From Goodwill to Good Business: A Comparative Analysis of ESG and Earnings Performance

By

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#### ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary paper examines the relationship between Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings and earnings performance of publicly traded US corporations, with an emphasis on business-to-consumer (B2C) firms. The study investigates the significance of specific rating agencies, ESG metrics, and firm attributes (i.e., size and sector classification) in order to provide insight into how a company's ESG performance relates to its ability to meet market expectations – potentially fostering the improvement of investment decisions and sustainability reporting. Although significant relationships arise between ESG ratings (from three distinct providers) and earnings outperformance, inconsistencies in significant ESG components emerge between distinct subsamples of companies. Ultimately, this research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the correspondence between ESG and financial performance, providing insight into the value of environmental, social, and governance reporting for stakeholder value.

**Keywords:** Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings; earnings expectations; stakeholder value; business-to-consumer (B2C); sustainability reporting; sector classification

#### **INTRODUCTION**

This paper attempts to distinguish how certain Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) facets are related to earnings reports across publicly traded US corporations. As the omnipresent progressiveness of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has crept into the economy, many managers, investors, and customers alike have faced pressure to comply with the principles of ESG – whether or not they are aware of it. Yet as ties between nonfinancial disclosures and financial valuation is a comprehensive conversation with much surrounding research and controversy, the findings of this research can expound a discrete application of the classic shareholder versus stakeholder value debate (Cornell and Shapiro 2020). Furthermore, within an era of transparency and standardization across financial markets, the advancement of ESG performance metrics has induced systematic discrepancies, and thus, a lack of credibility within the rating market. This paper adds to the existing knowledge of market participant attitudes toward ESG by distinguishing the significance of particular rating agencies, distinct ESG metrics, and firm attributes.

As opposed to preliminary studies which have chosen to focus on other financial metrics (e.g., stock prices, sell-side analyst recommendation, and investment fund portfolio compositions) concerning ESG, this research contemporarily centers around gaps between firm earnings and analyst revenue expectations. Consequently, this paper sheds light on how a company's ESG performance pertains to its ability in meeting market expectations – which is valuable information for investors and other stakeholders. In addition, with a focus on sales revenue, this analysis uses a sample of business-consumer (B2C) firms in an attempt to isolate the effect of customer behavior and shopping habits. Accordingly, this investigation contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between ESG and financial performance, ultimately allowing for the possibility of better-informed investment decisions and more sustainable financial markets.

The findings of this analysis indicate a significant relationship between ESG ratings from three distinct providers (specifically MSCI, Refinitiv, and Sustainalytics) and corporate revenue outperformance – yet variations arise in significant ESG components based on firm size and sector. Environmental factors (ENV) seem to generally possess a significant negative association with net income across all firm samples and rating agencies. However, unlike MSCI and Refinitiv datasets, where social metrics (SOC) demonstrate an inverse relation to earnings, Sustainalytics shows a positive correlation between social factors and revenue. In contrast to the findings of Lopez, Contreras, and Bendix (2020), this analysis found that relationships between governance factors (GOV) and revenues vary based on the particular subsample and rating agency. For instance, MSCI and Sustainalytics generally exhibit a direct association between governance factors and earnings while Refinitiv data reveals an inverse relationship.

#### **INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND**

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to endeavors that proactively balance a company's various stakeholders and the surrounding sustainability equilibria (Escrug-Olmedo, Fernández-Izquierdo, Ferrero-Ferrero, Rivera-Lirio, and Muñoz-Torres 2019). As noted by Cornell and Shapiro (2020), this concept is compatible with the Business Roundtable's (BRT) declaration in 2019 that a corporation's purpose is to deliver value to all stakeholders, rather than to solely maximize shareholder value (as famously contended by Nobel laureate Milton Friedman in 1970). Recent emphasis on the external impacts of corporate activities has led rise to ESG advocacy, which encourages companies to address three main areas of corporate

sustainability. Environmental initiatives focus on reducing the company's carbon footprint, conserving natural resources, and promoting renewable energy sources. Social leadership emphasizes developing relationships with local communities, investing in employee training and development, and creating a diverse and inclusive workplace. Governance ventures concentrate on enhancing transparency and accountability, diversifying board structure, and promoting corporate integrity across firms. ESG adoption can ultimately help companies create long-term value for their stakeholders by improving financial performance, increasing customer loyalty, and enhancing company reputation (Cornell and Shapiro 2020).

The acronym for Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) first appeared in the late 1990s, succeeding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and has become increasingly central over the past two decades - among firms and investors alike. In 2006, the United Nations launched the Principles for Responsible Investing (UN PRI), mainstreaming ESG practices, and coined the definition of "responsible investors" as those who incorporate ESG factors into their investment process (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014). Likewise, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) – a nonprofit organization founded in 2011 with the intent of providing consistent, reliable sustainability information on publicly traded companies for investors and other stakeholders - has only proliferated ESG prominence. Moreover, the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) – an international agency that collects information across Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – reported that assets under management in 2018 with an explicit ESG mandate increased 34 percent from two years prior (Lopez et al. 2020). Over time, the legitimization of ESG enterprises has emerged due to the gradual acceptance of a broader stakeholder focus and the weakening of the agency logic (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014).

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Many "responsible investors" regularly rely on metrics published by a variety of ESG rating agencies, which have generated a growing interest by financial markets and investment analysts as well (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014). First developed in the 1970s, ESG ratings have gained traction with the surrounding corporate sustainability movement. Yet as rating providers coin unstandardized definitions of ESG performance – despite the efforts of organizations like SASB – Escrug-Olmedo et al. (2019) have posed several challenges to be met for these ratings, such as a lack of transparency and commensurability. For example, some ratings are based exclusively on additional firm disclosures, while others combine financial and extra-financial data to quantify sustainability (Escrug-Olmedo et al. 2019). As the ESG rating agency market has become more concentrated within the last decade, which has allowed rating providers to develop wider and integral assessments, this research will focus on data sources such as MSCI KLD, the result of the absorption of several rating agencies. Furthermore, this paper attempts to locate and describe subsequential discrepancies among players in the ESG rating market.

#### **THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS**

As this study investigates the relationship between corporate ESG performance and net income, it is inspired by extensive prior research indicating a general finding of a positive relationship between ESG and financial performance. For instance, using a calendar-time portfolio stock return regression, Khan, Serafeim, and Yoon (2016) discovered a positive correlation between ESG ratings and stock prices. However, various sources that concur with this correspondence between ESG and shareholder value attribute it to contrasting factors. For example, a similar study by Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) argues that positive environmental performance fosters profitability due to innovation and operational efficiency (e.g. Porter and Van der Linde 1995) and superior organizational capabilities (e.g. Aragón-Correa, 1998). In contrast, findings by Paolone, Cucari, Wu, and Tiscini (2021) point to marketing performance as the driver of financial value derived from ESG. Yet as profitability is a function of consumer behavior, this paper attempts to isolate the customer response to firmwide ESG-related initiatives or media attention by selecting earnings as the dependent variable. Consequently, the null and first hypotheses (H0 and H1, respectively) of this investigation are put formally as follows:

H0: Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance unrelated to earnings.H1: Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is positively related to earnings.

These hypotheses are further motivated by previous studies that have found an independent relationship between ESG performance and consumer behavior. After all, current and future customer relationships are debatably the most valuable asset of a corporation (Blattberg and Deighton 1996). As such, Derrien, Krueger, Landier, and Yao (2021) discovered that the negative revisions of analyst revenue forecasts following negative ESG-related news or events reflect expectations of lower future sales (rather than higher future costs). Accordingly, ESG activities have been found to enhance sales value, purchase intent of potential customers, and consumer satisfaction and retention (Paolone et al. 2021). Customers are even willing to pay a higher price for products and services belonging to companies with higher ESG engagement ratings (Servaes and Tamayo 2013).

This paper evaluates the relationship between ESG conduct and earnings for the entire sample and via aggregations by both firm sector and size. According to Godfrey and Hatch (2006), researchers should conduct ESG performance research for individual industries rather than combining data across the entire market as previous studies have done. For instance, the healthcare sector may reveal distortions due to additional disclosures, as companies may have increased appreciation for their reputation and thus, patient trust (Paolone et al. 2021). In contrast, customer satisfaction is less important in industries with high switching barriers, such as regulated utilities (Ittner and Larcker 1998), potentially reducing the sales effect. Thus, the hypothesis will be tested for six sectors, including Consumer Products and Services, Financial Services, Healthcare, Energy, Information Technology, and Materials and Resources. The second segmentation of the data involves aggregating the sample by percentile ranking of net income. In line with research by Davidsson, Achtenhagen, and Naldi (2004), this approach is influenced by the fact that small-cap corporations are more likely to be socially and environmentally responsible as compared to their larger peers. Thus, the second hypothesis (H2) states:

**H2:** Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is positively related to earnings, yet the significance of certain ESG components varies with firm sector and size.

# SAMPLE AND DATA

# **Sampling Methodology**

The following analyses incorporate information regarding US publicly traded corporations from the past two decades, i.e., 2002-2022, to highlight the nation's recent ESG momentum and synchronize with data availability. As a vital component of this paper is the analysis of shopping habits, the sample focuses solely on business-to-consumer (B2C) firms, backing the sampling method of Goettsche, Steindl, and Gietl (2016). More precisely, this paper's firm selection draws on the work of Srinivasan, Lilien, and Sridhar (2011) by using primary four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes based on the business description provided by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to generate a sample of consumer-oriented SIC codes. If a business provides both B2C and B2B activities, such as Shell Energy, the firm is defined as B2C (Haddock-Fraser and Tourelle, 2010). Overall, 188 unique four-digit B2C SIC codes were identified (as described in Appendix 1), yielding a sample of 797 public US customer-oriented companies.

## **Data Collection**

Financial data was extracted from the Refinitiv (previously Thomson Reuters), Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S), a financial database containing equity analysts' estimates and reports on most publicly traded companies. As multiple earnings estimates were provided per quarter, only those corresponding to a release date within four months of an ESG rating change were retained. As such, this paper will incorporate three distinct rating providers, namely MSCI, Refinitiv, and Sustainalytics in order independently compare the effects of each of them. A summary of unique data source attributes is hosted in Table 1:

# [Insert Table 1 here]

Firstly, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), formerly KLD and GMI, ESG dataset is the most widely used in past studies (Khan et al. 2016). Researchers at MSCI review companies' public documents – including their annual disclosures, website, and specific ESG reporting – and monitor media sources for developing issues daily (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014). For the purposes of this study, MSCI has several advantages, not limited to including many US companies over a long period of time and maintaining credibility within the literary community focused on the relationship between social responsibility and financial performance (Ioannou and Serafeim 2014). The MSCI historical rating data set is designed as a binary system and

comprises both strengths and weaknesses – i.e., policies, procedures, and outcomes that induce either a positive or negative impact, respectively – regarding seven focal issues. These issues include Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, Product, Environment, and Human Rights (Serafeim & Yoon, 2016), enabling this analysis to crosssection various ESG phenomena. One caveat regarding MSCI, however, is the source's large proportion of missing data for the firms in the sample related to this paper's analysis. Wharton Research Data Services (Wrds) is currently awaiting an update from Morgan Stanley Capital International, which could provide more conclusive findings upon availability.

More recent sources, such as Darendeli, Fiechter, Hitz, and Lehmann (2021), have instead exploited the recent increase in Refinitiv, formerly Thomson Reuters (TR), Asset4 coverage. With inputs and proprietary technology similar to that of MSCI KLD, Refinitiv provides ESG screening data for over 400 different ESG input factors on 9,000 listed companies globally – with time series data going back to 2002 (Darendeli et al. 2021). This coverage is used by major asset managers, such as BlackRock, in assessing ESG investment risk, as well as a community of academic researchers (Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner 2019). Asset4 hosts categorically specific ratings as well, specifically across ten main themes – including emissions, human rights, and shareholders.

As suggested by Wharton Research Data Services, an additional database to be referenced includes Morningstar Sustainalytics, which commonly provides detailed ESG scores to "responsible" investment funds (Raghunandan and Rajgopal 2022). Unlike the MSCI and Refinitiv datasets, which have been used extensively in the past, Sustainalytics is a more recent addition to the ESG database landscape. However, its monthly reporting frequency allows for ample data to be retrieved – even with fewer years of due diligence. Additionally, as

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Sustainalytics specifically provides measures of unmanaged ESG risk rather than strength, it is worth noting that for the sake of comparability, the values in this dataset were reversed such that all positive values were made negative, and all negative values were made positive.

