, opinion hardened against this latest proposal.¹⁹

While the United Nations were deliberating in New York, the fighting between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine was growing progressively more fierce. It was predicted that after May 15, without doubt, there would be war, anarchy and carnage in Palestine.²⁰ The Times blamed the attitudes of the Arabs and Jews for the imbroglio,²¹ while The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman thought that Mr. Bevin was directly to blame (see Section 7). Also, most thought the ineffectuality of the United Nations had a lot to do with it;²² and so The Times demanded:

"... an unequivocal declaration that the United Nations is determined to assume complete authority when Britain lays down the mandate." 23

18. E, L.Ed., 27.3.48.

19. MG, L.Ed., 16.4.48; MG, Ed., 22.4.48; E, N., 10.4.48; & E, N., 24.4.48.

20. T, L.Ed., 20.3.48; MG, Ed., 25.3.48; MG, L.Ed., 15.5.48; ST, Ed., 28.3.48; & E, L.Art., 27.3.48.

21. T, L.Ed., 20.3.48; T, Ed., 10.4.48; T, L.Ed., 28.4.48; & also ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator; later T, L.Ed., 27.5.48.

22. T, Ed., 11.3.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.4.48; & ST, N.I., 7.3.48; cf. earlier, ST, Ed., 4.1.48.

23. T, Ed., 20.3.48; and earlier, T, Ed., 10.3.48.

Once again there were appeals for restraint and co-operation by all parties to facilitate partition;²⁴ and appeals in The Times for a United Nations authority to whom Britain might hand over the Mandate were more frequent and more earnest.²⁵

In the final weeks before Britain's relinquishing of the Mandate, much anxiety was evidenced about the situation in Palestine. The Times reported gravely that the country was on the verge of bankruptcy,²⁶ and The Economist lamented the shutting down of the oil refineries at Haifa, which deprived Britain of sterling revenues and, potentially, of 200,000 tons of oil a year.²⁷ The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman were more concerned with the hostility of the Arabs and Jews towards Britain, and with their determination to "fight it out" when Britain left.²⁸ The initial Jewish successes over the Arabs were explained in two ways; first, the Jews were a well-organised minority and were fighting for their very existence;²⁹ and secondly, the Arabs were divided among themselves and had mismanaged their campaign.³⁰

24. T, Ed., 10.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48; ST, Art., 21.3.48, Scrutator; & ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator.

25. T, Ed., 10.3.48; T, Ed., 22.3.48; & T, Ed., 3.4.48.

26. T, Ed., 10.4.48.

27. E, N., 1.5.48.

28. MG, L.Ed., 28.4.48; & NS, Art., 1.5.48.

29. ST, Art., 2.5.48, Scrutator; NS, Art., 1.5.48; & NS, C., 15.5.48.

30. T, Ed., 10.5.48; & NS, C., 17.4.48; later, ST, Art., 23.5.48, Scrutator; & NS, L.Ed., 22.5.48.

The Government's foremost critics, The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman, persisted in asking what precisely was its policy in Palestine, since it was seen by them to have been utterly negative.³¹ Both suggested that the evacuation of British troops should be accelerated.³²

After Senator Austin's speech to the Security Council on February 24, there seemed little hope of a United Nations' force to implement any United Nations' plan. However, there remained the possibility of setting up some international authority in Jerusalem, since in the original partition decision of November, 1947, there was provision for such a regime. All the papers were concerned with the future of the Holy Places, and with the exception of The Economist, requested that steps be taken to create a special authority for Jerusalem.³³ The Manchester Guardian also inquired whether British forces could be used to protect a regime of this nature, should it be set up.³⁴ The Economist, on the other hand, was opposed to such talk:

"What external force can do, the British feel they have done; it has failed. An external force under a United Nations' Governor-General could do no more." -35

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31. MG, L.Ed., 4.5.48; & NS, Art., 1.5.48; so too, after relinquishing the mandate, MG, L.Ed., 20.5.48; & MG, L.Ed., 27.5.48.
32. MG, L.Ed., 28.4.48; & NS, loc.cit.; so too, after relinquishing the mandate, ST, Art., 23.5.48, Scrutator; & NS, L.Ed., 22.5.48.
33. T, L.Ed., 28.4.48; MG, L.Ed., 25.3.48; MG, Ed., 3.4.48; MG, L.Ed., 16.4.48; MG, L.Ed., 24.4.48; ST, Ed., 28.3.48; & NS, C., 3.4.48.
34. MG, L.Ed., 3.4.48; MG, 16.4.48; & MG, L.Ed., 24.4.48.
35. E, N., 10.4.48; & E, N., 24.4.48.

After Britain had laid down the Mandate, a similar standpoint was adopted by this paper when it dismissed as futile any further British pleas to the combatants for restraint in Palestine.³⁶

With the reversal of American policy on Palestine and their favouring of a trusteeship in place of partition, the confusion which already surrounded the Palestine problem was exacerbated. The column lengths of news-items for March, 1948, (the month in which American policy was reversed) show a marked increase. This increase was maintained through April and May (i.e. until the end of the period), when Great Britain laid down her mandate, and war between the Jews and Arabs was officially declared.³⁷

36. Later E, Art., 22.5.48.

37. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see below, p.186.

6. Immediately After the Establishment of Israel.
May 15, 1948 until May 31, 1948.

Great Britain formally relinquished the Mandate on May 15, 1948. The Times and The Sunday Times reflected on what they regarded as a quarter of a century of service "discharged with honour."¹ The Manchester Guardian commented sadly that the mandate had come "to an ignoble end after twenty-five years",² and the New Statesman was of the same opinion.³ Although The Economist admitted that Britain had "contributed to this impasse", it sought to share the blame on:

"first, Hitler, for creating such a pressure of Jewish immigration.....; and secondly, the policy of the United States, for so encouraging the wilder ambitions of the Zionists."⁴

These judgments coincide closely with attitudes already observed.⁵

The United States accorded the newly proclaimed State of Israel de facto recognition within a few hours of its creation. Neither The Sunday Times nor The Economist was impressed by this move; they both regarded it as unwise, as it was expected by them to stiffen the Jews' determination to hold out against the Arabs and make compromise unlikely.⁶

1. T, L.Ed., 15.5.48; ST, Ed., 16.5.48; & ST, L.Ed., 30.5.48.

2. MG, L.Ed., 15.5.48.

3. NS, L.Ed., 29.5.48.

4. E, Art., 22.5.48.

5. See p.12, footnotes 2-6.

6. ST, Ed., 16.5.48; ST, Art., 23.5.48, Scrutator; and E, Art., 22.5.48.

The Economist considered that Britain was right in not granting Israel immediate recognition,⁷ while the New Statesman quickly urged Britain to do so.⁸

Britain had been supplying arms and other military equipment to various Arab states (in particular to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan) in accordance with treaty agreements before and after her relinquishment of the Palestine Mandate. Britain had staffed King Abdullah's Arab Legion with twenty-one officers as well.

When Britain formally laid down the Mandate, these Arab states marched upon Israel, using their British arms and equipment; there was also some haziness about what part the British officers in the Arab Legion were playing in these attacks. Consequently Britain found herself in the embarrassing position of aiding the Arab assault on Israel, after having so purposefully clung to a policy of "impartiality". The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman were not long in spotting this discrepancy, and censuring the Government for it.⁸ They coupled their censure with strong demands that Britain should embargo arms to the Arabs as long as they were active against Israel, and should withdraw all Britons and subsidies from the Arab

7. E, ibid.

8. NS, L.Ed., 22.5.48.

9. MG, L.Ed., 22.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 24.5.48; NS, L.Ed., 22.5.48; & NS, L.Ed., 29.5.48; cf. earlier The Manchester Guardian hoped that the Arab Legion would not be used to oppose any United Nations solution in Palestine, MG, Art., 24.12.47, Special Correspondent.

Legion forthwith.¹⁰

When, finally, Britain succeeded in having a truce resolution adopted in the Security Council which was accepted by the Arabs and the Jews on May 29, 1948, there was praise for Britain (remarkably from The Manchester Guardian) in the hope that this would be a change towards more constructive participation in the United Nations.¹¹

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- ¹⁰. MG, L.Ed., 22.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 24.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 27.5.48; MG, Ed., 28.5.48; MG, Ed., 29.5.48; NS, L.Ed., 22.5.48; & NS, L.Ed., 29.5.48; also T, L.Ed., 27.5.48.
- ¹¹. T, L.Ed., 31.5.48; MG, Ed., 29.5.48; & ST, L.Ed., 30.5.48.

7. The Attitudes of the Press Towards the Arabs, the Jews, and Mr. Bevin.

The papers in their attitude to the Arabs and Jews followed logical lines as a result of their attitudes to Zionism. The starting point was always Zionism, for the Jewish case was familiar and a stand could always be made for or against it. The Arab case seems to have been less understood, and so it was almost a corollary that a paper's attitude to the Arabs was in inverse proportion with its attitude to Zionism, except where the paper viewed both sides in an equally unfavourable light.

On this basis, broad indications have already been given of how each paper stood with regard to the two opposing factions in Palestine. The position was most clearly seen in the "pro-Zionist" papers, The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman, where criticism of the Arabs was not infrequent. It would be unfair however to conclude that these papers were biased, pure and simple, against the Arabs; for they were not prejudiced in a blind, unthinking way. They favoured partition strongly because it would establish a Jewish state; they therefore took equally strong exception to Arab efforts to frustrate the United Nations' attempts at partition.¹ Their pro-Zionist leanings did not prevent them from criticising the Jews when they felt that they too were in the wrong, but

1. E.g. MG, L.Ed., 22.5.48; & NS, C., 18.10.47.

as with their attitude to Jewish terrorism, such criticism was relatively mild (see, pp. 19-20).

The Times was careful not to show its sentiments in any way that might be construed as pro- or anti-Arab or Jew, but it was this writer's feeling that in supporting the Government's policy, The Times had more sympathy for the Arabs than the Jews. The Sunday Times, in so far as it did not really wish to give up Palestine, saw both the Arabs and the Jews to be inimical towards Britain and desirous of her withdrawal, and consequently this paper could not be kindly disposed to either party.² After the State of Israel had been proclaimed, The Sunday Times began to offer advice to the Arabs on how to destroy it.³

It was The Economist which most openly revealed its sympathies. This paper had not advocated partition because it supported Zionism (see pp.16-17), and it quickly withdrew its support for partition when the United Nations voted in favour of it (see p.29). Throughout the fifteen months surveyed, this paper repeatedly expressed itself in terms which smacked peculiarly of strong anti-Jewish feelings, (see, p.19 , The Economist's answer to Jewish terrorism, echoing General Barker after the terrorist bombing of the

2. ST, Art., 19.10.47, Scrutator.

3. ST, Art., 23.5.48, Scrutator.

King David Hotel in 1946).⁴ The Economist inquired about "A Communist Jewish State?"⁵ seeming to share Mr. Bevin's "idée fixe that the British position in the Middle East was threatened by a Jewish-Communist conspiracy."⁶ The majority of UNSCOP members were "pro-Zionists", and therefore had "extravagantly" favoured the Jews;⁷ the United Nations Partition Sub-Committee were also "pro-Zionists" who commanded too much attention.⁸ The Americans had conducted their policy "as though Palestine were a Zionist ward attached to New York State."⁹ This list of heavily weighted remarks could readily be lengthened without difficulty.¹⁰

Zionists never had much affection for Mr. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, whom they regarded as being their arch-enemy.¹¹ It was natural therefore that The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman should have have no love for Mr. Bevin. All the other papers at one

4. In July, 1946, General Barker, the British commanding officer in Palestine, had forbidden all intercourse between British soldiers and the Jews; this, he said, would punish the Jews "in a way the race dislikes more than any, by striking at their pockets and showing our contempt for them" (quoted in J.J. Zasloff, op.cit., p.38). This order provoked an outcry in Britain, leading the Cabinet to disassociate itself from it, and to reprimand General Barker for it.
5. E, N., 6.3.48.
6. Richard Crossman, A Nation Reborn (London, 1955), p.70.
7. E, N., 22.11.47.
8. E, Art., 6.12.47.
9. E, L.Art., 27.3.48.
10. E, N., 8.2.47; E, N., 3.5.47; E, N., 13.9.47; & E,N., 6.12.47.
11. See Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p.27; Richard Crossman, op.cit., Ch.II, pp.47-80; Ch. Weizmann, Trial and Error (London, 1949), p.541, et passim; J. and D. Kimche, op.cit., passim.

time or another criticized the Government, but they directed their comments at the Cabinet as a whole, and not at Mr. Bevin in particular. Not so with the "pro-Zionists"; time and again throughout the period personal attacks were made on Mr. Bevin, whom they held solely responsible for British policies on Palestine:

"Foreigners must not be judged too harshly if they suspect that the real reason for our refusal to help is Mr. Bevin's determination that, come what may, the Jews shall not have their State in Palestine." 12

"Mr. Bevin maintains an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the intervention of the Arab League in Palestine." 13

The catalogue of such remarks in both papers, growing more and more frequent and derogatory as time went on, and the conspicuous absence of similar opinions in the other papers, speaks for itself.¹⁴

12. MG, L.Ed., 6.11.47.

13. NS, C., 31.1.48.

14. MG, L.Ed., 26.2.47; MG, L.Ed., 6.11.47; MG, L.Ed., 21.2.48; MG, L.Ed., 12.3.48; MG, Ed., 5.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 21.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 22.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 24.5.48; MG, L.Ed., 27.5.48; MG, Ed., 28.5.48; MG, Ed., 29.5.48; NS, C., 8.3.47; NS, C., 3.5.47; NS, Art., 24.5.47; NS, C., 13.9.47; NS, Art., 20.9.47, R.H.S. Crossman; NS, C., 8.11.47; NS, C., 15.11.47; NS, Art., 17.1.48; NS, C., 31.1.48; & NS, C., 3.4.48.

8. Summary and Conclusions.

All the papers appear to have recognised by the beginning of 1947 that Britain could no longer hope to reconcile the conflicting interests in Palestine by herself, and so they urged that Britain should turn to the United Nations. It also appears to have been assumed that a unitary Arab-Jewish state of any form in Palestine was most unlikely, and therefore the real question was whether Palestine should be partitioned or not. Three papers answered in the affirmative; two because they supported the Zionist claims, and the third because it regarded partition as the "least evil" after a British withdrawal. The Sunday Times did not come to favour a British withdrawal until autumn 1947, and, in consequence, before that time it could hardly support partition which implied a total British evacuation; The Times awaited a lead from the Government, though it cautiously suggested partition as well.

Once UNSCOP had delivered a majority report in favour of partition, the issue became "Who is going to enforce it?" Conviction that Britain must quickly withdraw from Palestine had hardened over the summer of 1947 as a result of the terrorist activities; and it became a leading theme in the press that Britain must not commit herself to a prolonged stay in Palestine during the transition period of any United Nations' scheme. The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman however did think that Britain had a duty

to co-operate with the United Nations in company with other member nations to implement its decisions.

If Britain was not to enforce a solution or at least, not by herself, who was to help? Technically the answer was the United Nations, but this body is no more than what its member nations make of it; if no nation ventured its forces to work under the aegis of the United Nations, there would be no United Nations force to implement the decision. America could be expected to give a lead in the United Nations towards the enforcement of some solution, because she had emerged as the leading world power after World War II, with most influence in the United Nations Assembly; in addition to this, America had long been sympathetic to Zionism, she had large financial investments in the Middle East, and presumably did not wish to see an open war in the area which might offer the Russians an excuse to intrude. But all these arguments were not sufficient to make America offer her troops, and as long as she supported partition but avoided the enforcement issue she was under heavy fire from the British press. When the United States withdrew its support from partition, the two "pro-Zionist" papers were outraged, while the others were glad to see that America was at last showing some "common-sense".

The British Government's policy was an embarrassment, if only for the severe criticism it was evoking from the

rest of the world. Within Britain too there was criticism, in particular, though naturally enough, from The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman. The Times and The Sunday Times both revealed their discomfiture at the general censure to which Britain was subjected all over the world, by insisting that Britain's record in Palestine was an honourable one of achievement. The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman sought to pin most of the blame on one man, Mr. Bevin, while all the papers (the latter two included) endeavoured to show that those who accused Britain most (i.e. the Americans) were also in the wrong.

Violence and terror had increased steadily during the last year of the Mandate. These activities on the part of both Arab and Jew could not be condoned, even though they might be understood. The Arabs were uncompromising and the Jews were irresponsible. The Arabs had mismanaged both their case before the United Nations and the war in Palestine, while the Jews, said The Economist, had influence everywhere, particularly in America. When the State of Israel was declared, the papers were so concerned with the fighting in the area that none paused to wish the new State well in its uncertain future. However in the next weeks The Manchester Guardian increased the number of its editorials about the survival of Israel, revealing great concern for it, and the New Statesman quickly recommended that Britain should give de facto recognition to Israel.

We have suggested above that the papers' various attitudes to the Arabs and Jews was a corollary of their regard for Zionism. This proposition, it seems to the writer, can be extended with wider application, for it is pertinent to inquire whether the papers first supported a specific solution for Palestine, and then adjusted their attitude for or against the proponents and antagonists of that solution. This is to ask, did a paper decide, for example, to back partition as the best solution for Palestine, and so of necessity support the Jews who also desired it; and conversely did a paper, having put itself against partition, then support the Arabs in their fight against it? Or alternatively was the whole process reversed - did the papers, having long supported the Arabs or the Jews as the case may be, logically support or oppose partition and any other proposed solution, on the basis of their attachment to either party?

The present writer believes that the second alternative is the more reasonable one. Over the period of twenty-five years of British mandatory rule in Palestine, the papers surely had time to clarify their positions vis-à-vis the Arab, Jewish, and for that matter British, claims to Palestine. This would mean in terms of our first proposition that each paper knew where it stood as regards Zionism plus the Jews and Arabs. This was certainly true by 1947 when our investigation began. The various solutions

for Palestine propounded by all parties throughout the years were innumerable and seldom entertained for long, whereas the fact that the Arabs, Jews and British all had claims on Palestine was constant. This writer, therefore, submits that the papers evaluated each of the proposed solutions individually in order to see how far it would realise the objectives of whichever party the paper sympathised with most. From our own experience this conclusion would appear to have been validated. The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman sympathised with the Zionists and also with partition; The Sunday Times upheld the British stake in Palestine and as a result was reticent in supporting partition and a British withdrawal. The Economist was in favour of a British withdrawal and therefore it was irrelevant what happened in Palestine, though the fact that Britain had financial and other interests in the rest of the Arab world was a real consideration, and consequently the Arabs were to be supported. The Times, finding itself in the dilemma of awaiting guidance which was slow in coming from the Government, allowed that within the narrow confines of Palestine, partition was probably the best solution, but it would have agreed with The Economist that in the broader perspective it was more essential to placate the Arabs than the Jews. This would explain why at the end of May 1948 The Times felt it necessary to commiserate with the Arabs for the way that Israel had come about.¹

1. T, L.Ed., 27.5.48.

CHAPTER II

EGYPT 1952 - 1954: NEGUIB TO

NASSER

1. Background until July 23, 1952

Many years before Great Britain became supreme in Egypt, she had, together with other European powers, exercised special rights there under the "Capitulations" granted by the Sublime Porte.¹ Towards the end of the nineteenth century, after the Khedive Ismail's debts had grown to frightening proportions, a "Dual Control" supervised by Britain and France was set up to manage the country's finances. A year later, in 1879, Ismail dismissed this body and subsequently was deposed by the Ottoman Sultan as a result of pressure from Britain and France. The Khedive Tawfiq was appointed in his stead, and the "Dual Control" was revived; thereby "a virtual protectorate was set up, acting through a French and British controller."² The Dual Control authorities began to tackle the burdensome financial legacy inherited from Ismail, and imposed restrictions which, among other things, struck at the size of the Egyptian army. These restrictions sparked off a revolt in 1881 by Egyptian army officers, led by Ahmed Arabi, who were also motivated by a nascent Egyptian nationalism that

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1. For full description of background and British history in Egypt, see Tom Little, Egypt, (London, 1958), pp.1-175.
 2. The Middle East 1959, Europa Publications Ltd., (London, 1959), p.349.

objected to the predominance of Turkish and Circassian officers in the Egyptian army. In the following year, the British, without French approval, bombarded Alexandria, quashed the revolt, and restored the pliable Tawfiq, who had been deposed by Arabi. A number of pretexts gave Britain reason to prolong her occupation of Egypt, and by careful advances ~~her~~ influence was gradually increased until the real power in Egypt lay in the hands of the British Agent and Consul-General.

In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I, the British control of Egypt was sufficient to allow her unchallenged to enforce martial law and declare Egypt a British protectorate. The military regulations and the submissive part which the Egyptians were forced by Britain to play in the war were resented; at the close of the war a new, articulate nationalist movement, headed by Saad Zaghlul Pasha, was afoot. His party (known as the Wafd) made approaches to the British in 1919, but they were not received sympathetically. Nevertheless the British did grow to recognise in the ensuing years the strength of nationalist feeling in Egypt, to the extent that in 1922 Britain unilaterally declared the Protectorate ended. However, complete Egyptian independence was conditional on four points over which an agreed settlement was to be negotiated. Two of these points were to become bones of contention for the next thirty years; namely, the defence of Egypt, which Britain reserved as her prerogative, and the future status of

the Sudan, which Britain and Egypt then administered as "co-domini". Both these issues are treated in this chapter.

In the years after 1922 a pattern in Egyptian political life emerged. The Palace, representing the King and vested interests in Egypt was counter-balanced by the Egyptian Parliament, where, more often than not, the Wafd Party, representing the common people of Egypt, was in power (not without the aid of "rigged" elections). The balance was held by the British on whom the Palace relied for its protection. Although the British usually supported the King, there were occasions when they felt it necessary to go against the King's will, in what they conceived to be their own best interests. In 1936, after Italy had invaded Ethiopia and Tripolitania, an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was hastily signed since both countries feared the threat of an Italian attack. By this treaty the British occupation of Egypt was formally terminated, but provision was made to allow the British to garrison the Suez Canal Zone for the defence of the Suez Canal, and the status of the Sudan remained unchanged.

World War II brought a pause in Egyptian attempts to rid themselves of the British. By the end of the War, Egyptian nationalist feeling, sorely aggravated by the remaining British soldiers in the Suez Canal Zone, forced the Prime Minister, Sidki Pasha, to reopen discussions with the British about the latter's evacuation of the Suez Canal base, and also about the sovereignty of the Sudan. The

results of these talks were unsatisfactory (see Section 6), and in 1947 Egypt placed her grievances before the United Nations to no avail.

Meantime other forces were at work in Egypt, which culminated with a coup d'etat on July 23, 1952. Among the officers of the Egyptian army there was a revolutionary group of nationalists who strongly resented the presence of British soldiers stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, in a position to re-occupy the whole of Egypt at will. This group dated back to 1942 when the British had demonstrated their controlling grip on Egyptian internal affairs by forcing the Palace to accept a Wafd government. These revolutionaries, known as the "Free Officers", were led by Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1948, during the war against Israel, the Egyptian army had acquitted itself poorly, and its officers put the blame on politicians at home who had issued directives from afar and sent obsolete military equipment to the front. There was also disillusionment over the state of politics in Egypt, where corruption was rife, where elections were controlled and politicians looked after their own interests to the exclusion of the body politic at large, and where the King was forever intruding by dismissing and appointing ministers according to his whims. Finally, there was considerable discontent in Egypt, stemming from gross social inequalities, land problems, and a fast-expanding population which was growing steadily more hungry as the development of the national

economy lagged far behind the increasing population figures.

"Thus the army group that finally seized power was not the basic cause of revolution but only its occasion."³

In analysing the press's attitude to the coup d'etat and the events that followed it, our approach necessarily must differ from that employed in the preceding chapter. The coup and the new regime were properly internal Egyptian affairs; however, they were of interest to Great Britain since they radically altered the context in which the unsettled questions of the Sudan and the defence of Egypt had previously been discussed. Britain was an observer of the developments inside Egypt, and not a participant in them. This allowed the papers to be considerably more detached about these events than, shall we say, about the happenings in Palestine until May, 1948. On the other hand, Britain was an active party to the Sudan and Suez Base problems; as a result, the papers' sense of involvement in these specific questions was far greater. We will describe first the coup and the progress of the new order until Colonel Nasser had established himself as President and Premier of Egypt in November, 1954. Having set the stage, we will proceed to discuss the negotiations over the Sudan and the Suez Base, which involved Britain intimately.

3. John S. Badeau, "A Role in Search of a Hero", The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), p.374.

2. The Coup d'Etat, July 23, 1952 - September 30, 1952

The coup d'état of July 23, engineered by a select group of Free Officers within the Egyptian army, came to the world as a surprise. Indeed, although there were some in the Security Forces who suspected an impending revolt, scarcely anyone else in Egypt had any such premonitions.¹ Proof of its "out-of-the-blue" nature is to be found in the fact that none of the papers had a single mention of Egypt in the week immediately prior to July 23. But the moment the coup took place, there was plenty to say about it.

The papers could see that the reasons for it were many: King Farouk and his clique had made themselves unpopular and compromised themselves by dubious dealings in politics and business;² corruption had been rife in all avenues of life, and it had been positively encouraged by the Wafd who used it to suit their own ends and pockets;³ and the army was still aggrieved at the loss of prestige it had been made to suffer in 1948.⁴ The Sunday Times reasoned that the coup was Communist inspired by virtue of the "jubilant Communist reaction" in Egypt.⁵ If this is understood as confirmation of the disenchantment among the general population with the old regime and their pleasure at

1. Tom Little, op.cit., p.195-6.

2. T, L.Ed., 25.7.52; E, N., 26.7.52; & NS, C., 26.7.52.

3. T, Ed., 23.7.52; MG, Ed., 25.7.52; MG, Ed., 28.7.52; MG, L.Ed., 4.8.52; ST, Art., 27.7.52, Scrutator; & ST, N.I., 3.8.52.

4. T, Ed., 23.7.52; T, L.Ed., 25.7.52; & E, Art., 26.7.52.

5. ST, N.I., 3.8.52.

seeing it go (i.e. the coup was not purely a "Communist-inspired plot", as The Sunday Times would have us believe), all these explanations suggested by the press were perfectly valid, as has been indicated above (p. 56). Perhaps, The Times was not unjust in commenting:

"Under the old regime Egypt was in a state that could only get worse." ⁶

These justifications, stressing the negative character of the former "establishment", amounted to approval of the coup; and later, when the papers had a chance to reflect on the way it came about, they endorsed it as the only feasible means of breaking with the past. ⁷

The leaders of the Free Officers' group had requested that no foreign power should interfere with the coup (with obvious reference to Britain and her soldiers stationed in Suez). The Manchester Guardian seconded this, ⁸ as did The Economist, which remarked:

"but no foreigner ever thinks of intervening in a matter so domestic." ⁹

(In view of Britain's former record in Egypt and the implications the coup had for Britain, the present writer finds this opinion hard to accept). The Times a week later saw virtue in Britain's non-intervention policy. ¹⁰

6. T, Ed., 12.8.52.

7. T, L.Ed., 1.8.52; MG, L.Ed., 21.8.52; ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator; E, Art., 30.8.52; & NS, L.Ed., 16.8.52; then later, referring back to the coup, E, Art., 13.9.52.

8. MG, Ed., 25.7.52.

9. E, N., 26.7.52; & E, Art., 2.8.52.

10. T, Ed., 2.8.52.

The papers all believed General Neguib to be the leader of the revolt and to be in possession of full authority after it took place.¹¹ This was what the planners of the coup wanted the Egyptians and the world to believe, and although Neguib claimed in his autobiography that in fact he was in charge,¹² observers are of the opinion that General Neguib was not called in until the last minute and that Colonel Nasser was the real planner of the plot.¹³ The Times was aware that Neguib had been a late-comer to the group,¹⁴ and by the beginning of September reported that "the most influential of this group is Colonel Abdul-Naaser" (sic).¹⁵

In these early days there was dubiety about what would be the ultimate outcome of the turmoil, particularly on the part of The Manchester Guardian which had reservations about the affair.¹⁶ Even though Aly Maher, a respected politician and former minister, was appointed Prime Minister on the day of the coup, all the papers expected a military dictatorship with General Neguib at its head to take over.

11. T, L.Ed., 1.8.52; T, Ed., 12.8.52; MG, L.Ed., 21.8.52; ST, Art., 27.7.52, Scrutator; E, N, Art., 26.7.52; & NS, C., 2.8.52.

12. Mohammad Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, (London, 1955), p.110 sqq.

13. Tom Little, op.cit., p.226; Robert St.John, The Boss, (London, 1961), p.98; & Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (London, 1960), p.9.

14. T, Ed., 10.8.52; cf. The Sunday Times had at first rightly thought Neguib was a "tool of the high military committee", but when he became Prime Minister on September 7, it changed its mind, ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator.

15. T, Art., 10.9.52.

16. T, Ed., 12.8.52; MG, Ed., 25.7.52; MG, Ed., 28.7.52; & MG, L.Ed., 4.8.52.

"A general who creates a vacuum in the Constitution [by forcing the king to abdicate] is apt to find himself obliged to fill it." 17

This conviction was confirmed when the papers were informed of the aims of the coup, and as they observed the activities of the Free Officer group during August.¹⁸ (Neguib refused to meet Wafd leaders; the group proclaimed a programme for sweeping social reform; and it executed two ringleaders of riots at Kafr-el-Dawar on August 13).

Be this as it may, there was high commendation for Aly Maher's appointment, as a wise step and a sound choice.¹⁹ The papers had a great deal of faith in Aly Maher's ability, and they urged that determined efforts be made to eradicate corruption from Egyptian life.²⁰

The Sunday Times had pertinently predicted that Aly Maher would remain Prime Minister as long as he continued "to show results."²¹ Aly Maher, however, honest as he was, still belonged to the old conservative class of politician, and by the end of August was in conflict with the Officers' group over "targets, timing and methods."²² Matters came to a head over the Free Officers' proposed

17. ST, Art., 27.7.52, Scrutator.

18. T, L.Ed., 1.8.52; MG, Ed., 12.8.52; MG, Ed., 21.8.52; E, Art., 2.8.52; E, N., 16.8.52; NS, C., 9.8.52; NS, L.Ed., 16.8.52; & NS, C., 6.9.52.

19. T, L.Ed., 25.7.52; MG, Ed., 28.7.52; ST, N.I., 10.8.52; E, Art., 26.7.52; & E, N., 2.8.52.

20. T, L.Ed., 25.7.52; MG, Ed., 6.8.52; ST, Art., 27.7.52, Scrutator; & E, N., 26.7.52.

21. ST, N.I., 10.8.52.

22. E, N., 30.8.52.

scheme for land reform, which Aly Maher considered to be too radical; and he resigned on September 7. General Neguib took his place and formed a cabinet consisting mainly of the group of officers who had planned and executed the coup d'état. The papers objected to this development on the grounds that the officers were showing "unwise impatience",²³ and that the new cabinet ministers, whose average age was in the middle-thirties, were totally inexperienced.²⁴ Later reports attested to these officers' sincerity, selflessness and zeal, which, in a way, made up for some of their lack of experience.²⁵ There was comfort in that by all accounts General Neguib was a first-rate man,²⁶ but regret in that he had taken the initial step towards "unrelieved military dictatorship."²⁷

The papers had all greeted favourably the achievements of these last six weeks. King Farouk had been deposed and his ejection was not lamented;²⁸ the campaign against corrupt politicians augured well,²⁹ as did the

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23. T, Ed., 8.9.52; T, Ed., 10.9.52; MG, L.Ed., 9.9.52; E, Art., 13.9.52; & NS, L.Ed., 13.9.52.
24. T, Ed., 8.9.52; MG, L.Ed., 9.9.52; MG, Art., 19.9.52, Cairo Correspondent; & E, Art., 13.9.52; & later NS, C., 18.10.52; cf. earlier, T, L.Ed., 28.8.52.
25. T, Ed., 2.10.52; MG, Art., 18.9.52, Cairo Correspondent; & ST, N.I., 28.9.52.
26. T, Ed., 8.9.52; T, Art., 10.9.52; ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator; ST, N.I., 28.9.52; & E, Art., 13.9.52.
27. T, Ed., 8.9.52; & ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator; cf. later, after expulsion of Colonel Rashad Mehanna, NS, C., 18.10.52.
28. E, Art., 2.8.52; & NS, C., 2.8.52; cf. beforehand, T, L.Ed., 25.7.52.
29. T, L.Ed., 1.8.52; T, Art., 10.9.52; MG, Ed., 6.8.52; & ST, N.I., 14.9.52; then later, T, Ed., 2.10.52; & ST, N.I., 28.9.52.

