PLANNING AND THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL URBANIZATION

Chandan Deuskar

A DISSERTATION

in

City and Regional Planning

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2020

Supervisor of Dissertation

Eugenie L. Birch

Eugenie L. Birch

Lawrence C. Nussdorf Professor of Urban Research & Education

Graduate Group Chairperson

Eugenie L. Birch

Eugenie L. Birch, Lawrence C. Nussdorf Professor of Urban Research & Education

Dissertation Committee

Erick Guerra, Associate Professor of City and Regional Planning

Jeffrey Paller, Assistant Professor of Politics (University of San Francisco)

Figure 1: Growth of an informal subdivision on the periphery of Greater Accra (2000, 2010, and 2019)
Source: Google Earth

Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the maps of the cities that menace in nightmares and maledictions: Enoch, Babylon, Yahooland, Butua, Brave New World.

He said: "It is all useless, if the last landing place can only be the infernal city, and it is there that, in ever-narrowing circles, the current is drawing us."

And Polo said: "The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space."

Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities* (1974)

Acknowledgments

This dissertation benefited greatly from the guidance of my committee: Professors Eugenie Birch, Erick Guerra, and Jeffrey Paller. My advisor, Professor Birch, provided not only detailed feedback on multiple drafts of the dissertation, but also support and encouragement at every stage. Throughout my time as a doctoral student, she also provided me with opportunities and resources to teach, travel, and present my research, all of which have been formative experiences in my scholarly development. Professor Guerra was also supportive throughout, and my quantitative analysis in particular would not have been possible without his guidance. Professor Paller generously agreed to serve on my committee from across disciplines and across the country before he had even met me in person. The case study in this dissertation drew on insights first from his published work and eventually from my conversations with him and joint meetings with him in Ghana.

The case study of Ghana would not have been possible without the generosity of everyone who took the time to meet me and share their knowledge during my visits there. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Eden Gbeckor-Kove and Kofi Kekeli Amedzro, who met with me multiple teams during each visit, provided valuable information, put me in touch with other key people, and arranged site visits. Special thanks are also due to David Durban and Campbell Meyer for showing me around Accra. Others who shared their time and knowledge with me in Ghana were (in alphabetical order): Alhassan Ibn Abdallah, Joe Addo, Janet Adu, Joyce Afukaar, Cecilia Akyeampong, Mohammed Alhassan, Nat Nuno Amarteifio, Clifford

Amoako, Linda Amofa, Kojo Anane, Dorcas Ansah, Benedict Arkhurst, Divine Asafo, Mohammad Awal, Sam Ayeh-Datey, George Bob-Milliar, James Ebenezer Dadson, Mustapha Gariba, Joyce Gyanfi, Benoite Labrosse, Louis Lauzer, James Kwame Mensah, Gladys Muquah, Noah Nathan, Abena Ntori, Ebenezer Ntsiful, Richard K. Oduro, Patience Osei-Nyarko, George Owusu, Akwasi Owusu-Afriyie, Peter Owusu-Donkor, Nii Kwartelai Quartey, Nii Addo Quaynor, Dagna Rams, Ruth, Kwadwo Ohene Sarfoh, Frank Tackie, Nii Tieko Tagoe, Nada Tandoh, Alhaji Yahaya Hameed Yakubu, and Kwadwo Yeboah.

Jeb Brugmann and Martine Sobey of 100 Resilient Cities, Kimberly Noronha, and the students in the policy workshop on urban informality at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School were excellent partners in research and travel in Ghana in 2018. I am grateful to Perry World House for providing partial funding for a field visit to Ghana in 2019. Feedback from anonymous peer-reviewers at the *Journal of Planning Literature* and *Urban Studies* contributed to the development of my arguments in Chapters 2 and 3. Kate Daniel and Roslynne Carter helped patiently with countless administrative tasks throughout my time in the department.

Finally, I thank the other students in the PhD program for their friendship and help, as well as my parents, my brother and his family, and our extended family for their continuous support.

ABSTRACT

PLANNING AND THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL URBANIZATION

Chandan Deuskar

Eugenie L. Birch

Over a billion people worldwide live in informal settlements or "slums", according to the United Nations, a growing figure which indicates the failure of urban planning and policy to address urban inequality. One of the primary reasons that urban planning has failed to engage effectively with urban informality is informal politics. In particular, clientelism—the provision of benefits to the poor in exchange for political support—is an important channel by which the urban poor access land and services in developing democracies, and is central to how many cities grow and function. Clientelism conflicts with the aims of planning and disincentivizes political leaders from implementing plans. Yet planning scholars have not systematically investigated how clientelism is related to informal urban growth nor provided guidance as to how planners might operate more effectively in clientelistic environments. This study aims to addresses this gap in planning research, by asking two questions: (1) Are clientelism and informal urban growth related, and if so, how? (2) Does clientelism in informal settlements impact urban planning, and if so, how do planners respond? This study uses mixed methods to answer these questions. Employing statistical analysis of a large global sample of cities to address the first question, it finds that cities in more clientelistic countries are more likely to see the growth of informal settlements that show signs of having been laid out spatially in advance of settlement. The study uses a qualitative case study of Ghana to address the second question, finding that while the major constraints on effective planning in Ghana are political in nature,

pressures they face without open conflict with political leaders. The study offers recommendations for a 'politically adaptive planning' approach in Ghana which identifies and builds on what is already working for planners and the urban poor in their own political context, rather than emulating practices from elsewhere. The dissertation also outlines principles for the application of a politically adaptive approach to planning in other contexts.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

Over one billion people worldwide lived in 'slums' in 2014, according to the United Nations.[1] Between 2000 and 2015, this figure grew by six million people each year. Given that the world's urban population is expected to nearly double between 2015 and 2050 (United Nations, 2016), and that 90 percent of new urban growth is occurring in low- and middle-income countries, this number is likely to continue to rise dramatically in coming decades (PSUP, 2015).

Urban informality, of which 'slums' or informal settlements are a prominent manifestation, may grant the poor some access to necessities that are otherwise inaccessible, but this access is typically inadequate, precarious, and unequally distributed. Informality also undermines the ability of the state to deliver welfare and implement progressive plans aimed at urban equity and sustainability. For example, informality creates challenges for the state in making publicly-owned land available for open space or other amenities; protecting ecologically sensitive land via environmental regulations; protecting urban residents from natural

[1] According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators (data.worldbank.org), the urban population of the world in 2014 was 3.88 billion, and 29.8% of the world's urban population lived in slums that year, per the United Nations definition of "slums" as settlements lacking access to improved water, access to improved sanitation, sufficient living area, and durability of housing.

disasters, climate change, and disease;[2] building and allocating public housing; and operating viable public transportation services. Urbanization has the potential to be an engine for economic advancement, to forge more inclusive social relations, and foster environmentally sustainable modes of living. However, if governments are to respond effectively to the Sustainable Development Goal of making cities and human settlements "inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable" by 2030,[3] they must engage more effectively with urban informality.

National governments and international organizations often see informal urbanization as the result of a lack of urban planning, and call for resources to build planning capacity (Asian Development Bank, 2013; Government of India, 2013; Lall, 2013; Lall et al., 2017; Ozlu et al., 2015; United Nations, 2016). For example, the Government of Kenya's 2030 strategy for Metropolitan Nairobi aims to "plan, plan, plan" (Klopp, 2012). According to urban sociologist Lisa Björkman, "[t]he notion that slums arise from lack of planning, and must therefore be prevented and upgraded using planning-related tools, has become a veritable battle-cry" across the rapidly growing cities of the 'Global South' (2014b, p. 37).

However, others have argued that simply planning more is not the solution, and that planning, as it has been practiced in low- and middle-income countries, may in fact have caused more problems than it has solved (B. Patel, 2015; UN-Habitat, 2009). Several authors

---

[2] The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 remains a rapidly developing situation as this dissertation is being finalized, and it is unclear how the ability to contain the spread of the virus will be affected by high population densities and limited access to clean water in informal settlements worldwide.
[3] https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg11

have pointed to ways in which planning interventions and regulations have in fact helped to create and perpetuate informality (Bhan, 2016; Datta, 2012; D. E. Davis, 2014; A. Roy, 2012). They argue that when the state has tried to assert itself in cities dominated by informality through planned interventions, it has often done so in the form of 'mega-projects' that exclude the poor (Follmann, 2015; Huchzermeyer, 2011). Other criticize planners working among the urban poor for prioritizing economic growth over the immediate needs of the poor, valuing their own professional knowledge over that of poor communities, and offering simplistic solutions that fail to account for the sociopolitical complexity of informal settlements (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013).

Most would accept that in rapidly urbanizing countries there is a legitimate role for the state in performing some urban planning functions, i.e. anticipating and coordinating the provision of public goods in urban areas. Yet, given past failures and ongoing ineffectiveness, simply adding more resources for urban planning is unlikely to improve matters. Instead, planning theory and practice must adapt to the context of rapid informal urbanization in the 21st century (UN-Habitat, 2014; Watson, 2009).

Part of this adaptation involves developing a much more sophisticated understanding of the politics of informality, and the ways in which it shapes cities in general and informal settlements in particular. While urban informality may appear unplanned, haphazard, and chaotic, in fact an underlying order exists, governed by complex but well-established social and political relationships (Chalana & Hou, 2016). Informality has emerged for many reasons, including rapid population growth, a lack of jobs, housing markets that do not serve the poor,

various forms of discrimination, a lack of state capacity, and the neoliberal withdrawal of the state where nascent capacity once existed. However, in the developing democracies of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, informality persists because powerful actors, including state actors, have learned to benefit financially and politically from it, and thus have disincentives to effect change (Payne, 2016). These disincentives, which include corruption and clientelism, frequently undermine formal planning efforts, and are arguably more responsible for the limited impact of planning than lack of technical training, funding, technology, public participation, or 'political will' (Awal & Paller, 2016; Gandhi, 2012; Gandy, 2006; Goodfellow, 2012; Holland, 2017; UN-Habitat, 2014). In fact, these political factors can often cause these other challenges.

Clientelism refers to the provision of benefits to the poor in exchange for political support. This form of exchange has existed in various forms throughout history and in many parts of the world, but it is a particularly important mode of informal politics in developing democracies today. Clientelism can encourage informal urban growth, as political patrons supply land and services for informal settlements or protect informal settlements from removal after they have formed, in exchange for political support from the residents of these settlements. Clientelism also undermines urban planning. By creating an alternate, informal channel by which political leaders supply the poor with urban land and services, it disincentivizes both political leaders and the urban poor from supporting broad-based, formal planning efforts. Planning agencies therefore lack the political support needed to implement plans, build financial and technical capacity, and involve the public in planning. Politicians

manipulate planning decisions, allocating urban resources in accordance with their electoral calculations rather than public need, and may retaliate against planners who do not play along.

Clientelism and related forms of informal politics have been widely documented in informal settlements around the world. However, there has been little research devoted to understanding the extent to which clientelism impacts informal urban growth, exactly how it affects planning practice, and what planners do or could do to contend with informal politics. The aim of this study is to address this gap in the literature and produce knowledge that might help urban planners and policymakers bring about more inclusive and sustainable outcomes in environments dominated by clientelism.

Research questions

This study explores the relationships between clientelism, informal urban growth, and urban planning, by asking two questions:

(1) Are clientelism and informal urban growth related, and if so, how?

(2) Does clientelism in informal settlements impact urban planning, and if so, how do planners respond?

Research design

This study combines quantitative and qualitative methods in a mixed-method research design. Following a discussion based on a literature review on clientelism in informal settlements in

developing democracies around the world, it uses statistical models to explore the first question above and a qualitative case study of Ghana to address the second.

The statistical analysis takes advantage of the availability of recently released, globally standardized data on patterns of urban growth and clientelistic politics to explore the relationships between the two. It uses quantitative data on patterns of spatial growth in a globally representative sample of 200 large cities around the world from the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* (Angel, Blei, et al., 2016) and on clientelistic politics at the national level from the Varieties of Democracy database (Coppedge et al., 2018). Regression models use variables from these data sets, along with control variables, to determine whether there is a statistically significant relationship between clientelism and types of informal urban growth. Existing qualitative research in individual settlements or cities tends to focus on contextually specific elements of the relationships between politics and urban space and cannot make claims as to the generalizability of these relationships. By shedding light on previously unobserved regularities in these relationships across a large global sample of cities, this use of statistical analysis supports the argument that the study of informal politics is widely relevant to the core concerns of urban planning.

By contrast, the second question cannot be adequately answered without reference to specific planning institutions and regulations situated within an institutional, political, and cultural context, which necessitates case study research. The informal politics and 'tacit knowledge' that this question explores are not well captured in quantitative or archival data, and therefore the question does not lend itself to statistical or historical analysis. Past qualitative work on

urban clientelism has focused on the political economy within informal settlements, and the dynamic relationships among large populations that they study require sustained and immersive ethnographic research. However, the focus of this case study is not on patron-client relationships themselves but on how professional planners make sense of and respond to these relationships, which means it is better suited to interviews as the primary mode of qualitative data collection.

The case study research mainly took the form of semi-structured interviews conducted over 11 weeks in Ghana, mostly in Accra: five weeks in July-August 2018 and six weeks in June-July 2019.[4] The selection of interviewees combined 'opportunistic sampling' to make initial contacts and 'snowball sampling' to identify and make contact with other relevant experts (Maxwell, 2013, p. 97). The interviewees, some of whom gave more than one interview, were: eight physical (i.e. spatial) planners in local governments, two other local government officials, one former mayor, one physical planner at a regional government, four physical planners at the national Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA), one representative of the Ghana Institute of Planners, four other national government officials, four representatives of Ghanaian nongovernmental organizations, two representatives of international organizations, two private planning consultants, seven academic researchers,

[4] Most meetings were one-on-one, but several interviews during the 2018 field visit were conducted jointly with another University of Pennsylvania doctoral researcher (Kimberly Noronha), and Professor Jeffrey Paller from the University of San Francisco organized and participated in some meetings during the 2019 visit.

one researcher at a think tank, one private real estate developer, and an architect. More casual meetings with other experts, including political party 'foot soldiers' active in informal settlements in Accra, provided additional material. The fieldwork also involved a visit to Kumasi, site visits to indigenous and informal settlements in Accra, including Ga Mashie, Old Fadama, and Agbogbloshie, and visits to outlying areas of Greater Accra. The case study also drew from secondary sources, including government documents and academic studies.

Arguments and findings summarized

Clientelism among the urban poor in particular is "broadly accepted to be ubiquitous in the Global South" (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013, p. 61). In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, clientelism (often referred to as 'patronage' or 'vote-buying') is so widespread that clientelism may be considered the 'normal' form democracy around the world today (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Chapter 2 highlights common themes from the social science literature on clientelism in urban informal settlements in developing democracies. The goods that are distributed by patrons in exchange for political support in dense urban settlements often include neighborhood-scale urban infrastructure, such as water pipes, electrical connections, sewerage, or paved roads. Clientelism is also responsible for access to land for informal settlements. Political patrons provide land to client communities directly or ensure that new informal settlements are not demolished, and help to connect them to infrastructure and services incrementally after they have formed. Leaders in informal settlements often take on the role of brokers, cultivating relationships with political patrons and negotiating deals for community benefits in exchange for votes and attendance at political rallies. Clientelism

is often the only means by which the urban poor can access urban services and tentative security of tenure. Yet clientelism can be detrimental to the interests of the poor in the long term, as it may disincentivize the state from providing tenure security and reliable services, undermine state capacity, result in inequitable and poorly-targeted distribution of benefits, prevent the poor from mobilizing politically, foster dependency, and result in exploitation.

Recent decades have seen a profusion of studies of urban clientelism, but few examine its relationship to urban planning. Urban planning and clientelism are effectively competitors: they are both means of distributing urban land and services, and as such, the prevalence of one crowds out the other. They operate according to mutually contradictory logic. Clientelism, typically characterized by the provision of narrowly targeted, short-term benefits, is contrary to the ethos of planning, which aims to provide long-term, public goods. In more practical terms, clientelism often means that politicians help informal settlements occupy land which plans have reserved for streets, public open space, or other public infrastructure, or land that is deemed too ecologically sensitive or hazard-prone to build on, or that, during election campaigns, politicians redirect municipal funds previously set aside for planned infrastructure. Politicians have little incentive to support formal long-term planning if it interferes with their personalized patron-client relationships. Although some perceive clientelism as a transitory phase of democratic development, one which countries will outgrow as a result of economic growth and urbanization, it is not clear that this will necessarily happen. Chapter 2 concludes with a brief review of several cases from around the world in which urban clientelism has declined to various degrees, though lessons for urban

planners from these cases are not obvious, as most of these involve national political shifts that are beyond the ability of planners to influence.

While the literature implies that clientelistic politics and informal settlements appear together, lack of data made it impossible to test the global relationship between clientelism and informal settlements empirically, until recently. Two recently released data sets now allow this relationship to be analyzed at the global scale. The analysis in Chapter 3 uses data on political behavior from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database and urban growth from the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* to identify, for the first time, a statistical correlation between clientelism and informal urban growth, across a globally representative sample of 200 cities.

The analysis finds that cities in more clientelistic countries are more likely to experience urban growth in the form of informal settlements that appear to have been planned in advance of settlement ('informal subdivisions'). If a country were less clientelistic by one point on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its previous value, according to the main model. The effect of this one point reduction in clientelism on the share of informal subdivisions is equivalent to the effect on the share of informal subdivisions of a $2,700 increase in 1990 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. The analysis finds no significant positive or negative correlation between clientelism and the share of unplanned, ad-hoc informal growth ('atomistic settlements') or the total share of informal settlements (informal subdivisions plus atomistic settlements).

The relationship between clientelism and informal subdivisions might occur through several possible mechanisms: clientelism may cause the growth of informal subdivisions through direct provision of land or it may encourage the growth and persistence of new informal subdivisions through post-settlement protection and regularization; clientelism may lead to the 'informalization' of settlements over time; or settlements with strong leadership and more coordination may be more likely both to be laid out in advance and to cultivate clientelistic relationships with patrons.

The analysis provides an example of how newly available data may be used to advance our understanding of the relationship between politics, urban space, and informality. The results reinforce the argument from Chapter 2, that informality is not simply associated with poverty but also with politics, and that powerful state actors may be as implicated in the creation and perpetuation of informality as the urban poor. They also indicate that particular political dynamics may have a spatial 'signature' on the urban landscape; that, conversely, certain urban spatial forms may be conducive to certain kinds of politics; or both. By drawing attention to the small-scale, informal spatial planning already occurring, the chapter suggests alternate ways for planners to engage with informality, particularly as this form of informal spatial planning may make settlements more conducive to infrastructure upgrading in the future.

The qualitative case study presented in Chapters 4-7 then refines and complicates the understanding of the relationship between clientelism and informality developed in the earlier chapters, by placing it within a specific political, cultural, and institutional context, that of

urban Ghana, and bringing state-led planning into the picture. Despite the existence of planning institutions and supporting legislation, planners and planning scholars believe planning to have failed to effectively influence urban growth in Ghana, as Chapter 4 discusses. While plans, policies, and reports from Ghanaian government agencies pledge support to the informal sector, actions on the ground tell a different story, with harsh crackdowns on informal street vendors and demolitions of informal settlements being regular occurrences. Still, most urban growth ignores urban plans and regulations with impunity, and nearly all recent urban expansion, including the growth of both low-income settlements and middle-class neighborhoods, is informal in its disregard for planning permissions and procedures.

Chapter 5 explores the reasons behind this apparent planning failure. While it is true that planning in Ghana suffers from a lack of financial and human resources and that the mode of planning practiced is often ill-suited to the country's needs, the most binding constraints to effective planning in Ghana are political in nature. In Ghana, the political parties vie for votes through 'competitive clientelism.' Mayors, members of Parliament, and local assembly members act as political patrons to urban communities that are deemed electorally valuable. Planners face political pressure to approve or ignore developments that do not conform to plans, under threat of being transferred to an undesirable post if they do not play along. A host of other political challenges to planning, described in Chapter 6, co-exist with, and are sometimes enabled by, this clientelistic political environment. These include corruption, administrative fragmentation, inefficient decentralization, and the power of traditional chiefs to informally subdivide and sell peri-urban land without reference to spatial plans.

Despite these constraints, planners in Ghana have found ways to subtly push back against political interference without openly defying mayors, as Chapter 7 discusses. They may seek support from professional networks, quietly appeal to other government officials who are less exposed to politically motivated retaliation, call for public participation in the decision, or involve the media. Clientelism in Ghana is unlikely to erode in the near future, but planning can adapt to working within it.

Past recommendations for planning reform in Ghana from international organizations and academic researchers have largely been apolitical and vague. Chapter 7 includes three specific recommendations for 'politically adaptive planning' in Ghana. Such an approach acknowledges the political environment and builds on what is working within it, even if it is only working partially, occasionally, or temporarily so far. The first recommendation involves the creation of an independent planning 'watchdog' or oversight organization, which would formalize and strengthen a role that the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority, the Ghana Institute of Planners, and the media already play. Such an organization would help free planners from some political interference but could also check that newly independent planners do not abuse their power, ensuring that any moves to remove informal settlements are justified and carried out in accordance with certain procedures. The second recommendation proposes an attempt at 'planned clientelism', which would involve planners helping communities receive more coordinated, long-term public goods via clientelism than they do now. Planners could work with communities to develop lists of needs that can be met by political patrons on an item-by-item basis (like gifts in a wedding registry). This

approach might be appealing to planners, politicians, and the poor alike. Planners would be able to have parts of their plans implemented without much official expenditure; politicians would have a guide to what patronage would be most appreciated in any given community; and the poor would receive more vital benefits than before through clientelism while also being able to hold politicians accountable more easily. While this approach makes use of clientelism, it also has the potential to undermine it, because the more long-term public goods communities receive, the less dependent they would be on patrons. The third recommendation involves government planners providing non-legally-binding spatial plans to traditional authorities when they subdivide peri-urban customary land, replacing the unlicensed surveyors who already provide this service. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how these approaches may be applicable to other countries with institutional and political environments similar to Ghana.

The concluding chapter provides a general framework that outlines the principles of 'politically adaptive' planning in order to guide its use elsewhere, particularly in countries that have a high degree of informality. This approach builds on what is already working in a given political context, adapts planning interventions and policies based on the powerful actors likely to support or obstruct them, and is strategic in identifying organizations and opportune moments for implementation.

The study concludes by suggesting directions for future research. While this study focuses on spatial and land use planning, it could offer a basis for comparing the relationship between clientelism and planning in other areas, including transportation planning and environmental

planning. Future studies might build on the quantitative analysis presented here, making further use of new global data sets on urban growth and political dynamics to yield insights about the relationship between the two. Comparative work might contrast a country like Ghana, where traditional authorities play an important role, with a country that has a different mechanism for subdivision of peri-urban land, e.g. organized land invasions in Latin America. Future scholarship on urban informality can also build on the recent turn away from a focus on transnational forces and towards local power dynamics, and address difficult tradeoffs between progressive formal planning ideals and support for informality.

Chapter 2: Clientelism and Planning in the Informal Settlements of Developing Democracies

"[T]he campaign is coming and if you want votes, come down to earth: I need water for my people."

- Maria, a neighborhood leader in a squatter settlement in Montevideo, Uruguay, to a government official, quoted in Álvarez-Rivadulla (2017, p. 57)

Introduction [5]

For planning to have a more positive impact on the urban poor in developing democracies, planners and policymakers must recognize and adapt to the sociopolitical order underlying urban informality, rather than treating informality simply as the outcome of a lack of planning. Clientelism, i.e. the provision of benefits to the urban poor in exchange for political support, is a particularly important aspect of the politics of urban informality in many countries. While political dynamics vary greatly from one time and place to another, common themes emerge from the recent, multidisciplinary literature on clientelism across contexts explored in this chapter. Clientelism may benefit the urban poor in some ways, but it

[5] A version of this chapter has been published as Deuskar C (2019) Clientelism and Planning in the Informal Settlements of Developing Democracies. *Journal of Planning Literature* 34(4): 395–407. DOI: 10.1177/0885412219842520.

interferes with the implementation of formal plans and the reliable and equitable delivery of basic services. Some informal settlements around the world have transitioned away from clientelism to varying degrees, and this chapter discusses whether there are lessons that planners might learn from these examples.

An overview of clientelism

Political relationships between authorities and communities living in informal settlements in developing democracies are often 'particularistic', meaning that they involve the distribution of benefits to specific individuals or small groups, as opposed to providing broadly accessible, 'universalistic' benefits. Particularistic relationships may take various forms, including *corruption*, the exchange of benefits by public officials for money, and *clientelism*, the exchange of benefits for political support (Herrera, 2017).[6] The urban poor lack the resources to engage in corruption on a large scale, but in democracies they do have votes, which allows them to engage in clientelism to gain some access to benefits, including land and services.

Although some studies (Kramon, 2016; Sparling, 2019; World Bank, 1997) discuss clientelism as falling within the broader category of corrupt behavior, others distinguish

[6] Some authors, e.g. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) use the terms *clientelism* and *patronage* interchangeably, a convention that this study largely follows. Other scholars distinguish between these two terms, albeit in inconsistent ways. Piliavsky (2014) suggests that anthropologists use the term patronage to refer to the same thing that political scientists term clientelism. Sparling (2019, p. 106) explains that some political scientists use patronage to refer to a highly personalized relationship, as distinct from clientelism, which they associate with "mass-based politics and the party machine". Others ((Grindle, 2012; Herrera, 2017)) use patronage to mean the particularistic distribution specifically of public sector jobs. Yet others use the term patronage to refer to the goods and benefits distributed through clientelistic exchange ((Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 25))

between the corruption and clientelism (Herrera, 2017). The concept of corruption, at least as defined by the World Bank (1997) as the abuse of public office for private gain, does not exactly capture the dynamics of clientelism. Corruption is the use of public office to gain wealth, while clientelism is the use of wealth to gain public office. Wealth from corruption accumulates to the powerful while in the case of clientelism, wealth is distributed to the less powerful. While corruption and clientelism may be conceptually distinct, they are not mutually exclusive, and, in fact, are often mutually reinforcing. Politicians may use private wealth to buy their way into public office, which they then abuse through corruption to gain more private wealth, some of which they use to retain public office through clientelism, and so on. Studies in developing democracies like Ghana and Indonesia find that politicians believe that if they do not engage in corruption to gain wealth while in office, they would not be able to keep up with the costs of the clientelism required to compete in future elections (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Ayee & Crook, 2003; ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Westminster Foundation for Democracy & CDD-Ghana, 2018).

Clientelism remains so entrenched in many countries that some have argued that the "normal" form of democracy is in fact not programmatic democracy[7] but patronage democracy (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). A recent study of clientelism in Indonesia finds that politicians feel compelled to engage in clientelism even when they would rather not, out of fear of being

[7] Programmatic democracy refers to a regime in which the delivery of public services to individual citizens cannot be conditioned on political support and instead involves clearly defined eligibility rules based on publicly verifiable characteristics ((Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2018))

outbid by rivals and of failing to meet voter expectations of election-time benefits: "It takes particular moral courage, or an unusually strong political base, to run for office without distributing patronage, and many candidates who take this path lose" (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 250).

Scholarship has been catching up with the importance of clientelism. An analysis of academic publications in the Scopus database from 1972 onwards with the word 'clientelism' in the title, abstract, or keywords finds that, prior to 1995, there were never more than 10 such publications in any given year, whereas in 2016, 2017, and 2018 there were 121, 119, and 127 publications about clientelism respectively (Figure 2).[8]

---

[8] https://www.scopus.com/term/analyzer.uri?sid=33962ca06d14986709c9bcbdf0d98eec&origin=resultslist&src=s&s=TITLE-ABS-KEY%28clientelism%29&sort=cp-f&sdt=b&sot=b&sl=26&count=1281&analyzeResults=Analyze+results&txGid=001da65bafff0b833c78b9319c1bbe8d



Figure 2: Number of academic publications per year with the word 'clientelism' in the title, abstract, or keywords
Source: Scopus/ Elsevier B.V.

Clientelism in informal settlements

Today, scholars have "broadly accepted" clientelism among the urban poor to be "ubiquitous in the Global South" (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013, p. 61). Political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and others have researched clientelism in poor urban settlements extensively, including in South Asia (e.g. Auerbach, 2016; Banks, 2016; Benjamin, 2005; Björkman, 2014a; Chidambaram, 2011; de Wit, 2017; Hackenbroch & Hossain, 2012; Inskeep, 2011; Jha et al., 2005; Nahiduzzaman, 2006; A. Roy, 2003), Southeast Asia (Hutchison, 2007; Tomsa & Ufen, 2013), Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Adam, 2013; Awal & Paller, 2016; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012; S. Fox, 2014; Gandy, 2006; Levenson,

2017; Paller, 2014b, 2016, 2017; Rajack et al., 2013; Robins, 2008), and Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g. Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Auyero, 2000; Gay, 2006; Gray, 2004; Herrera, 2017; Holland, 2017; Murillo et al., 2019; Shefner, 2006; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Some scholars consider planning in their discussions of clientelism, but give it limited attention, usually commenting only on the role of planning in the eviction of informal settlers. They do not discuss how planning could operate more effectively in a clientelistic environment. International development institutions which promote urban planning in the developing world, like the World Bank, have discussed clientelism in the contexts of service delivery (World Bank, 2003) and governance (World Bank, 2017a) but not in the context of urban planning specifically.

Clientelism involves the provision of *private (or 'club') goods to the poor* in *contingent exchange* for *political support*, often mediated *through brokers*. The following discussion examines each of these elements of clientelism in the context of low-income urban settlements.

- 'Private or club goods':

The goods which patrons distribute may be private goods, e.g. food, clothes, or cash. However, in dense urban settlements, these goods are often 'club' goods which benefit the residents of a particular neighborhood, like water pipes, electrical connections, sewerage, or paved roads (Burgwal, 1995; Rojo et al., 2014; A. Roy, 2003). For example, several accounts of clientelism discuss water provision in informal settlements, in India (Björkman, 2014a; De & Nag, 2016; de Wit & Berner, 2009; Weinstein, 2014), Pakistan (Inskeep, 2011), Indonesia (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019), Mexico (Herrera, 2017), and Nigeria (Gandy, 2006). The

fact that urban clientelism involves the provision of urban services makes it a competitor of formal municipal systems of service delivery.

Patron-client relationships also provide land to the urban poor. Political patrons may own or otherwise control land and distribute it as a private good to clients. For example, politicians or government officials own over half the land in Kibera, the large informal settlement in Nairobi (Syagga et al., 2002, cited in Fox 2014), and these figures or their brokers informally allocate plots of land to residents. Perhaps more commonly, politicians protect informal settlements from demolition after they have formed, which acts as indirect provision of land (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Benjamin, 2008; Holland, 2017). Chapter 5 discusses the example of the demolition of an informal settlement being called off in order to protect a ruling party's popularity, a phenomenon which others have also observed elsewhere, e.g. in Tanzania (S. Fox, 2014). According to Huchzermeyer (2011, p. 26), "the modalities of patronage and exploitation [...] are part of the reason why, despite hostility, threats, sporadic evictions and even large-scale displacement, informal settlements have continued to exist in most African cities.". Informal settlers sometimes plan their actions around these dynamics. For example, Burgwal (1995) describes how leaders from among the urban poor in Quito, Ecuador, waited several months before initiating a planned 'land invasion' on vacant private land, so that the invasion would coincide with an election campaign during which they knew they would receive political support.

The Pakistani activist Perween Rehman argued that, in Karachi, "the government, the political parties, the police, the members of the national assembly, [and] the councilors" are

all involved in "land grabbing" to set up organized squatting.[9] In the absence of adequate formal land supply, she argued, these informal land grabbers are really "land suppliers", who provide land, infrastructure, and services to the poor, which in her view makes the municipality and planners redundant (Inskeep, 2011, p. 105). Informal settlements in Karachi often grow in size and number just before elections (A. H. Khan, 1992).

Clientelistic benefits may be private or public in origin. i.e. a candidate may use personal funds to pay for patronage, or, particularly if already incumbent or supported by an incumbent party, direct public resources towards clients (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

- 'To the poor':

Clientelism involves asymmetrical power relationships, with those distributing the goods in positions of greater power or authority than those receiving them. Some authors (Holland, 2017) explicitly include a 'progressive' element (i.e. benefits going disproportionately to the poor) as a defining criterion of clientelism, but even when this is not explicit, the recipients of clientelistic goods are usually the relatively poor, whose needs can be affordably met by patrons at a scale large enough to matter electorally (Muller, 2007).

---

[9] The grassroots organization European Coordination Via Campesina defines land grabbing as "the control - whether through ownership, lease, concession, contracts, quotas, or general power - of larger than locally-typical amounts of land by any persons or entities - public or private, foreign or domestic - via any means - 'legal' or 'illegal' - for purposes of speculation, extraction, resource control or commodification at the expense of peasant farmers, agroecology, land stewardship, food sovereignty and human rights." (European Coordination Via Campesina, 2016)

- 'Contingent exchange':

To be considered clientelism, an exchange must involve mutually contingent reciprocity, i.e. the community provides political support only if the patron has already provided benefits or can credibly commit to providing future benefits, and vice versa: the patron provides benefits only if a community has demonstrated or credibly promised political support (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Holland, 2017). Maintenance of the relationship depends on mutual monitoring. The provision of the same benefits to a poor community that is not directly contingent on political support would simply be an instance of welfare, 'constituency service,'[10] or 'pork-barrel politics', rather than clientelism. Nonetheless, some authors note that despite the contingent nature of clientelism, it typically does not simply involve a one-off *quid pro quo* exchange, but rather the cultivation of long-term relationships built on iterative problem-solving and the gradual building of trust (Muller, 2007).

Recent scholarship also notes that patrons often monitor voting in poor urban settlements not at the individual level but at the level of the neighborhood or voting booth, and that, as mentioned above, they target benefits not to individual households but to entire neighborhoods. Some scholars (Auerbach et al., 2016) categorize this kind of exchange as

---

[10] Bussell (2019) argues that constituency service plays an important but underappreciated role in clientelistic democracies. Based on fieldwork in India, she finds that nonpartisan, noncontingent but nevertheless individualized (i.e. nonprogrammatic) constituency service in the form of favors provided by high-level officials serves as an attractive alternative for constituents who are not favored by clientelistic or partisan distribution of benefits at the local level, while also allowing the politician to reach additional potential voters and develop a personal reputation for responsiveness and generosity. In this manner, clientelism at the local level necessitates the granting of non-clientelistic favors by higher-level politicians.

more in the realm of 'pork-barrel politics' than traditional clientelism. However, in their study of clientelism in Indonesia, Aspinall and Berenschot (2019) argue that regardless of the scale of the exchange or the difficulty of monitoring reciprocity, as long as it is intended as a contingent exchange, it still constitutes clientelism. They note instances in which a candidate will take back a benefit provided to the neighborhood if he or she believes that a community which received clientelistic club goods has not fulfilled its end of the bargain at the voting booth. The candidate may go so far as to pull out water pipes, take down street lights, and rip tiles out from mosques after a poor electoral result (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 144), suggesting that the exchange is very much a contingent one.

This study uses the term 'clientelism' broadly, to include the provision of club goods and the monitoring of votes at the neighborhood scale. This is in the spirit of Hicken and Nathan's argument that a dogmatic focus on monitoring as a defining criterion of clientelism misses broad commonalities between similar types of exchange. They argue that distinctions between "real" and "not-quite" clientelism are arbitrary, and that politicians may have reasons to practice clientelism even if they cannot easily monitor votes (2020).

- 'Political support':

Clientelism is sometimes described as election-time 'vote buying', referring to when a candidate provides material inducements to voters to switch their vote choice in his or her favor. However, it may also involve 'turnout buying', i.e. inducement to voters assumed to already support the candidate to show up to vote, or 'abstention buying', i.e. the opposite (Gans-Morse et al., 2014). While voting is central to clientelistic exchange, communities

may also demonstrate support in other ways, such as attendance at political rallies in large numbers (Auyero, 2000; Björkman, 2014a; Herrera, 2017; Kramon, 2016; Larreguy et al., 2018).

- 'Through brokers':

Accounts of clientelism in informal settlements typically highlight the role of 'brokers' who act as intermediaries between communities and officials. These brokers may be agents of parties or politicians entering informal settlements from the outside. However, they are often the opposite: leaders of poor communities selected and promoted from within to forge political connections and channel benefits to the informal settlement. Auerbach and Thachil (2016, pp. 3–4) found the latter to be the case when they surveyed residents in 110 informal settlements in two Indian cities. They argue that the "bottom-up construction of informal slum leadership demands that we take the agency of residents seriously in explaining the rise and mechanics of patron-client networks." Aspinall and Berenschot (2019, p. 1) support this view with the example of a community leader in Jakarta, Indonesia, proactively contacting candidates in a 2014 election so that the residents of his neighborhood could "leverage their voting power to gain benefits for their community." Similarly, in her study of squatting in Montevideo, Uruguay, sociologist María José Álvarez-Rivadulla (2017, p. 157) describes one broker who cultivated connections with several political parties and, as the broker himself put it, "flirted" with many politicians before establishing a relationship with one on behalf of his community. Another community leader in a Montevideo informal settlement approached a political contact of hers in the municipality and (as she later recalled) stated bluntly: "[T]he

campaign is coming and if you want votes, come down to earth: I need water for my people" (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017, p. 57).

Depending on how competitive the political landscape is, political candidates may compete to win the favor of such brokers before elections, with the expectation being that residents of informal settlements vote in blocs under the direction of their leaders. Álvarez-Rivadulla and others describe this as "market clientelism". For example, anthropologist Robert Gay describes how during one election in Rio de Janeiro, two candidates made competing offers to the president of a neighborhood association in a *favela* prior to an election: one offered sets of soccer shirts, the other promised the construction of toilets in a preschool in the settlement. The association president negotiated with the latter candidate for six weeks before agreeing on a budget for the construction. As soon as a check was handed over for the construction of toilets, the neighborhood association president publicly endorsed the candidate and accompanied him on door-to-door visits around the settlement. According to Gay, the politician's policies and his party's platform did not even need to be mentioned during these visits; the candidate's gift and the neighborhood association president's endorsement were enough (Gay, 2006).[11]

---

[11] Clientelism does not always feature this level of competition. Bénit-Gbaffou (2012) notes that while clientelism exists in informal settlements in Johannesburg, South Africa, the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) party limits the options available, and does not force accountability on the part of patrons to the extent seen in the discussion above.

Benefits of clientelism to the urban poor

For the poor, patron-client relationships are often the only means of accessing the power of an otherwise unresponsive state (Auerbach & Thachil, 2016; Auyero, 2000; Chidambaram, 2011; Jha et al., 2005; Mitlin, 2014; Robins, 2008). Patrons and brokers themselves benefit politically, but in exchange they are often highly receptive to the needs of the communities, building trust over time by developing personal relationships with households (Auyero, 2000; de Wit, 2017). Describing clientelism in an informal settlement in Buenos Aires, sociologist Javier Auyero (2000) relates examples of brokers distributing food and medicine to residents, holding "office hours" to listen to residents' complaints and requests, and even arranging to take schoolchildren to the beach. In her landmark 1976 study of *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, Perlman (1976) mentions political brokers negotiating collective benefits like sewerage and cement steps. Burgwal (1995) describes how clientelism gave a Quito settlement access to electricity, a paved road, a market, bus service, and sewerage. Sociologist Lisa Björkman, describing an informal settlement in Mumbai, India, notes how residents rely on assistance or information from leaders to accomplish a range of everyday activities, including accessing municipal water, disposing of garbage, and unblocking drains (Björkman, 2014a, p. 621).

Residents of informal settlements often see political patrons and brokers in positive terms. For example, according to Auyero, the urban poor in Argentina view political brokers as "'helpful' and 'sacrificing' and 'good people' with whom problem holders have a personal relationship sometimes described as 'friendship'" (p. 74). The personal nature of these relationships is critical. Álvarez-Rivadulla (2017, pp. 26–27) recalls being surprised early in

her research to find that the urban poor in Montevideo referred to high-ranking state officials by their first names and had their phone numbers in their home directories. In a study of urban Ghana, political scientists Awal and Paller argue that "[e]veryday interaction is a crucial – but poorly understood – component of how accountability is generated between leaders and citizens in the absence of formal mechanisms" (2016, p. 8). This personal relationship means that a sense of obligation or gratitude rather than a strictly transactional exchange of votes for services often motivates the support which the poor provide to these political figures.

For these reasons, some scholars dispute critiques of clientelism which dismiss it without regard to its benefits nor adequate consideration as to what could replace it (Mitlin, 2014, p. 3). They defend clientelism as the "poor country's welfare state", the removal of which would deprive the poor of their only networks of support and would lead not to programmatic democracy but instead to mass neglect (Brusco et al., 2004, p. 84). Clientelism, they argue, can act as a counterweight to elite influence and unrealistic technocratic standards in development (Nelson, 1979, p. 211), and under certain circumstances help consolidate democracy (Gay, 1998).

Costs of clientelism to the urban poor

Noting the benefits of clientelism described above helps understand why residents of informal settlements may be reluctant to abandon their trust relationships with patrons in favor of untested formal systems of service provision, no matter how 'inclusive' or 'participatory' in

their intent. However, clientelism clearly does not represent an ideal system for the poor either, for several reasons:

- Clientelism may produce worse outcomes for the poor than formal municipal systems of service delivery, in various ways. Studies of service provision in informal settlements in India (De & Nag, 2016) and Pakistan (Shami & Majid, 2014) find that settlements or households that are likelier to engage in clientelism are less likely to receive access to public goods. Clientelism may be associated with lack of completion of infrastructure projects (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2005). Scholars also argue that state effectiveness and institutional development are undermined when clientelism is the source of legitimacy of political players (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019; Fergusson et al., 2016; Goodfellow, 2012; Herrera, 2017; McCaffery, 1993).
- Patrons may distribute clientelistic benefits unequally, with the most disadvantaged groups being the ones least likely to benefit (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013).
- Clientelistic benefits are often supply-driven and targeted inefficiently. For example, a study of urban clientelism in Turkey (Yıldırım, 2020) describes the ruling party providing poor households with coal for heating at the peak of summer during an election campaign but not in winter, and distributing washing machines to households that had no running water. Examples from Ghana include politicians paying for the construction of a large block of public toilets without providing water for them to function (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 129), and building schools and clinics not where they are most urgently

needed but where past or potential supporters of the incumbent party live.[12]

- Coercion and violence may mark clientelistic relationships, especially if organized crime is active in the settlement, as studies observe in the case of Latin America (D. E. Davis, 2014), India (Gandhi, 2012), Jamaica, South Africa, and Bangladesh (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013). When clientelism involves protection of residents from the law, it effectively functions as a type of 'protection racket,' in which the promise of protection for a price comes with an implicit threat of punishment if the price is not paid. For example, in parts of Beirut, the militant organization and political party Hezbollah grants exceptions to planning regulations to its base, allowing the party's supporters to retain their 'illegal' structures as a 'favor' pegged to allegiance to the party (Fawaz, 2017).
- Clientelism locks residents of informal settlements into dependency, as political patrons have little incentive to allow the poor to access land and services independently (Benjamin, 2005; Nelson, 1979). Many scholars (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2005; Larreguy et al., 2018; Paller, 2019a) have observed that clientelism disincentivizes politicians from providing secure property rights in order to maintain this dependency. For example, Roy (2003) describes how politicians in Kolkata (Calcutta), India, promise land to squatters but never deliver secure tenure to them, as a means of keeping them "continuously mobilized" as an electorate.
- Clientelism can be exploitative. In the context of Brazilian *favelas*, da Silva and Shaw

[12] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August

(2012) describe clientelism as harkening back to feudalism and slavery. Evidence from Mumbai and Nairobi describe a specific ploy through which some powerful interests exploit informal settlers for their own ends: they first encourage the poor to occupy land which formal plans have deemed unsafe or ecologically sensitive, and then, once it has been accepted as residential land, force out or price out the settlers and sell the land to middle class residents or real estate developers (Pethe et al., 2014; Rajack et al., 2013). An elderly resident of a peri-urban settlement in Kolkata interviewed by Roy explains that this form of exploitation is common there: "You see, there is an unwritten law here—that the poor like us develop areas, fill in marshes, build homes, struggle to get infrastructure, and are then evicted to make way for the rich who move into a now desirable area" (2003, p. 154).

- Lastly, clientelism stifles political mobilization and activism among the urban poor (Nelson, 1979). Some (de Wit & Berner, 2009; Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013, p. 63) argue that, in the absence of state provision of infrastructure and services at scale, clientelism simply "buys off, co-opts and absorbs pressure and protest from the urban poor."[13] Research on South Africa in particular provides multiple examples of the role of

[13] These observations echo descriptions of "bossism" in the United States in an earlier era. For example, in his account of the Republican political machine or 'Organization' in Philadelphia between 1867 and 1933, McCaffery (1993) observes that "even though the Organization managed to secure the support of the overwhelming majority of Philadelphia's new immigrant, poor, and black population in return for the 'personal service' it rendered, it exploited those social groups as much as it helped them [...I]t effectively prevented political parties and government from responding to the real needs of the city's poor inhabitants, and also thwarted the emergence of *alternative* structures grounded in the effective mobilization of mass political power at the grassroots level" (190).

clientelism in undermining mobilization in this manner. When authorities threatened the eviction of a Johannesburg settlement in 2010, the residents initially sought help from a rights-based nongovernmental organization (NGO), which began to work with them on resisting the eviction. However, when the ANC stepped in and promised to preserve and refurbish their homes, the residents distanced themselves from the NGO, and denounced it as undermining the nation (Bénit-Gbaffou & Oldfield, 2014). Robins (2008) explains how local leaders embedded in clientelistic politics and open to ANC patronage thwarted the efforts of Shack/ Slum Dwellers International (SDI) to produce horizontal networks of the urban poor in Cape Town. In a discussion of how clientelism impacted the provision of resettlement housing in Cape Town, Levenson (2017) describes how the emergence of competing factions among potential beneficiaries was a boon to authorities who had promised housing to former squatters, as they were able to provide housing only to the best-organized faction and leave the others on a decades-long waiting list.

Evidence from studies of neighborhood organizations among the urban poor in both Quito (Burgwal, 1995) and Montevideo (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017) complicate this last point, suggesting that neighborhood organization and clientelism are not necessarily mutually exclusive but can be mutually reinforcing, as neighborhood organizations help strengthen the bargaining power of the poor and make it easier for patrons to engage with communities. However, such mobilization among the urban poor in a clientelistic environment tends to remain highly local, with communities competing with each other to attract patronage (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013, p. 64). Burgwal acknowledges that while the community in

Quito that he studied was able to use its collective power to successfully negotiate for a range of clientelistic goods, it probably did so at the expense of other neighborhoods, which reinforces the argument that clientelism undermines broad mobilization of the poor.

Even when the poor are aware of the ways in which their political patrons prevent them from independently accessing the benefits of the state, they have little choice but to accept this system, given the precariousness of their situations and their reliance on these patrons. According to De Wit and Berner (2009, p. 931), for the poor, "relations of patronage and reciprocity that offer some security have to be maintained regardless of their long-term costs. To cut off links with exploitative patrons and intermediaries would imply foregoing all claims to emergency assistance." To Wood (2003, p. 456), remaining poor in exchange for staying secure is a "Faustian bargain". "To be poor means, *inter alia*, to be unable to control future events because others have more control over them. [...] Securing any kind of longer term future requires recruiting the support of these others, but this only comes at a price: of dependency and the foreclosure of autonomy. Becoming a client, in other words." In short, the urban poor are stuck in a system that they know is failing them.

Clientelism as a barrier to planning

The responsibilities, legal status, and institutional location of the state's urban planning function vary from one country or city to another. Each context has its own 'planning culture', which evolves over time (Sanyal, 2005), and non-state actors may also perform activities that involve planning. All this makes it difficult to talk about planning as a monolithic

concept. Having said that, bearing in mind the definition of public-sector planning offered in the introductory chapter, i.e. the state's role in anticipating and coordinating the provision of urban public goods, then clearly, clientelism interferes with the ability of the state to plan. This definition of planning entails the provision of public (i.e. nonexcludable) goods, and a long-term vision. Planning also should involve broad public participation in decision-making, which requires transparency. The logic of clientelism, which involves targeting benefits to specific individuals or groups, in the short term, and in the form of nontransparent deal-making, is incompatible with all three of these aspects of planning.

In more practical terms, clientelism often means that powerful politicians help informal settlements occupy land which plans have reserved for streets, parks, or other public infrastructure, or land that is deemed too ecologically sensitive or hazard-prone to build on. Similarly, a local government cannot implement medium-term plans for infrastructure if the incumbent mayor unexpectedly diverts municipal resources towards an informal settlement in order to secure its votes for re-election. This is not to say that such formal plans would necessarily have positive outcomes for the poor if implemented, nor that clientelism is always bad for the poor (as discussed above), but to demonstrate the incompatibility between clientelism and planning.

Once clientelistic land and service provision is established, those who benefit from it often oppose the entry of formal planning or of any program that provides universal access to basic services to formal and informal settlements alike (S. Fox, 2014; Mitlin, 2014). Diane Davis

describes how, in Latin America, when planners turned their attention to informal settlements and tried to formalize them in the late 20th century,

> *[I]t was too little too late… [U]rban planners' room for manoeuvre was highly circumscribed, owing to the prior informal relations of brokerage that had flowered during earlier periods of state neglect. Even when they sought to introduce new urban projects into informal areas, planners were sometimes kept at bay by the local power brokers whose authority rested in the maintenance of a clear distinction between the formal and informal city* (D. E. Davis, 2014, p. 386).

This echoes Janice Perlman's observations about community leaders in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* who acted as brokers in the 1960s and '70s:

> *If the squatter settlements were to achieve legal rights to their lands and full urban services and facilities, in many cases the usefulness, power, and importance of these leaders would be severely reduced… In order to survive, they must persuade residents to be content with token change and slow progress, and to trust that local leadership is doing its best to deal with the difficult problems of infrastructure and tenure. This may sound Machiavellian, but it is generally true* (J. E. Perlman, 1976, pp. 166–167).

Similarly, in the context of clientelism in informal settlements in Mexico, Herrera (2017) argues that "politicians fail to provide reliable and high-quality public services because they often benefit politically from manipulating public service provision for electoral gain." Holland (2017) argues that once the post-hoc regularization of squatting is established as an

informal welfare policy, both the poor and the state are locked into a "forbearance trap,"[14] where the poor organize their demands around acceptance of informality rather than more involved forms of welfare (e.g. public housing provision), which, as a result, the state does not develop the capacity to provide.