### **DESIGN AND METHODS**

## **Variable Definitions**

## **Environment, Social, and Governance**

As urged by Cornell and Shapiro (2020), environmental, social, and governance factors are distinct and should not be considered simultaneously. As this analysis utilizes more detailed ESG-related metrics, they can also be consolidated, as different raters provide diverse arrays of score breakdowns. Thus, echoing Slater and Dixton-Fowler (2009), each statistic relating to an ESG constituent was aggregated to derive an equally weighted sum of rating changes per ESG category. Table 2 depicts the definitions for Environmental (*ENV*), Social (*SOC*), and Governance (*GOV*) for each of the three rating agencies. In this manner, both singular and combined ESG metrics can be used as independent variables in this analysis.

[Insert Table 2 here]

#### Earnings Outperformance

To capture an outperformance of analyst earnings estimates, two dependent variables were defined – namely *Outperform* and *Outperformance*. More explicitly, *Outperform* is a binary variable designating if a firm beats expectations at a given time, and *Outperformance* is defined as the amount by which revenues are over (or under) reported. This allows for the specification of two plausible models (i.e., both linear and logistic) in predicting future financial performance. On multiple occasions, however, the I/B/E/S dataset provided multiple earnings estimates in the four months following a rating revision. In those cases, the average expected value was taken as the variable dependent on a change in ESG ratings.

## **Control Variables**

**ESG controversies.** To follow several recent articles (e.g. Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010) that argue that CSR and CSiR (Corporate Social Irresponsibility) are two theoretically distinct constructs that should be treated as such empirically, ESG CONTROVERSY is selected as a control variable for datasets in which this information is provided (i.e., MSCI and Refinitiv). Although some prior studies have chosen to subtract total concerns from total strengths (e.g. Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Manner, 2010), this approach is not adopted in this analysis because of its focus on strategic ESG choices of corporations and how such policies impact consumer behavior. While Refinitiv explicitly provides a CONTROVERSEY score, the control variable for MSCI is constructed as an equally weighted sum of KLD's negative screens (Table 3).<sup>1</sup>

# [Insert Table 3 here]

**Fixed effects.** In order to control for variations in how companies are rated in terms of their ESG performance, fixed effects were used on both firm and year as control variables. This method is particularly useful when dealing with panel data involving multiple observations of the same entities over time.<sup>2</sup> By correcting for both time-variant homogeneity and time-invariant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> However, as the variance inflation factors (VIF) detect multicollinearity for many of the MSCI CONTROVERSY metrics, this control variable is omitted some models and result summaries to follow.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In accordance with Goettsche et al., fixed effects are preferred to random effect regressions.

heterogeneity across firms, the precise relationship between ESG ratings and earnings outperformance can be isolated (Goettsche, Steindl, and Gietl 2016).

# **Model Specification**

## **General Linear Model**

As a starting point, the following linear model using broad (i.e., aggregated) ESG performance metrics is specified:

$$Outperformance = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ENV_{it} + \beta_2 SOC_{it} + \beta_3 GOV_{it} + \beta_4 CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(1)

where i and t are firm and time indices, respectively. Dummy variables  $YEAR_{it}$  correspond to fixed effects by year, while  $\lambda_i$  refers to firm fixed effects. As this model can be applied across all three rating agencies, CONTROVERSY is assumed to be zero in the Sustainalytics case.

## **Detailed Linear Model**

Because different rating agencies provide varying ESG metrics, individualized models for more detailed performance metrics must be utilized for each rating provider. This approach yields Equations (2)-(4) for MSCI, Refinitiv, and Sustainalytics, respectively.

**MSCI data.** A linear regression on the MSCI dataset, incorporating fourteen ESG variables lacking multicollinearity, is specified as:

 $Outperformance = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CLEAN ENERGY_{it} + \beta_2 CLIMATE CHANGE_{it} + \beta_3 LAND/BIODIVERSITY_{it} + \beta_4 NONCARBON RELEASES_{it} + \beta_5 POLLUTION$  $PREVENTION_{it} + \beta_6 CHARITY_{it} + \beta_7 HEALTH/SAFETY_{it} + \beta_8 INNOVATIVE GIVING_{it} + \beta_9 PRODUCT SAFETY_{it} + \beta_{10} ANTITRUST_{it} + \beta_{11} ECONOMIC RISK_{it} + \beta_{12} MANAGEMENT_{it} + \beta_{13} REGULATORY PROBLEMS_{it} + \beta_{14} SUPPLY CHAIN$  $CONTROVERSIES_{it} + \beta_{15} CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ (2) Refinitiv data. For Refinitiv, a linear model including its ten detailed ESG performance

metrics and the CONTROVERSY control variable can be written as:

 $Outperformance = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EMISSIONS_{it} + \beta_2 ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION_{it} + \beta_3 RESOURCE_{it} + \beta_4 COMMUNITY_{it} + \beta_5 CSR_{it} + \beta_6 HUMAN RIGHTS_{it} + \beta_7 WORKFORCE_{it} + \beta_8 MANAGEMENT_{it} + \beta_9 PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY_{it} + \beta_{10} SHAREHOLDERS_{it} + \beta_{11} CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ (3)

Sustainalytics data. Accordingly, the linear model for the sixteen Sustainalytics

predictors is analytically put as follows:

 $\begin{aligned} Outperformance &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 CARBON_{it} + \beta_2 LAND/BIODIVERSITY_{it} + \beta_3 RESOURCE_{it} + \\ \beta_4 WASTE_{it} + \beta_5 BASIC SERVICES_{it} + \beta_6 COMMUNITY_{it} + \beta_7 DATA/PRIVACY_{it} + \\ \beta_8 HEALTH/SAFETY_{it} + \beta_9 HUMAN CAPITAL_{it} + \beta_{10} HUMAN RIGHTS_{it} + \beta_{11} PRODUCT \\ IMPACT_{it} + \beta_{12} CORRUPTION_{it} + \beta_{13} CORPORATE GOVERNANCE_{it} + \beta_{14} ETHICS_{it} + \\ \beta_{15} FINANCIALS_{it} + \beta_{16} PRODUCT GOVERNANCE_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$ (4)

# Logistic Models

Equation (1)-(4) can be modified to replace *Outperformance* with the natural logarithm of

the binary variable Outperform in order to ignore the magnitude of earnings for standardization

purposes. This yields Equations (5)-(8), given empirically as:

# General model.

$$Log(Outperform) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ENV_{it} + \beta_2 SOC_{it} + \beta_3 GOV_{it} + \beta_4 CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$
(5)

# MSCI data.

 $Log(Outperform) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CLEAN ENERGY_{it} + \beta_2 CLIMATE CHANGE_{it} + \beta_3 LAND/BIODIVERSITY_{it} + \beta_4 NONCARBON RELEASES_{it} + \beta_5 POLLUTION PREVENTION_{it} + \beta_6 CHARITY_{it} + \beta_7 HEALTH/SAFETY_{it} + \beta_8 INNOVATIVE GIVING_{it} + \beta_8 INNOVATVE GIVING$ 

 $\beta_{9}PRODUCT SAFETY_{it} + \beta_{10}ANTITRUST_{it} + \beta_{11}ECONOMIC RISK_{it} + \beta_{12}MANAGEMENT_{it} + \beta_{13}REGULATORY PROBLEMS_{it} + \beta_{14}SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROVERSIES_{it} + \beta_{15}CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_{i}YEAR_{it} + \lambda_{i} + \varepsilon_{it}$ (6)

# Refinitiv data.

 $Log(Outperform) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EMISSIONS_{it} + \beta_2 ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION_{it} + \beta_3 RESOURCE_{it} + \beta_4 COMMUNITY_{it} + \beta_5 CSR_{it} + \beta_6 HUMAN RIGHTS_{it} + \beta_7 WORKFORCE_{it} + \beta_8 MANAGEMENT_{it} + \beta_9 PRODUCT RESPONSIBILITY_{it} + \beta_{10} SHAREHOLDERS_{it} + \beta_{11} CONTROVERSY_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ (7)

# Sustainalytics data.

 $Log(Outperform) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CARBON_{it} + \beta_2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE_{it} + \beta_3 LAND/BIODIVERSITY_{it} + \beta_4 RESOURCE_{it} + \beta_5 WASTE_{it} + \beta_6 BASIC SERVICES_{it} + \beta_7 COMMUNITY_{it} + \beta_8 DATA_{it} + \beta_9 HEALTH/SAFETY_{it} + \beta_{10} HUMAN CAPITAL_{it} + \beta_{11} HUMAN RIGHTS_{it} + \beta_{12} PRODUCT_{it} + \beta_{13} BRIBERY/CORRUPTION_{it} + \beta_{14} ETHICS_{it} + \beta_{15} FINANCIALS_{it} + \beta_{16} PRODUCT GOVERNANCE_{it} + \delta_i YEAR_{it} + \lambda_i + \varepsilon_{it}$ (8)

Equations (4)-(6) may be useful in situations such that predicting the direction of earnings relative to a benchmark is the main objective, which is commonly the case for financial investors. Nonlinear regressions can also help to eliminate the impact of extreme values in the data, which may skew results and falsify conclusions.

# RESULTS

#### **By Individual Firm**

#### **Empirical Results**

Table 4 provides basic summary statistics for each of the three ESG rating providers across the entire sample. Evidently, each agency relies on a unique scale and provides varying observation counts. It is also worth noting that based on the sample corresponding to this paper, firms tended to exceed their revenue expectations (9019 counts) more frequently than they fell short (6495 counts).

[Insert Table 4 here]

# Multivariate Analysis

**General findings.** Multivariate regression results for each rating agency are depicted in Tables 5 and 6. The first approach (Table 5) defines ESG more broadly based on its three components (i.e., ENV, SOC, and GOV) with Equations (1) and (5). Based on the general linear model for the MSCI dataset (multiple  $R^2 = 0.07665$ ) and a ten percent significance level, ENV (p-value = 0.0520), SOC, (p-value = 0.0063) and GOV (p-value = 0.0808) are all significant predictors of exceeding earnings expectations. That said, these relationships are not necessarily all positive, as confirmed by the logistic output as well. More explicitly, while GOV is positively correlated to *Outperformance*, ENV and SOC exhibit a negative association. This supports the finding of Hassel, Nilsson, and Nyquist (2005) that environmental performance has a negative influence on the market value of firms. Consequently, although the null hypothesis (H0) can be rejected (p-value = 0.0002), H1 must be slightly altered before it can be accepted in favor of the null:

**H1':** Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is related to earnings, yet not necessarily in a positive or negative manner.

Findings from the Refinitiv data correspond to that of MSCI yet are not as strong (multiple  $R^2 = 0.05117$ ), as again only ENV is found to be significant (p-value = 0.0478). Despite the inability to draw assumptions regarding causation, it is also worth noting the positive relationship between CONTROVERSY and earnings outperformance (p-value = 0.0450) in Refinitiv's logistic application. As this contrasts with expectations, Derrien et al. (2021) point out that forecast revisions explain most of the negative impacts of ESG incidents on firm value. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that CONTROVERSY's positive coefficient is derived from analysts' reliance on MSCI ESG data.

Finally, although the linear Sustainalytics model is insignificant (p-value = 0.3502), the logistic implementation reiterates the earlier finding of a positive association between GOV and *Outperformance*.

# [Insert Table 5 here]

**Detailed findings.** Table 6 displays regression outputs based on Equations (2)-(4) and (6)-(8), which rely on more granular ESG performance metrics.<sup>3</sup> According to MSCI's linear model, Pollution Prevention (p-value = 0.0014) and Charity (p-value = 0.0601) both have significant negative relationships with revenue overperformance. Moreover, while Refinitiv Environmental Innovation (p-value = 0.0229) is inversely associated with net income, Refinitiv's ESG CONTROVERSY score exhibits a positive relationship (p-value = 0.0780) as shown in the logistic implementation.<sup>4</sup> Lastly, both Corporate Governance (p-value = 0.0846) and Product Governance (p-value = 0.0465) hold a positive correspondence with *Outperform* and *Outperformance* alike in the case of Sustainalytics, yet the dataset's linear model application is notably weak (p-value 0.3993). These conclusions echo those in Table 5 that support the revised H1 yet highlight significant factors within the definitions of ENV, GOV, and SOC.