Officers' wider intentions of reform³⁰ and the manner in which they were going about them.³¹ Most important of all was a marked change for the better in Egypt's attitude towards foreigners and Britain.³²

On August 8, Neguib had issued an order that all political parties should purge themselves of corrupt leaders, but the Wafd had openly defied this order. The papers persisted in describing the evils of the Wafd;³³ and when, at the beginning of October, Neguib embarked on an open trial of strength with the Wafd by touring the Delta, where the Wafd's support was strongest, the press wished him all success.³⁴ Neguib was met by enthusiastic crowds; and the Free Officers, having concluded that they had the backing of popular support, then arrested the leaders whom the Wafd had itself refused to eject. Among those arrested was Mustapha Nahas, the veteran Wafd leader, which gave at least one paper some pleasure.³⁵

The papers now were also in a position to make

30. T, Ed., 10.9.52; MG, L.Ed., 2.9.52; & E, Art., 30.8.52.

31. E, Art., 16.8.52; & E, Art., 30.8.52; cf. later, after expulsion of Colonel Rashad Mehanna, E, N., 25.10.52.

32. T, Ed., 12.8.52; ST, L.N.I., 28.9.52; & NS, L.Ed., 16.8.52.

33. T, L.Ed., 28.8.52; T, Ed., 10.9.52; MG, Art., 19.9.52; ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator; & E, Art., 16.8.52.

34. T, Ed., 2.10.52; E, N., 4.10.52; & NS, C., 4.10.52.

35. E, Art., 11.10.52.

further suggestions about what ought to be done. The Manchester Guardian and The Economist put stability as the prime objective,³⁶ warning that corruption was so prevalent that its elimination would be a long job which could not be hurried.³⁷ The Sunday Times asked for emancipation of the peasants;³⁸ The Economist questioned the wisdom of maintaining a "shaky" economy on "one cash crop alone" (i.e. cotton);³⁹ and the New Statesman requested strong leadership.⁴⁰

The remarkable feature in the press was the unanimous and equally favourable reception which up to this point they, as observers, gave the coup d'état, its engineers and their subsequent actions. There was not one unfavourable verdict, and the only real doubts to be raised were occasioned when Neguib became Prime Minister on September 7, but even these qualms were soon forgotten.⁴¹

36. MG, Ed., 21.8.52; cf. earlier, E, Art., 2.8.52.

37. MG, Art., 23.9.52, Cairo Correspondent; cf. E, Art., 30.8.52 (re action against corruption); then later, MG, complains against army-imposed "short-cuts", MG, Ed., 29.9.52.

38. ST, Art., 14.9.52, Scrutator.

39. E, Art., 16.8.52; & E, Art., 6.9.52.

40. NS, L.Ed., 13.9.52.

41. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.195.

3. Developments until the Proclamation of the Republic of Egypt, October 1, 1952 - June 18, 1953.

On November 13, 1952, the Cabinet had passed a decree giving legal form to the army coup d'état and granting General Neguib sovereign powers for the next six months: for The Manchester Guardian this edict was a "necessity" to take account of an existing state of affairs and to counter the Wafd's challenge that the junta's orders were not legally binding.¹ In December a committee was set up to prepare a constitution, which was another welcome move.² Although while it was being drafted there was speculation about its possible nature,³ there were no protests when it was presented on February 10, 1953, giving General Neguib supreme power for the next three years. Exactly what Neguib's relationships were with the junta was an open question: more papers grew aware of Nasser's strong position within the group (The Economist, by the end of October, 1952, and the New Statesman, by the middle of January, 1953).⁴ Whatever the precise relationship might be, it was not important, as Neguib was the man seen in the forefront, and apparently he was

1. MG, L.Ed., 15.11.52; also, T, Ed., 15.11.52.

2. T, L.Ed., 11.12.52.

3. E, N., 13.12.52, (suggested a monarchy under Prince Abdel Moneim); cf. earlier, ST, N.I., 19.10.52 (a Republic?).

4. E, Art., 25.10.52; & NS, Art., 17.1.53, R.H.S. Crossman; cf. again, NS, C., 30.5.53, and later, all depends on whether Britain makes Nasser a friend or enemy, NS, Art., 8.8.53, Kingsley Martin.

staunchly supported by a band of young men, whose dedication and vigour could not be denied.⁵ True, they were very inexperienced,⁶ but they were strong,⁷ pro-West,⁸ and had engaged the support of some able men.⁹

Egypt's biggest immediate difficulty was reckoned to be economic, as the Wafd had left the Egyptian treasury in a chaotic state and on the verge of bankruptcy.¹⁰ Thanks to the efforts of the Wafd leaders the Alexandrian cotton market was also in a dangerous condition. Consequently there could be no objection in the British press to the restrictions on imports from sterling countries, imposed in December, 1952;¹¹ rather the British Government should do everything it could to help Egypt.¹² In other spheres the junta was characterised as being consciously Kemalist in its approach,¹³ (a label which General Neguib resented and tried to refute in his autobiography).¹⁴ Their financial measures, social and land reforms, and dislike of "ceremonial militarism" were all laudable.¹⁵ In fact, criticism was only ventured

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5. MG, L.Ed., 31.7.53; E, L.Art., 1.8.53; NS, Art., 17.1.53, R.H.S. Crossman; & NS, Art., 8.8.53, Kingsley Martin.
 6. T, Ed., 15.11.52; MG, L.Ed., 31.7.53; NS, Art., 17.1.53, R.H.S. Crossman; & NS, C., 7.2.53; then later, NS, C., 26.9.53.
 7. NS, loc.cit.
 8. NS, Art., 1.8.53, Kingsley Martin.
 9. T, L.Ed., 11.12.52.
 10. E, Art., 6.12.52; E, N., 10.1.53; & NS, C., 7.2.53.
 11. MG, Ed., 5.12.52.
 12. MG, loc.cit., E, N., 10.1.53; & NS, C., 7.2.53.
 13. ST, N.I., 19.10.52; & NS, C., 18.10.52.
 14. M. Neguib, op.cit., p.188-89.
 15. MG, L.Ed., 24.1.53; E, N., 18.7.53; & NS, C., 14.2.53.

in connection with two matters; namely, the restoration to grace of some old-time leaders in December, 1952,¹⁶ and the inept handling of attempts at land reform.¹⁷

On June 20, 1953, The Manchester Guardian wrote:

"The Egyptian Republic has been proclaimed, and we may discreetly welcome its birth, without encouraging hopes of what will follow from the change." 18

This paper was the most guarded of all in its appraisals of the new regime, and we may fairly say that the others heralded the new republic with greater expectations. They had marked the junta's course with interest, and noted that it had more to its credit than otherwise. Further, they all sympathised (including The Manchester Guardian) with its cause, and wished it well in the future.¹⁹

16. E, Art., 6.12.52; & E, N., 13.12.52.

17. NS, C., 7.2.53.

18. MG, Ed., 20.6.53.

19. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.196.

4. "A Summer Cloud", Spring 1954.

Although the Free Officers' junta had a few days after the coup d'etat in 1952 issued an order requiring all political parties to purge themselves of corrupt leaders, and had in January 1953 dissolved all political parties, these moves did not apply to the Moslem Brotherhood. This organisation was treated with special deference for a number of reasons. First, the Brotherhood claimed that it was not a political party as such, and secondly, it had long set itself against the British. Finally, several of the junta were also members of it. The Brotherhood's ideology was a brand of militant pan-Arab Islamism; it appealed not only to the extreme right-wing, but on account of its anti-British endeavours which did not stop short of violence, it brought into its orbit large numbers of Egyptian "patriots" as well. By extending preferential treatment to the Brotherhood, the Free Officers were able to channel the support of its members towards their own movement.

The Moslem Brethren presently began to make extreme demands upon the junta, which challenged its authority and which were clearly not acceptable. They proclaimed that "the Koran is our only constitution" and proposed that the new regime continue for the next ten years under the supervision of the Brotherhood. When this was refused, they later requested the privilege to inspect all draft laws made by the junta, and this too was not granted. Angered, the

Brotherhood now withdrew its support for the regime and embarked on an underground propaganda campaign against it. Their activities came into the open in January 1954 at a student gathering when they conflicted with student members of the "Liberation Rally", which was the new all-embracing political party that had been formed by the junta when the other parties were dissolved. After these student disturbances of January, 1954, the Revolutionary Command Council (or R.C.C., as the junta now called itself), arrested many of the Moslem Brotherhood's leaders, including its Supreme Guide, Hassan el-Hudeiby. All the papers approved of the measures taken against the Brethren,¹ whom they regarded as "fanatics" and "obscurantists", and whose subversive activities were, they felt, incongruous in a new "enlightened" framework.² It was understandable that the British press should greet the weakening of the Moslem Brotherhood with pleasure, as this movement had been one of the greatest obstacles to Anglo-Egyptian friendship for many years, but none of the papers realised the full implications of its suppression, which were soon to reveal themselves.

The Economist continued to praise the measures being taken by Abdel Gelil el-Emary, the new Minister of Finance,³ but it is true to say that by the winter of 1953,

1. T, Ed., 14.1.54; E, L.Art., 23.1.54; & NS, C., 23.1.54.

2. T, loc.cit.; MG, Ed., 15.1.54; ST, N.I., 17.1.54; & E, loc.cit.

3. E, Art., 7.11.53; E, L.Art., 21.11.53; & E, Art., 6.3.54; then later E, Art., 17.7.54.

with the current negotiations on the Suez Canal Zone then proceeding unsuccessfully, a change came over the press and they began to find fault with the regime they had initially received so well. The Manchester Guardian, which had always been most restrained in its praise, now became the régime's leading critic. The R.C.C. "gives no real signs of political creativeness",⁴ even though, as The Economist reported, its power had been consolidated.⁵

In particular, the junta's external affairs gave reason for concern. In 1951 Egypt had begun to interfere with ships passing through the Suez Canal destined for Israel. Again in 1954 steps were taken to blockade Israeli shipping, to the chagrin of the papers.⁶ More especially, umbrage was taken at Major Salah Salem's propagandising in the Sudan to influence the voters in the first Sudanese elections (held November, 1953), attempting to woo their sympathies against Great Britain and towards the unity of the Sudan with Egypt.⁶

"Egypt has been perpetrating acts which it would not for a moment tolerate within its own frontiers, even from fellow-Arabs claiming 'brotherhood'; its behaviour might well be described in some quarters as imperialist." 7

4. MG, L.Ed., 2.2.54; also earlier, MG, Ed., 15.1.54; & cf. ST, L.Art., 23.8.53, J.B. Slade-Baker; & NS, C., 26.9.53.

5. E, L.Art., 21.11.53.

6. E.g. T, Ed., 20.11.53; MG, L.Ed., 2.2.54; & E, N., 30.1.54.

7. T, Ed., 12.3.54; & E, Art., 28.11.53.

Subsequently, Egypt was given full responsibility for the riots and bloodshed which occurred on March 1, 1954, in Khartoum, at what was to have been the formal opening of the first Sudanese parliament.⁸

Internally, the papers observed growing opposition to the regime, and the related tensions which were making themselves felt from disgruntled Wafdists, Communists and Moslem Brethren,⁹ all of whom had suffered at the hand of a régime that was determined to brook no opposition. Doubts began to be expressed about the regime's stability and its capacity to withstand the undercurrents of discontent among the Egyptian public.¹⁰ There were signs too that all was not well within the junta itself. This group had originally been bound by the common desire to overthrow the old regime in Egypt, and time had shown that their mutual aspirations did not amount to much more than this. The group was in reality a heterogeneous one, containing elements of all political persuasions. It was, as it later became apparent, dominated by Colonel Nasser, but for the sake of unity all its members had chosen to forgo their personal aspirations and act behind a cloak of anonymity by setting up General Neguib, an older man and a respected leader, as a figurehead.

8. E, loc.cit.

9. T, Ed., 6.3.54; T, Ed., 16.3.54; & MG, Ed., 2.3.54.

10. MG, Ed., 15.1.54; MG, L.Ed., 2.2.54; ST, L.Art., 23.8.53, J.B. Slade-Baker; ST, Art., 31.1.54, J.B. Slade-Baker; & E, N., 19.12.53; cf. earlier, ST, Art., 17.5.53, Scrutator.

The more extreme members, Abdul Moneim Abdul Raouf (a Moslem Brother) and Khaled Mohieddine (a Communist), could be and were cast off by the junta, but General Neguib could not be handled in such a facile manner. His position was not easy; as the so-called "Leader of the Revolution" he had to bear the brunt of the growing unrest in Egypt at the new order, and he had to take responsibility as Prime Minister for decisions which he did not approve of, but which were passed since he had only an ordinary single vote at Cabinet meetings and no powers of veto. The papers marked the anomalousness of his position which became more visible as the months went by.¹¹

The General was painfully conscious of his tenuous position, and at the beginning of 1954 he demanded that it be regularised.¹² He sought above all the right to veto decisions which he, being more conservative than his younger companions, could not accept. When all else was put aside, the issue amounted to an attempt by the General to replace his nominal leadership with full leadership of the group, and to challenge Colonel Nasser's position within it. Matters came to a head when the R.C.C. accepted General Neguib's "resignation" on February 24, 1954. The papers, all of which still entertained a great affection for General Neguib, were at first taken aback, but on reflection his deposition was not inexplicable, even though they thought it

¹¹. T, Ed., 17.12.53; ST, L.Art., 23.8.53, J.B. Slade-Baker; E, N., 26.9.53; & NS, Art., 1.8.53, Kingsley Martin.

¹². See Tom Little, op.cit., pp.227-233.

unwise.¹³ In Egypt this step led to mutiny in the army plus other ominous rumblings, including protests in the Sudan where Neguib was held in high esteem.

For the first time the junta now realised how much their régime rested on General Neguib's personal popularity, and two days later he was restored as President of the Republic of Egypt and Chairman of the R.C.C., with Colonel Nasser (after some swift "foot-work") as his Prime Minister. The papers viewed this development with more surprise than they had affected when General Neguib resigned, but they generally came to the conclusion that although General Neguib had not secured the powers he desired, his position had been strengthened by public acclaim which the junta could not pretend to ignore, and by the fact that all the elements which had grievance against the régime had moved in his support.¹⁴ The papers were not at all certain that the re-alignments (which General Neguib dismissed as a "summer-cloud") had enhanced the régime or its popularity; they rather thought the opposite.¹⁵

Whatever else there was to deduce from these events, the papers were agreed on three points; first, in spite of protests to the contrary, the R.C.C. suffered from internal disunity;¹⁶ secondly, Colonel Nasser had already emerged

13. T, L.Ed., 26.2.54; ST, N.I., 28.2.54; E, N., 27.2.54; & E, Art., 6.3.54.

14. T, L.Ed., 1.3.54; MG, L.Ed., 1.3.54; ST, N.I., 7.3.54; E, Art., 6.3.54; & E, N., 13.3.54.

15. E, N., 13.3.54.

16. E, Art., 6.3.54; & E, N., 13.3.54.

as the "strong man" of the group;¹⁷ and then, none of these exchanges would lend to the stability of the regime.¹⁸ On February 28, General Neguib spoke to a huge crowd in order to minimise the events of the last few days and to assure them that things would continue unchanged. At that time he also promised to restore a representative Assembly, which The Manchester Guardian, having spoken out against the arbitrary nature of the régime's government, welcomed,¹⁹ and which caused the New Statesman to speculate that now the R.C.C. would devote its energies to its Liberation Rally movement in order that it might win control of the proposed assembly.²⁰ More soberly, The Economist thought that economic and social reform would be retarded.²¹

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17. T, L.Ed., 26.2.54; E, N., 27.2.54; NS, Art., 6.3.54; & NS, C., 13.3.54.
 18. T, L.Ed., 1.3.54; MG, L.Ed., 1.3.54; & E, Art., 6.3.54.
 19. MG, L.Ed., 1.3.54.
 20. NS, C., 13.3.54.
 21. E, Art., 6.3.54.

5. Colonel Nasser in Full Control, March 1 - November 17, 1954.

The "summer cloud" episode of February, 1954 had brought into the open the tensions within the junta and Colonel Nasser's aspirations to become head of it. From this point onwards, Colonel Nasser devoted himself to attaining that position, first by having General Neguib shorn of all his power, and then by eliminating him altogether from the public scene. This process took some nine months, for Colonel Nasser had learnt that Neguib's popularity was such that he could not, without threat to the whole régime, throw the General out of office before he himself had consolidated his own position.

On March 9, 1954, Colonel Nasser resigned from the post of Prime Minister and General Neguib took up this office. On March 25, Colonel Nasser (still a member of the R.C.C.) tabled a resolution, which was accepted, proposing to end the revolution and restore a democratic order, in preparation for the free elections and elected assembly which General Neguib had promised at the end of February. This was a shrewd and calculated move on Colonel Nasser's part: General Neguib who had long opposed his fellow-members of the junta for their propensities towards unconstitutional action, had no alternative but to vote in favour of the resolution. In doing so, with the resolution's origin linked to his own name, his enemies were able to portray him as "the man who broke the revolution."¹

¹. Tom Little, op.cit., p.235.

A few days later there were strikes encouraged by members of the Liberation Rally which by the terms of the resolution was also to be disbanded, and with growing public disparagement, General Neguib resigned as Prime Minister on April 17. Colonel Nasser took up office again, and on the following day he assumed the title of Military Governor of Egypt, retaining General Neguib as President. The resolution to end the revolution was rescinded, and General Neguib was "neutralized", in that he no longer had any say in government.

The papers followed this jockeying for position attentively. The Manchester Guardian in particular deprecated the regime's instability,² and urged a return to parliamentary government as it did not see an essential difference between the alternatives of Neguib or Nasser.³ The Times would have preferred this as well, but "only the notorious corruption of the older parties could justify such a régime" (as was set up by Colonel Nasser on April 17).⁴ The other papers sympathised with General Neguib, who clearly was in an uncomfortable predicament;⁵ and soon had to admit, however reluctantly, that Colonel Nasser had won the contest.⁶ Only The Times had praise for Colonel Nasser,

2. MG, Ed., 12.3.54; MG, Ed., 26.3.54; & MG, Ed., 30.3.54.

3. MG, Ed., 30.3.54.

4. T, L.Ed., 20.4.54.

5. ST, N.I., 20.6.54; E, N., 3.4.54; & NS, C., 3.4.54.

6. ST, N.I., 20.6.54; E, N., 3.4.54; & NS, 24.4.54.

claiming that he had done much to restore unity within the junta;⁷ the others thought the outlook was a sad one,⁸ even if the regime was as firmly entrenched as any "Egypt has seen for many years."⁹ And significantly, almost two years after the coup d'état of July, 1952, there were papers that still exhorted the new government to direct its energies towards social and economic reform, which in spite of good intentions had not yet progressed far.¹⁰

However Colonel Nasser appeared more concerned to suppress any remaining subversive elements in Egypt. First, he moved against the Communists who were steadily rounded up and detained in prison. These measures did not evoke comment in the papers, which may indicate that they did not object; indirect evidence of this was found in a leading editorial in The Times which described the activities of the Communists in Egypt, and implicitly approved the R.C.C.'s steps taken against them. The campaign against the Moslem Brotherhood was conducted with greater vigour than before. In September 1954, an order was passed requiring all preachers in mosques to use texts of sermons prepared by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, since the Moslem Brothers had been using the pulpit as a sounding-base for invective against the junta and its regime. Both The Times and The Manchester Guardian saw wisdom in this edict.¹¹

7. T, loc.cit.

8. E, N., 24.4.54.

9. ST, 27.6.54; & ST, Art., 1.8.54, J.B.Slade-Baker.

10. T, loc.cit.; NS, loc.cit.

11. T, Ed., 14.9.54; & MG, L.Ed., 25.9.54.

On October 26, an attempt was made by a Moslem Brother to assassinate Colonel Nasser and this provided an ideal excuse to imprison thousands of the Brotherhood's members. Trials took place in December, and the papers gave their approval to the severe verdicts which ensued.¹²

During these months there had been other near-totalitarian moves, and by June The Sunday Times reported that the R.C.C. was "universally disliked" for its military dictatorship.¹³ However, this apparently did not deter it from its path, or from measures to rid itself of potential dangers. In May, Al-Misri, the leading opposition newspaper in Cairo, had been suppressed; in September Major Salah Salem was ejected from the junta for faux-pas in discussions with Nuri el-Said of Iraq, and at the beginning of October forty professors were dismissed for having connections with the Communists or the Moslem Brotherhood. The papers, and here again The Manchester Guardian especially, were highly critical of these outright attempts at suppression;¹⁴ they were in fact in full agreement with Mr. Keith Wheelock who later indicted the junta for "their steady elimination of political opposition and their abandonment of principles which they had held

¹². T, Ed., 10.12.54; MG, Ed., 7.12.54; & NS, C., 20.11.54.

¹³. ST, N.I., 20.6.54; cf. earlier, NS, Art., 6.3.54.

¹⁴. T, Ed., 14.5.54; MG, Ed., 10.9.54; MG, Ed., 5.10.54; MG, Ed., 2.11.54; MG, Ed., 15.11.54; & ST, N.I., 20.6.54.

aloft in the battle against the 'old order'."¹⁵

When therefore General Neguib was removed from the Presidency and put under house-arrest on November 14, 1954, on the flimsy pretext of having been in league with the Moslem Brotherhood to remove Colonel Nasser, the papers could register no amazement, as they had fully expected his total eclipse sooner or later.¹⁶ What surprised them more was the fact that Colonel Nasser had the confidence to take such a step in view of the unpopularity he had brought upon his head in acting ruthlessly against so many in the previous months;¹⁷ but his repressive tactics had been successful and there was no one at large who could rally effective opposition to him. As a final indication of The Manchester Guardian's strong aversion to the junta's record, this paper queried whether "Colonel Nasser will combine the principal offices [of state] in his person (as Hitler did after the death of President Hindenburg)"? (*italics mine*).¹⁸ He did so, being proclaimed on November 17, 1954 Premier and President of the Revolutionary Command Council. With this, the long chain of events commencing in July 1952, and encompassing agreements with Great Britain on the Sudan and the Suez Canal Base, came to an end. The Free Officers, led by Colonel Nasser, had made

15. Keith Wheelock, op.cit., p.21.

16. T, Ed., 15.11.54; MG, Ed., 15.11.54; ST, L.N.I., 21.11.54; & E, N., 21.11.54.

17. ST, L.N.I., 21.11.54; E, N., 20.11.54; & NS, C., 20.11.54.

18. MG, loc.cit.; cf. ST, loc.cit.

their coup d'état, putting General Neguib forward as their nominal leader; then, still dominated by Colonel Nasser, they had allowed the latter to remove the General, and install himself as dictator of Egypt.

It has been possible throughout the whole description of the coup d'état and Colonel Nasser's coming to power (i.e. sections 2-5 of this chapter) to talk of the papers as a body, since they, standing aloof from the developments inside Egypt, all reported and commented in much the same tone. If anything, The Times was the new regime's most constant supporter, apparently in the belief that any government is better than no government. The Manchester Guardian was clearly the junta's chief detractor, arguing that a dictatorship with good intentions still remains a dictatorship. The other papers applauded or calumniated with the occasion, although it should be mentioned that The Economist was fairly consistent in its praise of the attempted improvement of Egypt's economy. The trend of opinions throughout the two and a half years was to greet the coup enthusiastically at its inception, and gradually to withdraw support for it as time passed; the "watershed" between diminished esteem and general disfavour came in the winter of 1953, when there was a long gap in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal Base (see sections 7 and 8 of this chapter). The undertone of indifference about what happened to the Egyptians in the last resort, is borne out by the figures of column lengths of news-items

for the period (see p.192). These figures fall off severely during the frequent lulls in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, first on the Sudan, and then on Suez, even although developments of prime importance (to the Egyptians) were going on.¹⁹

19. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.198.

6. Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, February 12, 1953.

As indicated above (see Section 1 of this chapter), the status of the Sudan had remained an outstanding problem in Anglo-Egyptian relations until the coup of July, 1952.¹ The Sudan had become an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899, after a joint force had put down Mahdist control of the country. Egypt was always treated as less than an equal partner in the relationship, and in reality the administration of the Sudan was dominated by British officials. Their superior position was enhanced when in 1924, Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, forced the Egyptians to withdraw their troops from the Sudan as a reprisal for the assassination in Cairo of the British Governor-General of the Sudan. The British carefully trained a young generation of Sudanese to take their part in the country's affairs,² and by 1942 the Graduates' General Congress of the Sudan (a cultural and educational organisation rather than a political body) requested the right of Sudanese self-determination. With World War II at a critical stage Britain was scarcely able to countenance this request, even if she thought that the whole of the Sudan was ready for it, which she manifestly did not. Her main argument was that the

¹. For full description of the background see Peter M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan, (London, 1961).

². Attested to by all the newspapers:-
T, Ed., 13.1.53; MG, L.Ed., 23.10.52; ST, L.Ed., 15.2.53; E, L.Art., 21.2.52; & NS, Art., 8.11.52.

southern Sudanese (numbering about three million or one-third of the population) were much less mature politically than the northern Sudanese, and that they required continued British tutelage. Britain did answer the Graduates' Congress' demands in part, by establishing an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944. Then in 1948, by relaxing her policy with regard to the Southern Sudan, Britain founded a Legislative Assembly representing the whole of the Sudan. The Nationalists in the Sudan were not all of one mind: the Umma party called for complete independence, whilst the Ashiqqa party had as its slogan "Unity of the Nile Valley with Egypt." This is in fact an over-simplification of the position for by 1950 there were more than these two parties, and although they all talked of "self-determination", each had a different concept of what this implied.

Muhammad Ali of Egypt had conquered the Sudan early in the nineteenth century, but his successors were driven out by the Madhi's revolt in the 1880's. It was not until 1899 that Egypt had with the British regained the foothold in the Sudan. Muhammad Ali's dynasty in Egypt continued to covet the sovereignty of the Sudan. In addition to the monarch's personal interest, there were other more solid arguments - ethnic, economic, strategic and cultural - for uniting the Sudan with Egypt, and so the issue persisted.³

3. See Mohammad Awad, "Egypt, Great Britain and the Sudan: An Egyptian View", Middle East Journal, July, 1947.

In negotiations with Britain up to 1952 the Egyptians had insisted on discussing the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone and the status of the Sudan together, while the British argued that they were separate questions and ought to be treated as such. The Egyptians were dogmatic and had refused to discuss the various British proposals made after World War II. On October 8, 1951, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the Condominium Agreements of 1899 and 1936, and proclaimed King Farouk as "King of Egypt and the Sudan." At this point Anglo-Egyptian disagreement was still "wide and fundamental."⁴

Things changed radically after the Free Officers' coup d'état in July, 1952, since they had removed King Farouk (and his hankering after the crown of the Sudan) from Egyptian affairs. This gave reason to hope for a better turn of events,⁵ and by the middle of October this premonition was reinforced when General Neguib was accredited with willingness to discuss the Sudan question on its own.⁶

On October 22, 1952, Mr. Anthony Eden announced Britain's proposals for a Sudanese constitution, and whilst these were well received by the press,⁷ there was more acclaim for General Neguib's declaration on November 2 that

4. J.S.R. Duncan, The Sudan, (London, 1952), p.239.

5. ST, N.I., 10.8.52; & NS, C., 9.8.52.

6. MG, L.Ed., 23.10.52; ST, N.I., 19.10.52; & E, N., 1.11.52.

7. MG, L.Ed., 23.10.52; & ST, N.I., 26.10.52.

Egypt had abandoned her claim to the sole sovereignty of the Sudan and now recognised the principle of its self-determination.⁸ This was seen by the papers to furnish evidence of the General's astuteness and gave grounds for optimism.⁹

The negotiations thus commenced amicably,¹⁰ but by January, 1953 they were foundering once again over the question of the Southern Sudanese. Britain desired that these people should be given protection under the proposed constitution while Egypt was prepared to allow no such privileges. The papers thought that Britain's case was reasonable,¹¹ and so there was vexation when Egypt refused to concede the point,¹² and aggrieved perplexity when members of the Officers' junta encouraged guerrilla attacks on British soldiers in the Canal Zone.¹³ The Times and The Manchester Guardian hoped that good sense would prevail and that Britain would not be forced to an agreement on Egypt's terms,¹⁴ while The Economist and the New Statesman recognised that Egypt was in a stronger bargaining position than Britain, since the former had the backing of the

8. ST, Art., 2.11.52, Scrutator; E, Art., 8.11.52; & NS, Art., 8.11.52; ~~then later~~ referring back, T, L.Ed., 13.2.53; & earlier MG, L.Ed., 31.10.52.

9. T, L.Ed., 11.12.52; ST, Art., 2.11.52, Scrutator; NS, Art., 8.11.52; cf. earlier, MG, L.Ed., 31.10.52.

10. ST, N.I., 14.12.52.

11. T, Ed., 9.1.53; T, Ed., 13.1.53; & E, Art., 10.1.53; and earlier, ST, Art., 2.11.52, Scrutator.

12. MG, Ed., 30.1.53; ST, L.N.I., 4.1.53; & E, Art., 10.1.53.

13. T, Ed., 5.1.53; ST, L.N.I., 4.1.53; & E, Art., 10.1.53.

14. T, Ed., 5.1.53; & MG, L.Ed., 3.1.53.

Sudanese nationalists, and these papers suggested that Britain should settle on the available terms, rather than risk a collapse of negotiations and an impairing of British prestige.¹⁵

The Egyptians at this stage sent a fact-finding mission to the Sudan, during which Salah Salem earned the title of "the dancing Major" commemorating his antics in a "skimpy pair of drawers" in an effort to endear himself to the Southern Sudanese,¹⁶ The papers were startled, as they found his methods somewhat irregular,¹⁷ but when he returned with a report acknowledging the special conditions in the Southern Sudan, they complimented him.¹⁸

The agreement was finally signed on February 12, 1953, prescribing a three-year transitional stage, in which the Condominium administration was to be abolished and at the end of which self-determination was to take place; there was no mention of particular treatment for the Southern Sudanese. Reactions to this agreement were varied. The Sunday Times was most enthusiastic; describing it as a "skilful compromise";¹⁹ The Times, with The Manchester

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15. E, Art., 10.1.53; NS, L.Ed., 17.1.53; NS, Art., 24.1.53, R.H.S. Crossmann; & NS, C., 7.2.53.
16. For an insulted British administrator's account of the incident, see H.C. Jackson, Behind the Modern Sudan, (London, 1955), p.219.
17. MG, L.Ed., 13.1.53; ST, N.I., 11.1.53; & E, N., 19.1.53.
18. T, Ed., 13.1.53; MG, Ed., 19.1.53; & E, N., 17.1.53.
19. ST, L.Ed., 15.2.53.

Guardian were quietly appreciative, calling it "reasonable".²⁰ The Economist, however, felt that Britain was withdrawing too early from the Sudan and that the agreement was "a further ebbing of the tide of British influence in the Middle East",²¹ while the New Statesman scorned Mr. Eden for waiting too long and gaining nothing by the protracted negotiations.²² The New Statesman was alone in this denunciation, as all the other papers believed that the talks had been conducted skilfully.²³

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20. T, L.Ed., 13.2.53; MG, L.Ed., 13.2.53; & MG, L.Ed., 16.2.53.
 21. E, L.Art., 21.2.53.
 22. NS, Art., 21.2.53; cf. earlier questioning of Mr. Eden's policy, NS, C., 7.2.53.
 23. T, L.Ed., 13.2.53; MG, L.Ed., 13.2.53; ST, L.Ed., 15.2.53; & E, L.Art., 21.2.53.