Clientelism and informal urban growth

Clientelism may cause informal growth, informal growth may cause clientelism, or both. As mentioned previously, clientelism may lead to informal urban growth through the direct or indirect supply of land to informal settlers. This may be land that politicians own or otherwise control, as in the example of Kibera in Nairobi mentioned above. Even if political patrons do not own the land, they may collaborate with informal land brokers to organize the informal settlement of land, as in Karachi. If political patrons are not involved in the initial occupation of the land, they may still become involved in protecting and 'regularizing' the settlement after it has formed, which acts as an indirect form of land supply. They may intervene to prevent demolitions (S. Fox, 2014; Gillespie, 2017) and organize the provision of urban services such as water and electrical connections and neighborhood-level infrastructure like paved roads, sewerage, or public toilets, often through brokers (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Björkman, 2014a; Burgwal, 1995; De & Nag, 2016; de Wit & Berner, 2009; Gandy, 2006;

[14] In her book *Forbearance as Redistribution,* political scientist Alisha Holland argues that the selective non-enforcement of the law by authorities (which she terms 'forbearance'), such as the law against squatting, acts as a form of redistribution of resources like land to the poor. As a means of redistribution, this selective non-enforcement is much less expensive and more credible than other forms of welfare like public housing construction or state-sponsored land distribution.

Herrera, 2017; Inskeep, 2011; J. Perlman, 2010; Weinstein, 2014). This encourages the growth of informal settlements, as settlers in such an environment are more confident of their ability to remain on the land and access services.

Clientelism may also result in the 'informalization' of settlements, if political leaders are able to prevent them from receiving infrastructure and services, perhaps in response to their lack of political support. This causes these settlements to deteriorate and take on the qualities of an informal settlement. For example, the local government of Mumbai itself allocated land to households in an area called Shivajinagar-Bainganwadi in the 1970s, but antipathy on the part of subsequent political leaders towards its residents caused it to deteriorate into what is now widely considered an "informal settlement" (Björkman, 2014b). Similarly, the informal settlement of Old Fadama in Accra originated partially as a temporary government-provided camp for migrant refugees during a violent ethnic conflict elsewhere in Ghana, but is now a permanent informal settlement to which authorities are hostile (see Chapter 5).

Clientelism may also lead to informal urban growth in other, less direct ways. Clientelism undermines state capacity in general and urban planning capacity in particular. This lack of capacity may restrict the ability of the state to formally supply or regulate the formal supply of land and services, leaving poor urban residents, particularly migrants, to resort to informal alternatives. The broader lack of state capacity in a clientelistic country may also result in a weaker economy, leading to more poverty and therefore more informality.

Conversely, the prevalence of informal settlements could lead to an increase in clientelism. As discussed previously, some informal communities, particularly those that are internally cohesive and have proactive leadership, may seek out and cultivate patron-client relationships with politicians (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Burgwal, 1995). Politicians would find clientelism to be a more attractive strategy when faced with densely populated, low-income settlements, which have needs that can easily be met through clientelism, especially if they appear able to provide unified political support.

Chapter 3 returns to this discussion of causal linkages between clientelism and informal urban growth in the context of its hypothesis that clientelism is correlated with specific spatial forms. Further, the case study presented in Chapters 4-7 demonstrates that in Ghana, several of these mechanisms are at work in parallel. There, clientelism undermines urban planning capacity, resulting in informal growth (see Chapter 5). Clientelistic politicians also protect informal settlements from demolition (as in the case of Old Fadama – see Chapter 5). Politicians also do not intervene when community leaders, usually traditional authorities, informally subdivide and distribute land, possibly fearing that any intervention would result in a loss of political support (see Chapter 6).

How clientelism declines

In what circumstances can residents of informal settlements transition away from clientelistic systems which do not meet their best interests, and which prevent urban planning from being effective? Recent publications have observed that relatively little is known about why some

countries and not others transition away from clientelism (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 21; Larreguy et al., 2018, p. 2). One reason clientelism is so entrenched is that "supply-side" reform, i.e. reform that targets patrons, presents a collective-action problem: as long as clientelism is affordable and popular, no individual political party or candidate has an incentive to drop it as an electoral strategy (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 253). For successful reform on the patrons' side, every candidate would simultaneously have to agree to campaign without resorting to clientelism, trusting that everyone else would stick to that agreement, a scenario that is difficult to imagine.

According to Sparling (2019, p. 106), "All mass democracies in the modern age have passed through (or remain in) highly clientelistic conditions." This statement underlines the importance of clientelism in the political history of the world, but also gives the impression that clientelism is a passing phase characteristic of democratic juvenility. Many assume that economic growth, democratization, and urbanization eventually causes clientelism to give way to programmatic policies.

Political scientists have traditionally assumed that clientelism naturally declines as incomes grow, because (i) the cost of the clientelistic benefits demanded becomes prohibitive to patrons; (ii) economically secure voters are able to risk voting on the basis of policies, and do not have to sell their vote to obtain basic necessities; (iii) the growing number of middle-class voters, who are typically not the prime target group of clientelism, punish clientelistic politicians in elections; and (iv) economic growth is associated with urbanization, and the

voting behavior of dense urban settlements is harder to monitor (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

However, data lend only qualified support to these assumptions. The Clientelism Index, a national-level index of clientelistic behavior (explained in greater detail in the next chapter), does show that, when countries are aggregated by income, wealthier countries are less clientelistic (i.e. have higher Clientelism Index values), and on average, each income group improved between 1990 and 2015 (Figure 3).



Figure 3: Clientelism Index, averages by income group, 1990 & 2015 [15]
Source: Author's analysis of Clientelism Index (Coppedge et al., 2018) and World Bank country classification by income [16]

[15] In this figure, countries are grouped according to their 1990 income, such that countries are not reclassified between 1990 and 2015. This allows observation of changes in clientelism over time within unchanging cohorts of countries.
[16] http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/OGHIST.xls. Accessed 7 January 2019.

However, this grouping masks variation within groups. At the level of individual countries, only a moderate correlation exists between per-capita GDP and clientelism (with Pearson's correlation coefficients of +0.40 in 1990 and +.044 in 2015). As Figure 4 reveals, practically no relationship exists between the two variables if we ignore the least clientelistic countries, those with a Clientelism Index value of greater than 8 (above the dashed line). When these least clientelistic countries are excluded, the Pearson's correlation coefficients between clientelism and GDP per capita are +0.11 in 1990 and 0.10 in 2015.



Figure 4: GDP per capita & Clientelism, 2015
Source: Author, using data from V-Dem and World Development Indicators [17]

[17] GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $), (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD. Accessed 23 September 2016).

The absence of a uniform linear trend away from clientelism is evident in the fact that, despite growth in most of their economies, many former Soviet states have become more clientelistic in recent decades (Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7). Similarly, several developing democracies in Asia and Africa, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ghana, and South Africa, remained nearly constant in terms of clientelism between 1990 and 2015, improving or declining by only half a point or less on a 0-10 scale, despite economic growth in all of them. Further, no correlation exists between change in GDP per capita and change in clientelism during this period. This suggests that clientelism is a problem that will persist rather than gradually disappear with income growth.

Several factors may explain why the assumed relationship between increasing wealth and declining clientelism appears not to hold true. First, the argument that the cost of patronage becomes prohibitive as an economy grows may not apply when one of the benefits is urban land. As an economy grows, so do the demands of the poor, but so also does the value of urban land. This means that the value of this clientelistic benefit to the client increases as the economy grows, while the cost to the patron, that of protecting informal developments from regulation, remains largely unchanged. The literature does not discuss this argument and it would require empirical corroboration, but it seems a plausible explanation for why economic growth alone would not reduce the incentives for land-based clientelism.



Figure 5: Clientelism Index 1990
Sources: Author, using data from V-Dem and country boundaries from CShapes (Weidmann et al., 2010)



Figure 6: Clientelism Index 2015
Sources: Author, using data from V-Dem and country boundaries from UIA World Countries Boundaries [18]

[18] https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/252471276c9941729543be8789e06e12_0 Accessed 13 November 2018.



Figure 7: Clientelism Index, change 1990-2015
Sources: Author, using data from V-Dem and country boundaries from UIA World Countries Boundaries

Second, while middle-class voters may have more programmatic preferences, they often simply disengage from politics rather than trying to discipline candidates through their votes. In the context of Ghana, Nathan (2019) finds that while middle-class urban voters do prefer 'universalistic' policies to particularistic ones, they do not believe that politicians can deliver such policies. They therefore disengage from politics and abstain from voting altogether. For their part, politicians do not risk promising programmatic policies that are complex and costly. Instead, they ignore middle-class preferences and focus on particularistic exchanges with the poor (see Chapter 6). This suggests that the growth of the middle class alone is unlikely to conquer clientelism, to the extent that middle class disengagement from voting is a pattern across developing democracies.

Last, the evidence does not support the idea that urbanization thwarts clientelism. As this chapter has shown, clientelism is very much alive in urban informal settlements. The Asian and African countries listed above as having nearly stable levels of clientelism between 1990 and 2015 have also experienced rapid urbanization during the same period. A recent study finds that in parts of Indonesia that have relatively undiversified economies, clientelism is in fact more prevalent in urban areas than in rural areas (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019).

Transitions away from clientelism in low-income urban settlements

Given that existing theory does not reliably point to a way out of clientelism, real-world examples may provide better guidance. The discussion below identifies and briefly describes cases in which clientelistic urban service delivery has given way to more programmatic service delivery and examines whether these cases hold any lessons for planning.

- Bureaucratic reform, national welfare, and other changes (United States)

"The man in the slum votes according to his light, and the boss holds the candle," quipped the journalist and social reformer Jacob Riis in 1902, referring to the political 'bosses' in the slums of New York City (Riis, 1902/1969, p. 427). However, 'bossism,' the form that clientelism took in the United States, lost its grip on the urban poor over the first half of the twentieth century. A once-popular explanation for the demise of clientelism in American cities was sheer demographic growth in the number of middle class voters, who opposed clientelism. However, according to Nathan (2019, pp. 282–284), recent scholarship questions this explanation, pointing out that clientelism persisted long after middle class

growth, and instead ended during a period when middle classes were fleeing to the suburbs and the average urban household was becoming poorer, not wealthier. Scholars also cite restrictions on immigration from the 1920s onwards as an explanation for the decline in clientelism, as it reduced the number of vulnerable and factionalized newcomers in American cities. However, recent scholarship questions this explanation too, noting that political 'machines' which were not dependent on immigrant groups also declined at roughly the same time as the others.

Scholars (Hays, 1974; Lapomarda, 1970; Nathan, 2019; Nelson, 1979; Shannon, 1969) point to other plausible explanations for the decline of 'bossism' in the United States. Some of these involve broader shifts in society and technology. For example, increased access to education provided better opportunities to urban youth for attaining wealth than patronage jobs, and mass communication technology made it more efficient for politicians to appeal to constituents beyond the neighborhood level. However, many explanations refer to concerted civic reforms originating in the Progressive era. Civil service reforms dating from the 1890s made it harder to manipulate jobs as patronage. Reforms in municipal accounting made irregular expenditures harder to hide. Business elites and an emerging professional class centralized power in the city, removing it from ward- and community-level bosses and placing it in the hands of municipal-level technocrats, aided by new 'organization technologies' and institutions. Later, the implementation of national welfare programs, especially the 1930s New Deal and the 1960s Great Society programs undermined the power of local bosses further.

- Political crisis and reform (Naples, Italy)

Naples, Italy, saw an end to clientelism in the 1990s, when corruption scandals destroyed Italy's long-incumbent Christian Democratic Party. Reforms followed, including the direct election of mayors (who until then had been appointed by elected local councils), and a requirement that mayoral candidates win an absolute majority of votes. Whereas the previous coalition-based system allowed candidates to get a seat at the table by making deals for only a few thousand votes each, clientelistic procurement of votes was not possible at the scale necessary under the new system (Pasotti, 2010).

- Neighborhood-scale crisis as an inflection point (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)

Gay (2006, p. 205) documents how a *favela* called Vidigal in Rio de Janeiro managed to escape the confines of clientelistic service provision in the 1970s and 80s. A threat of eviction which their usual political patron was unable or unwilling to fight provided the impetus for this change. In response, community leaders in Vidigal joined with NGOs and church groups to combat the eviction threat, a move which "effectively eliminated the practice of clientelism in the *favela*." From this point on, unlike in neighboring settlements in Rio, the leaders in Vidigal presented their demands not to local politicians in the settlement but to more senior officials in city hall. Neighborhood leaders no longer made deals with candidates, and in fact refused to endorse candidates at all. They even made a concerted effort to convince the residents that public services were their right, and that public works programs organized by political candidates did not obligate residents to vote for them. While the community leaders still allowed politicians to organize public works projects in the settlement, candidates were

prohibited from campaigning directly on the basis of those projects. Instead, they were invited to present their broader policy positions and platforms to the residents.

Gay is cautious in his appraisal of this apparent success, partly because the residents of Vidigal did apparently continue to reward parties electorally that had initiated public works in the *favela*. Gay labels this behavior as 'semi-clientelism'. He observes that even if the public works influenced voting, residents did not vote for candidates as part of a *quid pro quo* deal or under any coercion or pressure, but independently in response to parties whose actions had benefited them.

- The role of local elite reformers during a broader political transition (Mexico)

Herrera (2017) describes relatively successful reforms that changed water provision from clientelistic to programmatic systems in several cities in Mexico. These reforms occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, as part of a broader move towards market-oriented and democratic reforms that were initiated in cities where an opposition party had come into power in the local government, displacing the more autocratic party that had held power across the country for decades.

In the city of Leon (population 1.4 million), the local business community became actively involved in the water and sanitation sector following a severe water shortage. This prompted reform in the water sector, which resulted in the city's water utility becoming effectively independent of political interference. The reform of the utility focused on charging user fees that, at times, appeared to favor the business interests which were represented on the board,

which led to protests from poor communities. Still, service delivery improved citywide, and became less clientelistic in nature. Similarly, in Irapuato (population around half a million), the same newly incumbent reform party moved the water utility towards cost recovery as a means of breaking clientelistic ties between the former incumbents and residents, which had involved low negotiated rates between the utility and community leaders in informal settlements. In both Leon and Irapuato, elite groups participated broadly in water reforms.

Two other Mexican cities – Naucalpan and Celaya – were similarly successful in pursuing water utility reforms, but unlike the previous pair of cities, did so through much narrower coalitions of reformers. Mayors rather than broader groups of elites led reforms in both cities, but as in Leon and Irapuato, they geared the changes towards collection of user fees, which led to protests that eventually subsided, leaving less politicized service provision.

Herrera describes four other Mexican cities whose experiences differ from the four above. In Toluca, Xalapa, Neza, and Veracruz, the newly incumbent parties preferred to retain or even expand the old clientelistic networks of water provision inherited from the former incumbents. Herrera uses these eight cities to argue that the presence of a strong middle-class political base as well as water-intensive industries were key factors in initiating and sustaining programmatic reform of water provision.

While Herrera emphasizes the role of elite reformers in weakening clientelism, Shefner (2006), also studying clientelism in Mexico, explores the community-based 'anticlientelist' activism of an NGO called UCI (Union of Independent Settlers). In collaboration with Jesuit

organizations and other NGOs, UCI fought for better service provision in informal settlements in Guadalajara. Notably, Shefner observes that UCI lost its momentum once it became formally involved in electoral politics.

- National land titling programs to weaken the power of local incumbent parties (Mexico)

While explanations of the decline of clientelism tend to focus on institutional reform and political shifts, a recent study (Larreguy et al., 2018) shows how a specific programmatic policy may also weaken clientelism in informal settlements even in the absence of broader change. The study explores the case of Mexico, where a large-scale, long-term national government program known as the Committee for the Regularization of Land Ownership (*Comité para la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra*, CORETT) program has provided land titles to residents of informal settlements on communal land in urban areas in Mexico beginning in the 1970s. Many of these settlements were originally formed with encouragement from politicians, who would then condition the community's ability to remain on the land on its demonstration of political support. Incumbent parties at the municipal level benefited from their ability to manipulate these voters, giving them an incumbency advantage.

The study demonstrates a correlation between the receipt of titles from the federal CORETT program and reduced vote share for municipal incumbents in future elections, suggesting that the federal titling program helped to weaken the clientelistic advantage of municipal incumbency. This was a successful strategy for the federally incumbent party, as even though the titling program cost it too some ability to engage in clientelistic politics where it was in

power locally, voters rewarded the party in national elections. (See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the implications of this for Ghana, which recently considered a shift from presidential appointment of mayors to local election of mayors.)

- Broad political reform and fiscal crisis (Bogota, Colombia)

Bogota, a city in which informal settlements occupy nearly 40 percent of the land area, also experienced a shift away from rampant clientelism in the 1990s. According to Pasotti (2010), the introduction of direct mayoral elections in 1986 set the conditions for reform, as they replaced the previous, highly centralized system in which the national Parliament controlled the nomination of mayors. When a new constitution which favored independent electoral candidates without party affiliations came into effect in 1991, identification with established parties among the electorate declined rapidly. This led to the collapse of the clientelistic political machine in Bogota. Campaigns now sought to mobilize public opinion instead of buying votes. Bogota also faced a fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, which led to several reforms that consolidated and strengthened the authority of mayors, and also prompted them to move away from clientelistic politics.

- The legacy of a technocratic dictatorship (Santiago, Chile)

Holland (2017) describes the transition from politically supported squatting to public housing provision in Santiago, Chile. The early 1970s saw a spike in the formation of informal settlements, with 400,000 people participating in land invasions, often in relatively central and visible locations in the city. According to Holland, the refusal of the socialist government of the time to suppress these invasions added to the sense of social chaos which culminated in

the military takeover in 1974. The military dictatorship suppressed new land invasions and initiated a formal housing subsidy program through a technocratic housing ministry. When Chile re-democratized starting in 1990, the democratic government took advantage of the existence of this technically competent housing ministry and used it to establish a housing program of its own, as a means of demonstrating that democracy could deliver public goods to the poor. In order to prevent squatting from re-emerging as a housing option for the poor, which would undermine the housing program, the new democratic continued to suppress squatting.

- A move towards right-wing politics (Istanbul, Turkey)

Holland also discusses the example of Istanbul, which also had a history of clientelistic support for informal settlements prior to 2002, when the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power and began to dominate Turkish politics. It took advantage of Turkey's declining poverty rate, which meant that the median voter was no longer poor, and the fact that its political base was the majority Sunni population, which no longer formed the majority of urban migrants. The government was able to associate informality with Kurds, Roma, and other ethnic minorities. The ruling party's political fortunes did not rely on clientelistic ties to the urban poor, and the government proceeded to demolish some informal settlements. (However, clientelism in informal settlements did not completely disappear, as research conducted in 2015 documents active clientelistic ties between the AKP and settlements that are, or at least were when they first formed, informal (Yıldırım, 2020).)

- Grassroots community organizations (multiple countries)

In several countries, grassroots organizations have attempted to move communities away from clientelism. Mitlin (2014) and Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2013) analyze ways in which grassroots NGOs active among the urban poor in Asia and Africa have been partially successful in subtly shifting the balance of power away from clientelism. These organizations include Karachi's Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), with its focus on building neighborhood-level sanitation using community savings and labor; Mumbai's Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), which later formed alliances with the National Slum Dwellers' Federation (NSDF) and Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), and formed a women's saving group called Mahila Milan; and the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), which has been involved in urban upgrading in informal settlements across the Asian continent. These three self-help organizations, all originally formed in the 1980s, have slightly different focuses and modes of operation, but share common features. They all tend to rely primarily on community savings to build neighborhood-level infrastructure. Also, the leaders of each of these organizations and the members of their savings groups are overwhelmingly women, many of whom have never been involved in civic or community activities before.

Importantly for this discussion, activists in these organizations tend to be highly critical of clientelistic provision of services, understanding them to be insufficient, unreliable, unequal, and divisive (Mitlin, 2014). They are determined not to "deliver the poor as a vote bank to any political party or candidate" (Appadurai, 2001, p. 29). Still, these organizations typically avoid contesting existing power structures through protest and confrontation. Instead, they

engage constructively with whomever is in power and aim to empower themselves and loosen the hold of political patrons through more subtle strategies. Mitlin highlights three approaches which "encapsulate the essence of the strategy to address clientelism" (Mitlin, 2014, p. 21). The first is the prevalence of women-led, alternate forms of organization such as savings groups, which the political elite do not see as threats, but which are highly accountable to residents. Second, community-led mapping and surveying provides these organizations with information that is useful not only to themselves but to government officials. Third, these organizations form city-wide networks of poor communities and other partners, which helps share information and practices, and strengthens the collective power of communities to bargain for rights.

These organizations do not claim to be self-sufficient, and they recognize the need for government support in scaling up. However, rather than angling for patronage, they prefer to start with 'precedent-setting' projects that demonstrate the kinds of interventions they consider necessary (Mitlin, 2014). Patel et al demonstrate this proactive approach in their account of Mahila Milan's activities in Mumbai, India. They recount how community women developed housing prototypes themselves, and then invited senior government officials at the ward, city, and state level to view and consider implementing them (S. Patel et al., 2016).

The extent to which grassroots organizations like these can eliminate clientelism altogether is debatable. Datta (2012, pp. 96–97) suggests that the work of Mahila Milan and another NGO in an informal settlement in Delhi, India, did in fact help to "connect working-class women to civil society organizations and subsequently move away from informal structures

of patronage, privilege, and customary authority." However, as noted earlier, other authors (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Burgwal, 1995) do not find that mobilization among the poor necessarily helps transition away from clientelism, even if it helps the poor bargain more effectively for clientelistic benefits. A common theme across Mitlin's work (Mitlin, 2008, 2018; Mitlin & Mogaladi, 2013) is that grassroots organizations tend to move opportunistically between various strategies, including openly contentious politics, collaboration with state actors, and subversion of state regulations, which suggests that they may not necessarily eschew clientelistic opportunities altogether. As Satterthwaite and Mitlin observe, "It is clearly not possible for a bottom-up process alone to either overcome clientelism or to provide the finance for universal solutions to be implemented" (p. 197).

Discussion: a role for planners?

While each of the transitions away from clientelism discussed above took place in a specific political and institutional context, it is possible to identify some recurring features. Crises appear to have acted as inflection points in the movement towards change in Rio de Janeiro, Leon (Mexico), and Bogota. In Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Turkey, and Italy, the move away from clientelism is impossible to separate from broader political transitions at the national level, which had impacts far beyond informal settlements. The Chilean case involves a military coup, while the Turkish case involves demonization of informal settlers, neither of which is likely to be in the best interests of the poor. Beyond being opportunistic in capitalizing on broader conditions that support urban planning, lessons for planners are hard to discern from any of these examples.

It is easier to imagine urban planning playing a role in supporting the grassroots organizations and NGOs discussed above, including both the neighborhood organizations associated with individual informal settlements and national and transnational networks like OPP, SDI, and ACHR. Álvarez-Rivadulla (2017, pp. 64–65) notes that when land invasions are organized and planned in advance, squatter organizations often "imitate" formal urban planning by subdividing the land into streets and parcels and reserving land for public spaces and community facilities, with the expectation that the settlement may eventually be integrated into the formal city. Urban upgrading by ACHR or provision of neighborhood-level sanitation by OPP involves organizing the provision of long-term public goods through community participation, which aligns with the broad definition of planning discussed above. To the extent that these organizations do help move away from clientelism, the fact that they perform planning-like functions indicates a potential role for professional planners in facilitating a transition from clientelism.

The idea that professionally trained urban planners might offer their expertise directly to individual urban communities rather than city governments has a long history (Davidoff, 1965), but in the context of informal settlements, the relationship between professionals and communities is often challenging. Mitlin (2013) discusses some of the challenges with regard to the "co-production" of solutions between professionals and communities. Professionals are often expected to arrive with solutions prepared, despite a lack of sufficient local knowledge. They are expected to act as intermediaries between communities and the state, a role they may not be equipped to play. Academic researchers and consultants often have their own

agendas, such as the preparation of research papers or reports, which differ from those of communities.

Community-based organizations like SDI are open to professional help, but they are often careful to ensure that they are not dominated by outside professionals (Mitlin, 2008). SDI uses various strategies to manage the relationship between communities and professionals, including getting involved in the training and recruitment of professionals and maintaining clear boundaries between professionals and communities so that communities can maintain control over projects (Mitlin, 2013).

Conclusion

Planners need to develop an understanding of clientelism and its role in the provision of urban land and services, and of why both the politically powerful patrons and the residents of the informal settlements themselves may resist change to formal service delivery or land use planning. While clientelism provides the poor with some access to the state, it also prevents them from participating fully in democracy and hinders the long-term provision of public goods. National governments and international organizations can use these insights to refine their support to cities, beyond simply providing technical capacity building or budgetary support for politically 'naïve' urban planning and management.

Gaps remain in the understanding of the relationships between planning and clientelism. First, while instances are known in which clientelism has declined in favor of a more formal, programmatic system of land and service provision, lessons for planning are not obvious.

Some of these cases reveal the need for more research into the role of planners. Even beyond these specific instances, it is likely that some planning initiatives or approaches around the world have been more effective than others in understanding and operating within clientelistic environments, even if they have not brought about such transitions. How do planners respond to clientelism? How successful are these responses? These underexplored questions suggest avenues for future research. Later chapters in this study begin to address these questions through a case study of the relationships between planning, informality, and clientelism in urban Ghana. While this global overview has treated planning and clientelism in the abstract for the sake of conceptual clarity, the case study will place them in a specific political, institutional, and cultural context, thus deepening and complicating the picture of how clientelism and planning interact.

Second, while the discussion so far has taken for granted that clientelistic politics and informal settlements go hand-in-hand, in fact most of our knowledge of clientelism comes from research in specific cities or settlements, which means we have no evidence to confirm the intuition that there is a systematic relationship between these phenomena. This is largely because, until recently, lack of data has made it impossible to test the global relationship between clientelism and informal settlements. However, two recently released data sets now allow this relationship to be analyzed empirically at the global scale, and it is to this analysis that this study turns next.

Chapter 3: The Spatial Patterns of Politics - Measuring the Global Relationship between Clientelism and Informal Urban Growth

Introduction [19]

Are clientelism and informal urban growth related? Anecdotal evidence from around the world indicates that they are. It suggests that political patrons provide land informally to the urban poor in exchange for their political support, that informal settlements whose residents are loyal to the ruling political party seem to escape demolition, and informal settlements appear to breed the kind of politician who thrives on clientelism. Previously, empirical testing of this relationship at a global scale was impossible due to a lack of data, but the release of new data that measure political behavior and urban growth now allows the identification, for the first time, of a statistical correlation between clientelism and patterns of informal urban growth, across a globally representative sample of 200 cities.

The results of the analysis presented in this chapter indicate that cities in more clientelistic countries are more likely to experience urban growth in the form of informal settlements that appear to have been spatially laid out in advance of settlement ("informal subdivisions"). If a country were less clientelistic by one point on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities

[19] A version of this chapter has been published as Deuskar C (2019) Informal urbanisation and clientelism: Measuring the global relationship. *Urban Studies*. DOI: 10.1177/0042098019878334.

would decrease by 16% of its previous value. The magnitude of this effect is equivalent to that of an increase in 1990 GDP per capita (PPP) of $2,700. Clientelism is not correlated with unplanned, ad-hoc informal growth or with overall informal growth. The chapter discusses plausible causal mechanisms which explain these findings.

The main finding of this analysis, that clientelism may affect urban spatial form, reinforces the argument that planners must take clientelism seriously, and that for planners and policymakers to make positive contributions in informal settlements, they must adapt their planning approach to account for informal politics. The analysis also provides an example of how newly available data may be used to advance our understanding of the relationship between politics, urban space, and informality.

Scholars across disciplines have long studied the relationships between political dynamics and urban growth, either through theoretical explorations (MacLeod, 2011; Molotch, 1976; Ortalo-Magné & Prat, 2014; Phelps & Wood, 2011), or through qualitative studies and narrative accounts (Barriga, 1995; Frisken, 2007, among others; Nada, 2014; Sridharan, 2011). In recent years, scholars have devoted extensive attention to the role that clientelism in particular plays in poor urban settlements in low- and middle-income countries, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Some of these studies (e.g. Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Benjamin, 2008; S. Fox, 2014) discuss the relationship between clientelism and the *growth* of informal settlements. These studies mostly explore causality in one direction, i.e. from clientelism to the growth of informal settlements. However, some studies (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Auerbach, 2016; Burgwal, 1995) imply that the causality may also run in

the opposite direction, i.e. that the growth of informal settlements may create conditions suitable to clientelism. In a review of the political science literature on urban politics in the developing world, Post (2018) suggests that more research is needed in order to understand whether this is the case.

The above suggests that scholars believe that political dynamics, including clientelism, are associated with informal settlements, including their growth. Yet, attempts to measure these relationships systematically have been rare, and specific to one or a small handful of countries. For example, Holland (2016) measures the progress of cases against illegal construction by squatters in Bogota, Colombia, and Lima, Peru, and Alves (2018) examines the impact of victories by the center-left party Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazilian municipalities on slum growth and upgrading.

There have also been several attempts to model the growth of informal settlements through simulations, though a review of such models (D. Roy et al., 2014) found that most do not incorporate the role of politics. The only one to do so is Patel et al's (2012) agent-based model, 'Slumulation', which incorporates the impact of politicians who aim to benefit electorally from a concentration of informal settlements. McGrath (2016) modifies the Slumulation model to incorporate electoral cycles, such that rents are lower and enforcement of laws in informal settlements is more lax during election periods.

No study has yet attempted to identify a statistical correlation between clientelism and informal growth across a large cross-sectional sample of cities. This is partly because the kind

of consistent data on either clientelism or patterns of urban growth that would be necessary to conduct this analysis on a global scale have not existed until recently. This changed with the release of two new global data sets within the last few years, one on patterns of urban growth and the other on clientelism. The first is the 2016 version of the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016), which includes metrics on different categories of urban growth, as discernible from satellite imagery, in a globally representative sample of 200 cities. The other is the eighth version of the Varieties of Democracy ('V-Dem') data set, released in 2018 (Coppedge et al., 2018). The V-Dem project, headquartered at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, uses thousands of country experts to produce metrics on political practices in 201 countries from 1789 onwards, in what it describes as "one of the largest-ever social science data collection efforts."[20] The 2018 version includes for the first time a Clientelism Index among its variables. While others have produced comparative metrics of clientelism, notably the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project or DALP (Kitschelt, 2013), V-Dem is more extensive in both geographic and temporal scope (DALP has data on 80 democracies, for 2008-09 and changes since a decade prior). This analysis uses the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* and V-Dem data to test the global relationship between clientelism and informal urban growth.

---

[20] https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/. Accessed 8 February 2019.

Hypothesis

This analysis makes use of a distinction that Angel et al make in the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* between two forms of informal growth. *Atomistic settlements* are those "with irregular layouts that were clearly not subdivided or laid out before residential construction took place. This category includes squatter settlements that grew incrementally without an overall plan, homes built on irregular parcels of land, or homes built on rural plots that were not regularly subdivided before their conversion to urban use" (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016, p. 30).

The other type of informal growth is *informal land subdivisions* (often referred to simply as *informal subdivisions*.)[21] The *Atlas of Urban Expansion* defines informal subdivisions generically as residential areas that appear to have been subdivided for urban use, with structures that are "typically laid out along straight or almost-straight roads, with regular intersections and standardized widths" and blocks that are "regular or semi-regular in size and shape, when topography permits", but are nonetheless "informal" as they "lack visible evidence of conformity to land subdivision regulations such as regular plot dimensions, paved roads, street lights, or sidewalks." (A later section in this chapter discusses the limitations of identifying settlements as "informal" purely on the basis of visual characteristics.)

---

[21] As documented in a comprehensive literature review by Payne (1989), studies on every region of the world began to pay sustained attention in the 1970s and especially the 1980s to how the informal subdivision of land by various actors facilitates the creation of informal land and housing submarkets. Shlomo Angel, who led the team of researchers which produced the *Atlas*, was among the first to write about informal subdivisions, in a study of Bangkok ((Angel et al., 1983)). Publications in recent years have continued to investigate the process of informal subdivision of land in both the Global North and South ((Cunha, 2009; Hasan & Mohib, 2003; Mukhija & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014; Navarro & Turnbull, 2010, among others)).

The other categories of residential land use in the *Atlas* are *formal land subdivisions* (or simply *formal subdivisions*) and *housing projects*. The first of these, *formal subdivisions,* "exhibit a higher level of regularity, a higher level of provision of infrastructure [fully paved roads, sidewalks, street lights], and better connections to existing roads." The second, *housing projects,* "range from large apartment tower projects to suburban tract housing" and are characterized by homogeneity of design, suggesting that they were "built by a single developer using variations on the same plan." Examples of the four categories of residential land use are depicted in Figure 8.

This analysis hypothesizes that countries with more clientelistic politics tend to experience a larger share of residential urban growth in the form of informal subdivisions, i.e. pre-planned informal settlements, but that there is no positive or negative correlation between clientelism and any of the other types of residential urban growth (atomistic settlements, formal subdivisions, or housing projects), for reasons discussed in the next section.

Figure 8: Four types of residential land use identified in the Atlas of Urban Expansion Atomistic settlements (top left), informal subdivisions (top right), formal subdivisions (bottom right), and housing projects (bottom left).

Source: Angel et al (2016).

Causal mechanisms

Possible mechanisms linking clientelism to only informal subdivisions

While this analysis does not attempt to test causality, in order to establish that the hypothesized correlation is theoretically plausible, the following section briefly outlines possible causal mechanisms linking clientelism to informal subdivisions.

Possible mechanism 1: Clientelism causes the growth of informal subdivisions through direct provision of land (clientelism → informal subdivisions). As mentioned in Chapter 2, political patrons may own or otherwise control land and distribute it to clients. For example, politicians and government officials own over half the land in Kibera, the large informal settlement in Nairobi, and these figures or their brokers informally subdivide and allocate plots of land to residents (Syagga et al., 2002, cited in Fox 2014). Even if political patrons do not own the land, they may collaborate with informal land brokers to organize the informal settlement of land, as in Karachi, Pakistan (Inskeep, 2011; A. H. Khan, 1992). The land may be settled gradually, but brokers may subdivide it informally in advance, resulting in the physical features associated with informal subdivisions.

Possible mechanism 2: Clientelism encourages the growth and persistence of new informal subdivisions through post-settlement protection and regularization (clientelism → informal subdivisions). Even if political patrons are not involved in the initial occupation of the land, they may become involved in 'regularizing' the settlement after it has formed, by intervening to prevent demolitions (S. Fox, 2014; Gillespie, 2017) and organizing the provision of urban services such as water and electrical connections and neighborhood-level infrastructure like paved roads, sewerage, or public toilets, often through brokers (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Björkman, 2014a; Burgwal, 1995; De & Nag, 2016; de Wit & Berner, 2009; Gandy, 2006; Herrera, 2017; Inskeep, 2011; J. Perlman, 2010; Weinstein, 2014).

This kind of post-settlement support may happen regardless of whether the built form of the settlement is as an informal subdivision or an atomistic development. However, evidence

suggests that in clientelistic environments, leaders among the urban poor are likelier to organize "planned" land invasions, in which an entire community settles a site in concert. For example, Álvarez-Rivadulla (2017) demonstrates that in Montevideo, Uruguay, the formation of ad-hoc "accretion" informal settlements had always been common, but "planned" land invasions grew in number during a period of intense political competition, when political parties eagerly courted the votes of the urban poor. Burgwal (1995) provides evidence of the connection between clientelism and coordinated, pre-planned settlement with the example of a land invasion in Quito, Ecuador, whose leaders waited several months in order to carry out the land invasion during campaign season, when they would be less likely to be evicted as political candidates fought for their votes. In both examples, settlers appear to have taken the opportunity of a clientelistic atmosphere to execute larger, more organized land invasions. Pre-planned invasions like these are likelier to involve some level of site planning, which would make them take the form of informal subdivisions rather than atomistic settlements. Álvarez-Rivadulla notes that participants in these pre-planned invasions often subdivide land into streets and individual parcels in advance of settlement. Similarly, Hasan and Mohib (2003) observe that in Karachi, in contrast to "unorganized" land invasions, informal subdivisions of state land tend to be planned in a grid pattern. The fact that pre-planned invasions are more likely to occur in clientelistic environments and also more likely to be spatially laid out in advance suggests that, even when patrons are not involved in the initial settlement, planned informal subdivisions are more likely to arise in clientelistic environments.

Possible mechanism 3: Clientelism leads to the 'informalization' of subdivisions (clientelism → informal subdivisions). Given that the *Atlas* does not distinguish between settlements based on their legal status but only on their physical characteristics, some settlements classified as informal subdivisions may have been settled legally but still be poorly served by infrastructure. Clientelism may be a factor in this scenario if political patrons are able to prevent infrastructure from being formally provided or maintained, in order to act as gatekeepers such that access to infrastructure is contingent on political support. The example of the Shivajinagar-Bainganwadi settlement in Mumbai suggests that such a mechanism is plausible. Here, the local government laid out the settlement in a grid pattern and allocated land to households in the 1970s, but antipathy on the part of subsequent political leaders towards its residents caused it to deteriorate into what is now widely considered an "informal settlement" (Björkman, 2014b).

Possible mechanism 4: Settlements with strong leadership and more coordination are likelier to be laid out in advance and also likelier to foster clientelism (neighborhood leadership → informal subdivisions; neighborhood leadership → clientelism). Some accounts of the growth of informal settlements (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Burgwal, 1995) suggest that informal settlements that have strong leadership and coordination from the outset are both likelier to be laid out in advance and better able to successfully engage in clientelistic bargaining with politicians. These communities often proactively seek out patrons, but even if they do not, patrons may be attracted to communities that appear able to provide unified political support. This means that even if there were no clientelism at the time of the emergence of the settlement, the

existence of a cohesive community under strong leadership could induce clientelism. Given that such a community is also likelier to have subdivided land in advance reinforces the hypothesis that informal subdivision and clientelism are likely to go together, even if clientelism does not directly cause these types of settlements to form.

The argument here is not that clientelism is associated *only* with informal subdivisions and not with other types of residential urban growth. If this were the case, more clientelism would be correlated with a significantly *smaller* share of the other types of growth. Rather, the argument is that the other types of growth may or may not be associated with clientelism, and so would not necessarily form a larger or smaller share of residential growth in a clientelistic environment. An informal settlement that lacks a regular layout, i.e. an "atomistic" settlement, may indeed result from clientelism, or may foster clientelism after it forms. Similarly, clientelism may be involved in the provision of land or services to what the *Atlas* describes as "formal subdivisions" (Agyemang & Morrison, 2018), or in the allocation of public housing to beneficiaries (Levenson, 2017). However, atomistic informal settlements, formal subdivisions, and housing projects could also arise in the absence of clientelism, whereas the discussion above suggests that informal subdivisions are particularly likely to be linked with clientelism and may be unlikely to form in its absence. For this reason, the hypothesis posits a correlation between clientelism and the share of informal subdivisions, but not between clientelism and the share of the other types of growth.

Other causal mechanisms linking clientelism to all informal growth

The following mechanisms would also result in a correlation between clientelism and informal growth, but are not consistent with the hypothesis above, as they would result in a correlation either between clientelism and all urban growth, i.e. informal subdivisions and atomistic settlements, or between clientelism and atomistic settlements specifically. In some cases, this correlation would also disappear if GDP is included as a control variable.

Low state capacity may independently cause clientelism and informal growth (low state capacity → clientelism; low state capacity → informal growth). A correlation between clientelism and overall informal growth (atomistic settlements and informal subdivisions) may result from omitted variable bias, in which the omitted variable is low state capacity. In a version of events in which this is the only reason for the correlation between clientelism and informal growth, a weak state fails to provide land and services to the poor, resulting in informal growth, and also fails to deliver on programmatic policies at the national level, leading to the prevalence of clientelism.[22] This could result in a correlation between clientelism and informality without any direct causal relationship in either direction. However, this would not be consistent with the hypothesis, as in this case there would be a correlation either between clientelism and all informal growth, i.e. atomistic settlements and informal subdivisions, if informal settlers could and sometimes would subdivide their land even in the absence of

[22] For a discussion of the relationship between state capacity and clientelism, see Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2017).

clientelism, or between clientelism and atomistic settlements specifically, if they could or would not. The hypothesized correlation, between clientelism and informal subdivisions alone, would not be consistent with a version of events in which this is the only causal mechanism.

Clientelism may weaken state capacity, which in turn causes informal growth (clientelism → low state capacity → informal growth). In this version of events, the causal relationship between clientelism and state capacity runs in the opposite direction, with clientelistic politics reducing the incentive or ability to build state capacity. Consequently, diminished state capacity to provide formal land and services results in the growth of informal settlements. If the only relationship between clientelism and informal settlements is via state capacity, as above clientelism would be correlated with the share of urban growth in the form of all informal settlements or with just atomistic settlements, not with just informal subdivisions.

Low GDP may independently cause clientelism and informal growth (low GDP → clientelism; low GDP → informal growth). As with state capacity, GDP may be correlated with both clientelism and informal growth, and low GDP could independently cause both informal growth and clientelism, without any direct causal link between clientelism and informal growth. However, a version of events in which is the only causal link between clientelism and informal growth would not be in keeping with the hypothesis because again it would result in a correlation between clientelism and all informal growth, or just atomistic settlements, in the absence of GDP as a control variable, and this correlation would also not remain once the GDP variable is included.

Clientelism may cause low GDP which in turn causes informal growth (clientelism → low GDP → informal growth). The causal relationship between clientelism and GDP could run in the opposite direction, with clientelistic politics preventing conditions conducive to economic growth from arising, and low GDP in turn resulting in informal settlements. If the only relationship between clientelism and informal settlements is via GDP in this manner, clientelism would be correlated with all informal growth, or with just atomistic settlements, in the absence of GDP as a control variable, and this correlation would not remain once the GDP variable is included.

Informal growth causes low GDP which in turn causes clientelism (informal growth → low GDP → clientelism). In this version of events, there is no clientelism in informal settlements themselves, but their existence lowers productivity in the economy as a whole, which creates conditions conducive to clientelism. As above, if the only relationship between clientelism and informal settlements is via GDP in this manner, clientelism would be correlated with all informal growth, or just atomistic settlements, in the absence of GDP as a control variable, and this correlation would not remain once the GDP variable is included.

Study design

The models in this study test whether the share of each of four types of residential growth experienced by a city between 1990 and 2015 is correlated with the level of clientelism in the country at the beginning of that period, controlling for the country's initial GDP per capita, the city's initial size and density, and other variables. The dependent variables in the

models are the shares of the four different categories of residential urban growth defined in the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016), which together add up to 100%: informal subdivisions, atomistic development, formal subdivisions, and housing projects. For the purposes of this analysis, the former two categories are considered "informal growth" and the latter two are "formal growth."

Data

Categories of residential urban growth. The *Atlas of Urban Expansion* presents a range of metrics on a globally-representative sample of 200 cities with populations of 100,000 people or more as of 2010.[23] For each of these cities, the *Atlas* team digitized and analyzed a random sample of 10-hectare "locales" within areas of each city that existed before 1990 and areas that grew between 1990 and 2015, using high-resolution Bing and Google Earth imagery. They used this analysis to estimate, within both the pre-1990 areas and the 1990-2015 areas, the shares of each of the four residential categories.

Clientelism. This study uses a measure of clientelistic politics at the country level, as an approximation of clientelism at the local level, from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2018; Sigman & Lindberg, 2017). The V-Dem team constructs the Clientelism Index ('e_v2xnp_client' in the V-Dem database) from indicators for vote-buying ('v2elvotbuy'), particularistic vs. public goods ('v2dlencmps'), and whether party linkages

[23] The *Atlas* data are available in the form of interactive charts and maps, as well as downloadable GIS and Excel files, at www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org.

are programmatic or clientelistic ('v2psprlnks'). The original e_v2xnp_client variable is on a 0 to 1 scale, but this study rescales it to a 0 to 10 scale to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients. Like in most V-Dem indicators, higher values mean 'more democratic', which in this case means less clientelistic. In other words, the more clientelistic a country's politics, the closer its Clientelism Index will be to 0. It is calculated for each year. The models use the value of the Index at the beginning of the period under consideration (1990-2015). Figure 5 and Figure 6 in Chapter 2 map the 1990 and 2015 values of the Clientelism Index respectively.

Control variables. The control variables included in the models are listed below, along with reasons why they may be expected to determine the shares of the settlement categories. Unless otherwise indicated, they were taken from the *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and are 1990 values.

- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2011 international dollars (World Development Indicators[24]): All else equal, cities in wealthier countries may be expected to have a smaller share of informal growth (informal subdivisions and atomistic settlements) and a larger share of formal growth (formal subdivisions and housing projects).
- City population: As more populous cities tend to be more economically vibrant and have

[24] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD. Accessed 23 September 2016.

a higher demand for land, all else equal, larger cities may be expected to see a smaller share of informal subdivisions, which require larger areas of land at once; a larger share of atomistic settlements, which require less land and may house migrants attracted to large cities; a larger share of formal subdivisions, which may be more affordable to residents of larger cities; and a larger share of housing projects, in response to a high demand for housing.

- City population density: Denser cities may be expected to have a smaller share of formal and informal subdivisions, as they require more land at once; and a larger share of atomistic settlements which require less land at once.
- National annual population growth rate (World Development Indicators,[25] average 1985-1995): Countries with rapidly growing populations may be expected to experience more demand for residential land, which would lead to the same outcomes as high population density discussed above.
- National urbanization level (share of population in "urban centers" per Global Human Settlements Data[26]): Countries that were more urbanized at the beginning of this period may be expected to have lower demand for new urban land, which, all else equal, may lead to a larger share of informal subdivisions and a smaller share of atomistic settlements.
- Capital city: Residential growth in capital cities may be more politicized, and as a result

[25] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW. Accessed 11 June 2019.
[26] This variable was obtained from a pre-release version of the Global Human Settlements data set shared by the European Commission team in 2016.

may experience a greater impact of clientelism than other cities in that country, which would lead to more informal subdivisions.

- Cohesion Index: This is a metric approximately expressing how circular in shape a city is, used here as a proxy for the geographic constraints faced by the city as it grows. A more constrained city, e.g. a city in a valley, would have a smaller supply of land, and may have more atomistic settlements and less of the other types of growth.
- Inclusion: This is the proportion of the 1990-2015 "growth" of the city that was in fact outlying development built prior to 1990, with which the city merged as it grew. These areas would have different characteristics than areas actually being settled during this period, though the exact differences are hard to predict.
- USSR: Some models include a dummy variable indicating whether a country belonged to the USSR. Plotting the data shows that cities in former Soviet countries have a larger share of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 growth than would otherwise be expected (see Figure 9). As the map of change in clientelism over this period (Figure 7 in Chapter 2) showed, many former Soviet countries became more clientelistic during this period, suggesting that if a later Clientelism Index value replaced the 1990 value, these countries might in fact conform to the general trend.

Table 1 summarizes these variables for the observations in the sample.

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.*	Median**	Max.*
Dependent variables (categories of residential urban growth, by share, 1990-2015) City-level (no. of observations = 200):					
Informal subdivisions	29%	26%	0% New York, USA	24% Sao Paulo, Brazil	98% Yanggu, China
Atomistic development	31%	24%	0% Berezniki, Russia	26% Bicheng, China	98% Vinh Long, Vietnam
All informal development (informal subd. + atomistic)	60%	29%	4% Modesto, USA	60% Cairo, Egypt	100% Ibadan, Nigeria
Formal subdivisions	28%	27%	0% Tashkent, Uzbekistan	19% Tianjin, China	90% Modesto, USA
Housing projects	12%	14%	0% Manchester, UK	6% Vienna, Austria	72% Singapore, Singapore
Independent variables City-level (no. of observations = 200):					
City population (millions, 1990)	2.124	3.642	0.006 Palmas, Brazil	0.698 Caracas, Venezuela	29.181 Tokyo, Japan
Population density (persons/ hectare, 1990)	98	83	5 Palmas, Brazil	72 Tangshan, China	444 Hong Kong, China
Cohesion Index (0-1 scale, 1990)	0.79	0.11	0.35 Cabimas, Venezuela	0.81 Manchester, UK	0.99 Zunyi, China
Inclusion growth (proportion, 1990-2015)	0.26	0.13	0.05 Oyo, Nigeria	0.24 Alexandria, Egypt	0.68 Beira, Mozambique
Country-level (no. of observations = 78, unless otherwise noted):					
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale, 1990)	5.8	2.5	1.1 El Salvador	6.0 Turkey	9.8 Germany
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale, avg. 1985-1995)	5.7	2.4	1.2 Thailand	5.8 Algeria	9.8 Germany
GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 dollars in thousands, 1990) No. of obs. = 71 (7 missing)	12.168	11.634	0.375 Mozambique	8.084 Belarus	46.600 Switzerland

National annual pop. growth rate (%, avg. 1985-1995)	1.72	1.06	-0.29 Hungary	1.86 Mozambique	4.37 Yemen
National urban population (share in urban centers, 1990, according to Global Human Settlement data)	0.43	0.16	0.09 Uganda	0.43 Ukraine	0.99 Singapore

* When multiple cities/countries share minimum or maximum values, the table reports the largest city/ country among these.
** For variables with even numbers of observations, city/country names reported under median values are the larger by population of the two middle values.

The figures below depict the relationships between clientelism on the x-axis, GDP per capita (dot size), membership of the former USSR (dot color), and on the respective y-axes, the shares of informal subdivisions (Figure 9), atomistic settlements (Figure 10), all informal growth (informal subdivisions plus atomistic settlements; Figure 11), formal subdivisions (Figure 12), and housing projects (Figure 13). Figure 9 shows that less clientelistic countries (countries with a higher Clientelism Index value) have lower shares of informal subdivisions, as hypothesized. However, it is also evident that less clientelistic countries are also wealthier (the dots to the right are larger), which suggests the need to model the relationship between clientelism and informal subdivisions controlling for GDP per capita. The fact that cities in member states of the former Soviet Union have higher shares of informal subdivisions than expected, as discussed above, is also evident in Figure 9, as lighter colored dots do not conform to the general downward trend.