[Insert Table 6 here]

# **By Firm Size**

To divide the sample by company size, the data was partitioned into terciles – with varying cutoffs depending on the rating provider. Table 7 provides net income thresholds for MSCI, Refinitiv, and Sustainalytics – accounting for variations in model subsamples. As

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Detailed regression outputs like Table 6 omit insignificant and multicollinear predictors variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> CONTROVERSY's positive significance can be overlooked and taken as analyst forecast revisions (Derrien et al. 2021).

illustrated MSCI data provides the largest range of firm earnings, which is intuitive because it provides information pertaining to the greatest number of unique corporations (Table 1).

[Inset Table 7 here]

# **Bottom 33% of Earnings**

**Empirical results.** Basic summary statistics for the three ESG rating providers across firms in the first tercile of actual revenue can be found in Table 8. On average, ENV, SOC, and GOV are lower for firms in this segment as compared to the entire sample. It is also worth noting that similar to the full sample, companies with the lowest earnings tended to exceed their earnings expectations (3088 counts) more frequently than they fell short (2035 counts).

# [Insert Table 8 here]

**Multivariate analysis.** Table 9 indicates that ENV, SOC, GOV – and CONTROVERSY – are all statistically significant predictors of revenue for smaller firms, yet disparities arise across rating agencies. While MSCI again asserts a significant inverse relation between ENV and *Outperform* (p-value = 0.0596), both Refinitiv (p-value = 0.0136) and Sustainalytics (p-value = 0.0949) reveal that GOV is positively associated with earnings outperformance. Additionally, although the full sample displays a negative relationship between SOC and *Outperformance* based on the regression output for MSCI, the first tercile of firm earnings instead shows a strong positive correlation between these two variables, as indicated by Sustainalytics.

#### [Insert Table 9]

Additional multivariate regression outputs for the first tercile of company revenues can be found in a highly contradictory Table 10, which breaks down results in Table 9 into more concrete ESG initiatives. For example, MSCI's Clean Energy index possesses a significant

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negative correlation with *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0008). Likewise, although the Refinitiv Workforce score is also negatively related to earnings (p-value = 0.0002), Management (p-value 0.0913) and CSR strengths (p-value 0.0194) display a positive relationship for the Refinitiv rating dataset (multiple  $R^2 = 0.3268$ ).<sup>5</sup> In contrast, according to Sustainalytics Human Capital score is positively associated with *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0903), meaning that although workforce size tends to correspond to decreased revenues, workforce strength (i.e., skills and intelligence) is congruous with an increase in earnings for the bottom tercile of firms. Finally, echoing the results of the sample-wide multivariate analysis, Sustainalytics' Product Governance (p-value = 0.0759) and Corporate Governance (p-value = 0.0553) ratings demonstrate a positive relation with exceeding earnings expectations.

# [Insert Table 10 here]

## Middle 33% of Earnings

**Empirical results.** Table 11 contains descriptive statistics for each rating agency among companies in the second tercile of actual earnings. Generally, the average scores for ENV, SOC, and GOV were diminished for firms in this group as compared to the entire sample. Likewise observe that compatible with the full sample, companies with net income in this middle bucket had a higher chance of exceeding earnings expectations (3032 counts) as opposed to missing analyst estimates (2081 counts).

# [Insert Table 11 here]

**Multivariate analysis.** According to Table 12, only GOV is a significant predictor of earnings for mid-sized firms (p-value = 0.956), as revealed by the logistic model on the Refinitiv

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The positive relationship between CONTROVERSY and *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0014) is again attributed to the forecast revision effect described by Derrien et al..

dataset. In contrast to earlier findings regarding other firm segments, this secondary tercile appears to maintain an inverse (rather than direct) relationship between GOV and *Outperform*.

# [Insert Table 12 here]

More descriptive findings for the middle category of companies can be located in Table 13. Once more, in this segment, the Clean Energy index of MSCI exhibits a significant and negative correlation with Outperformance (p-value = 0.0176). Additionally, the Refintiv Environmental Innovation score is also negatively correlated with revenue (p-value = 0.0119), while Workforce strengths (p-value = 0.0058) and CSR (p-value = 0.0037) demonstrate a positive relationship with the Refinitiv rating dataset (with a multiple R<sup>2</sup> of 0.1919). Furthermore, Sustainalytics indicates that Product Governance is once again positively linked to *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0119) – as well as Business Ethics (p-value = 0.0557).<sup>6</sup>

[Insert Table 13 here]

#### Top 33% of Earnings

**Empirical results.** Hosted in Table 14 are basic summary statistics for the top-earning companies in the sample. Overall, average ENV, SOC, and GOV scores were lower for the third tercile of firms in contrast to the full data. Specific discrepancies from this norm include elevated performance captured by Refinitive social and governance scores as well as the Sustainalytics GOV metric. Interestingly, this cross-section produced a higher proportion of underperformed earnings as compared to underestimated earnings – unlike the first two terciles.

[Insert Table 14 here]

 $<sup>^{6}</sup>$  Regardless, the linear Sustainalytics regression for mid-sized firms is quite weak, with a multiple R<sup>2</sup> of 0.09623 and a p-value of 0.3993.

Multivariate analysis. Table 15 discloses that ENV, SOC, GOV – and

CONTROVERSY – are significant predictors of net income for larger firms. MSCI again possesses a significant positive correspondence between GOV and *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0489) yet significant inverse relations between both ENV and SOC and earnings outperformance (with p-values 0.0552 and 0.0002, respectively). This finding is complemented by Refinitiv, which leads to yet another negative link between environmental factors and earnings performance (p-value = 0.0566). In addition, Refinitiv's positive CONTROVERSY coefficient (p-value = 0.0165) can again be attributed to the forecast revision effect.

### [Insert Table 15 here]

Detailed multivariate regression outputs for the top tercile of company revenues can be found in Table 16. The MSCI Pollution Prevention metric holds a highly significant negative relation with *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0192). Similarly, while Refintiv's Environmental Innovation is again negatively correlated to earnings (p-value = 0.0205), CSR strengths maintain a positive relationship (p-value = 0.0732).<sup>7</sup> Consistent with the environmental-related findings from the other two data providers, the Sustainalytics Land Use and Biodiversity score is negatively linked with *Outperform* (p-value = 0.0566).

[Insert Table 16 here]

#### **By Firm Sector**

Sector membership among sampled firms can be derived from a company's assigned SIC code. For example, SIC code 5651 – Family Clothing Stores – aligns with the sector Consumer Products and Services. Similarly, SIC code 6282 – Investment Advice – matches with the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The positive association between CONTROVERSY and *Outperformance* (p-value of 0.0438) is again related to the effect of forecast revision, as previously described by Derrien et al..

Financial Services sector. In all, six sectors are represented in this sample: Consumer Products and Services, Financial Services, Healthcare, Energy, Information Technology, and Materials and Resources.

### **Consumer Products and Services Sector**

General findings. As indicated by Table 17, ENV, SOC, and GOV are all statistically significant predictors of revenue for firms in the Consumer Products and Services sector. While MSCI again asserts significant relations between both social (p-value = 0.0387) and governance (p-value = 0.0455) factors and earnings outperformance, in this specific sector, GOV possesses a negative association with both *Outperform and Outperformance*.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, findings from the Refinitiv models (both linear and logistic) reassert the inverse relation between ENV and net income (p-value = 0.0454) from the broader model. The Sustainalytics dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.<sup>9</sup>

## [Insert Table 17 here]

**Detailed findings.** Table 18 displays regression outputs for more granular ESG performance metrics. According to MSCI's linear model, Pollution Prevention (p-value = 0.0193) has yet another significant negative relationship with *Outperformance*. Moreover, Refinitiv Environmental Innovation (p-value = 0.0229) is inversely associated with earnings for Consumer Products and Services firms. Novel findings exist within the Sustainalytics data and include positive correlations between Business Ethics (p-value = 0.0702), Carbon Reduction (p-value = 0.0393), and Product Impact (p-value = 0.0241) and firm earnings. On the contrary,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> SOC, as in the full regression, has a negative relationship with *Outperformance* for Consumer Products and Services companies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Likewise, all subsequent regression outputs are limited to significant variables lacking multicollinearity.

Human Rights (p-value = 0.0002) and Data Privacy/Security (p-value = 0.0981) both seem to be negatively related to revenue overperformance for this sector. However, it is important to consider the limited significance of this Sustainalytics multivariate analysis (multiple  $R^2 = 0.07999$ ) upon interpreting the aforementioned results.

[Insert Table 18 here]

# **Financial Services Sector**

**General findings.** Table 19 reveals that for Financial Services firms, only social and governance metrics are statistically significant predictors of earnings. MSCI reiterates that significant relationships between both SOC (p-value < 0.0001) and GOV (p-value = 0.0031) and *Outperformance* exist that match the direction of the sample-wide general model. Findings from the logistic Sustainalytics model support this positive relation between GOV and earnings (p-value = 0.0035) in the Financial Services sector. The Refinitiv dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.

#### [Insert Table 19 here]

**Detailed findings.** According to Table 20, Refinitiv's Emissions Reduction score is inversely related to *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0839) for companies in the Financial Services sector. Additionally, in correspondence with numerous other market segments thus far, Sustainalytics again exhibits a positive correlation between Product Governance and firm revenues (p-value = 0.0501) for Financial Services. The MSCI dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.

[Insert Table 20 here]

23

# Healthcare Sector

**General findings.** The results from Table 21 indicate only social ESG factors are statistically significant predictors of earnings outperformance for firms in the Healthcare sector (p-value = 0.0328). However, unlike past findings, SOC possesses a positive correlation with *Outperformance* for Healthcare firms, as found in the Sustainalytics model (multiple R<sup>2</sup> = 0.1433). Refinitiv maintains the prior found positive relationship between ESG CONTROVERSY and revenues for this sector as well. The MSCI dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.

## [Insert Table 21 here]

**Detailed findings.** As depicted by Table 22, the Refinitiv Community score has a negative association with *Outperform* (p-value = 0.0271) for the Healthcare sector. The detailed Sustainalytics report was very informative (multiple R<sup>2</sup> = 0.2518), indicating a significant positive relationship between earnings outperformance and the following predictor metrics: Access to Basic Services (p-value = 0.0054), Land Use and Biodiversity (p-value = 0.0312), Carbon Reduction (p-value = 0.0416), and Waste Reduction (p-value = 0.0759). In contrast, the Sustainalytics Resource Use variable revealed an inverse relation with net income (p-value = 0.0411). Again, the MSCI dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.

[Insert Table 22 here]

# **Energy Sector**

**General findings.** Table 23 portrays quite contradictory results for the Energy sector, particularly regarding the direction of SOC's significant correlation with earnings potential. While Refinitiv points to a negative relationship (p-value = 0.0884), Sustainalytics argues

otherwise (p-value = 0.0172). Consequently, this paper rejects the Refinitiv model in favor of Sustainalytics to minimize the p-value and AIC coefficient of the regression. The MSCI dataset did not produce any significant results for this sector.

# [Insert Table 23 here]

**Detailed findings.** Table 24 holds multivariate regression outputs on more detailed ESG metrics for Energy companies. According to MSCI, the Supply Chain (p-value = 0.09376), Pollution Prevention (p-value = 0.0691), and Health and Safety (p-value = 0.0282) metrics have significant positive relations with the overperformance of revenues in Energy firms. In contrast, the MSCI Regulatory Problems (p-value = 0.0088) and Innovative Giving (p-value = 0.0129) scores are inversely related to earnings. Refinitiv's linear model for the Energy sector suggests alternative significant variables, namely Workforce (p-value = 0.0607), Human Rights (p-value = 0.0380), Product Responsibility (p-value = 0.0216), and Management (p-value = 0.0608). While Refinitiv's Human Rights and Management scores exhibit a positive correspondence with *Outperformance*, Workforce and Product Responsibility maintain a negative relationship. Lastly, Sustainalytics indicates further significant predictors, including ESG Financial Integration (pvalue < 0.0001), Business Ethics (p-value = 0.0347), Carbon Reduction (p-value = 0.0811), Human Capital (p-value = 0.0263), and Corruption and Bribery (p-value = 0.0576). It is worth noting, however, that Business Ethics, Carbon Reduction, and Human Capital are directly related to Energy firm earnings yet ESG Financial Integration and Corruption and Bribery demonstrate an inverse correlation.

#### [Insert Table 24 here]

# Information Technology Sector

**General findings.** As revealed in Table 25, the only significant variable for net income based on firms in the Information Technology sector is MSCI's environmental sum (ENV), with a p-value of 0.0401. In this case, ENV is yet again negatively associated with *Outperformance* (multiple  $R^2 = 0.139$ ).