7. Towards an Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone, 1953.

We have explained that one of the motivating factors behind the coup d'état of 1952 was the desire to free Egypt of Great Britain. Although Britain had ceased to take an active part in Egypt's internal affairs after World War II, the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone was inhibiting and could only be interpreted by the nationalists as a limitation on Egypt's independence.¹ As above, Egypt had gone to the United Nations in 1947, both in regard to the Sudan question, and also because she claimed Britain was remaining on her territory against the will of the Egyptian people. These same pressures had led to the abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty at the end of 1951, and to a series of disturbances directed against the British troops, which culminated in rioting and arson in Cairo on January 26, 1952 ("Black Saturday"). Britain's concern to remain in Egypt after World War II was conditioned by the fact that she regarded Russia as a threat not only to Europe but to the Middle East as well.² She was eager therefore to retain a strategic base in the Middle East, and to organise a Middle East defence organisation against any Russian advance. The Suez Canal Base, huge, developed, and stocked with enormous quantities

1. See Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: Some Causes and Implications", The Middle East Journal, IX (1955), pp.239-255, and Tom Little, op.cit., p.239.

2. See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (New York, 1956), p.415.

of arms and equipment, was regarded by Britain as indispensable, but the climate of opinion in Egypt after the Free Officers' coup was such that a reopening of negotiations in the near future was unavoidable.

"In theory, relations should be easier once the Sudan question is settled, but in practice the Egyptian Cabinet is likely to prove far less tractable on the subject of the Canal Zone." 3

This prediction, made by The Sunday Times in December, 1952, proved not to be an empty one.

After the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan was signed in February 1953, the way was clear to begin talks about the Suez Canal Base, and all the papers were anxious for a quick settlement.⁴ But the talks were broken off in the middle of March because Egypt insisted vociferously that Britain must first withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone and then discussions could be conducted about Egypt's part in Middle East defence (Britain regarded these as two inseparable aspects of the same issue). Egypt's point of view was not taken graciously by The Times and The Economist,⁵ both of which strongly advised Egypt to join a Middle East Defence Organisation such as Britain and America

3. ST, N.I., 14.12.52.

4. T, L.Ed., 18.2.53; MG, L.Ed., 16.2.53; ST, L.N.I., 15.2.53; & E, L.Art., 21.2.53.

5. T, Ed., 24.3.53; E, L.Art., 21.2.53; E, N., 21.3.53; E, N., 28.3.53; & E, Art., 18.4.53, Cairo Correspondent.

were contemplating.⁶ Whilst The Economist argued that Britain had an "almost impregnable legal case" for remaining in Egypt,⁷ The Sunday Times was more acutely aware that Egypt was in a stronger bargaining position than Britain, as the moral and political reasons for the latter's remaining in Suez were seen to be weak as compared with those for withdrawal.⁸

The papers recognised that there was considerable weight to Egypt's insistence that the British soldiers had little right to be on her territory. (The 1936 Treaty allowed a British garrison of 10,000 men; in 1952 there were over 80,000 British soldiers in Suez). The papers all came to advocate a British withdrawal, on the proviso that a skeleton staff should remain on the base to maintain it, so that it could be brought back into service in the event of Russian aggression.⁹ The main arguments in favour of a withdrawal were first that the Suez Canal Base only had strategic value if the Egyptians were co-operative (and they patently were not so disposed), and furthermore, the 1936 Treaty would at any rate be open for revision in 1956

⁶, T, L.Ed., 18.2.53; T, Ed., 24.3.53; & E, N., 28.2.53.

⁷. E, N., 16.5.53.

⁸. ST, L.N.I., 15.2.53.

⁹. T, Ed., 12.5.53; MG, L.Ed., 12.5.53; MG, Ed., 13.5.53; ST, L.N.I., 15.2.53; E, N., 28.2.53; NS, Art., 24.1.53, R.H.S. Crossmann; NS, Art., 21.2.53; NS, C., 14.3.53; NS, C., 9.5.53; NS, L.Ed., 16.5.53; & NS, Art., 8.8.53, Kingsley Martin; and later, E, N., 3.10.53.

when Britain could not hope for a renewal of her occupation rights on the present basis. Evacuate yes; but a firm stand had to be taken in safeguarding the upkeep of the base, for without a clear understanding no withdrawal would be acceptable.¹⁰ Amidst all this agreement, we need only remark that the left-wing New Statesman was the strongest advocate of an early evacuation, and the right-wing Sunday Times was most adamant in its case for a "firm stand" on the terms of withdrawal.

A sense of urgency was in the air, for none of the papers believed that delay would work to Britain's advantage.¹¹ Colonel Nasser indicated in April 1953 his willingness to allow British technicians to remain on the base after an evacuation, coming thereby a fair distance to meet the British negotiators, and so there were reasonable grounds to expect a successful conclusion.¹² The talks were resumed at the end of April, but were broken off ten days later by Colonel Nasser when the British refused at the outset to agree in principle to a number of points, including the intention to withdraw completely. The press were genuinely disappointed at this set-back,¹³ but on account of

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10. T, Ed., 5.1.53; T, L.Ed., 16.4.53; T, L.Ed., 8.5.53; T, Ed., 18.5.53; ST, L.N.I., 15.2.53; ST, Art., 29.3.53, Scrutator; ST, Art., 17.5.53, Scrutator; E, L.Art., 21.2.53; E, N., 28.2.53; E, N., 21.3.53; & NS, Art., 1.8.53, Kingsley Martin.
11. T, L.Ed., 16.4.53; MG, L.Ed., 28.4.53; ST, Art., 29.3.53, Scrutator; E, N., 21.3.53; E, N., 28.3.53; & NS, C., 14.3.53.
12. T, L.Ed., 16.4.53; then T, L.Ed., 18.9.53; & E, N., 26.9.53.
13. T, L.Ed., 8.5.53; MG, L.Ed., 12.5.53; ST, N.I., 10.5.53; & E, N., 16.5.53.

Colonel Nasser's militancy they saw little prospect of pursuing the talks at that juncture.¹⁴ This inauspicious beginning set the tone for what was to be almost two years of protracted negotiations, which were forever being resumed, and broken off and revived again, sometimes officially and at other times informally.

Obstacles persisted, and in 1953 the two parties came no nearer to agreement for various reasons (see below, section 7). The papers were impatient for positive results,¹⁵ and before each resumption of the talks, they were hopeful and optimistic, and then bitter, when they collapsed. Correspondingly, every time the talks were called off, a sense of frustration during the subsequent weeks was evident in the press. In accounting for the failures, they blamed the British Government for its uncompromising attitude,¹⁶ just as much as they objected to the bellicose speeches frequently made by Egyptian leaders.¹⁷

It was claimed that most of the trouble lay in the Egyptian suspicions of British good-faith, and also in the fact that the junta were in a difficult position as they dared not appear in the eyes of the Egyptian public to

14. MG, loc.cit.; ST, loc.cit.; & E, loc.cit.

15. MG, L.Ed., 31.7.53; ST, N.I., 19.7.53; & NS, C., 1.8.53; then T, L.Ed., 18.9.53; ST, N.I., 27.9.53; E, N., 26.9.53; & E, N., 3.10.53.

16. T, Ed., 18.5.53; MG, L.Ed., 12.5.53; NS, L.Ed., 28.3.53; NS, L.Ed., 16.5.53; NS, C., 30.5.53; & NS, Art., 1.8.53, Kingsley Martin.

17. T, Ed., 14.7.53; MG, Ed., 12.10.53; ST, Art., 29.3.53, Scrutator; ST, N.I., 25.10.53; & NS, C., 23.5.53.

make concessions to Britain.¹⁸ It was, therefore, up to Britain to conduct the negotiations with the utmost care in order that they should not fall through.¹⁹ In all this The Sunday Times was most harsh on the Egyptians, while the New Statesman was most critical of the Conservative Government. In the middle of the summer a British airman disappeared, and General Festing, who was in charge of the Suez Base, sent a message to the Egyptian sub-governor of Ismailia threatening reprisals. Because of the already delicate situation and Egyptian sensitivity, this threat was greeted with dismay by the papers, who saw in it a psychological blunder.²⁰ It was significant that The Sunday Times alone remained silent, having urged two months previously:

"Let us hope.... that if General Neguib's Government insists on attacking us we shall not shrink from defending ourselves."²¹

At this time, the United States entertained a similar interest to that of Great Britain in a Middle East defence organisation. Although most of the papers regarded the talks over the Suez Canal Base as a purely British affair, The Economist and the New Statesman did feel that America should use her influence to bring about an

18. E, Art., 18.4.53, Cairo Correspondent; ST, Art., 17.5.53, Scrutator; & ST, N.I., 9.8.53.

19. T, L.Ed., 16.4.53; MG, L.Ed., 31.7.53; & E, N., 26.9.53.

20. T, Ed., 14.7.53; MG, Ed., 14.7.53; E, N., 18.7.53; & NS, 18.7.53.

21. ST, Art., 17.5.53, Scrutator.

agreement, perhaps with some persuasive dollars.²² However, because they had little faith in Mr. Dulles, and because America seemed to be siding with Egypt in the dispute, neither believed that in fact she would contribute much to a solution.²³ The Economist even ascribed "an important part of the blame for failure" to the American representatives in Cairo for "exaggerating the unwillingness of the Eisenhower Administration to act in support of the British."²⁴

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22. E, N., 21.3.53; & NS, C., 23.5.53; cf. ST, Art., 17.5.53, Scrutator (need for Anglo-American understanding).
 23. E, L.Art., 21.2.53; NS, C., 9.5.53; & NS, C., 30.5.53.
 24. E, N., 16.5.53.

8. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone, October 19, 1954.

"Because differences between Britain and Egypt over the future of the Canal Zone have been narrowed to a couple of crucial points, it would be unwise to assume that a settlement is to be expected in a matter of weeks." 1

Nothing could have been nearer the truth than this statement in The Economist at the end of 1953. During 1954 the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations assumed the same characteristics as those of 1953, and identical opinions were expressed in each of the papers about them.

By autumn 1953 there were only two issues still outstanding. The first concerned the conditions under which Britain would be entitled to reactivate the Suez Canal Base: the British desired permission to reactivate the base in the event of an attack on Turkey or on Iran, although they would settle for aggression against Turkey by itself; the Egyptians were unwilling to allow either concession. The second concerned the British technicians who would remain to keep the base in good order: should they be permitted to wear British army uniforms, as Britain desired, or not? The Egyptians argued that to permit technicians to remain in British army uniforms was tantamount to maintaining the status quo (i.e. British soldiers on Egyptian soil), and therefore was unacceptable. The first difficulty was seen to be a real point at issue, but the second struck the

1. E. Art., 21.11.53; cf. ST, L.Art., 31.1.54, J.B. Slade-Baker; E, N., 27.2.54; E, Art., 6.3.54; & E, N., 3.4.54.

papers as being almost absurd, for they could scarcely understand how it could not be solved: after all, what did it matter if British civilians, or British soldiers in mufti under a civilian authority, maintained the base?²

Once again the papers continued to advocate a British withdrawal,³ and likewise on carefully specified terms.⁴ Over the winter of 1953/54 the talks remained in abeyance whilst the R.C.C. was pre-occupied with affairs at home. As has been explained above (see Section 4) there had been growing discontent among various sectors of the Egyptian public and also discord within the junta itself; Colonel Nasser could not return to the negotiations until the middle of March, 1954 (after the "summer cloud").

This long hiatus served only to aggravate the papers' impatience, and pleas for a resumption were frequent.⁵ During this period the junta encouraged guerrilla attacks on and killings of British soldiers, in order to divert the public's attention from internal difficulties, and also to emphasise for the sake of the British that the Canal Zone Base's utility was contingent on Egyptian co-operation.⁶ These attacks made the British for their part

². T, L.Ed., 23.1.54; MG, Ed., 9.2.54; ST, N.I., 25.10.53; & E, L.Art., 21.11.53; also later T, Ed., 7.7.54.

³. T, L.Ed., 23.1.54; MG, Ed., 26.3.54; MG, L.Ed., 7.6.54; E, N., 19.12.53; & NS, 5.12.53.

⁴. T, L.Ed., 23.1.54; MG, Ed., 12.3.54; & MG, Ed., 26.3.54.

⁵. T, Ed., 17.12.53; T, L.Ed., 23.1.54; MG, Ed., 26.1.54; MG, Ed., 26.3.54; ST, L.Ed., 7.2.54; ST, L.Ed., 14.3.54; E, N., 19.12.53; NS, L.Ed., 5.12.53; NS, Art., 6.3.54; NS, C., 13.3.54; & NS, C., 3.4.54.

⁶. See Tom Little, op.cit., p.244.

unwilling to proceed with the talks, for they were reluctant to negotiate under such conditions. Consequently, most of the papers condemned the Egyptians for the outrages, putting the blame on them for the halt in the proceedings.⁷ They advised the Egyptians that it would be to their advantage to come to a quick settlement, and therefore they should put an end to the attacks so that discussions might proceed.⁸ The New Statesman, however, believed that the delays were the fault of the British Government which in its eyes was unwilling to settle for what it considered to be the best available terms.⁹ This paper also claimed that the Egyptians were actually willing to sign an agreement there and then,¹⁰ while the other papers did not detect any hopeful signs in the Egyptian attitude until the summer of 1954.

In March, 1954, an abortive attempt was made to recommence the talks at the point where they had been left off. When this attempt failed, the reactions of The Manchester Guardian conflicted with those of The Economist: the former thought that Mr. Eden was wrong to suspend the talks as the guerrilla activities would not cease during a further waiting period,¹² whilst the latter agreed with Mr. Eden

7. T, L.Ed., 23.1.54; T, Ed., 25.3.54; MG, Ed., 26.1.54; MG, Ed., 26.3.54; & ST, L.Art., 31.1.54, J.B.Slade-Baker; then later, MG, L.Ed., 7.6.54.

8. T, Ed., 25.3.54; ST, Art., 31.1.54, J.B.Slade-Baker; & E, N., 27.3.54.

9. NS, Art., 30.1.54, R.H.S. Crossmann; NS, Art., 6.3.54; & NS, L.Ed., 17.7.54; cf. also, MG, L.Ed., 7.6.54.

10. NS, Art., 30.1.54, R.H.S. Crossmann; & NS, Art., 6.3.54.

11. MG, L.Ed., 7.6.54; & ST, N.I., 4.7.54.

12. MG, Ed., 26.3.54.

that there was no point in continuing in the face of such threats.¹³ Entreaties for a resuscitation of the talks became prominent once again by the beginning of the summer.¹⁴

The talks were resumed in July and "Heads of Agreement" were initialled on July 27, 1954. The terms of this agreement (which were yet to be worked out in precise detail) specified that British troops would leave Egypt within twenty months of signing the final agreement, that British civilian contractors would maintain the base for seven years, and that the base could be reactivated during this time in the event of an attack on any of the Arab League countries or on Turkey. All the papers greeted the initialling of these principles with relief, but could not understand why they had not been reached much earlier (as the New Statesman had persistently demanded).¹⁵ The Times and The Sunday Times were pleased with the terms which they did not consider a blow to British prestige.¹⁶ The Manchester Guardian and The Economist were hesitant about it, pointing out that Britain had had to give way to most of Egypt's demands (partly because of Egyptian terrorist activities) and had little assurance that the agreement would work as it still was dependent on Egyptian goodwill.¹⁷

13. E, N., 27.3.54.

14. T, L.Ed., 7.7.54; MG, Ed., 7.6.54; & ST, Ed., 27.6.54.

15. MG, Ed., 28.7.54; & ST, Ed., 1.8.54; cf. T, Ed., 23.7.54.

16. T, L.Ed., 28.7.54; & ST, Art., 1.8.54, J.B.Slade-Baker.

17. MG, L.Ed., 29.7.54; & E, Art., 31.7.54.

The New Statesman greeted the terms in a matter of fact way since it had expected little else.¹⁸ In all fairness, The Times too recognised that the proposed agreement would stand or fall on Egyptian co-operation, and therefore suggested that such steps as could be taken to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations should be taken.¹⁹

The final agreement was eventually signed on October 19, 1954 in Cairo, without substantial change to the "Heads of Agreement" initialled in July. However, by this point The Times and The Manchester Guardian had exchanged their attitudes towards it. The former now claimed that notable concessions had been made to Egyptian nationalist feeling,²⁰ and the latter had swung in favour of the agreement "provided it can be made to work";²¹ both these papers reiterated that the agreement required effort by Egypt.²² The Economist and the New Statesman for their parts were far from enthusiastic about it.²³

Thus after two years of bargaining the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed and the last British troops were to leave Egypt exactly twenty years after the 1936 Treaty. The deadlock had been broken in July by two factors:

18. NS, Art., 31.7.54.

19. T, L.Ed., 31.7.54; also ST, Art., 1.8.54, J.B. Slade-Baker.

20. T, Ed., 20.10.54.

21. MG, L.Ed., 21.10.54.

22. T, loc.cit.; MG, loc.cit.

23. E, N., 23.10.54; & NS, C., 23.10.54.

namely: an American offer of possible financial aid to Egypt on the conclusion of an agreement, which persuaded the Egyptians to speed up negotiations; and the fact that Russia now possessed the hydrogen bomb, a consideration which convinced Britain of the diminished significance of a Middle East military base.²⁴

²⁴. For context units and their intensity ratings of this and the preceeding sections see pp. 199, 200 & 201.

9. Summary and Conclusions.

The coup d'état by the Free Officers in July 1952 had overthrown a régime for which Great Britain had no love. This régime had been headed on the one side by a fickle monarch who commanded no one's respect either in Egypt or abroad - certainly not in Britain, and by politicians on the other side who were infamously corrupt. Both the King and the politicians had in the past consistently obstructed a settlement of outstanding points between Britain and Egypt. All the papers therefore approved of the coup and later of its stated objectives. They were deceived into believing that the junta's leader was General Neguib, who in any event showed considerable ability and political wisdom. When on September 7, 1952 he assumed the post of Prime Minister there were some murmurings about the possible consequences of this act, but these were not loud enough to drown the wider applause which the papers were giving the junta in its early months.

With the elimination of the former order a new prospect of settling the questions of the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone Base presented itself, and all the papers urged the Government to grasp it. They were encouraged when in November 1952 General Neguib, backed by his Cabinet, acknowledged the Sudan's right to self-determination, enabling negotiations to open amicably. The talks lasted some three months, at the end of which an agreement was

signed that hardly satisfied all British requirements, particularly in regard to the Southern Sudanese. The papers were mixed in their reception of it. The Sunday Times was most enthusiastic, perhaps because it had feared that Britain might have suffered a greater loss of prestige, and The Times and The Manchester Guardian greeted it quietly with reticence moderated with relief. The Economist was most obviously disenchanted, giving further evidence of its rightist leanings in foreign affairs, similar to those evinced during the Palestine problem a few years earlier. The New Statesman on the other hand, faithful to its left-wing commitment was as eager in the Sudan question as it had been in the Palestine problem (and as it was to be regarding the Suez Canal Zone), for a reduction in British imperial interests and an early withdrawal. Therefore it only remained for this paper to reprimand the Government for not reaching the agreement sooner.

Two months later, in April 1953, talks began on the Suez Canal Base. These talks were to extend over the next eighteen months, and to be punctuated with frequent deadlocks and stoppages, even though there was no great distance from the very beginning between the respective demands of Great Britain and Egypt. The British negotiators were uncompromising on instruction from Whitehall, and the Egyptians could not give the talks their undivided attention for they were confronting difficulties at home, as various groups within the Egyptian public were becoming disgruntled

with the new régime. The Egyptians pricked the British soldiers in Suez with guerrilla activities to the annoyance of the British Government and also of the press, who gradually lost their patience with the junta. After a year in power the junta had not progressed far with its social and economic reforms (in spite of its good intentions), and seemingly was willing to procrastinate over a Suez Zone agreement while it sniped at British soldiers on the base. The Manchester Guardian took the lead in criticising the junta, but very shortly the other papers were close behind it in their remarks. Their re-appraisal of the junta was vindicated by internal conflicts within the group in the spring of 1954, when Colonel Nasser emerged as its real leader and General Neguib became a pawn in his hands.

The Suez Canal Zone Agreement was eventually brought into sight of conclusion by the initialling of "Heads of Agreement" in July 1954. The Egyptians had by their tactics gained most of their demands, and no matter what The Sunday Times said in support of the Government, the other papers (including The Times) were not convinced that Britain had emerged as well as Egypt. The proposed terms suffered from one major inadequacy; namely, the fact that for the agreement to work it required a large measure of co-operation from a régime which the press no longer had reason to trust, because it had not shown itself to be stable or above using violence against the British to further its own aims.

The R.C.C. continued under Colonel Nasser's direction to oppose all elements which might have offered resistance to it. Some of these elements, such as the Communists and the Moslem Brethren, were equally unpalatable to the British press, and so they could support the measures taken against them, but in the broader aspect the motives behind these suppressions and behind the others which also took place, were at odds with the initial aims of the Free Officers and repugnant to British ideals of freedom and democracy, which were treasured most sincerely by The Manchester Guardian. We do not intend to imply that the other papers did not cherish these ideals too, for they did and they joined The Manchester Guardian in deprecating the junta's contravention of them. However, the other papers necessarily orientated their judgments in terms of what they thought of the British Government and how far the R.C.C. was co-operating with it. It would appear that The Manchester Guardian could be rather more independent and faithful to its liberal ideals, just because the Liberal Party was not a great force in Parliament, and the paper was not bound to support Her Majesty's Government or Opposition.

The Suez Agreement was finally signed in October, 1954, to the press's reiterated observation that it depended entirely on the Egyptians. The crushing of more elements within Egyptian society by the junta had not increased the papers' confidence in it, and when General Neguib was at

long last removed from office, this was greeted as the logical conclusion of all the measures leading up to it. The Manchester Guardian was the first to draw a parallel between Colonel Nasser and Hitler, an analogy which two years later was popularly held to be accurate in Britain (see below, The Suez Crisis, Chapter III).¹

To our mind, the British press missed the real import of the Suez Base Agreement. This agreement, depriving Great Britain of the opportunity of stationing a large body of troops in the Middle East, marked the end of a long period of British domination in the area. Certainly since the close of World War I Britain had been the undisputed master in the Middle East, and she had always been in a position to defend her mastery manfully. After the agreement with Egypt in 1954 this was no longer the case. The press reported and commented on the negotiations leading up to this agreement without any vivid interest. Consequently, the significant features of their presentation of the talks and the concomitant events in Egypt are, in a sense, negative ones. Column lengths of news are not very great, nor were the papers replete with opinions and judgments.² Such as were offered, were spread thinly throughout the two and a half years of the crisis, and

1. See Albert Hourani, "The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956", St. Antony's Papers, (IV), Middle Eastern Affairs, N.I, (London, 1958), p.11.

2. For column lengths and recording units' totals see pp.192 and 194.

amounted in total to less than those for both the other crises which extended over shorter time periods. Within this somewhat flat record of the events, there was little diversification of opinion, and scarcely any burst of strong feeling from the five papers examined. All received the coup d'état favourably at first, and lost faith in it at approximately the same time. With the exception of The Sunday Times, none were very happy about the two agreements signed with Egypt during the period. All came to criticise the regime for more or less the same reasons, and such differences as existed were in emphasis rather than of kind.

CHAPTER III

THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956 - 1957

1. Background until October 29, 1956.

From the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone at the end of 1954 until the summer of 1956, attempts had been made by Great Britain to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations in an effort to put them on a more solid basis of friendship than before, but these attempts had failed.¹ Egypt, unwilling to commit herself wholeheartedly to the West (and to Britain in particular), had preferred to conduct a policy of neutrality, which in effect amounted to playing the Western powers off against the Soviet bloc, both to Egypt's own material advantage. By this policy she gained, in addition to aid coming from the West, extensive financial credit and many technical advisors from Russia, plus large supplies of arms from Czechoslovakia.

Egypt had begun to extend her influence within the Arab world, making vigorous efforts to assume complete leadership of it, by sending agents in all directions who preached against the "Western imperialists", and for the unity of the Arab cause.² At home Egypt was still beset with economic problems which had not yet been fundamentally changed by any of the new régime's efforts since 1952. The

¹. Little, op.cit., p.280. "By the spring of 1956 the British and Egyptian Government thoroughly disliked each other."

². Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960), p.421.

limited results of the junta's attempt at land reform had demonstrated that Egypt's basic problem of a population out-stepping her economic growth could only be arrested by some vast and imaginative programme which would radically alter and enlarge her economy. Such a scheme suggested itself in the proposal to build a high dam at Aswan on the Upper Nile in order to enlarge greatly the area of irrigated land in Egypt. The proposed dam would be very costly, far beyond the capacity of Egypt to finance it herself. She therefore turned to the outside world for assistance and by February, 1956 secured from the United States, Great Britain and the World Bank in concert, promises of a loan to the value of 270 million dollars towards the building of the dam. This loan was conditional on guarantees that Egypt would give the project priority in her budgetary planning (for at the time the larger part of her income was devoted to military expenditure), that contracts would be awarded on a competitive basis, and that aid would not be accepted from the Soviet bloc (for Russia had also offered to assist Egypt in building the dam).

No satisfactory assurances on these points were forthcoming from Egypt, whilst the United States and Britain became increasingly more aware of Russian influence in Egypt and all the more dubious about the abilities of the Egyptians to carry out the project successfully. On July 19, 1956 Mr. John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary

of State, withdrew the United States' offer of assistance for these reasons, and a day later Great Britain followed suit. President Nasser turned next to the Russians who informed him on July 22 that they too were unwilling to finance the dam.

These reverses could not have come at a worse time for President Nasser. He was then conferring with President Tito and Mr. Nehru at Brioni, and was ill-disposed to have his prestige so affronted. Likewise in Egypt itself all depended on the success of the Aswan dam project for without it the country and his own position would be in jeopardy. In retaliation President Nasser announced on July 26 that the Suez Canal would be nationalised by Egypt, and that the income from the Canal tolls would be devoted to financing the Aswan dam. This declaration was greeted with jubilation in Egypt, but with extreme apprehension in the West, especially by the British who were the biggest users of the Canal and who regarded the Canal as one of the most important links in their economy, and by the French who had built the Suez Canal in the first instance and who had long wielded the controlling influence in its administration. It must be noted at this point that France as well entertained no love for Egypt as the latter was encouraging the rebels in Algeria and inciting them against France.

There was a storm of protest against Egypt, not so

much over the legality of the act of nationalisation but because of the wider implications of that act.³ The Constantinople Convention of 1888 had stipulated that the canal was an international waterway and that it was to remain open to ships of all flags "for all time." Britain and France considered it imperative that guarantees should be obtained ensuring that these conditions would be fulfilled by Egypt. They immediately sought to bring economic pressures to bear on Egypt and also contemplated the use of force against her.⁴ America was quick to join in the economic restrictions placed on Egypt, but at the same time Mr. Dulles made it clear that the United States would be unwilling to use armed force against Egypt. The Americans were anxious to keep the Suez Canal issue free from any suggestion of a parallel in the Panama Canal.⁵

On August 16 a conference of the original signatories of the 1888 Constantinople Convention plus the principal users of the Suez Canal was convened in Lancaster House (London) by Great Britain, France and the United States. Twenty-two nations were represented including Russia, but excluding Egypt, who declined the invitation to attend. At this conference a plan put forward by Mr. Dulles

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3. For an account of reactions to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and subsequent events until October 29, 1956, see S.J. Weinberger, "The Suez Canal Issue 1956", Middle Eastern Affairs VIII (1957), pp.46-57. Also note, both The Economist and the New Statesman conceded that Egypt was entitled to territorial control of the Suez Canal; E, L.Art., 18.5.57; & NS, Art., 27.10.56, G.D.H.Cole.
 4. Sir Anthony Eden, op.cit., p.427. "From the start we had to prepare to back up our remonstrances with military action."
 5. Sir Anthony Eden, op.cit., p.435.

was, after slight modification, accepted by seventeen of the nations present, though notably opposed by Russia. Mr. Menzies of Australia was authorised by the conference to go to President Nasser and lay before him the plan which anticipated an international board that "would be established by treaty and associated with the United Nations" to administer the canal. Mr. Menzies met President Nasser on September 3, and although talks proceeded for six days, it was obvious that Egypt would not accept any such proposals which she regarded as infringements on her sovereignty. Ten days later Britain and France convened another conference to create a "Suez Canal Users' Association" (SCUA) in order to collect Canal tolls, for they had refused to pay canal dues to Egypt as was now required. A week previous Sir Anthony Eden had insisted that, if Egypt refused admittance to the canal to ships of the SCUA nations, force to gain entry would be resorted to, but at the conference on September 19 Mr. Dulles again stressed that the United States would not consent to the use of force. For the time being the Users' Association could not be effective, as it had no means of compelling Egypt to comply with its wishes. A second attempt to accord it some power to enforce its demands was again frustrated on October 2, when Mr. Dulles reiterated that America would not be party to an attack on Egypt. Recognising that a minatory SCUA without American support could have no coercive power, Britain and France then placed their complaints before the United Nations

Security Council on October 12, where little was achieved due to a Russian veto, other than securing the acceptance of six principles, namely,

"free and open transit [in the Canal],
respect for Egypt's sovereignty,
'insulation of the Canal from the
politics of any one country', tolls and
charges to be fixed by agreement between
Egypt and the users, the allotment of a
fair proportion of dues for development,
and the settlement of disputes by arbitration."⁶

At this stage Egypt was required to take the initiative by indicating how she intended to comply with these principles. Her attempts to meet SCUA were quashed by Britain and France on October 23, when these two countries stated that Egypt's new proposals were too vague to warrant discussion.

During these months tensions had been steadily building up in the State of Israel.⁷ These tensions sprung from the fact that the Arab nations were continuing their campaign against Israel with increased vehemence. Their activities were not confined to words; they had increased their stocks of arms and weapons by acquisitions from the Soviet bloc, the Egyptians had stepped up the "fedayeen" raids, and on October 24, 1956 a Unified Military Command had been established between Egypt, Syria and Jordan with the express purpose of destroying Israel. The Israelis saw themselves isolated in the world, lacking any allies, except for France who was supplying quantities of arms (which in no

6. Tom Little, op.cit., p.298.

7. See Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years, (London, 1958), pp.129-164.

way matched those provided by the Soviets to the Arabs). The nationalisation of the Suez Canal scarcely affected her, as Egypt had prevented the passage through the Canal of ships bound for Israel since 1951. After the establishment of the Unified Military Command, Israel felt that time was clearly in the Arabs' favour, for the longer the status quo was maintained, the stronger and more united the Arabs would become and the more she would suffer at the hands of the "fedayeen". She therefore decided to take matters into her own hands. Israel attacked Egypt on October 29, 1956, having mobilised her forces in secret four days earlier.

In the days before the Israeli attack on Egypt the press was more concerned with events in Hungary, where the first disturbances were reported on October 23, rather than with events in the Middle East. Within the Middle East itself attentions were turned away from the Suez Canal to the elections in Jordan which were held on October 21 and which resulted in a strongly anti-Western house (regarded by The Manchester Guardian as a victory for President Nasser).⁸ There was little to say about the Suez Canal, as matters were then in abeyance while SCUA awaited Egypt's next proposals. The Manchester Guardian and The Economist did approve the Government's decision to go to the United Nations and also in the event for having at least had the "six principles" adopted.⁹ The Economist revealed something

⁸. MG, Ed., 25.10.56.