Figure 9: Clientelism and informal subdivisions

Source: Author, using data from V-Dem, *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and World Development Indicators



Figure 10: Clientelism and atomistic settlements

Source: Author, using data from V-Dem, *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and World Development Indicators



Figure 11: Clientelism and all informal growth (informal subdivisions + atomistic settlements)

Source: Author, using data from V-Dem, *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and World Development Indicators



Figure 12: Clientelism and formal subdivisions

Source: Author, using data from V-Dem, *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and World Development Indicators



Figure 13: Clientelism and housing projects

Source: Author, using data from V-Dem, *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, and World Development Indicators

Model specifications

The models use ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variables in the models are the shares of each category of residential growth between 1990 and 2015. The independent variables are country-level variables, such as clientelism and GDP per capita, and city-level

variables including population size and density, as of 1990 or thereabouts.[27] In generic terms, the models treat the log-transformed[28] share of residential growth of a particular category (Y) as a function of country-level factors (X_1) and city-level factors (X_2) which might be expected to be correlated with Y:

$$Y = f(X_1, X_2)$$

In each model, the unit of observation is the city, with cities in the same country being assigned the same value for the country-level variables. To account for this for the purposes of significance testing, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Of the 200 cities in the *Atlas* data set, eight are dropped due to missing 1990 GDP data.

Three types of sensitivity tests were conducted. The first involved adding control variables to each model incrementally to observe changes in the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of clientelism. Second, the models were rerun replacing the Clientelism Index value for 1990 with an average value for 1985-1995, to ensure that brief fluctuations in this metric do not distort the results. Lastly, the cities were randomly assigned to five groups of equal size, and the models were run five times with one group removed each time, to test the robustness of the trends to the exclusion of observations.

---

[27] The analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017), and used the 'car' (J. Fox & Weisberg, 2011), 'estimatr' (Blair et al., 2018), 'ggplot2' (Wickham, 2016), and 'stargazer' (Hlavac, 2018) packages.
[28] For ease of interpretation and to avoid taking the undefined log of 0, the log-transformation used the function f(y)=log(100y+1), where y is the original variable.

Results

The results broadly support the hypothesis that cities in more clientelistic countries have a significantly higher share of informal subdivisions, but do not have a significantly higher or lower share of the other types of growth, even when controlling for GDP per capita and other variables.

Table 2 displays the results of two models for each of the types of growth, one with a limited number of controls and another with the full set of controls. Models 1 and 2 use the share of informal subdivisions as the dependent variable. Consistent with expectations, the models find a statistically significant negative relationship between the value of the Clientelism Index in 1990 and the (logged) share of informal subdivisions in residential growth during the 1990-2015 period. Unsurprisingly, the models find GDP to be strongly negatively correlated to the share of informal subdivisions: the poorer the country, the higher the share of informal subdivisions.

Model 1 explains 45% of the variation in the share of informal subdivisions. By taking the exponents of the coefficients in model 1, we find that if a country were one point less clientelistic on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its previous value. For comparison, if GDP per capita in 1990 were higher by $1000 (PPP), the proportion of informal subdivisions would decrease by 6% of its previous value. The

magnitude of the effect on share of informal subdivisions of a 1-point change in clientelism is approximately equivalent to that of a $2,700 change in GDP per capita (PPP).

Table 2: Results

Model no.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Logged share of 1990-2015 growth of -							
Dependent variable	Informal subdivisions		Atomistic settlements		Formal subdivisions		Housing projects	
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.171*	-0.170**	0.030	0.037	0.012	0.001	0.056	0.044
	(0.083)	(0.056)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.124)	(0.115)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990	-0.063**	-0.058***	-0.014*	-0.018**	0.064***	0.058***	-0.011	-0.016
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.032)
City population (millions), 1990	-0.028	-0.031	0.017	0.012	0.042*	0.042	0.037	0.033
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.031)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990	-0.003	-0.003	0.003**	0.003**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995		0.149		-0.092		-0.138		-0.136
		(0.162)		(0.122)		(0.164)		(0.290)
National urban population (share of total), 1990		0.486		-0.450		0.449		0.656
		(1.018)		(0.705)		(0.809)		(1.279)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)		0.090		0.077		-0.137		-0.043
		(0.202)		(0.149)		(0.257)		(0.299)
Cohesion Index (0-1 scale), 1990		0.322		-0.523		-0.355		-0.343
		(0.889)		(0.427)		(0.502)		(0.770)
Inclusion growth (proportion), 1990-2015		-0.972		0.149		0.684		0.321
		(0.958)		(0.876)		(1.004)		(1.075)
Former USSR (N=0, Y=1)		2.080***		-1.090*		-1.097		-0.575
		(0.392)		(0.519)		0.628		(0.483)
Constant	4.818***	4.079**	2.757***	3.565***	1.858***	2.262*	1.735***	2.073
	(0.256)	(1.292)	(0.328)	(0.634)	(0.473)	(0.974)	(0.465)	(1.509)
R^2	0.457	0.588	0.125	0.201	0.363	0.403	0.017	0.039
Adjusted R^2	0.445	0.562	0.106	0.156	0.349	0.370	-0.004	-0.014

Number of observations in each model = 192
Figures in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by country.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

In the expanded model with many more controls (model 2), these results are very similar. None of the other control variables, other than the one denoting membership of the former USSR, are significantly correlated with the share of informal subdivisions. Cities in former Soviet states have a share of informal subdivisions eight times higher than cities elsewhere, all else equal.

None of the models using the other shares of residential growth as dependent variables (models 3-8) show the coefficient of clientelism to be significant. In other words, clientelism does not appear to be significantly associated either positively or negatively with any of the other kinds of urban residential growth, including atomistic settlements. This is consistent with the theoretical argument above, as these types of growth can occur in both clientelistic and non-clientelistic environments. Other models show that clientelism is also not statistically significantly correlated with the total share of informal growth, i.e. atomistic development plus informal subdivisions (see Appendix 3 for detailed results of these models).

The models also indicate the relationships between the control variables and the shares of different types of growth. GDP is significantly negatively correlated with the share of atomistic settlements and total informal growth, and significantly positively correlated with the share of formal subdivisions, as expected, but is not correlated with the share of housing projects. City population size is not consistently significantly correlated with any of the types of growth. The coefficient of city population density is only significant in the models for atomistic settlement, where an additional 10 people per hectare corresponds to an increase

in the share of atomistic settlements of 3% of its previous value. Cities in former Soviet states had a significantly lower share of atomistic settlements, all else equal.

The sensitivity tests suggest that the main results are robust to small changes in the models (see Appendix 3). For the informal subdivision models, the coefficient of clientelism is much larger (-0.357) when clientelism is the only independent variable, but once GDP is included as a control, the clientelism coefficient remains relatively stable, between -0.154 and -0.173 regardless of the addition of other controls, and is consistently significant. When the Clientelism Index value for 1990 is replaced with a 1985-1995 average, the coefficients for clientelism in models 1 and 2 change from -0.171 and -0.170 to -0.184 and -0.161 respectively but are still significant in both cases. When the full model with all controls (corresponding to model 2) is run with samples arbitrarily reduced by 20% each time as explained above, the coefficient of clientelism is slightly less stable, varying from -0.146 to -0.194, but is still consistently significant. This range of values suggests that if a country were one point less clientelistic on a 0-10 scale in (or around) 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by between 13.6% and 17.6% of its previous value.[29]

[29] There is moderate collinearity in the models. Most notably, there is a correlation of +0.60 between GDP and the Clientelism Index. A full correlation table is provided in Appendix 3.

Discussion

The results of the statistical analysis are generally consistent with the expectations established above. The evidence suggests that more clientelism is associated with a greater share of residential growth occurring in the form of informal subdivisions, but does not suggest that clientelism is associated with any other type of growth. As discussed earlier, these results do not reveal anything about causality. The mechanism behind the observed relationship may be any of the four possible mechanisms discussed above, or some combination of these or others. Most likely, different mechanisms or combinations of mechanisms may be relevant in different cities. However, as the results do not show a correlation between clientelism and either atomistic settlements or the total share of informal growth, they do not support the other mechanisms discussed, in which clientelism and informal growth are only indirectly linked via low state capacity or low GDP.

The fact that clientelism is significantly correlated with more informal subdivisions but not less of any of the other three categories that add up to 100% of residential growth suggests that the increase in informal subdivisions does not occur at the expense of any one other category in particular. In other words, it is not clear that the additional informal subdivisions that are associated with clientelism would have taken the form of a specific one of the other types of growth in a less clientelistic environment.

As stated above, the main models suggest that if a country were one point less clientelistic on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions

between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by approximately 16% of its previous value. The example of Lahore, Pakistan, serves as a useful illustration, as model 1 predicts the share of informal subdivisions for Lahore more accurately than for any other city (the model predicts 31.36%, very close to the observed share of 31.38%). Figure 14 depicts the shares of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 residential growth in Lahore that model 1 predicts for every value of the Clientelism Index for 1990. Pakistan's Clientelism Index in 1990 was 2.6 on a scale of 0 to 10. If it were one point worse in terms of clientelism, at 1.6 (between Nigeria and Nepal), holding all other variables constant, the predicted share of informal subdivisions would change from 31% to around 37%. This is equivalent to the effect of reducing Pakistan's 1990 GDP per capita from $3,057 to around $360, close to that of the poorest country in the sample (Mozambique). If it were one point better in terms of clientelism in 1990, at 3.6 (between Egypt and the Philippines), the share of informal subdivisions would reduce from 31% to 26%. This is equivalent to the effect of increasing Pakistan's 1990 GDP from $3,057 to around $5,760, close to that of Tunisia.



Figure 14: Observed share of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 growth and shares predicted at every level of clientelism (Lahore, Pakistan)
Source: Author's calculations

Figure 15 and Figure 16 provide the equivalent graphs for two other cities, Accra (Ghana) and Vienna (Austria), are in as further examples. Ghana is the subject of the case study presented in later chapters, and Vienna had a similar population size in 1990 as Accra but was in a much wealthier country (Ghana's 1990 GDP per capita in PPP terms was $1,919, while Austria's was $31,113). Accra's observed share of informal subdivisions is higher than the model predicts, while the model correctly predicts a share for Vienna as close to zero. The two graphs together demonstrate how the share of informal subdivisions is much more sensitive to changes in clientelism in poorer countries.



Figure 15: Observed share of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 growth and shares predicted at every level of clientelism (Accra, Ghana)
Source: Author's calculations



Figure 16: Observed share of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 growth and shares predicted at every level of clientelism (Vienna, Austria)
Source: Author's calculations

Limitations and precautions

Identification of informal settlements based on standardized, purely visual characteristics. While this study borrows the term 'informal subdivisions' from the data source, it does so with full acknowledgment that informality is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, one which varies widely between contexts. Many scholars would argue that informality is not simply a physical fact that can be recognized from satellite imagery, but rather a designation resulting from the perceptions and prejudices of authorities (Ghertner, 2015; A. Roy, 2012; Yiftachel, 2009). Settlements perceived as "informal" may or may not be illegal in their origins (Björkman, 2014b), and properties that are considered "formal" may violate as many regulations as those that appear "informal" (A. Roy, 2012). McFarlane and Waibel (2012) explain that informality is not simply a spatial category (the "slum"), but also an organizational form, characterized by spontaneity and tacit knowledge rather than explicit rules; a governmental tool which enables certain modes of intervention; and a "negotiability of value" shaped through shifting social relations. Satellite imagery alone reveals little about the political circumstances or intentions surrounding the growth of a settlement. Recent scholarship also argues against what it sees as a reductive and constrictive "formal-informal" duality, which implicitly "others" the informal (Acuto et al., 2019). By using "informal subdivisions" as a globally consistent category, as discerned from satellite imagery, this analysis risks further reinforcing this formal-informal duality, flattening the cross-context variation in modes of informality, and associating informality primarily with visual characteristics of the built environment. If so, it does this in service of the larger goal of

showing how these seemingly superficial characteristics are in fact linked to informal behavior on the part of powerful actors in the supposedly "formal" political system, and that despite local variations, there is some global regularity in the link between these phenomena.

Subjectivity in input data. Both of the key data sets used in the statistical analysis, namely the classification of types of spatial expansion using satellite imagery from the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* and the classification of national political environments from the V-Dem data set, rely on subjective assessments. While both projects go to considerable lengths to harmonize the classifications from different evaluators, there is still room for variation in perceptions.

Use of national-level data at the city level. In the absence of city-level data for clientelism and GDP, national-level data have to be used uniformly across all cities in a country, even though the levels of clientelism and wealth may vary between cities in a country. This is particularly problematic for the largest countries, which are the most represented in the *Atlas* sample of 200 cities: China (34 cities), India (17 cities), and the United States (14 cities). The statistical technique of clustering standard errors only addresses the impact that this has on statistical significance in the models and does not address the underlying accuracy concern.

Long time-period in Atlas data. For each city, classification of residential land use is available in the *Atlas* data for just two unbroken periods of growth: pre-1990 and 1990-2015. The latter period, the one relevant to this study, covers a quarter-century in which the income levels of many countries increased dramatically, and in which political environments are likely to have

gone through multiple phases. The effects of these changes on urban growth cannot be measured with these data.

Inability to infer causality. While this analysis observes a correlation between clientelism and the growth of informal subdivisions, it does not attempt to establish causality. While the models use values of clientelism for 1990 and urban growth for a subsequent period (1990-2015), this should not be taken to mean that clientelism necessarily 'caused' this growth, since hypothetically settlements in the pre-1990 areas of the city, which may be similar to post-1990 areas, may have led to the observed clientelism. In theory, regression models could use clientelism as the dependent variable and the types of growth as independent variables. However, the data currently available do not lend themselves to testing this direction of causality, because clientelism is only available at the national level and not the city level. It would be a stretch to claim that the presence of informal subdivisions in certain cities could determine the overall level of clientelism across an entire country.

Conclusions

While clientelism in informal settlements has been observed across regions of the world in individual studies, this study is the first to measure this relationship empirically across a large, globally representative sample of cities. Using new data, it finds evidence for a theoretically plausible relationship between clientelism and informal subdivisions, i.e. informal settlements that show evidence of prior organization.

This study only uses a fraction of the indicators that are now publicly available through the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* and V-Dem, as well as others such as the Global Human Settlements Urban Centre Database (Florczyk et al., 2019). Future research can build on this study and use these data to explore many other such relationships, complementing the already advanced qualitative literature through quantitative studies that are only now becoming possible.

These specific findings have a broader significance for our understanding of the relationship between politics, urban space, and informality. The analysis here supports the notion that informality is not associated only with poverty or a lack of planning and enforcement, but also with politics, and that powerful state actors are as implicated in the creation and perpetuation of informality as the urban poor.

The main finding of this analysis, that clientelism may affect something as fundamental to the core concerns of urban planning as the layout of a city's streets and parcels of land as it grows, reinforces the argument made previously, that planners must take clientelism seriously. It emphasizes the notion that for planners and policymakers to make positive contributions in informal settlements, they must understand the informal political dynamics that tend to accompany them and adapt their planning approach to account for them. For example, while clientelism may interfere with the ability to implement formal spatial plans, some degree of informal planning already appears to take place in clientelistic environments. This suggests that professionally trained planners might find it effective in certain cases to provide their expertise directly to informal settlers, or perhaps even to political patrons and their brokers. Planners may find it beneficial to become involved at the stage of initial formation of informal

subdivisions because their specific spatial pattern, that of straight, gridded streets and regularly sized parcels, could be conducive to upgrading of infrastructure in the future. Chapter 7 develops a version of this recommendation in the context of Ghana.

Abstract analysis at this global scale using standardized data is useful to establish broad regularities, but nonetheless leaves several questions unanswered. How do clientelism and informal growth interact 'on the ground' in a complex urban environment? How do the various other forces specific to a particular context affect this relationship? Where does professional planning fit into the picture? These questions are best explored by focusing on a specific case study, which the next chapters do.

Chapter 4: Urban Informality and Planning Failure in Ghana

Planning has failed to exert effective influence on the growth of human settlements in Ghana [...] The district assemblies undertake little forward planning and the few plans that are prepared are rarely implemented.

- Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom (2010, pp. 78, 80)

Unfortunately, the answer to the question of how spatial planning responds to the rapid urbanisation, increased land use competition, and national and international demand for sustainable development is, 'not very good'. [sic]

- Fuseini and Kemp (2015, p. 318)

[U]rban planning has failed to create liveable and functional cities in Ghana.

- Cobbinah and Darkwah (2017, p. 1229)

Introduction

An investigation into the interactions between clientelism, informality, and urban planning needs to be situated within a specific political, institutional, and cultural context, and therefore lends itself to a case study approach. Ideal countries in which to explore these issues are low- or lower-middle-income countries (as these are likelier to have informal settlements), which have cities in the *Atlas of Urban Expansion*'s sample of 200 cities used in

the preceding analysis, and which are not governed by authoritarian regimes (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). For the purposes of this study, the country also needed to be one in which English is a language of government (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020), to facilitate interviews with government officials and reference to government documents. Among the ten countries which meet these criteria,[30] Ghana is the only one which has one of the two median values (i.e. ranked fifth or sixth of ten) for both GDP per capita and the Clientelism Index, suggesting that it is reasonably representative of the group in relevant economic and political terms.

Ghana is among the more economically advanced and politically stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a middle-income country with one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. It has had peaceful, democratic transitions of political power for a quarter century, and is relatively free of violent crime, terrorism, and sustained armed conflict. For these reasons, Ghana might seem to have the ideal economic and political conditions for urban planning to serve its growing urban population, which now constitutes half the national population.

[30] Ghana, India, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Instead, practically all academic, governmental, nongovernmental, or news publications describe planning in Ghana as ineffective.[31] The experts interviewed for this case study concur, emphatically arguing that planning in Ghana has failed,[32] that plans are not implemented,[33] and that it is impossible for planners to "do any real planning."[34]

The extent to which urban growth in Ghana occurs informally, without regard to plans and regulations lends credence to this narrative of planning failure. Between 65 and 80% of construction across income categories in Greater Accra, the largest urban area in the country, did not comply with building permit regulations (Arku et al., 2016). In the country's second largest city, Kumasi, almost all new construction starts without a building permit, and only a small fraction of buildings successfully obtains permits at any stage (Owusu-Ansah & Braimah, 2013). Given that development control through land use and building permits is the means by which spatial plans are implemented, the fact that such permits are ignored supports the notion that planning has failed. Poor urban infrastructure and service provision is additional evidence of the weak state of planning. For example, in Accra, only half the population has access to an improved toilet facility (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014; World Bank, 2017b), and unreliable water supply requires three-quarters of the city's population to

---

[31] The one partial exception is Larbi, who concluded his 1996 assessment of planning in Accra by saying that, while it may be tempting to describe spatial planning in the city as a complete failure, some planned industrial and residential estates, mostly on state-controlled land, were well-planned and developed. Still, he noted that there had been "gross disregard of planning" on customary land, which made up 87% of land in the city(1996)

[32] Amoako, C. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

[33] Owusu-Donkor, P. 2019, personal communication, 8 July

[34] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

purchase drinking water from private providers (Gaisie et al., 2019). Most drainage infrastructure is uncovered and frequently clogged (World Bank, 2010), resulting in frequent and often fatal floods.

Why has planning in Ghana failed? Building on the arguments and findings from previous chapters, this case study demonstrates that the primary constraints to planning in Ghana are political in nature. Having established a general relationship between clientelism and informal urbanization both theoretically and empirically in previous chapters, this case study explores the texture of this relationship but also complicates it by placing it in a specific context. This case study also focuses on urban planning, the central concern of this study. It addresses how clientelism and other political pressures impact planning in Ghana and how planners respond. It begins in this chapter by presenting Ghana's planning "failure" in context and examining the widespread informality which provides evidence for it.

Urban Ghana

National context

The struggle of planning in Ghana to guide urban development effectively is all the more important to understand in light of the fact that, far from being a failed state, Ghana is in many ways a posterchild for postcolonial development. It was the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from European colonization, has experienced a quarter-century of robust multiparty democracy and peaceful transitions of power, and enjoys among the highest economic growth rates in the world. As an urbanizing middle-income democracy,

studies of urban politics in Ghana also have broad applicability to the countries across the Global South that fall in the same category, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and others.

Ghana is a West African country located on the prime meridian a few degrees north of the equator. It borders Burkina Faso to the North, Cote d'Ivoire to the West, Togo to the East, and the Gulf of Guinea to the South. Most of the country's 29 million inhabitants trace their heritage to groups which are believed to have migrated to the area within the last 600 years. They were in contact with, and influenced by, Islamic empires of northern Africa since the 14th century, and began trade with the Portuguese in the 15th century (Fage et al., 2019). In subsequent centuries, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Prussia colonized and exploited the country first for gold and then slaves. It was formally a British colony (the "Gold Coast") from 1901 until 1957, when it achieved independence. Kwame Nkrumah, a leader of the independence movement, served as the country's president during its first nine years of independence, before being deposed in a coup in 1966. Political instability marked the next several years. Jerry Rawlings, an air force officer, seized power in another coup in 1982, and presided over a decade-long military junta in the country. However, the Rawlings government led a transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s, enacting a new constitution in 1992. Since then, the country has successfully maintained stable electoral democracy. However, as this case study discusses in detail, democratic competition has at times created perverse incentives with respect to the delivery of long-term

public goods. A classification of regime types by the Economist Intelligence Unit now categorizes Ghana as a "flawed democracy" (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

Ghana's economy, based mostly on the export of gold, oil, cocoa, and other natural resources, has achieved strong growth in recent decades. This is true even in per capita terms, despite a more than four-fold increase in population since independence. In 2011, the World Bank reclassified Ghana from being a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country in GDP per capita terms, joining a group that includes Kenya, Nigeria, India, the Philippines, and others. In April 2019, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that Ghana would have the fastest growing economy in the world in 2019, with a GDP growth rate of 8.8% (Naidoo & Wallace, 2019).

Ghana is officially a secular country, although religion plays a prominent role in daily life in Ghana. An estimated 60% and 18% of Ghanaians practice Christianity and Islam respectively, with the remainder following traditional and other religious practices (Fage et al., 2019). The official state language is English. Ghanaians speak many ethnic languages, including Twi as a *lingua franca*, and others including Ewe and Ga.

Ghana is home to more than a hundred ethnic groups and subgroups (Stacey, 2019). The largest ethnic group is the Akan, which accounts for nearly half of the national population, and is subdivided into several subgroups (Nathan, 2019, p. 77). The Ashanti, an Akan subgroup, established an important kingdom in the 17th century with its capital at Kumasi, and the Ashanti king ('Asantehene') remains the most powerful figure in the Ashanti Region.

The indigenous people of Greater Accra are known as the Ga, although today the majority of Greater Accra's population is Akan (Andrews, 2017).

Since its democratic transition in 1992, Ghana has had two major political parties: the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The constitution created high barriers to entry for new political parties, and as a result the two main parties have dominated politics in recent decades and given Ghana one of the most well-institutionalized party systems in Africa (Nathan, 2019, p. 75). The two parties have fought close elections and have regularly exchanged power since the 1990s. The NDC was in power under presidents John Atta Mills and John Mahama between 2009 and 2017, after which the NPP came to power under president Nana Akufo-Addo.

Urbanization in Ghana

Ghana has experienced rapid urbanization, despite having an economy that relies mainly on agricultural and mining. Official sources estimate that around 55% of its population lives in urban areas as of 2017, having increased from 30% in 1975, based on a definition that counts all localities with over 5,000 inhabitants as "urban" (United Nations, 2018). According to one estimate, Ghana had 456 urban settlements with more than 5,000 people in 2010, though only 199 settlements had populations over 10,000, and only 27 had populations over 50,000 (Government of Ghana, 2015b). Alternatively, the European Commission's Global Human Settlements (GHS) database classifies 50% of Ghana's population as residing in 51 high-density "urban centers" with populations over 50,000, and an additional 28% as residing in

"urban clusters" (towns and suburbs) which satisfy lower size and density criteria. The corresponding values in 1975 were 21% in urban centers and 45% in urban clusters. In 2015, urban centers and clusters together only occupied less than 3% of the total land area of the country .[35]

The two largest urban areas in Ghana are Accra and Kumasi. Accra lies on the country's southern coast. Due to administrative fragmentation in Greater Accra (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), no one local government unit has boundaries coterminous with the urbanized area of Greater Accra. Official sources state that in 2010, 91% of the population of the Greater Accra Region was urban (i.e. in settlements of over 5,000 people), suggesting that the urban population of the region was around 3.6 million (Government of Ghana, 2017). The GHS database puts the population of the Accra urban center at 4.41 million as of 2015, having increased from 1.92 million in 1990. Using a different approach to defining urban areas, the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* arrives at a very similar population for Accra in 2015, 4.43 million, up from 1.31 in 1991.[36] According to the *Atlas*, the population of the Accra urban area grew at 4.0% per year between 2000 and 2014, which was a slightly lower growth rate than the average for Sub-Saharan African cities in the *Atlas* sample (4.6%) but higher than the average of all cities in its global sample of 200 cities with populations over 100,000 (2.8%).

---

[35] https://ghsl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/gate.php?waw=708010138021
[36] http://atlasofurbanexpansion.org/cities/view/Accra

Figure 17 shows the expansion of Greater Accra's urban footprint since the beginning of the 20th century.



Figure 17: Spatial expansion of Accra, 1903-2014
Source: *Atlas of Urban Expansion*

The relatively low population density within Accra's urban extents—51 people per hectare in 2014, lower than both the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (79) and the world (67) in the *Atlas* sample—reflects the fact that residential development in Accra primarily takes the form of single-story housing. The GHS database puts the population density of the Accra urban center higher, at 89 people per hectare.

The Greater Accra Region is the least poor region in the country, with a poverty headcount ratio of 6.6% in 2015, while the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), defined by its boundaries as of that year, had a poverty headcount ratio of 2.6% (Ghana Statistical Service,

2015a). Using a measure based on education, English literacy, and formal-sector employment, Nathan estimates that the share of Greater Accra's middle class has grown from 7% in 1993 to nearly 25% in 2014 (2019, p. 49). Access to health facilities in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area is relatively high (77%). Access to electricity is even higher (93%) (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014), although residents of informal settlements are often unable to acquire electrical connections formally and therefore have to pay bribes and high prices to middlemen to access it informally (Birch & Mensah, 2020). Only 50% have adequate access to an improved toilet facility, and only 30% of households have a toilet at home (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014; World Bank, 2017b). Thirty percent of AMA residents rely on public toilets, but this proportion varies across the city, increasing to 60% of households in the Ashiedu Keteke sub-metro, which includes the indigenous settlement of Ga Mashie (World Bank, 2010). While somewhere between half and three-quarters of Greater Accra has access to piped water (Bartels, 2016; Gaisie et al., 2019), the supply is intermittent, requiring households to rely on water delivery from private tanker trucks to fill the gap (Bartels, 2016). Less than a quarter of Accra's population uses piped water for drinking due to fears about contamination, with the rest buying drinking water packaged in bottles or sachets (Gaisie et al., 2019). The majority of neighborhoods have municipal drainage infrastructure, but most drains are uncovered (World Bank, 2010). Waste management is also a major challenge for Accra. Poor waste management results in solid waste clogging drains. This contributes to flooding, which frequently causes loss of life and property and spreads water-borne diseases (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2019).

Kumasi, Ghana's second-largest urban area, lies approximately 125 miles (200 kilometers) inland in south-central Ghana. A 2013 plan for Kumasi (Japan International Cooperation Agency et al., 2013) estimated the population of the "Greater Kumasi Conurbation" as 2.5 million in 2010, with 2.0 million people residing within the boundaries of Kumasi itself. The GHS database estimates the population of the Kumasi urban center as nearly 3.0 million in 2015 (from just under 1.0 million in 1990), and its population density as 110 people per hectare. The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly has a poverty headcount ratio of 5.3% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015a). Kumasi's middle class has grown from just 3% of its population in 1993 to 20% in 2014 (Nathan, 2019, p. 49). While 80% of residents have access to piped water (Maoulidi, 2010), 40% of residents rely on public toilets, most of which were found by a 2015 study to be in poor condition (WSUP, 2016).

Analyses of urban resilience in Accra identify a number of hazards as potential threats, including flooding, disease outbreaks (particularly cholera), fires, earthquakes, building collapses, coastal erosion, and sea level rise (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2018; World Bank, 2017b). Ghana is projected to be among the West African countries most affected by climate change. Southern Ghana is expected to experience more extreme heat as a result of climate change, with some areas, including the Ashanti region of which Kumasi is the capital, experiencing drought. The impacts of climate change in Northern Ghana are also likely to hasten migration towards Accra and Kumasi (World Bank, 2018).

Local government in Ghana

Ghana had ten first-level administrative jurisdictions or 'regions' until 2019, when the government created six additional regions. Each region comprises local governments known as metropolitan, municipal, or district assemblies (generically, MMDAs) depending mainly on population size. Metropolitan assemblies, including Accra and Kumasi, have sub-metropolitan district councils which play a coordination and implementation role.

Ghana is a unitary republic, with an elected president as head of state, as well as members of Parliament (MPs) elected simultaneously. Chief executives, often referred to as 'mayors,' lead MMDAs. Chief executives are appointed by the president rather than being locally elected. In addition to the chief executive, local assemblies consist of locally elected members, MPs from the area (who cannot vote in the local assembly), and presidential appointees (up to a third of the total assembly membership). Locally elected assembly members are not allowed to affiliate with political parties (Local Governance Act, 2016), but even senior government officials acknowledge that the non-partisan nature of assembly members is a pretense and that the party affiliations of assembly candidates are well known to voters (Amoah, 2018; Obeng-Odoom, 2013). The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) comprises the metropolitan chief executive, 76 elected assembly members (one from each of the 76 electoral areas), 40 appointed members, and 13 MPs from the AMA area (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018). The chief executive of an MMDA chairs an Executive Committee, which also includes the chairpersons of various sub-committees (Development Planning, Social Services, Works, Justice and Security, Finance and Administration, and any

others necessary), and two other members elected by the assembly members (Local Governance Act, 2016).

Figure 18 shows the structure of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, in which 16 departments report to the Metropolitan Coordinating Director (MCD), and ultimately to the metropolitan chief executive (MCE). The Metropolitan Planning Coordinating Unit (MPCU) coordinates the work of the assembly and prepares a Medium Term Development Plan covering 4-5 years. The AMA also has 14 sub-committees (Social Services, Finance & Administration, Development Planning, Revenue Mobilization, Justice & Security, Education, Works, Environmental Management, Youth & Sports, Culture & Trade and Industry, Disaster Management, Food & Agriculture, Health, and Women & Children) (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018).



Figure 18: Organization of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly
Source: Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018

The Government of Ghana has recently created or updated several laws and policies related to local governance and urban development. Relevant national urban policy documents released in recent years include the *National Urban Policy Action Plan* (Government of Ghana, 2012), *National Housing Policy* (Government of Ghana, 2015a), and *National Spatial Development Framework* (Government of Ghana, 2015b). The government enacted the *Local Governance Act* of 2016:

> *…to provide for local governance in accordance with the Constitution; to establish a Local Government Service; to provide for the establishment and administration of the District Assemblies Common Fund; to provide for a National Development Planning System; to define and regulate planning procedures of District Assemblies; to co-ordinate, facilitate, monitor and supervise internal audit activities within District Assemblies and for related matters* (Local Governance Act, 2016).

Another act, the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act* of 2016, is intended:

> *…to revise and consolidate the laws on land use and spatial planning, provide for sustainable development of land and human settlements through a decentralised planning system, ensure judicious use of land in order to improve quality of life, promote health and safety in respect of human settlements and to regulate national, regional, district and local spatial planning, and generally to provide for spatial aspects of socio-economic development and for related matters* (Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016).

Planning in Ghana

An important feature of planning in Ghana is the distinction between "development planning" and 'physical planning' (also referred to as 'spatial planning'). Development planning in this context refers to the identification and coordination of planned projects of the MMDA's departments, and their alignment with the national government's strategic economic, social, and other goals, in consultation with the public. An MMDA's Planning Coordinating Unit, of which the chair is the chief executive and the secretary is the director of development planning, is responsible for development planning. Representatives of other departments, including Physical Planning, are also members of the Planning Coordinating Unit. The unit prepares a Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) covering 4-5 years. The 2018-2021 MTDP for the AMA runs over 900 pages, with detailed lists of intended projects from each department for each year within the planning period (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018).

Given this study's interest in the relationship between politics and spatial growth, it focuses on "physical" planning. While development planning has a broad remit, physical planning pertains specifically to the preparation of spatial plans and zoning regulations and the issuance of development and building permits. MMDAs have a Spatial Planning Committee, chaired by the chief executive, with the director of physical planning as secretary, and with membership including representatives of the Departments of Works, Roads, and Disaster Prevention, the Lands Commission and the district's traditional council (Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016).

Appendix 2 provides a detailed history of planning in Ghana (primarily Accra) prior to the current democratic era, which began in the 1990s. Regulatory and institutional reforms enacted in 1994 put in place the "development planning system," an ethos which Acheampong (2019) criticizes for its "aspatial" quality. Development planning dominated until the Land Use Planning and Management Project, funded by the Government of Ghana and the Nordic Development Fund and implemented between 2007 and 2010, revived spatial planning as a parallel system. These reforms resulted in the enactment of the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act* in 2016, which replaced the previous town planning regulations which dated back to the 1940s. The new act renamed the Town and Country Planning Department the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA), and streamlined the planning process by instituting National, Regional, and Local Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs). SDFs form the basis for Structure Plans, which address zoning, and Local Plans, which are detailed subdivision plans (Acheampong, 2019).

The 2016 act also promoted the decentralization of physical planning to MMDAs, so that LUSPA at the national and regional levels are under the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology, and Innovation, but under the Ministry of Local Government at the local level.[37] Accordingly, in 2019, 790 officers from the national Civil Service under LUSPA were transferred to the Local Government Service under the Department of Parks and Gardens, as a step towards greater administrative decentralization. This included 110 professional

[37] Arkhurst, B. 2019, personal communication, 28 June

planners, 430 technical officers, and 103 auxiliary staff, to be deployed across regions and MMDAs throughout Ghana (Duho, 2019).

Political appointees like chief executives do not officially control the appointment of technocrats, either before or since this decentralization measure. However, politicians occasionally use their influence to have planners or other government officers transferred from cities to remote areas if they perceive these officers to be uncooperative, aligned with the opposition, or too powerful. As discussed further in Chapter 6, planners worry that the decentralization of planners to local governments makes them more vulnerable to being transferred by chief executives.

Private consultants, overseen by LUSPA, prepare spatial development frameworks throughout Ghana, often with donor funding.[38] A 1991 plan remains the latest MMDA-level spatial plan for AMA, though physical planners at AMA have updated Local Plans since then and are now preparing to update the overall AMA plan in accordance with the new regulations.[39] A regional spatial development framework for the Greater Accra Region was released in 2017 (Government of Ghana, 2017). Also in 2017, president Akufo-Addo initiated the large 'Marine Drive' project, which is poised to transform 241 acres (around 1 sq. km.) of Accra's city center and waterfront with new tourist attractions, residential and commercial developments, and government buildings. The Ministry of Tourism, Arts and

---

[38] Owusu-Donkor, P. 2019, personal communication, 8 July
[39] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July

Culture leads the project, which President Nkrumah had first envisioned around the time of Independence. The designer is Ghanaian-British architect David Adjaye (Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture & Adjaye Associates, 2017). In 2018, the national government announced that it intended to hire Liu Thai Ker, known as the "master planner" of Singapore in the 1970s and '80s (Leyl, 2015), to help "transform Accra into a modern city" after Ker met with the Ministry of Finance and investors (Graphic Online, 2018), though it is unclear if this has happened.

Planning has been less active in Kumasi. A 1962 land use plan for Kumasi, which led to the construction of a ring road, remained the latest land use plan until 2013, when the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) prepared the *Comprehensive Urban Development Plan for Greater Kumasi*. This plan also included a spatial development framework for the Ashanti region (Japan International Cooperation Agency et al., 2013). Four years later, in 2017, another spatial development framework was prepared for the region, this time with World Bank funds.

Urban land in Ghana

The Ghanaian constitution considers 80 percent of land in Ghana, including roughly that proportion in both Accra and Kumasi, to be customary land. Customary land may be 'stool land' (or 'skin land' in the North), which is customary land controlled by chiefs, or 'family land', which is allocated by chiefs to family heads. According to the Ghanaian constitution, traditional authorities hold the land 'in trust' for their communities, though as Chapter 6

discusses, chiefs often treat it as their private wealth. Technically, private entities may lease land for 50 or 99 years from customary owners, but as these arrangements involve high upfront payments and only nominal recurring rents, they are more like sales than leases.[40] The World Bank's Land Administration Project helped establish Customary Land Secretariats throughout the country to formally document customary land holdings, though many have closed due to lack of funds or have strayed from their original purpose to become land brokers for chiefs (Andrews, 2017).

Disputes over family land are common. These disputes may be between different branches of a family, or between different buyers who have bought the same piece of land as a result of fraudulent duplicate sales. Notices put up throughout urban Ghana, like those in Figure 19, are evidence of these disputes over family land. Research in peri-urban Accra (Bartels et al., 2018) finds that in order to combat these fraudulent duplicate sales, land buyers might:

> *(i) put up signs indicating that the land is already taken [...], (ii) plant crops on the building land acquired, (iii) hire land guards to guard their plot of land, (iv) hire caretakers that live in incomplete houses and thus watch the land and the house that is under construction (v) buy the same plot of land several times but from different actors, and by this means make the acquisition legitimate for all parties claiming control over the land in question and/or (vi) go to court.*

[40] Dadson, J.E. 2019, personal communication, 1 July

Figure 19: Signs in Greater Accra indicating land disputes and fraudulent land sales
Source: photographs by the author

Some liken land in Accra to cocaine, presumably alluding not just to its high price and desirability, but also to the violence that accompanies its possession and trade.[41] As mentioned

[41] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June

above, the disputes over land parcels around Accra have prompted many landowners to hire gangs of armed 'land guards' to patrol their properties and keep off prospective encroachers, buyers and sellers, private surveyors, and even government officials. Land guards use violence, even fatal violence, against anyone entering a property, though they may be persuaded to leave through payment (Andrews, 2017). Land guards are particularly prevalent on the fringes of Greater Accra, where there is still undeveloped land.[42] Customary authorities, families involved in land disputes, and property developers are the most frequent employers of land guards. However, public institutions have also resorted to land guards to remove unauthorized structures on their land, while residents of informal settlements in turn hire land guards to keep authorities away.[43] Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this privatized violence for planners, who themselves have been violently attacked or threatened by land guards in the course of their work.

Twenty percent of land in Ghana is state land. The government may acquire land from customary owners for public purposes for a compensation (i.e. through eminent domain). For example, the government recently acquired a parcel of land for an industrial estate near Tema, in the eastern part of Greater Accra, to be built by a Chinese company.[44] As discussed in Chapter 6, the land acquired is not always used for the intended purposes and may even eventually be sold to private interests (Boamah & Amoako, 2019).

---

[42] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 16 July
[43] Dadson, J.E. 2019, personal communication, 1 July
[44] Ibid.

The Lands Commission is responsible for the management of public land and the regulation of land titles, and also provides advice to government and traditional authorities on land management. It deals only with land ownership, not land use, which is monitored by local governments.[45] The Lands Commission has divisions responsible for surveying and mapping, land valuation, and the management of private, state, and stool land (Andrews, 2017). While the Lands Commission has an arbitration wing, it is largely inactive, and the Commission's involvement in dispute resolution is largely limited to providing property records to the police's property fraud unit or to courts. A Lands Commission official interviewed for this study estimated that 80% of development in Ghana occurs without land title.[46]

Urban informality in Ghana

The primary evidence for the failure of planning to regulate and direct urbanization in Ghana is widespread informality, which dominates urban Ghana in the 21st century. The informal sector in urban Ghana includes informal settlements and informal economic activity, including informal retail, informal transportation services, and informal waste collection. Various entities have defined and understood Ghanaian 'informality' in various ways depending on the context (see Appendix 1). However, 'informality' in Ghana generally refers to activities that violate some regulation, but where regulations are unenforced or enforced irregularly.

---

[45] Dadson, J.E. 2019, personal communication, 1 July
[46] Ibid.

The informal urban economy

Scholars typically ascribe the growth of the informal sector of the economy in Ghana to the decline in state employment and the rise in urbanization that followed structural adjustment (Adom, 2016; Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011; Paller, 2014b; Stacey & Lund, 2016). Even the World Bank now blames the growth of the informal sector in Ghana on the collapse of industrial establishments that occurred as a result of structural adjustment and globalization (World Bank, 2015, p. 13). Statistics on formal employment in the 1980s and 1990s support this narrative. The World Bank and IMF initiated structural adjustment in Ghana under their 'Economic Recovery Program' in 1983.Consequently, between 1985 and 1991, formal sector employment contracted by an average of nearly 4% each year. Between 1987 and 2000, the state sold over 300 enterprises, and 70,000 formal sector employees lost their jobs. Some returned to the formal sector at much lower salary levels, while many others entered the informal economy (Obeng-Odoom, 2013).

Employment in urban Ghana is now primarily informal, with 74% of the working population in Accra (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2018) and 70% of the population of Greater Kumasi (Japan International Cooperation Agency et al., 2013) employed in the private informal sector. Informal vendors operating out of makeshift structures or carts, or simply carrying goods in containers on their heads, are ubiquitous on

pedestrian pavements and in-between vehicles stopped at traffic lights.[47] The most popular mode of transport in Greater Accra is the 'tro-tro' or informal minivan, which captures 62% of the modal share (Government of Ghana, 2017).

Informal waste collectors collect a quarter of all waste (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018), and 80% of the recycling of metallic waste is done informally (Government of Ghana, 2017). Of the 280,000 metric tons of electronic waste (e-waste) that entered Ghana in 2009 alone, 99% was processed informally. The electronic waste processing hub of Agbogbloshie in Accra has achieved international notoriety following journalistic articles which describe it as the world's largest electronic waste dump and one of the most toxic places on earth, though scholars believe these claims to be dubious (Daum et al., 2017).

Informal settlements

In Ghanaian cities, settlements that may be described as 'slums' or 'informal settlements' due to high densities, lack of adherence to building standards, or lack of access to services and infrastructure may be one of at least three different types of settlements. They may be indigenous settlements, whose right to the land on which they are located is supported by both tradition and the Ghanaian constitution. For example, Ga Mashie in Accra, comprising James Town and Ussher Town, may appear to be a 'slum' by certain criteria, but the

[47] Items sold to drivers and passengers of vehicles stopped at traffic lights include: fresh or packaged food and drink, clothes and shoes, books, stationary, framed artwork, electronics, toys and games, exercise equipment, personal accessories, tools, cleaning equipment, bedding, and other items.

government considers it to be a legitimate settlement and in fact celebrates it as Accra's historic center, channeling development efforts towards its residents. A second category of low-income settlement occupies land acquired from local chiefs, and while these settlements too may have 'slum'-like features, they are considered legitimate by the state and customary authorities by virtue of the nature of their initial settlement. These include '*zongos*', communities settled mostly by Muslim migrants from the North on land acquired from local chiefs. For example, a migrant community purchased the land for the neighborhood of Nima in what is now central Accra from local chiefs in the early 1930s, and it remains a largely Muslim community. By contrast, the government considers low-income settlements like Old Fadama and Agbogbloshie, whose residents occupy state land without formal authorization, to be 'squatter settlements', and government agencies as well as indigenous Ga residents are often hostile to their existence (Paller, 2019a). (The history and current status of these settlements are discussed in the next chapter.)

For these reasons, estimates of the share of 'informal settlements' in Accra vary widely. According to the AMA, there are 29 informal settlement communities in Accra (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018). However, a survey by the nongovernmental organization People's Dialogue, an affiliate of Shack/Slum Dwellers International, lists *zongos* and squatter settlements but not indigenous settlements as informal settlements, and identifies 265 informal settlements in the AMA area. These include 116 "developing/infant" settlements, 73 that are "growing/ consolidating", and 76 that have "matured" (People's Dialogue et al., 2016).

According to the AMA's *Preliminary Resilience Assessment*, 58% of the city's residents live in informal housing. Other estimates find that informal settlements cover 40% of the Greater Accra region (World Bank, 2017b). The *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, which is based on a globally standardized analysis of satellite imagery and makes none of the locally-specific distinctions described above, produces different figures. It estimates that the share of new residential growth between 1990 and 2015 that occurred in the form of "atomistic settlements", i.e. informal settlements not laid out prior to occupation, was 48%, compared to the Sub-Saharan African and global averages of 43% and 31% respectively. The share of new residential growth during this period that occurred in the form of "informal subdivisions," i.e. informal settlements that show signs of prior spatial planning, was 47%, equal to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa but higher than the global average of 29%. This means that in total, informal settlements as defined and measured in the *Atlas* (atomistic settlements plus informal subdivisions) made up 95% of new residential growth in Accra, higher than not only the global average (60%) but also the Sub-Saharan African average (90%) in the *Atlas* sample (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016).

Informality is equally prevalent in Kumasi's urban fabric. A study of urban expansion around Kumasi found that almost all the home builders interviewed had started construction prior to obtaining a permit from the local government, with over a third never even attempting to obtain such a permit, and only a fifth having successfully obtained it, albeit after have already started construction without one (Owusu-Ansah & Braimah, 2013). However, the study found that every single household studied had obtained "allocation papers" from chiefs.

Another study based on interviews of residents in an informal settlement in Kumasi found a low level of awareness of building and zoning regulations (Adjei Mensah et al., 2013). It also found that 64% of respondents perceived land use laws to be irrelevant to them, 94% believed these laws too rigid for them to obey, and 99% and 98% respectively believed the process of acquiring building permits to be cumbersome and costly. In addition, 82%, 87%, and 88% respectively believed that the land use planning authorities could not stop them from building, demolish their structures, or punish them for building without a permit.

Government institutions and policies relevant to informality in Ghana

Given how widespread informality is in Ghana, practically every government agency's work relates in some way to informality, at least in theory. Although many of these profess support for the informal sector, government actions towards informal activity on the ground is often far from supportive.

National government agencies and informality

National government agencies whose work impacts the urban informal sector include the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, the Ministry of Works and Housing, and the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA) under the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, among others. There have been calls for a national ministry dedicated to supporting the informal sector (Gyesi, 2018), though there is none at present. A previous government (under the NDC party) created a National Committee on the Informal Economy (Gillespie,

2017), but it appears to have had a "mixed track record" (Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Job Creation, 2014) and to be inactive at present.

The NPP government which took office in 2017 created a new Ministry of Inner-City and Zongo Development (MICZD), with the president pledging US$50 million to the associated Zongo Development Fund (Brady & Hooper, 2019). Many perceive the MICZD as a politically motivated initiative to allow the NPP to build bridges with Ghana's Muslims, with which it has had a difficult relationship over many decades (Amorse, 2017; Brady & Hooper, 2019). The ministry has started to implement small projects in poor urban settlements, e.g. organizing waste collection drives and building sports facilities. Despite the ministry's work among the urban poor, it appears to avoid the use of term 'informal' (MICZD, 2018). Based on interviews conducted in early 2018, a year after the creation of the ministry, Brady and Hooper (2019) find that *zongo* communities felt left out of the planning of the ministry's activities, and also that there was a mismatch between the kinds of interventions *zongo* residents and the ministry had in mind.

In a national address in February 2019, the president announced plans for the MICZD and the Ministry of Works and Housing to redevelop the low-income, majority Muslim community of Nima, which he referred to as "Accra's first slum" (Nyabor, 2019). In May, the Minister of Works and Housing elaborated on these plans, explaining that part of the 1,039-acre (1.6-square mile/ 4.2-square kilometer) area of Nima and neighboring Maamobi would be redeveloped into a "glamorous" "world-class residential enclave" for sale, while some of the revenue from the new development would be used to resettle the existing

residents and build government offices on the remaining land, at no cost to the existing residents or the state (GhanaWeb, 2019d). A news report found that while Nima residents were in favor of redevelopment in principle, they were skeptical about whether the government would be able to get the community on board and implement the plans with no cost to the residents ("Nima Redevelopment Project," 2019).

National government policies and informality

At least four national policy documents released since 2012 acknowledge the need to recognize and support the informal sector. First, in 2012, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development released the *National Urban Policy* (Government of Ghana, 2012). It lists several actions related to the informal economy as part of its action plan. These include changing the official attitude towards informal enterprises "from neglect to recognition and policy support," which would be accomplished by initiating regular dialogue between municipal authorities and informal economy operators, registering informal enterprises, assessing the needs of specific informal groups, and resourcing the Department of Trade and Industry to be able to serve the informal sector. In order to "ensure that urban planning provides for the activities of the informal economy," it encourages planning legislation that protects and facilitates informal economic activity, local plans that incorporate the needs of the informal sector, and the relocation of informal traders to alternative sites that have competitive locations and ancillary facilities. To "build up and upgrade the operational capacities of the informal enterprises," it aims to provide training and the formation of

informal associations. It proposes improving funding support for the informal economy by establishing a special fund managed by an independent body.

Second, the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations established a *National Employment Policy* in 2014, taking a similarly positive attitude to the informal economy. The strategies it proposes to address informality include facilitating and supervising the transition from informal to formal economy; maintaining a national database on the informal economy; integrating informal enterprises into urban plans; assisting informal enterprises to grow and employ more people; and providing financial assistance (Government of Ghana, 2014).

Third, the *National Housing Policy* (Government of Ghana, 2015a) includes upgrading slums and preventing the occurrence of new ones among its main policy objectives. It proposes a National Housing Fund to support slum upgrading, among other things. It also proposes the formulation of a slum infrastructure improvement policy and the empowerment of slum dwellers to participate in decision-making, among other initiatives.

Fourth, the *National Spatial Development Framework* (Government of Ghana, 2015b) acknowledges the importance of the informal sector, but beyond discussing "neighbourhood regeneration or informal settlement upgrading projects" as possibilities for cities, does not specifically discuss how to address informality.

Regional policies and informality

The regional government of Greater Accra released its *Greater Accra Regional Spatial Development Framework* (Government of Ghana, 2017) in 2017, in keeping with the

requirements of the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act*. The regional spatial development framework discusses the need to "ensure that urban planning provides for the activities of the informal economy," and advocates allotting 500,000 cedis (around USD 100,000) for the national government and regional coordinating council to adopt an "informal sector plan" to help convert "informal localised business and micro-survivalist enterprises into formal, small and medium sized mainstream business enterprises."

Local government policies and informality

In its 2018-2021 Medium Term Development Plan (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018), the AMA discusses building capacity in the informal economy as an adopted strategy, though the only specific activity it lists against this strategy is for the Agriculture Department to "demonstrate to 200 market women soya weanimix, soya milk and soya kyebab preparation," with an associated budget of 2,190 cedis (USD 440).