# [Insert Table 25 here]

**Detailed findings.** Table 26 depicts more granular findings for the Information Technology sector. One highly significant positive association is between MSCI's Antitrust score and firm *Outperformance* (p-value = 0.0002). According to Sustainalytics, Human Capital (p-value = 0.0179) and Resource Use (p-value = 0.0443) are significant positive predictors of earnings, while Human Rights (p-value = 0.0088) and ESG Financial Integration (p-value = 0.0917) both possess a significant negative relationship.

[Insert Table 26 here]

#### Materials and Resources Sector

**General findings.** To summarize findings for the Materials and Resources sector, Table 27 exhibits general regression model outputs. While Refinitiv was the only rating provider with significant results (multiple  $R^2 = 0.5088$ ), the multivariate analysis produced statistically significant negative coefficients for ENV (p-value = 0.0006) and GOV (p-value = 0.0205). This relationship between governance factors and revenue outperformance differs for Materials and Resources firms than for firms across the widest sample.

[Insert Table 27 here]

**Detailed findings.** Finally, Table 28 displays more detailed regression outputs for the Materials and Resources sector. To start, MSCI proposed that Health and Safety (p-value = 0.0009), Product Safety (p-value < 0.0001), and Antitrust (p-value – 0.0194) are all significant predictors of *Outperformance* in this last sector. While Antitrust is negatively correlated with earnings (unlike the Information Technology sector), the MSCI Health and Safety and Product Safety metrics both maintain a positive relationship with the independent variable. According to Refinitive, Management (p-value = 0.0199), CSR (p-value = 0.0570), and Workforce (p-value = 0.0215) scores are statistically significant and directly associated with firm financial performance. The strong linear Sustainalytics model (multiple R<sup>2</sup> = 0.4871) also yielded significant results yet diverge from past findings, marking a negative relationship between *Outperformance* and Human Capital (p-value = 0.0964), Product Governance (p-value = 0.0475), and Business Ethics (p-value = 0.0378) alike.

[Insert Table 28 here]

Ultimately, before the second hypothesis can be accepted in favor of others (i.e., H0 and H1), it must be modified as follows:

H2': Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is related to earnings (not necessarily positively nor negatively), yet the significance of certain ESG components varies with firm sector and size.

#### CONCLUSION

The analysis of this paper provides a good indication that ESG ratings are associated with earnings outperformance for US business-to-consumer firms – despite variations in significant

ESG performance metrics for firms in different size and sector segments. Table 29 is provided to summarize significant input variables of ESG across various rating providers and segmentation approaches. As shown, environmental factors have a significant inverse relationship with net income for all firms and rating providers (besides Sustainalytics, which proved to be insignificant). While social metrics are inversely associated with earnings for MSCI and Refinitiv, the opposite is the case for the Sustainalytics dataset. Lastly, in opposition to observations made by Lopez et al. (2020), the relationship between governance variables and revenue greatly depends on the subsample and rating agency. For example, the Sustainalytics governance factor exhibits a strictly positive correspondence with earnings outperformance. Similarly, among the significant regression outputs, MSCI's governance score has a positive coefficient for all samples but the Consumer Products and Services sectors. In contrast, the sole positive relationship belonging to Refinitiv's governance aggregate is within the subsample including firms in the first tercile of earnings. Despite between-sample variations in findings, this research supports the statement of Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005) that firms face the risk that regulation, changes in consumer preferences, and litigation induced by firms' environmental and social policies feed back into cash flows.

# [Insert Table 29 here]

Two major limitations of this study include missing data and predictor multicollinearity. As mentioned previously, a considerable disadvantage of relying on MSCI data is incompleteness – as the initial dataset contains 174,412 missing values. This limitation applies to other data sources as well; initial Refinitiv and I/B/E/S datasets include 3281 and 248,265 omitted observations, respectively. Multicollinearity between ESG predictor metrics was also a common problem among the regression analyses, as many variables had to be discarded in avoidance of illegitimate findings. Another shortcoming of this analysis is a lack of consistent findings among rating agencies. For example, Sustainalytics' Carbon Reduction metric has a significant negative coefficient while MSCI's Clean Energy has a positive coefficient in the analysis of the firms in the bottom tier of financial performance. While differences across ESG scores can naturally emerge if rating providers adopt divergent definitions of ESG performance, research by Lopez et al. (2020) shows that deviations arise even when agencies rely on similar definitions. Likewise, Escrug et al. (2019) note that certain ESG rating methodologies may compensate for higher scores in one domain with very low scores in another domain. Thus, this paper holds the view of Lopez et al. (2020) such that rating agencies' different emphases on ESG components can be informative as long the raters' ESG priorities are transparent.

These caveats notwithstanding, this paper raises questions about whether ESG performance metrics can be used to forecast how corporate earnings compare to analyst estimates, yet further research is necessary to draw definite conclusions about any of the discovered relationships. Supplemental investigations include an analysis of other factors that could influence the nature between ESG and financial value, such as firm ownership status or social media presence. Furthermore, the reliance on ESG materiality of Khan et al. (2016) can be incorporated into this research via intelligence published by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB). In line with Friedman's stakeholder theory (Cornell and Shapiro 2020), the most pressing next step to this study, however, is the analysis of certain negative relationships between ESG and financial performance – and how firms can mitigate this bias.

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	Start Year	End Year	Number of B2C Firms in Sample	<b>Release Frequency</b>
MSCI	2000	2019	547	Annually, in January or February
Refinitiv	2002	2022	169	Annually, on Firm Fiscal Year End Date
Sustainalytics	2018	2022	169	Monthly

Table 1: ESG Rating Providers

Table 2: ESG Definitions Across Raters

	MSCI	Refinitiv	Sustainalytics
ENV	Clean Energy, Climate Change,	Emissions,	Carbon - Products and
	Electronic Waste, Energy	Environmental	Services Risk, E&S Impact of
	Efficiency, Land Use &	Innovation,	Products and Services Risk,
	Biodiversity, Non-Carbon Releases,	Resource Use	Emissions/ Effluents/Waste
	Opportunities in Green Building,		Risk, Land Use and
	Opportunities in Renewable Energy,		Biodiversity Risk, Resource
	Pollution Prevention, Product		Use Risk
	Carbon Footprint, Raw Material		
	Sourcing, Recycling, Substantial		
	Emissions, Water Management		
SOC	Beneficial Products and Services,	Community,	Access to Basic Services
	Board Diversity,	CSR, Human	Risk, Community Relations
	Compensation/Benefits, Community	Rights,	Risk, Data Privacy and
	Engagement, Employment of	Workforce	Security Risk, E&S Impact of
	Underrepresented Groups,		Products and Services Risk,
	Employee Involvement, Employee		Human Capital Risk, Human
	Relations, Benefits to Economically		Rights Risk, Occupational
	Disadvantaged, Health and Safety		Health and Safety Risk
	Strength, Human Capital		
	Development, Indigenous Peoples		
	Relations Strength, Innovative		
	Giving, Professional Development,		
	Privacy & Data Security, Social		
	Opportunities - Access to Finance,		
	Social Opportunities - Nutrition and		
	Health, Supply Chain Management,		
	Women and Minority Contracting		

GOV	Antitrust, Freedom of Expression &	CSR,	Bribery and Corruption Risk,
	Censorship, Management Systems	Management,	Business Ethics Risk,
	Strength	Product	Corporate Governance-Risk,
		Responsibility,	ESG Integration - Financials
		Shareholders	Risk, Product Governance
			Risk

# Table 3: Definition of ESG CONTROVERSY for MSCI KLD

ENV	Biodiversity & Land Use, Climate Change Vulnerability, Water Stress
SOC	Board of Directors - Minorities, Child Labor, Customer Relations, Employee
	Relations Number of Concerns, Health and Safety Concern, Human Rights Violations,
	Negative Impact of Products and Services, Product Safety, Supply Chain
GOV	Corruption & Political Instability, Financial System Instability, Controversial

Investments, Governance Structures Controversies, Marketing-Contracting Concerns, Negative Economic Impact, Regulatory Problems

**Notes:** The CONTROVERSY control variable was discarded for many MSCI multivariate regression models due to multicollinearity detected by variance inflation factors (VIF).

	MSCI	Refinitiv	Sustainalytics
Number of	9009	4591	1914
Observations			
ENV	Min.: 0.000	Min.: 0.0000	Min.: -15.360
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 5.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.0439	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -3.600
	Median: 6.000	Median: 0.8148	<b>Median:</b> 0.000
	<b>Mean: 5.948</b>	Mean: 0.9613	<b>Mean: -2.361</b>
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 7.000	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> 1.7399	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 0.000
	Max.: 13.000	Max.: 2.9114	Max.: 0.000
	Std. Dev.: 0.764	Std. Dev.: 2.4030	Std. Dev.: 11.819
SOC	Min.: 0.000	Min.: 0.0293	<b>Min.:</b> -20.941
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 6.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.9767	<b>1</b> <sup>st</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -8.874
	Median: 7.000	Median: 1.5961	<b>Median: -</b> 7.330
	Mean: 6.608	Mean: 1.7498	<b>Mean: -</b> 7.691
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 7.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.5348	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -5.999
	Max.: 13.000	Max.: 3.8983	<b>Max.:</b> -1.320
	Std. Dev.: 0.890	Std. Dev.: 2.5195	Std. Dev.: 7.670
GOV	Min.: 0.000	Min.: 0.0338	<b>Min.:</b> -27.592
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 2.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 1.3728	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -14.854
	Median: 2.000	Median: 1.9546	Median: -11.562
	Mean: 1.992	Mean: 1.9573	Mean: -11.792
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.5317	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -8.227
	Max.: 3.000	Max.: 3.7757	<b>Max.:</b> -3.438

Table 4: Sample-Wide Univariate Analysis

	Std. Dev.: 0.619	Std. Dev.: 0.3303	Std. Dev.: 19.991
Outperform	FALSE: 3713	FALSE: 1864	FALSE: 918
	TRUE: 5296	TRUE: 2727	TRUE: 996

 Table 5: Sample-Wide General Multivariate Regression Outputs

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	<b>P(&gt; t )</b>	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		_
				MSC	CI					
Intercept	-755.6	1245	-0.607	0.5438		0.3327	0.1828	1.920	0.0688	*
ENV	-100.3	51.60	-1.944	0.0520	*	-0.025	0.0076	-3.258	0.0011	***
SOC	-116.0	42.44	-2.735	0.0063	***	-0.004	0.0062	-0.563	0.5734	
GOV	250.8	143.6	1.746	0.0808	*	-0.009	0.0211	-0.442	0.6585	
CONTROVERSY										
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
	Residua	al standard	l error: 32	246 on 844	40 DF	Dispersi	ion param	eter for g	aussian fa	amily
	Multipl	e R-square	ed: 0.076	65		taken to	be 0.227	219	·	•
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.014	51		Null dev	viance: 21	82.7 on 9	9008 DF	
	F-statis	tic: 1.233	on 568 ar	nd 8440 D	F	Residua	l deviance	e: 1917.7	on 8440 ]	DF
	p-value	: 0.000194	44			AIC: 12	769			
	•					Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	: 2
				Refini	itiv			_		
Intercept	-251.2	1107.1	-0.227	0.8205		0.1905	0.1012	1.883	0.0598	*
ENV	-595.7	300.84	-1.980	0.0478	**	0.0016	0.0275	0.059	0.9531	
SOC	142.15	264.40	0.538	0.5909		0.0105	0.0242	0.434	0.6646	
GOV	157.40	251.21	0.627	0.5310		-0.016	0.0230	-0.700	0.4841	
CONTROVERSY	379.53	359.09	1.057	0.2901		0.0658	0.0328	2.005	0.0450	**
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
	Residua	al standard	l error: 51	43 on 400	)6 DF	Dispersi	ion param	eter for g	aussian fa	amily
	393 obs	servations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness	taken to	be 0.220	9799		
	Multipl	e R-square	ed: 0.051	17		Null dev	viance: 98	5.83 on 4	4197 DF	
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.005	934		Residua	l deviance	e: 885.25	on 4006 l	DF
	F-statis	tic: 1.131	on 191 ar	nd 4006 D	F	393 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness
	p-value	: 0.1093				AIC: 57	65.2			
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	: 2
				Sustaina	lytics					
Intercept	-1133	4391.8	-0.258	0.7964		0.5107	0.1570	3.252	0.0012	***
ENV										
SOC	466.1	297.78	1.565	0.1177		0.0044	0.0106	0.414	0.6788	
GOV	91.60	240.90	0.380	0.7038		0.0212	0.0086	2.463	0.0139	**
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										