⁹. MG, Ed., 24.10.56; & L, Art., 20.10.56.

of the regard in which President Nasser was popularly held throughout the country by describing him as a "menace";¹⁰ The Manchester Guardian could not understand why 20,000 soldiers on reserve had just been recalled,¹¹ and the New Statesman put forward the hypothesis that:

"the real object of the French and British governments is to overthrow Nasser as a dangerous potential ally of the Soviet Union against the Western bloc." 12

Most interesting was the New Statesman's concern for Israel which was not matched in any of the other papers. The New Statesman published a leading editorial on October 20 and then a long article the following week warning of the possibility of an imminent conflagration on Israel's borders, and stigmatising the Government for "the bankruptcy of our policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict", especially as Israel was "the one Middle Eastern State to share our values."¹³ It abused President Nasser for barring Israeli ships from the Suez Canal and called upon the Government to use strong action against this expedient.¹⁴ The Manchester Guardian agreed with this paper that the user nations of the Canal should endeavour to reach a settlement with Egypt which assured all countries freedom of passage, although it stressed that time would not be in the user nations' favour.¹⁵

10. E, loc.cit.

11. MG, loc.cit.

12. NS, Art., 27.10.56, G.D.H.Cole.

13. NS, L.Ed., 20.10.56.

14. NS, loc.cit.; & NS, Art., 27.10.56, G.D.H.Cole.

15. MG, Ed., 24.10.56; & NS, loc.cit. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section see p. 208.

2. The Israeli Attack on Egypt, October 29, 1956 until the Anglo-French Cease-Fire, November 7, 1956.

The Israeli attack on Egypt, of October 29, 1956, and the events of the next few days, which occurred so rapidly, had an electrifying effect upon the press. Until this date all attentions were turned to Hungary where the situation was still grave and horrifying to the West; after this date it was almost as if nothing else was happening or mattered in the world. The Middle East had become the centre of the globe. A glance at the figures of the column lengths of news-items devoted by the newspapers to the crisis will give some impression of the coverage that was devoted to the affair.¹ Whole pages, front pages included, carried nothing but news from Egypt, Sinai and Gaza, plus reports of the lengthy debates and statements being made at home and abroad about the crisis. The two daily newspapers published leading editorials with regard to the "Suez Affair" virtually every day during the first weeks, and sometimes even two editorials a day.² The weekly papers gave similar coverage

1. For column lengths of news-items of this and subsequent sections, see p.206.

2. The number of editorials published in The Times and The Manchester Guardian were:-

	<u>Oct/Nov.</u> <u>1956</u>	<u>Dec.</u>	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1957</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Total</u>
T.	18	6	5	6	7	8	5	55
MG.	28	11	8	6	9	8	2	72

This represented a great increase of interest over the attention given to the last five months of the Palestine problem which was the most highly reported period of the other crises examined. The number of editorials in these papers then was:

	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1948</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May.</u>	<u>Total</u>
T.	-	4	5	3	5	17
MG.	4	2	5	8	11	30

to the crisis; so likewise, in the first weeks after its outbreak, there was scarcely an article in them which did not refer to it in some way. The number of recording units for this crisis which covered (for our purpose) just seven months was greater than the number of recording units for both the Palestine question (sixteen months) and the Egyptian revolution (thirty months).³ The positions of the various papers quickly emerged, and once established they were held to steadfastly throughout the period.

All the papers agreed that Israel had been subject to strong provocation from the Arab nations.⁴ There had been persistent threats to annihilate her; she had suffered from the "fedayeen", and Egypt's policy towards Israel in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba had been intolerable. But while the papers could single out Colonel Nasser as the "villain of the plot", for his policies towards Israel and his attitude towards the West,⁵ and although they could sympathise with Israel's predicament, all of them, albeit reluctantly, as in the case of the New Statesman,⁶ felt that Israel was wrong for attacking Egypt

3. The total number of recording units for the Suez Crisis was 691;
 cf. " " " " " " Palestine problem was 456;
 " " " " " " Egyptian Revolution was 473.

4. T, L.Ed., 30.10.56; T, L.Ed., 31.10.56; MG, L.Ed., 30.10.56;
 ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

5. T, L.Ed., 31.10.56; ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; & ST, Art., 4.11.56;
 Lt.Gen.Sir J.B. Glubb; (note Lt.Gen.Glubb had been dismissed
 by King Hussein of Jordan in May, 1956). E, Art., 3.11.56,
Cairo Correspondent (cabled 31.10.56); & E, N., 10.11.56.

6. NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; cf. later, NS, Art., 24.11.56, Critic,
 (doubted "whether Israel's resort to realpolitik was
 clever").

on October 29.⁷ The Sunday Times alone tried to reason that although Israel may legally have been the aggressor, she could not in all fairness be held guilty when her action was viewed against the wider context of Arab hostility for the past eight years.⁸

On October 30 Britain and France sent an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt demanding an end to the hostilities under threat of joint Anglo-French intervention. Britain and France on that day also vetoed two separate resolutions in the United Nations Security Council demanding an immediate cease-fire between Israel and Egypt. On the next day, after Egypt had rejected the Anglo-French ultimatum, the joint expedition against Egypt was launched. Fighting ensued, and on November 3 Britain and France rejected another United Nations' call for a cease-fire. They had given as the reason for their original intervention the desire to separate the combatants and to safeguard the Suez Canal; now they argued that they could not relinquish their position until the United Nations set up a police force which would be accepted by both Israel and Egypt; until then they would act on behalf of the United Nations.

7. T, L.Ed., 30.10.56; (though this paper thought Israel would gain by the attack, since it was "unthinkable [that] the nations of the world will now allow her to be wiped off the map"; T, L.Ed., 12.11.56). MG, L.Ed., 30.10.56; MG, Ed., 3.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; then much later E, Art., 16.3.57 (commented on the damage done to Israel's economy as a result of the attack), and a month later, this paper described Israel as an "inevitable loser", as it could never get more than verbal sympathy as long as the Arabs possessed oil, pipelines, the Suez Canal and strategic bases; therefore Israel should not renew her war against Egypt; E, Art., 6.4.57.

8. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; also later, NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57.

Two days later Port Said fell to Anglo-French paratroopers. On the next day Russia warned Britain and France that it would be prepared to use force if the aggression did not cease, and on the following day, November 7, Britain and France announced a cease-fire. By this date, the Israelis had taken Gaza and the whole of the Sinai Peninsula; blockships had been sunk by Egypt in the Suez Canal; the Anglo-French forces had totally destroyed the Egyptian air-force, ammunition dumps and bases; and they had also advanced thirty miles south of Port Said along the Suez Canal.

The reactions in the press to the Anglo-French ultimatum and subsequent action were emphatic and outspoken. All the papers, with the sole exception of the Conservative Sunday Times, were horrified by the Government's policy and cried out against it in no uncertain terms, for on every score they found it indefensible. The Times on the day of the Anglo-French intervention agreed with the Government's stated objectives, but clearly saw that the action was fraught with risks, and so requested that it should be strictly temporary and aimed only at stability in the area.⁹ A day later this paper shifted its opinion and joined in deprecating the action. The Sunday Times consistently supported the Government throughout. The other four papers' remonstrances against the Government were manifold.

9. T, L.Ed., 31.10.56; cf. T, L.Ed., 30.10.56, (when The Times tried to justify the Anglo-French ultimatum in spite of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950).

The Anglo-French ultimatum was in their opinion totally illegal, and directly contravened the United Nations' Charter.¹⁰ The intervention on October 31 was described as a deliberate act of aggression, and was, said the New Statesmen, something which had been planned since Nasser had taken over the Suez Canal; the Government was indulging in opportunism, using the Israeli attack as a pretext, and its real intentions were far from keeping the peace.¹¹ The Sunday Times disagreed, for it stood firmly behind the Prime Minister, arguing that "battles are infectious", and that if Britain and France had not entered the foray, then war would have spread throughout the area.¹²

The other papers continued that the Anglo-French action was morally reprehensible, just because it was based on "brief expediency", which was testified to in what was seen to be a contradiction between the declared objectives of the intervention and the manner in which it was conducted (i.e. the intervention was supposed to have separated the combatants, but in fact all Anglo-French efforts were directed against Egypt).¹³ Not so The Sunday Times, which was convinced of Sir Anthony Eden's sincerity.¹⁴

10. MG, L.Ed., 31.10.56; NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

11. MG, L.Ed., 31.10.56; MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 2.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 3.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; E, L.Art., 3.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 10.11.56.

12. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; ST, Art., 4.11.56, Lt.Gen. Sir J.B. Glubb; & ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56.

13. T, L.Ed., 7.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 31.10.56.; MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; E, L.Art., 3.11.56; E, Art., 3.11.56, Cairo Correspondent; NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 10.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

14. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; & ST, Art., 4.11.56, Lt.Gen. Sir J.B. Glubb.

Furthermore, the intervention and Anglo-French conduct, both in the area and at the United Nations, was held to be politically stupid in every way. First and foremost, the British and French Governments were believed to have dealt a "body blow" at the United Nations; by exercising their power of veto in the Security Council and then by refusing to comply with its resolutions demanding a cease-fire, they had done incalculable damage to that body and their own prestige within it.¹⁵ Again The Sunday Times was of a different mind: Britain and France were doing the United Nations' task for them (since experience had shown that this gathering was incapable of moving at speed); and if, as it seemed likely, a United Nations "Police force" would be created as a result of the intervention, to take over from the Anglo-French expedition, then a great service would have been rendered.¹⁶

But this was not all, according to the other four papers. The Americans had not been consulted about or advised of the intended Anglo-French advance, and thereby the Atlantic Alliance had been severely shaken; likewise the Commonwealth had not been informed, which was to be

15. MG, L.Ed., 2.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 7.11.56; E, L.Art., 3.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

16. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; (entitled "Doing UNO's Business"); & ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56, Sir N. Angell (Nobel Peace Prize Winner 1933).

deplored, since they, together with almost every nation in the world now joined in censuring Great Britain and France.¹⁷ Next, the 1950 Tripartite Declaration assuring any Arab state or Israel of defence against violation of Israel's boundaries, had been cast out of hand when Britain and France attacked Egypt (the aggrieved), instead of restraining Israel (the aggressor).¹⁸ By their joint action they had played into the hands of the Arabs and what was termed the latter's "myth" that Israel was founded by Western imperialism.¹⁹ Moreover the action had supplied perfect material for Russian propaganda.²⁰ The Sunday Times would have challenged this last argument most violently, for she believed that the large supplies of Soviet arms found in Sinai by the Israelis constituted ample proof that Colonel Nasser was in reality a "quisling" to the Russians, and therefore the joint venture had eradicated the threat of Soviet-inspired aggression in the area.²¹ Britain and France should go ahead and eliminate Nasser as well, concluded The Sunday Times.²²

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17. T, L.Ed., 1.11.56; T, L.Ed., 2.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56; E, L.Art., 3.11.56; E, N., 3.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; E, N., 10.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56.
18. T, L.Ed., 2.11.56; & E, L.Art., 3.11.56.
19. T, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56; & E, L.Art., 3.11.56.
20. E, L.Art., 3.11.56.
21. ST, L.N.I., 11.11.56; ST, N.I., 11.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56; & ST, L.Art., 11.11.56, Sir N. Angell.
22. ST, Art., 4.11.56, Lt.Gen.Sir J.B. Glubb; cf. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56.

The other papers were still not finished, for there were even more considerations to marshal against the Anglo-French action. As a result of it the Suez Canal had been blocked and no one could foresee the extent of the damage this would do to world trade and more specifically, to Britain's own economy.²³ A large part of Britain's oil had previously been transported through the Canal, which was now closed, and then to make matters worse the overland pipelines to the Mediterranean belonging to the Iraq Petroleum Company had been sabotaged in Syria on November 3.²⁴ And rather than stop conflict in the Middle East, Britain and France had added to the tensions, for it was reported on November 5 that Iraqi troops were moving through Jordan and Syria towards Israel's borders,²⁵ though this report appears to have been false.²⁶ This multiplicity of reasons which the four papers amassed against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was capped by the final charge that, as an outcome of all this, British and French prestige had sunk disastrously throughout the world at large, in particular among the Arabs and within the United Nations.²⁷

Most of these arguments were to be adduced time and time again, especially throughout the next two months,

23. E, Art., 10.11.56; & E, N., 10.11.56.

24. MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56; & E, Art., 10.11.56.

25. MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; & MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56.

26. See Sir Anthony Eden, op.cit., p.543: "not a mouse moved in Arab lands."

27. T, L.Ed., 7.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 31.10.56; MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 2.11.56; E, N., 10.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

generally with unrestrained vigour. The New Statesman was least guarded in its language, but it was The Manchester Guardian which was most strident in its condemnation of the Government. The last named paper twice devoted special editorials (the first in large type spread across two columns of the centre page, and the second similarly presented spread across four columns), demanding that the Government resign forthwith.²⁸ In order to demonstrate the repeated nature of these arguments and for the sake of continuity we have extracted all references to them for the remainder of the period and have presented them in the footnote.²⁹ It will

28. MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; & MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56.

29. A. Opinions against Anglo-French action:-

- i. That the intervention was morally wrong and politically misguided:-
T, L.Ed., 12.11.56; T, L.Ed., 27.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; E, N., 5.1.57; E, L.Art., 30.3.57; NS, Art., 24.11.56; NS, Art., 8.12.56; NS, C., 8.12.56; NS, Art., 22.12.56, Barbara Castle; & NS, L.Ed., 24.11.56.
- ii. That British influence and prestige has suffered:-
T, L.Ed., 12.11.56; T, L.Ed., 28.11.56; T, L.Ed., 1.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; MG, Ed., 17.11.56; MG, Ed., 15.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 24.4.57; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; E, L.Art., 9.3.57; NS, Art., 17.11.56; NS, C., 1.12.56; NS, Art., 8.12.56, J.P.W. Mallalieu; & NS, Art., 15.12.56.
- iii. That British economy has suffered (especially through loss of oil supplies):-
T, L.Ed., 13.11.56; T, L.Ed., 28.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 13.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 5.12.56; NS, Art., 17.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 8.12.56.
- iv. That Anglo-American relations have suffered:-
T, L.Ed., 28.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 28.11.56; E, L.Art., 17.11.56; & E, Art., 8.12.56.
- v. That Commonwealth and other world friendships have suffered:
T, L.Ed., 28.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; & E, Art., 9.2.57.

be observed that the burden of the criticism was mainly two-fold; that the whole act of intervention was politically and morally wrong, and that as a direct result of it British prestige and influence had suffered a grave set-back. It is also worthy of note that the frequency of the criticisms fell off sharply after the British and French troops had withdrawn from Port Said on December 22, 1956. After that date, new issues had arisen, and with them other butts for criticism had presented themselves.

Amidst this burst of high feelings all the parties in any way concerned with the crisis were criticised negatively by one or other of the papers. To this writer the most surprising fact which emerged was how little France was castigated for her part in the intervention, both in the days immediately following it, and then during

Footnote 29. (contd.)

- vi. That the intervention aided anti-Western elements throughout the world:-
MG, Ed., 9.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; E, L.Art., 30.3.57; NS, Art., 24.11.56, Critic; & NS, L.Ed., 1.12.56.
- vii. That Britain and France have not helped the United Nations:-
MG, Ed., 9.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 6.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 1.12.56.
- B. **Opinions** in favour of Anglo-French action:
 - viii. That the intervention was a "moral duty" to protect the free world from further (Russian inspired aggression) in the Middle East:-
ST, L.Art., 18.11.56, Lord Strang; & ST, L.Ed., 30.12.56.
 - ix. That Britain and France have helped the United Nations:-
ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56; & ST, L.Ed., 30.12.56.
 - x. That Britain was not obliged to consult America before intervention:-
ST, L.Ed., 9.12.56.

Observe that ST was alone in siding with Government's action.

the rest of the period.³⁰ The Times and The Sunday Times put part of the blame for the crisis on America's policy during the preceding months, when she refused to allow SCUA any semblance of coercive power to deal with President Nasser.³¹ The Times was alarmed when it became obvious that the United States did not support the Anglo-French action.³² (The Sunday Times necessarily had to argue that in spite of the official United States' reaction, the "man in the street" in America wholeheartedly supported the intervention).³³ Also in those first few days when The Times was undecided about the merits of the Anglo-French advance, it remarked that there were no grounds to expect "that any effective action would have come from the Security Council."³⁴ There was criticism of Russia from The Times for Mr. Bulganin's threatening notes to Britain, France and Israel,³⁵ and naturally enough from The Sunday Times for encouraging Egypt's hostile attitude towards Israel.³⁶

30. Negative criticism of France:- E, Art., 3.11.56, Paris Correspondent; & NS, C., 10.11.56; then later, T, L.Ed., 15.11.56; & MG, Ed., 12.11.56. On the other hand The Sunday Times, which presumably supported the French part in the intervention, published later an article advocating closer ties with France under the heading of "A Franco-British Commonwealth?"; ST, L.Art., 3.3.57, Alexandre Metaxas (a Frenchman).

31. T, L.Ed., 2.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56.

32. T, L.Ed., 31.10.56.

33. ST, L.Art., 4.11.56, H.V. Hodson (Editor of The Sunday Times); & ST, N.I., 4.11.56.

34. T, L.Ed., 1.11.56.

35. T, L.Ed., 6.11.56.

36. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56.

This last paper in full accord with its sympathy for Israel and its support for the intervention published a complimentary profile of Mr. Ben Gurion, and an enthusiastic article about "Young Israel - a New Race of Fighters and Workers".³⁷

It even applauded, somewhat prematurely, Mr. Ben Gurion's decision to withdraw Israeli forces from Sinai!³⁸

The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman on the other hand were disturbed by Mr. Ben Gurion's "truculent speech" of November 7, when he expressed Israel's determination to hold on to its victories.³⁹ The only words of praise for the Government from the "opposition" newspapers were ventured by The Manchester Guardian and The Economist for the skill of the Anglo-French forces in attaining their military objectives with minimum loss of human life.⁴⁰ However, two weeks later The Economist was to withdraw its praise on the grounds that the joint command had revealed logistic deficiencies in the British forces.⁴¹

The Manchester Guardian's second reaction to the Israeli invasion of Egypt (i.e. after maligning it) was to call for restraint first from Israel,⁴² and then from Egypt.⁴³

37. ST, "Portrait Gallery", 4.11.56; & ST, Art., 4.11.56, Sonia Orwell.

38. ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56.

39. MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; & NS, Art., 10.11.56.

40. MG, L.Ed., 6.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56; & E, Art., 10.11.56; then later, T, Ed., 24.12.56 (complimented British troops for their conduct throughout the occupation of Egypt).

41. E, Art., 24.11.56.

42. MG, L.Ed., 30.10.56.

43. MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56.

After the Anglo-French entry this paper had appeared to move towards The Sunday Times' point of view in one specific respect; namely, that it was perhaps wiser for Britain and France to capture the Suez Canal completely rather than leave the job half-done.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, when a cease-fire was announced at midnight on November 6, this paper joined The Times in welcoming it;⁴⁵ both papers explained that it was a result of the Russian threat which had been made earlier that day, to use force to put an end to the violence.⁴⁶

In these days immediately following the outbreak of the crisis there were various opinions about who should now go about settling it. The Times and The Sunday Times spoke vaguely of the need for a lead to come from the Western nations,⁴⁷ while The Manchester Guardian and The Economist were quite sure that this was a task for the United Nations.⁴⁸ However, The Manchester Guardian went

44. MG, L.Ed., 13.11.56; cf. ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56.

45. T, L.Ed., 7.11.56; & MG, L.Ed., 7.11.56; cf. later, E, N., 15.12.56 (if cease-fire had been delayed the inevitable result would have been a devaluation of the pound).

46. T, L.Ed., 9.11.56; & MG, loc.cit.; cf. later, T.L.Ed., 14.11.56; T, L.Ed., 14.3.57; & E, N., 17.11.56.

47. T, L.Ed., 9.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56. (But some ten days later The Times wrote, "Almost certainly it will have to be done through the United Nations.....").

48. E, Art., 10.11.56; then later also, T, L.Ed., 21.11.56, (see footnote 45 above).

further and designated the United States as the power which had now to assume the leadership of the Western world, for, it felt, Great Britain and France had by their action disqualified themselves.⁴⁹

Mr. Lester Pearson, of Canada, had suggested to the United Nations General Assembly on November 2 that a United Nations force should be established to take over from Britain and France in the conflict area. The papers were anything but reticent in their support for this suggestion,⁵⁰ although both The Manchester Guardian and The Economist understood that such a force would solve nothing fundamental: a real solution was a job for Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, not General Burns, who had been nominated as commander of the proposed force.⁵¹ In the interests of peace The Times and The Manchester Guardian were both eager that Israel should withdraw behind her frontiers,⁵² and also that the Anglo-French troops should hand over to the United Nations' force once it arrived.⁵³

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49. MG, L.Ed., 1.11.56; MG, Ed., 2.11.56; & MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56.
50. T, L.Ed., 3.11.56; T, L.Ed., 9.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 3.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; MG, Ed., 9.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 4.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; & E, N., 10.11.56.
51. MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; & E, Art., 10.11.56.
52. T, L.Ed., 9.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 31.10.56; MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56; & MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56.
53. T, L.Ed., 3.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.209.

3. Developments until the Anglo-French Withdrawal was Completed, December 22, 1956.

During the six weeks after the cease-fire of November 6 until the Anglo-French troops had completely withdrawn from Egypt on December 22, the press was mainly concerned with four topics. These were (a) the task confronting the United Nations to solve the crisis; then within the United Nations, the roles of (b) Great Britain, (c) the United States, and (d) Egypt.

(a) United Nations.

The papers considered that the United Nations had now been brought face to face yet again with two problems which Britain and France had endeavoured to handle in their own fashion. These problems were (i) the international security of the Suez Canal and (ii) permanent peace between Israel and the Arab States (in the first instance between Israel and Egypt).¹ As we have seen, four of the papers had not approved of the Anglo-French intrusion, which had only complicated these questions, because first, the Suez Canal was now blocked by approximately fifty ships, and secondly the intervention had allowed the Israelis to overrun large areas beyond their own territory. Regrettable as this may have been, The Economist earnestly pleaded that the United Nations should not allow a return to the status quo ante.²

¹. T, L.Ed., 4.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 12.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56.

². E, Art., 17.11.56; E, Art., 24.11.56; & E, N., 15.12.56; and later NS, C., 26.1.57.

The Egyptians had indicated that they would co-operate in the clearance of the Canal only after the Anglo-French and Israeli troops left Egypt. Therefore it was of prime importance that the United Nations dispatched its emergency force (UNEF) to take over from Britain and France within Egypt. This was stressed by the papers, even after the first UNEF contingents began to arrive in Egypt on November 21.³ The next objective was that the Canal should be cleared without delay; the papers emphasised this during December after the arrival of UNEF contingents.⁴ Although many points had not yet been clarified regarding functions and location of UNEF,⁵ three of the papers were able to praise the United Nations for its prompt organisation of the force at the beginning of December.⁶ Both The Economist and the New Statesman agreed that its headquarters should be in Gaza.⁷ However when towards the end of the month it was seen that the United Nations had not progressed

³, MG, L.Ed., 12.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 25.11.56; E, N., 10.11.56; E, Art., 24.11.56; E, N., 1.12.56; NS, C., 17.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 24.11.56.

⁴. T, L.Ed., 28.11.56; T, Ed., 18.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 18.12.56; MG, Ed., 20.12.56; ST, L.Ed., 25.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56; E, N., 22.12.56; NS, C., 8.12.56; & NS, C., 15.12.56.

⁵. T, L.Ed., 16.11.56; & E, N., 8.12.56; also later, T, L.Ed., 1.2.57; T, L.Ed., 22.2.57 (still complained that functions of UNEF were far from clear).

⁶. MG, L.Ed., 3.12.56; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; E, N., 8.12.56; & NS, C., 15.12.56.

⁷. E, Art., 24.11.56; & NS, loc.cit.

with the clearing of the Canal, The Times and the New Statesman protested against this dilatoriness.⁸ Recognising that the major cause of delay was President Nasser who was doing his best to impede progress (see below (d)), three of the papers demanded that the United Nations should adopt a "strong line" with him and make it clear that they were unwilling to act merely on his sufferance.⁹

(b) Great Britain

Early in November charges were being made in various quarters that Great Britain and France had acted in complicity with Israel when the latter invaded Egypt and when the two former followed close on her heels.¹⁰ Reports that French airmen and airplanes had taken part in the Israeli attack seemed to prove the truth of these charges and three of the papers believed them. The Manchester Guardian was especially convinced that there had been collusion, and the New Statesman felt strongly enough about the matter to demand an enquiry.¹¹ Significantly The Times (which seemingly felt constrained to minimise its criticism of the Government) and The Sunday Times did not mention the

8. T, Ed., 18.12.56; T, Ed., 21.12.56; NS, C., 15.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 22.12.56; cf. earlier, ST, L.Ed., 25.11.56.

9. T, L.Ed., 30.11.56; T, Ed., 21.12.56; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; E, N., 22.12.56; NS, C., 15.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 22.12.56.

10. For an exposé of the collusion charges see M. and S. Bromberger, Secrets of Suez (London, 1957).

11. MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 20.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 21.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 23.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 6.12.56; E, N., 10.11.56; NS, Art., 17.11.56; & NS, Art., 24.11.56.

collusion charges at all. The Manchester Guardian was relieved when the Prime Minister officially denied the charges on December 20.¹²

The Manchester Guardian was acutely aware of Britain's duty to co-operate with the United Nations, and it repeatedly reminded her readers of this duty.¹³ All the papers, with the understandable exception of The Sunday Times, believed that Britain's first task was to withdraw from Egypt, as required by United Nations' resolutions of November 7 and 24, in order that UNEF could take up its duties.¹⁴ Britain's promise to withdraw, given on December 3, was greeted with pleasure.¹⁵ Similarly The Manchester Guardian and The Economist were anxious that Britain should co-operate with regard to the clearance of the Canal and they welcomed British efforts to comply with requests made by General Wheeler, who had been appointed by the United Nations to undertake the clearance.¹⁶

Another urgent task for Britain was seen to be the

12. MG, L.Ed., 21.12.56.

13. MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 10.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 13.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56; & MG, L.Ed., 22.11.56.

14. T, L.Ed., 21.11.56; T, L.Ed., 30.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; MG, Ed., 9.11.56; MG, Ed., 20.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 26.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 28.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 30.11.56; E, L.Art., 24.11.56; E, L.Art., 1.12.56; NS, C., 10.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 24.11.56; NS, L.Ed., 1.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 8.12.56.

15. MG, L.Ed., 4.12.56; & E, L.Art., 8.12.56.

16. MG, Ed., 20.12.56; & E, N., 22.12.56.

restoration of good Anglo-American relations.¹⁷ This task had become all the more imperative in November and December when America not only refused to support Britain and France in the United Nations, but took a lead in condemning them for their action. This task was coupled with that of repairing damage done to Commonwealth relations,¹⁸ although this was not felt to be so pressing a duty, perhaps because Mr. Nehru was the only Commonwealth leader who had strongly spoken out against Britain in the United Nations, while the others had been moderate in their remarks. The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times took offence at Mr. Nehru's condemnation of Britain because they objected to his "double standard" - of blindness towards the Russian activities in Hungary and open-eyed vilification of the Anglo-French presence in Egypt.¹⁹

(c) United States

"To denounce and neither to offer nor to accept any constructive suggestion was the core of American policy." 20

We must admit that Sir Anthony Eden, whom we have

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17. T, L.Ed., 21.11.56; MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 4.12.56; ST, L.Ed., 25.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 9.12.56; E, L.Art., 17.11.56; E, L.Art., 1.12.56; & E, Art., 8.12.56. (Note, nine days prior to The Times' reference (loc.cit) that paper had believed it was too early to apologise to America before it was ascertained precisely what damage had been done). cf. earlier, T, L.Ed., 2.11.56; T, L.Ed., 9.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56.
18. T, loc.cit.; MG, Special Editorial, 14.11.56; & MG, L.Ed., 4.12.56; also later, E, Art., 9.2.57.
19. MG, Ed., 19.11.56; MG, Ed., 20.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 9.12.56.
20. Sir Anthony Eden, op.cit., p.529.

here quoted, was too closely implicated in the Suez crisis for a strictly objective evaluation of American policy during this period, but it is important to remember that the press also involved itself deeply in the crisis and it too did not make scholarly judgments.

The United States were "in total opposition to Anglo-French policy, partly from principle and partly from anger."²¹ On October 31 they had suspended plans to send oil to Britain and France if supplies via the Canal to these countries were arrested, and after this date they had clung to the position that the Egyptians had suffered from aggression at the hands of Britain, France and Israel, all of whom were in the wrong and were to be condemned. America insisted on November 28 that until the Anglo-French forces had quitted Port Said, she would not release oil supplies for Europe. Feeling was so strong in the House of Commons against America that on November 27 a large number of Conservative members tabled a resolution deploring the American attitude towards Britain since the outbreak of the crisis.

In the light of all this the press was, in the writer's opinion, remarkably restrained in its criticism of America. In keeping with Conservative feeling throughout the country, The Sunday Times was prominent in its strictures against American policy,²² but its sole partner in this was

²¹. Tom Little, op.cit., p.304.

²². ST, N.I., 18.11.56; ST, L.N.I., 25.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 25.11.56; then later, ST, L.Art., 30.12.56, Lord Chandos.

The Times, which in all probability was taking its lead from the House of Commons as well.²³ The other papers, interestingly enough, were encouraged by the manner in which the Americans were approaching the crisis.²⁴ This approval referred to the earlier part of November when these papers were at one with America in condemning the British Government for its policy. But as the month wore on and America did not take any positive lead towards a real solution all the papers began to demand that she should use her influence in prevailing upon President Nasser to make him comply more readily with the United Nations, and secondly that she should do something towards alleviating Europe's sorely pressed oil supplies.²⁵ It was noteworthy that The Economist and the New Statesman felt that America too was under an obligation to help mend the Atlantic Alliance;²⁶ but the triumphant headlines in The Sunday Times of "America Thinks Again" and "Mr. Dulles Eager to Mend Alliance" (supposedly at the NATO talks to be held in Paris at the end of December) evoked no surprise.²⁷

23. T, L.Ed., 27.11.56. (This paper however did not approve of the attempt to deplore openly American policy, T, L.Ed., 28.11.56).

24. MG, L.Ed., 19.11.56; E, Art., 10.11.56; & NS, L.Ed., 1.12.56.

25. T, L.Ed., 27.11.56; T, L.Ed., 4.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 28.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56; E, L.Art., 17.11.56; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; & NS, C., 17.11.56.

26. E, Art., 8.12.56; & NS, C., 17.11.56.

27. ST, L.Art., 2.12.56, Henry Brandon; & ST, N.I., 9.12.56.

(d) Egypt.

At the close of 1954 we had seen that The Manchester Guardian alone was firmly pitted against Colonel Nasser, although all the papers were none too happy with the conduct of his régime. By the close of 1956 all the papers were speaking out strongly against both President Nasser and his régime. Their faith in him had been lost once and for all after he had nationalised the Canal in July of that year, and as a result of his obduracy in the subsequent negotiations.

In November and December the papers were unanimous in their vituperation of Egypt. At the beginning of November Egypt had been loath to admit UNEF to her shores; on November 9 she agreed "provisionally" to allow them entry, and three days later Mr. Hammarskjöld admitted that according to UNEF's mandate they would have to leave if Egypt withdrew her approval of them. On the next day their entry was postponed and the first contingents did not enter Egypt until November 21, after ten days of waiting in Italy. In all this the Egyptians were severely reproved by the press.²⁸ On November 23 the Egyptian Government began to expel Jews, Britons and Frenchmen from Egypt under pitiable conditions. Again, she was reviled by the press for her action.²⁹

²⁸. T, L.Ed., 21.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 8.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 10.11.56; ST, L.Ed., 11.11.56; & E, L.Art., 1.12.56.

²⁹. MG, L.Ed., 4.12.56; ST, N.I., 25.11.56; ST, Ed., 16.12.56; & NS, C., 1.12.56; then later, T, L.Ed., 27.12.56; & NS, Art., 26.1.57, Critic, (complained about Nasser's measures against the Jews) also re. refugees: The Times and The Manchester Guardian requested that the British Government should do its utmost to look after those arriving penniless in the British Isles; T, L.Ed., 6.1.57; T, Ed., 8.1.57; & MG, L.Ed., 4.12.56; also later, MG, L.Ed., 1.4.57.

Then throughout December Egypt steadfastly refused to permit the United Nations to begin work on clearing the Suez Canal until there was a complete evacuation of hostile foreign troops from her soil. She also stipulated that Britain and France should not participate in the clearance, even though these countries were well equipped to do the job and had the best available salvage vessels; the Egyptians marked their antagonism to the British and French salvage fleet by commencing guerrilla activities against it. Nothing other than these obstructive tactics could have been more calculated to provoke the ire of the British press.³⁰

³⁰. T, Ed., 18.12.56; T, Ed., 21.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 22.11.56; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; E, N., 22.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 22.12.56.