One of the five "discovery areas" listed in the AMA's *Preliminary Resilience Assessment*, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation as part of its 100 Resilient Cities program, is "Recognizing, Embracing and Supporting the Informal Sector." It lists in-situ upgrading, integrating informal waste collection into formal systems, and the expansion of water infrastructure into informal settlements as example initiatives (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2018). The final version of this document, the *Accra Resilience Strategy* released in 2019, reiterated AMA's support for the informal sector, with one of three pillars

aiming to "Embrace Informality's Contributions to Resilience Building" (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2019).

The *Greater Kumasi Spatial Development Framework* recognizes the importance of the informal sector as a source of employment, but also emphasizes the need to modernize the informal sector by creating "linkages" with the formal sector, including research institutes (Japan International Cooperation Agency et al., 2013).

Little of the government rhetoric in policy documents about supporting the informal economy has translated into a change in the legal status of informal activities in cities. For example, vending on public property such as streets and pavements remains illegal, and local governments have ensured that it remains so. The 1993 *Local Government Act* allows cities to make their own by-laws relevant to local government functions, and the AMA has made several policies which target street vendors under the guise of "decongestion." These include a 1995 by-law which states that "no person shall offer for sale or sell any article in a street market other than the space of selling allocated to him by the AMA" (Resnick, 2019, p. 9), and another in 2009 which outlawed street trading and established a "Special Task Force" to evict street vendors (Crentsil & Owusu, 2018).

Government actions towards the informal sector

The discussion above demonstrates that Ghanaian government bodies have proposed a range of policies and initiatives to support the informal sector, including: recognizing the importance of the informal sector (Government of Ghana, 2012); supporting the

formalization of informal enterprises (Government of Ghana, 2014; World Bank, 2015); providing training to informal workers (Anyidoho, 2013; Government of Ghana, 2012); incorporating the needs of the informal sector into urban planning (Government of Ghana, 2012, 2014, 2017); upgrading informal settlements (Government of Ghana, 2015a, 2015b); involving informal workers in decision-making (Government of Ghana, 2012, 2014); and allocating special funds for these and other activities (Government of Ghana, 2012, 2015a).

However, these government documents are starkly at odds with the Ghanaian state's reputation for sporadic but brutal antagonism towards the informal sector in practice. One study describes the state's approach towards residents of informal settlements and informal workers as "aggressive, combative, and impulsive" (Obeng-Odoom, 2011).

Evictions and demolitions of informal settlements

Residents of many informal settlements are under constant threat of their homes being destroyed by the AMA, often with no compensation or resettlement. People's Dialogue estimates that 43 of the 265 settlements within the AMA's boundaries (as of 2016) face threats of eviction (People's Dialogue et al., 2016). In August 2018, not long after releasing the *Preliminary Resilience Assessment* that expressed its support for the informal sector, the AMA announced its intention to demolish a thousand structures along the railway line in Agbogbloshie. An AMA spokesperson stated, "We have given them ample time to ensure that they move their belongings and failure to do so we will be forced to eject them. They are not supposed to be there, and the assembly is not making any arrangement to relocate them to

any other place" (GhanaWeb, 2018b). Across Greater Accra, local governments routinely demolish unauthorized structures and settlements. Government workers usually carry out these demolitions with bulldozers, under the direction of planners and engineers, in the presence of armed police or army personnel, and allegedly without prior warning. For example, in the month of August 2019 alone, at least three local governments in Greater Accra, namely the Ablekuma North, Ablekuma West, and Ayawaso North municipal districts, carried out such demolitions (GhanaWeb, 2019h, 2019i, 2019j).

The AMA has repeatedly announced its intentions to demolish the Old Fadama settlement in Accra. The settlement has existed since the 1980s and includes among its 80,000 inhabitants people who were resettled there by the government itself in the 1990s. When the residents of Old Fadama took the AMA to court following an eviction notice in 2002, a high court judgment ruled that the AMA had no legal obligation to compensate or resettle the residents, and that evicting the "trespassers" from their "illegal occupations" did not in any way infringe on their human rights (Amnesty International, 2011). The settlement has also faced eviction threats in 2009 and 2012, and the AMA demolished part of the settlement in 2015, amid riots of protest (Oteng-Ababio & Grant, 2018). The next chapter presents further details about the history of Old Fadama and attempts at demolishing it.

In 2014, the AMA demolished Mensah Guinea, a waterfront settlement of 5,000 residents in central Accra, having given them three days' notice to clear out. While the AMA told residents that a cholera outbreak was the reason for the demolition, residents claim that there had been only 10 cases of cholera, and that the patients had been treated in hospital

(McTernan, 2014). In any case, some have pointed out that the appropriate response to an outbreak of a contagious disease would in fact have been to contain the patients rather than to disperse them.[48]

In many cases, however, demolitions are threatened but not carried out at all, or if they are, residents often return immediately. This is usually due to political pressure, often from party leadership, as discussed in the next chapter.

Harassment and violent removal of informal vendors

The AMA is notorious among street and market vendors for its aggressive 'decongestion exercises', in which AMA officials knock over, burn, or bulldoze stalls and confiscate merchandise (Anyidoho, 2013; Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Okoye, 2013). As mentioned above, the AMA has enacted various by-laws outlawing street vending, and the AMA invokes these laws in order to justify its actions (GhanaWeb, 2018a).

A 2019 study found that crackdowns on informal vendors has been constant in recent years, regardless of the party in power, with 32 crackdowns occurring between 2000 and 2016, of which half were in Accra (Resnick, 2019). In 2007, roadside structures used by vendors both for trade and as accommodation were demolished in preparation for the arrival of international visitors on the occasion of the fifty-year anniversary of Ghana's independence (Broadbent, 2012). In preparation for Barack Obama's 2009 visit to Accra, AMA officials set

---

[48] Owusu, G. 2018, personal communication, 19 July

fire to informal vendors' stalls along the US president's route, in order to clear them away to "beautify" the city (Obeng-Odoom, 2011). In 2011 and 2012, the AMA demolished kiosks and ordered the police to beat or arrest anyone who resisted (Amedzro, 2012). Gillespie (2017) recounts the story of a street trader who fell into a coma after being hit on the head with a paving stone when he resisted the confiscation of his wares by the AMA in 2011. The AMA and other local governments in Greater Accra have conducted decongestion exercises under the subsequent NPP administration as well, e.g. in January 2018 (GhanaWeb, 2018a), June 2019 (GhanaWeb, 2019f), and August 2019 (GhanaWeb, 2019g). Street vendors also accuse AMA officials of harassing them for bribes (Anyidoho, 2013; Obeng-Odoom, 2011). The violence is not only in one direction, however: vendors are known to throw stones at officials as they conduct decongestion exercises (Obeng-Odoom, 2011), and on occasion vendors have allegedly bitten officials or pushed them to the ground (Ghana Trade Union Congress, 2013).

Decongestion exercises are also common in Kumasi. There too, guards armed with whips and batons drive traders away from their locations. However, traders usually return after bribing the guards with cash, or sometimes even with sexual favors (Owusu-Sekyere et al., 2016).

Decongestion exercises are generally initiated and carried out by local governments under direction from the chief executive, with national government agencies neither taking part nor taking responsibility for them (Resnick, 2019). Still, national politicians are concerned about the electoral implications of these harsh crackdowns. As with the demolition of informal

settlements, national leaders in the ruling party often instruct local officials to halt the eviction of informal vendors, fearful that the actions would cost the party votes in the next election. For example, in 2005, the ruling NPP government instructed the AMA to stop evicting street vendors for fear of losing popularity (Bob-Milliar & Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Gillespie, 2017), and the NDC government did the same in 2009 (Bob-Milliar & Obeng-Odoom, 2011). Similarly, the local government of Kumasi rarely conducts decongestion exercises during election years, and if a mayor does attempt one, higher-ups within the party overturn it. An exception was 2008, an election year in which the city administration did conduct a decongestion exercise, and the incumbent party believes that it cost them the election (Owusu-Sekyere et al., 2016). Victims of these demolitions are quick to blame the ruling party and threaten electoral boycott, and in turn, political figures deny being behind the actions. For example, when demolitions were carried out in Ga West in August 2019, traders called for the president to discipline the chief executive or risk losing their votes in the 2020 general election. The chief executive claimed to not have known about the demolitions before they began. In an admission of how campaign cycles influence the timing of such demolitions, he told the press that he would never carry out a demolition while also running for MP in the area (GhanaWeb, 2019g).

Oteng-Ababio and Grant (2018) describe this disjuncture between progressive policy positions in government documents and actions including the threats, evictions, demolitions, and confiscations that characterize the government's day-to-day interaction with the poor as a form of "hypocrisy". They note the fact that the various stakeholders and collaborators

involved in policymaking, including political parties, national ministries, traditional authorities, international organizations, and private consultants, pull planners in several different directions. Planners also have to deal with resource constraints, ideological incoherence, and infrequent opportunities to engage with communities. The authors also suggest that this "hypocrisy" may not necessarily be bad, as the policy documents may act as a means of formulating and expressing planners' aspirations of the direction in which policy should go, even if they do not reflect present-day reality.

Other organizations and informality

A handful of nongovernmental and membership-based organizations have stepped in to help organize the informal sector and protect it from harassment from officials. These include community-based organizations, unions, and international organizations.

Community-based organizations

In response to an eviction notice in 2002, residents of Old Fadama sought the help of visiting leaders from the South African branch of Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), the global network of community-based organizations active in informal settlements. With SDI's help, the residents of Old Fadama organized themselves into People's Dialogue on Human Settlements, which helped create savings groups and facilitated negotiations between the residents and authorities. In 2004, People's Dialogue helped create the Old Fadama Development Association (OFADA), which performs tasks similar to that of local government (waste management, regulation of buildings, policing) while in other ways

mimicking practices usually associated with traditional authorities, like collecting discretionary contributions from residents (Stacey, 2019).

People's Dialogue has expanded beyond Old Fadama to form a national network, the Ghana Federation of the Urban Poor (GHAFUP). GHAFUP has worked with SDI on building public bathrooms and a hostel for the homeless, and with UN-Habitat on building a block of cooperative housing units (Gillespie, 2017). In 2016, People's Dialogue, Cities Alliance, and the AMA worked together on the mapping exercise mentioned earlier. The exercise mapped 265 slums across Greater Accra, recording numbers of residents, access to services, land tenure security, and other attributes (People's Dialogue et al., 2016). GHAFUP is also active in Kumasi, Ashaiman, and Takoradi.

Unions and associations

Informal street vendors in Ghana often belong to local associations, e.g. the Makola Market Traders Association, Oxford Street Vendors' Association, Circle Traders Association, etc. in Accra, which are intended to protect their right to space against harassment by authorities, and are organized under an umbrella organization called the Informal Hawkers and Vendors Association of Ghana (IHVAG) (Anyidoho, 2013; Okoye, 2013). These associations have approximately 6,000 members, two-thirds of whom are women (Anyidoho, 2013; Gillespie, 2017). IHVAG aims to share information on solutions to common problems and strategies to campaign for more rights for informal vendors. It trains leaders among informal vendors, particularly women, to negotiate with local authorities and speak to the public and the media,

and thereby build political power (Gillespie, 2017). A study of the informal sector (Adom, 2016) considered the Ghana Trade Union Congress, which created IHVAG, to be the organization that has worked most extensively on organizing informal workers.

Ghana's informal transportation system also consists of unions and associations. The Ghana Private Road Transport Union controls 90% of the tro-tro (informal minivan) market. The union controls terminals and the operators which serve them. It collects dues and regulates the market by controlling entry of new operators. Other organizations, namely the Progressive Transport Owners Association and the Ghana Co-operative Transport Association, play a similar role in the inter-city travel and shared taxi sector (Kumar & Barrett, 2008).

International organizations

Various international organizations have been active in urban upgrading projects in informal settlements in Ghana. For example, the Urban Environmental Sanitation Programme, funded by the French Development Agency (ADF), the Nordic Development Fund, and the World Bank, was active in five cities in Ghana including Accra and Kumasi in the 1990s and 2000s. Its work involved storm water management, urban sanitation, solid waste management, community infrastructure development, and institutional strengthening. The United Nations' Slum Upgrading Facility was active in Kumasi between 2005 and 2009 (Amoako & Cobbinah, 2011). The UN-Habitat Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme (PSUP) conducted collaborative planning exercises and paved alleys in James Town, and also

supported a community-driven housing project in Ashaiman. These projects have had mixed success. In the case of James Town, the AMA's failure to provide the counterpart funding to which it had committed delayed the project's progress (Stoquart & Majale, 2015). A study of slum upgrading projects in Kumasi, most of which involved international donor funding, noted challenges arising from inadequate involvement of residents, lack of coordination, political interference, and over-reliance on donor support (Amoako & Cobbinah, 2011).

In 2016, Dutch consultants working for UN-Habitat drafted a "planned city extension" to accommodate 1.5 million people for the district of Ningo-Prampram on the eastern periphery of Greater Accra, 50km away from the city center. This effort aimed to address "explosive unplanned urban sprawl in the Accra region, the need to accommodate flooding during peak rainfall, and the necessity to provide housing for all in Accra". Following a stakeholder consultation process, the district assembly approved the plan in July 2016 (Grant et al., 2019; UN-Habitat, 2016). However, implementation has apparently ceased since the member of Parliament driving the project lost his seat in the 2016 election.[49] Meanwhile, local residents have complained of people claiming to represent the UN-Habitat project trying to defraud landowners in Ningo-Prampram into selling their land (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2018).

Reports and studies by international organizations frequently address the informal sector. A World Bank study of urbanization in Ghana (2015) notes that informality causes lags in

[49] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

productivity and housing supply, and in response recommends formalizing the land market and reducing the barriers to registration of property. Another World Bank study, on urban resilience in Greater Accra, lists the "proliferation of informality" as one of the major stresses on resilience, and frequently notes the ways in which informality contributes to land disputes, disease outbreaks, floods, and fires (World Bank, 2017b). As of 2019, the World Bank was also preparing the Greater Accra Climate Resilient and Integrated Development Project, which plans to spend USD 200 million between 2019 and 2023 on activities mainly related to drainage and solid waste management. The project also aims to "increase access to services, infrastructure and housing in most vulnerable informal settlements within Greater Accra Region". One of the components of the project, for which USD 11 million is budgeted, involves "[s]trengthening capacity for planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation" including "support for climate smart urban development planning, facilitating access to climate risk information [...] and improving planning and coordination between the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies in Greater Accra, Ministries, Departments and Agencies and other relevant stakeholders" (World Bank, 2018).

International organizations have implemented various other initiatives that directly or indirectly relate to urban informality and planning, involving financial support in the form of loans or grants amounting to several hundred million US dollars. These include:

- the Land Administration Project which supported land registration and spatial planning (World Bank, USD 50 million, 2003-2018);
- the *Greater Accra Spatial Development Framework*, discussed further in a later section (World

Bank, USD 0.65 million, 2016-2017);

- the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area Sanitation and Water Project (World Bank, USD 150 million, 2013-2018);
- the Local Government Capacity Support Project, which aimed to improve urban infrastructure and services and municipal finance across 46 local governments in Ghana (World Bank, USD 175 million, 2011-2018);
- the Support for Decentralization Reforms (SfDR) Project, which addressed urban management, urban services, and capacity building (GIZ, EUR 21 million, 2003-2016); and
- the District Development Facility 2 project which provided performance-based grants to local governments to implement Medium Term Development Plans (multiple donors, USD 230 million, 2014-2018) (World Bank, 2017b, p. 41).

The international organization most actively working with informal vendors in Accra is Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). It has worked with street vendors in Accra since 2009 and with market vendors in five locations since 2013, with IHVAG as its primary affiliate. Its activities promote occupational health and safety and strengthen the vendor associations' ability to provide welfare to its members. WIEGO also trains vendors in understanding the workings of government, to help them engage and negotiate more effectively with the AMA and other municipal and national government bodies. In 2013, it conducted an in-depth study in which informal vendors and their needs were profiled through surveys and focus group discussions (Anyidoho, 2013).

One of the successes of WIEGO's engagement has been the abolition of fees for informal 'head porters' (*kayayei*) collected by the AMA Task Force. According to WIEGO, most of the fees collected never reached municipal coffers and were effectively 'harassment bribes'. With WIEGO's support, the porters actively lobbied for several years to a range of senior officials for their abolition. In the 2016 election, the NPP, then in the opposition, promised that the fees would be scrapped. An estimated 80% of head porters voted for the NPP, and when the party won and followed through on its promise, the head porters organized a public procession to thank the NPP. WIEGO believes that after this visible success, an opposition party would be very reluctant to reinstate the fee if it were to come to power.[50]

Conclusion

Despite a growing economy, a stable political environment, a supporting institutional and legislative framework, and significant infusions of development aid money, urban planning in Ghana has failed to influence urbanization effectively. Informality is widespread, characterizing every aspect of urban life in Ghana. A range of government policies proclaim support for those working and living in informality, but government actions towards the informal sector consist instead of neglect alternating with sporadic but harsh evictions and demolitions. International and community-based organizations are active in Ghana's cities and have improved conditions in certain areas, but have made little impact on informal

[50] Ansah, D. 2018, personal communication, 26 July.

growth, which continues. Why has planning in Ghana failed to make an impact, and what planning approaches might be more effective in this informal environment? The following chapters explore these questions in detail.

Chapter 5: The Impact of Clientelism on Planning in Ghana

The primary constraint to urban planning is Ghana is informal politics, particularly the competitive clientelism which pervades politics at all levels. Planning agencies in Ghanaian cities lack adequate funding and staff, as the first section of this chapter describes. However, as the subsequent sections discuss, politicians including mayors, MPs, and local assembly members, have a greater incentive to cultivate personalized relationships with urban communities through the selective enforcement of regulations and the granting of favors than to implement plans in an objective, coordinated, and impartial manner. As a result, politicians frequently put pressure on planners to support politically motivated decisions, undermining the effectiveness of planning and of local government in general. This suggests that simply providing more resources and building technical capacity without also adapting planning practice to this political environment would be ineffective.

Non-political constraints to planning in Ghana

Local governments in Ghana have planning departments which are enabled by legislation to plan for and regulate urban growth, but, as the previous chapter explained, their impact appears minimal. The moribund state of planning in Ghana is partly the result of insufficient human and financial capacity to perform effective planning, and unsuitable and unrealistic plans and regulations.

Low planning capacity

Undeniably, planning authorities in Ghana lack both human and financial capacity. Trained planners are in short supply in the country (Fuseini & Kemp, 2015; ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010). Ghana had only an estimated 150 accredited planners in 2011, which amounted to just 0.6 planners per 100,000 people. This compares poorly to the 12 accredited planners per 100,000 people in the United States, or the 38 planners per 100,000 in the United Kingdom. However, Ghana lacks planners even by African standards. A survey of a dozen African countries found that the average country had just under 1 planner per 100,000 people. Nigeria had 1.4 planners per 100,000 people, and South Africa had 3.3 (African Planning Association & UN-Habitat, 2014). Several planners interviewed for this study complained of lack of human resources. The planning director for the Ashanti region noted that there were only 20 qualified planners overseeing 43 local governments in the region, with some in charge of up to five MMDAs.[51]

Local governments in Ghana also lack financial capacity. The gap between the cost of the projects identified in Accra's Medium Term Development Plan for 2018-2021 and the funds that are expected to be available for these projects is astonishing. The total cost of the projects identified in the plan is over 4 billion Ghana cedis (USD 700 million). The expected revenue during this period, combining transfers from the national government, internally generated

[51] Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

funds, and donor funds, is less than 300 million cedis (USD 50 million), leaving a budgetary gap of 3.8 billion cedis (over USD 650 million) or 93% (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018). Even though this budgetary shortfall is mentioned only briefly in the plan, in a section buried over 300 pages into a 900-page document, it calls into question the seriousness of the entire development planning exercise and its identification of hundreds of future projects.

Physical planning functions are particularly underfunded (Arku et al., 2016). Practically all the local government planners interviewed for this study listed lack of financial resources as a major constraint in their work. Local governments in Ghana rely heavily on intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national government. Internally generated revenues make up only 12% of local government revenues in Ghana. According to an act passed in 1992 and not revised since, local governments have very limited borrowing capacity; they can only borrow up to 2000 cedis (USD 350 in 2019) (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 46).

The most important unconditional transfer to local governments is the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). However, the formula used to allocate the DACF prioritizes rural areas. In addition, the national government unilaterally deducts large portions of the DACF (e.g. between 66% and 72% each year in 2012, 2013, and 2014) for its own purposes (discussed further in the next chapter), and even the disbursement of the remaining funds is irregular (ICF Consulting Services, 2017). For example, DACF transfers for the second

quarter of 2018 reached the AMA only in mid-2019, one full year later, while local government offices, unable to pay electricity bills, literally failed to keep the lights on.[52]

Planning authorities receive only a small portion of these local government funds. For example, planning authorities in Tamale receive 15-20% of the budget requested from the local government (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010, p. 89). Due to lack of resources, planners sometimes have to use their personal computers and cars for official business.[53] Donors often fund the preparation of plans, but rarely fund their implementation.[54] Planning authorities do have the authority to raise some revenue through fees for permit applications and other activities, but most must deposit it in their city's general operating budget. The planning departments of Accra and Kumasi are the exception, as they can keep up to 15% of internally generated funds. However, this revenue-raising potential is inadequate: in 2009, the AMA's planning authority generated an amount equivalent to only 10% of its annual expenditure (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010).

While lack of financial capacity may initially seem like a politically neutral issue, later sections of this chapter demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. Clientelistic politics interferes with intergovernmental fiscal transfers, diverts resources, and gives political leaders little incentive to build planning capacity.

---

[52] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June
[53] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June
[54] Owusu-Donkor, P. 2019, personal communication, 8 July

Unsuitable planning practices

Physical planning in Ghana takes the form of rigid formal plans that do not suit the reality of informality and mixed land use in the country (Amedzro, 2012; Amoako, 2016; Arku et al., 2016; Cobbinah et al., 2017; Korah et al., 2017; Larbi, 1996). In part, this is because planning education in Ghana relies on obsolete and unsuitable ideas from British town and country planning, as promulgated during the colonial era (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010). Only in 2016 did the government replace planning regulations based on the *Town and Country Planning Ordinance* of 1945, modeled on British town planning law of the time, with the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act*.

The public has limited opportunities to participate meaningfully in planning decisions.[55] Public participation occurs only indirectly, through the inclusion of invited representatives of stakeholder groups to Spatial Planning Committee meetings (Acheampong, 2019, p. 159). The 2016 act aimed to address this shortcoming by requiring three rounds of consultation in the preparation of spatial development frameworks (SDFs) and local plans, accompanied by publication of plans in various venues. While many are optimistic about the ability of the 2016 act to encourage more bottom-up, participatory, and coordinated planning (Cobbinah & Darkwah, 2017; Fuseini & Kemp, 2015; ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Korah et al., 2017), others are skeptical that a change in legislation will be transformative (Boamah & Amoako,

[55] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Awal, M. 2018, personal communication, 17 August

2019, p. 11). In the preparation of the SDFs and local plans since the passage of the 2016 act, participation still occurs mostly through invited representation of stakeholder groups. Ransford Acheampong, a planning scholar who has also been involved in the preparation of these more recent plans as a consultant, observes that stakeholders tend to accept the alternatives promoted by planners without full comprehension (2019). The physical planning director of the AMA also does not believe that the new law has brought about much improvement in the situation.[56]

Physical planning authorities are responsible not just for preparing plans but also for enforcing development controls. Studies of non-compliance with building regulations in Ghana (Arku et al., 2016; Owusu-Ansah & Braimah, 2013; Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010) list administrative bureaucracy, poor management, and inefficiency (permits take 3 to 5 years to obtain); the high cost of construction permits (up to 5% of the land value); the perception of planning officials as being unhelpful and corrupt; restrictive, cumbersome, and outdated planning regulations; lack of enforcement, and other issues as reasons for non-compliance.

Clearly, lack of planning capacity and unsuitability of plans are real constraints. Whether overcoming these constraints would be sufficient for planning to be effective, and whether it is even possible to overcome them in Ghana's political environment, are fundamental questions to which this chapter will return.

---

[56] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

Competitive clientelism

Planning in Ghana is pulled in many directions by political forces of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial origin. Traditional authorities are precolonial in origin, though colonial regimes which ruled the country indirectly through these authorities, as well as the postcolonial constitution which recognizes the power of traditional authorities over most of the land in the country, have strengthened the power of traditional authorities. The British introduced formal town planning, and, as discussed above, their legacy has continued to influence planning since independence. The dominant force that has flourished in the postcolonial era, particularly since the democratic transition of the early 1990s, is the 'competitive clientelism' that characterizes modern Ghanaian democracy, although it too has roots in both traditional norms of customary leadership and patron-client relationships under British rule (Paller, 2019a).

Urban planners and policymakers aiming to adapt planning practice to the political realities of a country, particularly one dominated by informality, might find the concept of a country's 'political settlement' to be useful in characterizing the balance of powers in that country.[57] An increasing number of researchers of the Global South are applying the political settlements approach, first developed by institutional economist Mushtaq Khan (M. Khan, 1995, 2010), to issues around urban informality (Goodfellow, 2018), land governance (Kjær, 2017), and

[57] The word 'settlement' in 'political settlement' is used in the sense of agreement or arrangement, rather than inhabitation as in 'informal settlement'.

international development policy (Parks & Cole, 2010). A stable political settlement emerges when institutions correspond with the distribution of power in society. In 'advanced' capitalist states, the political settlement might be one in which formal institutions support the wealthy, who are the ones who hold power. In many developing countries, power is not based simply on financial capital, but also on traditional authority and patron-client relationships. Strictly formal, rule-based institutions do not easily support these forms of power, and so informal institutions, as well as informal adaptations of formal institutions, emerge. Though developing countries with clientelistic political settlements may have formal institutions like courts, laws, and property rights, these institutions function differently—in a more personalized, informal manner—than they would in 'advanced' countries (M. Khan, 2010). Crucially for planning reform, attempts to formalize these institutions to the point where they no longer support existing forms of power would cause instability, and are unlikely to proceed unhindered.

Ghana's political settlement is one of 'competitive clientelism' (D. Appiah & Abdulai, 2017; Awal & Paller, 2016; Booth & Therkildsen, 2012; ICF Consulting Services, 2017). When clientelistic countries have too many factions to be included in a ruling coalition, and no one faction is strong enough to permanently exclude the others through legal or military means, the compromise reached is that of 'competitive clientelism', in which power is shared through credible elections. This political settlement is more stable than a conflict situation and more inclusive than authoritarianism, but is typically characterized by low enforcement capacity and short time horizons (M. Khan, 2010).

Agents of competitive clientelism in Ghanaian cities

The general principles of clientelism described in Chapter 2 largely apply to the delivery of urban land and services in Ghanaian cities today as well. As in the global examples provided there, in Ghana too, political patrons provide neighborhood-scale benefits in the form of infrastructure, services, and informal property rights, in exchange for political support, in a manner that circumvents and undermines the formal planning system.

Many services that are demanded by urban voters in Ghana's informal settlements, including both private benefits like jobs and loans and club goods like water pipes and schools, are what political scientist Noah Nathan describes as "fundamentally targetable" (2019, p. 21). In a survey of voter preferences in Greater Accra, Nathan found that 64% of respondents demanded at least one club good. For example, 31% wanted sanitation, 27% wanted water supply, 27% wanted infrastructure, and 8% wanted educational facilities. This was higher than both the proportion of respondents who demanded at least one universalistic policy (55%) and the proportion that demanded at least one purely private good (53%) (Nathan, 2019, pp. 97–98). Local politicians meet at least some this demand for club goods, with Nathan's survey respondents recalling local politicians providing infrastructure like roads and street lights (48%); sanitation, including drainage (23%); educational facilities (8%); water pipes, tanks, and boreholes (6%); and health facilities (6%) (2019, p. 195). Nathan also finds that there is favoritism in the delivery of club goods, especially roads and schools (2019, p. 271).

Several figures act as political patrons in the Ghanaian context, including chief executives of MMDAs (i.e. mayors) who belong to the incumbent political party, and (incumbent or aspiring) members of Parliament and district assembly members.

Political parties

Both of Ghana's major political parties engage in competitive clientelism, narrowly targeting benefits to supporters in the interest of winning or maintaining their loyalty. Electoral outcomes probably depend at least as much on clientelism as on promises of broader policies and programs or on ethnic loyalties.

The NDC describes itself as more socialist while the NPP describes itself as center-right and pro-business, but analysis of their manifestos and policies has revealed them to be ideologically incoherent or inconsistent. Moreover, 70-80% of the content of their election manifestoes overlap, and focus largely on 'valence' issues, i.e. advocating for things which are indisputably desirable. In any case, surveys find that the manifestoes lack credibility among the public, suggesting that they are not meaningfully distinguished by their broad programmatic promises. While the parties are not ethnically defined, broad trends exist in the support for the parties among ethnic groups and their corresponding regions of origin. For example, the indigenous Ga of Accra, as well Northern migrants settled in Accra, have mostly supported the NDC, while the NPP has been more popular among the Ashanti of Kumasi (Nathan, 2019).

Chief executives

Appointed by the president, the metropolitan, municipal, or district chief executive (MMDCE, sometimes referred to as the mayor) is aligned with the political party that is in power at the national level. The chief executive, who chairs the Spatial Planning Committee, exerts heavy influence over planning decisions. Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom (2010, p. 87) explain that the chief executive is "the single most powerful political person in the district," and that "his views on planning issues can override professional planning decisions." New chief executives also routinely abandon incomplete projects initiated by their predecessors.[58]

The chief executive is seen as the local representative of the president and the ruling party, rather than as independently powerful, and as a result often faces political pressure from above, making him or her unaccountable to the local public (ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Paller, 2019a, p. 195; Yeebo, 2014). A former president of the Ghana Institute of Planners, when interviewed for this study, referred to chief executives as "toothless" and "powerless", "pawns" manipulated by national government officials and their political agendas.[59] A former mayor refers to the position as the president's "viceroy in the city."[60]

During its 2016 campaign, the NPP promised a change to a system whereby mayors would be locally elected rather than nominated by the president. On winning the election, the NPP

---

[58] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July; Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July
[59] Tackie, F. 2018, personal communication, 30 July
[60] Amarteifio, N.N. 2019, personal communication, 2 July

government took steps to implement this change. Lawmakers placed a bill for a constitutional amendment to this effect before Parliament in February 2019, following which the public was to vote on the matter in a referendum in December 2019 (GhanaWeb, 2019e). The referendum was to pass if 75% of votes cast were in favor of the change, and if the turnout was at least 40% of eligible voters. If passed, the first chief executive elections would have taken place in June 2021 (GhanaWeb, 2019b). The NDC opposed the change, perhaps calculating that a victory would boost the NPP's chances of re-election in the following year's general election. The president, apparently fearing the consequences for his re-election bid if the referendum were to fail,[61] abruptly canceled the referendum at the beginning of the month in which it was scheduled to take place (Citi Newsroom, 2019).

Many observers, including planners, were optimistic about the potential for this change to make mayors more accountable to the local electorate and allow them to take advice from planners,[62] as well as to make local governments more financially independent.[63] One interviewee believed that, since mayoral candidates would be allowed to affiliate with political parties (unlike locally elected assembly members), the collective strength of

---

[61] Paller, J. 2019, personal communication, 18 December; Amedzro, K.K. 2010, personal communication, 5 December.
[62] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July; Muquah, G. 2019, personal communication, 27 June; Bob-Milliar, G. 2019, personal communication, 8 July
[63] Tackie, F. 2018, personal communication, 30 July

opposition-party mayors would help create pressure on the incumbent party to deliver on promises, increasing accountability.[64]

Others cautioned against seeing this change as a magic bullet that would automatically make mayors more locally accountable. They expressed concern about the fiscal consequences of a local government electing a mayor from a different party than the president, given that local governments depend so heavily on fiscal transfers from the national government, which can withhold or delay these transfers.[65] An AMA planning officer pointed out that members of Parliament are already locally elected, and yet their behavior is not much different from appointed officials.[66] The next chapter speculates on the impacts a move to locally elected mayors might have on clientelism.

Unless the proposal to change the system is revived, the chief executive remains more of a conduit for patronage from his or her party rather than a self-interested patron. The exception is when an incumbent chief executive is also campaigning for an elected position in an upcoming election at the end of his or her tenure as chief executive. For example, a recent AMA chief executive campaigned, while in office, to become the member of Parliament for the Ablekuma South constituency in Accra. As a senior planner explained in an interview, "Eventually about sixty, seventy percent of the resources of AMA was [directed] towards

---

[64] Awal, M. 2018, personal communication, 17 August
[65] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July
[66] Tamakloe, E.M. 2018, personal communication, 23 July

Ablekuma South – construction of drains, roads, and everything. And eventually he won, so he is now an MP!"[67]

Members of Parliament and district assemblies

Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana can be even more powerful than chief executives, but only if they belong to the nationally incumbent party.[68] While MPs are nominally legislators, their power is felt mostly through their informal role as the *de facto* heads of the local branch of their party, through which they campaign on behalf of their party's presidential candidate and influence appointments and resource allocation in local government (Nathan, 2019, p. 76).

MPs also often have their own "development apparatus" in parallel to the local government structure.[69] They use the MP's share of the Common Fund to implement small infrastructure projects for their constituents, like the construction of roads. At times, they may consult with local government planners and engineers on the details of these projects. For example, one planner recounted the case of an MP who specified an amount he was willing to spend on roads from his share of the MP Common Fund but let planners and engineers select their

[67] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July
[68] Paller, J. 2019, personal communication, 10 June
[69] Awal, M. 2019, personal communication, 10 June

location.[70] However, MPs may also use their influence to allow people to violate planning regulations.[71]

Clientelism is an established and seemingly accepted part of Parliamentary elections in Ghana. A 2018 survey of 300 Parliamentary candidates found that 83% of them approved of the practice of rewarding loyal voters for their electoral support during a previous election (Westminster Foundation for Democracy & CDD-Ghana, 2018). Various kinds of public goods and services are provided through these personalized political channels. Illegal water connections have proliferated across the water network, "often with support from politically influential elements that treat free access to public resources as a legitimate part of the political patronage system designed to generate and maintain support factions" (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 118). In addition, the setting of water tariffs has become subject to political interference, with tariffs set far below levels necessary for operation and maintenance, and increases being blocked during election campaigns (ICF Consulting Services, 2017).

Patrons may be not only sitting MPs but also candidates. For example, during a campaign for member of Parliament in Odododiodio, the constituency in Accra that contains Old Fadama, Agbogbloshie, James Town, and other informal and indigenous settlements, a candidate provided not only private goods to households (jobs, school fees, loans, rice, clothes), but

---

[70] Amofa, L. 2019, personal communication, 18 June
[71] Bob-Milliar, G. 2019, personal communication, 8 July

also paved the alleyway in front of his family home and promised to do the same for the entire community if he was elected (Paller, 2019a, p. 164). Meanwhile, the incumbent campaigning for re-election boasted about having used the District Assembly Common Fund and other funds to build classroom blocks and computer labs in local schools and renovate local clinics (Adam, 2013).

Mohammad Awal of Accra's Center for Democratic Development (CDD), himself a resident of Nima, the large *zongo* mentioned in the previous chapter, explains that MPs and assembly members provided streetlights, sanitation, drainage, and paved roads in his community, often using their share of the DACF, and that they were able to monitor the voting behavior of households closely and target such benefits accordingly. He notes that the small margins of victory in recent elections in Accra has forced politicians to compete for support from these communities, but that this has not yet translated into the communities organizing to make sustained demands for long-term public goods.[72]

Even if MPs do support long-term plans, they are often dropped when a new MP is elected. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Dutch consultants working for UN-Habitat drafted a "planned city extension" for the district of Ningo-Prampram on the eastern periphery of Greater Accra, but although the district assembly approved the plan,

[72] Awal, M. 2018, personal communication, 17 August

implementation appears to have ceased once the MP driving the project lost his seat in the 2016 election.[73]

Local assembly members are less powerful than MPs, and are "fairly minor players in the grand scheme of Ghanaian politics" (Nathan, 2019, p. 248). Still, they can affect some local outcomes, partly through their use of the Electoral Area Fund set aside from the district budget, which they use for such private or club goods as streetlights and drainage. Paller (2019a, p. 140) recounts meeting an assembly member in Greater Accra who had purchased a stack of bulbs for streetlights with his own money, so that the Assembly could use them to replace streetlights that had gone out. Candidates for local assemblies do not campaign on policies at all, relying entirely on clientelism and constituency service (Nathan, 2019). Planners interviewed for this study explained that assembly members often oppose the demolition of buildings constructed in flood-prone areas, support construction without building permits (sometimes allegedly in exchange for bribes rather than just political support), and try to get planners to deny permits to applicants who do not support their party.

Notably, informal politics in Ghana does not consist simply of 'buying' votes in an impersonal, purely instrumental *quid pro quo* manner before elections. The public views local leaders in Ghana as personal benefactors and their constituents expect them to channel private

---

[73] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

and public goods to them. These figures include incumbent and aspiring MPs and assembly members, but they may also include community-level political brokers or "opinion leaders" who generate trust and popularity by solving problems, doing favors, and settling disputes for members of their communities for years before ever seeking elected office, and are an important component of the democratic process in Ghana (Paller, 2019a). Formal duties of elected officials in Ghana co-exist with informal expectations of them, which often are rooted in traditional notions of the leader as the head of family, with a moral responsibility to solve problems (Lindberg, 2010). Paller describes these multiple informal leadership roles as "friend, entrepreneur, parent, [and] preacher" (2014b). These informal expectations create a mechanism of accountability for members of Parliament and district assemblies which is more present on a day-to-day basis than elections are. As Awal and Paller (2016, p. 8) describe it: "Formal mechanisms of democratic accountability are seldom accessible for the poorest. But urban residents have found other ways to hold leaders to account that fit within informal networks and social norms."

<u>The impact of competitive clientelism on local government capacity</u>

The observation that political leaders in a competitive clientelistic setting have a disincentive to build long-term bureaucratic capacity in order to maintain their power (Levy, 2014) is borne out in Ghana. The detrimental effects of competitive clientelism on local governance in Ghana is the overarching theme of the study funded by UKAID and Cities Alliance, which argues that the "economic impact of this practice of competitive clientelism in Ghana has been far-reaching" and "has engendered institutions and practices that undermine meritocracy and

administrative decentralization" (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 11). Awal and Paller state that "'[c]ompetitive clientelism' and the associated power struggles that take place in the ranks of Ghana's political parties have negative consequences for urban governance" (2016, p. 3). Similarly, Appiah and Abdulai (2017, p. 1) argue that competitive clientelism in Ghana "is central to understanding the country's limited success in improving the effectiveness of public institutions." Even the AMA's Medium Term Development Plan 2018-2021 mentions "political interference" as one of three key problems that Accra's local government faces in the implementation of projects (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018, p. xvi).

Nathan (2019) argues that in the context of Greater Accra, clientelism and low-quality urban governance are mutually reinforcing, acting as a vicious circle or "trap." The state's inability to deliver universal urban services leads voters who prefer programmatic policies (primarily the urban middle class) to disengage from political participation in frustration, allowing politicians to ignore their preferences and focus on those voters who seek particularistic benefits, often along ethnic lines. This allows narrow interest groups to capture city governments, allocate limited state resources in an inefficient and unequal manner, and neglect investment in state capacity. This behavior reinforces the belief that politicians are unable to deliver urban programmatic policies, further causing disengagement from voters with programmatic preferences. In other words, clientelism not only undermines state capacity in urban Ghana but also removes the incentives to build state capacity.

Competitive clientelism also interferes with intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs) from national to local governments, on which local governments rely heavily, as noted above. The

UKAID and Cities Alliance study (ICF Consulting Services, 2017) describes how clientelism complicates the IGFTs in the form of another vicious cycle. During election campaigns, the national political parties promise to deliver, as "priority projects", the urban services that local governments have been unable to provide. Once in office, the winning party then takes money out of DACF funds to fulfill these promises, which undermines local decision-making and implementation. This makes it all the more difficult for local governments to provide these services, further increasing the need for national parties to step in in order to make up for the lack of local service delivery. The study found that in 2012 and 2013, between 65 and 75% of the DACF allocations were withheld by the national government and by MPs to fund their own priority projects. The report also describes how fiscal transfers are fought over by chief executives and MPs.

Several officials and experts interviewed noted that this politicization of fiscal transfers leads to the use of the DACF for projects that do not conform to the Medium Term Development Plan, especially in election years.[74] Municipalities sometimes give funds from the municipal budget as 'donations' to electorally important communities or chiefs during festivals.[75] The national government also has the incentive to withhold or delay the release of the MPs' share of the Common Fund to MPs who belong to other parties.[76]

---

[74] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Awal, M. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Oduro, R. 2018, personal communication, 8 August
[75] Amofa, L. 2019, personal communication, 18 June
[76] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July

Ghana's political settlement, that of competitive clientelism, requires some formal institutions (elections, political parties, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, etc.) as vehicles for patronage. It therefore props up these institutions, like a parasite that needs its host to remain alive. At the same time, because it could not operate in a fully formal environment, it also prevents formal institutions that would threaten competitive clientelism (impersonal, programmatic service delivery and implementation of formal plans) from flourishing. It is the co-existence of these "pro-formal" and "anti-formal" elements of urban informal politics, to use a classification proposed by Goodfellow, that sustains the current equilibrium in Ghana.[77]

The impact of competitive clientelism on planning

Politicians in Ghana routinely interfere in planning decisions for short-term electoral gain (Cobbinah & Darkwah, 2017; Frimpong, 2017). Clifford Amoako, a professor of planning at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in Kumasi, refers to this phenomenon as a "war against ethical planning" in Ghana.[78] Political interference in planning decisions can take many forms. Chief executives force planners to change the location of

[77] Goodfellow (2019) proposes a classification of political informality into four categories: pro-formal, anti-formal, para-formal, and a-formal. 'Pro-formal' informality includes practices that are outside formal rules but nonetheless support formal institutions, by increasing the likelihood that formal rules will be enforced or resolving ambiguities and conflicts in formal rules. 'Anti-formal' political informality involves "[p]olitical activities that deliberately challenge or weaken formal institutions" (6). He notes that the activities of politicians managing linkages with citizens under conditions of competitive clientelism are often 'anti-procedural', meaning that they subvert formal programs and processes, and as such are highly anti-formal. In populist environments, formality itself is often vilified, as political patrons position themselves as popular heroes 'protecting' certain groups from unpopular regulations.

[78] Amoako, C. personal communication, 9 July

planned facilities based on electoral calculations rather than need. As a planner in LUSPA's national headquarters explained:

> *I've had conversations with some [local] planners and they tell you that… when they want to site a school or a health facility, the district chief executive will say: "No, I do not want it here. I want it located here." So, in the end, where they site it becomes problematic. People are not able to access these facilities, and they become a waste of resources… [T]hey make the plans sometimes ineffective or useless to some extent…*
>
> *[Politicians make these changes to plans] based on where they think they will get their votes, or where most people voted for them. They will prefer to site those things there, even when those locations have an abundance of those facilities… [W]here they go against the plans that have been made, it's mainly for getting more votes…*[79]

The UKAID and Cities Alliance report recounts the example of a chief executive constructing a 40-seat toilet block without providing any water connection. This rendered the construction of the facilities useless but is nonetheless "fully consistent with the logic of competitive clientelism, which incentivizes political elites to focus on the provision of visible goods like infrastructure, without a consideration of what holds the greatest promise in improving the welfare of the wider citizenry" (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 129).

---

[79] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August

Nearly all the planners interviewed for this study readily related examples from their own careers of political pressure that they have faced to take actions which they believed to be detrimental to the public interest. These actions tended to involve rezoning or ignoring zoning violations in environmentally or culturally sensitive areas (e.g. waterways, forests, flood-prone areas, cemeteries) or on land reserved for public space (e.g. streets, playgrounds), in order to allow development of some kind. This development may be in the form of middle-class residential neighborhoods or commercial establishments, but it is particularly likely to be in the form of low-income settlements. In the words of a planner interviewed by Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom (2010, p. 87): "A nicely planned neighborhood does not vote but people who live in unapproved developments do."

While civil servants are not officially political appointees, politicians at the local level, with the help of their party colleagues at national ministries, can easily derail the careers of planners who do not cooperate with politically motivated decisions. The use of transfers of this sort as a tool for political control over bureaucrats is not unique to Ghana, being common in other developing democracies as well, e.g. India (Bussell, 2019; Iyer & Mani, 2012) and Indonesia (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). The ever-present threat of a transfer to an undesirable post acts as a mechanism by which politicians discipline planners. "It is very difficult for you to challenge [the chief executive], because if you are not careful, he will change your destiny," a

senior planner said in an interview. [80] To avoid getting transferred, planners have to "tread carefully" when working with chief executives, another planner explained.[81]

The threat of an undesirable transfer is sometimes made explicit, but it does not have to be. The frequency with which the possibility of such a transfer came up in interviews with planners suggests that it is a constant concern. Planners were quick to recall instances from their own careers or those of their colleagues in which a planner was transferred or threatened with a politically motivated transfer. One senior planner recalled an episode from her career in which she had refused to approve a commercial development, in which the chief executive had a personal interest, on land zoned as a playground. The chief executive complained to someone in the national government that he could not work with her, and she was transferred back to her previous job. Another planner mentioned the story of a municipal engineer being transferred to the Western region because he was "becoming too powerful."[82] Another mentioned that a chief executive who had fought with a municipal employee in another department was now threatening him with a transfer to the Northern region, and that the employee was considering resigning.[83] Yet another planner recalled that the previous chief executive of his district had threatened the former planning director with a transfer because he had resisted approving an application to rezone a portion of a cemetery for development.[84]

---

[80] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July
[81] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June
[82] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2019, personal communication, 12 June
[83] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June
[84] Owusu-Afriyie, A. 2019, personal communication, 25 June

Such a transfer may not be immediate, and when it comes, the planner is not officially given an explanation. Being branded among the ruling party as a supporter of the opposition or simply 'difficult to work with' or 'no good' damages a planner's professional reputation and has a detrimental effect on his or her career.[85] Not only do transfers to remote rural districts derail planners' careers, but they also cause disruption for their families.[86]

Whether or not the behavior of politicians here can be strictly classified as 'clientelism,' rather than 'corruption,' 'constituency service,' 'pork-barrel politics,' 'forbearance,' or other related behavior, depends on the extent to which they involve a contingent exchange of benefits for votes. Social and cultural norms in Ghana mentioned above, in which political leaders are expected to behave like traditional community leaders, channeling benefits to their communities, complicates the picture, as does the possible exchange of money between developers or chiefs and politicians. However, the fact that the demolition of informal settlements appears to occur along party lines suggests that clientelism does play a role. For example, in 2009, the AMA announced plans to demolish two informal settlements areas in Accra. Residents of the first settlement (Old Fadama), whose residents primarily supported the incumbent party, protested and threatened to defect to the opposition. In response, the president called off the demolition, saying, "[W]hen we are working to improve the

---

[85] Gariba, M. 2019, personal communication, June 17; Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

[86] Not all planners have antagonistic relationships with their chief executives or are powerless to enforce plans. One planner in the Greater Accra area who has support from his chief executive, and who also has some legal knowledge and a sympathetic local high court judge, has taken several developers to court for violating regulations, including 12 within one year (Owusu-Afriyie, A. 2019, personal communication, 25 June).

economy, it is not proper for us to treat our people in this manner." Residents of the other settlement, who tended to support the opposition party, also protested and called for the president to intervene, but the demolitions continued as planned (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010).

As noted above, low-income settlements in urban Ghana may be indigenous neighborhoods or migrant settlements built on land purchased from indigenous chiefs, which are seen as "legitimate," or they may be squatter settlements, which neither traditional nor state authorities consider legitimate. Clientelism may operate in any of these types of settlements, at least in theory.[87] Clientelistic provision of land through non-eviction is clearly more pertinent to squatter settlements, at least on a large scale. However, even in the other kinds of settlement, politicians may "provide" land by not enforcing zoning and building regulations or tolerating construction on public or unsafe land. Clientelism may be responsible for the provision of urban services and infrastructure in any of these types of settlements.

Clientelistic support of informal settlements – the case of Old Fadama

Government officials in Ghana readily acknowledge that politicians resist the strict enforcement of plans and tolerate informality among electorally important groups. When interviewed for this study, local planners and other government officials at all levels, e.g. a

[87] However, (Paller, 2019a) argues that politics in "purchased" settlements tend to develop along less narrowly targeted lines, and that these settlements see more provision of public goods through collective decision-making.

former mayor,[88] a senior advisor in the Ministry of Inner-City and Zongo Development,[89] and the Director of the Ga Mashie Development Agency,[90] all accepted that this is the case.

The events surrounding attempted demolitions of parts of Accra's Old Fadama informal settlement, mentioned earlier, illustrate the interplay between politics, planning, and informal settlements. Old Fadama occupies 31 hectares (77 acres) of land along the Odaw River and Korle Lagoon in central Accra (Housing the Masses, 2010) (Figure 20). It is adjacent to Agbogbloshie, another low-income settlement. Both areas have a mix of land uses, including residential (informal housing), commercial (vegetable markets), and industrial (waste processing).

---

[88] Amarteifio, N.N. 2019, personal communication, 2 July
[89] Ohene-Sarfoh, K. 2018, personal communication, 20 July
[90] Tagoe, G.N.T. 2018, personal communication, 14 August

Figure 20: Old Fadama in the context of central Accra
Source: Author, Google Earth

The Ga ethnic group considers the land and the lagoon sacred, part of their customary inheritance. The name 'Fadama' comes from a Hausa[91] word meaning "marshy, uninhabitable area." In the early 20th century, commercial interests planned to build first a railway station and then a harbor on the site, and in the 1950s, prior to Independence, the colonial government planned to build low-income housing at Agbogbloshie, but the Ga opposed both. The Nkrumah government earmarked the area for manufacturing and light industry in the early 1960s, and acquired the land from Ga chiefs in exchange for monetary compensation, relocating the few inhabitants to a location that was named "New Fadama." A 1970 plan determined the area to be too flood-prone for residential or industrial use, and designated the site for the construction of a retention pond and public recreation facilities, including a yacht club, sports stadium, botanical garden, and open-air theater (see Figure 21 and Figure 22). Nonetheless, the site remained largely vacant, apart from small settlements, fisheries, and a garbage dump (Grant, 2009; Paller, 2014a; Stacey, 2019).

[91] The Hausa language is spoken across several African countries. In Accra it is spoken mostly by Muslim migrants from Northern Ghana.