Residual standard error: 12690 on 1739 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
Multiple R-squared: 0.09429	taken to be 0.205959
Adjusted R-squared: 0.003663	Null deviance: 477.71 on 1913 DF
F-statistic: 1.04 on 174 and 1739 DF	Residual deviance: 358.16 on 1739 DF
p-value: 0.3502	AIC: 2575.9
•	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

			Linear			Logistic				
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value		_		Error	Value		_
				MSC	CI					
Pollution	-5052	1548	-3.264	0.0014	***					
Prevention										
Charity	-5197	2741	-1.896	0.0601	*					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	al standard	d error: 15	522 on 130	6 DF					
	8811 ol	oservation	s deleted	due to						
	missing	gness								
	Multipl	e R-squar	ed: 0.7072	2						
	Adjuste	ed R-squar	red: 0.575	9						
	F-statis	tic: 5.386	on 61 and	1 136 DF						
	p-value	: < 2.2e-1	6							
				Refin	itiv					
Environmental						-0.118	0.0520	-2.277	0.0229	**
Innovation										
CONTROVERSY						0.0585	0.0332	1.763	0.0780	*
Firm Fixed						Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed						Yes				
Effects						D'	•	C	·	
						Dispers	ton param	eter for g	aussian ia	imily
						Null do	vience: 00	05/9 25.82 on /	107 DE	
						Dociduo	daviana	0.05 011 4 0.002 12	$\frac{19}{2000}$	DE
						303 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	on on ess
						AIC: 57	69 2	defeted d		singliess
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	. 🤈
				Sustaina	lytics		51 1 15110	Scoring	norations.	• -
Corporate	2279 3	1321.0	1.726	0.0846	*					
Governance	,,	1021.0	1.,20	510010						
Product						0.0231	0.0116	1.992	0.0465	**
Governance							0			
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										

Table 6: Sample-Wide Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs

Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
	Residual standard error: 12700 on 1733 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
	Multiple R-squared: 0.09623	taken to be 0.206117
	Adjusted R-squared: 0.002363	Null deviance: 477.71 on 1913 DF
	F-statistic: 1.025 on 180 and 1733 DF	Residual deviance: 357.20 on 1733 DF
	p-value: 0.3993	AIC: 2582.8
	•	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

Table 7: Earnings Cutoffs Across Rating Agencies

	Lower Tercile (\$000)	Upper Tercile (\$000)
MSCI	11,369.57	52,803.44
Refinitiv	2905.45	11,106.92
Sustainalytics	4950.10	12,980.21

	MSCI	Refinitiv	Sustainalytics
Number of Firms	333	101	80
Number of	2973	1517	633
Observations			
ENV	Min.: 0.000	Min.: 0.0000	Min.: -22.672
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 5.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.0000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -8.930
	Median: 5.000	Median: 0.1040	<b>Median:</b> 0.000
	Mean: 4.966	Mean: 0.3260	<b>Mean:</b> -4.865
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 5.000	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> 0.5196	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 0.000
	Max.: 10.000	Max.: 2.2900	<b>Max.:</b> 0.000
	Std. Dev.: 1.431	Std. Dev.: 0.2201	Std. Dev.: 38.122
SOC	Min.: -8.000	Min.: 0.0324	<b>Min.:</b> -16.333
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -2.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.7453	<b>1</b> <sup>st</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -9.919
	<b>Median:</b> 0.000	Median: 0.9752	<b>Median: -</b> 7.748
	Mean: 0.681	Mean: 0.9846	<b>Mean:</b> -8.023
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 4.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 1.2129	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -5.943
	Max.: 4.000	Max.: 2.3218	<b>Max.:</b> -1.670
	Std. Dev.: 10.183	Std. Dev.: 0.1526	Std. Dev.: 8.029
GOV	Min.: -7.000	Min.: 0.0338	<b>Min.:</b> -22.742
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -6.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 1.1767	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -8.475
	Median: -4.000	Median: 1.4795	Median: -15.701
	<b>Mean: -4</b> .517	Mean: 1.4844	Mean: -12.402
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -3.000	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> 1.8335	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -11.051

Table 8: Univariate Analysis of Bottom 33% of Earnings

	<b>Max.:</b> 0.000 <b>Std. Dev.:</b> 1.634	Max.: 2.7033 Std. Dev.: 0.2649	Max.: -4.928 Std. Dev.: 20.906
Outperform	FALSE: 1136	FALSE: 630	FALSE: 269
	TRUE: 1837	TRUE: 887	TRUE: 364

Table 9: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Bottom 33% of Earnings

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.
				MS	CI					
Intercept						0.2978	0.4244	0.702	0.4829	
ENV						-0.028	0.0149	-1.884	0.0596	*
SOC						-0.024	0.0147	-1.601	0.1094	
GOV						0.0824	0.0631	1.305	0.1916	
CONTROVERSY Firm Fixed						Yes				
Year Fixed Effects						Yes				
						Dispersio	on parame	ter for ga	ussian fan	nily
						taken to	be 0.2239	584		-
						Null dev	iance: 701	.93 on 29	972 DF	
						Residual	deviance	: 586.32 c	on 2618 D	F
						AIC: 432	22.5			-
				D. C	• , •	Number	of Fisher	Scoring if	terations:	2
T	(40.6	142.25	4.460	Refin	1tiv ***					
Intercept	-640.6	143.35	-4.469	9e-06	444					
	5.300	24.005	0.097	0.9228						
GOV	-0.903 64 737	26 206	-0.203	0.0395	**					
CONTROVERSY	109 16	20.200 50 141	2.470	0.0130	**					
Firm Fixed	Yes	201111	2.177	0.0277						
Effects	1.00									
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	l error: 24	0.6 on 12	05 DF					
	188 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	ingness					
	Multiple	e R-squar	ed: 0.314							
	Adjuste	d R-squar	red: 0.243	9	-					
	F-statist	tic: 4.484	on 123 an	id 1205 D	F					
	p-value:	< 2.2e-10	6	S	- <b>I4</b> :					
Intoroont	010.7	200.10	2 0 9 4	Sustaina	alytics ***	0.042	0.2100	0.126	0.0010	
ENV	-919.7	508.18	-2.984	0.0030		-0.045	0.3190	-0.130	0.8918	
SOC	67.70	21.35	3.171	0.0016	***	0.0251	0.0221	1.135	0.2570	-1-
GOV	5.772	14.72	0.392	0.6951		0.0255	0.0152	1.673	0.0949	*
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Lilects Voor Fixed	Vac					Vac				
Effects	1 05					1 08				

Residual standard error: 430.2 on 547 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
Multiple R-squared: 0.5754	taken to be 0.1982951
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5094	Null deviance: 154.69 on 632 DF
F-statistic: 8.719 on 85 and 547 DF	Residual deviance: 108.47 on 547 DF
p-value: < 2.2e-16	AIC: 853.75
-	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value		_		Error	Value		_
				MSC	CI					
Clean Energy	-90.42	134.10	-0.674	0.0008	****					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	l error: 14	2.6 on 22	99 DF					
	321 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness					
	Multiple	e R-square	ed: 0.8592	2	•					
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.837	7						
	F-statist	tic: 39.86	on 352 ar	nd 2299 D	F					
	p-value	: < 2.2e-1	6							
	-			Refini	itiv					
Workforce	-275	72.794	-3.782	0.0002	****					
Management	78.181	46.255	1.690	0.0913	*					
CSR	246.43	50.270	2.342	0.0194	***	0.2626	0.1501	1.749	0.0805	*
CONTROVERSY	117.72	76.745	3.211	0.0014	**					
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
	Residua	ıl standard	l error: 23	9.1 on 11	98 DF	Dispersi	ion param	eter for g	aussian fa	umily
	188 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness	taken to	be 0.218	5879		
	Multipl	e R-squar	ed: 0.3268	8		Null dev	viance: 31	3.82 on 1	1328 DF	
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.253	7		Residua	l devianc	e: 261.87	on 1198 l	DF
	F-statist	tic: 4.473	on 130 ar	nd 1198 D	F	188 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness
	p-value	: < 2.2e-10	6			AIC: 18	76.8			
						Number	of Fisher	r Scoring	iterations	: 2
				Sustaina	lytics					
Human Capital	106.26	62.622	1.697	0.0903	*					
Carbon	87.78	37.806	2.321	0.0206	**	0.0695	0.0391	1.778	0.0759	*
Product						0.0386	0.0201	1.921	0.0553	*
Governance										
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects						• •				
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										

Table 10: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Bottom 33% of Earnings

Residual standard error: 431.5 on 543 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
Multiple R-squared: 0.576	taken to be 0.1987193
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5065	Null deviance: 154.69 on 632 DF
F-statistic: 8.288 on 89 and 543 DF	Residual deviance: 107.90 on 543 DF
p-value: < 2.2e-16	AIC: 858.46
-	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

	MSCI	Refinitiv	Sustainalytics
Number of Firms	234	65	67
Number of	2973	1511	629
Observations			
ENV	<b>Min.:</b> 2.000	Min.: 0.0000	Min.: -24.485
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 5.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.1703	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -7.901
	Median: 5.000	Median: 0.8764	Median: 0.000
	Mean: 5.284	Mean: 0.9116	<b>Mean: -4</b> .105
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 6.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 1.4797	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 0.000
	Max.: 10.000	Max.: 2.4216	<b>Max.:</b> 0.000
	Std. Dev.: 1.489	Std. Dev.: 0.5490	Std. Dev.: 27.693
SOC	Min.: -9.000	Min.: 0.0293	Min.: -20.171
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -2.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.9486	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -9.402
	Median: 0.000	Median: 1.3706	Median: -7.852
	Mean: 0.501	Mean: 1.3651	Mean: -7.945
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 4.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 1.7138	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -6.047
	Max.: 4.000	Max.: 2.9196	Max.: -1.320
	Std. Dev.: 10.231	Std. Dev.: 0.3404	Std. Dev.: 8.652
GOV	Min.: -7.000	Min.: 0.0676	Min.: -26.149
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -6.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 1.2168	<b>1</b> <sup>st</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -15.075
	Median: -4.000	Median: 1.6562	Median: -11.611
	Mean: -4.608	Mean: 1.5887	Mean: -11.813
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -4.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 1.9775	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -8.004
	Max.: 0.000	Max.: 2.8587	<b>Max.:</b> -3.651
	Std. Dev.: 1.628	Std. Dev.: 0.3409	Std. Dev.: 21.201
Outperform	FALSE: 1222	FALSE: 565	FALSE: 294
	TRUE: 1751	TRUE: 946	TRUE: 335

Table 11: Univariate Analysis of Middle 33% of Earnings

Table 12: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Middle 33% of Earnings

Linear	Logistic	

	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				Refini	tiv					
Intercept						0.3071	0.1368	2.246	0.0249	**
ENV						0.0071	0.0477	0.149	0.8813	
SOC						0.0249	0.0441	0.565	0.5724	
GOV						-0.071	0.0427	-1.668	0.0956	*
CONTROVERSY						-0.047	0.0579	-0.810	0.4178	
Firm Fixed						Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed						Yes				
Effects										
						Dispers	ion param	neter for g	aussian fa	mily
						taken to	be 0.215	4561		
						Null de	viance: 32	23.23 on 1	418 DF	
						Residua	l devianc	e: 288.06	on 1337 I	DF
						92 obse	rvations d	leleted du	e to missi	ngness
						AIC: 19	30.3			-
						Number	r of Fisher	r Scoring	iterations	: 2

**Notes:** The dependent variable for the linear regression is *Outperformance*, while the dependent variable for the logistic model is *Outperform*. Firm and time fixed effects are not provided. Statistical significance at the 0%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by \*\*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*, and \*, respectively.