4. Developments until the Israeli Withdrawal,
Completed March 8, 1957.

In the two months after the Anglo-French evacuation from Egypt, the emphases in the concern of the press for the crisis shifted somewhat. First, the papers grew to regard the issue as a test-case for the United Nations (i.e. whether it would be successful in forcing Egypt and Israel to comply with it or not). If small nations such as these could defy the United Nations with impunity, then the latter's prestige was in the balance and its utility was open to question. The papers continued to urge the United States to employ its influence, first to uphold the authority of the United Nations by making Egypt co-operate, and then to offer conditions under which Israel could withdraw in confidence from her positions in Sinai and Gaza. Since Britain and France had already departed, they passed from the immediate horizon, and the question of an Israeli withdrawal moved to the forefront, presenting special problems of its own.

(a) United Nations

In November, 1956, the United Nations had censured Britain, France and Israel for their aggression against Egypt; it had established UNEF, and passed resolutions calling on the three nations mentioned above to withdraw. It had then for all practical purposes handed the crisis over to its Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, whose

responsibility it became to see that the Assembly's wishes were carried out. As has been mentioned already Egypt had obstructed the entry of UNEF into her territory, making it conditional on her own tolerance of its presence, and had put obstacles in the way of the Canal clearance, which she had tied to an Anglo-French withdrawal and non-participation in the salvage operations. Although the Israelis had partially withdrawn into Sinai, they refused to comply wholly with the United Nations' order to retire since as it then stood, it offered them no guarantees of security after they withdrew. In December, 1956 and January of the next year Mr. Hammarskjold did his utmost to cajole Britain, France, Egypt and Israel into compliance with the United Nations' resolutions. On February 11 he reported to the United Nations that he had been "frustrated" in his efforts by Egyptian and Israeli defiance. Both The Times and The Manchester Guardian had given him great credit up to this date,¹ but they came to realise that the fault for the deadlock which had been reached was not his.

"The United Nations is itself to blame if its resolutions are so drawn or its authority so enforced that such attitudes can be struck." 2

The papers accused the Assembly of being "emotional

¹ T, L.Ed., 16.11.56; T, L.Ed., 21.11.56; T, L.Ed., 18.1.57; T, L.Ed., 26.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 14.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 1.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 17.1.57; & MG, Ed., 30.1.57.

² T, Ed., 4.1.57; cf. later NS, L.Ed., 30.3.57; ("It is useless to pretend that Mr. Hammarskjold can solve these problems through private negotiations; that all we have to do is to wait in patience").

and timid", as well as "dilatory" and "weak" in its efforts.³ To this criticism was added the accusation that the Assembly had rightly condemned Israel for her repudiation of the Charter, but had wrongly neglected to censure Egypt for her transgression of the Assembly's statutes.⁴ The papers considered it all-important for the United Nations to adopt a firm stand and to break the deadlock,⁵ since they all would have agreed with the innuendo implicit in "Where Uno [United Nations] Stands or Falls" (a headline in The Economist, mid-January, 1957).⁶ The Sunday Times believed that the deadlock was an inevitable expression of the Assembly's limitations, and the chances of breaking it were "only fair",⁷ whilst The Economist thought that the United Nations possessed some bargaining power because Egypt would have to depend on UNEF, since she was in no condition to face another conflict with Israel, and secondly, the United Nations could place sanctions on Israel which the latter could not withstand.⁸

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3. T, loc.cit., T, L.Ed., 18.1.57; MG, Ed., 30.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 4.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; MG, Ed., 4.3.57; ST, L.Ed., 30.12.56; ST, N.I., 3.2.57; ST, L.Ed., 3.2.57; ST, L.Ed., 3.3.57; & E, Art., 12.1.57; then later E, N., 16.3.57; & NS, C., 4.5.57, ("U.N. Emergency Farce").
4. MG, Ed., 2.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57; ST, Ed., 10.2.57; E, N., 5.1.57; E, Art., 23.2.57; & NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57.
5. T, L.Ed., 18.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; E, Art., 25.1.57; & NS, Ed., 9.2.57.
6. E, N., 19.1.57; cf. later, E, Art., 13.4.57; (article questioning value and function of United Nations) and NS, L.Ed., 25.5.57, ("If the United Nations now denies her [Israel] justice, it will write her own death warrant.").
7. ST, L.Ed., 3.3.57.
8. E, Art., 23.2.57.

And then there were other things to do. Egypt should be condemned as well as Israel.⁹ UNEF should move into Sinai in the train of the slowly retreating Israelis and it should establish its headquarters in Gaza, which it should also administer. (At the time there was an Israeli military governor in Gaza, and the Egyptians were angrily demanding the area back, as their rightful territory). UNEF should further deploy itself along either side of the Egypt-Israel Armistice lines, and along the Aqaba coast.¹⁰ The papers recognised that there was a deeper issue at stake than just the short-term requirement of peace between Egypt and Israel; namely, that peace had to be made on a lasting scale between Israel and all the Arab states, which were nominally at war with Israel. Both The Times and the New Statesman had observed that this was still in the distant future,¹¹ and bearing this in mind, The Manchester Guardian and The Economist suggested that UNEF "should be given some more permanent embodiment",¹² until an Arab-Israeli settlement was reached.¹³

9. MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57; & NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57.

10. T, Ed., 4.1.57; T, L.Ed., 26.1.57; T, L.Ed., 19.2.57; MG, Ed., 21.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 26.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; E, Art., 12.1.57; & E, N., 16.2.57. Note, NS, Art., 12.1.57, R.H.S.Crossman, (believed Gaza should become part of Israel).

11. T, L.Ed., 1.3.57; & NS, Art., 12.1.57, R.H.S.Crossman.

12. MG, Ed., 14.1.57.

13. MG, L.Ed., 1.1.57; MG, Ed., 14.1.57; MG, 8.3.57; & E, N., 5.1.57; cf. later, MG, Ed., 4.3.57, & E, N., 6.4.57.

(b) Egypt

The Anglo-French intervention had reduced Egypt's military power to naught, but by gaining for her the sympathy of the world it had enhanced her bargaining power which she was now exploiting to the full. The papers met President Nasser's tactics with contempt, but even they could not have expected their disgust and harsh rebuke to make him alter his course.

The papers berated Colonel Nasser for obstructing in the clearance of the Suez Canal, particularly when in February he prevented work from proceeding on the tug Edgar Bonnet, with a demand that Israel must retire completely behind the Armistice lines before work could proceed.¹⁴ Previously in December, 1956, Colonel Nasser had determined that work would not begin at all except on his conditions (p.137 above), and the papers protested against this "blackmail", which they claimed was "intolerable" and "legally inadmissible",¹⁵ since, said The Manchester Guardian, there was no justification for linking two separate issues (i.e. the clearance of the Canal and the evacuation of hostile troops).¹⁶ Although the papers took

14. T, Ed., 18.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57; ST, N.I., 3.2.57; & E, N., 2.3.57; and earlier, E, Art., 17.11.56.

15. MG, Ed., 9.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 7.2.57; E, N., 29.12.56; E, Art., 12.1.57; E, L.Art., 2.3.57; & NS.C., 12.1.57; Note later when Egypt linked Israeli passage through the Suez Canal with a demand that the Arab refugee problem be settled first, The Economist wrote that these issues were not really unrelated because they both derived from the Palestine War, 1948; E, N., 6.4.57; but The Manchester Guardian still denied Egypt's right to link issues and exploit them; MG, L.Ed., 1.4.57.

16. MG, L.Ed., 7.2.57.

Egypt's abrogation on January 1, 1957 of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone as a matter of course,¹⁷ there were other actions which they could not receive so complacently. They deplored the abduction and assassination of a British officer in December, 1956,¹⁸ and likewise they noted with regret that even after the final Israeli withdrawal from Gaza:

"Egypt has not renounced belligerent rights against Israel, or accepted any qualification of possession or sovereign rights in the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, or anywhere else." 19

These were equal examples "of the fatally negative and destructive character of the nationalist movement in Egypt."²⁰

In view of the foregoing all the papers would surely have agreed with The Manchester Guardian when it wrote that it was time to tell President Nasser that he could not treat the United Nations like:

"an executive organ of the Egyptian Government, or an organisation on which he can impose his conditions without being bound by its rules." 21

The papers appreciated that the success of the United Nations depended entirely on Colonel Nasser's unqualified support,²² and they supplemented their demands by summoning

17. MG, Ed., 2.1.57; & E, N., 5.1.57.

18. T, L.Ed., 27.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 28.12.56; & E, N., 29.12.56.

19. E, L.Art., 9.3.57; also earlier ST, Ed., 10.2.57; E, Art., 17.11.56; & NS, C., 26.1.57.

20. T, L.Ed., 27.12.56.

21. MG, L.Ed., 28.12.56.

22. MG, L.Ed., 10.11.56; MG, L.Ed., 28.12.56; & E, N., 29.12.56.

"all great but uncommitted states" (The Economist),²³ those nations "seeking stability in the area", (The Times),²⁴ and the Afro-Asian nations, led by Mr. Nehru (The Manchester Guardian),²⁵ to exert what pressure they could on the Egyptian premier, in addition to that which had already been requested from the United States.

(c) Israel.

Israel too was defying the United Nations, but there was the greatest sympathy among the press for her stand and Mr. Ben Gurion's negotiations of it. Israel had attacked Egypt in the first instance because of alarm at Egypt's growing military strength, because of the latter's militancy, and the provocation given by her on Israel's borders. To this must be added the fact that Egypt as well as debarring Israeli ships from the Suez Canal, had blockaded the entry of Israeli vessels into the Gulf of Aqaba, thereby preventing Israel's access to her southern port at Eilat. Now Israel was demanding that before she withdrew from her positions in the Sinai peninsula she should receive assurances from the United Nations that in future no violence on her frontiers would be tolerated, and that the Gulf of Aqaba should be open to ships of all nations. Later, in February, 1957 Israel indicated that such assurances from the United States alone would suffice to enable her to withdraw. The

23. E, L.Art., 8,12.56; & E, Art., 26.1.57.

24. T, Ed., 26.1.57.

25. MG, L.Ed., 3.12.56; MG, L.Ed., 27.12.56; & MG, L.Ed., 17.1.57.

papers recognised that Mr. Ben Gurion was not as intractable in his demands as President Nasser,²⁶ and in any event they considered his requests fully justified and reasonable.²⁷

America was quite adamant that Israel should retire behind the 1949 armistice line, and had told Israel on January 3, 1957, that she could not expect to gain political advantages from her aggression. The papers believed that Israel should withdraw from her positions,²⁸ provided the guarantees she was demanding were granted.²⁹ As well as guarantees of security on her borders (which would be UNEF's task), the papers agreed that the Gulf of Aqaba should be open to all,³⁰ and further that Israel should have full unrestricted access to the Suez Canal since Egypt's blockade was a contravention of the 1888 Convention and of United Nations' resolutions since 1951.³¹

26. MG, Ed., 9.1.57; & MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57.

27. T, Ed., 19.2.57; T, L.Ed., 22.2.57; MG, Ed., 9.1.57; MG, Ed., 30.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 4.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; & E, L.Art., 2.3.57; then later, NS, C., 23.3.57; & NS, L.Ed., 25.5.57; also cf. MG, L.Ed., 13.5.57 ("Israel is within her rights in choosing to rely upon her own strength and no one else's").

28. T, L.Ed., 1.2.57; T, L.Ed., 19.2.57; MG, Ed., 21.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 22.2.57; MG, Ed., 4.3.57; MG, Ed., 5.3.57; NS, C., 15.12.56; & NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57.

29. T, L.Ed., 21.11.56; T, L.Ed., 19.2.57; T, Ed., 6.3.57; MG, Ed., 21.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 26.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 22.2.57; MG, Ed., 2.3.57; ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56; ST, Ed., 24.2.57; E, Art., 24.11.56; E, N., 5.1.57; NS, C., 15.12.56; NS, C., 26.1.57; & NS, L.Ed., 16.2.57.

30. T, Ed., 4.1.57; T, L.Ed., 1.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 17.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 8.3.57; E, 16.2.57; & NS, Art., 2.2.57, Barbara Castle.

31. T, Ed., 4.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 1.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 8.3.57; ST, Ed., 24.2.57; E, Art., 24.11.56; E, L.Art., 8.12.56; E, N., 16.2.57; & NS, C., 17.11.56; cf. earlier T, L.Ed., 3.11.56; & ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56.

When, by mid-February, 1957, Israel had still not wholly retired from Sinai and the Gaza strip, there was talk, mainly in America and among the Arab States, of putting economic sanctions on Israel in order that she should complete her withdrawal. All the papers, excepting The Economist,³² were opposed to the use of such sanctions against Israel while Egypt was at the same time permitted to defy the General Assembly over the clearance of the Canal without rebuke.³³ Two of the papers reported that Israel was determined to hold out even in the face of sanctions;³⁴ and this may have been the reason which led The Manchester Guardian to conclude that sanctions would be of no value whatsoever.³⁵ In the first two months after the Israeli attack the papers thought that the assurances which Israel was seeking should come from the United Nations.³⁶ However, The Times and The Manchester Guardian especially, recognising that the vast majority of this body held Israel to be in the wrong and therefore was opposed to giving Israel guarantees of security whilst she held out against it, began to advocate that America should assure Israel of her determination to uphold the latter's rights.³⁷ (As mentioned

32. E, Art., 23.2.57.

33. T, Ed., 12.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; & NS, Art., 16.2.57, Critic.

34. ST, Ed., 24.2.57; & E, loc.cit.; cf. later, E, Art., 6.4.57.

35. MG, loc.cit.

36. MG, L.Ed., 26.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; ST, L.Ed., 2.12.56; NS, C., 15.12.56; & NS, C., 26.1.57; then later, NS, L.Ed., 25.5.57.

37. T, L.Ed., 19.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 22.2.57; & MG, Ed., 2.3.57; later, MG, Ed., 19.3.57.

above, Israel had indicated on February 11 that solid assurances from the United States would suffice to make her withdraw.)

(d) United States

The United States continued during these months to hold Israel guilty of aggression and insisted that she withdraw. Besides State Department warnings to Israel and threats of economic sanctions, President Eisenhower also wrote to Mr. Ben Gurion to induce the Israelis to move. The Anglo-French intervention in Egypt and the consequent loss of British and French prestige throughout the Middle East had created a "power vacuum" in the area. In response to this President Eisenhower presented his "Doctrine" for the Middle East to Congress for its consideration on January 5, 1957.³⁸ A discussion of this programme need not detain us here since it relates to the Middle East as a whole, and not to our crisis in particular. However, it must be borne in mind that the Suez Crisis occasioned the Eisenhower Doctrine, and American policy from the beginning of January, 1957 was, in The Economist's opinion determined "by the attempt to create favourable starting conditions for the Eisenhower doctrine."³⁹

All the papers were disappointed with the United

38. See Sir Anthony Eden, op.cit., p.577.

39. E, L.Art., 2.3.57; & E, L.Art., 9.3.57; also see W.R. Folk, "America in the Middle East, 1947-1958", St. Antony's Papers (XI) (London, 1961), pp.70-74.

States during this period. Since the crisis had grown to the dimensions of a test case for the United Nations, The Times and The Manchester Guardian were adamant that the United States should give a strong lead within the assembly which it had done so much to create.⁴⁰ In reference to the effectiveness of United Nations resolutions, The Manchester Guardian inquired rhetorically with clear insinuation:

"In practice this now means that the United States must know what it wants. But does it?" 41

America, said the papers, was wrong in regarding Egypt as an innocent party,⁴² and she should lay aside her "double standard" policy by exerting pressure on that country, just as much as on Israel, to make her comply with the United Nations' wishes as well.⁴³ However, the burden of the press criticism was directed at America's reticence to give Israel firm assurances for her security and her international rights in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.⁴⁴

"It was ingenuous to expect Israel to withdraw and simply rely, in MR. EISENHOWER'S words the other day, on the 'resoluteness of all the friends of justice'."⁴⁵

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40. T, L.Ed., 1.1.57; T, L.Ed., 19.2.57; T, Ed., 6.3.57; MG, Ed., 14.1.57; MG, Ed., 21.1.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; & MG, L.Ed., 22.2.57; later, T, Ed., 1.4.57; & MG, Ed., 20.4.57.
41. MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; & also MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57.
42. MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57; ST, Ed., 24.2.57; & NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57.
43. MG, L.Ed., 12.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; MG, L.Ed., 26.2.57; & NS, C., 23.2.57.
44. T, L.Ed., 26.2.57; T, Ed., 12.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 18.2.57; MG, Ed., 2.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 8.3.57; E, N., 16.2.57; & E, N., 23.2.57.
45. T, L.Ed., 26.2.57.

(e) Great Britain

Britain scarcely featured at all in the paper's discussions at this stage, other than through the occasional negative comment that she no longer had any say in the affair since her influence had been lost forever after the Anglo-French intervention.⁴⁶ The Sunday Times and the New Statesman did add, however, that Britain must reject America's "double standards" in the United Nations.⁴⁷

Mr. Ben Gurion was praised by The Sunday Times for his "courageous statesmanship" and for his decision to complete the evacuation of Gaza and Sinai on March 1, 1957.⁴⁸ Although the other papers agreed with the first sentiment,⁴⁹ they were noticeably restrained about the second, presumably because they were not convinced that Israel had yet received suitable assurances from the United Nations or United States.⁵⁰

46. See p.145, footnote 29.

47. ST, Ed., 24.2.57; & NS, L.Ed., 2.3.57; cf. later, The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times insisted that Britain must see that Israel received justice (per the United Nations) regarding access to the Suez Canal; MG, L.Ed., 2.4.57; MG, L.Ed., 11.5.57; & ST, L.Ed., 12.5.57. The Times thought that this question should be laid before the International Court in the Hague; T, L.Ed., 14.5.57.

48. ST, L.Ed., 3.3.57.

49. E, Art., 23.2.57; E, L.Art., 9.3.57; & NS, C., 23.2.57; cf. much earlier, MG, L.Ed., 10.11.56; MG, Ed., 9.1.57; & E, Art., 17.11.56; then later, NS, L.Ed., 25.5.57.

50. Cf. E, L.Art., 9.3.57, ("No Peace in Palestine"). For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.213.

5. The Re-opening of the Suez Canal and Afterwards until May 31, 1957.

On the day after the Israelis had completed their withdrawal, the Egyptians named a military governor for Gaza. The Manchester Guardian cried out against Egypt's "browbeating" the United Nations and urged the United States to ensure that the Egyptians should not be allowed to return to the Gaza strip.¹ But these pleas were lost, for on April 14 Egyptian civil administrators moved back into the territory, and to register their protest was as much as the press could do.²

"Egypt has moved fast to destroy some of the hopes on which the United Nations' endeavour uneasily rested."³

The Times considered that the General Assembly had also been at fault, having "shirked the duty of wholly taking over the Gaza strip."⁴

When the Israelis refused to allow UNEF to deploy itself on her side of the border, The Times and The Manchester Guardian pleaded with her to permit UNEF to enter, as it offered the sole hope of security;⁵ but after three weeks The Economist observed that now, with Egypt back in Gaza,

1. MG, Ed., 13.3.57.

2. T, L.Ed., 20.3.57; T, L.Ed., 27.3.57; T, Ed., 1.4.57; MG, Ed., 19.3.57; E, Art., 16.3.57; & E, N., 16.3.57.

3. MG, loc.cit.

4. T, L.Ed., 14.3.57; also T, Ed., 12.3.57, ("The Price of Weakness"), and T, Ed., 1.4.57.

5. MG, L.Ed., 27.3.57; MG, Ed., 15.3.57; & MG, Ed., 19.3.57.

with no real guarantee of permanent security beyond thin UNEF protection, and with no assurances over the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, matters were virtually unchanged for Israel since the campaign at the end of October, 1956.⁶ (In the writer's opinion this judgment proved in the next years to be incorrect, since border incidents became much less frequent and Israeli shipping was not interfered with in the Gulf of Aqaba).

Work now progressed at speed on the clearance of the remaining block-ships from the Suez Canal, and the press devoted its full attentions to the question of utilising the Canal once it became re-available for shipping. Opinions, already referred to in footnotes, concerning the reasonableness of Israel's cause, the need for a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, the ineffectuality of the United Nations and the folly of Anglo-French moves continued to recur.

It only remains, therefore, to describe the attitude of the papers to the prospect of using the Suez Canal on President Nasser's terms, which became known in March, 1957.⁷ These terms were far from meeting the requirements of the Security Council's "six principles" of October, 1956 (see above, p.112), and consequently they proved disconcerting to the press. At this point we must interject that The Times

6. E, Art., 6.4.57.

7. For Egypt's terms, as re-affirmed by Mr. Fawzi, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on April 25, 1957, see The Middle East Journal, XI (1957), pp.196-197.

and The Manchester Guardian appear to have been more concerned than the other papers with this issue, as will be borne out in the frequency of references found in them and noted in the footnotes below.

"The first duty, certainly, for the Western Powers, is to press on towards a settlement for the Suez Canal."⁸

America should co-ordinate her views with those of Britain and France,⁹ and join in criticising Colonel Nasser's terms, which were received with a great deal of suspicion,¹⁰ in the hope that he may be more accommodating.¹¹ Talks began in Cairo regarding the future of the Canal between President Nasser and Mr. Hammarskjold, who was later joined at the beginning of April by Mr. Hare, the American Ambassador in Cairo. However, the negotiations were to be utterly futile, as President Nasser refused to modify his terms in any way to bring them closer to the Security Council's "six principles".

The papers became exasperated with President Nasser's intransigence,¹² and when on April 24, he reaffirmed his terms, The Times noted in disgust:

"Seldom have negotiations produced such little result." 13

8. T, L.Ed., 14.3.57.

9. T, L.Ed., 11.3.57.

10. T, L.Ed., 20.3.57; T, L.Ed., 27.3.57; T, Ed., 1.4.57; T, L.Ed., 25.4.57; T, L.Ed., 10.5.57; MG, Ed., 16.4.57; E, N., 6.4.57; & E, L.Art., 18.5.57.

11. T, L.Ed., 20.3.57.

12. T, Ed., 11.3.57; T, L.Ed., 27.3.57; T, Ed., 4.4.57; T, Ed., 12.4.57; T, L.Ed., 16.4.57; T, L.Ed., 30.4.57; MG, Ed., 16.4.57; MG, Ed., 26.4.57; ST, L.N.I., 14.4.57; ST, N.I., 21.4.57; & E, N., 23.3.57; cf. earlier, E, N., 9.2.57; & E, N., 23.2.57.

13. T, L.Ed., 25.4.57.

The Times and other papers explained that since "the United States and the United Nations treated him [Nasser] as an injured innocent ... they put him in clover."¹⁴ When on May 9, SCUA permitted its members to use the Canal on the best available terms, this paper stated in resignation that the Egyptians were likely to persist in their "take-it-or-leave-it attitude."¹⁵ After this date, both The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times urged however that efforts be continued to make Colonel Nasser yield some ground.¹⁶

Impatient for positive results from the Cairo talks,¹⁷ the papers were (perhaps unkindly) derogatory of the American ability to change President Nasser's tune.¹⁸ On April 23 Mr. Dulles suggested that the issue should go before the Security Council, but neither The Times nor The Manchester Guardian felt that this body could settle it.¹⁹ The Economist explained that America's thoughts were turning in this direction through the embarrassment they were suffering from the Cairo talks.²⁰ As it became all too obvious that the Americans were meeting no success, The Times

14. T, Ed., 1.4.57; also T, L.Ed., 16.4.57; ST, L.N.I., 14.4.57, Henry Brandon; & E, N., 20.4.57.

15. T, L.Ed., 10.5.57.

16. MG, L.Ed., 11.5.57; & ST, L.Ed., 12.5.57.

17. T, Ed., 4.4.57; & MG, L.Ed., 24.4.57.

18. T, Ed., 4.4.57; T, Ed., 12.4.57; T, L.Ed., 16.4.57; T, L.Ed., 25.4.57; MG, L.Ed., 24.4.57; & E, N., 20.4.57.

19. T, L.Ed., 30.4.57; & MG, L.Ed., 24.4.57; cf. earlier, MG, Ed., 16.4.57; while still earlier the NS had advocated that the United Nations provided the only framework through which negotiations could take place, and within which Britain and America could make their voices heard; NS, L.Ed., 30.5.57; & NS, C., 6.4.57.

20. E, Art., 20.4.57.

and The Manchester Guardian together called upon SCUA to present a united front against Egypt, since this, they believed, might produce better results.²¹ The Economist joined The Times in commenting sadly that in Cairo the Canal Users were now paying the price of disunity for not having all agreed to boycott the Suez Canal until suitable terms had been reached.²²

It had been realised well before the talks began that one of the problems would be to whom were canal dues to be paid, since Britain and other SCUA member nations had no desire to concede to President Nasser's demand that the dues be entirely paid to him without guarantees that appropriate sums would be set aside for canal maintenance and development. Both The Manchester Guardian and The Economist had emphasised the need for an interim authority.²³ Another issue was Israel's right of access to the Canal which Egypt denied on the grounds that she was at war with Israel. The papers continued to speak ill of Colonel Nasser for his hostile attitude to Israel,²⁴ and to assert that the Canal must be open to all nations.²⁵ Significantly,

21. T, Ed., 4.4.57; T, L.Ed., 12.4.57; T, L.Ed., 16.4.57; T, L.Ed., 25.4.57; MG, Ed., 9.4.57; & MG, Ed., 16.4.57.

22. T, L.Ed., 16.4.57; & E, N., 20.4.57.

23. MG, L.Ed., 7.2.57; & E, N., 16.2.57.

24. MG, Ed., 23.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 1.4.57; E, N., 20.4.57; & NS, C., 4.5.57.

25. T, Ed., 1.4.57; MG, Ed., 23.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 2.4.57; MG, L.Ed., 24.4.47; MG, L.Ed., 11.5.57; NS, C., 23.3.57; NS, L.Ed., 13.4.57; NS, Art., 18.5.57; & NS, L.Ed., 25.5.57.

the New Statesman which in general was a firm supporter of Israel, and which had been conspicuously quiet regarding other aspects of the Suez Canal talks spoke up in advocating Israel's right of access.

A separate question was that of compensation from Egypt to Britain for the sequestration in November, 1956 of properties and assets formerly held by British subjects in Egypt. Britain had already demanded compensation in November for Egyptian "sabotage of the Canal" - a demand which made the New Statesman indignant and which that paper had termed "shameless".²⁶ In February, 1957, The Manchester Guardian reminded the Government that the issue of compensation was still outstanding,²⁷ and later The Economist suggested that to facilitate negotiations Britain should re-establish normal diplomatic relations with Egypt.²⁸ When talks about compensation were set to open in Rome between Britain and Egypt, The Times asked that they should be confined strictly to the proposed agenda.²⁹

Although the Canal was open to shipping by the middle of April, Britain prohibited her shipping from using it, hoping that other nations would join in boycotting the Canal, and thereby force Egypt's hand. The Manchester

26. NS, Ed., 17.11.56.

27. MG, L.Ed., 7.2.57.

28. E, N., 4.5.57; & E, L.Art., 18.5.57.

29. T, L.Ed., 14.5.57; & T, L.Ed., 24.5.57.

Guardian and The Economist pitted themselves against a boycott since they were sure that the Egyptians would win in the long run, especially as many of the User Nations were now employing the canal, having accepted Nasser's terms.³⁰ A boycott could only damage British shipping and prove a boon to others. Not all the papers had thought that President Nasser's terms were totally unreasonable on every score,³¹ but reasonable or not, the papers gradually reconciled themselves to the fact that Egypt had no intention of giving ground, and that Britain would be advised to concede victory.³² Mr. Macmillan lifted the ban on British shipping on May 13; his decision was approved especially by The Economist which was eager to see the British economy restored to its former condition as quickly as possible.³³

The papers believed that Britain could derive a number of lessons from the Suez crisis. First among them was that Britain urgently required to make herself less dependent on Middle East oil and the Suez Canal. Three papers, therefore, advocated construction of larger oil tankers to circumnavigate the Cape of Good Hope, laying more overland pipelines, and enlarging Britain's own atomic

³⁰. MG, Ed., 23.3.57; MG, L.Ed., 4.4.57; MG, Ed., 9.4.57; MG, Ed., 16.4.57; & E, N., 6.4.57.

³¹. E, N., 6.4.57; & NS, C., 23.3.57.

³². T, L.Ed., 30.4.57; T, L.Ed., 10.5.57; E, N., 27.4.57; E, N., 4.5.57; NS, L.Ed., 13.4.57; & NS, L.Ed., 20.4.57.

³³. E, L.Art., 18.5.57; & E, L.Art., 25.5.57.

energy programme.³⁴ The Manchester Guardian said Britain must put her dealings with the Arab States "chiefly on a commercial basis" for "the era of intrigue with this or that political faction has ended."³⁵ The Sunday Times suggested that now Britain should base her future policy "unreservedly upon the Baghdad Pact and mutual defensive commitments with Israel." (italics mine).³⁶

As a final assessment of the Suez Crisis, both The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman, echoing Sir Winston Churchill, described it as "a total and unmitigated defeat."³⁷

34. T, L.Ed., 20.3.57; T, Ed., 17.5.57; MG, Ed., 16.4.57; & NS, L.Ed., 13.4.57.

35. MG, L.Ed., 14.11.56; cf. earlier (Britain must not alienate the Arab nations further), ST, Art., 4.11.56, Lt.Gen. Sir J.B. Glubb; & E, Art., 3.11.56, Cairo Correspondent.

36. ST, L.Ed., 9.12.56.

37. MG, L.Ed., 11.5.57; & NS, Art., 18.5.57. For context units and their intensity ratings of this section, see p.215.

6. Summary and Conclusions.

There was greater unanimity among the five papers with regard to this crisis than in the other two crises examined. All of them sympathised with Israel's difficult position at the end of 1956, but only The Sunday Times could support her attack on Egypt. Likewise, The Sunday Times was alone in its support of the Anglo-French intervention following the Israeli attack; the other papers regarded this move as something far graver in its implications than the Israel attack, and they anathematised the Government for it. We have catalogued above the charges which these papers laid before the Government, and we may add here that in sum they amounted to saying that a week after Russia had been seen to have intervened criminally in Hungary, Britain and France committed an identical act in Egypt. By this act they had destroyed not only their own prestige but also the basis of Western diplomacy and it was left to the United States to try to rescue the situation. The only saving grace in the Anglo-French intervention was the limited loss of human life and personal property which it entailed. From a reading of the leading press it appears almost a misnomer to call the intervention "Anglo-French". It is true that the papers knew that France had participated in it, but they did not seem to care; what mattered was that Britain had compromised herself before the whole world. If France had done the same, the papers were not excessively concerned.

The affair was unique in the proportions it reached and the implications it had for the world which were far greater than those of the two former crises. The fear that it may have led to a third World War when Russia threatened to intervene soon passed away, but a new worry, perhaps just as serious in the long term, manifested itself. The crisis proved the inadequacies of the United Nations as it was constituted, and demonstrated that even the smallest and most insignificant of nations could defy it and make a mockery of its deliberations and resolutions. This fact distressed all the papers, and we must add, initiated many discussions in their columns about the future and composition of the Assembly. (We have not described these since they were not within our purview, but the writer hopes that the seriousness in which the papers held the matter was reflected in the narrative).

Britain and France had defied the United Nations by refusing to stop their advance until November 6, and then by being dilatory in withdrawing from Egypt. There were no longer grounds to chastise Russia alone for its use of the veto. Then Egypt and Israel defied the United Nations as well. Here the papers which had clamoured so loudly against "double standards" of justice on the part of the General Assembly as a whole, and of the United States and India in particular, also revealed inconsistencies in their own position. Logically, all except The Sunday Times condemned Israel at the outset, but in the course of time,

their sympathies for Israel's cause and their aversion for Egypt made them adopt a "double standard" of their own. It was utterly wrong for Egypt to refuse to comply with the United Nations' resolutions; she was exploiting her position and engaging in not very subtle blackmail, said the papers. Yet, although Israel too was duty-bound to fulfil the Assembly's directives, she should not withdraw unless her demands for guarantess of security were satisfied.