Figure 21: 1970 plan for the Korle Lagoon Recreational Area, Accra (photograph of original)
Source: photograph by author of plan produced by Town Planning Division

LEGEND

A. PUBLIC GARDEN SECTOR

1. CARE TAKER HOUSE WITH TOOLS ROOM AND STORE
2. STADIUM, RESTAURANT, CAFETRIA,CLUB ROOM OFFICES ETC.
3. BOATING AND YACTH-CLUB BOAT HIRING
4. BIRDS AVIARY
5. PUBLIC SWIMMING POOL WITH RESTAURANT AND TENNIS COURTS
6. PUBLIC TENNIS COURTS
7. BAMBOO BUSH HUT WITH CANTEEN
8. DANCE CIRCLE
9. CHILDREN PLAY GROUNDS + CAFE TERIA

B. GARDENS AND PLUBLIC GREEN SECTOR ALONE THE GREEN AND

10. GARDENS AND PLUBLIC GREEN
11. RAMADAN SQUARE AS THE HIGSION OF THE MOSQUE PRECINT
12. SMALL RESTAURENT
13. CHURCH
14. OPEN AIR CINEMA CATE TERIA
15. HOTEL RESTAURANT
16. BOTANICAL GARDEN SIGHT SEEING TERRACES, WALK THROUGH GREEN LEADING TO NODAL POING FOR RELAXATION
17. MOTEL AND RESTAURANT
18. PETROL STATION
19. SMALL SHOPING CENTRE
20. CAFETARIA
21. BUSH HUT
22. PADDLE BOAT HIRING
23. SEWERAGE PUMPING STATION D' WITH RESERVE FOR FUTURE EXTENSION

C SPORTS SECTOR

24. STADIUM WITH ATHLETIC OVAL, AND FOOTBALL PITCH
25. SPORTS HALL FOR INDOOR GAMES WITH RESTAURANT, CHANGING ROOM, CLUB ROOMS AND STORES
26. SECTOR FACES AND CARE TAKERS ROOM
27. FOOTBALL PITCH FOR TRAINING
28. BADMINTON COURTS
29. VOLLEY-BALL PITCH
30. CRICKET OVAL
31. TENNIS COURTS NETBALL
33. BASKETBALL PITCH
34. HOCKEY PITCH
35. BOATING AND YACHT
36. NIGHT CLUB
37. CHANGING ROOMS WITH TOILET AND SHOWERS

D. WALK WAY THROUGH GREEN FROM THE SITE OF JAMES TOWN

38. GBOTSUI ASHIFOR SHRINE

E. LAGOON

39. BOAT RACING TRACK

CARRIAGE WAYS

CAR PARKING

FOOT PATH

LAGOON EMBANKMENT AND SCARPS

TREES

LAWN

WATER MIRROR

KIOSKS

(a)

(b)

Figure 22: 1970 plan for the Korle Lagoon Recreational Area, Accra (reproduced legend (a) and map (b)) [92]

[92] Reproduced by AMA Town and Country Planning Department, 2016. https://www.scribd.com/document/393353413/Korle-Lagoon-Recreational. Accessed 6 December, 2019.

Figure 23: The Korle Lagoon area in 2018
Source: Author, Google Earth

Squatters started to settle on the site in the 1980s, building structures from wooden boards and cartons on woodchip floors (Paller, 2019a, p. 194, 2019c). In 1991, city authorities

drove street hawkers and traders away from other areas in the city in preparation for a conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, which resulted in them settling in Old Fadama (Stacey, 2018). When a fire in 1993 burned down Makola Market, the city's largest market, 'Makola Market 2' was built at Agbogbloshie to relieve pressure on the original, contributing to the growth of neighboring Old Fadama. Settlers who were displaced for the construction of the new market simply moved further into the site, creating new land by filling the swamp with sawdust.

It was the section built on this flood-prone land which was originally referred to as 'Sodom and Gomorrah.' Various stories regarding the exact origin of this name are in circulation. According to one account, a Ga leader gave this rear section of the settlement the name to distinguish it from the earlier-established sections that had been bought from the Ga, and the name was popularized when a radio reporter overheard it and used it on the air. Another account ascribes the name to an AMA spokesperson who stated that the people of the neighborhood would be destroyed like the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah in the Bible (Paller, 2019c). Yet another version of events states that a doctor who used to keep horses on the swamp warned the earliest settlers that the structures that they built there would be swept away like the biblical cities of those names (Yeebo, 2014). Whatever its origins, eventually the name was applied to all of Old Fadama. Today the name 'Sodom and Gomorrah' is used as widely as 'Old Fadama,' and has even made its way into official government documents (Paller, 2019c). The biblical connotations of the name, as a place of sin that deserves only to be destroyed, is not lost in a country where even tro-tros, taxis, and

small roadside businesses are adorned with biblical phrases. As Paller notes, "Over time, the name shaped the broader public opinion of the neighbourhood, and the perception of the residents as squatters did not change. The settlement was transformed from a temporary place of refuge into an evil problem that needed to be exterminated" (Paller, 2019c).

In 1994, an MP from Ghana's Northern region requested that the mayor of Accra at the time, Nat Nuno Amarteifio, allow migrants who were fleeing a violent conflict in the North to camp at Old Fadama for a month or two.[93] At the time, planners advised politicians against this, fearing that the settlement would become permanent and grow as more migrants came South to join their relatives who had settled there. As a former AMA planning director recalled:

> *The entire planning department advised them: "No, if we do that, there will be a multiplier effect because [once someone] has got the place, he will go and call the brother, the sister, the aunt, and the rest. 'Oh! There's a place here!' If we are not careful, within some small time the whole place will be inundated with squatters." They ignored it. They're politicians. They said, "No, we need to settle them right now. Go away." And then? They settled their people there, and they started multiplying, multiplying, multiplying… It has become a political issue now.*[94]

For years, settlers built structures in Old Fadama from temporary materials. This norm was instituted and monitored by community leaders and People's Dialogue (PD), which rose to

---

[93] Amarteifio, N.N. 2019, personal communication, 2 July
[94] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July

prominence in the area in the 2000s and established close ties to senior government officials (Paller, 2019a). The residents intended the use of temporary materials as a signal to authorities that they sought relocation and did not intend to settle there permanently. However, the outbreak of a fire in 2009 marked a turning point. Following the fire, PD and its affiliate OFADA (Old Fadama Development Association) began encouraging the use of concrete blocks for reconstruction, as well as enforcing informal building codes, widening streets, and taxing residents (Paller, 2019c).

By 2010, the settlement was home to 80,000 inhabitants, giving it a population density of more than 2,500 inhabitants per hectare (over 1,000 per acre). A 2010 survey found that two-thirds of residents were from the Northern region. Though these households had originally come to Accra from the North to escape conflict, they remained mainly for employment: a very high proportion, 96%, were employed in some way, and 91% said that their main reason for not returning to their hometowns was a lack of jobs. Many women worked as *kayayei* or head porters, often living in dormitory-style structures in rooms holding between eight and twenty women each. Only one in three children under the age of 18 was in school, and nearly half of the residents had had no education (Housing the Masses, 2010). Seven local strongmen controlled this land and maintained order in the settlement, and neighborhoods and public spaces within the settlement were named either after them or places back home in the North (Paller, 2019c). Some allege that the settlement is home to

criminal organizations involved in illegal trade of guns, human organs, and even babies for use in rituals.[95]

Old Fadama is stuck in a three-way stalemate, between the state, which owns the land on paper; the Ga leaders, who claim traditional rights to the land; and the settlers who occupy it. The state officially considers residents of Old Fadama to be illegal squatters on state land, as it had acquired the land from Ga authorities in the 1960s. Although in the early days of the settlement some Ga families informally 'sold' land to squatters (Paller, 2014a), Ga traditional authorities now also strongly oppose the existence of the settlement. However, the Ga also dispute the state's claim to the land, taking the position that the government acquisition is no longer valid, as it did not use the land to provide local development as promised (Stacey, 2019).

[95] Ayeh-Datey, S. 2019, personal communication, 2 July

Figure 24: A makeshift bridge to Old Fadama across a canal
Source: Yepoka Yeebo (2014)

Figure 25: The yam market at Old Fadama
Source: Yepoka Yeebo (2014)

Figure 26: Residences in Old Fadama
Source: Penny Wang [96]

[96] flic.kr/p/gaURaE. Creative Commons License - Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).

Figure 27: Residences in Old Fadama
Source: Penny Wang [97]

[97] flic.kr/p/gaTxhE. Creative Commons License - Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).

Figure 28: GHAFUP-led community toilet project in Old Fadama.
Source: SDI [98]

[98] flic.kr/p/bfgzaV. Creative Commons License - Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).

Figure 29: Evening in Old Fadama
Source: Yepoka Yeebo (2014)

Informal workers recycle electronic waste in Agbogbloshie, which involves burning hazardous materials in open fires, with little protection, if any. Studies have found toxins, including heavy metals and flame-retardant chemicals, in the blood of waste workers and nearby residents, and even in the breastmilk of mothers living in the area (Daum et al., 2017). The waste processing workers also suffer from burns, injuries, and respiratory illnesses (Acquah et al., 2019).

Figure 30: Informal waste workers burning electrical wires to recover copper in Agbogbloshie
Source: Muntaka Chasant [99]

[99] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Agbogbloshie,_Ghana_2019.jpg. Creative Commons License - Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International.

Figure 31: An informal waste worker burning plastic insulation off copper wiring in Agbogbloshie
Source: Jon Spaull (Spaull, 2015)

Figure 32: An informal waste worker pulls a cart full of empty PC cases to be broken down by recyclers in Agbogbloshie
Source: Adam Minter (Minter, 2016)

As mentioned in a previous section, over the years the AMA has threatened or carried out partial evictions and demolitions of structures at Old Fadama, regardless of which party has been in power. Yet the settlement has managed to survive, in large part because of its importance in elections. Old Fadama is particularly important from an electoral standpoint, not only because it is home to 80,000 residents, but also because political parties believe that the political views of these residents strongly influence the votes of their relatives in the North. As a former AMA official explained in an interview, "Each individual in Sodom and

Gomorrah represents a household at Sodom and Gomorrah and also has a link to the Northern part of this country… So no government, no politician takes that place for granted."[100] The constituency in which it lies, Odododiodio, has been important since the country's early years, with Kwame Nkrumah himself having represented it as an MP. Its residents boast: "If you win Odododiodio Constituency, you win Ghana" (Paller, 2019b). Moreover, Old Fadama is also a valuable source of labor for political party business, as it is home to a large population of underemployed youths (Paller, 2019a).

The events surrounding attempts at removing the settlement underscore how its political importance has helped it to remain in place, despite hostility from the AMA and the surrounding Ga population. The government served an eviction notice to the residents of Old Fadama in 2002, to make room for the Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project. The Centre for Public Interest Law fought this eviction notice in court but lost. However, by now the settlement had become electorally important, and with the launch of campaigns for the 2004 election, the government put aside its plans for demolition. Voters in Old Fadama were instrumental in the victory of the NDC candidate for MP in that election, providing some respite for its residents (Paller, 2019a).

Although Old Fadama was largely aligned with the NDC, the NDC chief executive appointed in 2008 had close ties to Ga leaders who were hostile to the existence of the settlement

---

[100] Ayeh-Datey, S. 2019, personal communication, 2 July

(Paller, 2019a). As mentioned previously, in 2009, the AMA again earmarked Old Fadama for demolition as part of an "urban renewal" program, but when the residents threatened to defect from the ruling NDC to the opposition NPP, the president quickly and publicly called for the demolition to be stopped. Meanwhile, demolitions in other areas perceived as NPP strongholds proceeded as planned (Yeboah & Obeng-Odoom, 2010, p. 88).

A fire in 2012 provided the opportunity for leaders from the NPP to consolidate their organizing machinery in the settlement by promising disaster relief to their supporters, with the aspiring NPP candidate for MP asking them to "coordinate within their groups and to write down what they needed" (Paller, 2019c, p. 450).

In June 2015, heavy rainfall in Accra caused a devastating flood which affected over 50,000 people in Accra. The flood also resulted in an explosion at a petrol station, which caused yet another fire, killing 150 people (Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, 2016; World Bank, 2017b). In response, the AMA chief executive called for the demolition of structures in Old Fadama that had allegedly caused the flooding by obstructing the flow of water in the lagoon. However, the AMA demolished more structures than they had initially announced (Bigg, 2015). Analysis of satellite imagery reveals that government bulldozers removed structures occupying approximately 13 hectares, making up over 40% of the settlement (see Figure 33 (a) and (b)). This suggests that the demolitions may have destroyed the houses of around 30,000 to 35,000 residents (a figure in line with the previously estimated "more than 25,000" (Paller, 2019a, p. 197)). The affected residents perceived the small sums of money given to them to "go back where they came from" as

insulting (Stacey, 2019). Rumors and conspiracy theories circulated that the demolitions were a pretext for the chief executive and his associates to confiscate and develop the prime land to enrich themselves[101], or that the president had awarded his brother the contract for dredging the lagoon and that Old Fadama was the easiest place to do it (Paller, 2019a). While these rumors have not been substantiated, it is the case that the chief executive was also campaigning for a Parliamentary seat in a nearby constituency at the time (which he subsequently won), and it is possible that he may have been attempting to boost his popularity with the Ga population of Accra by removing parts of Old Fadama.

Residents of Old Fadama rioted in protest of the demolitions[102], which again forced political leaders to take notice. Party leaders summoned the chief executive, accompanied by the director of physical planning at AMA at the time, to Parliament. The planning director displayed the 1970 plan as justification for the demolition.[103] Leaders of the incumbent NDC party admonished the chief executive for his actions, reminding him that the residents of the settlement were key NDC supporters. As the planning director recalled:

---

[101] Paller, J. W. 2018, personal communication, 18 June

[102] For news footage of the riots, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI20XObRybc (*Old Fadama Demolition—Today Big Story (22-6-15)*, 2015)

[103] The fact that the 1970 plan, though never implemented, retained the ability to determine what is and is not legal development and thereby justify demolitions even 45 years later echoes similar observations about plans and settlements in Delhi by Bhan (2013)

> *[T]hey asked our mayor a question: Where does he get his powers from? You see? They were from the same party. Doesn't he know that what he is doing is going to affect his source of power?*[104]

The demolition was called off. Most of the residents from the demolished structures have since returned and rebuilt their homes along the waterway (Figure 33 (c)). Still, observers believe that the attempted demolition hurt the NDC's performance in the 2016 election, which it lost.[105]

---

[104] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July
[105] Paller, J. W. 2018, personal communication, 18 June



(a) Old Fadama in late 2014

(b) The same area in late 2015, after the AMA undertook demolitions along the lagoon

(c) The same area in 2018, showing reconstruction in demolished areas

Figure 33: Satellite images of Old Fadama in 2014, 2015, and 2018, showing demolitions and reconstruction along the lagoon

Perhaps aiming to take advantage of the NDC's loosened grip over the residents of the settlement and with an eye towards the 2020 elections, the vice president of Ghana under the subsequent NPP administration made a high-profile visit to Old Fadama and Agbogbloshie in September 2019, accompanied by the Ministers of Inner-City and Zongo Development, the Interior, Defence, Water and Sanitation, and Local Government and Rural Development; the AMA chief executive; and other NPP leaders (Figure 34). The vice president acknowledged the mistrust between the residents and successive governments due to neglect and threats of eviction, and promised to improve living conditions in the area through the provision of amenities including "four eight-unit places of convenience, 20 four-unit bathrooms, street lights, water, a kindergarten, as well as laying of pavement blocks at the Agbogbloshie Market" (Nunoo, 2019). Two weeks later, the vice president met with traditional authorities and other community leaders from Old Fadama and Agbogbloshie at Jubilee House, the presidential palace. He announced via Twitter that the government had already provided streetlights throughout the community, and added a community center, a police station, and waste facilities to his list of promises to the residents. "Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama though slums, equally deserve to be served just like any other community in the country," the vice president wrote on Twitter (Bawumia, 2019).

Figure 34: Scenes from the visit of the vice president and other senior government officials to Old Fadama and Agbogbloshie in September 2019
Source: the vice president's Twitter account (@MBawumia)

The government's attitude towards electronic waste processing in Agbogbloshie also appears to be changing. In the past, AMA officials have stated that the informal waste processing activities "derange the progress of our development agenda" and are a "nuisance to the city['s] development" (Amuzu, 2018). However, in 2019, the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation and the German government launched a project that aims to transform Agbogbloshie into an "environmentally friendly scrap park" and includes the construction of a new scrapyard, a training center that teaches workers to process waste in a safe and environmentally friendly manner, a clinic, and a football field (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2019). The German government has committed EUR 25 million to fund the project in the form of a grant and technical assistance (German Embassy - Accra, n.d.).

The events of 2009 and 2015 and similar incidents in previous years have led many scholars (Frimpong, 2017; Gillespie, 2017; Oppong, 2016; Stacey & Lund, 2016; Yeebo, 2014) and interviewed experts[106] to believe that Old Fadama's electoral importance makes it practically invulnerable to removal. The former planning director of AMA described Old Fadama, with its 80,000 inhabitants flagrantly violating official plans, as an albatross around the necks of planners in Accra.[107] The mayor who was in power in the 1990s, who agreed to allow the Northern refugees to settle on the site at the time, said in an interview:

---

[106] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Tagoe, G.N.T. 2018, personal communication, 14 August; Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July; Yakubu, A.Y.H. 2018, personal communication, 16 July

[107] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July

> *The city makes noises about clearing them, but it's not possible to do so, for many reasons. And this is where we come to your thesis. They are now a political fact. Eighty or ninety or hundred thousand residents – even though they may not be registered to vote in Accra but are registered to vote in other parts of the country – are still assets that a political party does not throw away easily. So, any attempt to dislodge them quickly runs into heavy political headwinds. And that's a fact. Politicians will always seize opportunity to cultivate a constituency.* [108]

Despite frequent floods and fires, Accra's 'Sodom and Gomorrah' survives because of its electoral importance, Ghana's clientelistic democracy having saved it from the destruction that befell its biblical namesake settlements. As the previous chapter showed, demolitions of informal settlements are in fact frequent across Greater Accra, which means that the persistence of certain settlements, not only the large and high-profile Old Fadama but also other, smaller settlements and structures mentioned by planners in interviews, cannot be put down simply to general neglect or weakness on the part of local governments. The survival of these settlements can only be understood in light of their political importance.

As Chapter 2 discussed, this kind of clientelistic support for informal settlements is a mixed blessing. While it has allowed Old Fadama and others to escape demolition, it has not led to substantial improvements. The residents of such settlements still lack long-term tenure security and access to basic infrastructure and services (Paller, 2014a). Arguably, people in power are instead incentivized to keep these residents in a state of dependency. The political

---

[108] Amarteifio, N.N. 2019, personal communication, 2 July

parties have no incentive to provide long-term solutions when it is the very vulnerability of these communities that makes them useful as client populations. Paller (2014a, p. 58) finds that in Old Fadama, "the informal institution of squatter illegality in slums provides opportunities for leaders to 'cash in' and strengthen power, for political parties and politicians to mobilize support, and for international NGOs to support a cause while the most vulnerable residents are left unrepresented."

The most recent overtures to Old Fadama's residents by the NPP also demonstrate how political parties use informality. Whether or not this can be considered clientelism in a strict sense depends on how the NPP responds to future electoral results in Old Fadama: if it fails to win their votes and consequently abandons its largesse, which is certainly conceivable, then in effect the (continued) provision of benefits is contingent on political support, making it a case of clientelism. Either way, if, as the vice president claims, the residents of Old Fadama "deserve to be served just like any other community in the country," the provision of basic services to Old Fadama should be unremarkable, carried out routinely by local government, rather than in the form of a high-profile, media-friendly gift from the vice president and several national ministers. Moreover, it is notable that for all its support, the ruling NPP has not commented on the legal status of the settlement nor promised to provide secure land tenure, supporting the argument that politicians need communities like Old Fadama to remain informal and therefore susceptible to clientelism.

In summary, the case of Old Fadama illustrates many of the broader arguments of this study about the relationships between planning, informal politics, and informal urban growth.

Here, an ambitious and well-meaning formal plan proved impossible to implement due to informality and politics. A settlement that was partly formal in origin (as a refugee camp, in this case) became 'informalized' due to political antipathy on the part of political leaders, as discussed in Chapter 2. Politically influential land brokers (Ga chiefs, in this case) helped create the settlement by informally subdividing land, a phenomenon discussed in Chapter 2 and further explored in the next chapter. The informal settlement remained in place and grew due to its clientelistic political ties, despite violating plans and regulations. Politicians provide its residents with benefits in exchange for their political support, but they have not permanently freed them from dependence by providing formal tenure rights. Patron-client relationships have made planners powerless to intervene.

Clientelism beyond low-income informal settlements

While low-income settlements present political patrons with large, dense communities that are vulnerable and have easily met material needs, informal politics does not only affect the poor, and that non-poor developments may be equally "informal" in terms of the violation of regulations. As mentioned above, the pressures that planners face from political figures also involve ignoring regulatory violations in industrial, commercial, and residential developments operated or occupied by middle-class citizens.

In an interview, one experienced planner in Accra described urban growth as a "free-for-all," explaining that if landowners or developers wish to start a new residential community somewhere beyond the urban fringe, in violation of existing plans, they can do it as long as

they have political connections.[109] As discussed further in the next chapter, traditional authorities often allocate land to middle-class settlers, regardless of whether the traditional authorities legally control that land. Local governments often paint notices on structures which lack permits, prompting the owners to seek the help of politically and socially influential "big men" who intervene to allow the developments to remain (Arku et al., 2016). Middle-class settlers may also use their relationships with influential actors to obtain piped water connections from the Ghana Water Company, and then use the provision of such services as evidence that the state considers the settlement legitimate (Bartels, 2019).

Clientelism can also affect formal developments, particularly the allocation of units in public housing projects. Ghana has never had particularly robust state-built housing programs, but those that did exist between the 1960s and 1980s, besides suffering from a shortage of funds and ultimately falling out of favor during structural adjustment, were also plagued by clientelism in the allocation of units, according to Sarfoh (2010).

Conclusion

Ghana's atmosphere of competitive clientelism has informalized and undermined its state institutions, including urban planning, such that short-term political interests determine urban decision-making. Planners cannot openly defy politically motivated decisions from politicians, out of fear of retaliation that would derail their careers. At times, clientelism has

[109] Tackie, F. 2018, personal communication, 3 July

allowed some politically important informal settlements to escape demolition, but it has not delivered long-term benefits, and has deepened the dependency of the poor on political patronage.

The political dynamics outlined above are not the only ones which affect urban growth and planning. The role of traditional authorities, the subdivision of local government jurisdictions into ever-smaller areas, inefficient decentralization, corruption, and land-based violence all shape Ghana's cities and the ability of planners to influence urban growth. However, all these seemingly disparate factors can be traced back to clientelism, as the next chapter explains.

Chapter 6: Related Political Constraints on Planning

The clientelistic provision of benefits in exchange for political support creates major challenges for urban planning in Ghana, as the previous chapter discussed. However, planning also faces several other institutional, administrative, and practical constraints, not all of which are directly related to an exchange of benefits for political support, but which are also political in nature. Traditional authorities distribute land without regard to plans. The proliferation of new local government units exacerbates the shortage of planning staff and makes metropolitan coordination more difficult. National agencies withhold autonomy from local governments, while simultaneously decentralizing planning staff in a way that makes them vulnerable to local political control. Corruption abounds. Privately hired thugs use violence to prevent land from even being inspected by authorities. While this may seem like a litany of unrelated woes, the discussion that follows argues that the clientelistic politics of Ghana either partially causes or intensifies each of these other challenges.

The power of traditional authorities over urban land

Scholars once expected customary practices and indigenous social institutions in Africa to fade with the advent of state institutions, economic modernization, and urbanization. Instead, the 'customary' and the 'modern' now intertwine and co-evolve in complex ways across the continent (Joireman, 2011; Juul & Lund, 2002). The institution of traditional chieftaincy in Ghana may be precolonial in origin, but the British reshaped it during the colonial period as a means of supporting 'indirect rule'. The British referred to the Gold Coast, as Ghana was

then known, as a 'colony', but it was arguably more akin to a 'protectorate', not only because the British never settled there in large numbers, but also because they ruled it through existing local authorities who never gave up their power (Jackson, 2019). Chiefs in Ghana under British rule were able to become less accountable to their communities and more predatory and self-serving than they had been in precolonial times (Joireman, 2011; Obeng-Odoom, 2013). In countries which were never colonized, like Ethiopia, customary practices simply became codified into state law, while in Ghana, colonization permanently enshrined 'legal pluralism,' with competing factions making claims through different systems, according to Joireman (2011).

The Ghanaian constitution recognizes the customary authority of traditional chiefs over 80% of land in the country (Tieleman & Uitermark, 2018). The customary land controlled by chiefs is known as 'stool' land in most of Ghana and 'skin' land in the North, in synecdochic reference to the ornamental stools and animal skins that are traditional symbols of authority of chiefs (like 'crown' land in the United Kingdom). Customary land in Accra constitutes 78% of land in the city and belongs either to Ga chiefs (stool land) or to Ga families represented by family heads to whom chiefs have allocated land (family land). Land in and around Kumasi, the capital of the historic Ashanti kingdom and present-day Ashanti Region, belongs to chiefs who are all subordinate to the Asantehene (Ashanti king). The Asantehene's Land Secretariat manages stool lands, which make up 81% of the land around Kumasi (Boamah & Amoako, 2019).

Customary land tenure remains a powerful force in shaping urban growth and service delivery in urban Ghana. According to the constitution, chiefs hold land in trust for their people. The land is not meant to be for sale but rather to be used and passed down by families. However, in urban and peri-urban areas with increasing land values, chiefs have increasingly commodified customary land. Households seeking a chief's approval to settle on stool land traditionally pay their respects to the chief in the form of 'drink money,' which in the past was equivalent to the price of a "few bottles of imported schnapps," but is now closer to the equivalent of the market price of the land (Owusu-Ansah & Braimah, 2013, p. 694). According to the constitution, 55% of the revenue from stool lands must be given to the local government, with the rest divided between the chief and the stool elders. However, since stool land transactions are not a matter of public record, the amounts actually paid are impossible to determine (Berry, 2002).

Chiefs often treat this money as private wealth, which means that the stool land is effectively their private property to sell for personal enrichment (Ayee et al., 2011; Owusu-Ansah & Braimah, 2013; Tieleman & Uitermark, 2018). In some cases, chiefs even go to the extent of officially registering land in their own name as personal property, as in Faroma on the periphery of Accra (Tieleman & Uitermark, 2018). Chiefs are also involved in fraudulent land sales, reselling land that the state has previously acquired (Boamah & Amoako, 2019), which sometimes results in the state having to repurchase land that it has already acquired

once. Chiefs also sell land that plans have set aside for waterways, roads, or public space.[110] A former AMA official gave the example of an area known as Lavender Hill, which had been acquired by the state in 1908. The AMA had to pay a local chief 100,000 cedis (roughly USD 17,400) to reacquire it in order to use it for a sewage management project funded by the Danish government. The official described the government's loss of land to haphazard development all over Accra, after having which the preserved for years, as "painful."[111]

The nature of interactions between chiefs and planners in the Greater Accra region can vary greatly. While they are meant to be on the Spatial Planning Committees of MMDAs, they may or may not participate in planning meetings.[112] Planners sometimes have cooperative relationships with chiefs. For example, a few planners noted instances in which chiefs have invited them to help plan their land,[113] or in which chiefs have helped planners communicate information from planners to their communities, including conveying the need for relocation of informal structures.[114]

However, cooperation between chiefs and planners may be the exception rather than the rule. Chiefs often subdivide and allocate stool land without regard for any extant land use plans and without coordination between adjacent subdivisions (Amoateng et al., 2013; ICF

---

[110] Owusu-Afriyie, A. 2019, personal communication, 25 June; Owusu-Donkor, P. 2019, personal communication, 8 July
[111] Ayeh-Datey, S. 2019, personal communication, 2 July
[112] Muquah, G. 2019, personal communication, 27 June
[113] Gariba, M. 2019, personal communication, 17 June; Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June; Owusu-Afriyie, A. 2019, personal communication, 25 June
[114] Akyeampong, C. 2019, personal communication, 26 June; Amofa, L. 2019, personal communication, 18 June

Consulting Services, 2017). Chiefs frequently employ unlicensed ('quack') surveyors to prepare subdivision plans in which parcels are smaller than the legal minimum, do not have proper street access, or are used for purposes not permitted by the local plan.[115] Sometimes these informal surveyors are remunerated in the form of a plot of land in the informal subdivision itself, which they may resell (Bartels, 2019). This practice means that there is little opportunity for public input into land use decisions (Ayee et al., 2011).

Chiefs believe that they alone, rather than planners, have the right to make decisions about the land in their custody.[116] Cobbinah and Darkwah (2017, p. 1239) quote a traditional leader saying: "[T]he land is ours. We are the traditional custodians… Nobody can develop our land without our consent, not even the government. If the planning people want to plan our community or land, they should contact us first and seek our approval." Many believe that land acquired from chiefs is not subject to planning laws at all (Boamah & Amoako, 2019).

Beyond their role in subdividing and allocating land, chiefs also play a facilitating role in arranging the provision of services to newly subdivided peri-urban stool land. Depending on the needs of a settlement, a chief may persuade the utility companies to extend water and electrical connections to new settlers, and negotiate with judges, police officers, and municipal agencies, including the planning agency, to legitimize the new settlement (Tieleman & Uitermark, 2018).

---

[115] Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July; Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June
[116] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June

Based on research in Ga Mashie, Paller (2019a) finds that in indigenous settlements, traditional authorities have an incentive to keep residents' property rights ambiguous in order to benefit personally. They also use their authority to demand public services (public toilets, roads, drainage systems, street lights, schools, markets) from the state on behalf of residents, in what Paller (2014a) describes as a form of patron-client relationship.[117] However, these public services are usually unequally distributed, disproportionally benefiting a small number of families. Additionally, as with clientelism in non-indigenous squatter settlements, in indigenous communities too, informal channels of service delivery undermine formal rules and institutions in general and planning in particular.

Perhaps counterintuitively, urbanization and interaction with the formal nation-state strengthen rather than diminish the role of traditional chiefs. According to Tieleman and Uitermark (2018, pp. 13-14; emphasis in the original):

> *Chieftaincy has* co-evolved with *the modern state. The chiefs have been folded into the Ghanaian nation-state, making the state the carrier of the chieftaincy system. When the state rolls itself out, agency by agency, over an area following recent urban expansion, it provides openings for chieftaincies to emerge. The state* expects to find a chief*, and accords him certain rights and privileges, irrespective of the degree to which he is rooted in the local population. As the*

---

[117] By contrast, Nelson (1979) distinguishes between the relationship between a patron and client and that between a traditional leader and follower in two ways. (1) The patron-client relationship is based on reciprocity and is at least partly voluntary on the part of the client, while in principle the follower automatically owes loyalty to a traditional leader regardless of whether the latter provides any benefits. (2) According to Nelson, the patron-client relationship is 'dyadic' (one-to-one) rather than one-to-many (though as we have seen, in the case of neighborhood-scale clientelism, this distinction does not hold).

urban areas expand spatially, and consequently the Ghanaian state follows, including its legal foundations, the chieftaincy structure expands as well.

The role of traditional authorities in planning in the Ashanti region, including Kumasi, is different. Here all chiefs are subordinate to the Ashanti king (Asantehene), and for all practical purposes, so is the state. In some ways, this clear hierarchy facilitates cooperation and coordination.[118] Chiefs in Kumasi actively participate in planning meetings and in the preparation of Spatial Development Frameworks, and sometimes donate land necessary for the implementation of plans.[119] The Asantehene need not consult planners before making a decision relevant to planning,[120] but once he has made it, planners face little resistance in its implementation.[121] The current Asantehene encourages chiefs to prepare subdivision plans and submit them to the Customary Land Secretariat, which reduces land disputes, and he leases his out own land in accordance with existing plans.[122] He even punishes subordinate chiefs who engage in the kind of duplicate sales of land that are common in the rest of Ghana, sometimes with 'destoolment' (removal from their position) (F. Appiah, 2019). Low-income migrant settlements in Kumasi were often formed with permission from the Asantehene and thus are not as contested as squatter settlements in Accra.[123]

---

[118] Gyanfi, J. 2019, personal communication, 24 June
[119] Amofa, L. 2019, personal communication, 18 June, Amedzro, K.K. 2019, personal communication, 28 June
[120] Owusu-Donkor, P. 2019, personal communication, 8 July
[121] Bob-Milliar, G. 2019, personal communication, 8 July
[122] Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July
[123] Bob-Milliar, G. 2019, personal communication, 8 July

Chiefs in Ghana are seen as too powerful to be challenged and reprimanded by state authorities. As a former AMA official explained in an interview, "If a chief sells the land, nobody can touch the chief."[124] The reason the state fears them goes back to competitive clientelism: chiefs influence how their communities vote, and political leaders dare not risk antagonizing them for fear of losing votes.[125]

At times, the power of traditional authorities comes into conflict with the force of competitive clientelism. Traditional Ga leaders complain that the continued existence of the Old Fadama informal settlement has destroyed the natural ecology of the area and is an affront to their customary authority over the land (Stacey, 2018). Yet, as discusses previously, the settlement's strength as a voting bloc means that it is hard to remove, which indicates the limits of traditional authorities' control over land if a population of informal settlers is large enough to reshape political incentives in its favor.

Administrative fragmentation

In recent years, successive governments in Ghana have carved over a hundred new metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies (MMDAs) out of existing ones. This is in keeping with a trend observed in several other African and Asian countries since the 1990s (Green, 2010). In Ghana, the proliferation of local government units has accelerated since

---

[124] Ayeh-Datey, S. 2019, personal communication, 2 July Bob-Milliar, G. 2019, personal communication, 8 July; Dadson, J.E. 2019, personal communication, 1 July
[125] Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

the mid-2000s. The total number of MMDAs in Ghana increased from 138 in 2004 to 260 in 2019, meaning that nearly half the local governments in the country date from that 15-year period.

The Greater Accra Metropolitan Area had just three local governments until 2004, when the government created a fourth. It created four more in 2008, and another four in 2012, increasing the total to 12 (Owusu, 2015). In February 2019, the government carved yet more districts out of the already much-diminished Accra Metropolitan Assembly, including areas close to the city center, leading the AMA to shrink from 137 sq. km. to just 23 sq. km.[126] . For example, the economically important commercial area of Osu, less than a fifteen-minute drive from the AMA headquarters in the heart of the city, is no longer within the AMA but in the newly created Osu-Klottey district. The government has also split up Kumasi, with five out of its former total of nine sub-districts now new MMDAs.[127]

In theory, the need for effective decentralization and proximity to government resources during a period of rapid population growth may justify to some extent the creation of so many new local governments (ICF Consulting Services, 2017). The increase in the number of MMDAs has in fact kept pace with the increase in population, such that the population per local government is not much lower today than in 1988 (Table 3). The government has argued that the need "to facilitate development" (GhanaWeb, 2018c) and "to bring

---

[126] Osei-Nyarko, P. 2019, personal communication, 12 June
[127] Afukaar, J. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

development closer to the people" motivates the creation of new districts (GhanaWeb, 2019c). It describes the creation of the latest round of new districts in Accra as a way to allow better urban management. In a televised interview in April 2019, the Deputy Local Government Minister argued that the AMA was struggling to cater effectively to its large population with the transfers it received via the District Assembly Common Fund and the revenues it was able to raise locally. The large sub-districts within the AMA, according to the minister, had no ability to raise their own revenues or operate effectively from their "two-roomed," i.e. small and under-resourced, sub-district offices. Once elevated to municipalities, he explained, they would have "all the powers of a municipal assembly to have their subcommittees, raise revenue, manage and plan development and get the city in a better shape" (GhanaWeb, 2019c).

Table 3: Local governments and population in Ghana

Year	No. of local govts.	Population	Population per local govt. (5)
1988	110 (1)	13,854,214 (3)	125,947
2004	138 (1)	20,986,536 (3)	152,076
2008	170 (1)	23,298,640 (3)	137,051
2012	216 (1)	25,733,049 (3)	119,134
2019	260 (2)	30,280,811 (4)	116,465

Sources: (1) Owusu (2015, p. 7); (2) GhanaWeb (2019a); (3) United Nations World Population Prospects, via data.worldbank.org; (4) Ghana Statistical Service (www.statsghana.gov.gh); (5) author's calculations.

However, Owusu (2015) casts doubt on the notion that the creation of new districts is simply an objective exercise in keeping up with population growth. He points out that in fact, in

2010, 31 districts did not even meet the minimum population requirements for their category of local government (metropolitan, municipal, or district assembly). Instead, Owusu attributes the creation of this large number of new MMDAs to two distinct political motivations: creating new MMDAs allows the incumbent party to engage in gerrymandering by indirectly creating new electoral constituencies, and it allows the president to extend patronage by appointing more chief executives.

The incumbent political party may benefit from the creation of certain new electoral constituencies, which could increase its number of seats in Parliament. However, while the constitution does not allow a president to create constituencies (only the Election Commission can), the president can create new MMDAs at any time. Since a Parliamentary constituency cannot straddle two MMDAs, the creation of new MMDAs automatically necessitates the creation of new constituencies, which means that the process can be manipulated for electoral gain. Owusu bolsters this argument by pointing out that the recent increase in political competition between the two major parties has coincided with a sharp increase in the creation of new MMDAs, and that whenever the NPP or NDC have created new MMDAs when in power, the opposition party has objected.

The second political motivation for creating new MMDAs, according to Owusu, is to increase the number of chief executive positions to which an incoming president can appoint loyalists in the form of patronage jobs. This is consistent with a study of Uganda which found that of all the theoretical explanations for the proliferation of new local government units there, the creation of patronage jobs was the most plausible (Green, 2010). In these ways, the

proliferation of new local governments is intertwined with Ghana's competitive clientelism.[128]

The creation of new MMDAs in this manner has several debilitating effects on urban planning and management:

- The government does not consult planners in the creation of new districts, which means that planners cannot take it account in future planning. A regulation in the original draft bill of the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act* of 2016 stated that planners and statisticians had to be consulted before the creation of new districts, but allegedly, Parliament removed this regulation to allow the process to be manipulated by political parties.[129]
- Metropolitan coordination mechanisms are weak, and administrative fragmentation of contiguous urbanized areas makes it even more difficult to plan, especially as the creation of new districts leads to boundary disputes between neighboring jurisdictions (Owusu, 2015). Planners interviewed confirmed the lack of coordination between MMDAs.[130]
- The dearth of planning staff in Ghana means that the more MMDAs there are in total, the more there are that do not have any trained local planning staff. In interviews, some local planning staff expressed frustration that their teams were being broken up in order to transfer staff to newly created MMDAs. As of mid-2019, only six out of the ten districts

---

[128] Not everyone explains the creation of new MMDAs exactly as Owusu does. While most interviewees took for granted that it was politically motivated, each offered a slightly different take on the exact motivations behind it.
[129] Personal communication with an interviewee who preferred not to be quoted by name on this subject
[130] Gbeckor-Kove, 2019 personal communication, 12 June

that were previously part of AMA had planners on staff.[131]

- Smaller MMDAs are more vulnerable to being "hijacked" by local political elites (ICF Consulting Services, 2017).
- Lastly, contrary to government statements, it is possible that administrative fragmentation of urban areas may make it harder and not than easier for local governments to be fiscally self-sufficient. This would increase their reliance on transfers from the national government.

Inefficient decentralization

Ghana began to decentralize in 1988 with the enactment of the Local Government Law. Decentralization in Ghana was an extension of the Economic Recovery Program initiated by the World Bank and IMF in 1983 (Larbi, 1996; Owusu, 2015). The district assembly system was put in place in 1989, and the 1992 Constitution mandated the devolution of power and resources to local governments (Fridy & Myers, 2019).

Ghana's current level of decentralization interferes with urban planning and management in two ways. The partial nature of decentralization means that national agencies and politicians continue to dominate urban decision-making, while the ways in which the country has decentralized its planning staff has made them more vulnerable to local politics than before.

---

[131] Osei-Nyarko, P. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

Lack of decentralization

The incomplete nature of decentralization is evident from the discussions in this chapter and the previous chapter. To reiterate the relevant points: (1) local governments lack own-source revenue and must rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers from the national government; (2) chief executives, who are appointed by the president, face pressure to enact their national party's political agenda rather than determine local priorities in response to local demands; and (3) fragmentation of metropolitan areas into increasing numbers of MMDAs, driven by national politics, reduces the ability of local governments to plan the delivery of key services like water provision and wastewater management which require metropolitan-scale solutions.

The important role that members of Parliament, as opposed to district assembly members, play in everyday problem-solving in Ghana is further evidence of the importance of national-level actors over local ones. In a 2019 survey (Fridy & Myers, 2019), over 60% of respondents in both the low-income Odododiodio and wealthy Ayawaso West constituencies of Accra stated that the first person they would contact about a borehole, school, or road would be their MP, compared to fewer than 20% who said that they would first contact their district assembly member.

Various national agencies continue to play a major role in urban outcomes. The national utility companies, Ghana Water Company Limited and Electricity Company of Ghana, provide connections to new settlements regardless of whether they conform to a local spatial

plan. This is often done under the direction of politicians who use utility connections as a form of patronage, as discussed above, but it is also sometimes simply a way to increase revenue.[132] The Ministry of Inner-City and Zongo Development, which works on urban redevelopment and local infrastructure provision, is another example of a national agency that is directly involved in urban affairs.

The national government also maintains control over certain large contracts for urban services. For example, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development awarded a solid waste management contract to a company named Zoomlion Ghana Limited, through an apparently non-competitive process. The national government deducts funds for these services, including capital equipment, from local government transfers without sharing any information on actual costs of the services or equipment (ICF Consulting Services, 2017). The AMA's Medium Term Development Plan hints at this when it mentions that "a large chunk of the Assembly's internally generated revenues which should have been used to implement other projects was used to pay its waste management contractors" (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018, pp. 2–3). This lack of competition and transparency seems designed to enable corruption, and in fact the World Bank has previously debarred Zoomlion Ghana for engaging in bribery in Liberia (World Bank, 2013). From a decentralization point

[132] Amedzro, K.K. 2018, personal communication, 17 August; Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 3 July; Owusu, G. 2018, personal communication, 19 July

of view, this desire to maintain control over lucrative contracts reduces the ability of local governments to make their own decisions.

Similarly, the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture, and not the local or regional planning authority, leads the massive 'Marine Drive' project, which is poised to transform 241 acres (around 1 sq. km.) of Accra's city center and waterfront with new tourist attractions, residential and commercial developments, and government buildings (Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture & Adjaye Associates, 2017). The fact that neither the AMA's 900-page Medium Term Development Plan for 2018-2021 (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2018) nor the Greater Accra's regional Spatial Development Framework (Government of Ghana, 2017) even mentions this transformative project once, despite frequent media coverage and the involvement of the AMA's Physical Planning department in the project, is evidence of the disjuncture between national and subnational planning processes. These examples suggest that national agencies and officials have not relinquished substantial decision-making power to local governments, and in various ways continue to undermine the control of local planners over their jurisdictions.

Decentralization of planning staff

Local planners interviewed for this study expressed frustration at the decentralization of their positions. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the government transferred physical planners working in local governments from the national Civil Service to the Local Government Service under the Department of Parks and Gardens in 2019. (The transfer to the Department of Parks and

Gardens appears to be only be notional for now. One planner remarked that the Director of Parks and Gardens did not even know where the spatial planning office is located.)

Decentralization has reduced some of the oversight that the national and regional branches of the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA) formerly had over local planning, as plans at the local government level no longer have to be submitted to these bodies. However, the more significant impact is on the employment status of planners. Whereas in the past they were able to appeal to LUSPA's regional or national bodies on matters relating to their employment, the change has orphaned them in terms of human resources, giving local leaders more control over employment decisions. Prior to this change, it was also common for planners to move back and forth between local, regional, and national posts within the LUSPA system, but now that planners in local government belong to the Local Government Service, they can no longer move to higher levels. Most alarmingly for planners, they expect to have to reapply for their jobs in local government following this change.

Several of the planners interviewed expressed concerns that, in an environment where planners are already subject to pressure and interference from local politicians, the increased control of local authorities over the employment of planners will result in the further politicization of planning, with local politicians now able to install loyalists in planning positions and retaliate with impunity against planners who resist political decisions. Physical planners noted that departments that have always been decentralized, such as development planning or public works, are much more politicized than physical planning has been in the past. For example, a planner in the LUSPA head office explained that political leaders had

"marked" a local planner (who was also interviewed for this study) for an imminent transfer, because he had refused to sign a development permit that the spatial planning committee had voted against but that the chief executive favored. Whereas the planner had managed to maintain his post so far, the decentralization of planners meant that he was unlikely to remain much longer, according to the interviewee. One planner believed that the change was a deliberate attempt to reduce the power of technocrats.

Corruption

Unsurprisingly, urban planning and service delivery are undermined not only for political gain, but also for financial gain. There are indications of corrupt practices in the award of service contracts, e.g. waste management (as discussed above) and water (ICF Consulting Services, 2017). Most contracts for the operation of fee-charging public toilets are in the hands of assembly members or of front companies controlled by them (Ayee & Crook, 2003). It is common for applicants to pay bribes to Lands Commission officials handling land permits to 'speed up' the process on their behalf (Andrews, 2017). Land acquired by the state from the poor, supposedly for public use, is sometimes leased to developers for high-end private developments instead (Gillespie, 2016). In an interview, planners related a 2012 case in which developers wanted to build commercial establishments on land zoned for open space in the city of Takoradi (GhanaWeb, 2012). According to the interviewees, the planner at Takoradi was pressured into rezoning the area by the chief executive and ministers from a national ministry, who had been promised some of the land in exchange for their assistance.

Some allege that while planners may portray themselves as manipulated or pressured by politicians, some planners are themselves complicit in corruption.[133] Acheampong (2019, p. 131) alleges that planning officers sometimes accept bribes from developers, landowners, and traditional authorities to modify plans. According to Clifford Amoako, a professor of planning at KNUST, intentional ambiguity in application fees for planning permits enables corruption in planning. Planning departments are allowed to recover some of their operating expenses through such fees, but in the absence of a specified fee schedule, an applicant is never sure what part of the payment demanded goes towards operating expenses of the planning office and how much officials pocket for themselves. According to Amoako, planning officers sometimes expect applicants to arrange for their transportation to the site under consideration and to pay for refreshments for planning meetings at which the application will be evaluated. Planners may even refuse to process an application without further monetary inducements, perhaps in the form of a 'mobile money' transfer. Independently investigating these claims is beyond the scope of this case study, especially given that it relies on interviews with planners themselves, but Amoako and his colleagues are currently preparing a study of corruption among planners in Ghana.

Leaving alleged corruption among planners aside, while corruption among politicians and other public officials may at first glance seem apolitical, in fact, Ghana's competitive clientelistic politics supports and perpetuates corruption, in two ways. First, lucrative public

---

[133] Amoako, C. 2019, personal communication, 9 July

contracts for services and public positions in which an official can manipulate procurement have become a form of patronage with which local and national politicians can reward loyalists. The president alone can directly appoint 4,000 individuals in the country, including chief executives and heads of various state agencies (ICF Consulting Services, 2017). As a result, when a new party takes over after winning an election, the incoming party replaces personnel at all levels with loyalists. This includes a range of appointees, from the board and senior management of the Ghana Water Company to the operators of public toilets in informal settlements (Ayee & Crook, 2003; ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Owusu & Afutu-Kotey, 2010). Allowing these posts to be used as venues for personal enrichment adds to their value as a currency of patronage.

Second, corruption is a way to offset the expense of elections, including the costs associated with providing patronage. Elections in Ghana are increasingly expensive, with a 90% increase in average expenditure per candidate in parliamentary campaigns between the 2012 and 2016 elections alone. Adding the cost of party primaries, the average expenditure per candidate is equivalent to two years of an MP's salary (Westminster Foundation for Democracy & CDD-Ghana, 2018). Candidates get limited financial support from their parties, and mostly have to spend their own money to provide the kinds of clientelistic benefits that are expected of them. These include not just the public services described above but also private ones like school fees, donations to religious organizations, and funds for community events. They can only do this if the office comes with opportunities to recoup some of that expense (Ayee &

Crook, 2003; ICF Consulting Services, 2017; Westminster Foundation for Democracy & CDD-Ghana, 2018).

Violence and intimidation around land

Chapter 4 introduced 'land guards', armed gangs hired by those who own or control land to ward off prospective encroachers, buyers and sellers, private surveyors, and even government officials with violence and intimidation. As mentioned earlier, land guards are typically hired by chiefs or families involved in land disputes, but at times state institutions hire them too. Land guards are particularly prevalent on the fringes of cities where land is valuable but not yet developed.

In interviews, several planners raised the presence of land guards as a challenge. Land guards prevented two of the interviewed planners from inspecting a site in order to evaluate a permit application. One of them recalled visiting a site on which construction was occurring on a road reservation and being told by the land guards to leave if she valued her life. Planners interviewed also related a recent case in which land guards physically assaulted a planner. While one planner mentioned that land guards leave if a planner arrives on site with a police officer, Andrews (2017) finds that police officers are often bribed by or otherwise loyal to chiefs, and so cannot always be relied upon to provide protection from land guards.

The most alarming incidents related to violence around planning involved a planner who was working at the time in a town on the Western fringes of Greater Accra. While he was never able to confirm who was behind the troubles he faced, he believes it came about because of

the firm position he took against certain unauthorized developments in the area, including construction on land reserved for roads, schools, and open space. One night when the planner was at home (studying in preparation for the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE)), a group of strangers tried to break down his door with a cement block. A burglar-proof door stopped them, and they eventually left. The planner and his family moved temporarily to his father's house in Accra to avoid further trouble. While he was away, his relatives took his place, but there were no further intrusions on the property, even though cars were parked outside, which he understood to mean that the incident had not been an attempted burglary. As soon as he returned to his house eight months later, ten or so men again tried to break down his door with a cement block. His terrified wife tried to reason with them through the door, and they told her to warn her husband to stay away. Meanwhile, the planner phoned a neighbor who happened to be a soldier. The soldier fired a gun in the assailants' direction, and they fled. To protect his wife and son, who had been traumatized by the incident, the planner again moved with his family back to Accra, and did not return. When he went to the police, they advised him not to antagonize land guards. They set up an identification line-up, but someone advised him that even if he identified someone anonymously through a two-way mirror, a bribed police officer might reveal his identity to the land guards, so he avoided doing so. The planner recalls the break-ins as his "worst nightmare" and says he still cannot sleep soundly since they occurred.