	Linear							Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				MSC	CI					
Climate Change	-640.5	265.57	-2.412	0.0176	***					
Health and Safety						-0.835	0.4260	-1.961	0.0526	*
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	l error: 34	1.1 on 10	4 DF	Dispers	ion param	eter for g	aussian fa	mily
	2823 observations deleted due to					taken to be 0.172292				
	missing	ness				Null deviance: 31.093 on 149 DF				
	Multipl	e R-square	ed: 0.523	1		Residual deviance: 17.918 on 104 DF				
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.316	8		2823 ob	servation	s deleted	due to	
	F-statist	tic: 2.535	on 45 and	1104 DF		missingness				
	p-value	: 5.245e-0	5			AIC: 20	0.96			
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	: 2
				Refini	itiv					
Environmental	-538.4	213.70	-2.519	0.0119	**	-0.152	0.0921	-1.652	0.0988	*
Innovation										
Workforce	712.58	257.96	2.762	0.0058	***	0.2998	0.1111	2.697	0.0071	***
CSR						-0.287	0.0986	-2.911	0.0037	***
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										

 Table 13: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Middle 33% of Earnings

Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes		
	Residual standard error: 1074 on 1330 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family		
	92 observations deleted due to missingness	taken to be $0.2140/92$		
	A diusted R-squared: 0.1384	Residual deviance: 284.73 on 1330 DF		
	F-statistic: 3 589 on 88 and 1330 D	92 observations deleted due to missingness		
	p-value: < 2.2e-16	AIC: 1927.8		
	1	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2		
	Sustainalytics	-		
Product	154.59 61.275 2.523 0.0119 **	0.0458 0.0255 1.800 0.0724 *		
Governance				
Business Ethics	246.79 128.71 1.917 0.0557 *			
Firm Fixed	Yes	Yes		
Effects Veen Fined	V	V		
Effects	Yes	Yes		
	Residual standard error: 12700 on 1733 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family		
	Multiple R-squared: 0.09623	taken to be 0.1969296		
	Adjusted R-squared: 0.002363	Null deviance: 156.58 on 628 DF		
	F-statistic: 1.025 on 180 and 1733 DF	Residual deviance: 108.31 on 550 DF		
	p-value: 0.3993	AIC: 838.54		
		Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2		

	MSCI	Refinitiv	Sustainalytics
Number of Firms	148	49	60
Number of	3063	1563	652
Observations			
ENV	Min.: 0.000	Min.: 0.0000	<b>Min.:</b> -20.447
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 5.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 0.9795	<b>1</b> <sup>st</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -5.105
	Median: 5.000	Median: 1.7792	<b>Median: -2.850</b>
	Mean: 5.516	Mean: 1.5923	<b>Mean: -3.596</b>
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 6.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.3356	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 0.000
	Max.: 10.000	Max.: 2.9114	<b>Max.:</b> 0.000
	Std. Dev.: 1.541	Std. Dev.: 0.7033	Std. Dev.: 17.979
SOC	Min.: -7.000	Min.: 0.0595	Min.: -20.941
	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -2.000	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: 1.4777	<b>1<sup>st</sup> Q.:</b> -9.901
	Median: 0.000	Median: 1.9846	<b>Median: -</b> 8.180
	Mean: 0.607	Mean: 1.9033	<b>Mean: -</b> 8.597
	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 4.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.4023	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> -6.748
	Max.: 5.000	Max.: 2.9644	<b>Max.:</b> -2.806
	Std. Dev.: 8.776	Std. Dev.: 0.2419	Std. Dev.: 8.341
GOV	Min.: -7.000	Min.: 0.2720	<b>Min.:</b> -27.592

# Table 14: Univariate Analysis of Top 33% of Earnings

	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -5.000	<b>1</b> <sup>st</sup> <b>Q.:</b> 1.4770	1 <sup>st</sup> Q.: -13.739
	<b>Median: -4.000</b>	Median: 1.8500	Median: -11.575
	<b>Mean: -4.446</b>	Mean: 1.8270	<b>Mean: -</b> 11.178
	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -4.000	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> Q.:</b> 2.2420	<b>3</b> <sup>rd</sup> <b>Q.:</b> -7.759
	Max.: 0.000	Max.: 2.7930	<b>Max.:</b> -3.438
	Std. Dev.: 1.156	Std. Dev.: 0.2783	Std. Dev.: 17.256
Outperform	FALSE: 1708	FALSE: 894	FALSE: 355
	TRUE: 1355	TRUE: 669	TRUE: 297

 Table 15: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Top 33% of Earnings

			Linear			Logistic						
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.		
		Error	Value		_		Error	Value		_		
				MSC	CI							
Intercept	523.91	3066.7	0.171	0.8644		0.3213	0.2700	1.190	0.2341			
ENV	-282.3	147.14	-1.918	0.0552	*	-0.034	0.0130	-2.589	0.0100	***		
SOC	-481.7	130.08	-3.703	0.0002	****	-0.008	0.0115	-0.678	0.4979			
GOV	917.36	465.60	1.979	0.0489	**	-0.006	0.0410	-0.150	0.8805			
CONTROVERSY												
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes						
Effects												
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes						
Effects												
	Residua	l standard	l error: 54	50 on 289	93 DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family						
	Multiple	e R-squar	ed: 0.073	32		taken to be 0.2302642						
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.019	19		Null de	viance: 75	5.58 on 3	3062 DF			
	F-statist	ic: 1.354	on 169 ar	nd 2893 D	F	Residua	l devianc	e: 666.15	on 2893 I	DF		
	p-value:	0.002058	3			AIC: 43	61.4					
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	: 2		
	150.0	25261	0.047	Refini	tiv	0.4606	0.1000	2 201	0.0010	ala ala ala		
Intercept	-170.3	2536.1	-0.067	0.9465	4	0.4606	0.1399	3.291	0.0010	***		
ENV	-15/3	824.23	-1.908	0.0566	*	-0.044	0.0455	-0.975	0.3297			
SOC	192.58	705.68	0.273	0.7850		0.0013	0.0389	0.032	0.9/41			
GOV	597.17	709.85	0.841	0.4004		0.049/	0.0392	1.268	0.2051	ماد ماد		
CONTROVERSY	/6/./8	8/0.35	0.882	0.3//9		0.1153 V	0.0480	2.402	0.0165	ጥጥ		
FILM FIXED	res					res						
Effects Voor Fired	Var					Vac						
Y ear rixeu	res					res						
Effects	Dacidua	1 stondard	l arman 86	27 on 127	7 DE	Dianara	ion norm	ator for a	oussion fo	mily		
	113 obs	ervations	deleted d	107011107	ingness	taken to	be 0 227	107	aussiaii ic	unny		
	Multiple	$\sim R_{-sauons}$		94 10 miss	ingness	Null der	viance 3/	107	449 DF			
	Adjusted P squared: 0.01184					Residual deviance: 312 73 on 1377 DF						
	E-statistic: 1.241 on 72 and 1377 DE					113 observations deleted due to missingness						
	$p_{-}$ value: 0.08767					AIC: 2038.6						
	P funde.	0.00707				Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2						

**Notes:** The dependent variable for the linear regression is *Outperformance*, while the dependent variable for the logistic model is *Outperform*. Firm and time fixed effects are not provided. Statistical significance at the 0%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by \*\*\*\*, \*\*\*, \*\*, and \*, respectively.

			Linear			Logistic						
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.		
				MSC	I							
Pollution	-4986	2083.78	-2.393	0.0192	**							
Prevention												
Firm Fixed	Yes											
Effects Voor Fixed	Vac											
Effects	105											
Linceis	Residua	al standard	error: 202	20 on 75 I	DF							
	2953 ol	oservations	deleted d	lue to								
	missing	gness										
	Multipl	e R-square	d: 0.7058									
	Adjuste	ed R-square	ed: 0.5724	1								
	F-statis	tic: 5.291 c	on 34 and	75 DF								
	p-value	: 9.64e-10		Definit	4							
Fnvironmontal				Kenni	liv	-0.18/	0.0754	2 320	0.0205	**		
Innovation						-0.104	0.0754	-2.320	0.0203			
CSR						0.1591	0.0887	1.793	0.0732	*		
CONTROVERSY						0.0998	0.0494	2.018	0.0438	**		
Firm Fixed						Yes						
Effects												
Year Fixed Effects						Yes						
				Sustainal	lytics	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family taken to be 0.2261202 Null deviance: 347.19 on 1449 DF Residual deviance: 309.78 on 1370 DF 113 observations deleted due to missingness AIC: 2038.9 Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2						
Land Use and						-0.445	0.2327	-1.910	0.0566	*		
Biodiversity Firm Fixed						Yes						
Effects Year Fixed						Yes						
Effects						Dispers taken to Null dev Residua AIC: 91 Number	ion param be 0.214 viance: 16 1 deviance 8.78 c of Fisher	neter for g 4615 51.71 on 6 e: 123.74 r Scoring	aussian fa 551 DF on 577 D iterations	nmily F : 2		

# Table 16: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Top 33% of Earnings

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				MS	CI					
SOC	-147.3	71.18	-2.069	0.0387	**					
GOV	-409.6	204.77	-2.001	0.0455	**	-0.0655	0.0388	-1.688	0.0914	*
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects	Residua 26 obse Multipl Adjuste F-statist p-value	Il standard rvations d e R-squard d R-squar tic: 1.562 : 3.797e-0	l error: 25 leleted du ed: 0.0756 red: 0.027 on 142 an	110 on 270 e to missin 58 23 ad 2709 D <b>Refin</b>	09 DF ngness F <b>itiv</b>	Dispersion taken to b Null devi Residual 26 observ AIC: 399	on parame be 0.2259 fance: 682 deviance: vations de 3.3	ter for ga 922 2.07 on 28 612.21 o leted due	ussian fan 351 DF on 2709 D to missin	nily F gness
ENV Firm Fixed	-1192 Ves	594.94	-2.003	0.0454	**	-0.1047 Ves	0.0414	-2.530	0.0115	**
Effects	1 05					103				
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects	Residua 116 obs Multipl Adjuste F-statist p-value	Il standard ervations e R-squard d R-squar tic: 1.334 : 0.02987	l error: 67 deleted d ed: 0.0652 red: 0.016 on 78 and	09 on 149 ue to miss 21 34 I 1492 DF	02 DF ingness	Dispersion taken to b Null devi Residual 116 obse AIC: 214 Number of	on parame be 0.21770 iance: 372 deviance: rvations d 2.1 of Fisher (	ter for ga 093 2.01 on 15 2324.82 o leleted du Scoring it	ussian fan 570 DF on 1492 D e to missi serations: 2	nily F ngness 2

Table 17: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Consumer Products and Services Sector

Table 18: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Consumer Products and Services Se	Sector
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			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.
				MSC	CI					
Pollution Prevention	-5113	2156.9	-2.371	0.0193	**					
Regulatory Problems	-8010	4675.7	-1.713	0.0892	*					
Firm Fixed Effects	Yes									
Year Fixed Effects	Yes									
	Residua	al standard	l error: 21	15 on 126	5 DF					

	2697 observations deleted due to missingness Multiple R-squared: 0.5872 Adjusted R-squared: 0.4103											
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.410	3								
	F-statist	123.319	on 54 and	1 126 DF								
	p-value:	1./2/e-0	0	Rofini	tiv							
Environmental	-1820	1100.2	-1 654	0.0984	*							
Innovation	1020	1100.2	1.054	0.0704								
Firm Fixed	Yes											
Effects												
Year Fixed Effects	Yes											
	Residua	l standard	error: 67	20 on 148	35 DF							
	116 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	ingness							
	Multiple	R-square	ed: 0.066	78								
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.013	37								
	F-statist	ic: 1.25 c	on 85 and	1485 DF								
	p-value:	0.06554		G ( •								
и р. г.	2000	1050 1	2 (04	Sustaina	lytics							
Human Rights	-3909	1058.1	-3.694	0.0002	*							
Carbon	2121.1 5996.6	2850.0	1.814	0.0702	**							
Carbon Product Impost	2480.8	2830.0	2.000	0.0393	**							
Data Privacy and	2-109.0	1100.5	2.202	0.0241		-0.096	0.0580	-1 657	0.0981	*		
Security						-0.070	0.0500	-1.057	0.0701			
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes						
Effects												
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes						
Effects												
	Residua	l standard	l error: 97	769 on 545	5 DF	Dispersi	ion param	eter for g	aussian fa	ımily		
	Multiple	e R-square	ed: 0.079	99		taken to	be 0.2242	2627				
	Adjusted R-squared: -0.02973					Null deviance: 152.66 on 610 DF						
	F-statist	ic: 0.729	on 65 and	1 545 DF		Residual deviance: 122.22 on 545 DF						
	p-value:	0.9433				AIC: 884.69						
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	: 2		

Notes: Equation, sig level, only includes significant variables with not MC

Table 19:	General	Multivariate	Regression	Outputs for	Financial	Services	Sector
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			Linear		Logistic					
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				MS	CI					
SOC	-332.6	68.284	-4.870	1e-06	****					
GOV	705.31	237.81	2.966	0.0031	***					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua 26 obse	l standard rvations d	l error: 26 eleted du	34 on 184 e to missi	15 DF ngness					