The United States caused the papers most frustration. The papers might have hoped that Egypt would have acted less astutely in her own self-interest, but they did not really expect her to do so. However, they did not calculate (as presumably the British Government also did not) that the United States would cling to the rigid stand that she adopted. It was fair for America to brand Israel as an aggressor, but, the papers demanded, what of Egypt? Egypt's subsequently strong bargaining position was attributed in large part to the Americans who treated her as an "injured innocent." In the papers' eyes, America had to shoulder the blame for not redeeming the United Nations after it had been weakened by Britain and France, since it was her mismanagement of justice, which allowed Egypt to defy the United Nations, and her dogged refusal to give Israel any firm guarantees, which prevented the latter from obeying the Assembly's resolutions.

The press's dissatisfaction with the quality of the

American promises to Israel was vindicated in their own minds when Egypt returned to administer Gaza less than a week after Israel had withdrawn from there. It seemed then that Israel had lost, at least on this count. But there was still the question of the utilisation of the Suez Canal after it re-opened to be considered. In this it was not just Israel who was entitled to assurances, but the papers argued, the whole world. Profitless negotiations were conducted with Egypt by Mr. Hammarskjold and the American Ambassador, Mr. Hare, in an attempt to bring President Nasser's terms nearer to the "six principles" of the Security Council. The papers bitterly queried how Colonel Nasser could conceivably be expected to yield, after the United States had "set him in clover" (The Times). A boycott of the Canal would leave Britain in virtually "splendid isolation" and cause further pain to her economy which had suffered badly in the crisis, and there was little option but to accept under protest Colonel Nasser's terms.

The Manchester Guardian had described the days after the Anglo-French intervention as the "blackest since Munich",¹ and the New Statesman had summed up the crisis with Sir Winston Churchill's words after that unhappy occasion.² These assessments typify in essence the feelings of the four papers which opposed the Government's policy; no evaluation

1. MG, Special Editorial, 5.11.56.

2. NS, Art., 18.5.57.

was later found in The Sunday Times to the effect that the action had in hindsight been a striking success. The fact that each of the four papers may have emphasised different aspects of the wrongness of the Government's policy is no matter; they were of one mind: Egypt had gained, and the world had lost.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

In the introduction to this study our declared aim was not only to trace the development of opinion in the leading British press, but further to sample the press in such a way that a picture would emerge of the attitudes of the politically minded in the country towards British policy in the Middle East. To this end, five papers with differing political allegiances were examined. If they are taken to be fairly representative of the groups which they incline towards, then five distinct and consistent points of view are visible.

The Times' position was anomalous in political terms and perhaps in truth cannot be termed a "point of view". Seeking a lead from the Government at all times, it might better be described as an echo of the majority feeling in the House and in the country, at least in theory. As such, this paper was a splendid indicator of the dilemmas which confronted the governments of the decade. The post-War Labour Government was as reticent to relinquish British prerogatives in Palestine as the Conservative Government (after 1952) was in the Sudan and Egypt. This interpretation makes it understandable why The Times was still propounding new plans for Palestine long after the other papers had committed themselves firmly for or against partition. It

explains also why The Times was most prominent in counselling patience in the negotiations over the Sudan and Egypt, while all others were calling loudly for early settlements. That The Times was not hidebound in its support of the Government was revealed when the paper condemned the Conservative Government's action in Egypt in 1956. Nevertheless, even then, The Times did seek to minimise its criticisms.

The other papers more properly represent points of view, which are best seen when held in contrast with one another. The Conservative Sunday Times clearly voiced opinions further to the right of the "progressive" Economist. Consequently it did not approve of the contemplated withdrawal from Palestine, when The Economist could back this in terms of expediency. Similarly, The Sunday Times voiced the sentiments of those Britons who favoured the Anglo-French action in Suez, but The Economist presented the point of view of those within the Conservative Party who broke with the Government on this issue. On the other side of the fence, the Socialists and the Liberals reached the same conclusion on many issues, though often for divergent reasons, and were able to present a common front. If the New Statesman attacked what it regarded as outmoded British imperialism, and The Manchester Guardian stressed the predicament of the Jews, both concurred that the only solution was to partition Palestine. It is possible to trace in this way the similarities in the positions adopted

by both these groups, but at all times the basic difference in their approaches to the various issues must be underlined.

Our method was singularly useful in isolating the various papers' concern for and opinions about the three crises examined, but in this it suffered one major failing. By concentrating our attentions exclusively on these crises, and by treating them, each in its own right, as separate units, there was a tendency to ignore the connections between the crises, and also to overlook the total world perspective in which they were set.

From the British view-point, the three crises were not really unrelated. They each marked crucial stages in the progression following World War II to a wholly new British standing in the Middle East. And for the Middle East, between the years 1947 and 1957, there were no happenings which affected it so fundamentally as the emergence of Israel, the Egyptian revolution and the crisis of 1956. In 1945 Britain still possessed unrivalled power in the area, but the war had had too great an effect to allow the status quo to remain. Britain's home economy was at its lowest ebb; the national aspirations of those Middle Eastern groupings, whose homage to Britain had previously been assured by subsidies of one form or another, were now higher than ever; and an East-West confrontation, however "cold" and uninvolved, was a reality. These three considerations, which epitomise so much, implied of necessity new alignments within the Middle East.

Britain had announced that she was unable to sustain her commitments in Greece and Turkey in February, 1947 - the same month in which she turned to the United Nations for "advice" on Palestine. The United States, all too conscious of Soviet dedication to the furtherance of Communism, could no longer remain aloof.¹ In March, 1947, the "Truman Doctrine" was produced, giving way in time to the Point IV and Mutual Security programmes of 1949, and then to the Baghdad Pact of 1955. The Russians too were increasing their influence in the Middle East, but rather more covertly, until in 1955 the Czech arms deal with Egypt demonstrated to the Middle Eastern states the profitability of adopting a "neutral" commitment. In the face of increasing American and Russian influence in the Middle East, that of Great Britain was diminishing. We have described in detail Britain's retirement from Palestine, the Sudan and Egypt. To these we must add the rebuffs she met in Persia (Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, 1951-1953), in Cyprus (from 1955) and in Jordan.

The press, reporting and commenting on events day by day, or week by week, scarcely, if ever, had time to reflect on long-time periods. Occasionally such an indulgence was to be found, usually in the form of an article, but it was rare. Nevertheless, a very clear picture of the press's main

¹. For bases of American policy in the Middle East, and its development in the decade investigated, see William R. Polk, "A Decade of Discovery: America in the Middle East", St. Antony's Papers, XI (London, 1961), pp.49-80.

concerns did emerge and develop in the decade until 1957; and we may say, was consistently presented in their own ways by each of the five papers in the study.

There was real concern for Britain's loss of power and prestige in the Middle East. This was as true in 1947-48 as it was over the Sudan and Suez Base agreements of 1953 and 1954. The Times, even though it was in the special position of trying to support the British Government in all its actions, evinced this concern, as did the right-wing Sunday Times and The Economist. The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman were not so perturbed by Britain's loss of power as with her loss of good-will and prestige. The Anglo-French intervention in Egypt could in one way be regarded as a last attempt by these powers to assert their authority in the Middle East. With the exception of the Conservative Sunday Times, all the papers decried the action on grounds amounting to the fact that Britain and France had by 1956 no such authority, and what little prestige they had left had been thrown to the winds.

Perhaps without full realisation of the extent to which Britain was about to retire from the Middle East, the papers in 1947 had already begun to urge that America should come forward, and start taking over. The papers did not stress any fear of a Russian advance in 1947, and when Russia voted for the partition of Palestine, there was no interpretation offered that this Russian move was to hasten the British withdrawal from the whole area. However, this writer

believes that such fears, whether unconscious or unadmitted, were present and implicit in the papers' constant demands that America should take a more active part in the affairs of the region. This would explain the depth of the frustration felt by the papers when America persistently refused to offer her troops for Palestine, when America did little to break the Anglo-Egyptian deadlock in the Suez Base talks, and when she offered no solid guarantees to Israel in 1957. The only open apprehension about Russia to be expressed was in 1956 when that country threatened to stop the Anglo-French advance in Suez by force. Even then the papers were inclined to minimise the suggestion that Russian influence in Egypt had been sufficient to justify the intervention, although The Sunday Times understandably did clutch at this straw.

The papers would have welcomed greater American participation in all these events, and although the press's reception of the "Truman Doctrine", the Point IV. Program and other American plans for the Middle East were not investigated, this writer feels sure that the papers must have considered them all to have fallen short of what was needed. We are supported in our view by the disappointment which was apparent in 1957 when the "Eisenhower Doctrine" was propounded. Further evidence that the papers would have desired an American willingness to offer her troops in the area and not limit herself to offers of aid was also to be found in the papers' strictures against Mr. Dulles when he

prevented the Suez Canal Users' Association from contemplating the use of force. (These were not recorded above as they fell outside our time demarcations).

Disappointment with America was paralleled by disappointment with the United Nations. Perhaps, in the papers' eyes these shortcomings were one and the same thing, for time and again it was emphasised that America was the power in the United Nations, which would accept her lead if a firm one was given. This was the case in 1947, as it was in 1957 with even greater pertinence, since the Suez Crisis was so much more of a challenge to the Assembly. Both the Palestine problem and the crisis of 1956 were tests for the United Nations and in both of them the papers would have liked that body to ~~have~~ adopted a firmer stand than it did. They had called for a United Nations force in 1947 and clearly thought it was long overdue when it appeared in 1956. If the decision to partition Palestine had illustrated the part that power blocs were to play in the General Assembly, then the respective stands of Egypt and Israel in 1956-57 effectively showed the defiance small nations could offer. In either case (i.e. overwhelming power blocs or stubborn individuality) the constitution of the United Nations was challenged, its authority was weakened and its reputation was at stake. The leading British press was aware of this, and anxious that measures should somehow be taken to insulate the United Nations from such pressures.

Finally, thought was given to Britain's new role in the Middle East. Britain's political retirement from the

area which was more or less complete after the Suez Crisis, did not spell the end for all British interest in the area. It could hardly remove the effects of the long association of centuries and decades of dominance. Britain still held a special place in the thinking of all Middle Easterners, and in any event British financial investment and interests were not eliminated. In each of the crises the papers evinced concern for Anglo-Arab relations. It was this consideration which was almost over-riding in The Economist's approach to the Palestine problem, no less than it was a guiding principle for the New Statesman which believed that the imperialist's day was no more, and the sooner Britain withdrew all vestiges of such influence, the better were the prospects of setting up sound, workable relationships with the Middle Eastern States. The suggestions in 1954, after the signing of the Suez Base Agreement, that Britain must improve her relations with the Arabs found precedents in similar recommendations after the establishment of Israel. So too the demands in 1957 that Britain must make herself more independent of the Middle East were merely echoes of requests in 1953 and 1954 when the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were proceeding.

A new Britain in a new Middle East was desired: it may not be irrelevant to ask how far the papers of today find Britain's attempts at re-orientation successful.

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ABBREVIATIONS IN APPENDICES

A.	Arabs.
CU.	<u>Context Unit(s).</u>
E.	Egypt.
GB.	Great Britain.
I.	Israel.
IR.	<u>Intensity Rating(s).</u>
J.	Jews.
ME.	Middle East.
P.	Palestine.
R.	Russia.
UN.	United Nations.
US.	United States.

Note: See page 180, footnote 2 for explanation of the tables in which these abbreviations appear.

CHAPTER I : APPENDIX

1. Chronology of the Main Events of the Crisis.

November	1917	Balfour Declaration.
April	1920	Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine allotted to Great Britain.
July	1922	League of Nations confirmed British Mandate for Palestine.
March	1930	Report by the Shaw Commission published.
October	1930	"Passfield White Paper".
July	1937	Report of Peel Commission recommended partition of Palestine.
May	1939	British White Paper regulating Jewish immigration and land sales.
May	1942	Zionist "Biltmore Program" advocating "Jewish Commonwealth" in Palestine.
Spring	1946	Anglo-American Commission in Palestine.
September	1946	London Conference on Palestine rejected "Morrison Plan".
18 Feb.	1947	H.M. Government decided to turn to United Nations for advice.
1 Mar.	1947	British Officers' Club in Jerusalem bombed.
16 Apr.	1947	Dor Grunner plus three other members of Irgun hanged in Acre.
28 Apr.	1947	First Special Session of United Nations General Assembly on Palestine.
15 May	1947	UNSCOP appointed from 11 nations who were not Permanent Members of the Security Council.
14/15 June	1947	UNSCOP arrives in Palestine.
18 July	1947	<u>President Warfield (= Exodus 1947)</u> arrived at Haifa.
31 July	1947	Irgun killed two British sergeants as reprisals for three of their members executed by British (27 July, 1947).
1 Sept.	1947	UNSCOP report published.
8 Sept.	1947	Illegal immigrants aboard <u>President Warfield</u> debarked at Hamburg.
25 Sept.	1947	First meeting of United Nations <u>ad hoc</u> Committee on the Palestine question.

11	Oct.	1947	U.S. delegate declared American support for UNSCOP majority plan.
13	Oct.	1947	USSR delegate declared Russian support for UNSCOP majority plan.
13	Nov.	1947	G.B. rejected U.N. sub-committee's plan for partition of Palestine.
19	Nov.	1947	G.B. rejected U.N. sub-committee's revised plan for partition of Palestine.
29	Nov.	1947	U.N. General Assembly voted in favour of partition of Palestine.
11	Dec.	1947	Mr. Creech Jones placed G.B.'s evacuation time-table before the U.N.; Mandate to end May 15, 1948.
9	Jan.	1948	U.N. Palestine Commission held its first meeting to discuss implementation of partition.
24	Feb.	1948	U.N. Security Council met to consider armed implementation in Palestine. Mr. Warren Austin (USA) revealed waning of American support for partition; Mr. Creech Jones reaffirmed British policy of neutrality.
	March	1948	Further Arab-Jewish clashes in Palestine.
19	March	1948	Mr. Warren Austin reversed American policy by withdrawing support for partition; he suggested U.N. Trusteeship instead.
26	Apr.	1948	Mr. Austin still called for U.N. Trusteeship.
15	May	1948	Great Britain lays down Mandate, and State of Israel proclaimed.
29	May	1948	Truce resolution adopted in Security Council and accepted by Arabs and Jews.

Mr. Vyshinsky made charges against Great Britain and
U.S.A. at U.N. General Assembly
(Sept.18).

Report by 16 Nations on Marshall scheme presented in Paris
(Sept.22).

President Truman asked Committees of the two Houses of
Congress to start work on aid plan
(Sept.30).

Agreement as to reconstitution of Burma signed in London
(Oct. 17).

Opening of Parliament by the King (Oct.20).

Municipal elections result in over 640 Conservative gains
(Nov.1).

The Harriman Committee published its report as to European
recovery (Nov.8).

French strikes caused M. Ramadier's resignation (Nov.19).

Princess Elizabeth married Duke of Edinburgh (Nov.20).

M. Schumann became Premier of France (Nov.23).

Foreign Ministers' Conference began London (Nov.25).

Strikes in France (Nov.27).

General Strike in Rome (Dec.11).

President Truman signed Aid to Europe Bill (Dec.17).

King Michael of Rumania abdicated (Dec.30).

Burma became a Republic (Jan.1,1948).

Gandhi assassinated by a Hindu (Jan.30).

Government remonstrated with Guatemala for action in British
Honduras (Mar.4).

Jan Masaryk committed suicide after Czechoslovakia crisis
(Mar.10).

Mr. Bevin opened Marshall Aid Conference in Paris (Mar.15).

Five-Power Pact signed in Brussels (Mar.17).

President Truman signed the Foreign Aid Bill (April 3).

Convention on European Recovery Programme signed in Paris
(April 16).

Government returned in Italy (April 21).

Mr. Churchill gave inaugural address to Congress of Europe
at the Hague (May 7).

Dr. Malan replaces General Smuts as Prime Minister of
S. Africa (May 28).

Columns.

Partition of Palestine.

Columns Lengths.


Columns.

$T = 8$ editions per month = —

$Mq = 8$ " " = —

$ST = 4$ " " = —

$$\therefore 1T = 1Mq = 2ST$$



3. Column Lengths of News-Items in The Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Section of Chapter I</u>	<u>Paper</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sep.</u>
1 & 2 (Feb.10, 1947 - Sep.30, 1947)	T	$6\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{3}{8}$	$4\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{8}$	$8\frac{3}{8}$
	MG	$5\frac{1}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{5}{8}$	$3\frac{7}{8}$	$3\frac{7}{8}$	$4\frac{7}{8}$	$4\frac{5}{8}$	$5\frac{3}{8}$
	ST	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{7}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$	-	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{5}{8}$	$2\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{8}$
		<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>						
3 (Oct.1, 1947 - Nov.30, 1947)	T	$2\frac{3}{4}$	$5\frac{3}{8}$						
	MG	$6\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{3}{8}$						
	ST	$3\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$						
		<u>Dec.</u>	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>					
4 (Dec.1, 1947 - Feb.29, 1948)	T	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{1}{4}$					
	MG	$6\frac{3}{8}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$					
	ST	2	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$					
		<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May</u>					
5 & 6 (Mar.1, 1948 - May 31, 1948)	T	$6\frac{1}{8}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	$16\frac{1}{8}$					
	MG	$6\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{1}{8}$	$8\frac{3}{4}$					
	ST	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$2\frac{7}{8}$	$10\frac{3}{8}$					

Note:

Throughout the period the three newspapers were more or less on a par (proportionately) in the amount of news-space they each devoted to the Palestine problem. The fluctuatings between the months fairly reflect the events of the times. February, 1947 - heavy reporting of decision to go to U.N.

May, 1947 - less reporting as UNSCOP appointed and began task.

June-August, 1947 - increase with rise in terrorism and illegal immigration.

- September, 1947 - further increase when
UNSCOP delivered its
report and problem re-
opened in U.N.
- October, 1947 -
May, 1948 - consistently heavy
reporting, with tendency
to increase as time
progressed and events
quickenened.

4. Recording Units Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Section of Chapter I</u>	<u>T.</u>	<u>MG.</u>	<u>ST.</u>	<u>E.</u>	<u>NS.</u>
1	9	6	5	3	4
2	32	38	15	20	15
3	23	18	10	13	14
4	19	27	5	9	9
5	20	29	16	12	10
6	7	21	9	4	6
7	-	16	-	-	12
Totals	<u>110</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>70</u>

Grand Total - 456

Notes:

- a. In Section 7 entries are restricted to The Manchester Guardian and the New Statesman since it was these two papers in particular which ventured opinions about Mr. Bevin. The other references which made up the rest of the section were taken up in the preceding sections.
- b. Interestingly enough, the two "pro-Zionist" papers yielded proportionately more recording units than the others.

5. Context Units and their Intensity Ratings Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.²

(1) Chapter I, Section 1. (Feb.10-17, 1947).

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	II E. A.	1				1	(2)				
	II G. GB.	1	(3)							2	(3)
	IV B. GB.			1	(4)						
	V C.									1	(4)
a.	V F.	1	(4)			1	(4)	1	(4)	1	(4)
	VI A.			1	(1)						
b.	VI B.			1	(5)			2	(9)	1	(4)
	VI F.					1	(5)				

- Notes:
- a. Re. need to place problem before U.N., see p.9 (+ note 11 ibid.).
 - b. Re. partition of Palestine as most favoured solution, see p.9 (+ note 15 ibid.).

2. In the "Category Column" are listed all those major categories as appeared during the time-period covered by this table; all other categories which did not appear have been omitted. Beside the category reference is an abbreviation to indicate, where necessary, to whom the opinion referred. The following abbreviations have been used:-

CU - Context Unit	A - Arabs
IR - Intensity Rating	GB - Great Britain
	J - Jews
	P - Palestine
	UN - United Nations
	US - United States

In the respective column of each newspaper two figures always appear with each insertion. The left-hand figure is the number of context units in the category during the time period covered by the table, and the right-hand

figure (in brackets) is the number of context units converted into numerical terms according to the intensity rating scale, (as explained in the Supplement, Section 2,iv).

<u>Illustration.</u>	<u>Categ.</u>	ST
	II E. A.	1 (2)

This signifies that in The Sunday Times under Category II E (disapproval of personality) in reference to the Arabs one context unit with an intensity rating of two points (i.e. unfavourable) appeared during the seven days covered by this table.

5. (2) Chapter I, Section 2, February 18 - September 24, 1947

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	I E. J.					1	4				
	I F. J.			1	(4)						
a.	I G. GB.			1	(4)	2	(8)				
b.	I H. UN.	2	(10)	1	(4)						
c.	II A. P.							1	(1)		
	II C. J.	1	(1)	1	(3)	3	(4)				
	II E. A.							1	(2)		
	II E. J.							1	(2)		
	II F. J.			1	(2)	1	(1)				
d.	II G. GB.			5	(7)	1	(2)	3	(5)	5	(8)
	II H. US									1	(2)
	IIIC. UN.	1	(5)								
e.	IV B. GB.	1	(3)	5	(23)	2	(8)	1	(4)	3	(13)
	V A. GB.	1	(5)								
	V E.	3	(12)							1	(4)
f.	V F.	4	(19)					2	(10)		
	VI A.			1	(2)						
g.	VI B.	1	(3)	2	(8)	1	(3)	2	(10)	2	(9)
	VI C.	2	(10)							1	(4)
	VI D.	1	(3)							1	(3)
	VI E.			1	(1)					3	(4)

Notes:

- a. Re. ST's pride in British record in Palestine, see p. 12.
- b. Re. T's praise for U.N.'s approach, see p. 13.
- c. Re. All papers' criticism of Jewish terrorist activities, see pp. 17-18.

- d. The extent of criticism aimed against G.B. is striking. T is conspicuous in refraining from criticism; MG and NS on the other hand were prominent.
 Re. MG's and NS's denigration of Brit. Administration in Palestine, see p.12.
 E and NS displeased with G.B. at U.N. see p.14.
 MG suspicious of G.B.'s intentions, see p.15.
 MG, ST, E and NS dissatisfied with G.B.'s handling of terrorists, see pp.18-19.
 MG, E, and NS outraged over Exodus 1947, see p.21.
- e. MG especially, and also NS adamant that G.B. should not undertake implementation of settlement in Palestine alone, see pp. 14 & 21.
- f. T particularly interested in speeding up deliberations towards settlement, see p. 13.
- g. MG, E and NS supported partition further, see pp.14, & 21-22 while T and ST remained uncommitted.

5. (3) Chapter I, Section 3, September 25 - November 28, 1947.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>		<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
			CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I	G.GB.	1	(5)			1	(4)	1	(5)	2	(6)
	I	H.US.									1	(2)
b.	II	D.A + J.							1	(2)		
c.	II	G.GB.			3	(4)	1	(3)			3	(3)
d.	II	H.US.	1	(2)			3	(6)	3	(4)	1	(2)
e.	III	B.GB.			6	(26)						
	III	C.UN.			1	(4)			1	(3)		
	III	C.US	1	(4)			1	(4)				
f.	IV	B.GB.	2	(7)					2	(10)	1	(5)
	V	A.	1	(4)							1	(4)
	V	B.	1	(4)								
	V	E.	2	(8)	1	(4)			1	(5)		
	VI	B.							1	(4)	1	(4)
g.	VI	D.	2	(8)	1	(4)					2	(8)
	VI	E.									3	(4)

Notes:

- a. Re. general approval for British declaration to United Nations that she intended to withdraw from Palestine, see p. 24.
- b. Observe that in whole period only one article directed against Arabs and Jews; indicates pre-occupation with debates in United Nations, which, it would seem, did not involve these two parties!
- c. Again MG and NS took lead in criticising G.B. see pp. 24-25.
- d. Re. dissatisfaction in T, ST and E regarding position adopted by America in U.N. debates, see p. 27. Observe reticence on parts of MG and NS to deride U.S., see p. 27.
- e. Re. MG's frequent and insistent call for a British policy-declaration, of which part should be the willingness to co-operate with U.N., see pp. 24-25. This demand was so prominent that it overshadowed (in terms of context) MG's approval of G.B.'s declaration that she was going to withdraw from Palestine; therefore no units of approval are recorded for MG in Category I G.GB.
- f. These units were reminders to GB that she must withdraw from Palestine; therefore approval unanimously evinced when she conceded to do so, as mentioned above.
- g. Re. call for international force to implement solution, see p. 27.

5. (4) Chapter I, Section 4, November 29, 1947 - February 23, 1948

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I G.GB.	3	(12)	1	(4)			1	(5)		
	I H.UN.			1	(4)						
	II A.A.+ J.	1	(1)			1	(2)				
	II C.A.+ J.										
	II C.J.			1	(1)			1	(1)		
	II E.J.							1	(1)		
	II F.J.	1	(2)	1	(1)						
b.	II G.B.			4	(5)					3	(5)
c.	II H.UN.	1	(2)	1	(3)	2	(4)	2	(3)		
d.	II H.US							2	(3)	3	(5)
	III B.GB.			1	(4)					1	(4)
	IV B.GB.	1	(4)			2	(8)				
	V A.	2	(9)								
	V E.			1	(5)			1	(4)		
	VI B.			1	(5)	1	(2)				
	VI G.							1	(4)		
e.	VI D.	2	(10)	2	(9)	1	(4)			1	(4)
	VI F.							1	(4)		

Notes:

- a. T still endeavoured to praise British "impartiality", see p.30.
- b. MG and NS disapproved of this "impartiality" as they considered that effectively it helped the Arabs, see p.30.
- c. Gradual loss of confidence in United Nations' ability to bring about partition under the existing circumstances, see pp.31-32.
- d. Observe NS now prominent in criticising U.S. for its unwillingness to provide military aid to enforce partition, see p.31.
- e. General call for formation of international force to effect partition, see p.32.

5. (5) Chapter I, Section 5, February 24 - May 14, 1948.

<u>Notes</u> (below)		<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
			CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I	D.J.									2	(8)
	I	G.GB.	1	(5)			2	(8)				
b.	I	H.US.	3	(12)			1	(4)				
c.	II	A.P.			1	(2)	1	(2)	2	(2)		
	}	II	C.A.+								1	(2)
		J.										
		II	D.A.						1	(1)		
		II	D.J.					1	(2)			
		II	E.A.+									
		J.	1	(2)			1	(2)				
	II	F.J.			1	(1)						
	II	G.GB.			2	(3)						
e.	II	H.US.			3	(4)			1	(2)	2	(2)
	III	B.GB.			1	(5)						
	III	C.US.			1	(5)			2	(8)		
f.	IV	B.GB.			2	(10)					1	(4)
	V	C.	2	(9)								
	V	E.	1	(3)	1	(5)					1	(4)
	V	F.					1	(4)				
g.	VI	B.			3	(13)						
h.	VI	C.	3	(14)								
i.	VI	D.	3	(13)	5	(23)	1	(4)	2	(2)	1	(4)
	VI	E.			1	(2)						
	VI	F.					1	(4)	1	(1)		

Notes:

- NS praise for good organisation of Jewish side in struggle with Arabs, see p.37.
- T and ST applause for U.S. policy shift away from partition in favour of trusteeship, see pp.35-36.
- War predicted in Palestine, see p.37.
- Increased reproach for Arabs and Jews as situation worsened, see pp. 37 & 38.
- MG and NS especially deprecated American change in policy, see pp.34-35.
- MG and NS suggested acceleration in evacuating British troops from Palestine, see p.39.
- MG reiterated that partition decision must be upheld, see p.36.
- T called for end to terrorism, see p.38.
- All except E appeal desperately for U.N.international force, pp.38 & 39. For E's objections to such a force, see p.39.

5. (6) Chapter I, Section 6, May 15 - 29, 1948.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	T.		MG.		ST.		E.		NS.	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	I D.J.			1	(4)						
a.	I G.GB.	1	(5)	1	(4)	2	(9)				
	II G.GB.			2	(2)	1	(2)				
b.	II H.US					2	(4)	1	(1)		
c.	III B.GB.	1	(4)							1	(4)
	III C.US	1	(4)								
d.	IV B.GB.			2	(10)	1	(4)				
	V A.	1	(5)					1	(4)		
	V E.	1	(4)								
	V F.			2	(10)						
	VI E.			2	(3)						

Notes:

- a. T and ST praised G.B. for record in Palestine, see p.41.
MG praised G.B. for having truce resolution adopted in the United Nations, see p.43.
- b. ST and E very unimpressed by immediate American de facto recognition of Palestine, see p.41.
- c. Calls for G.B. to co-operate in future with U.N., see p.43.
- d. MG especially demanded G.B. should embargo arms to Arab nations, see p.42.

CHAPTER II: APPENDIX1. Chronology of the Main Events of the Crisis.

- 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan.
- 1922 Britain unilaterally declared the termination of Protectorate in Egypt.
- 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.
- 1946 "Sidki-Bevin Protocol".
- 1947 Egypt placed grievances before United Nations.
- 1951 Egypt unilaterally abrogated 1899 Agreement and 1936 Treaty.
-
26. Jan. 1952 Riots and arson in Cairo.
- 23 Jul. 1952 Coup d'état by Free Officers: Aly Maher appointed Prime Minister.
- 26 Jul. 1952 King Farouk abdicated in favour of infant son, Ahmed Fuad.
- 7 Sep. 1952 Aly Maher resigned, and General Neguib took over Prime Ministership.
- 10 Feb. 1953 New temporary constitution announced granting General Neguib supreme powers for 3 years.
- 12 Feb. 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan signed.
- 18 Jun. 1953 Proclamation of the Republic of Egypt.
- 24 Feb. 1954 Junta accepted General Neguib's resignation from Egyptian presidency.
- 27 Feb. 1954 Resumption by General Neguib of presidency and chairmanship of R.C.C.
- 1 Mar. 1954 Riots in Khartoum.
- 25 Mar. 1954 Resolution to end the revolution passed by junta.
- 17 Apr. 1954 General Neguib resigns; Colonel Nasser became Prime Minister.
- 27 Jul. 1954 "Heads of Agreement" on Suez Canal Base initialled by Britain and Egypt.
- 19 Oct. 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone signed.
- 14 Nov. 1954 General Neguib removed from presidency and placed under house arrest.
- 17 Nov. 1954 Colonel Nasser became head of State of Egypt and President of R.C.C.

2. Chronology of Main Contemporaneous Events Reported in the British Press during the Crisis.¹

1952

Dr. Mossadegh resigned Premiership of Persia (July 17).
 The 15th Olympic Games were opened, Helsinki (July 19).
 Hague Court declared its incompetence to judge in Anglo-Persian oil dispute (July 23).
 King Talal of Jordan deposed (Aug.11).
 Dr. Mossadegh invested with full powers in Persia (Aug.11).
 Congress of Russian Communist Party announced new five-year plan (Aug.19).
 Appointment of Sir Wm. Slim as Governor-General of Australia announced (Sep.3).
 Signor de Gasperi, Italian Premier, greeted cordially in Bonn (Sep. 21).
 Chinese attacked Western and Central Korean fronts (Sep.22).
 British-Persian relations broken off (Oct. 21).
 Gen. Eisenhower won U.S. Presidential election (Nov.4).
 Mr. Trygve Lie resigned Secretary-General of UN. (Nov.10).
 Gen. Eisenhower visited Korea (Dec. 2, 3, 4).
 French Prime Minister, M. Pinay, resigned (Dec. 23).

1953

M. Rene Mayer formed new French government (Jan.6).
 Pope invested 15 new cardinals in Rome (Jan.15).
 Gen. Eisenhower inaugurated as U.S. President (Jan.20).
 Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard visited London (Feb.26).
 Marshall Stalin died (Mar.5).
 President Gottwald of Czechoslovakia died (Mar.14).

1. Period from July 17 - Sept.22, 1952, extracted from The Daily Mail Year Book for 1953, op.cit., pp.197-198.
 Period from October 22, 1952 - October 6, 1953, extracted from op.cit., for 1954, pp.201-203.
 Period from October 9, 1953 - September 20, 1954, extracted from op.cit., for 1955, pp.23-26.
 Period from October 3, 1954 - December 2, 1954, extracted from op.cit., for 1956, p.83.