While the various political constraints to planning catalogued above may initially seem distinct issues, this discussion reveals many to be related to competitive clientelism in some

way. Traditional authorities are able to subdivide and sell peri-urban land informally without punishment because of the votes they control as political brokers. Political party competition and the desire to create patronage jobs motivates administrative fragmentation. Party leaders also distribute jobs with opportunities for rent-seeking as a form of patronage, and elected officials engage in corruption in order to recoup the expenses associated with providing patronage. Planning staff may have been decentralized in order to allow local politicians to more easily coerce them into supporting their clientelistic decisions. While violence and intimidation around land and planning are not related solely to competitive clientelism, it can be understood as at least partly the product of an environment in which power and security do not derive from formal laws but through personalized channels.

Explaining the relationship between clientelism and informal subdivisions in Accra

The *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, discussed in Chapter 3, estimates that nearly all (95%) of the 1990-2015 residential growth in Accra has been informal. Nearly half (47%) of all growth took place in the form of 'informal subdivisions', i.e. settlements which the presence of a street grid and regular plot sizes suggest have been laid out in advance but which "lack visible evidence of conformity to land subdivision regulations such as regular plot dimensions, paved roads, street lights, or sidewalks" (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016, p. 30). The 1991-2014

period was the first time since the beginning of the 20th century that informal subdivisions were the most common form of residential growth in Accra (Figure 35).[134]



Figure 35: Shares of residential growth in Accra by type, 1903-2014
Source: Author, using data from *Atlas of Urban Expansion* (Angel, Lamson-Hall, et al., 2016)

Another 48% between 1990 and 2015 was in the form of 'atomistic' settlements, i.e. those that appear not to have been laid out in advance. However, some areas classified as atomistic settlements within the 1990-2015 area in the *Atlas* appear to be peripheral villages whose built form may in fact be much older, even if they only merged with the growing city after

[134] The *Atlas* reports shares of 47% for informal subdivisions and 48% for atomistic settlements in Accra between 1990 and 2015 in the main data set, but 48% and 45% respectively for the 1991-2014 period in the historic data set. The values may have been projected to match the 1990-2015 period used in the larger data set.

1990. Excluding these, a majority of new residential growth in Accra may be informal subdivisions.

How does this relate to the finding in Chapter 3, that cities in more clientelistic countries are likely to see a higher share of informal subdivisions? It is probably not a coincidence that the increase in the share of informal subdivisions in Accra coincides with the beginning of Ghana's current democratic era in the early 1990s, when the competitive clientelism that dominates Ghana took its present form. A likely explanatory factor for this high proportion of informal subdivisions is the use of 'quack' surveyors by traditional authorities to subdivide land in ways that do not conform to planning standards, described above. However, of the mechanisms by which clientelism and informal subdivisions are linked that were proposed in Chapter 3, the first one, according to which patrons directly provide land to their clients, may not be the most relevant. While chiefs do act as patrons to their communities in indigenous settlements, the relationship between chiefs and the buyers of their greenfield peri-urban land, who are not necessarily from their own community, is not necessarily clientelistic.

Instead, the second possible mechanism, in which clientelism encourages the growth and persistence of new informal subdivisions through post-settlement protection and regularization, may better describe the growth of informal subdivisions in Accra. The fact that chiefs are able to subdivide and sell large areas of land at once, rather than small parcels on an uncoordinated, ad hoc basis, suggests an expectation on the part of the chiefs and the buyers that authorities will not punish or evict them for their lack of formal planning permissions. This expectation most likely derives from the clientelistic relationships they have

with authorities, including the chief executive and MP. Politicians are reluctant to penalize chiefs, as this would anger their followers, who are voters, or would cause the chiefs to instruct their followers to vote against the politicians concerned.[135] A version of the fourth proposed mechanism, in which neighborhood leadership may lead to new informal settlements being spatially coordinated and also foster clientelism in parallel may apply as well. This puts the chiefs in the role of neighborhood leaders, planning out new settlements with the help of unlicensed surveyors while also brokering the relationships with politicians that allow the settlements to remain. In these ways, the relationship between clientelism and the growth of informal subdivisions in Ghana is consistent with the analysis in Chapter 3, but also sheds light on a specific variant of this relationship, one which may be relevant to many countries in which traditional authorities have customary land rights.

Conclusion

In their assessment of planning in Ghana, Cobbinah and Darkwah (2017) argue that while it is common to blame planning agencies themselves for planning failures, it is, in fact, political interference, from both traditional and modern systems, that is the real cause of the "misfortunes" of urban planning in the country. In Ghana, they write, "traditional and modern political systems have rendered the position of urban planning agencies untenable, and the role of urban residents in planning unimportant" (1230). The evidence discussed in this and

[135] Paller, J. 2019, personal communication, 25 September

the previous chapter suggests that clientelism affects nearly every aspect of urban development and service delivery in Ghana's cities, and supports the argument that competitive clientelism in Ghana has "engendered institutions and practices that undermine meritocracy and administrative decentralization" (ICF Consulting Services, 2017, p. 11).

A thought experiment

Prior to its exploration of political constraints to effective planning, the previous chapter considered two other constraints: low fiscal and human capacity for planning, and inappropriate planning regulations and processes. That discussion left no doubt that these are real concerns. However, among these three categories of constraints, which one might term 'planning capacity', 'planning quality', and 'politics', the last is the most critical. One way to compare the relative effect of these constraints is to conduct a thought experiment which involves imagining two of these three constraints disappearing, leaving only one. How different would the outcomes be in each case to the present situation?

If political support for the preparation and implementation of plans existed, and planning capacity were high, but plans remained of low quality, bad plans would be implemented. The outcomes would be unsatisfactory in various ways, perhaps even socially, economically, or environmentally damaging, but this is clearly a different outcome to the current *status quo*, in which plans are largely ignored. The solution in such a scenario might involve better training for planners, perhaps with support from donor organizations or universities.

If political support for the preparation and implementation of plans existed, and plans were appropriately flexible and inclusive, but fiscal and human capacity to prepare and implement plans remained low, perhaps people would be unable to develop new land as their permit applications languished in underfunded and understaffed planning departments. This would slow down new construction, which would not necessarily be a positive outcome, but certainly would be a different one from the current situation in which cities are seeing rapid informal growth. In any case, in this scenario in which planning is a political priority, this problem might resolve itself, as decisionmakers would quickly devote the necessary resources to meet planning needs. This too would be a situation well-suited to the involvement of donor organizations, who could bring in training and capacity building to local planners.

The final scenario is one in which high planning capacity exists, and the plans prepared are well-developed and context-appropriate, but there is no change to the political context, i.e. political leaders remain able to make decisions based on short-term clientelistic imperatives and ignore the advice of planners. In this scenario, the plans would be of better quality than today, but would remain unimplemented. This is clearly the 'least change' scenario from the current *status quo*. It is also the only scenario for which there is no ready solution, as no amount of training or capacity building would change the underlying political settlement.

None of these schematic hypotheticals is necessarily intended to be realistic, but rather to emphasize the fact that political constraints are the binding constraints to planning to Ghana. As Awal and Paller conclude their assessment of urban governance in Ghana: "Planning and finance are not the foremost problems: poorly understood politics is" (2016, p. 12). As long

as political constraints remain and planning is not significantly reconceived in light of these constraints, addressing the other constraints is unlikely to significantly change the *status quo*.

Chapter 7: Planning the Clientelistic City

> *[A] man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to self-destruction…*
>
> - Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513), quoted in Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 236)

Planning reform that builds on what is already working for planners and the urban poor in their own political environment is likely to be more successful than reform that aims for a hypothetical ideal system or imitates organizational forms or practices from elsewhere. The aim of this chapter is to observe what is working for planners in Ghana now, even if only partially, occasionally, or temporarily so far, and use these observations to build recommendations that are realistic within Ghana's current political system.[136] In the terms of Machiavelli's dictum above, it uses "what is actually done" as the basis for determining "what should be done." It begins with a discussion of how planners try to contend with the political constraints described in the previous chapters, using subtle strategies to push back against political interference. The next section briefly considers the prospects for future change in the status quo. The chapter concludes with recommendations for how planning can be made more effective in the clientelistic environment of urban Ghana, calling for a 'politically

[136] The approach taken here—of seeking out and analyzing overlooked planning successes rather than well-known planning failures—draws from (Sanyal, under review)

adaptive' approach to planning. The next chapter generalizes this approach and outlines broad principles for politically adaptive planning.

How local planners respond to political interference

Strategies

Local planners in Ghana feel powerless. Their work is subject to interference from politicians engaging in short-term competitive clientelism, forcing planners to choose between long-term urban development objectives and their own careers, over which politicians have increasing power. If planners oppose any of the actions of the government in power too openly, politicians brand them as being politically aligned with the opposition and transfer them somewhere where they cannot make trouble. Both customary landholding authorities and the general public ignore plans and regulations, often with the tacit support of these politicians. Chief executives of local governments, appointed by the president, face political pressure from above and are not locally accountable. Planners lack financial and human resources to prepare and implement plans, and politics interferes in their ability to access the necessary resources. The politically motivated fragmentation of local government jurisdictions exacerbates this situation and also makes coordination across a metropolitan area difficult. Corruption, itself often an outcome of competitive clientelism, further undermines planning.

According to the planning theorist John Forester (2014, p. 50):

> *That planners can be powerless in a given setting is a thesis, or a plaintive cry, as old as the profession. Taken by itself, the thesis is likely to evoke a response like, "So what else is new?" The research problem here is to explore just how, in previously unexamined ways, social relations of power (influence? authority?) and powerlessness work to provide whatever "power" planners might have in particular settings.*

This section explores this research problem, i.e. how planners come to have whatever power they do have in the particular setting of Ghanaian cities. How do planners respond to the constraints and pressures they face? In interviews, planners noted subtle strategies that they sometimes employ to contend with political interference and avoid outcomes they consider unacceptable, without risking their jobs by openly antagonizing political leaders.

Calling for professional back-up

An important strategy planners use is to call for support from professional organizations or from other government officials.

- Support from planning organizations

As previous chapters explored, planners in Ghana often face political pressure to go along with decisions that they disagree with on technical grounds, which they feel compromise their professional integrity, or which might expose them to disciplinary actions in the future. In these situations, planners sometimes call for support from a professional organization or higher-level planning authority, specifically the Ghana Institute of Planners (GIP) or the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority (LUSPA, formerly the Town and Country Planning

Department). Doing so adds weight to their technical opinion, but also, in the guise of seeking technical advice, exposes a potentially controversial issue to a slightly wider audience, which prompts caution on the part of the politician who is in favor of it.

The Ghana Institute of Planners is an autonomous organization unaffiliated with any government body. The GIP sustains itself through membership dues from its approximately 700 members, which include both development planners and physical planners in the public and private sectors. While most local government planners are members, not all are. The GIP presents itself as a neutral organization, and local government planners, communities, the media, and even politicians call upon the GIP to provide technical advice on planning issues occasionally. A GIP representative described its role as that of a mediator rather than a regulator.[137] Political figures tend to heed the advice of the GIP on decisions that may show favoritism, knowing that the body can publicize a controversial issue in the media if its advice is ignored. The GIP may also submit a report on a particular case to the Ministry of Environment, as in a recent case in which a chief executive had allowed the construction of a petrol station where there had previously been a pond.[138]

At the moment, the GIP is called upon for such advice only occasionally, around five times a year by one estimate,[139] and usually from planners in or near Greater Accra, where the GIP

---

[137] Ntsiful, E. 2019, personal communication, 17 June
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.

is headquartered.[140] Even within Greater Accra, planners interviewed varied in their opinion of the GIP's effectiveness and independence. At least one planner felt that she could not appeal to the GIP without the chief executive viewing it as a "betrayal". Still, the involvement of the GIP has prevented politically-motivated decisions that planners disagreed with from being forced through in at least a handful of cases.

Embattled planners have also sometimes appealed to the regional or national offices of LUSPA, which, unlike the GIP, is a government body. In these situations, LUSPA may send planners from elsewhere to provide a second opinion. An example related by a planner in an interview involved a developer attempting to site a petrol station in a location which would have caused an obstruction to traffic. The chief executive initially supported the application (possibly because, as the planner eventually learned, the developer had supported the chief executive in a political campaign by distributing T-shirts bearing his image). The local planning officer enlisted the support of representatives of LUSPA, GIP, and other government agencies in opposing the decision, and the chief executive backed down. Despite this success, the planner in question also noted the risk he incurred of being punished with a transfer for doing so, particularly during an election year when politicians are particularly sensitive to their public image. Indeed, the planner believes that this incident may have been the cause for an unfavorable transfer he was subjected to two years later.

---

[140] Osei-Nyarko, P. 2019, personal communication, 12 June

While planners in local governments have used their affiliation with LUSPA to insulate them from political pressure in the past, planners now worry that the recent moves towards decentralization of planning staff, discussed in the previous chapter, may have cut off this channel of support.

- Conspiring with other local government officials

Each local government's Spatial Planning Committee (SPC) deliberates over planning decisions. The SPC is chaired by the chief executive, has the physical planning department as the secretariat, and has members from other government agencies. Some of these agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and fire department, are not decentralized, meaning that their local representatives are relatively insulated from local politics, and have less to fear from opposing a chief executive in planning meetings. For this reason, planners have sometimes found it useful to discuss their dissenting views with these other officials separately, without the knowledge of the chief executive, to try to get them to vote against the chief executive's decision in planning meetings. In interviews, planners mentioned having used this tactic successfully on at least two or three occasions. Local assembly members are also represented on the SPC, and planners have sometimes appealed to assembly members they consider "reasonable". These assembly members may then take it on themselves to convince others of the planner's position. One planner who had used this approach stressed the importance of maintaining a reputation for integrity in order to be able to enlist the support of these other committee members in this manner.

Strategic use of public participation

Another strategy that planners use to push back subtly against political decisions is to include public participation in the planning process, knowing that politicians would prefer not to expose some of these decisions to public scrutiny. The current and former director of physical planning at AMA both described instances from the last five or ten years when they have used this approach (in Accra or elsewhere). In one instance, a chief executive was receiving pressure from national party leaders before an election to approve developments that had been built within the right of way of a railway line. The planning director at the time was against this, as it meant that the AMA would have to pay compensation if they had to remove any of these structures in the future. He agreed to review the matter but said he would do so in a participatory manner, allowing the entire surrounding community to weigh in on whether the structures should be approved. In part, this was a stalling technique, as he guessed, correctly as it turned out, that the incumbent party would lose the election. The chief executive lost his position when his party lost, and the matter was dropped.[141]

While the previous example involved planners trying to combat informal growth, others involved supporting it. One of the planners interviewed recounted a land use planning and management project in a district in which he had worked. Political leaders had insisted that an informal settlement be demolished as part of this project. The local planning officers felt

[141] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July

that as the community was well-established and was "living in harmony," it would have been unnecessarily disruptive to demolish the settlement. They preferred to review structures on a case-by-case basis, and to remove only those that blocked access for emergency vehicles and utilities. The planners engaged in a sustained outreach effort, meeting with resident associations, church members, elected assembly members, and representatives of other government agencies. They involved traditional chiefs, who recruited their elders and other members to participate in focus groups. The planners even hosted a weekly local radio show in which they discussed planning issues with the public (aired just before coverage of the soccer World Cup to ensure a high listenership). The planners were able to generate support for their approach from a wide array of stakeholders, which ultimately caused the political leaders to accept their position.[142]

Planning discourse often treats public participation as a mechanism through which a powerful institution, state planning, empowers and legitimizes a less powerful group, the public, by giving it a voice. Here, in Ghana's atmosphere of competitive clientelism, the tables are turned. It is state planning that is the powerless force seeking to use public participation to borrow power and legitimacy from more powerful groups, i.e. the voting public, and in the last example, traditional authorities as well. In some cases, no actual public consultation is even conducted; it is simply the threat of public exposure, disguised by planners in non-confrontational techno-democratic terms as "public consultation", which causes the

---

[142] Gbeckor-Kove, E. 2018, personal communication, 23 July

politicians to back down from potentially scandalous decisions. In interviews, planners framed public consultation (or the threat of it) not as an opportunity for planners and politicians to learn from the public, but as a way for planners to lend weight to their pre-existing opposition to decisions by politicians which they, the planners, perceived as being based on short-term political calculation and potentially damaging to the public interest.

Media involvement

Ghana has relatively independent media, ranked as the world's 27th freest press in Reporters Without Borders' 2019 World Press Freedom Index, higher than the United States, United Kingdom, and several Western European countries.[143] It was the highest-ranking African country prior to the murder of a journalist in 2018 which appears to have been politically motivated.[144] Television and radio stations carry stories and host debates on urban development issues regularly, and local news websites usually cover the demolition of informal settlements.

The involvement of the media has caused politicians to back down from decisions that planners have opposed. One such case involved development on protected wetlands. The planning director of the local government in question secretly contacted the media about the issue, prompting a member of the public to take the government to court, which stopped the development. Another instance centered on the narrowing of a road in order to allow private

---

[143] https://rsf.org/en/ranking# Accessed 6 September 2019.
[144] https://rsf.org/en/ghana Accessed 6 September 2019.

development along it, a move opposed by the planner but supported by the chief executive for unknown reasons. In this instance, it was the residents of the area who alerted the media, not the planner, but again the controversy forced the chief executive to back down.

Self-preservation

When political pressures force planners to approve an action they disagree with and consider against the public interest, they try to at least distance themselves from these actions to protect themselves from being prosecuted for them later, which may happen if the public becomes aware of it and the chief executive is looking for a scapegoat, or if the issue is raised by subsequent political leadership following a change of government. As one planner pointed out, the chief executive may only be around for four years, while a planner hopes to remain in the system for his or her entire professional career. Often this self-preservation on the part of planners involves simply recording their objections in an official document that can be cited later. In one alleged instance (the corruption case in Takoradi mentioned in the previous chapter), when the planning director could not resist political pressure to approve the rezoning of public space that would enable a corrupt land deal, he made sure that it was his deputy's signature on the approval rather than his own.

<u>Example: Rezoning Achimota Forest</u>

The case of the thwarted attempt by senior government officials to rezone Achimota Forest in Greater Accra for commercial use illustrates the kind of political pressures planners face,

and their use of various strategies in concert to try to resist such pressure. This example came up in several interviews.

Achimota Forest is the only protected forest in Greater Accra and is one of the metropolitan area's few green spaces of any kind. Located adjacent to the University of Ghana at Legon, it covers 3.6 sq. km. (1.4 sq. miles). In 2014, the Forestry Commission of Ghana announced an "eco-tourism" project in the protected area, to be developed as a public-private partnership (E. Appiah, 2014; Otoo, 2018). The Commission invited investment from the private sector, noting that the Nairobi National Park in Kenya generates USD 8 million per year. The Minister of Lands and Natural Resources offered his "personal commitment" to the success of the project (Forestry Commission of Ghana, n.d.).

Senior figures in the national government began to apply intense and sustained pressure on the chief executive and planners to approve the development. "The pressure was too much on us," a senior planner recalled in an interview. "Initially [when] it came, we refused it. The pressure came back again."[145] This pressure on at least one planning officer took the form of an offer of a bribe as well as an anonymous phone call threatening a transfer. However, the planners were conscious of the ecological role of the forest in protecting biodiversity and retaining rainwater. They believed that the proposed development would result in severe floods, for which they might later be blamed if they supported the project. They also

[145] Yeboah, K. 2018, personal communication, 17 July

suspected that while the proposed development was supposedly for "eco-tourism" the use was likely to change once approved. Yet they knew that if they simply voted against the approval in an assembly meeting, they would lose the vote, besides inviting possible retaliation from political leaders. One of the planners facing this pressure recalls almost quitting under the stress of the situation.

Planners contributed to resisting the proposed development in various ways. First, the planning department approved the change in principle, but included a stipulation for a public consultation before the change would be finalized, knowing that this condition would deter the politicians from pursuing it. "Because the public would bash them, they couldn't go for that consultation," recalled a planner involved.[146] Second, they notified the regional and national LUSPA leadership. Third, the GIP discussed its concerns about the project with the media. Fourth, one of the local government planners noticed that Article 93(4) of the new *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act* of 2016 stated that "change of use or re-zoning of a public space shall be subjected to approval by Parliament." When notified, the Parliament referred the issue to the LUSPA board, which officially advised against the rezoning. Faced with a potential scandal, the officials who had pushed the project were forced to let it drop and could not punish the planners for their resistance for fear of further scandal. In this manner an entire suite of strategies worked in the planners' favor: threatening public consultation, seeking

---

[146] Ibid.

support from professional planning bodies, alerting the media, and also making use of a previously ignored provision in planning legislation.

Possible avenues for change

Planning in Ghana is at an impasse, unable to guide urban growth effectively. Under present conditions, Ghana's urbanization will continue to occur informally, precluding the possibility for government interventions or regulations to bring about more sustainable or inclusive outcomes. In a future in which business continues as usual, the pro-formal and anti-formal elements of urban politics will maintain their equilibrium such that despite the continued existence of some formal elements of democracy, such as strong political parties and regular elections, Ghana will not automatically move towards increasing formality or state capacity. Urban growth will continue to ignore plans and regulations. Informal settlements will continue to form and grow, benefiting to some extent from clientelistic protection and service provision, but without formal planning intervention or reliable service provision, and vulnerable to periodic evictions and demolitions. Plans and policies may continue to decry the state of planning in Ghana, and some capacity building efforts might result in marginal improvements in outcomes, but no opportunities for substantial change will come, at least until Ghana's urbanization process concludes decades in the future.[147] Even then, the physical form of cities will not be easily changed, and future generations will have to pay the economic

[147] According to UN estimates, in 2050, the final year of its current projections, 73% of Ghana's population will live in urban areas ((United Nations, 2018))

and environmental costs of Ghana's current mode of urbanization, particularly as environmental disasters become more intense and frequent as a result of climate change.

However, a change in the social, economic, or political environment may prevent this future. This section discusses the likelihood that planning and urbanization in Ghana will change course as a result of such broader changes.

Programmatic policies or reform driven by non-poor groups

How likely is it that clientelism will eventually fade away as Ghana's economy prospers and its middle class grows? Conventional notions of developing democracies assume that middle classes prefer 'universalistic' policies, i.e. those benefiting all citizens, over narrowly targeted clientelism, and as a result, the rise of the middle class in a democracy will bring about a shift away from 'particularistic' policies aimed at benefiting small groups of supporters towards universalistic ones (Levy, 2014). In theory, this would lead to more support for coordinated urban planning and the provision of long-term public goods.

Could the growth of the middle class cause this to happen in Ghana? Part of this proposition is true in the case of Ghana: the growing Ghanaian urban middle class does prefer more universalistic policies. This is potentially significant, because at least in Greater Accra, the middle class is already large enough (25% of the population) to sway elections away from clientelism. However, this has not happened. As discussed previously, politicians do not have the capacity to deliver on universalistic policy promises, so they instead ignore middle class voters and focus on the poor, who have needs that can be met more easily with particularistic

expenditures. This causes frustrated middle-class voters with universalistic preferences to give up on voting, which allows politicians to continue ignoring their preferences and to stick to clientelism without being punished at the ballot box. In local assembly elections in particular, turnout in middle class neighborhoods can be as low as 5%, compared to up to 60% in poor neighborhoods. As a result, politicians are able to win these elections with a relatively small number of votes, making narrow targeting of benefits a viable strategy. This 'trap' leads Nathan to believe that 'demand-side' pressures arising from urbanization and economic growth are unlikely to yield significant political transformation (Nathan, 2019).

The preferences of the non-poor need not express themselves only through votes but could also take the form of reform movements. As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the explanations for the decline of machine politics in the United States in the early 20th century is the efforts of a coalition of reformers from professional and business elites. These groups sought to take power away from ward-level 'bosses' with strong ties to local communities and put it in the hands of municipal technocrats whose concerns were more universal. The growth of "centralizing institutions" (public administration agencies, specialized professions, large retail establishments) and "organizational technologies" (the telephone, rapid transit, large office buildings) that created connections among people of similar class interests across the city weakened the importance of neighborhood-level ties and catalyzed this process (Hays, 1974). Some equivalent to this activity exists among Ghanaian urban elites, who in recent years have been engaging in non-partisan, reform-oriented campaigns and have founded citizen

watchdog groups like Occupy Ghana.[148] The internet, which acts both as an "organizational technology" and a non-local "centralizing institution," has enabled these activities.

Still, urban politics in early 21st century Ghana differs from that of early 20th century America. Local political 'machines' in the US were typically the result of the complete dominance of one political party, sometimes a single politician (Nelson, 1979), which is a different state of affairs than the highly competitive clientelism of Ghana. The US was much wealthier and had higher state capacity even during its days of clientelism a century ago than Ghana today. Low state capacity means that civil service reforms are less effective in the Ghanaian context than they were in the US (Nathan, 2019). Another important difference is the prevalence in Ghana of informal settlements, which differ in their legal status from low-income neighborhoods in urban America during the days of political machines. Non-poor reformers in the US could bring about the decline of clientelism in poor communities without necessarily threatening the physical existence of those communities, which were not necessarily violating the law by situating where they were. In Ghana, where clientelism is responsible for the very existence of many informal settlements on the land they occupy, insistence on rule of law by non-poor reformers could easily involve a call for the demolition of informal settlements. This would be a version of what happened in Turkey, when the political base shifted away from the migrant poor towards the middle class, which allowed a right-wing government to eschew clientelism and demolish informal settlements (see Chapter 2). For now, all of this is

---

[148] Awal, M. 2018, personal communication, 17 August

speculation, as it remains to be seen whether non-poor reform movements are likely to impact urban politics in Ghana significantly, and whether such reform would have a positive or negative effect on the poor.

Mayoral elections

As discussed above, the government scheduled a referendum to be held in December 2019, in which a change to a system whereby mayors would be locally elected instead of appointed by the president would be put to a public vote, but cancelled it at the beginning of that month. It is unclear whether the government will revive the proposal, but as it was the subject of publicity and debate in the Ghanaian media in the months leading to the cancelled referendum, it has entered the public consciousness and may resurface sooner or later.

There are mixed opinions about the possible impacts of such a change among planners in Ghana. Some argue that this change would increase local accountability in ways that would encourage mayors to support broad-based planning efforts. As mentioned in Chapter 2, a change in Colombia by which mayors were no longer nominated from above but elected locally was one of the changes that created conditions for increased accountability and the decline of clientelism (Pasotti, 2010). Others in Ghana are skeptical, noting that MMDAs depend heavily on intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national government, and that, as the national government can manipulate these transfers, local governments with opposition-party mayors would be starved of funds under the proposed system.

Additionally, mayors would not necessarily be less motivated by clientelism under the proposed system, as long as they still rely on votes to attain or remain in power. If anything, political decentralization of this sort, coupled with the administrative decentralization already partially implemented in Ghana, may enhance both the ability and the incentive for mayors and their parties to engage in competitive clientelism. For example, in the context of Mexico, local governments are "in a particularly good position to exploit the dependency of squatters upon the government" due to their close proximity to squatter communities (Larreguy et al., 2018, pp. 21–22). Similarly, decentralization in Indonesia simply multiplied the sites of informal deal-making rather than diminishing it (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, p. 12).

For now, Ghanaian politicians cannot act alone and are dependent on party support, so even when an individual constituency has universalistic preferences, politicians cannot easily tailor their behavior to suit these preferences. This suggests that if mayors are to be elected locally and are given enough autonomy to set and implement their own policies, they may pursue differentiated or bifurcated approaches: mayors of middle-class MMDAs would provide more universalistic benefits, whereas clientelism would be reinforced in MMDAs with larger poor populations. Such 'dual appeals' are made in Chile, where spatial segregation has allowed the conservative UDI party to combine policy-based appeals to middle-class and wealthy voters and clientelistic appeals to the poor (Nathan, 2019).

However, one potential outcome of such a change could have an anti-clientelistic effect. Recent research (Frey, 2018a, 2018b; Larreguy et al., 2018) has demonstrated that in federal countries like Mexico and Brazil, national and state governments sometimes establish

programs to distribute irrevocable, non-clientelistic benefits (e.g. land titles in Mexico [see Chapter 2], cash transfers and cisterns in Brazil) such that they undermine the ability for mayors from other parties to benefit from clientelism at the municipal level, even if in doing so they also undermine their own parties' ability to engage in local clientelism. This recalls the role federal welfare programs in the United States played in undermining the power of local political bosses. Even though this behavior has not been relevant in Ghana so far due to its unitary structure, in which chief executives are necessarily aligned with the national government, it may become a factor in a system with locally elected mayors who may be from opposition parties. A scenario is possible in which, for example, the incumbent party at the national level, threatened by opposition mayors' clientelistic cultivation of votes from informal settlements, implements a universal (non-clientelistic) land titling or upgrading program across urban areas in order to weaken incumbent mayors' advantage, which would also have a long-term effect of weakening clientelism overall. This would be a potential positive outcome of the proposed change (albeit one which interviewed experts or academic sources did not mention in the Ghanaian context).

Authoritarianism or populism

Chapter 2 briefly described how the rapid growth of informal settlements in Chile contributed to the sense of disorder which led to a military coup in the 1970s, and that this ended the state's clientelistic support for squatting. While Ghana's political settlement seems stable for now, some unforeseeable economic or environmental shock could create the conditions for authoritarianism to take over. Even if there is no military coup, voters may

become frustrated enough to democratically elect a 'strong-man' type populist leader, as has occurred in India and the Philippines, who would have free reign to target informality. If a right-wing authoritarian or populist regime exploits frustration with urban disorder or nativist resentment of migrants, it might consolidate its support by demolishing informal settlements under the banner of rule of law and technocratic efficiency. Such a regime would boost the power of planners to shape the city, but it would do so in a way that would harm the poor.

For now, none of the above changes in the overall political environment appear imminent. Still, it may be possible for planning in Ghana to take a different approach, one which is reformulated to be more effective under the current political settlement. What such an approach might look like is the subject of the following section.

Recommendations

Past recommendations

Government policies and plans

Ghana has many national, regional, and local policy documents which aim to support urban informality in urban Ghana, but the reality on the ground, in which informal settlers and vendors are the target of harsh antagonism by the state, contradicts these documents (see Chapter 4). Recently updated planning legislation supports the implementation of plans, but at least in the brief period that has elapsed so far since the passage of the *Land Use and Spatial Planning Act* of 2016, the results have not been transformative. This suggests that neither

broad policy directives nor legislative changes alone are likely to allow planners to work more effectively or the urban poor in informal settlements to prosper.

Spatial plans mention in passing the difficulties local governments in Ghana have had in implementing previous plans, but addressing the political concerns that are the main constraints to the implementation of plans in the country is beyond their remit. The government usually outsources the preparation of these documents to consulting firms which have no incentive to stray from the scope of traditional spatial plans in order to take on the broader sociopolitical environment of planning, even if they are well aware of the likely fate of their spatial plans. A planning consultant who has worked on several such plans acknowledged in an interview that the government rarely implements the plans that he helps prepare. Perhaps the well-established narrative of 'planning failure' in Ghana means that planners never feel much responsibility to make plans that are actually implementable. In a situation where plans are unlikely to be implemented because of political factors beyond any planner's control, a plan might as well be ambitious and idealized. A beautiful plan on paper reflects well on a planner, even if the most impressive elements also make the plan even less likely to be implemented.

International development organizations

International development organizations, with their broad expertise and developmental remit, may be expected to take a more holistic perspective in their reports on urban development than spatial plans do. However, while they sometimes do mention political

issues in passing, they typically shy away from addressing them in depth. For example, a World Bank study of urbanization in Ghana (World Bank, 2015) mentions "undue political interference" as one of the factors responsible for "unplanned" spatial expansion and mentions that the success of new planning regulations require "strong political support". However, it does not expand on what this means, and its recommendations concern reforming land regulations, strengthening municipal finance, building transportation infrastructure, institutional coordination, and decentralization, without much discussion of the political environment. Another World Bank study, on urban resilience in Greater Accra (World Bank, 2017b), makes frequent reference to lack of planning and implementation capacity, poor planning methods, lack of enforcement of plans, poor coordination, and insufficient participation, but only mentions politics glancingly and vaguely. Its two mentions of politics are of "insufficient local political will" as a challenge for urban finance, and of how sanitation policies remain powerless because political and traditional leaders "plead" on behalf of constituents who do not comply to protect them from punishment. A UN-Habitat profile of Accra (Abankwa et al., 2009) does mention "lack of political will" once and "political interference" three times, but does not explore these issues beyond brief mentions. The *Accra Resilience Strategy* (Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities, 2019) mentions politics only very indirectly.

The exclusion of critical political issues in publications by international organizations does not necessarily mean that their staff are unaware of these issues, though given that staff and consultants based abroad often lead these organizations' projects and studies makes it possible

that they are. Perhaps they believe that it would be inappropriate for international organizations to get involved in or even comment on local politics, given the sensitivity around these issues, and that as a result prefer to restrict discussions to technical, financial, and regulatory issues, which are important in their own right. Besides, pointed political critiques may hit uncomfortably close to home to government officials with whom these organizations must maintain positive relationships (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013). However, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, one cannot disentangle political issues from any of the other issues surrounding urban planning and informality in Ghana, and these publications either misunderstand or misrepresent their subject matter by avoiding politics.

The apolitical tendencies of international development institutions have been well-documented. According to Carothers and de Gramont, "international development assistance has had an uncertain and uncomfortable relationship with politics" since its early years (2013, p. 3). "To fulfill their central economic mission, aid organizations held fast to what can be called 'the temptation of the technical,' the belief that they could help economically transform poor countries by providing timely doses of capital and technical knowledge while maintaining a comfortably clinical distance from these countries' internal political life," they write, before cataloging the various ways in which ignoring politics can cause well-intentioned development efforts to be ineffective or even harmful. In *The Anti-Politics Machine,* Ferguson (1990) describes how a World Bank project in Lesotho focused on technical concerns and ignored entrenched political interests, eventually finding itself ill-equipped to play the political game in which it suddenly found itself. In a study of housing in Ghana, Sarfoh

(2010, p. 93) argues that development theories and prescriptions originating in international agencies suffer from not acknowledging the ways in which they are "inscribed into local structures" or "indigenized" through the influence of politics.

The following passage (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019, pp. 257–258), though written about Indonesia, applies well enough to Ghana, and likely to many other clientelistic democracies, that it is worth quoting at length:

> *Policies and development interventions are destined to fail if they operate on the assumption that Indonesia's state is a rule-bound, Weberian institution only occasionally waylaid by deviant behavior. Clientelistic exchange relations pervade state institutions and affect their basic functioning. Any policy intervention or development initiative should start by recognizing this reality, rather than wishing it away [...]*
>
> *In our experience, policy makers as well as development organizations struggle to incorporate this political dimension into their work. This is understandable: it is much easier and less risky for them to work on training in technical skills or the preparation of guidelines and operating procedures than to deal with politics head-on. Compared to technical fixes, political approaches are messy and controversial since they involve, in one way or another, addressing power inequalities. Consequently, much policy making and development cooperation still proceeds on the assumption (or hope) that the provision of knowledge and skills, the training of a few bureaucrats or judges, or the adoption of a particular policy will fix a problem. This logic gives rise to a never-ending seminar circuit in Jakarta's upmarket hotels, where new skills and policies are eagerly discussed, whether the topic at hand is legal development, the environment, urban planning, or bureaucratic reform. We have often participated in such seminars; it is very*

> *common that someone in the course of the discussions will observe that even if the policy or law being suggested is adopted, it will have little effect, because Indonesia's major problems relate to implementation rather than policy design. Often everyone agrees—but the conversation typically then resumes its course. The elephant in these hotel rooms, in other words, is informal politics.*

A notable exception to this trend of international agencies avoiding Ghanaian politics is the report on urban governance and services in Ghana, prepared by ICF Consulting Services for UK Aid and Cities Alliance (2017), a publication that previous chapters cite frequently. Unlike the other reports on urban Ghana, this report uses competitive clientelism as its framing concept, leading to an unusually clear-eyed and sophisticated reading of the political nature of urban issues relating to planning, land, finances, and service delivery in the country. Disappointingly, the recommendations for planning in this report too are somewhat conventional and vague, focusing on institutional capacity-building and changes to planning procedures, which do not follow from the preceding diagnosis.

Academic publications

Like the ICF report, many academic studies feature insightful diagnoses of the problems, including the political problems, that afflict urban planning in Ghana, but then follow them up with recommendations that are either non-specific or unrealistic in the prevailing political environment. These include:

- the creation of secondary and tertiary cities, participatory slum upgrading programs, and

building institutional capacity and collaboration (Amoako & Cobbinah, 2011);

- "[h]aving effective land management and land use planning systems in place" (Agyemang & Morrison, 2018, p. 2655);
- making the TCPD (now LUSPA) "an independent entity, devoid of undue political interference and control but work[ing] collaboratively with both urban residents and political elites" (Cobbinah & Darkwah, 2017, p. 1243);
- "rethinking the overall urban planning and development processes, urban land management and participatory urban governance and the right to urban citizenship" (Amoako, 2016, p. 15);
- "rethink[ing] the essence of decentralised local government by building stakeholder capacity for effective participation in decision-making as well as delinking overly parochial political interests of individuals and groups from those of societal interests to allow development programmes to progress uninhibited" (Fuseini & Kemp, 2015, p. 319);
- "introducing and adhering to the philosophy of sustainable urban development in the urban development process" (Cobbinah et al., 2017, p. 44); and
- "[p]olitical will at all levels of government" (Arku et al., 2016, p. 379).

The intention here is not to denigrate the work of these scholars, the insights of many of whom have been valuable in developing the argument presented in previous chapters, but rather to identify a gap in the literature around clientelism and planning in Ghana.

Many of these recommendations have a tautological quality: the solution to a lack of public participation is to ensure more public participation; to reduce the lack of enforcement of plans, plans must be better enforced, etc. In other words, the solution to the problem is for the problem to be solved. Practically all the documents mentioned above, including academic works, reports of international development organizations and national government policies, discuss the need to build "capacity" of one kind or another. The concept of capacity, according to Williams (2018, p. 4), "misrepresents the *mechanisms* of bureaucratic performance and policy implementation and obscures the *contingency* of performance and implementation on the details of politics, policies, and contexts." The World Bank too has made a similar argument in a *World Development Report*: "If organizational failures are the result of deeper weaknesses in institutional arrangements (weak political commitment, unclear objectives, no enforceability), direct attacks on the proximate determinants (more money, better training, more internal information) will fail" (World Bank, 2003, p. 58). Especially for international organizations, it is convenient to focus on the capacity of a government agency in terms of staff, training modules, and equipment, which international organizations can provide and measure easily, even if that capacity is irrelevant in the given context, e.g. if the agency is hamstrung by political interference or corruption.

Lastly, many academic sources and development organizations call for more "political will." The recurring call for political will across contexts imagines politicians' behavior to be the outcome not of political incentives and public demands but simply of a lack of moral fiber.

Recommendations: Politically Adaptive Planning

The recommendations that follow take a 'politically adaptive' approach, building on the understanding of urban political dynamics that previous chapters have tried to develop and on the observations above about what is already working for both planners and the urban poor. The recommendations aim to satisfy two broad needs, which sometimes pull in opposite directions: first, the need to free planning from political interference in order to facilitate the implementation of plans, and second, the need to support the rights of the urban poor living in informal settlements, in an environment where the only reason they are able to remain where they are may be political interference itself. To complicate matters further, informal settlements are sometimes situated on vulnerable land, e.g. in flood plains, and while demolition of informal settlements has often been carried out in an unnecessarily brutal and antagonistic manner, some relocation of settlements seems justifiable. Any recommendations must balance these partially contradictory needs.

1. *Planning watchdog: Insulating planning from political interference through an independent urban planning oversight organization*

The recent decentralization of planning staff from national to local government service seems destined to result in rampant politicization of planning in Ghana, such that only the planners willing to carry out politically motivated decisions will stand a chance of remaining in senior positions, while those that do not will find their careers thwarted. Local governments already had planning departments with the same planners working in them, which means that there

is little practical benefit of the move in terms of decentralization. For these reasons, an important first step would be to reverse this decentralization and re-map local planners to the national level, which gives them a slightly greater degree of insulation from local political interference.

Even if this change is reversible, it would not be sufficient, as planners were vulnerable to local political pressures even before the change. However, as this chapter has shown, they have found ways to fend off this pressure: appealing to bodies like the Ghana Institute of Planners and LUSPA and informing the public and media of unsound political decisions. These approaches have only been partially successful and have had to be used with caution so as not to provoke hostility and retaliation from political leaders. Yet, they hint at an approach which might build on what has worked in the past.

As this chapter has described, GIP and LUSPA have played a 'watchdog' or oversight role at times, coming to the aid of local planners facing political pressures. However, this is not their primarily role, and they do not have the resources to devote staff to this task full-time. As a government agency, LUSPA is also not completely independent. This suggests that there is potential for an independent urban planning oversight organization, created with the involvement of Ghanaian civil society organizations, and perhaps funded with support from international donors.

In order to reduce political interference in planning, such an organization could: (1) respond to calls for support from planners facing political pressures, much like GIP and LUSPA have

done in the past; (2) independently keep track of planning-related decisions, including new building permits issued as well as transfers of planning staff, and investigate those that appear politically motivated; and (3) alert the public and media to political interference in planning decisions, through the publication of reports and press releases. At the same time, in order to prevent planners from abusing their newfound independence and indiscriminately demolishing informal settlements that may have been protected through clientelism previously, the organization might also (4) ensure that any demolition of informal settlements is strictly justified on safety or environmental grounds, and is accompanied by sufficient compensation and resettlement in a suitable location in accordance with international standards. International donor funding in support of plan preparation or other related activities could be contingent on adhering to these international standards. The organization could either be independent from or affiliated with the Ghana Institute of Planners.

Realistically, such an organization is likely to become politicized itself, but this is not necessarily bad. Most likely it would be used as a tool for the opposition party at any given time to check the excesses of the incumbent party. In this case, competitive politics would benefit the organization: each party would have an incentive to allow it to exist when it is incumbent, so that it can use it when it is in the opposition. Such an organization may even be established by an opposition party, soon after an election loss. As the examples in this chapter has shown, fear of political backlash has at times caused politicians to back down from self-serving decisions. If through the work of an oversight organization such as the one

proposed, planning issues systematically become campaign issues, politics would work in planning's favor.

2. *Planned clientelism: Facilitating the provision of more coordinated, long-term benefits in low-income settlements through clientelism*

If something is defined as 'informal' when it has social or political legitimacy without having official or legal legitimacy, planning is an example of the opposite of informality (which has no corresponding name): something that has only official or legal legitimacy without any social or political legitimacy. Planning does not have inherent power of its own and is incapable of reshaping dominant power relations or the political settlement by itself. Planning tends to be taken seriously only when it aligns itself with the institutions that are already powerful within a given political settlement. In a country like the United States this might mean large corporations or powerful advocacy groups, while the equivalent in China might be the Communist Party. Ideally, progressive planners can then push these institutions from within to act more sustainably and inclusively. The dominant political settlement in Ghana is competitive clientelism, and this is the powerful institution with which planning must align itself in order to wield any power. This echoes arguments made by other authors (Levy, 2014; Payne, 2016) that planning, and development in general, should "work with the grain" of politics. This means seeking opportunities for incremental reform that are compatible with the incentives of influential actors and pre-existing social relations, even if the long-term aim of this reform efforts is to change these incentives (Goodfellow, 2019, p. 14). With this in mind, planning in clientelistic environments must seek ways to work with clientelism while

simultaneously moving the clientelistic provision of benefits towards more coordinated, long-term goods, in effect producing something that can be described as 'planned clientelism.'

This could mean working with poor urban communities and traditional authorities to prepare a coordinated list of community needs, with associated costs, from which political patrons can choose (like guests at a wedding selecting gifts from a registry established by the recipients). Such an approach would potentially be useful to planners, political patrons, and low-income communities alike:

- Planners could bring technical knowledge to bear on what would be most useful for a community and make a case to a community for their inclusion on their list. Planners would also be able to coordinate the needs of adjacent communities and align them with larger spatial plans.
- Patrons could publicly sponsor certain benefits on the list, e.g. land titles, better drainage, paved roads, cement for the construction of public toilets, bulbs for street lights, etc. particularly in the run-up to elections. Providing the benefits from the established list would allow them to more easily take credit. The political parties may eventually find it useful to consolidate such lists and pay for items or materials in bulk rather than leaving it to individual candidates to determine and pay for the needs of their constituencies in isolation. The resulting economies of scale would result in greater benefits being provided than through the current, uncoordinated system.
- In this system, client communities would be better equipped to hold patrons accountable

if they do not deliver. Civil society organizations could assist in keeping track of the fulfillment of these promises. It would also allow communities to play politicians off one another. In the competitive politics of Ghana, some communities would see bidding wars, with competing candidates aiming to outdo each other by providing the bigger or higher-priority item on the list. With the help of planners, a list or 'registry' such as this could result in the provision of not just private favors, or short-term, uncoordinated, redundant club goods as described in previous chapters, but long-term public goods.

Chapter 5 mentioned the MP who worked with planners to site the roads he was paying for through his share of the Common Fund. It also described the aspiring MP who, following a fire, asked his supporters in Old Fadama to "coordinate within their groups and to write down what they needed" (Paller, 2019c, p. 450). These incidents may be insignificant in isolation, but hint at a willingness on the part of political patrons to seek guidance from both planners and residents of informal settlements in determining the exact nature and location of discretionary benefits provided, which is the essence of 'planned clientelism.'

Ideally, local government planners would lead or participate actively in such an exercise, as this would enable coordination among different communities and between community-level and city-level spatial plans. However, if government officials lack the resources or the willingness to engage in such an exercise, community-based organizations, international development organizations, planning departments at universities, or others could perform a similar planning and coordinating function.

This intervention goes with rather than against a dominant political institution, in this case competitive clientelism. This may seem to contradict the argument made in Chapter 2, that planning and clientelism are at odds. However, the fact that the two cannot co-exist indefinitely is part of the motivation for bringing them together: just as clientelism has undermined a politically naïve form of planning in Ghana, the more politically astute form of planning advocated here has the potential to undermine clientelism. 'Planned clientelism' can insidiously weaken clientelism 'from within' by pushing demands towards more and more long-term public goods, including formal land titles and durable infrastructure in the case of informal settlements, which would eventually release communities from the need to depend on clientelism. This approach is therefore incremental at first, but potentially transformative over time.

3. *Guided informal growth*

Local government planners could guide urban growth more effectively by developing recommended, but not legally binding, spatial layouts to chiefs who hold vacant land in rapidly urbanizing areas. As the conclusion to Chapter 3 observed, the prevalence of informal subdivisions globally points to new ways for state planners to engage with urban growth. Informal subdivisions in Accra make up half of new urban expansion, and grow mainly through the actions of traditional authorities who hire unlicensed surveyors to subdivide customary land holdings for sale (see Chapter 6). Chiefs may prefer to avoid the effort and cost associated with formal subdivision, but the fact that they nonetheless pay for their land holdings to be spatially organized and subdivided before sale, rather than simply creating new

plots on an *ad hoc* basis, suggests that market demand exists for some form of spatial planning. The provision of recommended spatial layouts responds to this demand.

The state could also provide a special category of licenses to previously unlicensed surveyors, contingent on following certain minimal guidelines in their subdivisions. The prospect of formalization of their practice, and the associated increase in demand and fees, would incentivize them to comply. These recommended layouts and subdivision guidelines could be devised with future infrastructure upgrading in mind. Prospective land buyers would likely demand subdivisions laid out according to these guidelines if it is easier for the government to provide infrastructure to them later.

This approach would follow historical precedent first established by British colonial administrators in Accra in the 1930s. Government reports at the time noted that while there was no formal planning, the government's extensive provision of layouts "by agreement with" the local chiefs or landowners had been effective in "ensuring correct development" of stool lands adjacent to Accra, and that chiefs and landowners actively requested such layouts (see Appendix 2). Even today, chiefs do sometimes seek the cooperation of government spatial planners (see Chapter 5), which means that the workability of this approach is plausible.

Generalizability of these recommendations

These three specific recommendations have been developed with urban Ghana in mind and may or may not be directly applicable to other contexts. Countries which share certain features with Ghana are likelier to find these specific recommendations useful:

- *Primarily political barriers to planning:* These recommendations take as a starting point the fact that, despite other constraints, the main barriers to the implementation of plans in Ghana are political. They take into account that Ghana already has relatively supportive legislation in place, especially since 2016; has at least some trained urban planners available in the public and private sector, even if this number is relatively low in Ghana; and that there is funding for plans to be drafted, even if these funds are from external sources. These recommendations are likelier to translate to countries where this basic planning capacity exists, which may include several other middle-income democracies including Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, and South Africa.
- *Competitive clientelism:* These recommendations are likely to be more easily translatable to countries in which the dominant political settlement is competitive clientelism. An oversight organization like the one in the first recommendation above is likelier to survive where political power changes hands frequently, so that the incumbent party can foresee a time when it is in the opposition. Close elections give parties an incentive to compete vigorously in order to respond to lists of demands from an existing or potential client community. While there is no definitive list of countries that feature competitive clientelism, several of the countries listed under the previous point are likely to fall into this category.
- *Well-established and stable political parties*: For the same reasons as those outlined in the previous point, these recommendations are also likelier to work in countries with a small number of relatively strongly institutionalized political parties, as opposed to a large

number of independent fly-by-night candidates who are not seeking to build long-term reputations.

- *Civil society and media:* A nascent tradition of civil society activism and an independent media, both of which exist in Ghana, would aid the institution of an oversight organization.
- *Prevalence of informal subdivisions:* The provision of spatial layouts for subdivisions as discussed in the third recommendation is likely to be most effective in contexts where a dominant mode of urban growth is through informal subdivisions, i.e. large swathes of land are laid out prior to settlement, rather than where informal urban growth happens primarily in the form of 'atomistic' settlements.