	F-statistic: 2.774 on 129 and 1845 DF p- value: < 2.2e-16					
	Sustainalytics					
GOV		0.0306	0.0124	2.478	0.0135	**
Firm Fixed		Yes				
Effects						
Year Fixed		Yes				
Effects						
		Dispersion taken to 1	on parame be 0.2066	ter for ga 77	ussian fan	nily
		Null dev	iance: 142	2.36 on 50	69 DF	
		Residual	deviances	107.27 c	on 519 DF	
		AIC: 769	9.5			
		Number	of Fisher	Scoring i	terations: 2	2

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				Refini	itiv					
Emissions	-2486	1437.1	-1.730	0.0839	*					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed Effects	Yes									
	Residua	ıl standaro	l error: 44	85 on 107	75 DS					
	173 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness					
	Multipl	e R-squar	ed: 0.037	98						
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: -0.03	898						
	F-statis	tic: 0.493	5 on 86 ar	nd 1075 D	F					
	p-value	: 1								
				Sustaina	lytics					
Product	477.47	243.15	1.964	0.0501	*	0.0306	0.0183	1.671	0.0952	*
Governance										
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects	D 11		1 ()		DE	D.'				••
	Residua	al standard	1  error:  60	)56 on 513	5 DF	Dispers	ion paran	neter for $g$	aussian fa	mily
	Multipl	e R-squar	ed: $0.087$	39		taken to	be $0.207$	4264	5(0 DE	
	Adjuste	d K-squai	ed: -0.00	8504 1515 DE	,	Null deviance: 142.36 on 569 DF				
	F-statis	10: 0.913	2 on 54 ar	10 313 DF		Kesidual deviance: 106.82 on 515 DF				
	p-value	: 0.6509				AIU: //J.1J Number of Fisher Security iterations, 2				
						Number	of Fishe	r Scoring	iterations	2

Table 20: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Financial Services Sector

Multiple R-squared: 0.1624 Adjusted R-squared: 0.1039

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	Value				Error	Value		
				Refini	tiv					
CONTROVERSY	2247.1	1291.15	1.740	0.0827	*					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	error: 510	4 on 357	DF					
	66 obse	rvations de	leted due	to missin	gness					
	Multiple	e R-squared	d: 0.0637	6						
	Adjuste	d R-square	d: -0.043'	76						
	F-statist	ic: 0.593 o	n 41 and	357 DF						
	p-value:	0.9786								
				Sustaina	lytics					
SOC	1125.8	521.95	2.157	0.0328	**					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	error: 568	2 on 135	DF					
	Multiple	e R-squared	d: 0.1433	_						
	Adjuste	d R-square	d: 0.0163	7						
	F-statist	ac: 1.129 o	n 20 and	135 DF						
	p-value:	0.3279								

Table 21: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Healthcare Sector

Table 22: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Healthcare Sector

			Logistic							
	Est.	Std.	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.
		Error	value				Error	value		
				Refinit	iv					
Community						-0.452	0.2034	-2.220	0.0271	**
Firm Fixed						Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed						Yes				
Effects										

Null deviance: 95.008 on 398 DF Residual deviance: 83.381 on 351 DF 66 observations deleted due to missingness AIC: 605.66 Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

			5	Sustainaly	rtics	_
<b>Basic Services</b>	4763.8	1682.5	2.831	0.0054	***	
Land Use and	377477	173095	2.181	0.0312	**	
Biodiversity						
<b>Resource</b> Use	-163140	78999	-2.065	0.0411	**	
Carbon	166298	80739	2.060	0.0416	**	
Emissions,						1.6172 0.9030 1.791 0.0759 *
Effluents, and						
Waste						
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes
Effects						
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes
Effects						
	Residual st	andard er	or: 5655	on 119 D	F	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
	Multiple R	-squared:	0.2518			taken to be 0.2123373
	Adjusted R	L-squared:	0.02543			Null deviance: 38.481 on 155 DF
	F-statistic:	1.112 on 3	36 and 11	9 DF		Residual deviance: 25.268 on 119 DF
	p-value: 0.	3277				AIC: 234.74
						Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

<b>1 HOIC 23.</b> Ocher al maniful fait $Action Comparis for the ty sector$
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			Linear			Logistic						
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.		
				Refin	itiv							
SOC						-0.0948	0.0556	-1.706	0.0884	*		
Firm Fixed						Yes						
Effects												
Year Fixed						Yes						
Effects												
						Dispersio	on parame	ter for ga	ussian far	nily		
						taken to l	be 0.1684	U		2		
						Null dev	iance: 152	2.19 on 73	5 DF			
						Residual	deviance	117.04 c	on 695 DF			
						73 observ	vations de	leted due	to missin	oness		
						AIC: 819	) 37	leteu uue	10 111100111	511000		
						Number	of Fisher	Scoring it	erations	,		
				Sustaina	alvtics	i tumoer		seering h	crations.	-		
SOC	93.539	45.445	2.058	0.0406	**	0.0525	0.0219	2.398	0.0172	**		
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes			····=·=			
Effects	2 00					1 - 5						
Vear Fixed	Ves					Ves						
Effects	105					1 05						

Residual standard error: 805 9 on DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family
Multiple D. generadi () 2165	talian ta ha 0 1505994
Multiple K-squared: 0.5105	laken to be 0.1505884
Adjusted R-squared: 0.2481	Null deviance: 60.943 on 264 DF
F-statistic: 4.63 on 24 and 240 DF	Residual deviance: 36.141 on 240 DF
p-value: 1.861e-10	AIC: 276.08
-	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

			Linear					Logistic				
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.		
		Error	Value				Error	Value				
				MSC	ĽI –							
Supply Chain	2993	1777.5	1.684	0.0936	*							
Pollution						0.2914	0.1596	1.826	0.0691	*		
Prevention										de de de		
Regulatory						-0.259	0.0982	-2.639	0.0088	***		
Problems						0.201	0.1550	2 505	0.0120	* *		
Innovative Giving						-0.391	0.1559	-2.505	0.0129	** **		
Health and Safety						0.213	0.0965	2.207	0.0282	***		
CUNTROVERSY	V					-0.249	0.0905	-2./45	0.0065	1.1.1.		
FIFIN FIXED	res					res						
Directs Vear Fixed	Ves					Ves						
Effects	105					105						
Effects	Residua	l standard	error 49	03 on 243	DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family						
	426 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	ingness	taken to	be $0.180$	0336	uussiun n	lilli		
	Multiple	e R-souar	ed: 0.183	9	mBriess	Null de	viance: 71	.150 on 2	85 DF			
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.042	89		Residua	l devianc	e: 43.748	on 243 D	F		
	F-statist	tic: 1.304	on 42 and	1 243 DF		426 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to miss	singness		
	p-value	0.1129				AIC: 362.66						
	-			Refini	tiv							
Workforce	-1848	983.42	-1.879	0.0607	*							
Human Rights	1445.6	695.43	2.079	0.0380	**							
Product	-1282	556.55	-2.303	0.0216	**							
Responsibility												
Management	1207.8	643.05	1.878	0.0608	*							
Firm Fixed	Yes											
Effects	• •											
Year Fixed	Yes											
Effects	р · 1	1 / 1 1		000 (00								
	Residua	l standard	l error: 28	93 on 688	5 DF							
	/ 5 ODSe	rvations d	eleted du	e to missi 1	ngness							
	Adjusto	d D squar	ad: 0.1/3	1 7								
	E statist	u K-squar	cu. 0.118	1688 DE								
	n-value	1 1120.1	$0^{1}$ + / and 0	1 000 DI								
	p-value	. 1.1136-1	U	Sustaina	lytics							
				Sustailla	171103							

Table 24: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Energy Sector

ESG Financial	-1268	277 32	-4 572	8e-06	****	-0.326	0 1381	-2 361	0.0191	**
Integration	1200	211.52	1.572	00 00		0.520	0.1501	2.301	0.0171	
Integration										
Business Ethics	402.34	189.35	-1.613	0.0347	**					
Carbon	2006.1	1145.0	2.125	0.0811	*					
Human Capital						0.2291	0.1025	2.236	0.0263	**
Corruption and						-0.564	0.2956	-1.908	0.0576	*
Bribery										
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes				
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	error: 76	4.5 on DF	7	Dispersi	on param	eter for g	aussian fa	milv
	Multiple	- R-square	d. 0 4053	3		taken to	be 0 1449	9283 Ŭ		5
	A 1	1 D	1 0 222	, ,		NL-11 1		042 2		
	Adjuste	a K-squar	ed: 0.323	3		Null dev	fance: 60	.943 on 2	64 DF	
	F-statist	ic: 4.942 (	on 32 and	l 232 DF		Residua	l deviance	e: 33.623	on 232 DI	7
	p-value:	2.009e-1	3			AIC: 27	2.94			
	1		-			Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations	2
						TAUHIDEI	UT I ISHCI	Scoring	incrations.	4

			Linear					Logistic		
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.
				MS	CI					
ENV	-567.7	275.22	-2.063	0.0401	**					
Firm Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
Year Fixed	Yes									
Effects										
	Residua	l standard	l error: 25	527 on 25'	7 DF					
	26 obse	rvations d	leleted du	e to missi	ngness					
	Multiple	e R-squar	ed: 0.139		U					
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.022	234						
	F-statist	tic: 1.191	on 35 and	1257 DF						
	p-value	: 0.2228								

Table 25: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Information Technology Sector

Table 26: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Information Technology Sector

		Linear		Logistic					
Est.	Est. Std. t- P(> t ) Sig. Error Value						t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.
			MSC	Ι					

Antitrust	3988.89	1056.2	3.777	0.0002	****	
Firm Fixed	Yes					
Effects						
Year Fixed	Yes					
Effects						
	Residual	standard e	error: 180	3 on 134 ]	DF	
	156 obser	rvations d	eleted due	e to missir	ngness	
	Multiple	R-squared	l: 0.1838		-	
	Adjusted	R-square	d: 0.0132	1		
	F-statistic	c: 1.077 of	n 28 and	134 DF		
	p-value: (	0.3748				
	1			Sustainal	ytics	
Human Rights	-14110	5198	-2.715	0.0088	***	
Human Capital	18660	7649	2.439	0.0179	**	
ESG Financial	-5814	3389	-1.716	0.0917	*	
Integration						
<b>Resource Use</b>	14670	7132	2.057	0.0443	**	
Data Privacy and	6038	3601	1.676	0.0992	*	
Security						
Firm Fixed	Yes					
Effects						
Year Fixed	Yes					
Effects						
	Residual	standard e	error: 448	8 on 56 D	F	
	Multiple	R-squared	l: 0.2259			
	Adjusted	R-square	d: -0.0366	59		
	F-statistic	e: 0.8603 o	on 19 and	56 DF		
	p-value: (	0.6296				

			Linear					Logistic			
	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std. Error	t- Value	P(> t )	Sig.	
				Refin	itiv						
ENV	-1030	290.83	-3.543	0.0006	****						
GOV	-535.7	227.19	-2.358	0.0205	**	-0.5945	0.2228	-2.668	0.0090	***	
CONTROVERSY	-846.9	495.54	-1.709	0.0908	*	-1.0739	0.4860	-2.210	0.0296	**	
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes					
Effects											
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes					
Effects											
	Residua	l standard	l error: 43	7.7 on 91	DF	Dispersion parameter for gaussian family					
	28 obse	rvations d	eleted du	e to missi	ngness	taken to be 0.1842468					
	Multiple	e R-square	ed: 0.5088	8		Null deviance: 26.325 on 116 DF					
	Adjuste	d R-squar	ed: 0.373	8		Residual deviance: 16.766 on 91 DF					
	F-statist	ic: 3.77 c	on 25 and	91 DF		28 observ	vations de	leted due	to missin	gness	