Marshall Tito visited Britain (Mar.16).
 H.M. Queen Mary died (Mar.25).
 Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies dissolved (Apr.4).
 Mr. Dag Hammerskjold elected new Secretary-General of
 U.N. (Apr.8).
 Jomo Kenyatta imprisoned (Apr. 8).
 Korea P.O.W. exchange pact signed (Apr.10).
 Dr. Malan re-elected in S. Africa (Apr.16).
 Prince Akihito of Japan visited Britain (Apr.27).
 King Feisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan inaugurated
 as monarchs (May 2).
 Dr. Adenauer in London (May 14).
 William Oatis, American journalist, released from Czech
 prison (May 15).
 Mt. Everest climbed (May 29).
 Coronation of H.M. Queen Elizabeth (June 2).
 East German Government made concessions (June 10).
 Riots in Berlin, Russian troops called in (June 17).
 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg executed in New York (June 19).
 M. Laniel formed new French Government (June 26).
 Beria arrested in Russia (July 10).
 U.S.S.R. and Israel re-established diplomatic relations (July 20).
 Korean Armistice signed (July 27).
 French attack Indo-China (July 28).
 Shah and Queen of Persia flee from Teheran (Aug.16).
 U.S.S.R. asked for German peace conference (Aug.16).
 Dr. Mossadegh arrested (Aug.19).
 U.S.S.R. now had hydrogen bomb (Aug.20).
 Plebiscite for Kashmir agreed upon (Aug.20).
 Dr. Adenauer gained absolute majority (Sep.7).
 Bank rate reduced to $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ (Sep.17).
 Defence agreement between U.S. and Spain signed (Sep.26).
 British forces combatted Communist coup in Bt. Guinea (Oct.6).
 British and U.S. withdrawal from Trieste announced (Oct.9).
 Pakistan as Islamic Republic announced (Nov.2).
 Piltdown jawbone declared forgery (Nov.23).
 H.M. Queen began Commonwealth tour (Nov.23).
 Kabaka of Uganda deposed by Britain (Nov.30).

Oil discovery in W. Australia (Dec.4).

Britain and Persia resumed diplomatic relations (Dec.4).

M. René Coty elected President of France (Dec.23).

Indo-China cut in two by Communist Viet-Minh forces (Dec.26).

1954

The Sudan began self-government (Jan.10).

Nautilus launched by U.S. (Jan.21).

Four-Power Conference on Berlin opened (Jan.25).

U.S. military aid for Pakistan announced (Feb.22).

Riots in Damascus after Shishakly's resignation (Feb.28).

Christian Socialists gained majority in Belgium (Apr.11).

Vladimir Petrov, Soviet official, sought asylum in Australia (Apr.14).

Russia broke off diplomatic relations with Australia (Apr.23).

19 Nation Geneva Conference opened (Apr.26).

Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet-Minh rebels (May 27).

Pope Pius X(died 1914) canonised in Rome (May 30).

M. Mendes-France elected French Prime Minister (June 6).

President Arbenz of Guatemala resigned (June 28).

Armistice agreement reached for Indo-China (July 20).

Anglo-Persian oil dispute settled (Aug.5).

Balkan Pact signed (Aug.9).

Greece turned to U.N. over Cyprus (Aug.20).

Mr. Atlee received by Mao Tse-Tung in Peking (Aug.24).

Roman temple discovered in London (Sep.20).

9 Power Conference in London decided to re-arm Germany (Oct.3).

Haile Selassie visited Britain (Oct.14).

Democrat majority in both houses in U.S. elections (Nov.4).


Peru seized some Greek-owned ships in her waters (Nov.17).

Eastern European countries formed parallel organisation
to N.A.T.O. (Dec.2).

Columns.

Egyptian Revolution.
Graph of column lengths.

$T = 8$ editions per month = —
 $ME = 8$ " " —
 $ST = 4$ " " —
 $\therefore 1T = 1ME = 2ST.$



3. Column Lengths of News-Items in The Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Paper</u>	<u>1952.</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sept.</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>
T		2	6	$5\frac{1}{4}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$
MG		$4\frac{1}{4}$	$6\frac{1}{8}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{3}{8}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$	1
ST		$2\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{8}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{5}{8}$
	<u>1953.</u>	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>
T		5	$1\frac{7}{8}$	$2\frac{7}{8}$	$4\frac{1}{8}$	$4\frac{1}{8}$	$2\frac{1}{8}$
MG		$3\frac{1}{2}$	$5\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{5}{8}$
ST		$2\frac{1}{8}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	-	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
		<u>July</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sept.</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>
T		$\frac{3}{4}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{7}{8}$	4	$4\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{8}$
MG		$\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$
ST		$\frac{7}{8}$	$1\frac{5}{8}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{1}{8}$	-	$\frac{5}{8}$
	<u>1954.</u>	<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>Apr.</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>
T		$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$	$8\frac{1}{8}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$1\frac{1}{4}$
MG		$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{5}{8}$	$3\frac{7}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{8}$	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
ST		$2\frac{3}{8}$	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{7}{8}$	-	$\frac{1}{8}$	$1\frac{7}{8}$
		<u>July</u>	<u>Aug.</u>	<u>Sept.</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>
T		$5\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{3}{8}$	$3\frac{3}{8}$	$1\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{7}{8}$
MG		$5\frac{7}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	2	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
ST		1	$2\frac{7}{8}$	-	$2\frac{7}{8}$	2	-

Notes:

- a. Since sections 6, 7 and 8 of Chapter II overlap in time with sections 2, 3, 4 and 5, it was not possible to divide the above table to correspond with the sub-divisions of the Chapter, as has been done in the corresponding tables for Chapters I and III.
- b. The fluctuations in the figures correspond with the turning of events in Egypt during the period. When something of intimate concern to G.B. was taking place, the amount of space allocated increased, whereas reporting of Egyptian internal affairs was generally not heavy.

End of July, August and September, 1952 high figures, reporting the coup, and the new regime's first months,

Oct., Nov., Dec., 1952, plus Jan., and Feb., 1953, figures continue to be equally high as Sudanese Agreement is negotiated.

March, April and May, 1953 the figures persist at same rate as talks over Suez Base begin.

June to November, 1953, figures decrease as negotiations on Suez make no headway.

Dec., 1953 to March, 1954 figures rise to report internal troubles in Egypt ("Summer Cloud").

April to June, 1954, figures reflect lull in negotiations on Suez Base.

July, 1954. Sudden rise when "Heads of Agreement" are initialled.

Aug., and Sept. 1954 further decrease with pause while final agreement is worked out.

Oct., 1954 rise briefly when final agreement is signed.

Nov. and Dec., 1954, figures drop to show clearly how little concerned British press were in internal happenings, for in these months Neguib was arrested and Nasser came to power.

4. Recording Units Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Section of Chapter II.</u>	T.	MG.	ST.	E.	NS.
1 + 2	33	22	15	30	13
3	8	11	13	12	10
4	5	10	2	10	14
5	18	11	17	26	16
6	13	11	8	21	5
7	15	19	12	12	15
8	11	13	9	7	6
Totals	<u>103</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>79</u>

Grant Total: 473

Note: The two dailies yielded very comparable figures as did ST and NS, both appearing once a week. However, E, which appeared once a week as well, even surpassed both the dailies. This is perhaps because Egypt's biggest problem was seen to be economic, and correspondingly, most of the measures taken by the new regime aimed at righting the economy: consequently E found itself with the lion's share of the reporting.

5. Context Units and their Intensity Ratings Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.

(1) Chapter II, Sections 1 + 2, July 14 - September 30, 1952³

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I A.E.	1	(4)							1	(4)
	I B.E.	1	(4)	1	(4)	1	(3)	2	(6)		
	I C.E.	1	(4)								
	I F.E.	1	(4)								
	I H.US.							1	(3)		
b.	II B.E.							3	(6)		
	II D.E.	1	(3)	1	(3)			2	(6)		
c.	III A.E.	2	(8)	1	(4)	2	(9)	4	(16)		
	III B.GB.									2	(8)
	V A.			1	(5)			1	(4)		
d.	VI E.	1	(4)								
	VI A.	3	(6)	2	(2)	3	(4)			2	(4)
e.	VI B.	1	(4)	2	(6)	3	(12)	2	(7)	3	(10)
f.	VI D.	3	(14)	2	(8)	2	(8)	1	(4)	2	(6)
	VI E.	1	(2)			1	(2)				

Notes:

- a. Re. general belief that junta was sincerely aiming at reform, see p. 61.
- b. Re. apprehension that members of junta were inexperienced, p. 62.
- c. Exhortations that junta should now work for stability, and economic viability, see p. 64. Note that E was particularly prominent in this regard.
- d. Heavy criticism of old regime, see p. 63.
- e. Wholehearted support for General Neguib, see pp. 62-63.
- f. Complete approval for the coup, its engineers and the events of the first six weeks, see pp. 62-64.

³. Sections 1 + 2 have been treated together, although in fact there were no context units recorded prior to the outbreak of the crisis on July 23, 1952.
For abbreviations in this and subsequent tables see p. In addition, E = Egypt.

5 (2) Chapter II, Section 3, October 1, 1952 - June 18, 1953.

Notes (below)	Categor.	T.		MG.		ST.		E.		NS.		
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	
a. }	I	B.E.		1	(4)					1	(4)	
	I	C.E.	1	(4)								
	I	D.E.	1	(4)				1	(4)	1	(4)	
	I	G.GB.						1	(4)			
	II	B.E.						4	(8)	1	(2)	
b.	II	D.E.	1	(3)	1	(4)				1	(3)	
	II	E.E.								1	(2)	
	III	A.E.			1	(4)						
	III	B.GB.								1	(4)	
	V	E.						1	(4)			
c.	VI	B.	3	(13)	2	(9)	1	(5)	2	(9)	3	(11)
	VI	C.						1	(3)			
d.	VI	D.	2	(7)	2	(11)	2	(8)	2	(7)	2	(7)
	VI	E.			1	(3)						

Notes:

- a. Observe general praise for activities of new regime, see p.66.
- b. Apprehension concerning junta's inexperience reiterated, see p.66.
- c. Continued backing of General Neguib, see p.65.
- d. New regime's cause heavily endorsed by all, see p. 67.

5. (3) Chapter II, Section 4. Winter 1953/4 until February 28, 1954.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>		<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
			CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a. }	I	B.E.							2	(8)		
	I	D.E.	1	(4)					1	(4)		
	I	E.E.							1	(4)		
	II	B.E.							1	(2)		
	II	C.E.	2	(4)	1	(2)			1	(2)		
	II	D.E.	1	(2)	3	(5)	2	(4)	3	(6)		
	II	E.E.	1	(2)								
	III	A.E.			1	(4)						
	IV	B.	1	(4)								
	V.	D.	1	(4)								
b.	VI	A.	1	(2)	1	(2)			1	(1)		
c.	VI	B.	2	(6)	1	(4)			3	(8)		
	VI	C.	1	(4)					1	(3)		
d.	VI	D.	2	(6)			1	(3)	1	(5)	3	(11)
e.	VI	E.			1	(2)	2	(4)	1	(2)	1	(2)

Notes:

- a. E conspicuous in its support of the new regime, see pp. 69-70.
- b. Disapproval of Moslem Brotherhood, see p. 69.
- c. Continued affection for General Neguib, see p. 72.
- d. Approval of campaign against Moslem Brotherhood, see p. 69.
- e. Faults now being found with the new regime, see pp. 70-71.

5. (4) Chapter II, Section 5, March 1 - November 17, 1954.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	I	B.E.	3 (12)								
	I	E.E.				1	(4)				
	II	B.E.	1 (2)								
	II	D.E.				1	(2)			1	(3)
a.	III	A.E.	1 (3)							1	(4)
	VI	A.								1	(1)
	VI	B.	1 (3)								
b.	VI	C.	1 (4)					3	(11)	3	(11)
c.	VI	D.						1	(3)	2	(9)
d.	VI	E.	1 (3)	3	(6)	1	(2)	1	(2)	1	(3)

Notes:

- a. T and NS still called upon the junta to fulfill earlier intentions, see p. 77.
- b. Wry admissions that Colonel Nasser had won contest for complete control of Egyptian Cabinet, see p. 76.
- c. Meagre praise for continued campaign against Communists and Moslem Brethren, see p. 77.
- d. General denigration for instability and suppression tactics, see pp. 78-79.
Note MG leading critic.

5. (5) Chapter II, Section 6, Autumn, 1952 - February 12, 1953.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I G.GB.	2	(9)	1	(5)	1	(5)	1	(4)	1	(5)
	II C.E.			2	(3)						
	II E.E.			1	(2)			2	(4)	1	(3)
b.	II G.GB.							3	(6)	2	(3)
	III A.E.									1	(5)
	III B.GB.									1	(4)
	IV B.GB.	1	(4)							1	(4)
	V B.					1	(4)				
	V E.	1	(4)								
	V F.							1	(4)		
c.	VI B.	2	(9)			1	(4)	2	(9)		

Notes:

- a. Unanimous praise for British record in the Sudan, see p. 82.
- b. E and NS disapprove of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, see p. 87.
- c. Compliments for General Neguib for taking lead in preparing the ground for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Sudan, see pp. 84-85.

5. (6) Chapter II, Section 7, Summer 1953 - October 21, 1953.

<u>Notes</u> <u>(below)</u>	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	I B.E.							1	(4)		
a.	I E.E.	1	(3)					2	(8)	1	(3)
	I G.GB.	1	(3)					1	(4)		
	I H.US.									1	(4)
	II C.E.							1	(2)	1	(2)
	II D.E.	1	(2)								
b.	II E.E.	2	(5)	1	(2)	1	(3)	2	(3)		
	II F.E.							1	(1)		
c.	II G.GB.	2	(5)	1	(2)			1	(2)	4	(6)
	II H.US.									1	(2)
	III A.E.	1	(5)					1	(4)		
	III B.GB.							1	(4)		
	III C.US.							1	(4)		
d.	IV B.GB.	5	(19)	2	(8)	4	(19)	1	(4)	6	(25)
	V E.			1	(5)						
	V F.	3	(13)					3	(9)	1	(3)
	VI B.							2	(6)		
	VI E.							1	(2)		
e.	VI F.			3	(10)	4	(10)	1	(4)	1	(3)

Notes:

- a. E and others optimistic of a quick settlement once the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of the Suez Canal Base would begin, see p. 91; not so ST, see p. 89.
- b. Egyptians suspicious of G.B., see p. 92. This was seen as reason for failure of talks, except by NS (ibid).
- c. Criticism of G.B., particularly for General Festing's action - observe that NS was severest critic of the Government, see pp. 92-93.
- d. All papers recognised need for British withdrawal; observe that NS is most convinced advocate of this policy, whereas E saw "legal case" for remaining in Egypt, see pp. 90-91.
- e. General disappointment at failure of talks to produce positive results, see p. 92.
- f. Note also that E published considerably more articles on the issue than all the other papers (21 context units, as against 16 in T and NS, 9 in ST, and 8 in MG).

5. (7) Chapter II, Section 8. October 22, 1953 - October 19, 1954.

<u>Notes</u> <u>(below)</u>	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
	I A.E.					1	(4)				
	I E.E.									1	(4)
	I G.GB.	1	(4)					1	(4)		
	II C.E.			1	(1)						
	II E.E.							1	(2)		
a.	II G.GB.	1	(2)	3	(5)					4	(6)
	III A.E.	1	(4)					1	(4)		
b.	III B.GB.	1	(4)								
c.	IV B.GB.	2	(8)	2	(8)	1	(5)	1	(5)	1	(4)
	V E.	2	(8)	1	(5)						
d.	V F.	2	(8)	2	(9)	4	(18)	1	(4)	3	(12)
e	VI F.(pro.)	2	(6)	2	(8)	3	(11)	3	(9)		
f.	VI F.(con)			3	(6)			3	(6)		

Notes:

- a. NS in particular blamed G.B. for its obtuseness in Anglo-Egyptian discussions on the Suez Canal Base, see p. 97.
- b. T suggested G.B. should set about improving Anglo-Egyptian relations after signing of "Heads of Agreement" see p.99.
- c. All continued to advocate British withdrawal, see p.96.
- d. Frequent pleas to resume talks and come to some agreement, see pp. 97-98.
- e. Moderate relief when "Heads of Agreement" signed; NS notably absent as had demanded earlier signing, see p.98.
- f. MG and E were doubtful about "Heads of Agreement", see p. 98.

CHAPTER III; APPENDIX

1. Chronology of the Main Events of the Crisis.

25	March	1950	Tripartite Declaration (G.B., U.S.A., & France).
17	June	1950	Arab Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty.
1	Sept.	1951	Security Council censured Egypt for blockading Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal.
9	Feb.	1956	Mr. Black (World Bank) announced "substantial agreement" with Egypt re. Aswan Dam.
19	July	1956	Mr. Dulles told President Nasser that American aid had been withdrawn from Aswan Dam project.
20	July	1956	Britain and World Bank also withdrew aid offers.
21	July	1956	Russia refused to finance dam.
26	July	1956	President Nasser nationalised Suez Canal.
31	July	1956	President Nasser promised to abide by 1888 Constantinople Convention.
16- 23	Aug.	1956	22 Power London Conference.
9	Sept.	1956	Mr. Menzies mission to President Nasser failed.
19- 21	Sept.	1956	Second Suez Conference in London.
13	Oct.	1956	"6 Principles" on Suez Canal adopted by Security Council.
23	Oct.	1956	First reports of disturbances in Hungary.
25	Oct.	1956	First reports of Israel's intent to mobilize.
29	Oct.	1956	Israel attacked Egypt.
30	Oct.	1956	Anglo-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt.
30	Oct.	1956	G.B. and France vetoed resolution in Security Council calling for Israel to withdraw immediately.
31	Oct.	1956	Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

2	Nov.	1956	U.N. General Assembly demanded cease-fire.
4	Nov.	1956	U.N. General Assembly adopted Canadian plan for UNEF.
6	Nov.	1956	Britain and France ceased fire.
21	Nov.	1956	First UNEF contingents entered Egypt.
24	Nov.	1956	U.N. General Assembly called for Anglo-French and Israeli withdrawal.
20	Dec.	1956	G.B. placed her salvage ships under U.N. flag.
22	Dec.	1956	G.B. and France completed withdrawal.
30	Dec.	1956	Egypt consented to full-scale effort to clear Suez Canal.
3	Jan.	1957	U.S. told Israel "no support" for demands: Israel must retire.
5	Jan.	1957	"Eisenhower Doctrine" submitted to Congress.
9	Jan.	1957	Sir Anthony Eden resigned.
19	Jan.	1957	U.N. again called on Israel to withdraw.
1	Feb.	1957	U.S. again demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal from remaining positions (Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh),
13	Feb.	1957	Egypt obstructed clearance of <u>Edgar Bonnet</u> .
1	March	1957	Israel agreed to prompt withdrawal.
8	March	1957	Israel withdrew completely behind armistice lines.
14	March	1957	Egyptian administrators entered Gaza.
28	March	1957	President Nasser's terms for Suez Canal fully released.
9	April	1957	Ships began passing through Suez Canal.
24	April	1957	U.S. sent ship through Suez Canal.
19	May	1957	SCUA allowed member nations to use Suez Canal.
13	May	1957	G.B. lifted ban on her ships bound for Suez Canal.
25	May	1957	Anglo-Egyptian talks began in Rome.

2. Chronology of Main Contemporaneous Events Reported in the British Press during the Crisis.¹

1956

Discussion on Suez Canal began in U.N. Security Council (Oct.5).
 Seretse Khama returned to Bechuanaland after 6 years exile (Oct.10).
 Mr. Gomulka elected First Secretary of Polish Workers' Party (Oct.21).
 Fighting between demonstrators and Soviet troops in Budapest (Oct.23).
 Nagy became Prime Minister of Hungary (Oct.24).
 Kadar became First Secretary of Hungarian Workers' Party (Oct.25).
 Cardinal Mindszenty returned to Budapest (Oct.31).
 Hungarian Government renounced Warsaw Pact (Nov.1).
 Soviet forces bombed Budapest. Kadar replaced Nagy (Nov. 4).
 President Eisenhower elected again in America (Nov.7).
 Dispute between Britain and Iceland over fisheries settled (Nov.14).
 Hungarian refugees began to arrive in Britain (Nov.17).
 Sir Anthony Eden ordered to rest by doctors (Nov.19).
 16th Olympic Games opened in Melbourne (Nov.22).
 Resistance to Russians continued in Hungary (Dec.4).
 140 persons arrested in S.Africa for treason (Dec.5).

1957

Saar became part of Federal Germany (Jan.1).
 Agreement reached between Russia and East Germany (Jan.7).
 Sir Anthony Eden resigned as Prime Minister (Jan.9).
 Princess Grace of Monaco gave birth to heir (Jan.23).
 Bank rate cut to 5% (Feb.7).
 British forces to be reduced by 65,500 men (Feb.13).
 Mr. Gromyko replaced Mr. Shepilov as Foreign Minister of U.S.S.R. (Feb.15).

¹. Abstracted from the Daily Mail Year Book for 1958 (ed. G.B. Newman) (London, 1958), pp.27.30.

Plans to treble nuclear power programmes announced (Mar.5).
Ghana declared independent (Mar.6).
Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 ended (Mar.13).
Entire British shipbuilding industry halted by strike
(Mar.16).
Bermuda Conference between U.S.A. and G.B. began
(Mar.21).
Archbishop Makarios to be released from Seychelles
(Mar.28).
Russian industry to be reorganised and decentralised
(Mar.29).
Crisis in Jordan after Nabulsi dismissed (Apr.10).
Labour gains in Municipal elections in England and
Wales (May 9).
Petrol rationing ended in Britain (May 15).
M. Mollet resigned as French Premier (May 21).
Riots in Taipeh against U.S. (May 24).

Columns.

60

50

40

30

20

10

Oct.
1956

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.
1957.

Feb.

Mar.


April.

May.

Suez Crisis.

Graph of Column Lengths.

$T = 8$ editions per week. —
 $M_4 = 8$ " " " "
 $ST = 4$ " " " "
 $\therefore 1T = 1M_4 = 2ST.$



3. Column Lengths of News-Items in The Times, The Manchester Guardian and The Sunday Times Appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Section of Chapter III.</u>	<u>Paper</u>	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>
1, 2 & 3 (October 22, 1956 - Dec. 30, 1956)	T	$6\frac{1}{8}$	$58\frac{3}{8}$	$20\frac{1}{2}$
	MG	$9\frac{1}{8}$	46	$13\frac{7}{8}$
	ST	$\frac{1}{2}$	$23\frac{3}{4}$	$8\frac{7}{8}$
		<u>Jan.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	
4 (January 1, 1957 - Feb. 28, 1957)	T	$10\frac{3}{8}$	$16\frac{3}{4}$	
	MG	12	$14\frac{1}{8}$	
	ST	$1\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	
		<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>	<u>May</u>
5 (March 1, 1957 - May 31, 1957)	T	13	$9\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{3}{8}$
	MG	$9\frac{3}{4}$	$7\frac{7}{8}$	$5\frac{5}{8}$
	ST	$9\frac{1}{2}$	$1\frac{3}{8}$	$2\frac{3}{8}$

4. Recording Units Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.

<u>Section of Chapter III</u>	T.	MG.	ST.	E.	NS.
1		6		3	13
2	42	62	38	38	33
3	24	39	16	29	22
4	36	78	24	44	29
5	44	31	5	22	13
Totals	<u>146</u>	<u>216</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>110</u>

Grand Total. 691

Note: MG proportionately yielded almost twice as many recording units as the average for the sample, and of equal significance ST yielded least of these units in its effort to support the Government.

5. Context Units and their Intensity Ratings Found in the Papers Appertaining to the Crisis.

(1). Chapter III, Section 1, October 22-28, 1956

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a. }	I G.GB.							1	(4)		
	I H.UN.							1	(4)		
b. }	II A.ME							1	(2)	1	(3)
	II C.E.			1	(2)						
c. }	II G.GB.			1	(2)					2	(4)
	V E.			1	(4)						
d. }	VI B.									1	(5)
	VI F.									1	(5)

Note: For abbreviations in this and subsequent tables see p.

in addition,

I = Israel

ME = Middle East

R = Russia

Notes:

- a. Praise for G.B.'s securing of agreement on "Six principles" in United Nations, see p.113.
- b. War warnings, see p.114.
- c. MG and NS critical of G.B.'s recall of 20,000 reservists, see p.114.
- d. NS concerned for Israel's security, see p.114.

5. (2) Chapter III, Section 2, October 29 - November 7, 1956.

Notes (below)	Categ.	T.		MG.		ST.		E.		NS.	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I D.I.					3	(14)				
	I F.I.	1	(3)								
b.	I G.GB.	1	(5)	1	(3)	9	(43)	11	(4)		
c.	II A.ME.	1	(3)			1	(1)				
	II F.I.									1	(2)
d.	II G.GB.	8	(16)	14	(16)			10	(11)	15	(15)
e.	II H.US.	1	(2)			1	(1)				
f.	II H.R.	1	(1)								
g.	III A.I.			2	(10)						
	III A.GB.	1	(4)			1	(5)	1	(4)		
h.	III C.UN.			1	(5)			1	(4)		
i.	III C.US.			3	(15)						
	IV B.GB.			1	(5)	1	(5)			1	(5)
	V C.	1	(5)								
j.	VI A.	1	(4)	1	(5)			2	(8)		
	VI B.	1	(4)								
	VI E.			1	(4)						
k.	Collusion Charges							1	(5)		

Notes:

- a. ST praised Israeli action, see p.126.
- b. ST supported G.B.'s action wholeheartedly, see pp. 118 sqq.
T for first two days supported British declared intentions, see p.118.
MG and E praised British soldiers' skill, see p.126.
- c. T and ST argued that battles are infectious, and therefore must be stopped, see pp. 118 & 120.

- d. All papers, except ST, castigated Government for Anglo-French intervention, see pp.118 sqq.
- e. T and ST put part of blame for crisis on America on account of its policy during preceding months, see p.125.
- f. T objected to threatening notes from Mr. Bulganin, see p.125.
- g. MG urged restraint from Israel, see p.126.
- h. MG and E designated U.N. to solve crisis, see p.127.
- i. MG specified U.S. within U.N. to take lead in solving crisis, see p.128.
- j. Papers were quick to support proposed U.N. force for area, see p.128.
- k. E published one article expressing the conviction that there had been collusion between G.B., France and Israel, see p.131, (in Section 3).

5. (3) Chapter III, Section 3, November 7 - December 22, 1956.

<u>Notes</u> (below)	<u>Categ.</u>		T.		MG.		ST.		E.		NS.	
			CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a.	I	G.GB.	1	(4)	4	(16)						
	I	H.UN.			1	(5)						
	I	H.US.			1	(4)	1	(4)				
	II	A.ME.	2	(4)								
	II	C.E.	1	(1)			1	(2)				
b.	II	E.E.	2	(3)								
	II	F.E.									1	(2)
c.	II	H.UN.	3	(3)			1	(2)			2	(4)
d.	II	H.US.					3	(6)				
	II	H.R.	1	(1)								
	III	A.E.	1	(4)	2	(8)			1	(4)		
e.	III	B.GB.	1	(5)	3	(15)	3	(15)	3	(15)		
	III	C.UN.	1	(4)	1	(5)	1	(5)	2	(10)	2	(9)
f.	III	C.US.	2	(8)	1	(5)	1	(5)	2	(10)	1	(4)
h.	IV	B.GB.	1	(5)	2	(10)					2	(10)
	V	C.	1	(3)								
	V	E.			1	(5)	1	(5)	1	(5)		
	V	F.	1	(4)	1	(5)						
i.	VI	A.	1	(5)	2	(9)	1	(5)	3	(14)	2	(8)
	VI	C.							1	(5)		
	VI	D.			1	(5)					1	(5)
j.		Collusion charges			3	(14)					2	(10)

Notes:

- a. MG particularly pleased when G.B. showed signs of co-operating with U.N., as corollary of this paper's frequent demands for G.B. to do same, see p. 132.

- b. Frequent criticism of Egypt on various grounds, mainly for obduracy and unco-operative attitudes, see pp.136-137.
- c. T and NS especially complained against U.N. dilatoriness in December, 1956, see p.131.
- d. ST alone in objecting to American attitude in November, 1956, see p. 134.
- e. Generally urged that G.B. must co-operate with U.N., and also help repair the Atlantic Alliance, see p.132.
- f. Unanimously demanded that U.N. should take "strong line" with Egypt in enforcing its decisions; in this E and NS most prominent, see p.131.
- g. Similarly unanimous demand that U.S. take lead within U.N., see p.135.
- h. MG and NS eager that G.B. should withdraw from Suez, see p.132.
- i. General acclaim for U.N.'s speed in organising UNEF, especially from MG, E and NS, see p.130.
- j. MG and NS voiced strong belief that there was collusion between G.B., France, and Israel before and during the crisis; they joined E in this, see pp.131-132.

5. (4) Chapter III, Section 4, December 23, 1956 - March 8, 1957.

Notes (below)	Categ.	T.		MG.		ST.		E.		NS.	
		CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR
a. }	I	C.I.						1	(4)	1	(5)
	I	D.I.				1	(4)				
	I	H.UN.						1	(4)		
b. }	II	C.E.	1	(1)	4	(5)	1	(1)		2	(4)
	II	E.E.	1	(2)	1	(2)		1	(2)	1	(2)
	II	F.E.						1	(2)		
c.	II	H.UN.	3	(6)	4	(8)	3	(5)	2	(3)	
d.	II	H.US.			1	(2)	2	(2)	3	(4)	
	III	A.E.			1	(5)					
	III	B.GB.						1	(5)	1	(5)
e.	III	C.UN.	3	(12)	1	(5)		3	(14)	2	(9)
f.	III	C.US.	2	(8)	5	(28)				1	(4)
	IV	C.E.					1	(2)			
	V	E.	1	(4)				1	(5)		
	V	F.	2	(8)							
	VI	A.			1	(5)		3	(14)	1	(3)
g.	VI	C.	3	(12)	3	(12)				2	(9)
h.	VI	E.	2	(8)	2	(9)				1	(4)
	VI	F.						1	(4)		
	VI	G.	1	(4)	3	(14)				1	(1)
	VI	H.	1	(2)							

Notes:

- a. Press was sympathetic to Israel; it is noteworthy that there were no context units recorded disapproving of Israel; see p.144.
- b. Press was extremely hostile to Egypt; in contradistinction with Israel no context units were recorded approving of Egypt, (Category II C.E. chastised Egypt for her methods, and Category II.E.E. spoke out against Egypt's intransigent attitude); see pp.142-143.

- c. General despair with U.N. which was considered to be weak and timid, see pp. 139-140.
- d. Disappointment with U.S. for not taking lead within U.N. and not giving Israel the assurances she was seeking; see pp. 147-148.
- e. Re. demands for U.N. to face up to its tasks, see p. 140.
- f. Observe MG very eager that U.S. should take lead within U.N., see p. 148.
- g. Re. demands that Israel should be given the guarantees she was seeking, see p. 146.
- h. Re. demands that Israel should withdraw, (after receiving appropriate guarantees); see p. 145.

5. (5) Chapter III, Section 5, March 9 - May 31, 1957.

<u>Notes</u> (below)		<u>Categ.</u>	<u>T.</u>		<u>MG.</u>		<u>ST.</u>		<u>E.</u>		<u>NS.</u>		
			CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	CU	IR	
	I	C.I.									1	(5)	
	I	E.E.	1	(3)									
	I	G.GB.	1	(4)					1	(4)			
a.	}	II	A.E.			1	(1)			1	(2)		
		II	C.E.	4	(5)	4	(4)			2	(3)		
		II	E.E.	3	(4)	2	(3)	1	(1)	2	(4)		
b.	II	H.UN.	4	(6)					1	(2)			
c.	II	H.US.	6	(9)	1	(2)	1	(3)	1	(3)			
	III	A.E.							1	(4)			
d.	III	B.GB.	1	(4)			1	(4)	1	(4)	1	(4)	
e.	III	C.E.	3	(12)	3	(14)			1	(4)	1	(4)	
	IV	A.E.	1	(2)	1	(4)			1	(4)			
	IV	B.GB.	2	(8)							1	(4)	
	IV	C.UN	1	(2)									
	V	C.									1	(4)	
f.	V	E.	4	(17)	2	(8)	1	(4)					
g.	VI	A.	1	(3)	1	(3)					1	(1)	
	VI	B.	1	(3)									
	VI	C.									1	(4)	
h.	VI	F.									3	(14)	
	VI	G.									1	(2)	
i.	VI	H.	1	(4)	3	(7)			1	(2)			
j.	VI	I.	1	(4)	1	(3)			2	(8)	1	(5)	

Notes:

- a. Heavy attacks on Egypt, particularly from T, continued; burden of criticism again aimed at Egyptian methods and intransigent attitudes; see pp. 152-153.
- b. T was highly critical of U.N. for "shirking its duty", see p. 150.