Summary

While planners in Ghana are hamstrung by political interference, they have found ways to occasionally circumvent political pressures, including calling for professional back-up from planning organizations, conspiring with other local government officials to oppose politically-motivated decisions, and using public participation and the media strategically to discourage politicians from making potentially unpopular decisions. While changes to the broader sociopolitical environment surrounding planning, e.g. the growth of the middle class, a move to elect rather than appoint mayors, or larger political shifts, are unlikely to transform the situation, a 'politically adaptive' approach can help planning in Ghana advance beyond the current impasse. Whereas past recommendations lack realistic solutions to the political

challenges planning faces in the country, a politically adaptive approach can make use of what is already working for planners (the strategies mentioned above) and the urban poor (clientelistic provision of neighborhood-scale public goods) to achieve planning goals. The recommendations proposed in this chapter are examples of interventions generated by such an approach when applied to Ghana. The next chapter proposes a general framework for politically adaptive planning which can be applied more broadly.

Chapter 8: A Framework for Politically Adaptive Planning

"[…] This sort of academic theorizing may be an amusing occupation for close friends chattering among themselves. But in a king's council chamber, where important matters are debated by important people, there's no time for such matters."

"But," said Raphael, "that's exactly my point. Kings have no time for philosophy."

"Yes they do", I replied, "but not for this ivory-tower theorizing, which makes no allowances for time and place. There's another philosophy, better suited to politics, which recognizes the play that's being staged, adapts itself to playing a part in it, revises what it has to say as the drama unfolds, and speaks appropriately for the time and place. That's the philosophy you should adopt. […] You will have made a complete mess of the play that's being performed when you mixed it up with another, even if your speeches come from a better play than the one on stage."

- Thomas More, *Utopia* (1516)

Questions of how people organize their activities across space and what resources they can access are relevant to every human challenge the world faces today. Policymakers cannot address these challenges, which include reducing poverty and inequality, combating climate change, and mitigating disaster risk, without considering these questions. The coronavirus pandemic, which is infecting thousands each day and causing unprecedented disruption across the world as this dissertation is being completed, draws attention to how these questions are

also central to protecting public health. The spatial organization of human activity and expanding access to resources are also the core concerns of urban planning. The state has a vital role in anticipating and coordinating the provision of urban public goods and planning future urban growth. This role is particularly important during a time of unprecedented urbanization, which will have economic, social, and environmental impacts lasting generations. Yet traditional approaches to urban planning and policy have failed to meet the needs of many low- and middle-income countries in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere which are urbanizing rapidly. This is largely because these approaches have not adapted to the sociopolitical contexts of these places.

The fictional exchange quoted at the beginning of this chapter, written centuries ago, suggests that people have long debated whether and how policymakers ought to adapt policy to the political realities of their time and place. Although the fictional country from which the book *Utopia* takes its name has become a byword for an unrealistically idealized vision of society, in the passage above More in fact argues for pragmatism and against, in modern terms, the adoption of 'best practices' that are in use in more successful systems ("speeches [which] come from a better play than the one on stage.") This study has aimed to use the literature on informal urban politics from a range of disciplines, statistical analysis of spatial data from satellite imagery, and interviews in the field to help planners and policymakers "recognize the play that's being staged," i.e. to make a case that urban growth in developing democracies cannot be fully understood, or guided to be more equitable or sustainable, without knowledge of the informal politics that drive it.

This concluding chapter outlines a framework for a 'politically adaptive' approach to planning. While the preceding chapter applied such an approach to Ghana in particular, the framework below identifies guiding principles for applying it to a broader variety of contexts. The second part of this chapter reflects on areas for future research that can build on this study.

Politically adaptive planning: a proposed framework

The recommendations for planning in Ghana in the previous chapter took a 'politically adaptive' approach to planning. The specific recommendations there responded to Ghana's specific political, social, and institutional environment, but the approach can be generalized into a set of guidelines which may be useful more broadly, especially in highly informal contexts.

Guidelines

1. Identify planning principles.

Planning does not need to be 'political' in terms of supporting specific political parties, candidates, or agendas, but it does have to be 'politic'—practical and expedient under given circumstances. However, while the term 'politic' also connotes a lack of regard for ethics or principles,[149] the strategies planners use in determining a politically adaptive course of action should follow from a well-established set of principles. These may be broad, universal

[149] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/politic

principles (socioeconomic equity, environmental sustainability) or principles particularly applicable in a given context (e.g. public safety, advancing women's rights, respecting cultural traditions).

2. Identify those benefiting from the *status quo*.

Planning initiatives usually begin by identifying those who currently have unmet needs, who are the intended beneficiaries of the initiative. However, they do not always systematically identify parties who may have a vested interest in maintaining the current situation, and how they may use their power to block change. An important guiding question to ask while proposing any planning initiative is: *Why would someone in a position of power who benefits from the* status quo *support the proposed change?* If the only reason is that it is 'the right thing to do' in an abstract sense, the proposal is unlikely to gain purchase.

The means by which these interests may hinder plans, projects or policies may be overt, e.g. through public opposition, bribery, or intimidation, but they may be more subtle, through professing support publicly but not providing the required resources to ensure success, or diverting the resources received towards other uses. This is particularly relevant when initiatives are funded by international donors, where politicians have an incentive to be seen publicly with foreign officials and receive funds under the banner of a specific project but may have little incentive to use the funds for the intended purposes. (In some cases, the staff of donor organizations may also have an incentive to ignore these irregularities in the interest of making the project appear successful.)

3. Identify reasons why the intended beneficiaries may oppose change.

While planners may assume that the intended beneficiaries of an initiative are in favor of it, the latter may trust the established *status quo*, suboptimal though it may be, more than a proposed change, particularly in contexts where they have been previously antagonized by planning efforts. These communities may have invested their limited social and political capital in establishing the existing relationships and channels of access, which they would be unlikely to give up easily. In many cases, a failed or only partially successful planning initiative may do more harm than good, disrupting existing practices and networks without adequately compensating for them. Communities which may seem to oppose planning efforts intended to benefit them out of ignorance may instead be judiciously defending the little they have and showing understandable caution about the transformative potential of planning.

4. Identify what is already working.

New political regimes, newly incumbent political parties or politicians, and donor agencies alike often feel the need to discard past practices or systems which appear to have failed. However, while there is rhetorical power in making a clean break from the past, it is rarely the most practical course of action. It loses the 'tacit knowledge' and strategies developed over time by actors in the current system, and replaces it with an untested system, which may well prove to be unrealistic in the given political context. The politically adaptive approach would be to identify what is already working in that context, both for planners and the public, even if only partially, occasionally, or temporarily so far, and find ways to make more room for those practices to succeed more substantially.

5. Identify existing organizations that can implement initiatives without being co-opted, if any.

Planning initiatives should be cautious in recommending the creation of new organizations, not just because of the high upfront costs, but also because such an organization may be co-opted by powerful interests during their formation, e.g. through staffing choices. If an organization already exists which has managed to maintain its political independence over time, it may be easier to build technical and financial capacity in such an organization than ensure the political autonomy of a new organization. However, planners must also consider the increased risk of co-option involved in increasing the prominence and resources of such an organization.

6. Consider the social or cultural roots of existing practices.

While this approach emphasizes the role of politics, often what appears to be political behavior is instead a social or cultural behavior manifested through political institutions. As discussed earlier, the role of politicians in Ghana as patrons is an example of this. While it may appear to be a simple exchange of benefits for votes emerging from the demands of modern electoral politics, it is in fact rooted partly in traditional expectations of leaders as benefactors and family heads. As a result, rather than being destroyed by regulatory or institutional changes, clientelism may re-emerge in a different form in the new environment,

and client communities perceived to be suffering as a result of it may show more attachment to it than reformers expect.[150]

7. Identify opportune moments to introduce new initiatives.

In democracies, politicians are likely to be particularly sensitive to public opinion before elections, and particularly insensitive to it following electoral victories, especially those won with a large majority. Depending on the nature of the initiative in question, planners can enhance the chances of political support by taking electoral cycles into account. Initiatives that are in high demand by the voting public but that political leaders are typically reluctant to invest in are likeliest to find support during competitive election campaigns. Initiatives that may be unpopular with the public in the short run but are likely to demonstrate their benefits in a few years are best introduced immediately after elections. Of course, such calculations are routine for politicians, but have not been fully absorbed into planning practice.

The Ghana case study as an example of politically adaptive planning

The table below shows how the recommendations provided for Ghana in the previous chapter exemplify the guidelines described above:

[150] Taking into account the cultural roots of practices need not mean accepting them, as traditional cultural practices may run counter to the principles identified at the start, particularly those of non-discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, ethnicity, etc.

Table 4: Politically adaptive planning guidelines applied to Ghana

Guidelines	**Application to Ghana**	**Politically adaptive recommendations for Ghana**
1. Identify planning principles.	The recommendations aim to increase the ability for planning to provide urban public goods and manage spatial growth, without unnecessary evictions and demolitions of informal settlements.	The planning 'watchdog' organization and 'planned clientelism' increase the ability for planners to provide public goods. The watchdog organization and 'guided informal growth' help planners manage spatial growth. The watchdog organization prevents unnecessary evictions and demolitions. Growth that occurs through 'guided informal growth' is less likely to be demolished.
2. Identify those benefiting from the *status quo*.	Political patrons take advantage of the vulnerability of residents of informal settlements and use clientelism to reward supporters. They have little incentive to support broad planning efforts, and frequently pressure planners to make exceptions to regulations. Traditional authorities resist planning regulations that interfere with their ability to distribute or sell land.	'Planned clientelism' works with rather than against politicians' desire to provide benefits to informal settlements. The watchdog organization increases planners' ability to resist political pressure. 'Guided informal growth' allows traditional authorities to subdivide land, but with some professional planning guidance.

3. Identify reasons why the intended beneficiaries may oppose change.	Residents of informal settlements may not want to relinquish their ability to receive benefits from political patrons.	'Planned clientelism' works with rather than against the ability for informal settlements to receive benefits from political patrons.
4. Identify what is already working.	Planners use various strategies to circumvent political interference, including appealing to professional organizations, the media, and the public. Some informal settlements benefit from informal politics to receive services and avoid demolition.	The proposed functions of the planning watchdog organization build on planners' strategies, by supporting local planners' decisions, tracking their transfers, and using the media and public awareness to combat the politicization of planning decisions. 'Planned clientelism' builds on these positive aspects of informal politics.
5. Identify existing organizations that can implement initiatives without being co-opted, if any.	The Ghana Institute of Planners (GIP) occasionally plays an oversight role and appears politically independent.	The planning watchdog organization may be a strengthened version of the GIP.
6. Consider the social or cultural roots of existing practices.	Clientelism is rooted in traditional expectations of community leadership in Ghana.	'Planned clientelism' does not seek to end clientelism but works with the aspects of it which benefit the poor while also allowing them to move beyond it over time.

7. Identify opportune moments to introduce new initiatives.	In Ghana's competitive political environment, parties are eager to court votes from informal settlers preceding elections, and opposition parties are vocal in their criticisms of ruling party actions.	The watchdog organization may be instituted by an opposition party shortly after an election, while 'planned clientelism' is likely to get the most traction before elections.

Directions for future research

Using new sources of quantitative data for mixed methods research

While the majority of research on informal politics in low-income urban settlements has been qualitative and has focused on single settlements or cities, the analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrates that new sources of global data on land use patterns and political behavior can be combined to generate insights on the spatial impacts of urban politics at spatial and temporal scales that are beyond the scope of a qualitative case study. Research, including this study, has barely begun to exploit the full combined potential of data sets such as the Varieties of Democracy database, the *Atlas of Urban Expansion*, the Global Human Settlements database, and others. This promises possibilities for mixed methods research in which relationships observed in ethnographic data collection or interviews can be tested empirically across a large number of cities, or trends first observed in statistical models can be better understood through qualitative fieldwork.

Understanding informal subdivisions

According to data in the *Atlas of Urban Expansion* discussed in Chapter 3, the mean share of residential area in the *Atlas*' sample of 200 cities that took the form of informal subdivisions prior to 1990 was 17%, while the share in areas that grew between 1990 and 2015 was 29%. In cities in low- and lower-middle-income countries, which are expected to see the greatest amounts of urban growth in coming decades, the 1990-2015 share of informal subdivisions was higher still, at 35% (up from 21% in pre-1990 areas). This suggests that informal subdivisions are an increasingly important form of global urban growth, one which deserves more comparative investigation. The discussion in Chapter 6 of the power dynamics around land and urban growth in Ghana suggested that the informal subdivisions there are most likely the result of customary land rights accorded to traditional authorities, who hire unlicensed 'quack' surveyors to subdivide peri-urban land in ways that do not conform to planning regulations. This mechanism for the formation of informal subdivisions may be common in several African countries, and it has also been documented in places as diverse as Mexico and the Pacific Islands, where some form of traditional land rights exist (Payne, 1989). However, other studies have described the formation of informal subdivisions through organized invasions of land (e.g. Burgwal, 1995; Holland, 2017), through the unauthorized subdivision of legally purchased land (Cunha, 2009), or the 'informalization' of legal subdivisions over time (Björkman, 2014b). While Chapter 3 was able to demonstrate a broad correlation between informal settlements and clientelism globally, the exact role of informal politics in

this type of urban growth is likely to vary between these mechanisms of formation and warrants further study.

Comparing the impacts of informal politics on planning across sectors

This study has focused largely on the relationship between informal politics and land use in the form of informal urban growth. A number of studies have examined the politics surrounding other informal urban sectors, e.g. informal transportation (Goodfellow, 2015; Klopp, 2012; Kumar, 2011; Venter, 2013, inter alia). Future research that compares the impact of politics on these other sectors with its impact on informal land use may be instructive to policymakers. For example, if it is easier for planners to work with informal transportation operators because they are organized into route associations or unions, are there equivalent bodies in the case of informal settlements, or could such bodies be created? Do successful attempts at formalization of informal transportation have any lessons for informal settlements in a similar political environment? Conversely, are 'informal' settlements and 'informal' transportation services so fundamentally different that they should not be grouped together as part of the same phenomenon ('urban informality') at all? Similar questions could be asked about informal retail, informal waste management, and other areas. This study has not focused directly on environmental concerns, but the kinds of political issues discussed here, about the role of technical experts vis-à-vis politicians and how the poor access scarce resources, have clear relevance to environmental planning. Examples of this kind of comparative political analysis of urban informality across sectors have been rare, suggesting a gap in the literature.

Situating recommendations within a political settlement

The previous chapter discussed the fact that past research on planning in Ghana, particularly from international development organizations, has often ignored the important role of politics in the lack of implementation of plans. This is in keeping with the reluctance on the part of international organizations to engage with politics, which other scholars have also observed (Carothers & de Gramont, 2013; Ferguson, 1990). A handful of studies from international organizations as well as several academic studies have in fact included insightful descriptions of informal political dynamics, but nonetheless have concluded with recommendations that focus on technical constraints. To the extent that their recommendations touch on politics, they are vague, e.g. calling for more 'political will' to enforce regulations. Future studies would benefit from beginning with a close examination of the dominant political settlement and where planning fits within it, as this study has aimed to do.

International organizations like the World Bank typically group countries by per-capita income and geographic region and avoid characterizing countries by the type of political regime under which they operate. Yet there is a vast difference between planning under autocratic and democratic regimes. Political regime is arguably a more meaningful criterion with which to distinguish planning systems across countries than region or even income. For example, although Vietnam and Indonesia are both lower-middle-income countries in South-East Asia, the political environment of planning in Vietnam may have more in common with that of other single-party-dominated or otherwise non-democratic states like Ethiopia,

Singapore, or the United Arab Emirates than with Indonesia, which, as a multi-party electoral democracy, may be better compared to Ghana, Brazil, or the United States.

Disaggregating 'the state'

Literature on cities of the Global South, particularly literature on urban theory, often treats 'the state' as an undifferentiated, monolithic entity, unified in its intentions and character, and planning as simply an arm of the state apparatus (Harvey, 2008; Pethe et al., 2014; A. Roy, 2009). This study demonstrates that this is not the case, and that instead the state is a "heterarchy" (Coslovsky, 2015). The internal relationships among state actors – for example, between planners and local politicians, local and national politicians, or planners and other local bureaucrats – are full of conflicting objectives, power differentials, and even unexpected alliances. These relationships are consequential to how 'the state' operates. The state is also temporally discontinuous, especially in countries like Ghana where there is high turnover in personnel at all levels after elections. Studies of urban planning in the Global South might generate useful insights by continuing to disaggregate the state and investigate its internal relationships, particularly those that involve planning agencies.

Documenting local 'hidden successes' rather than global 'best practices'

International organizations working on urban development routinely collect and disseminate 'best practices' on urban planning or governance. For example, UN-Habitat's Best Practices Database features "approximately 4,000 proven solutions to the common social, economic and environmental problems" (UN-Habitat, n.d.). The Asian Development Bank's Urban

Innovation Series of publications "shares best practices and lessons learned in urban infrastructure, transport, sanitation, as well as urban planning, policies, and urban development financing" (Asian Development Bank, 2014). The publications and events of global city networks including C40, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), United Cities and Local Governments, and the Global Platform for Sustainable Cities are devoted to sharing case studies from cities around the world that others can emulate or adapt. International organizations see these knowledge-sharing activities as their comparative advantage: they may not know more about any given city than that city's own planners and policymakers, but at least they can bring in case studies and best practices from elsewhere of which the locals in that city would not be aware.

However, as this study argues, the challenges associated with urban planning and governance in a country emerge from its specific political settlement and social, cultural, and institutional environment. This means that international case studies are of limited relevance, especially if presented as technical and apolitical in nature, as they often are.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Ghanaian government recently invited one of the planners responsible for overseeing the growth of Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s, to "transform Accra into a modern city" (Graphic Online, 2018). This is in keeping with a growing trend of what Watson refers to as "African urban fantasies" of emulating Singapore, Dubai, and Shanghai. These visions override existing plans and planning processes, ignore public participation, and threaten to exclude the majority of urban residents from access to urban space (Watson, 2014). No doubt Singapore is an expertly planned city, but it is unlikely that

the best person to prepare a plan for Accra, given its political complexities and challenges, is someone whose planning experience is in a city-state under a benevolent dictatorship. The Ghanaian government seeking Singaporean planning expertise exemplifies More's metaphor of an actor making a mess of the play being staged by trying to insert speeches from a better one.

An alternative approach, followed by this study, is to build recommendations on what Sanyal (under review) calls 'hidden successes,' i.e. practices which have not previously been documented, but have been relatively successful within their context. The quotes that open Chapter 5 make clear that planning in Ghana is overwhelmingly viewed as a failure, and it is true that it is nearly impossible to identify examples of any unambiguous planning successes. Still, some efforts have paid off, even if only partially, occasionally, or temporarily thus far, such as the attempts of planners to prevent certain harmful developments from proceeding (Chapter 7). International organizations and researchers might do well to identify these kinds of efforts in the cities in which they take place and find ways to support them. To quote the epigraph to this study (Calvino, 1974, pp. 147–148), even in the most "infernal" cities, "cities that menace in nightmares and maledictions," we can "seek and learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give them space."

Turning away from transnational forces

The role of transnational forces in global urbanization has been extensively theorized. While the scholarship which originally drew attention to these forces offered valuable insights and

critiques, the subsequent tendency to fit all discussions of urban informality anywhere in the world into narratives of neoliberalism and globalization has ossified into orthodoxy and homogenized urban scholarship. At a time when the rise of economic protectionism and parochial politics across the world threatens to overshadow neoliberalism and globalization, new research can advance scholarship by turning to the ways in which locally specific political factors interact with urban informality, regardless of whether they conform to dominant global narratives.

The most influential scholarship on urbanization in low- and middle-income countries during recent decades has focused on the ways in which global forces, primarily neoliberalism and globalization, have pushed the poor into informality. Neoliberalism has allowed the state to abdicate its responsibilities to provide services and a social safety net, the argument goes, while globalization allows multinational corporations to exploit the poor across the world. In his book *Planet of Slums* (2006, p. 174), Mike Davis blames what he sees as the catastrophic explosion of informality in the developing world, and the resulting exploitation of the poor, on the "brutal tectonics of neoliberal globalization." To the Marxist geographer David Harvey (2008), capitalism's need to utilize surpluses is the driving force behind rapid urbanization, which by its very nature involves "accumulation by dispossession." To Saskia Sassen, globalization allows large urban centers that are connected to global networks of trade and finance to disconnect from their hinterlands, resulting in growing spatial and socio-economic inequality (2005).

Development discourse, emerging as it did from the United States and Europe, has primarily centered on the role that the 'developed' world ought to play with regard to development. Those who believe that the 'Global North' has a responsibility to the 'South' and ought to provide more aid, as well as those who argue the opposite, that the 'Northern' model of development has caused great harm to the South, both have one thing in common: they place the 'North' at the center of the story. In invoking transnational forces to explain dispossession, displacement, and segregation in cities in the 'South', Davis, Harvey, Sassen, and others take as their conceptual starting point forces emanating from the United States and Europe, and approach the cities of Asia, Africa, and Latin America only to collect evidence of the harm these forces do to the world's most vulnerable people, often with apparently little interest in the specific institutional structures or political dynamics at work in these places.

Authors, editors, and readers in the US and Europe, who remain influential in global discourse, can perhaps relate more easily to a narrative in which they see themselves, whether as hero or villain, which may partly account for this focus on transnational forces. It may also be that they feel more comfortable focusing their critical attention on organizations they perceive as extremely powerful and important, such as international financial institutions or multinational corporations based in 'Northern' capitals, rather than players they perceive as relatively unimportant and powerless, like minor local politicians and political brokers in low-income settlements who never make global headlines. Besides, as Parnell and Robinson (2012, p. 603) observe, "academic-institution demands for high-impact scholarly publications

in 'international' journals are biased against work that is not embedded in dominant theoretical frameworks." No doubt an academic article about informality in any given city is more likely to be cited internationally if it focuses on the role of neoliberal capitalism rather than that of the low-level politician who is unknown outside his or her district.

In an article calling for a 'post-neoliberal' perspective on urbanization in the Global South (2012, pp. 594–596), South African-origin scholars Susan Parnell and Jennifer Robinson argue that while critiques of neoliberalism are legitimate, these critiques "have come to dominate theoretical and political reflection in contemporary urban studies, and offer a ready-made interpretive framework for understanding the particular dynamics of urban policy formation in particular cities," a framework which overlooks the fact that in cities of the Global South, "traditional authority, religion, and informality are as central to legitimate urban narratives as the vacillations in modern urban capitalist public policy."

The world has changed even since the influential works from Davis, Harvey, and Sassen cited above were published in the mid-2000s. Two decades into the 21st century, no consensus around neoliberalism or globalization remains among world leaders, the traditional development organizations are struggling to cling to relevance, and investment in a developing country is as likely to come from China, the Middle East, or elsewhere than from the US or Europe. This suggests a need to move beyond a preoccupation with what the role of aid or ideology from traditional donor countries has been or should be. Already, studies with a more 'Southern' perspective, including this one, are much more acutely aware of locally specific economic, social, and political dynamics, and are more eager to hold local and

national policymakers and politicians to account. Crucially, they also differ in their perception of who holds real power on the ground, often seeing local leaders as having more agency than international organizations and abstract global forces, even if this means agency to subvert attempts at reform. Studies with this perspective are likelier to perceive local politicians as manipulating international aid organizations to suit their own purposes than as passive, gullible victims of schemes hatched in Washington DC or elsewhere.

Scholars who take this Southern perspective often base their understanding on extensive fieldwork in cities in the developing world. A recent study of daily practices of informality in two South African cities from the African Centre for Cities grounds its understanding in the local, using in-depth interviews with individuals and families about their working and domestic lives as the primary mode of data collection. The report takes a consciously "inductive" approach, "working upwards from the particularities and realities of people's lives and the spaces they occupy, rather than drawing down from the generalities of ideas and theories" (Harrison et al., 2018, p. 7). In a study on informal settlements in New Delhi, Chattaraj, Choudhury, and Joshi (2017) argue that the Western theories that are often used to explain what is happening in Indian cities, including Harvey's "dispossession by capitalist accumulation," are largely irrelevant to New Delhi. Instead, their discussion centers on the opposite phenomenon, i.e. "regularization" of informal settlements by authorities, and focuses on local political factors, including corruption and clientelism, as explanations.

Similarly, the urban sociologist Liza Weinstein calls into question the narrative of slum residents as hapless, undifferentiated victims of rapacious global forces. She notes that the

communities she studied during ethnographic fieldwork in Dharavi, the large informal settlement in Mumbai, "did not resemble the 'surplus humanity' depicted in these writings: excluded, exploited, and expendable (M. Davis, 2006). From this vantage point, Dharavi, and the experiences of at least some of its residents, seemed to complicate the typical accounts of the slum" (Weinstein, 2014, p. 3). She takes issue with Harvey's characterization of a proposed redevelopment project in Dharavi as simply exemplifying the "obliterating character" of global capital on urban space. She notes that "local political factors shaped these conditions as much as globalization did" (Weinstein, 2014, p. 13), and that the ability of the residents of Dharavi to remain in place suggests that something more complex than obliteration is taking place. Nor were those who opposed the redevelopment innocent victims, but often powerful and politically savvy actors with agendas of their own, leading her to observe that this was "not a simple David-and-Goliath story of the innocent grassroots struggling against malevolent globality" (Weinstein, 2014, p. xi). According to Weinstein, "While these authors [Davis, Harvey, and others] associate slum clearance and residential displacements with globalization and the workings of capitalism under conditions of neoliberalism, most scholars of urban India tend to ground their explanations of these processes in local politics…" (Weinstein, 2014, p. 14).

In a 2008 article on the 'right to the city', David Harvey writes: "I wager that within fifteen years, if present trends continue, all those hillsides in Rio now occupied by favelas will be covered by high-rise condominiums with fabulous views over the idyllic bay, while the erstwhile favela dwellers will have been filtered off into some remote periphery" (2008, pp.

36–37). More than ten years later, the favelas endure. If Harvey's prediction turns out to be wrong, which seems likely, it may be because he failed to consider the agency of local actors. A scholar with a perspective rooted in Rio de Janeiro, regardless of ideological leanings, might not have made the same prediction. The schism here is not between the supporters and critics of neoliberalism or globalization, but over which scale is the relevant one at which to understand what happens in a city, and which set of actors holds power, particularly in the Global South.

Exploring difficult tradeoffs between planning and informality

If plans are spatial regulations and informality is the socially tolerated violation of regulations, then, by definition, the two are in conflict. Past studies have often critiqued specific planning approaches for the way they hurt informal settlements or the informal economy, but there has been remarkably little discussion of this fundamental conflict. Perhaps this is because the notion of planning, at least in the abstract as a form of state action that can bring about inclusive and sustainable outcomes, and support for informality are both progressive causes, which makes it uncomfortable to discuss their practical lack of alignment. Ideally, a progressive planner would be able to champion the right to live in informal settlements and engage in informal economic activity in one breath and then advocate for state-led welfare schemes and environmental regulations in the next without contradiction. Yet the power of the state to make publicly-owned land available for open space, public transportation, or other amenities, to protect ecologically sensitive land via environmental regulations, to build public housing, and in general to implement any progressive plans is by definition undermined

by informality, i.e. by activities over which the state has no regulatory control. Arguing against any degree of formalization of the informal effectively echoes arguments in favor of a *laissez-faire*, unregulated market, even if it comes from a different ideological direction and is applied to a different set of actors.

This is not to say that one has to make a blanket choice between an all-formal world and an all-informal one, but rather to suggest that there are difficult tradeoffs between creating the conditions for effective regulation and supporting the rights of people to remain in the informal sector that need to be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis. Should the right to live in informal settlements extend to the right to occupy land that is reserved for public parks or is prone to flooding? If the informal sale of housing units by political leaders is likely to undermine a housing scheme, how exactly can this be taken into account in the design of the scheme? How much informal industrial activity would need to be formalized in order to prevent exploitative child labor or gender discrimination in wages, and how can this be done without making these activities economically unviable? Is there a spatial scale at which a community is better off self-organizing and another at which informal coordination becomes impossible and formal plans become necessary? These questions have not been adequately explored. For planning to play any meaningful role in low-income urban settings dominated by informality, which it is largely failing to do so far, future research must explicitly address these difficult tradeoffs.

Final thoughts: Living with moral ambiguity

The moral world of urban informality is confoundingly gray. Any honest exploration of it defies attempts to place actors and actions in simple moral categories. Understanding the role of informal politics and planning in the lives of the urban poor requires living with political and moral ambiguity, as this study has tried to do. Ideally, the accompanying discomfort and confusion can ultimately be a productive part of the research process.

For example, uncertainty about how exactly to interpret and portray the moral valence of planners in the Ghanaian case study was a challenge in this research. The case study was motivated in part by a desire to produce knowledge that would allow planners to work more effectively in clientelistic conditions in which they typically have little independent power. Local government planners were among the primary informants in the case study research, and many issues and events are presented from their perspective. Many planners are trying to do their best under extremely challenging circumstances, and it is not surprising that the most capable among them are perpetually on the verge of quitting their jobs. Empowered planners are better equipped to implement participatory, inclusive, and sustainable plans. However, many of them are unsympathetic towards informal settlers, participate in evictions and demolitions accompanied by armed police officers, and might call for more if they had the power to do so. Empowering planners to do good might also empower them to harm the most vulnerable. The recommendations in the previous chapter attempted to balance these conflicting considerations.

Similarly, this study takes a risk in drawing attention to the involvement of the urban poor in patron-client relationships. By suggesting that the poor are 'in cahoots with' politicians, a study like this risks diminishing readers' sympathy for the poor, making them seem less like helpless victims deserving of aid and more as opportunists living off the fat of a corrupt system and perpetuating it in the process. *If the settlements that avoid demolition over time are those that have powerful political patrons*, readers might think, *then surely residents of these surviving settlements are not that badly off after all. Why waste resources trying to help them?* To researchers who want to avoid lending credence to this point of view, it may be more comfortable to focus on confrontations between the powerful and the poor, writing only about demolitions and evictions and not about informal deal-making. Such an approach would certainly lend itself more easily to activism on behalf of these vulnerable communities; "It's complicated" does not make a stirring slogan.

Evictions and demolitions in informal settlements are rightly decried as human rights violations. However, to understand them properly one has to observe that they are neither uniform nor arbitrary: there is a reason why some informal settlements are demolished and others are not, and the reason is usually informal politics. Confrontation and clientelism are two sides of the same coin. The high visibility of confrontations between the powerful and the poor—evictions, demolitions, and the accompanying protests and riots—may obscure the fact that unequal but stable power relations are in fact more common than confrontations (Flyvbjerg, 1998). In an early study of the politics of urban poverty in the developing world, Joan Nelson (1979, p. 12) wrote that "it is profoundly misleading to place radicalism and

violence at the center of an analysis of politics and the urban poor [… H]igher priority should be given to more sustained and widespread patterns of political participation." Asef Bayat argues that the urban poor mostly make gains through apolitical "quiet encroachment", only turning to less quiet protests and riots when these gains are threatened (2013). This is borne out in the example of Old Fadama in Accra: it is not ordinarily a violent place; when riots have erupted, they have only been in response to government demolitions (see Chapter 5).

Additionally, the fact that relationships between the poor and powerful politicians are non-confrontational and even mutually beneficial does not mean that they are ideal for the poor in the long run. A refrain throughout this study has been that clientelism undermines the provision of long-term public goods and tenure security, which would be better for the poor than short-term, narrowly targeted patronage. It would be misguided to think that residents of informal settlements who are engaged in clientelistic deal-making do not face deprivation as a result of social, economic, and political inequality.

A final reason to draw attention to the ways in which the poor participate in informal politics is to grant that the poor have agency in their lives. It does a disservice to the dignity of the urban poor to portray them as helpless victims who are incapable of using their wits to maneuver for whatever benefits they can in order to make the best of a bad situation. On a more practical level, if planners, policymakers, and representatives of international development organizations acknowledge the agency that the poor already have, they are more likely to include them as agents of change in planned reforms and interventions, which would make these efforts more likely to succeed.

Appendix 1: Notes on Terminology

Informality

British anthropologist Keith Hart was the first scholar anywhere to use the term 'informal sector' (Adom, 2016; Elyachar, 2005, p. 227; Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011; WIEGO, n.d.), and, as it happens, he did so in the context of urban Ghana. Hart did his doctoral fieldwork on the economic activity in Accra between 1965 and 1968. While his doctoral dissertation did not use the term 'informal', his subsequent writing based on his experiences in Ghana did (K. Hart, 1973). Looking back on his time in Ghana fifty years after his fieldwork there, Hart (2016, pp. 123–124) explains the original intention of his use of the 'informal' label, and its successes and failures:

> *It took me some time to work out that the people I knew in Accra were not unemployed—they were working, but for erratic and often low pay. At that time there were few liberal economists; most economists, Keynesians and Marxists, saw the state as the engine of development. I wanted to draw attention to what people were doing beyond the state's reach. The formal/informal distinction sought to make the invisible visible and it succeeded in doing so. The mass of fragmented economic activities now had a name. But "informal" tells us only what they are not—not subject to regulation—rather than what they are.*
>
> *There is something homogenizing and anonymous in lumping people together as 'the informal economy.' If I have one regret, it is that I sacrificed the individuality of my doctoral thesis for a general abstraction.*

This reflection not only provides a pithy definition ("not subject to regulation"), but also explains that it was a rejection of the assumption that development had to be state-led which prompted his desire to draw attention to the informal sector. To Hart, the informal sector is "what people were doing beyond the state's reach."

The term 'informal' has been criticized at times for being an imposition by international organizations based in a Western perspective (Elyachar, 2005), but in fact Hart and other early promoters, including the International Labour Organization (ILO) in a report on Kenya (1972), saw it as a way to get away from a Western point of view. They were reacting to modernization theory, which saw the indigenous economy as backward and unproductive. Hart was explicitly writing in opposition to "the unthinking transfer of western categories to the economic and social structures of African cities" (K. Hart, 1973, p. 62). In its report, the ILO looked forward optimistically to a time in which the concept of 'informality' would open up productive new avenues of research in Africa: "One begins to sense that a new school of analysis may be emerging, drawing on work in East and West Africa and using the formal-informal distinction to gain insights into a wide variety of situations" (International Labour Organization, 1972, p. 6). Informality has indeed become increasingly central to how a range of academic disciplines, governments, and development organizations make sense of places, especially cities, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, particularly in the 21st century. To take just academic research as an illustration, the Scopus academic database finds that the term

'informal' was used in over 24,000 publications in 2018, up from less than 3,400 in the year 2000.[151]

Still, there is little scholarly consensus on a precise definition of 'informality'. The *Global Encyclopaedia of Informality* opens with the claim that informality is indefinable, saying that "it would probably be difficult to agree on a definition of informality acceptable to all." Instead, the publication uses the word 'informality' as "an umbrella term for a variety of social and cultural phenomena that are too complex to be grasped in a single definition", but which broadly refers to "the world's open secrets, unwritten rules and hidden practices" (Ledeneva, 2018, p. 1). McFarlane and Waibel (2012) discuss various ways in which informality has been conceived: as a spatial category (the 'slum'), an organizational form (characterized by spontaneity and tacit knowledge rather than explicit rules), a governmental tool (which enables certain modes of intervention), and a "negotiability of value" (shaped through shifting social relations). Recent scholarship (Acuto et al., 2019; D. E. Davis, 2018) argues for a discursive shift beyond rigid dichotomies of 'formal' and 'informal'.

Broadly, this study uses the term to refer to practices pertaining to economic activity, land use, building construction, service delivery, waste management, transportation and other activities that do not conform to regulations but are widely tolerated. This study does not

---

151 https://www.scopus.com/term/analyzer.uri?sid=d3e0820cabdbeaae878e72684fb37d17&origin=resultslist&src=s&s=ALL%28informal%29&sort=plf-f&sdt=b&sot=b&sl=38&count=78941&analyzeResults=Analyze+results&txGid=d951758ae7a393be5a99fc72f2480397

consider informality to be simply that which is beyond the reach of the state. It has often been characterized as such; for example, Bayat (2013, p. 51) suggests that there is more informality in the Global South than in the North because governments in less-industrialized countries have lower capacity to "conduct surveillance of their populations" and crack down on "tax evasion, infringement of private property, and encroachment on the state domains." If these governments tolerate informality, Bayat argues, it is only because it is a mechanism by which the poor help themselves. In other words, for Bayat, informality persists either because the state is too weak to catch it, or because the state passively allows it to persist.

By contrast, an overarching theme of this study is that the state is in fact actively involved in the creation and perpetuation of informality, inasmuch as politicians and political parties who influence the distribution of state benefits are state actors (which, if they are ever incumbent, they are). As Diane Davis (2018, pp. 366–367) observes:

> *[D]ecisions made by local states to shun or tolerate informality do not merely reveal the state's priorities with respect to upholding the law, creating urban order, or accommodating citizen claims. They literally embody them, and by so doing tell us something about the state's own character and self-definition as a source of authority that may be as likely to find its legitimacy or electoral successes through informal mediation as through formal processes.*

Chapter 3, which demonstrates that certain types of informal growth are correlated with clientelism, and the Ghanaian case study of later chapters, which describes mayors and members of Parliament actively supporting informal developments among the poor and non-poor, both suggest that informality is not simply that which is beyond the reach of the state.

Instead, this study supports an understanding of informality closer to that of anthropologist Julia Elyachar (2005, pp. 67–69), for whom informal practices "have a legitimacy that is not the state's" but may still implicate the state in various ways.

Bayat also argues that the state opposes informality partly because it makes the public illegible and deprives the state of "the knowledge necessary to exert surveillance" (2013, p. 52), even going as far as to suggest that upgrading of informal settlements is really an attempt by the state to make these settlements knowable and therefore controllable. Whether or not these strongly Foucauldian interpretations are legitimate in the context of the Middle East, on which Bayat bases his analysis, they do not seem applicable to Ghana, where political parties are deeply embedded in informal settlements. For example, Paller (2019c) notes that the NDC party has 27 branch organizations in the Old Fadama informal settlement of Accra alone, and it is hard to imagine any news from the settlement not quickly traveling upwards from party 'foot soldiers' to party leaders and the mayor. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests that similarly close relationships between party workers and informal communities are common throughout developing democracies, which suggests that the informal may be more legible to the state than Bayat portrays it as being.

Like other recent publications (Björkman, 2014b; Boudreau & Davis, 2017; Fawaz, 2017; Haid, 2016; Schindler, 2017), this study holds that informality is not an inherent characteristic but a status assigned to a practice, place, or person by those in positions of power, including both state and non-state actors. To take another example from the Ghanaian case study herein, indigenous settlements and squatter settlements in Accra are equally poor,

overcrowded, and undocumented, but the latter are considered informal while the former are not, for reasons of ethnicity and history. Moreover, middle-class property developments in Accra may be in violation of as many building or land use regulations as squatter settlements, but they are rarely referred to as 'informal.'

This study does not consider informality to be simply a holdover of a premodern past, but a feature of a new kind of modernity. In Ghana, informality exploded as a result of neoliberal reforms and urbanization since the 1980s. Jennifer Hart, a historian of urban Ghana, argues that "informalization is a consequence of modernization itself" (J. Hart, 2019). Informality has a mutually supportive rather than an antagonistic relationship with process of urbanization and the institutions of electoral democracy that have characterized the last quarter-century of Ghana's history. Examples of informal practices emerging, re-emerging, or persisting in the Global North emphasize the fact that there is no linear temporal or economic trajectory from formality to informality (Mukhija & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2014; Pradel-Miquel, 2017).

Relatedly, this study largely avoids the use of the term 'slum' to describe informal or low-income settlements. Some have argued that the term should be dropped from our collective vocabulary on account of its pejorative connotations (Mayne, 2017), though the fact that some organizations founded and led by the urban poor, such as Shack/ Slum Dwellers International, use the term themselves suggests that the term may have been reclaimed, or at least need not be viewed as necessarily negative. A more important reason to prefer the term 'informal settlement', as this study does, is that it makes explicit the fact that such settlements are not characterized solely by their poor physical condition, but also by an ambiguous and

often vulnerable relationship to the law and authority. The terms used in Chapter 3 – 'informal subdivisions', 'atomistic settlements', etc. – are borrowed from the input data used in the analysis in that chapter.

Defining 'informality' in the Ghanaian context

Ghanaian academics and researchers frequently note the contradictions and ambiguities in the use of the term 'informal' (Adom, 2016; Koto, 2015; Osei-Boateng & Ampratwum, 2011). Kwame Adom, who teaches at the University of Ghana's Business School, argues that "the absence of a clear-cut definition of [...] informal entrepreneurship has hindered policy makers to figure out the significance of the sector vis-à-vis its contribution to the national economy" (2016, p. 227). Other Ghanaian academics write about informality without defining it. For example, in a study of 'head porters' (women who transport objects on their heads for a fee) and their role in the urban informal economy in Ghana, Agyei et al (2016) refer to the informal economy, informal settlements, "informal union/betrothal" (as a marital status), informal channels of remittances, and informal credit rotation organizations, without definition.

Most government reports or policies that refer to informality do so in the context of the informal economy. In 2015, the Ghana Statistical Service, together with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and with financial support from the Dutch and British governments and the World Bank, released a *National Employment Report* which uses the following definition: "An establishment is considered to be formal if it is registered with the Registrar-General's

Department and keeps accounting records managed by a professional; otherwise it is considered informal" (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015b, p. 30). This definition combines a commonly held understanding of formality (registration with the state) with a more unusual one (professional accountancy). Ghana's 2012 *National Urban Policy* (Government of Ghana, 2012) discusses informality extensively but does not define it.

Similarly, few sources define 'informal settlements.' While for Keith Hart (1973, p. 86), "[t]he informal sector may be identified for heuristic purposes with the sub-proletariat of the slum," the informal sector and the slum are not always equated. The *National Urban Policy* refers to 'slums' but does not use the term 'informal settlements', nor does it treat them as part of the 'informal sector'. (Chapter 4 discusses various definitions of informal settlements in Ghana.)

The concept of informality can be considered the victim of its own success. Keith Hart's ambition in his early use of the term, to "make the invisible visible" (2016, p. 123) were certainly achieved, not just in the context of economic activity in urban Ghana but in a wide array of contexts across the world. Arguably, Hart and the ILO also did manage to shift the conversation on entrepreneurship and employment away from Western categories of 'traditional' and 'modern', and to valorize indigenous modes of economic activity as dynamic in their own right, which was their explicit intent. Still, the term's popularity over the last fifty years has stretched it thin. Even in Ghana, the place of its original emergence, it is now used in a myriad of overlapping but inconsistent ways.

‘Developing countries’/ low- and middle-income countries/ the ‘Global South’

There is no ideal way to refer collectively to low- and middle-income countries in Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere that have, or had until very recently, relatively high poverty rates, weak institutions, or both, and are currently or are expected to soon be urbanizing rapidly. The term ‘developing countries’, as contrasted with ‘developed countries’, can be criticized for implying that there is a single development trajectory and that certain countries, e.g. those in North America and Europe, are simply further along it than others. This leaves little room for variation in how countries may choose to develop, including paths that are more environmentally sustainable than those taken by the early-industrializing countries. Meanwhile, referring to these countries by their GDP per capita, as ‘low- and middle-income countries’, places too much importance on GDP, a measure which does not capture the distribution of wealth within a country, the strength of its institutions, political freedoms, access to public services, public safety, or other important characteristics.

‘Global South’ is currently the term of choice in academic literature, although it too is far from ideal. For one, it is not in common use among the general English-speaking public. It is also confusing in that it uses a geographic term for a non-geographic concept (many countries in the ‘Global South’ are in the northern hemisphere). North-South terminology may be intuitive for discussions that focus on the relationships between North and South America, or between Europe and Africa, but it takes an awkward leap of the imagination to extend this terminology to Asia (for which an East-West distinction has been more traditional).

Additionally, there is a touch of geographic determinism in the term 'Global South', which echoes the term 'the tropics' which was briefly popular in development literature. Both imply, vaguely and probably unwittingly, that 'Southern' or 'tropical' countries inevitably lag behind because of their climate (which in turn is a step away from the old racist stereotype that peoples from warmer parts of the world are less capable), and obscures the ways in which colonialism, corruption, or other non-environmental factors may have impoverished these countries. Given that each possible term is problematic in its own way, this study does not consistently prefer any one over the others.

Appendix 2: A Brief History of Planning in Ghana

The planning history of Ghana centers primarily on Accra, where planning efforts have been both the most extensive and best documented. Accra became the economic center of the region as a trading post in the 17th century, and the earliest Ga settlers established "quarters" based on family lineage, which evolved into today's indigenous neighborhoods (Paller, 2019a). Under colonial rule, like elsewhere around the world, a concern over public health prompted early attention to the built environment, with British medical officers blaming the "deplorable" sanitary conditions and "foul stenches" of mid-19th-century Accra on the density of housing and lack of free-flowing air. When the British moved their capital from Cape Coast to Accra in the 1870s, they implemented public works in the city related to drainage, sanitation (public latrines), roads, and bridges. A fire that destroyed much of the indigenous James Town settlement in Accra in 1894 prompted the British government to acquire and replan the affected land, laying out wide roads and drains and specifying plot sizes (Jackson, 2019).

By the end of the 19th century, the British had instituted a program of intrusive household sanitary inspections, which were ostensibly to control the spread of malaria, but as they were not the most practical approach to disease eradication, may have been more a means to impose control over native neighborhoods. Although malaria was equally prevalent in European cantonments, the British claimed that the native population was responsible for the spread of the disease, and this claim led to the segregation of native and European settlements.

The mistaken notion that mosquitoes only bit at night resulted in the imposition of night-time curfews. Although the government did not fully enforce either of these measures, medical reports as well as the 1901 *Towns Act* increased government control over the built environment and gave the Director of Public Works the power to lay out roads and specify building regulations (Jackson, 2019).

When a plague broke out in Accra in 1908, British medical officers again fixated on the built environment of native residents, calling for a separate European business quarter and wide spacing of buildings in the native settlements. The government created an 'Accra Improvement Committee' in response to the outbreak, which began demolishing houses to widen streets and remodel neighborhoods, resettling residents to newly built areas. Another outbreak, this time of Yellow Fever, led to calls for stricter segregation between Europeans and natives, and a new official map (Figure 36) was prepared, depicting large swathes of land as "taken for public purposes" (in pink) and native settlements (in brown) simply as "congested." The pink zone became the site for a number of residential, recreational, and institutional structures (Jackson, 2019).



Figure 36: 1916 map of Accra
Source: Jackson, 2019: 62

Public works continued in the first few decades of the 20th century, with the laying out of streets in suburbs of Accra in 1910 (Government of the Gold Coast, 1911), the advent of a public water supply in Accra in 1917, the construction of a ring road in 1920, and the laying out of planned suburbs in the 1930s with the cooperation of landowners (Jackson, 2019). Several of the annual reports produced by the colonial administration of the Gold Coast in the 1930s (Government of the Gold Coast, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938) repeat a passage

explaining that, while there is no planning in a strict sense, the government is able to ensure "orderly" urban growth through agreement with traditional authorities and land owners:

> *Town-planning, in the strict application of the term, does not prevail, although legislation provides for it… A substitute for town-planning has been found in the provision, as conditions warrant, of lay-outs by agreement with the local chiefs or land-owners. This system has been effective in ensuring correct development of many towns, both large and small. Extensive lay-outs of stool lands adjacent to Accra have recently been effected and in these cases the allocation of any vacant plots remains under the control of the chiefs. In towns where development is anticipated, agreements are made with the local chiefs whereby such development shall proceed only on orderly lines and in accordance with the lay-out as designed. Arrangements are concluded at the same time to enable Government to acquire free of claims for compensation the land required for roads and for such other sites as are required for public purposes. A plan of the lay-out superimposed upon a survey of the town affected is attached to the agreement, which thus defines clearly and finally the position and enables the orderly development of the town to take place without undue expenditure. Repeated requests are received for the lay-out of towns and villages to which no lay-out scheme has yet been applied.*

The colony's Governor, Gordon Guggisberg, launched a development plan for the colony for the years 1920-30. The government implemented the Guggisberg plan largely successfully, and it constructed infrastructure including schools and hospitals in accordance with the plan (Fuseini & Kemp, 2015). In 1945, the government hired the architect Edwin Maxwell Fry to study and propose plans for the major cities of West Africa, including Accra. His plan for Accra (Figure 37) proposed a new outer ring road connecting a string of neighborhoods, each

of which would have its own shops, community centers, schools, and parks. However, the British never substantially implemented Fry's plan for Accra, in part because it required the demolition of large parts of James Town at a time when the grip of the British over the Gold Coast was starting to weaken (Jackson, 2019). In 1945, they implemented the *Town and Country Planning Ordinance*, based largely on British planning regulations (Fuseini & Kemp, 2015).



Figure 37: Maxwell Fry's 1945 plan for Accra
Source: Jackson, 2019: 102

In 1958, the year after Independence, the country's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, introduced a detailed new plan for Accra (Trevallion & Hood, 1958) which created

monumental squares and buildings intended to inspire national sentiment among citizens, but which too was not implemented (Government of Ghana, 2017; Jackson, 2019). The new government formed the "Accra Slum Clearance Committee" in 1961, which, despite its name, identified James Town, Nima, and Labadi for upgrading projects rather than clearance. However, the government's strategy of recognition and service provision in these settlements was eventually abandoned, though the political importance of these settlements meant that they could not be easily demolished either (Paller, 2019a, p. 104).

In 1961, Doxiadis Associates prepared a masterplan for the large new industrial port town at Tema on the eastern edge of Accra. Conscious of the fate of other planned cities in the developing world like Chandigarh and Brasilia, Doxiadis' team paid particular attention to housing for the working population in Tema. The plan was implemented relatively successfully, although today informal commercial structures occupy some of the public space (d'Auria, 2010). Around this time, United Nations consultants and others drafted the country's first National Physical Development Plan, for the 1963-1970 period. However, Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a coup in 1966, the plan was not implemented, and little citywide planning occurred during the political instability of the subsequent two decades (Acheampong, 2019; Fuseini & Kemp, 2015). A plan to relocate residents of Nima, the large Muslim-majority migrant settlement or '*zongo*' in Accra, to make room for commercial development, was introduced in the 1970s, though protests from chiefs, landlords, and university students meant that this plan was never implemented either (Paller, 2019a, pp. 104–105).

Beginning in 1983, the World Bank and IMF initiated the 'Economic Recovery Program' (ERP) in Ghana. While the program focused mainly on monetary and macroeconomic policy, like other structural adjustment programs it also encouraged decentralization of urban management to the local level. The Accra Planning and Development Programme accompanied the ERP, and was implemented with assistance from the United Nations Development Program and UN-Habitat in three phases between 1985 and 1990. It culminated in the completion of a strategic plan for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area in 1991, which also included a spatial plan (Accra Planning and Development Programme et al., 1991; Larbi, 1996). Up to this time, an area had to officially be declared a 'planning area' before a plan could be prepared for it, but new regulations in 1993 declared all settlements in Ghana, both urban and rural, to be planning areas (Amoateng et al., 2013). Chapter 4 briefly recounts the subsequent history of planning in Ghana, during its current democratic era.