Table 27: General Multivariate Regression Outputs for Materials and Resources Sector

p-value: 1.804e-06	AIC: 158.72
	Number of Fisher Scoring iterations: 2

			Linear					Logistic	;		
	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	Est.	Std.	t-	P(> t )	Sig.	
		Error	Value		-		Error	Value			
		4404 -		MSC	1			1 - 2 0	0.0070		
Health and Safety	3816.4	1106.5	3.449	0.0009	****	0.720	0.4144	1.738	0.0860	*	
Product Safety	3368.85	637.59	5.284	le-06	****	0.5062	0.2388	2.120	0.0371	**	
Antitrust	-1579.1	662.18	-2.385	0.0194	**						
Firm Fixed	Yes					Yes					
Effects	• •										
Year Fixed	Yes					Yes					
Effects	р <sup>1</sup> 1 1	. 1 1	100	0.00	T	D'			· .	.1	
	Residual	standard of	error: 128	3 on 82 L	)F	Dispers	ion param	eter for g	aussian fai	mily	
	199 obse	rvations d	eleted due $1 - 0.2(17)$	e to missi	ngness	taken to be 0.2308924					
	Multiple	R-squarec	1: 0.361/			Null de	viance: $23$	10.7/4  on	105 DF		
	Adjusted	R-square	d: 0.1826			Kesidua	l deviance	e: 18.933	on 82 DF		
	F-statisti	c: 2.02  or	123 and $8$	52 DF	199 obs	ervations	deleted d	ue to missi	ingness		
	p-value:	0.01111		D.c.	4 <b>.</b>	AIC: IC	08.23				
Managamant	1210	512 54	2 2 7 2		<u>الا</u> **						
	-1218	313.34 456.29	-2.3/3	0.0199	*						
USK Workforgo	-000.5	430.38	-1.929	0.0370		2 021	0.8674	2 3 4 2	0.0215	**	
CONTROLL						-2.031	0.8074	1 780	0.0213	*	
Firm Fixed	Vec					-0.044 Ves	0.4720	-1./09	0.07713		
Fifforts	103					105					
Vear Fixed	Ves					Ves					
Effects	103					103					
Lifetts	Residual	standard o	error 479	on 88 DF	7	Dispers	ion naram	eter for g	aussian fai	milv	
	28 observ	vations de	leted due	to missing	mess	taken to	be 0.197	1397	uussiun iu	J	
	Multiple	R-squared	1: 0.4309		5	Null deviance: 26.325 on 116 DF					
	Adjusted	R-square	d: 0.2499			Residual deviance: 17.348 on 88 DF					
	F-statisti	c: $2.38 \text{ or}$	128 and $8$	88 DF		28 observations deleted due to missingness					
	p-value:	0.001145				AIC: 168.72					
	1					Number	of Fisher	Scoring	iterations:	2	
				Sustainal	lytics			U			
Human Capital	-2101	1029.2	1.700	0.0964	*						
Product	-3204	1493.4	-2.041	0.0475	**						
Governance											
<b>Business Ethics</b>	-14904	6143.5	-2.426	0.0378	**						
Firm Fixed	Yes										
Effects											
Year Fixed	Yes										
Effects											

 Table 28: Detailed Multivariate Regression Outputs for Materials and Resources Sector

Residual standard error: 773.3 on 42 DF
Multiple R-squared: 0.4871
Adjusted R-squared: 0.3406
F-statistic: 3.325 on 12 and 42 DF
p-value: 0.001891

	Full	Bottom	Middle	Top 3rd	Consumer	Financial	Healthcare	Energy	Information	Materials
	Sample	3 <sup>rd</sup> of Earnings	3 <sup>rd</sup> of Earnings	of Earnings	Products and	Services			Technology	and Resources
		8-	8-	8_	Services					
				Gene	ral MSCI Mo	del				
ENV	Negative	Negative		Negative	Negative	Nagativa			Negative	
GOV	Positive			Positive	Negative	Positive				
				Gener	al Refintiv M	odel				
ENV	Negative			Negative	Negative					Negative
SOC		р '/'	N					Negative		N C
GUV		Positive	Negative	General	Sustainalytics	Model				Negative
ENV				General	Justannarytics	lituti				
SOC		Positive					Positive			
GOV	Positive	Positive				Positive				
Clean Energy		Nanatina		Detai	led MSCI Mo	del				
Clean Energy Climate		Negative	Negative							
Change			reguire							
Land and										
Biodiversity										
Noncarbon										
Pollution	Negative			Negative	Negative			Positive		
Prevention					8					
Charity	Negative									
Health and			Negative					Positive		Positive
Salety Innovative								Negative		
Giving								reguire		
Product Safety										Positive
Antitrust									Positive	Negative
Economic Risk										
Regulatory					Negative			Negative		
Problems					8			0		
Supply Chain								Positive		
Emissions				Detaile	ed Refintiv M	odel				
Environmental	Negative		Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative				
Innovation	rieguirie		reguire	rieguirie	rieguire					
<b>Resource</b> Use										
Community		D	NT	D			Negative			NT C
USK Human Rights		Positive	Negative	Positive				Positive		Negative
Workforce		Negative	Positive					Negative		Negative
Management		Positive						Positive		Negative
Product								Negative		-
Responsibility										
Snareholders				Detailed (	Sustainalytics	Model				
Carbon		Positive		Detaneu	Positive	mouti	Positive	Positive		

Table 29: Summary of Significant Input Variables Directional Relationship with Earnings

Land and Biodiversity Resource Use Waste Basic Services			Negative			Positive Negative Positive Positive		Positive	
Data Security and Privacy Health and Safety				Negative				Positive	
Human Capital Human Rights Product Impact		Positive		Negative Positive			Positive	Positive Negative	Negative
Corruption and Bribery Corporate Governance	Positive	Positive					Negative		
Business Ethics ESG Financial Integration			Positive	Positive			Positive Negative	Negative	Negative
Product Governance	Positive	Positive	Positive		Positive				Negative

Notes: Insignificant dependent variables are omitted from the table.

# APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Sample B2C SIC Codes

0191	General Farms, Primarily Crop	6099	Functions Related to Depository Banking		
0291	General Farms, Primarily Livestock	6141	Personal Credit Institutions		
0742	Veterinary Services for Animal Specialties	6159	Miscellaneous Business Credit Institutions		
0781	Landscape Counseling and Planning	6282	Investment Advice		
0782	Lawn and Garden Services	6311	Life Insurance		
1521	General Contractors, Single-Family	6321	Accident and Health Insurance		
1521	General Contractors, Residential	6324	Hospital and Medical Service Plans		
1522	Buildings	6361	Title Insurance		
1711	Plumbing, Heating, and Air-Conditioning	6371	Pension, Health, and Welfare Funds		
1731	Electrical Work	(200	Insurance Carriers, Not Elsewhere		
4111	Local and Suburban Transit	0399			
4119	Local Passenger Transportation	0411 (512	Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service		
4121	Taxicabs	0315	Operators of Dwellings other than		
4131	Intercity and Rural Bus Transportation	6514	Apartment Buildings		
4311	United States Postal Service	6515	Operators of Residential Mobile Home		
4481	Deep Sea Transportation of Passengers	6531	Real Estate Agents and Managers		
4482	Ferries	7011	Hotels and Motels		
4489	Water Transportation of Passengers	7021	Rooming and Boarding Houses		
4512	Scheduled Air Transportation	7021	Sporting and Recreational Camps		
4724	Travel Agencies	7032	Recreational Vehicle Parks and		
4841	Cable and Other Pay Television Services	7033	Campsites		
4931	Electric and Other Services Combined	7216	Dry-Cleaning Plants		
4932	Gas and Other Services Combined	7217	Carpet and Upholstery Cleaning		
4939	Combination Utilities	7219	Laundry and Garment Services		
4961	Steam and Air-Conditioning Supply	7221	Photographic Studios, Portrait		
5231	Paint, Glass, and Wallpaper Stores	7231	Beauty Shops		
5251	Hardware Stores	7241	Barber Shops		
5261	Retail Nurseries, Lawn, and Garden	7251	Shoe Repair Shops and Shoeshine Parlors		
5271	Mobile Home Dealers	7261	Funeral Service and Crematories		
5211	Department Stores	7291	Tax Return Preparation Services		
5221	Veriety Stores	7299	Miscellaneous Personal Services		
3331	Miscellaneous General Merchandise	7323	Credit Reporting Services		
5399	Stores	7342	Disinfecting and Pest Control Services		
5411	Grocery Stores	7340	Building Cleaning and Maintenance		
5421	Meat and Fish Markets	1347			

5431	Fruit and Vegetable Markets	7377	Computer Rental and Leasing
5441	Candy, Nut, and Confectionery Stores	7378	Computer Maintenance and Repair
5451	Dairy Products Stores	7382	Security Systems Services
5461	Retail Bakeries	7384	Photofinishing Laboratories
5499	Miscellaneous Food Stores	7389	Business Services
5511	Motor Vehicle Dealers	7512	Garment Pressing and Agents for
5521	Used Motor Vehicle Dealers	7512	Truels Pontal and Leasing without Drivers
5531	Auto and Home Supply Stores	7517	Passanger Car Pental
5541	Gasoline Service Stations	7514	Passenger Car Leasing
5551	Boat Dealers	/515	Utility Trailer and Recreational Vehicle
5561	Recreation Vehicle Dealers	7519	Rental
5571	Motorcycle Dealers	7521	Automobile Parking
5599 5611	Automotive Dealers Men's and Boy's Clothing and Accessory Stores	7532	and Paint Shops Automotive Exhaust System Repair
5621	Women's Clothing Stores	7533	Shops
5632	Women's Accessory and Specialty Stores	7534	Tire Retreading and Repair Shops
5641	Children's and Infants' Wear Stores	7536	Automotive Glass Replacement Shops
5651	Family Clothing Stores	7537	Automotive Transmission Repair Shops
5661	Shoe Stores	7538	General Automotive Repair Shops
5001	Miscellaneous Apparel and Accessory	7539	Automotive Repair Shops
5699	Stores	7542	Car Washes
5712	Furniture Stores	7549	Automotive Services
5713	Floor Covering Stores	7622	Radio and Television Repair Shops
5714	Drapery, Curtain, and Upholstery Stores	7623	Service and Repair Shops
5719	Miscellaneous Home Furnishings Stores	7629	Electrical and Electronic Repair Shops
5722	Household Appliance Stores	7631	Watch, Clock, and Jewelry Repair
5731	Electronics Stores	7641	Reupholstery and Furniture Repair
5734	Computer and Computer Software Stores	7692	Welding Repair
5735	Record and Prerecorded Tape Stores	7694	Armature Rewinding Shops
5736	Musical Instrument Stores	7699	Repair Shops and Related Services
5812	Eating Places	7831	Motion Picture Theaters
5813	Drinking Places	7833	Drive-In Motion Picture Theaters
5912	Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores	7841	Video Tape Rental
5921	Liquor Stores	7911	Dance Studios, Schools, and Halls
5932	Used Merchandise Stores	7929	Bands, Orchestras, Actors, and other Entertainers and Entertainment Groups
5941	Sporting Goods Stores and Bicycle Shops	7933	Bowling Centers
5942	Book Stores	7941	Professional Sports Clubs and Promoters
5943	Stationary Stores	7991	Physical Fitness Facilities
5944	Jewelry Stores	7992	Public Golf Courses
5945	Hobby, Toy, and Game Shops	1772	

5946	Camera and Photographic Supply Stores	7996	Amusement Parks	
5947	Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir Shops	7997	Membership Sports and Recreation Clubs	
5948	Luggage and Leather Goods Stores Sewing, Needlework, and Piece Goods	7999	Amusement and Recreation Services Offices and Clinics of Doctors of	
5949	Stores	8011	Medicine	
5961	Catalog and Mail-Order Houses	8021	Offices and Clinics of Dentists	
5963	Direct Selling Establishments	8031	Offices and Clinics of Doctors of Osteopathy	
5983	Fuel Oil Dealers	8041	Offices and Clinics of Chiropractors	
5984	Liquefied Petroleum Gas Dealers	8042	Offices and Clinics of Ontometrists	
5989	Fuel Dealers	8043	Offices and Clinics of Podiatrists	
5992	Florists	0015	Offices and Clinics of Health	
5993	Tobacco Stores and Stands	8049	Practitioners	
5994	News Dealers and Newsstands	8051	Skilled Nursing Care Facilities	
5995	Optical Goods Stores	8052	Intermediate Care Facilities	
5999	Miscellaneous Retail Stores	8059	Nursing and Personal Care Facilities	
6021	National Commercial Banks	8062	General Medical and Surgical Hospitals	
6022	State Commercial Banks	8063	Psychiatric Hospitals	
6020	Commercial Banks, Not Elsewhere	8069	Specialty Hospitals	
6025	Classified	8071	Medical Laboratories	
0055	Savings Institutions, Not Federally	8082	Home Health Care Services	
6036	Chartered	8092	Kidney Dialysis Centers	
6061	Credit Unions, Federally Chartered	8093	Specialty Outpatient Facilities	
6062	Credit Unions, Not Federally Chartered	8351	Child Day Care Services	
6081	Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks	8361	Residential Care	
		8412	Museums and Art Galleries	
		8422	Arboreta and Botanical or Zoological	
		0 <del>4</del> 22 8811	Drivata Households	
		0011	I IIVate FIOUSCHOIUS	

**Notes:** If a firm business provides both B2C and B2B activities, the firm is defined as B2C (Haddock-Fraser and Tourelle, 2010).