- c. All papers, except NS, disdained American efforts to help in negotiations with President Nasser; see p.153.
- d. Re. various demands made of G.B., see pp. 156-157.
- e. T and MG adamant that Egypt should co-operate, see pp.151-152.
- f. T took lead in urging that SCUA nations present united front against Egyptian terms; see p.154.
- g. Repeated complaints against UNEF when Egypt returned to Gaza; see p.150.
- h. NS emphatic re. Israel's rights to use Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba; see p.155.
- i. MG firmly opposed to the use of sanctions against Israel, see p.146.
- j. Papers reluctantly suggested that the Suez Canal be used on Egyptian terms; observe that ST was silent on this issue, and E was most insistent; see pp.155-156.
- k. Observe that NS was quietest on most aspects of the crisis by this stage, except with reference to Israel's rights; see p.155.

SUPPLEMENT ON UNIVERSE AND METHOD

1. UNIVERSE

This study is a sampling; necessarily so, because a complete analysis of everything that was written by the leading British press on the topics at hand would have been a mammoth task, if for no other reason than volume alone. But it is our belief that this is a representative and significant sampling. The newspapers employed were five in number: namely, The Times, The Manchester Guardian,¹ The Sunday Times,² The Economist, and the New Statesman and Nation.³ The last two named are weekly magazines. Our "spectrum" therefore was made up of two dailies, one Sunday newspaper and two weekly journals.

Each of these newspapers is long established and enjoys a first-class reputation. They are, with the exception of The Manchester Guardian, published in London, and are read throughout the British Isles on the day of publication. It is reasonable to assume that one or other is read regularly by the majority of thinking people in Great

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1. In 1959, The Manchester Guardian changed its name to The Guardian, but in this study it will be referred to by its former name (as it was in the years described); since 1961 The Guardian has also been published in London.
 2. This is an independent newspaper and is in no way connected with The Times.
 3. In 1958, this paper changed its name to New Statesman by which it was already generally known; in this study it will be referred to by this shorter and more popular name.

Britain. These newspapers were selected in particular as each points in a different direction politically, and as will be gathered from what follows, they cover the political affiliations of the vast majority of Britons. Since it was part of our aim to trace the attitudes and opinions of various segments of the British public, the papers employed in this study were taken to be representative, at least to some degree, of the political groups to which they incline. Thus, in speaking of each paper, we also mean to imply the supporters of the political party to which they as newspapers give allegiance. This was done in the belief that the attitudes of the politically conscious are formed to a significant degree by the authoritative press.

(a) The Times is described officially as "National and Independent".⁴ It carries by far the most influence and prestige as a newspaper in the country, and:

"Since the first quarter of the 19th century The Times,....., never ceased to be the preferred reading of the politically intelligent, and has never lacked close connexion with the government, the professions, and the men of finance. Its policy remains national, supporting the government of the day in so far as it is seen to receive the support of public opinion."
(italics mine) 5.

4. The Newspaper Press Directory and Advertisers' Guide, London, Benn Bros.Ltd., 1953, p.57.

5. Chamber's Encyclopaedia, London, George Newnes Ltd., (New Edition), 1955, Vol.XIII, p.642.

(b) The Manchester Guardian is described as "Liberal".⁶

"The Manchester Guardian is, next to The Times, probably the best known British daily abroad. Under the editorship of C.P. Scott, it became the exponent of British liberalism in a political sense and of liberal thought and action in cultural and economic fields." 7

(c) The Sunday Times is described as "Conservative".⁸

A fuller authoritative description of its editorial policies was not found, but this paper is generally regarded as a confirmed right-wing supporter, and a great admirer of tradition, royalty and the church. It does not carry as much political influence as The Observer (another great Sunday newspaper),⁹ but it was preferred for our sample, as the latter is inclined to be liberal in its politics, which point of view was already well represented by The Manchester Guardian. The Sunday Times was also selected in preference to The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, because, although that paper too is right-wing in its political affiliations, it falls short of the other newspapers in this study in terms of "class". Furthermore, to achieve an adequate balance of the press surveyed, it was felt necessary to

6. The Newspaper Press Guide, op.cit., p.141.

7. Chamber's Encyclopaedia, op.cit., Vol.IX, p.52.

8. The Newspaper Press Guide, op.cit., p.61.

9. "The Observer, the most powerful political organ among the Sunday newspapers, was founded in 1791." (*italics mine*). Encyclopaedia Britannica, University of Chicago, 1949, vol.16, p.342.

include a Sunday newspaper; it was this last consideration which excluded The Spectator, (a right-wing weekly journal).

(d) The Economist. The political leanings of this paper were difficult to ascertain, for it does not commit itself to any fixed point of view in The Newspaper Press Directory. Those hints which were found, were confusing.

On the frontispiece to bound volumes of this paper there is printed a quotation from Adam Smith advocating free trade in the best liberal tradition. Then, writing about itself in 1948, it said:

"This journal has never been Socialist in its views, that is true enough; but it has always been well to the left of centre and that is where it stands today." 10

But nine years later it wrote:

" - and The Economist does not disguise its independent view that progressive Conservatism is still, all things considered, the best medicine for the country at this stage - " 11.

The present writer feels that the second quotation is a more accurate expression of the paper's sympathies during the years investigated (at least in the field of foreign affairs which was our concern).

(e) New Statesman and Nation. Whilst in The Newspaper Press Directory this paper is simply described as "Independent",¹² the Encyclopaedia Britannica depicts it

10. The Economist "Wages Impolicy", Vol.154, p.3, January 3, 1948.

11. The Economist "Ring in the New", Vol.181, p.1109, December 28, 1956.

12. The Newspaper Press Directory, op.cit., p.352.

more forcefully as:

"A moderate exponent of Socialist policies."¹³

The New Statesman, writing about itself in 1956, asserted its attachment to "unsentimental Fabianism."¹⁴ This weekly, which is in fact unashamedly left-wing, was held to be a fair counterweight to the rightish Economist.

The circulations of these newspapers were:¹⁵

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1957</u>
<u>The Times</u>	253,502	235,814	232,719
<u>The Manchester Guardian</u>	140,224	127,083	176,924
<u>The Sunday Times</u>	535,021	495,300	740,133
<u>The Economist</u>	not released	49,943	59,733
<u>New Statesman and Nation</u>	77,509	77,814	79,735

The number of people reading these papers, of course, will be in excess of the number of papers circulated.

13. Encyclopaedia Britannica, loc.cit.

14. New Statesman and Nation, Critic "London Diary", Vol.51, p.185, March 3, 1956.

15. All circulation figures were abstracted from The Newspaper Press Directory, op.cit.
The first available figures, for 1950, were released in 1951 in the Centennial Issue, 1951.
Figures for 1952 from Annual 102nd Issue, 1953,
Figures for 1957 from Annual 107th Issue, 1958.

2. METHOD.

i) Initial considerations

(a) How could the content of the dailies reasonably be compared with that of the weeklies? Obviously, in terms of bulk alone, the dailies were many times greater than the weeklies. Then, the nature of their respective contents was not similar; as, to instance the major difference itself, the weekly journals did not print news-items. Where did The Sunday Times, as a weekly newspaper, fit into the scheme of things?

(b) The quantity of material to be examined was very large, and as yet imprecisely defined. Was everything equally relevant and was every item to be accorded the same weight?

ii) Definition of the sample

In an attempt to solve these problems, the following working policy was adopted and pursued:-

(a) The period to be read for each crisis was considered to begin at the commencement of the publishing week prior to the full outbreak of the crisis. The events leading up to the crisis, perhaps stretching over many years, were described in a brief historical introduction to the chapter, but were ignored for the purposes of analysis proper. Reading concluded at the end of three publishing weeks after the settlement of the crisis or the last major turning-point before it passed into (comparative) oblivion.

(b) Only news-items, editorials, feature articles and the like, directly related to the crisis under discussion were treated as relevant. Other items which might perhaps be indirectly connected with the topic were not included.

(c) "Letters to the Editor" were also regarded as inadmissible material, since they were of such an unequal nature that they could not be classified consistently. They ranged in content between the equivalent of news-items on the one hand and extreme opinion contrary to the publishing newspapers' position on the other. Often they were neither news nor opinion, but neutral items such as mutual recriminations between offended readers and contributors.

These exclusions served a double function. First, they narrowed down the quantity of material to be scrutinized; and then, of greater note, they helped to put the dailies and the weeklies on a more equal footing. It will readily be understood that one of the greatest advantages a daily has over a weekly is that it can publish many more articles of an incidental nature than the latter, and similarly it can devote many columns to correspondence, whereas the weekly is extremely limited in these respects. It is admitted that these exclusions may have resulted in the passing-over of some relevant information, but we would contend that omitted data were not sufficient to unbalance a proper understanding of the various papers' points of view.

(d) A "trial-run" had revealed that the coverage of news in the two daily newspapers was generally neutral, and unembellished with opinions and value judgments. Certainly, the news-items were always free from the newspapers' suggestions of what ought to be done in any given circumstance. Moreover, these items were often identical, as the two papers shared the same news agencies.¹⁶ It was therefore decided that the news-items of these daily papers should be treated separately, for they could simply be quantified and compared in terms of column lengths, without being scrutinized for opinions and recommendations. A random sample of two editions of each paper in every publishing week was measured for presentation (see below).

This meant that the weekly journals were now more or less on a par with the dailies, because all analysis of judgments and prescriptions was conducted from editorials, feature articles, etc., which were carried by both classes of paper, and where length was not the essential criterion.

(e) The Sunday Times, however, was in a special category, since as a newspaper, it did report the weekend news. Furthermore, there was an added complication in that this paper generally published only one lengthy

16. Each such item was acknowledged at its end by the reference "'The T.' & 'M.G.' Service." Other news agencies included Reuter, British United Press, and Associated Press.

editorial a week, usually on home affairs, and devoted the larger part of its feature articles not to politics, but to literature, history and the arts. It also permitted its reporters greater editorial licence than the two dailies, and opinions were very often expressed in the news columns.¹⁷

Therefore to meet these characteristics, the news-items in The Sunday Times were both scrutinized for opinions, and also measured for presentation alongside the figures from The Times and The Manchester Guardian. All other items (editorials, features, etc.) were examined in the same way as the rest of the papers.

In sum, every pertinent editorial, feature, etc., in the dailies during the crises were read, as were all such items in the weeklies. As well as these, in the special case of The Sunday Times, news-items were also read, as they too yielded value-judgments and prescriptions.

iii) Quantification

(a) News-items (newspapers only).

As indicated above, news-items were treated separately and measured in terms of columns and parts of columns. Two random editions of The Times and The Manchester

17. In 1957 the size of The Sunday Times was greatly enlarged and with more space for feature articles the policy of allowing reporters the licence to express opinions seems to have been curtailed to some extent. However, the method of handling this paper, described above, was applied throughout.

Guardian in every publishing week and all editions of The Sunday Times were measured. The total length of columns every calendar month devoted to the crises by each newspaper has been tabulated and presented in appendices to each crisis examined.¹⁸

(b) Editorials, feature articles, etc.

Opinions, judgments and recommendations found in these items were quantified and classified on two levels. This system accommodated each "value-toned" expression in its own right, and also treated that same expression in terms of the context in which it was found.

1. The recording unit - i.e. the smaller unit to be recorded.¹⁹

Every discrete opinion, both descriptive and prescriptive, constituted one recording unit. No lesser recording value was ascribed to an opinion which was expressed in a single word or short phrase, than to one opinion which took a whole paragraph to express. All such recorded units were classified according to the categories below, and described in the narrative of the study. The

18. News "lineage" alone was measured. This included headlines but excluded photographs, maps and cartoons. Also the verbatim reports of Parliamentary debates published daily in The Times were not measured.

19. For full description of recording and context units, see Dorwin P. Cartwright "Analysis of Qualitative Material" in Festinger, Leon and Daniel Katz (eds.) Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences (London, 1954), p.436 sqq.

total number of recording units in each paper on the three crises was stated in the appendices to their respective chapters according to the same divisions as the tables of context units below.

2. The context unit - i.e. the larger unit to be recorded.

The context unit represented the burden of the whole article, or (if the article was clearly arranged in sections) the burden of each of its parts. These units were classified by the major divisions of the categories below.²⁰ They were then counted and tabulated for presentation in the appendices. These tables were arranged in accordance with the sub-divisions of the chapters to which they referred.

This is to say, the material analysed was quantified in three ways. News-items were simply measured in terms of lineage; opinions in editorials and the like were classified first as recording units and secondly as context units. The recording units were like the individual trees of which a forest consists: they have been described in full in the narrative of this study, and each footnoted reference to the sources represents a single recording unit. The context units enabled the writer to see the larger groupings of "trees" of which the "forest"

20. I.e. According to categories IA, IB, IC, etc., each as a whole and not in terms of their further sub-divisions (IAI, 2, 3, 4, etc.).

was made up. He has endeavoured to convey this in the course of the narrative by describing the major emphases of concern in the several papers throughout the developing crises. (See below, Illustration of Method).

iv) Measurement of intensity

Precise mensuration of intensity of opinion calls for a highly specialised examination of content, and for a well defined rating scale. Although our primary interest was not to measure the intensity of the opinions as found in each newspaper, it was considered essential that there should be an intensity gauge of some kind. Merely to know, for example, that two newspapers advocated the same policy was insufficient, as one paper could be very reserved, while the other might be quite adamant about the matter.

Therefore, the context units (above) were also given an intensity value rating on a simple 5 point scale as follows:-

Those <u>context units</u> regarded as Very Favourable ...	5 points	} Positive Rating Values
Those <u>context units</u> regarded as Favourable ...	4 "	
Those <u>context units</u> regarded as Non-committal .	3 "	
Those <u>context units</u> regarded as Unfavourable .	2 "	} Negative Rating Values
Those <u>context units</u> regarded as Very Unfavourable .	1 "	

We may have found that for one four week period in a single major category two newspapers each yielded two recording units. Those of one paper had intensity values of 3 and 4 points respectively, while those of the other

had intensity values of 5 and 5 points. By adding the points, we find that the first paper was in favour of the situation or action to the extent of 7 points, whereas the second newspaper was more enthusiastically in favour to the extent of 10 points. These results were also tabulated according to the same time periods as the context units and presented beside them in the appendices.

A secondary gauge of intensity, which admittedly had but limited utility, was simply to observe the frequency with which an opinion recurred in any paper. No attempt has been made to arrive at an equivalence between, by way of example, an opinion expressed once with an intensity rating value of 5 points in one paper, as against the same opinion occurring twice elsewhere with a combined value rating of 6 points; such an attempt would have unnecessarily raised many theoretic problems. Nevertheless, the reader will in all probability find it a convenient guide to the individual papers' major concerns if attention is given to the footnotes and the predominance of reference to specific papers is marked.

v) Categories

Our categories have been taken extensively from Henry C. Bush, who made a similar study, measuring opinion in Great Britain regarding the United States and Russia between 1946 and 1950.²¹ His categories have been

²¹. Bush, Henry C. British Press and Parliamentary Opinion about the United States and the Soviet Union, 1946-1950, (University of Chicago, 1954), pp.37-42.

modified freely to fit our own purposes, and Sections IG, IH, IIG, IIH, IIIC, IVC, VI, and VII, plus their sub-divisions have been added by ourselves.

All recording units were classified into the following categories:-

I. Those "descriptive" opinions usually associated with approval (from Great Britain's point of view).

Context units falling within this section all received positive intensity rating values.

A. Effects of (M.E.) upon Britain, Europe and the World. 22

1. M.E. keeps the peace, adds to Britain's safety.
2. M.E. helps Britain economically and otherwise.
3. M.E. is not infringing on Britain's independence, or freedom of action, and is not detracting from Britain's prestige, influence and honour.
4. M.E. is pro-West.
5. M.E. is helping Europe and the World economically.

B. Internal political and economic characteristics of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is progressive, and legislates wisely.
2. M.E. achieves approximate social justice, (although it is not as democratic as Britain, and not in the same sense).
3. M.E. is economically stable, and is not boom-or-bust-bound.

C. Norms and Methods of (M.E.)

1. M.E. acts legally, observes treaty obligations, and obeys the law.

22. The abbreviation M.E. (Middle East) has been used throughout in the enunciation of the categories, but it should be understood that this is a convenience and it was substituted by "Palestine", "Arabs", "Jews", "Egypt", "Suez Canal", etc., to fit each crisis as required.

2. M.E. obeys U.N.O. and helps U.N.O.
3. M.E. does not abuse its power, exercises restraint in its dealings with others; acts multilaterally and does not throw its weight around in world politics.

D. Capacity of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is skilled, experienced, diplomatic, and knows what it is doing.
2. M.E. is strong, and united.

E. Personality of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is co-operative, internationalist.
2. M.E. is friendly, sympathetic, generous.

F. Morality of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is morally right; possesses moral prestige, is just, fair.
2. M.E. is aware of its responsibilities, is doing its duty in and for the world.

G. The role of Britain in the (M.E.)

1. Britain helps the M.E.: to keep the peace, economically, etc.; and deals with M.E. in such a way as to protect her own honour.
2. Britain treats M.E. legally, respects treaty obligations, and does not bully M.E.
3. Britain is skilled, experienced, and knows what she is doing.
4. Britain is co-operative and sympathetic to M.E.
5. Britain is morally right in her dealings with M.E.
6. Britain is successful in the M.E.

H. The role of the United Nations, America, and other nations or bodies in the (M.E.) 23

1. (U.N.) can and does help in the M.E.
2. (U.N.) helps and supports Britain in the M.E.

23. The abbreviation U.N. (United Nations) has been used in the enunciation of this category, and also in categories IIH, IIIC, and others below, but again it should be understood (as in footnote 22) that it was substituted by the appropriate nation or body as each case required.

3. (U.N.) is skilled, experienced, co-operative and sympathetic.
4. (U.N.) is morally right.
5. These nations or bodies act legally and support (U.N.) in the M.E.

II. Those "descriptive" opinions usually associated with disapproval (from Britain's point of view).
Context units falling within this section all received negative intensity rating values.

A. Effects of M.E. upon Britain, Europe and the World.

1. M.E. is a threat to peace.
2. M.E. is hurting Britain economically.
3. M.E. detracts from the prestige or dignity of Britain or infringes upon or reduces Britain's freedom of action.
4. M.E. hurts Europe, and/or the World.
5. M.E. hurts Europe, and/or the World economically.

B. Internal political and economic characteristics of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is anti-democratic, totalitarian.
2. M.E. is reactionary, opposed to or not working for social change.
3. M.E. does not achieve social justice; M.E. permits economic inequality, allows large rewards for some at the expense of many poor; M.E. exploits its (or other nations') people.
4. M.E. is economically unstable, heading for or in either inflation or deflation.

C. Goals and Norms of (M.E.)

1. M.E. acts illegally, ignores its treaty obligations.
2. M.E. hurts or disobeys the U.N.
3. M.E. uses deception or violence, abuses its power, bullies other nations, and abuses the institutions of international affairs.
4. M.E. is imperialist.
5. M.E.'s motive is to get or retain markets, loot, or investments which belong to others.

D. Capacity of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is inexperienced, cannot lead, lacks ability and does not know what it is doing.
2. M.E. is weak, unstable, disorganised.

E. Personality of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is unduly sensitive, suspicious, unduly secretive.
2. M.E. is selfish, stubborn, unco-operative, not persuadable.
3. M.E. is hostile, hates Britain.
4. M.E. has a bias against communism.
5. M.E. has a Marxist bias, and co-operates with the U.S.S.R.

F. Morality of (M.E.)

1. M.E. is morally wrong, lacking in moral prestige, unjust, unfair.
2. M.E. lacks moral purpose, is morally mean.
3. M.E. is irresponsible, is not aware of and is not fulfilling its duties to Britain and the World.

G. Role of Britain in the (M.E.)

1. Britain does not help to keep the peace in M.E., and does not act to protect her own economic interests, her prestige and honour in the M.E.
2. Britain does not treat M.E. legally, does not respect treaty obligations, and bullies M.E.
3. Britain is not co-operative, sympathetic to M.E.
4. Britain is morally wrong, is deceitful in M.E.
5. Britain is blundering, unsuccessful in M.E.

H. Role of United Nations, America and other nations or bodies in the (M.E.)

1. (U.N.) cannot or does not help in M.E.
2. (U.N.) does not help or support Britain in M.E.
3. (U.N.) does not act legally.
4. (U.N.) is not skilled, is inexperienced, unco-operative, irresponsible.
5. (U.N.) is morally wrong.

III. Prescriptions (i.e. expectations and demands) for positive action, usually associated with approval (from Britain's point of view).

Context units falling within this section all received positive intensity rating values.

A. (M.E.) should, will or must:

1. Give Britain money.
2. Lower its trade barriers and import from Britain.
3. Provide men and money in common defence.
4. Strive towards its own internal stability, removing corruption and disturbing factors.
5. Work for social, economic and political reform.
6. Co-operate with U.N. and other nations or bodies.

B. Britain should, will or must:

1. Use her best endeavours to solve crises in M.E.
2. Increase her ties to, and co-operate with M.E.; take pains not to alienate M.E.
3. Welcome M.E. investment in Britain.
4. Seek trade and increase trade in M.E.
5. Preserve or restore good relations with the rest of the world, and not lose friends on account of her dispute in M.E.

C. United Nations, America, and other nations or bodies should, will or must:

1. Use influence to solve crisis in M.E.
2. Support and help Britain in M.E.
3. Give aid, financially or militarily.

IV. Prescriptions (i.e. expectations and demands) for non-positive action, usually associated with disapproval (from Britain's point of view).

Context units falling within this section all received negative intensity value ratings.

A. M.E. should, will or must not:

1. Co-operate.
2. Give Britain money or goods.
3. Provide men or arms.
4. Buy British goods or increase trade with Britain.

B. Britain should, will or must:

1. Not increase her ties with M.E. but seek to lessen or sever them.
2. Not seek or welcome M.E. investment in Britain.
3. Not trade with M.E.
4. Take diplomatic action against M.E.
5. Counter M.E. threats and action likewise.
6. Wage propaganda war against M.E.
7. Not compromise.
8. Embargo war materials and military aid.

C. United Nations, America and other nations or bodies should, will or must not:

1. Help in the crisis in M.E.
2. Interfere in the crisis in M.E.
3. Help Britain in the crisis in M.E.

V. Other prescriptions.

Context units falling within this section received positive or negative intensity rating values as the sense required.

- A. Britain should/must be neutral and not interfere in M.E.
- B. Britain should/must seek to be an independent mediator in M.E.
- C. The crisis in M.E. should/must be handed over to a neutral power or body (e.g. U.N.) for solution.
- D. Interested parties should/must not interfere in M.E.
- E. All interested should/must work together, make compromises and help towards success.
- F. Action should/must be speeded up, by formulating some plan or policy and reaching agreement.

VI. Special Categories.²⁴

Context units falling within this section received positive or negative intensity rating values as the sense required.

Chap. I: Partition of Palestine and Establishment of State of Israel.

- A. Some form of federalisation should/must be instituted in Palestine.
- B. Palestine should/must be partitioned.
- C. Terrorism and violence should/must cease.
- D. U.N. should/must form an international body to help towards or enforce a solution in Palestine.
- E. Opinions expressed about Mr. Bevin.
- F. Palestine should/must be held as trusteeship.

Chap. II: Revolution in Egypt, 1952-54.

- A. Opinions expressed about Farouk and the old regime.
- B. Opinions expressed about General Neguib.
- C. Opinions expressed about Colonel Nasser.
- D. Opinions expressed about the new regime (positive).
- E. Opinions expressed about the new regime (negative).
- F. Opinions expressed about the negotiations and agreements over the Sudan and the Suez Canal Zone.

24. This section was designed for the provision of special categories to meet particular needs of the individual crises. Its purpose was to offer adequate elasticity without disrupting the above scheme of categories. Had new categories been inserted into Bush's framework with every crisis, the results would have no longer been comparable.

Chap.III: The Suez Crisis

- A. Opinions expressed about U.N. forces in the area.
- B. International security of the Suez Canal should/must be ensured.
- C. Israel should/must receive guarantees for her security.
- D. The Suez Canal should/must be cleared quickly.
- E. Israel should/must withdraw from area.
- F. The Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aqaba should/must be open to all.
- G. Opinions expressed about Mr. Hammarskjold.
- H. Sanctions, or other means should/must be used to force the issue.
- I. Colonel Nasser's terms should/must be accepted.

VII. Unclassifiabiles.²⁵

vi) Illustration of Method

First, in the case of the daily newspapers, lots were drawn to determine which edition was to be measured for news-items. Then, all news-items found in that edition appertaining to the crisis were noted in terms of column lengths for subsequent tabulation.

²⁵. This category was left undefined to accommodate all opinions which did not readily fit into any of the above categories. Once an "unclassifiable" theme began to recur and become significant, it was promoted to become a "special" category (Section VI above).

Diagram

Recording Illustrating the Derivation of Recording and Context Units. Context
Units. (E. L. Art., 4.10.47) Units.

Withdrawal From Palestine

1. THE statement of the British Government's Palestine policy that was made to the United Nations Assembly by Mr Creech Jones, last week was, in the circumstances, exactly right. If the United Nations can work out a settlement that is accepted by both Arabs and Jews, then Britain will take the responsibility for implementing it. If, at the other extreme, the Assembly reaches no conclusions and adopts no policy, then

His Majesty's Government . . . have decided that . . . they must plan for the early withdrawal of the British Forces and British Administration from Palestine.

If neither extreme course is followed—that is, if there is a United Nations policy but it is not accepted by both Jews and Arabs—then the British Government's intentions are necessarily less simply stated. In substance, they will neither obstruct the execution of such a policy (for example, of the recommendations of the majority of the United Nations Commission) nor accept the major role in its enforcement; whether they will take any part at all depends upon their opinion of the policy's justice.

2. That this declaration is a confession of failure, and of tragic failure too, it would be useless to attempt to conceal. But the failure lies in the past, and the great merit of Mr Creech Jones's statement in the present is that, for the first time in the sorry history of the Palestine question, all the contending parties are abruptly brought up against the consequences of their activities. Jew and Arab face a day when there will be no third party in Palestine to take the blame, to repair the damage and to struggle in the face of fanatical resistance on both sides to keep intact a structure which for all its grievous errors, has permitted the Jews to establish a National Home 600,000 strong and the Arab population almost to double in twenty-five years. The American Administration, content for years to turn a blind eye to the criminally irresponsible activities of a clique of American Jews, is now confronted with a United Nations problem too urgent and too complicated to be solved with regard only to the Jewish vote in New York City. The Assembly itself must now complete the work of its Committee by devising the actual means of getting from the present impasse to the solution of partition which it recommends. Without exception, the various interests have been jolted into a reconsideration of their policies by the British statement and that is precisely what was most needed in the unbroken deadlock of the last two years.

(b) = Categ.
I G.

(Most of the article explains why British policy was "exactly right".)

∴ Intensity
Rating 5.

(a) = Categ.
II G.

(Paragraph is an attempt to share blame and qualify extent of failure.)

∴ Intensity
Rating 2.

Opinions (numbered above) were classified as Category

1. "...British ... policy ... was ... exactly right." --- I G 3.
2. "... is a confession ... of tragic failure" --- II G 5.
2A. But failure was not total: both Jews and Arabs have benefitted; i.e. qualifies previous opinion. --- " " ".
3. "... fanatical resistance on both sides ..." --- II E 2.
4. "The American Administration, content for years to turn a blind eye" --- II H 1.
5. "...criminally irresponsible activities of a clique of American Jews ..." --- II F 3.
6. "The Assembly must now complete the work" --- V F.

Next, the paper was scrutinized for editorials, etc., dealing with our topic; say, one such leading article was found (see plate opposite). This article was read closely and six discrete opinions were identified in it. (Firstly, in the circumstances, the British Government's policy was 'exactly right', and secondly, in the past Britain had met with 'tragic' - but not total - failure in Palestine. In the course of explaining why the Government's policy was so apposite, Jews and Arabs in Palestine were castigated, as were the American Administration and Jews in the United States. All these opinions were "descriptive", but, in addition, one "prescriptive" opinion - in the form of a demand - was ventured. It was that the United Nations must devise "the actual means of getting from the present impasse to the solution of partition which it recommended.") Each one of these six opinions constituted a recording unit in its own right, and was classified according to the categories above (perhaps as I G 3, II G 5, II E 2, II H 1, II F 3, and V F). The burden of the whole article was twofold:- (a) Britain had failed in the past, but (b) her present policy was admirable. That is to say, we derived two context units from this article; context unit (a) [= II G] had an intensity rating of 2 points, while context unit (b) [= I G] was rated 5 points. These intensity ratings were recorded alongside the classification of their respective context units.

Having thus analysed the content of the whole sample, the recording units were described in close relation with the

historical events of each crisis, since it is the recording units which, taken together, represent the detailed positions of the various newspapers as they developed throughout the crises. This description forms the major part of the narrative of this study. Furthermore, in the summaries to each chapter an effort has been made to bring out the major areas of concern in the press as revealed in the context units (and of course, as reflected in the recording units).

Appendices were attached to each chapter, containing:

- (1) A chronology of main events appertaining to the crisis.
- (2) A chronology of contemporaneous important news reported in the British press during the crisis.
- (3) The column lengths of news-items devoted by each newspaper to the crisis, arranged according to the sub-divisions of the chapter.
- (4) The total number of recording units about the crisis in each paper, similarly arranged according to the sub-divisions of the chapter.
- (5) The context units arranged according to the major divisions of the categories employed and also in terms of the sub-divisions of the chapter.
- (6) Alongside these context units, their combined intensity ratings in numerical terms according to the points-scale described above.
- (7) Comments on, and interpretation of these tables and figures, where necessary.

vii) Evaluation of the Method

The material handled could have been treated in many ways. Headlines could have been examined to ascertain

how the news was "slanted"; an inquiry could have been made into what news each paper chose to report and what news it chose to ignore; readers' letters might have been reviewed to test reactions to the news, and so on. But these are really tasks for others, and not for the student of the Middle East whose first concern lies elsewhere.

In a sense, these areas which were left untouched demarcate the limits of our inquiry and the limitations of our method. It is true that the headlines in the papers were not quite free from "value-toned" expressions, and that the news-items in the dailies were not 100% neutral; both headlines and news-items could therefore have been subjected to measurement and quantification as well. This would have required a complex rating scale, the application of which is surely the proper concern of another study. Furthermore, we would contend that the ensuing results would not alter the substance of our findings in any significant way. So it was with the "Letters to the Editor". Certainly, an analysis of these would have revealed some of the readers' reactions to the news, but the objectivity of this is open to challenge. Since The Times especially and also The Manchester Guardian are "high prestige" newspapers, they attract correspondence from distinguished contributors, whose letters they prefer to print in favour of those from "average readers." On account of these papers' influence, pressure groups and agencies with vested interests are also inclined to "write to the editor", usually under concealed

names. To a lesser extent the same is true of the other papers in the sample, which by definition rank among Britain's leading press. When there are added to these considerations the difficulties referred to above (p.223), it will be understood why we preferred to examine the manifest content of the newspapers, rather than gauge the readers' reactions to the news (see Introduction).

Our purpose was to understand the respective positions of the various newspapers, in so far as they represented different groups of political opinion in Great Britain, and to trace the changes and trends in these positions as they developed with the crises. Our method guided our attentions directly to the locations where these opinions would be most clearly expressed; it purposely bypassed other areas. In so doing, the information which we were seeking was quickly thrown into relief. This information was then recorded in a double manner, and thereby it could be presented quantitatively as well as in an interpretive narrative. These presentations complement one another, and only have meaning together, for contained in them is a study in political history which derives from a content analysis. This was the writer's aim.

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