Appendix 3: Additional Results from Chapter 3

Table 5: Independent variables correlation matrix

	Clientelism Index	GDP per capita	City population	City pop. density	National annual pop. growth rate	National urban population	Capital city	Cohesion Index	Inclusion growth
GDP per capita	0.60								
City population	0.06	0.19							
City pop. density	-0.26	-0.49	0.12						
National annual pop. growth rate	-0.64	-0.51	-0.11	0.31					
National urban population	-0.09	0.01	0.18	0.30	0.06				
Capital city	-0.09	-0.01	0.33	0.00	0.16	-0.09			
Cohesion Index	-0.03	-0.13	-0.12	0.09	0.10	-0.07	-0.04		
Inclusion growth	0.34	0.09	-0.05	-0.16	-0.32	-0.08	-0.11	0.01	
Former USSR	0.19	0.06	-0.04	-0.15	-0.30	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.20

Table 6: Results for informal subdivisions models, with stepwise addition of controls (sensitivity test 1)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.357***		-0.173*	-0.171*	-0.165**	-0.154*	-0.170**
	(0.082)		(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.056)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.073***	-0.054**	-0.063**	-0.066**	-0.067**	-0.058***
		(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.014)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.028	-0.031	-0.041	-0.031
				(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.007	-0.060	0.149
					(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.162)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.690	0.834	0.486
					(1.050)	(1.134)	(1.018)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.241	0.090
						(0.257)	(0.202)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.467	0.322
						(0.959)	(0.889)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.646	-0.972
						(0.897)	(0.958)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.080***
							(0.392)
Constant	4.852***	3.528***	4.362***	4.818***	4.542***	4.294**	4.079**
	(0.393)	(0.323)	(0.215)	(0.256)	(0.801)	(1.592)	(1.292)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.287	0.378	0.421	0.457	0.461	0.469	0.583
Adjusted R^2	0.283	0.375	0.415	0.445	0.443	0.442	0.560
Residual Std. Error	1.216 (df = 190)	1.135 (df = 190)	1.098 (df = 189)	1.069 (df = 187)	1.071 (df = 185)	1.072 (df = 182)	0.953 (df = 181)
F Statistic	76.384*** (df = 1; 190)	115.643*** (df = 1; 190)	68.827*** (df = 2; 189)	39.310*** (df = 4; 187)	26.348*** (df = 6; 185)	17.839*** (df = 9; 182)	25.274*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 7: Results for informal subdivisions models, replacing 1990 value of clientelism with a 1985-1995 average (sensitivity test 2)

	Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), avg. 1985-1995	-0.372***		-0.186*	-0.184*	-0.182**	-0.171*	-0.161**
	(0.082)		(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.058)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.073***	-0.053**	-0.062**	-0.064**	-0.066**	-0.059***
		(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.014)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.029	-0.032	-0.041	-0.031
				(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.024)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.027	-0.083	0.143
					(0.235)	(0.236)	(0.168)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.647	0.788	0.490
					(1.071)	(1.148)	(1.041)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.236	0.090
						(0.253)	(0.205)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.478	0.321
						(0.951)	(0.890)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.698	-1.087
						(0.907)	(0.968)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.001***
							(0.442)
Constant	4.899***	3.528***	4.403***	4.856***	4.656***	4.425**	4.072**
	(0.390)	(0.323)	(0.225)	(0.270)	(0.756)	(1.535)	(1.293)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.301	0.378	0.425	0.461	0.464	0.473	0.578
Adjusted R^2	0.297	0.375	0.419	0.449	0.447	0.447	0.555
Residual Std. Error	1.203 (df = 190)	1.135 (df = 190)	1.094 (df = 189)	1.066 (df = 187)	1.068 (df = 185)	1.068 (df = 182)	0.958 (df = 181)
F Statistic	81.840*** (df = 1; 190)	115.643*** (df = 1; 190)	69.963*** (df = 2; 189)	39.926*** (df = 4; 187)	26.722*** (df = 6; 185)	18.123*** (df = 9; 182)	24.821*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 8: Results for informal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf) - reduced sample (no A cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.381***		-0.200*	-0.199*	-0.179*	-0.169*	-0.194**
	(0.094)		(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.074)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.070***	-0.050*	-0.057*	-0.060*	-0.061*	-0.053**
		(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.019)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.034	-0.034	-0.042	-0.030
				(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.019)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.041	0.001	0.154
					(0.262)	(0.249)	(0.181)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.895	0.971	0.620
					(1.001)	(1.132)	(1.042)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.164	0.014
						(0.307)	(0.260)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.117	-0.076
						(1.284)	(1.198)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.554	-0.689
						(0.873)	(0.874)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.044***
							(0.447)
Constant	4.992***	3.522***	4.490***	4.872***	4.351***	4.384*	4.338**
	(0.475)	(0.397)	(0.265)	(0.364)	(0.903)	(1.946)	(1.683)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.307	0.373	0.426	0.451	0.459	0.463	0.564
Adjusted R^2	0.303	0.369	0.419	0.436	0.437	0.430	0.533
Residual Std. Error	1.197 (df = 153)	1.139 (df = 153)	1.093 (df = 152)	1.076 (df = 150)	1.075 (df = 148)	1.082 (df = 145)	0.979 (df = 144)
F Statistic	67.909*** (df = 1; 153)	91.010*** (df = 1; 153)	56.474*** (df = 2; 152)	30.813*** (df = 4; 150)	20.930*** (df = 6; 148)	13.910*** (df = 9; 145)	18.602*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 9: Results for informal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group B) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf) - reduced sample (no B cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.367***		-0.177*	-0.174	-0.175*	-0.171*	-0.175**
	(0.077)		(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.054)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.075***	-0.055**	-0.064**	-0.067**	-0.067**	-0.058***
		(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.010)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.020	-0.025	-0.039	-0.033
				(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.003	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.003
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.047	-0.110	0.142
					(0.251)	(0.238)	(0.156)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.775	1.010	0.647
					(0.959)	(1.079)	(1.034)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.392	0.342
						(0.297)	(0.225)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.811	0.666
						(1.006)	(0.885)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.399	-1.029
						(0.744)	(0.828)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.253***
							(0.322)
Constant	4.905***	3.525***	4.373***	4.793***	4.602***	3.992*	3.703**
	(0.383)	(0.327)	(0.246)	(0.275)	(0.882)	(1.576)	(1.247)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.314	0.402	0.447	0.478	0.483	0.497	0.619
Adjusted R^2	0.310	0.398	0.440	0.464	0.462	0.465	0.593
Residual Std. Error	1.194 (df = 153)	1.114 (df = 153)	1.075 (df = 152)	1.052 (df = 150)	1.054 (df = 148)	1.050 (df = 145)	0.917 (df = 144)
F Statistic	70.060*** (df = 1; 153)	102.996*** (df = 1; 153)	61.483*** (df = 2; 152)	34.292*** (df = 4; 150)	23.054*** (df = 6; 148)	15.897*** (df = 9; 145)	23.415*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 10: Results for informal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group C) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf) - reduced sample (no C cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.330***		-0.157*	-0.160*	-0.165*	-0.142	-0.153**
	(0.073)		(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.059)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.068***	-0.051***	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.067***	-0.060***
		(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.013)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.027	-0.029	-0.035	-0.029
				(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004*	-0.004
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.035	-0.092	0.062
					(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.189)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.159	0.320	0.024
					(1.076)	(1.128)	(1.034)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.142	0.007
						(0.242)	(0.202)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.358	0.177
						(1.067)	(1.061)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-1.059	-1.527
						(0.952)	(1.069)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							1.901***
							(0.388)
Constant	4.722***	3.465***	4.242***	4.829***	4.858***	4.794**	4.765***
	(0.359)	(0.263)	(0.227)	(0.254)	(0.737)	(1.514)	(1.329)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.255	0.350	0.388	0.441	0.442	0.452	0.555
Adjusted R^2	0.250	0.345	0.379	0.426	0.419	0.417	0.524
Residual Std. Error	1.188 (df = 151)	1.110 (df = 151)	1.081 (df = 150)	1.040 (df = 148)	1.046 (df = 146)	1.048 (df = 143)	0.947 (df = 142)
F Statistic	51.759*** (df = 1; 151)	81.221*** (df = 1; 151)	47.467*** (df = 2; 150)	29.230*** (df = 4; 148)	19.254*** (df = 6; 146)	13.098*** (df = 9; 143)	17.723*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 11: Results for informal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group D) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf) - reduced sample (no D cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.344***		-0.181*	-0.174*	-0.162*	-0.153*	-0.177**
	(0.079)		(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.055)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.070***	-0.050*	-0.063**	-0.067**	-0.068**	-0.056***
		(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.014)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.029	-0.032	-0.047	-0.035
				(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.004*	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004*
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.004	-0.052	0.185
					(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.169)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					1.392	1.644	1.182
					(1.407)	(1.536)	(1.338)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.384	0.186
						(0.293)	(0.232)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.221	0.149
						(0.889)	(0.754)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.389	-0.774
						(0.949)	(0.953)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.093***
							(0.420)
Constant	4.774***	3.491***	4.362***	4.923***	4.311***	4.130*	3.849**
	(0.371)	(0.347)	(0.211)	(0.218)	(0.895)	(1.624)	(1.189)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.265	0.330	0.378	0.432	0.446	0.457	0.590
Adjusted R^2	0.260	0.325	0.369	0.417	0.423	0.422	0.561
Residual Std. Error	1.257 (df = 151)	1.201 (df = 151)	1.161 (df = 150)	1.116 (df = 148)	1.110 (df = 146)	1.111 (df = 143)	0.968 (df = 142)
F Statistic	54.520*** (df = 1; 151)	74.220*** (df = 1; 151)	45.506*** (df = 2; 150)	28.143*** (df = 4; 148)	19.596*** (df = 6; 146)	13.347*** (df = 9; 143)	20.414*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 12: Results for informal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group E) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of informal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (inf) - reduced sample (no E cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(inf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.363***		-0.149*	-0.147	-0.140*	-0.130	-0.146**
	(0.098)		(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.055)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.080***	-0.064***	-0.070**	-0.071**	-0.073**	-0.060***
		(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.015)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.030	-0.032	-0.039	-0.025
				(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.018	-0.052	0.209
					(0.217)	(0.247)	(0.170)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.334	0.418	0.120
					(1.057)	(1.102)	(0.932)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.173	-0.053
						(0.249)	(0.202)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.648	0.568
						(0.860)	(0.792)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.954	-0.989
						(1.266)	(1.216)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							2.193***
							(0.396)
Constant	4.866***	3.641***	4.342***	4.683***	4.494***	4.250**	3.753**
	(0.447)	(0.291)	(0.229)	(0.272)	(0.756)	(1.529)	(1.151)
Observations	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.292	0.441	0.472	0.494	0.495	0.504	0.617
Adjusted R^2	0.287	0.437	0.465	0.481	0.474	0.473	0.590
Residual Std. Error	1.247 (df = 150)	1.108 (df = 150)	1.080 (df = 149)	1.064 (df = 147)	1.071 (df = 145)	1.072 (df = 142)	0.945 (df = 141)
F Statistic	61.822*** (df = 1; 150)	118.332*** (df = 1; 150)	66.714*** (df = 2; 149)	35.927*** (df = 4; 147)	23.714*** (df = 6; 145)	16.052*** (df = 9; 142)	22.745*** (df = 10; 141)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 13: Results for atomistic settlements models, with stepwise addition of controls (sensitivity test 1)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.048		0.034	0.030	0.026	0.029	0.037
	(0.045)		(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.055)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.020**	-0.024**	-0.014*	-0.012	-0.013*	-0.018**
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
City population (millions), 1990				0.017	0.019	0.017	0.012
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.011	0.017	-0.092
					(0.157)	(0.169)	(0.122)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.595	-0.632	-0.450
					(0.761)	(0.771)	(0.705)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.002	0.077
						(0.154)	(0.149)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.599	-0.523
						(0.443)	(0.427)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.022	0.149
						(0.816)	(0.876)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.090*
							(0.519)
Constant	3.394***	3.339***	3.177***	2.757***	2.980***	3.453***	3.565***
	(0.295)	(0.093)	(0.298)	(0.328)	(0.588)	(0.797)	(0.634)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.011	0.062	0.066	0.125	0.131	0.135	0.201
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.057	0.056	0.106	0.103	0.093	0.156
Residual Std. Error	0.992 (df = 190)	0.966 (df = 190)	0.967 (df = 189)	0.941 (df = 187)	0.943 (df = 185)	0.948 (df = 182)	0.914 (df = 181)
F Statistic	2.055 (df = 1; 190)	12.601*** (df = 1; 190)	6.631** (df = 2; 189)	6.649*** (df = 4; 187)	4.638*** (df = 6; 185)	3.164** (df = 9; 182)	4.540*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 14: Results for atomistic settlements models, replacing 1990 value of clientelism with a 1985-1995 average (sensitivity test 2)

	Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), avg. 1985-1995	-0.054		0.028	0.024	0.017	0.020	0.014
	(0.047)		(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.020**	-0.023**	-0.014*	-0.012	-0.012	-0.016*
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				0.016	0.019	0.017	0.011
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.002	0.009	-0.113
					(0.159)	(0.172)	(0.129)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.605	-0.641	-0.481
					(0.759)	(0.768)	(0.698)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.001	0.078
						(0.155)	(0.149)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.592	-0.508
						(0.449)	(0.440)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.019	0.229
						(0.822)	(0.895)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.077*
							(0.529)
Constant	3.426***	3.339***	3.205***	2.786***	3.043***	3.500***	3.690***
	(0.295)	(0.093)	(0.302)	(0.330)	(0.591)	(0.797)	(0.637)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.013	0.062	0.064	0.124	0.130	0.134	0.198
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.057	0.055	0.105	0.102	0.092	0.154
Residual Std. Error	0.991 (df = 190)	0.966 (df = 190)	0.967 (df = 189)	0.941 (df = 187)	0.943 (df = 185)	0.948 (df = 182)	0.915 (df = 181)
F Statistic	2.560 (df = 1; 190)	12.601*** (df = 1; 190)	6.513** (df = 2; 189)	6.588*** (df = 4; 187)	4.603*** (df = 6; 185)	3.138** (df = 9; 182)	4.471*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 15: Results for atomistic settlements models, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo) - reduced sample (no A cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.026		0.059	0.057	0.048	0.049	0.063
	(0.046)		(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.063)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.018**	-0.024**	-0.016	-0.014	-0.014	-0.019**
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				0.029	0.030	0.018	0.011
				(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.014)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.007	-0.028	-0.119
					(0.161)	(0.170)	(0.125)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.577	-0.559	-0.349
					(0.729)	(0.720)	(0.658)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.217	0.307
						(0.159)	(0.165)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.952	-0.836
						(0.932)	(0.874)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.076	0.156
						(0.972)	(0.954)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.223**
							(0.396)
Constant	3.255***	3.304***	3.019***	2.622***	2.901***	3.616**	3.644***
	(0.310)	(0.108)	(0.317)	(0.358)	(0.651)	(1.214)	(1.010)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.003	0.051	0.061	0.117	0.124	0.144	0.222
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.045	0.048	0.094	0.089	0.090	0.168
Residual Std. Error	0.970 (df = 153)	0.947 (df = 153)	0.945 (df = 152)	0.922 (df = 150)	0.925 (df = 148)	0.924 (df = 145)	0.884 (df = 144)
F Statistic	0.500 (df = 1; 153)	8.181** (df = 1; 153)	4.924** (df = 2; 152)	4.993*** (df = 4; 150)	3.506** (df = 6; 148)	2.701** (df = 9; 145)	4.112*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 16: Results for atomistic settlements models, removing 20% of the sample (group B) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo) - reduced sample (no B cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.047		0.046	0.043	0.035	0.043	0.044
	(0.048)		(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.022***	-0.027**	-0.018*	-0.014	-0.015	-0.020***
		(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				0.020	0.026	0.027	0.024
				(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003*	0.004**	0.003*	0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.017	0.024	-0.099
					(0.145)	(0.155)	(0.128)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.985	-1.023	-0.846
					(0.707)	(0.708)	(0.688)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.063	-0.039
						(0.186)	(0.171)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.409	-0.338
						(0.449)	(0.468)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.269	0.039
						(0.574)	(0.639)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.101*
							(0.432)
Constant	3.402***	3.363***	3.142***	2.725***	3.092***	3.472***	3.613***
	(0.319)	(0.098)	(0.326)	(0.358)	(0.592)	(0.740)	(0.679)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.011	0.071	0.077	0.140	0.157	0.160	0.222
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.065	0.065	0.117	0.123	0.108	0.168
Residual Std. Error	0.991 (df = 153)	0.960 (df = 153)	0.960 (df = 152)	0.933 (df = 150)	0.930 (df = 148)	0.938 (df = 145)	0.906 (df = 144)
F Statistic	1.647 (df = 1; 153)	11.684*** (df = 1; 153)	6.369** (df = 2; 152)	6.126*** (df = 4; 150)	4.600*** (df = 6; 148)	3.079** (df = 9; 145)	4.101*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 17: Results for atomistic settlements models, removing 20% of the sample (group C) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo) - reduced sample (no C cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.062		0.012	0.012	0.002	0.015	0.020
	(0.044)		(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.058)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.021***	-0.022*	-0.012	-0.012	-0.014*	-0.017*
		(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
City population (millions), 1990				0.006	0.005	0.007	0.005
				(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.044	-0.057	-0.116
					(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.122)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.046	-0.090	0.023
					(0.714)	(0.759)	(0.725)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.081	-0.030
						(0.160)	(0.156)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.399	-0.330
						(0.511)	(0.520)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.560	-0.382
						(0.813)	(0.905)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.723
							(0.432)
Constant	3.553***	3.406***	3.346***	2.907***	3.049***	3.528***	3.539***
	(0.292)	(0.110)	(0.291)	(0.309)	(0.520)	(0.713)	(0.634)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.018	0.067	0.068	0.125	0.126	0.133	0.163
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.061	0.055	0.102	0.090	0.078	0.104
Residual Std. Error	0.965 (df = 151)	0.940 (df = 151)	0.943 (df = 150)	0.920 (df = 148)	0.926 (df = 146)	0.932 (df = 143)	0.919 (df = 142)
F Statistic	2.810 (df = 1; 151)	10.871** (df = 1; 151)	5.439** (df = 2; 150)	5.297*** (df = 4; 148)	3.506** (df = 6; 146)	2.429* (df = 9; 143)	2.756** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 18: Results for atomistic settlements models, removing 20% of the sample (group D) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo) - reduced sample (no D cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.043		0.038	0.031	0.027	0.020	0.033
	(0.049)		(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.058)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.021**	-0.025**	-0.014	-0.013	-0.012	-0.018**
		(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
City population (millions), 1990				0.007	0.008	0.009	0.002
				(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003**	0.003*	0.004**	0.003**
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.009	0.036	-0.097
					(0.169)	(0.183)	(0.128)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.677	-0.723	-0.463
					(0.988)	(0.998)	(0.877)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.068	0.043
						(0.186)	(0.178)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.637	-0.597
						(0.512)	(0.532)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.441	0.658
						(0.823)	(0.829)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.178*
							(0.497)
Constant	3.377***	3.355***	3.172***	2.781***	3.046***	3.454***	3.612***
	(0.310)	(0.101)	(0.320)	(0.357)	(0.643)	(0.831)	(0.728)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.008	0.061	0.065	0.116	0.123	0.131	0.217
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.055	0.053	0.093	0.087	0.076	0.162
Residual Std. Error	1.023 (df = 151)	0.995 (df = 151)	0.996 (df = 150)	0.975 (df = 148)	0.978 (df = 146)	0.984 (df = 143)	0.937 (df = 142)
F Statistic	1.292 (df = 1; 151)	9.810** (df = 1; 151)	5.243** (df = 2; 150)	4.875** (df = 4; 148)	3.421** (df = 6; 146)	2.396* (df = 9; 143)	3.935*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 19: Results for atomistic settlements models, removing 20% of the sample (group E) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of atomistic settlements, %, 1990-2015 (nlo) - reduced sample (no E cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(nlo)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.062		0.011	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.016
	(0.045)		(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.059)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.021*	-0.022*	-0.012	-0.009	-0.008	-0.015
		(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)
City population (millions), 1990				0.024	0.029*	0.030	0.022
				(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.003*	0.004*	0.004*	0.003*
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.049	0.064	-0.081
					(0.186)	(0.212)	(0.139)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.739	-0.799	-0.633
					(0.890)	(0.921)	(0.836)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.031	0.095
						(0.178)	(0.173)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.499	-0.454
						(0.579)	(0.562)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.202	0.221
						(1.407)	(1.407)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.223
							(0.859)
Constant	3.388***	3.262***	3.211***	2.745***	2.904***	3.251**	3.528***
	(0.290)	(0.121)	(0.286)	(0.329)	(0.664)	(1.008)	(0.750)
Observations	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.018	0.061	0.061	0.135	0.145	0.149	0.223
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.055	0.049	0.111	0.110	0.095	0.168
Residual Std. Error	1.009 (df = 150)	0.986 (df = 150)	0.989 (df = 149)	0.957 (df = 147)	0.957 (df = 145)	0.965 (df = 142)	0.925 (df = 141)
F Statistic	2.723 (df = 1; 150)	9.766** (df = 1; 150)	4.879** (df = 2; 149)	5.718*** (df = 4; 147)	4.102*** (df = 6; 145)	2.754** (df = 9; 142)	4.047*** (df = 10; 141)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 20: Results for formal subdivisions models, with stepwise addition of controls (sensitivity test 1)

	Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.240**		0.004	0.012	0.001	-0.007	0.001
	(0.075)		(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.076)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.070***	0.070***	0.064***	0.062***	0.063***	0.058***
		(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
City population (millions), 1990				0.042*	0.039	0.047	0.042
				(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.073	-0.028	-0.138
					(0.196)	(0.208)	(0.164)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.395	0.266	0.449
					(0.775)	(0.789)	(0.809)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.217	-0.137
						(0.265)	(0.257)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.431	-0.355
						(0.504)	(0.502)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.512	0.684
						(0.908)	(1.004)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.097
							(0.628)
Constant	1.211*	1.860***	1.839***	1.858***	1.900*	2.148*	2.262*
	(0.484)	(0.187)	(0.406)	(0.473)	(0.871)	(1.084)	(0.974)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.130	0.352	0.352	0.363	0.365	0.371	0.403
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.349	0.345	0.349	0.344	0.340	0.370
Residual Std. Error	1.340 (df = 190)	1.157 (df = 190)	1.160 (df = 189)	1.157 (df = 187)	1.161 (df = 185)	1.165 (df = 182)	1.138 (df = 181)
F Statistic	28.425*** (df = 1; 190)	103.243*** (df = 1; 190)	51.356*** (df = 2; 189)	26.589*** (df = 4; 187)	17.715*** (df = 6; 185)	11.921*** (df = 9; 182)	12.201*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 21: Results for formal subdivisions models, replacing 1990 value of clientelism with a 1985-1995 average (sensitivity test 2)

	Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), avg. 1985-1995	0.241**		-0.010	-0.002	-0.018	-0.026	-0.032
	(0.076)		(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.076)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.070***	0.071***	0.065***	0.063***	0.064***	0.061***
		(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)
City population (millions), 1990				0.041*	0.038	0.047	0.041
				(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.095	-0.047	-0.172
					(0.195)	(0.209)	(0.171)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.366	0.238	0.402
					(0.781)	(0.799)	(0.822)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.217	-0.136
						(0.265)	(0.254)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.418	-0.331
						(0.503)	(0.502)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.555	0.770
						(0.907)	(1.017)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.102
							(0.630)
Constant	1.237**	1.860***	1.905***	1.920***	2.040*	2.258*	2.453*
	(0.469)	(0.187)	(0.388)	(0.457)	(0.864)	(1.096)	(0.996)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.126	0.352	0.352	0.362	0.365	0.371	0.404
Adjusted R^2	0.122	0.349	0.345	0.349	0.345	0.340	0.371
Residual Std. Error	1.343 (df = 190)	1.157 (df = 190)	1.160 (df = 189)	1.157 (df = 187)	1.160 (df = 185)	1.164 (df = 182)	1.137 (df = 181)
F Statistic	27.455*** (df = 1; 190)	103.243*** (df = 1; 190)	51.377*** (df = 2; 189)	26.567*** (df = 4; 187)	17.739*** (df = 6; 185)	11.951*** (df = 9; 182)	12.249*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 22: Results for formal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm) - reduced sample (no A cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.248**		-0.016	-0.005	-0.009	-0.014	0.001
	(0.089)		(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.088)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.071***	0.073***	0.067***	0.066***	0.067***	0.062***
		(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
City population (millions), 1990				0.064*	0.063	0.075	0.068
				(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.038)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.028	0.046	-0.051
					(0.218)	(0.224)	(0.184)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.125	-0.077	0.147
					(0.823)	(0.833)	(0.863)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.352	-0.256
						(0.331)	(0.325)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.848	-0.724
						(0.663)	(0.667)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.573	0.659
						(1.068)	(1.125)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.309*
							(0.639)
Constant	1.139*	1.793***	1.870***	1.837***	1.865	2.413	2.443*
	(0.562)	(0.217)	(0.469)	(0.543)	(0.999)	(1.257)	(1.162)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.119	0.349	0.349	0.365	0.365	0.379	0.416
Adjusted R^2	0.113	0.345	0.341	0.348	0.340	0.340	0.376
Residual Std. Error	1.410 (df = 153)	1.212 (df = 153)	1.216 (df = 152)	1.209 (df = 150)	1.217 (df = 148)	1.216 (df = 145)	1.183 (df = 144)
F Statistic	20.690*** (df = 1; 153)	82.090*** (df = 1; 153)	40.831*** (df = 2; 152)	21.560*** (df = 4; 150)	14.200*** (df = 6; 148)	9.825*** (df = 9; 145)	10.277*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 23: Results for formal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group B) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm) - reduced sample (no B cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.239**		0.007	0.014	0.023	-0.001	0.001
	(0.076)		(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.083)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.068***	0.067***	0.060***	0.058***	0.061***	0.056***
		(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
City population (millions), 1990				0.030	0.026	0.030	0.027
				(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.009	0.054	-0.070
					(0.221)	(0.231)	(0.188)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.638	0.543	0.722
					(0.935)	(0.932)	(0.932)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.120	-0.096
						(0.274)	(0.265)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.408	-0.336
						(0.667)	(0.717)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						1.233	1.543
						(0.919)	(1.129)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.109
							(0.851)
Constant	1.215*	1.899***	1.865***	1.980***	1.686	1.763	1.905
	(0.488)	(0.173)	(0.399)	(0.448)	(0.961)	(1.082)	(1.040)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.137	0.342	0.342	0.350	0.353	0.366	0.396
Adjusted R^2	0.131	0.337	0.333	0.333	0.327	0.326	0.354
Residual Std. Error	1.318 (df = 153)	1.152 (df = 153)	1.155 (df = 152)	1.156 (df = 150)	1.160 (df = 148)	1.161 (df = 145)	1.137 (df = 144)
F Statistic	24.314*** (df = 1; 153)	79.369*** (df = 1; 153)	39.438*** (df = 2; 152)	20.189*** (df = 4; 150)	13.480*** (df = 6; 148)	9.286*** (df = 9; 145)	9.452*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 24: Results for formal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group C) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm) - reduced sample (no C cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.226**		-0.025	-0.016	-0.046	-0.061	-0.056
	(0.076)		(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.079)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.072***	0.075***	0.066***	0.065***	0.068***	0.065***
		(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
City population (millions), 1990				0.043	0.039	0.047	0.044
				(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.026)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.142	-0.102	-0.168
					(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.171)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.031	-0.121	0.006
					(0.811)	(0.823)	(0.855)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.177	-0.119
						(0.282)	(0.277)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.353	-0.276
						(0.597)	(0.600)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.616	0.818
						(0.941)	(1.074)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.818
							(0.528)
Constant	1.287*	1.862***	1.985***	2.121***	2.506**	2.693*	2.705**
	(0.516)	(0.180)	(0.419)	(0.486)	(0.817)	(1.082)	(1.038)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.115	0.380	0.381	0.398	0.401	0.407	0.425
Adjusted R^2	0.109	0.376	0.373	0.381	0.376	0.369	0.384
Residual Std. Error	1.325 (df = 151)	1.109 (df = 151)	1.111 (df = 150)	1.104 (df = 148)	1.109 (df = 146)	1.115 (df = 143)	1.101 (df = 142)
F Statistic	19.544*** (df = 1; 151)	92.740*** (df = 1; 151)	46.241*** (df = 2; 150)	24.418*** (df = 4; 148)	16.281*** (df = 6; 146)	10.888*** (df = 9; 143)	10.492*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 25: Results for formal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group D) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm) - reduced sample (no D cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.232**		0.005	0.011	0.006	0.001	0.012
	(0.072)		(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.082)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.071***	0.070***	0.066***	0.065***	0.066***	0.060***
		(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)
City population (millions), 1990				0.055	0.054	0.061	0.055
				(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.032)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.036	-0.005	-0.120
					(0.205)	(0.219)	(0.176)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.269	0.146	0.370
					(0.884)	(0.937)	(0.934)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.186	-0.090
						(0.302)	(0.285)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.357	-0.322
						(0.453)	(0.439)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.266	0.453
						(1.020)	(1.111)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.015
							(0.661)
Constant	1.223*	1.819***	1.796***	1.686**	1.676	1.937	2.074*
	(0.476)	(0.198)	(0.435)	(0.517)	(0.940)	(1.180)	(1.036)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.123	0.346	0.346	0.365	0.366	0.370	0.402
Adjusted R^2	0.117	0.342	0.337	0.348	0.340	0.330	0.359
Residual Std. Error	1.358 (df = 151)	1.173 (df = 151)	1.177 (df = 150)	1.167 (df = 148)	1.174 (df = 146)	1.183 (df = 143)	1.157 (df = 142)
F Statistic	21.178*** (df = 1; 151)	79.934*** (df = 1; 151)	39.708*** (df = 2; 150)	21.292*** (df = 4; 148)	14.053*** (df = 6; 146)	9.312*** (df = 9; 143)	9.529*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 26: Results for formal subdivisions models, removing 20% of the sample (group E) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of formal subdivisions, %, 1990-2015 (frm) - reduced sample (no E cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(frm)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.257**		0.049	0.053	0.028	0.036	0.046
	(0.078)		(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.081)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.068***	0.063***	0.059***	0.055***	0.054***	0.047***
		(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
City population (millions), 1990				0.026	0.019	0.031	0.022
				(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.024)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.0003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.163	-0.135	-0.291
					(0.201)	(0.220)	(0.180)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.888	0.805	0.984
					(0.792)	(0.786)	(0.822)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.294	-0.158
						(0.283)	(0.273)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.199	-0.151
						(0.642)	(0.615)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.249	-0.228
						(0.999)	(0.969)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-1.314*
							(0.569)
Constant	1.190*	1.929***	1.699***	1.682***	1.793*	2.010	2.308*
	(0.482)	(0.204)	(0.416)	(0.502)	(0.912)	(1.257)	(1.103)
Observations	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.161	0.346	0.350	0.355	0.367	0.374	0.419
Adjusted R^2	0.156	0.342	0.341	0.337	0.341	0.334	0.378
Residual Std. Error	1.291 (df = 150)	1.140 (df = 150)	1.141 (df = 149)	1.144 (df = 147)	1.140 (df = 145)	1.146 (df = 142)	1.109 (df = 141)
F Statistic	28.886*** (df = 1; 150)	79.417*** (df = 1; 150)	40.098*** (df = 2; 149)	20.187*** (df = 4; 147)	14.038*** (df = 6; 145)	9.429*** (df = 9; 142)	10.163*** (df = 10; 141)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 27: Results for housing projects models, with stepwise addition of controls (sensitivity test 1)

	Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.027		0.050	0.056	0.043	0.040	0.044
	(0.053)		(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.115)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.001	-0.007	-0.011	-0.014	-0.014	-0.016
		(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)
City population (millions), 1990				0.037	0.033	0.036	0.033
				(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.100	-0.078	-0.136
					(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.290)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.623	0.559	0.656
					(1.202)	(1.305)	(1.279)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.085	-0.043
						(0.324)	(0.299)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.383	-0.343
						(0.799)	(0.770)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.231	0.321
						(1.108)	(1.075)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.575
							(0.483)
Constant	1.809***	1.989***	1.747***	1.735***	1.757	2.014	2.073
	(0.356)	(0.390)	(0.405)	(0.465)	(0.989)	(1.519)	(1.509)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.002	0.0002	0.005	0.017	0.024	0.027	0.039
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.007	-0.021	-0.014
Residual Std. Error	1.204 (df = 190)	1.205 (df = 190)	1.206 (df = 189)	1.205 (df = 187)	1.207 (df = 185)	1.215 (df = 182)	1.211 (df = 181)
F Statistic	0.449 (df = 1; 190)	0.041 (df = 1; 190)	0.509 (df = 2; 189)	0.802 (df = 4; 187)	0.766 (df = 6; 185)	0.554 (df = 9; 182)	0.737 (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 28: Results for housing projects models, replacing 1990 value of clientelism with a 1985-1995 average (sensitivity test 2)

	Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou)						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), avg. 1985-1995	0.026		0.050	0.057	0.043	0.040	0.037
	(0.056)		(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.123)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.001	-0.007	-0.011	-0.014	-0.014	-0.016
		(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)
City population (millions), 1990				0.037	0.033	0.036	0.033
				(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.099	-0.077	-0.140
					(0.243)	(0.248)	(0.286)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.628	0.565	0.648
					(1.194)	(1.296)	(1.280)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.084	-0.043
						(0.324)	(0.301)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.383	-0.339
						(0.806)	(0.776)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.255	0.363
						(1.091)	(1.051)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.556
							(0.456)
Constant	1.817***	1.989***	1.753***	1.740***	1.759	2.005	2.103
	(0.358)	(0.390)	(0.429)	(0.482)	(0.960)	(1.480)	(1.497)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.002	0.0002	0.005	0.017	0.024	0.027	0.038
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.008	-0.022	-0.015
Residual Std. Error	1.204 (df = 190)	1.205 (df = 190)	1.206 (df = 189)	1.205 (df = 187)	1.207 (df = 185)	1.215 (df = 182)	1.211 (df = 181)
F Statistic	0.407 (df = 1; 190)	0.041 (df = 1; 190)	0.484 (df = 2; 189)	0.790 (df = 4; 187)	0.760 (df = 6; 185)	0.552 (df = 9; 182)	0.718 (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 29: Results for housing projects models, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou) - reduced sample (no A cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.027		0.037	0.046	0.035	0.028	0.034
	(0.059)		(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.118)	(0.118)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.001	-0.003	-0.009	-0.013	-0.012	-0.014
		(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
City population (millions), 1990				0.053	0.052	0.059	0.056
				(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.030)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.112	-0.082	-0.119
					(0.263)	(0.248)	(0.266)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.787	0.736	0.819
					(1.121)	(1.232)	(1.217)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.143	-0.107
						(0.385)	(0.366)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.114	0.160
						(0.938)	(0.921)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.378	0.410
						(1.056)	(1.056)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.486
							(0.376)
Constant	1.790***	1.941***	1.762***	1.756**	1.738	1.565	1.576
	(0.409)	(0.373)	(0.467)	(0.566)	(1.015)	(1.532)	(1.499)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.002	0.0001	0.003	0.020	0.032	0.036	0.044
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	-0.007	-0.024	-0.022
Residual Std. Error	1.205 (df = 153)	1.207 (df = 153)	1.209 (df = 152)	1.207 (df = 150)	1.207 (df = 148)	1.217 (df = 145)	1.216 (df = 144)
F Statistic	0.335 (df = 1; 153)	0.017 (df = 1; 153)	0.205 (df = 2; 152)	0.768 (df = 4; 150)	0.818 (df = 6; 148)	0.600 (df = 9; 145)	0.662 (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 30: Results for housing projects models, removing 20% of the sample (group B) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou) - reduced sample (no B cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.041		0.063	0.072	0.060	0.049	0.050
	(0.053)		(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.114)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.001	-0.007	-0.014	-0.018	-0.016	-0.019
		(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
City population (millions), 1990				0.038	0.031	0.036	0.034
				(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.104	-0.056	-0.131
					(0.278)	(0.265)	(0.309)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.855	0.725	0.833
					(1.219)	(1.378)	(1.356)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.188	-0.173
						(0.377)	(0.364)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.843	-0.799
						(0.939)	(0.899)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.671	0.859
						(1.141)	(1.068)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.672
							(0.559)
Constant	1.749***	1.989***	1.686***	1.756***	1.695	2.233	2.319
	(0.353)	(0.411)	(0.420)	(0.490)	(1.072)	(1.649)	(1.647)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.005	0.00004	0.008	0.022	0.034	0.046	0.062
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.013	-0.004
Residual Std. Error	1.218 (df = 153)	1.221 (df = 153)	1.221 (df = 152)	1.220 (df = 150)	1.221 (df = 148)	1.225 (df = 145)	1.220 (df = 144)
F Statistic	0.838 (df = 1; 153)	0.006 (df = 1; 153)	0.616 (df = 2; 152)	0.846 (df = 4; 150)	0.859 (df = 6; 148)	0.784 (df = 9; 145)	0.945 (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 31: Results for housing projects models, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou) - reduced sample (no C cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.021		0.056	0.065	0.087	0.091	0.095
	(0.055)		(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.123)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.005	-0.010	-0.014	-0.015	-0.016	-0.018
		(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.033)
City population (millions), 1990				0.051	0.052	0.050	0.049
				(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.0003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
				(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					0.090	0.118	0.074
					(0.272)	(0.293)	(0.319)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.322	0.205	0.290
					(1.248)	(1.324)	(1.306)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.009	0.030
						(0.344)	(0.321)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-1.079	-1.027
						(0.717)	(0.714)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.263	0.398
						(1.235)	(1.207)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.548
							(0.461)
Constant	1.852***	2.032***	1.756***	1.660***	1.271	2.034	2.042
	(0.360)	(0.401)	(0.396)	(0.426)	(0.998)	(1.468)	(1.454)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.009	0.033	0.037	0.049	0.060
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	0.007	-0.003	-0.011	-0.006
Residual Std. Error	1.181 (df = 151)	1.181 (df = 151)	1.181 (df = 150)	1.174 (df = 148)	1.180 (df = 146)	1.185 (df = 143)	1.181 (df = 142)
F Statistic	0.216 (df = 1; 151)	0.323 (df = 1; 151)	0.650 (df = 2; 150)	1.277 (df = 4; 148)	0.930 (df = 6; 146)	0.810 (df = 9; 143)	0.909 (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 32: Results for housing projects models, removing 20% of the sample (group D) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou) - reduced sample (no D cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.021		0.056	0.058	0.020	0.022	0.027
	(0.056)		(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.117)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.005	-0.011	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.016
		(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)
City population (millions), 1990				0.028	0.027	0.031	0.027
				(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.036)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.0003
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.175	-0.171	-0.230
					(0.247)	(0.249)	(0.290)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					-0.322	-0.374	-0.259
					(1.523)	(1.669)	(1.639)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.080	-0.031
						(0.332)	(0.309)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.195	0.212
						(0.892)	(0.858)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.098	-0.003
						(1.242)	(1.209)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.520
							(0.477)
Constant	1.813***	1.992***	1.725***	1.636***	2.282*	2.175	2.245
	(0.365)	(0.387)	(0.408)	(0.481)	(1.060)	(1.700)	(1.690)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.009	0.017	0.026	0.027	0.039
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.010	-0.014	-0.034	-0.028
Residual Std. Error	1.217 (df = 151)	1.217 (df = 151)	1.217 (df = 150)	1.220 (df = 148)	1.222 (df = 146)	1.235 (df = 143)	1.231 (df = 142)
F Statistic	0.209 (df = 1; 151)	0.347 (df = 1; 151)	0.669 (df = 2; 150)	0.628 (df = 4; 148)	0.662 (df = 6; 146)	0.448 (df = 9; 143)	0.582 (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 33: Results for housing projects models, removing 20% of the sample (group E) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of housing projects, %, 1990-2015 (hou) - reduced sample (no E cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(hou)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	0.025		0.038	0.042	0.024	0.026	0.032
	(0.056)		(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.109)	(0.121)	(0.120)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		0.0002	-0.004	-0.008	-0.014	-0.014	-0.018
		(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.037)
City population (millions), 1990				0.021	0.012	0.012	0.007
				(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.153	-0.155	-0.243
					(0.240)	(0.266)	(0.316)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					1.355	1.334	1.435
					(1.061)	(1.151)	(1.109)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.010	0.067
						(0.298)	(0.273)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.139	-0.111
						(0.938)	(0.905)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.082	-0.070
						(1.253)	(1.248)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							-0.742
							(0.621)
Constant	1.844***	1.992***	1.812***	1.850***	1.743	1.878	2.047
	(0.386)	(0.390)	(0.430)	(0.495)	(1.024)	(1.633)	(1.664)
Observations	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.002	0.00000	0.003	0.008	0.037	0.038	0.057
Adjusted R^2	-0.005	-0.007	-0.010	-0.019	-0.003	-0.023	-0.010
Residual Std. Error	1.204 (df = 150)	1.206 (df = 150)	1.208 (df = 149)	1.213 (df = 147)	1.203 (df = 145)	1.216 (df = 142)	1.208 (df = 141)
F Statistic	0.317 (df = 1; 150)	0.001 (df = 1; 150)	0.233 (df = 2; 149)	0.279 (df = 4; 147)	0.936 (df = 6; 145)	0.615 (df = 9; 142)	0.853 (df = 10; 141)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 34: Results for models for all informal growth, with stepwise addition of controls (sensitivity test 1)

	Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.139**		-0.014	-0.014	-0.030	-0.028	-0.033
	(0.046)		(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.031)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.036***
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				0.0001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001
				(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0001	0.00005	0.00004	0.0003
				(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.094	-0.100	-0.037
					(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.085)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.249	0.263	0.157
					(0.374)	(0.410)	(0.413)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.036	-0.010
						(0.110)	(0.094)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.065	-0.109
						(0.332)	(0.303)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.094	-0.193
						(0.414)	(0.433)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.633***
							(0.167)
Constant	4.765***	4.366***	4.432***	4.420***	4.586***	4.653***	4.587***
	(0.241)	(0.098)	(0.129)	(0.154)	(0.315)	(0.553)	(0.468)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.194	0.472	0.473	0.474	0.484	0.484	0.532
Adjusted R^2	0.190	0.469	0.468	0.462	0.467	0.459	0.506
Residual Std. Error	0.610 (df = 190)	0.494 (df = 190)	0.495 (df = 189)	0.497 (df = 187)	0.495 (df = 185)	0.499 (df = 182)	0.477 (df = 181)
F Statistic	45.846*** (df = 1; 190)	170.027*** (df = 1; 190)	84.981*** (df = 2; 189)	42.058*** (df = 4; 187)	28.868*** (df = 6; 185)	18.994*** (df = 9; 182)	20.547*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 35: Results for models for all informal growth, replacing 1990 value of clientelism with a 1985-1995 average (sensitivity test 2)

	Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015						
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), avg. 1985-1995	-0.147**		-0.019	-0.019	-0.038	-0.036	-0.033
	(0.046)		(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.031)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.038***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.036***
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.0001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.001
				(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0003
				(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.103	-0.110	-0.040
					(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.084)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.234	0.247	0.155
					(0.370)	(0.405)	(0.411)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.036	-0.009
						(0.109)	(0.094)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.059	-0.108
						(0.330)	(0.304)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.091	-0.211
						(0.406)	(0.426)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.617***
							(0.174)
Constant	4.795***	4.366***	4.453***	4.440***	4.642***	4.705***	4.596***
	(0.235)	(0.098)	(0.131)	(0.157)	(0.300)	(0.532)	(0.465)
Observations	192	192	192	192	192	192	192
R^2	0.209	0.472	0.474	0.474	0.486	0.486	0.531
Adjusted R^2	0.205	0.469	0.469	0.463	0.469	0.461	0.505
Residual Std. Error	0.604 (df = 190)	0.494 (df = 190)	0.494 (df = 189)	0.497 (df = 187)	0.494 (df = 185)	0.498 (df = 182)	0.477 (df = 181)
F Statistic	50.352*** (df = 1; 190)	170.027*** (df = 1; 190)	85.276*** (df = 2; 189)	42.206*** (df = 4; 187)	29.106*** (df = 6; 185)	19.147*** (df = 9; 182)	20.525*** (df = 10; 181)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 36: Results for models for all informal growth, removing 20% of the sample (group A) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015 - reduced sample (no A cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.139**		-0.006	-0.008	-0.019	-0.016	-0.023
	(0.051)		(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.035)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.036***
		(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.011	-0.012	-0.018	-0.014
				(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0002	0.00000	0.00001	0.0003
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.079	-0.098	-0.054
					(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.084)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.310	0.346	0.244
					(0.368)	(0.398)	(0.406)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.112	0.068
						(0.121)	(0.109)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.131	-0.187
						(0.297)	(0.284)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.169	-0.208
						(0.412)	(0.426)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.591**
							(0.189)
Constant	4.759***	4.360***	4.390***	4.394***	4.489***	4.627***	4.614***
	(0.272)	(0.096)	(0.153)	(0.196)	(0.332)	(0.498)	(0.431)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.184	0.472	0.472	0.474	0.484	0.490	0.527
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.468	0.465	0.460	0.463	0.458	0.495
Residual Std. Error	0.614 (df = 153)	0.494 (df = 153)	0.495 (df = 152)	0.497 (df = 150)	0.496 (df = 148)	0.498 (df = 145)	0.481 (df = 144)
F Statistic	34.563*** (df = 1; 153)	136.641*** (df = 1; 153)	67.936*** (df = 2; 152)	33.854*** (df = 4; 150)	23.160*** (df = 6; 148)	15.464*** (df = 9; 145)	16.068*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 37: Results for models for all informal growth, removing 20% of the sample (group B) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015 - reduced sample (no B cities)							
	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.148**		-0.022	-0.022	-0.041	-0.036	-0.037
	(0.046)		(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.030)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.039***	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.037***	-0.038***	-0.035***
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)
City population (millions), 1990				0.007	0.005	0.003	0.005
				(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0003	0.0004	0.0003	0.001
				(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.096	-0.110	-0.031
					(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.083)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.065	0.103	-0.010
					(0.388)	(0.430)	(0.422)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.060	0.045
						(0.114)	(0.091)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.089	0.044
						(0.360)	(0.308)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.253	-0.449
						(0.462)	(0.489)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.700***
							(0.157)
Constant	4.816***	4.359***	4.465***	4.414***	4.665***	4.638***	4.548***
	(0.242)	(0.098)	(0.136)	(0.161)	(0.322)	(0.578)	(0.472)
Observations	155	155	155	155	155	155	155
R^2	0.222	0.474	0.477	0.480	0.488	0.491	0.543
Adjusted R^2	0.217	0.470	0.470	0.466	0.467	0.460	0.511
Residual Std. Error	0.607 (df = 153)	0.499 (df = 153)	0.500 (df = 152)	0.501 (df = 150)	0.501 (df = 148)	0.505 (df = 145)	0.480 (df = 144)
F Statistic	43.717*** (df = 1; 153)	137.800*** (df = 1; 153)	69.290*** (df = 2; 152)	34.630*** (df = 4; 150)	23.518*** (df = 6; 148)	15.550*** (df = 9; 145)	17.104*** (df = 10; 144)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 38: Results for models for all informal growth, removing 20% of the sample (group C) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015 - reduced sample (no C cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.135**		-0.009	-0.009	-0.032	-0.027	-0.030
	(0.046)		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.032)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.037***
		(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002
				(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0002	0.0002	0.0001	0.0003
				(0.0004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.124	-0.134	-0.085
					(0.100)	(0.105)	(0.095)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.324	0.326	0.232
					(0.386)	(0.436)	(0.442)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						-0.028	-0.071
						(0.121)	(0.107)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.0003	-0.057
						(0.354)	(0.346)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.273	-0.423
						(0.417)	(0.461)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.608***
							(0.167)
Constant	4.768***	4.375***	4.417***	4.400***	4.607***	4.687***	4.678***
	(0.245)	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.300)	(0.554)	(0.505)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.183	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.502	0.548
Adjusted R^2	0.177	0.482	0.479	0.472	0.480	0.471	0.516
Residual Std. Error	0.601 (df = 151)	0.477 (df = 151)	0.478 (df = 150)	0.481 (df = 148)	0.478 (df = 146)	0.482 (df = 143)	0.461 (df = 142)
F Statistic	33.798*** (df = 1; 151)	142.395*** (df = 1; 151)	70.862*** (df = 2; 150)	34.995*** (df = 4; 148)	24.355*** (df = 6; 146)	16.045*** (df = 9; 143)	17.207*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 39: Results for models for all informal growth, removing 20% of the sample (group D) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015 - reduced sample (no D cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.124**		-0.011	-0.011	-0.026	-0.031	-0.037
	(0.041)		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.036***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.034***
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
City population (millions), 1990				-0.007	-0.009	-0.012	-0.008
				(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.015)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				-0.0003	-0.0005	-0.0004	-0.0001
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.097	-0.092	-0.027
					(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.085)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.496	0.525	0.398
					(0.462)	(0.498)	(0.494)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.046	-0.009
						(0.126)	(0.107)
Cohesion Index, 1990						-0.324	-0.343
						(0.463)	(0.418)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						0.238	0.132
						(0.421)	(0.435)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.575***
							(0.174)
Constant	4.702***	4.364***	4.418***	4.468***	4.534***	4.717***	4.640***
	(0.218)	(0.092)	(0.135)	(0.162)	(0.347)	(0.683)	(0.577)
Observations	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
R^2	0.170	0.434	0.435	0.438	0.456	0.461	0.511
Adjusted R^2	0.164	0.430	0.427	0.423	0.434	0.428	0.477
Residual Std. Error	0.601 (df = 151)	0.496 (df = 151)	0.498 (df = 150)	0.500 (df = 148)	0.495 (df = 146)	0.498 (df = 143)	0.476 (df = 142)
F Statistic	30.871*** (df = 1; 151)	115.754*** (df = 1; 151)	57.708*** (df = 2; 150)	28.823*** (df = 4; 148)	20.427*** (df = 6; 146)	13.617*** (df = 9; 143)	14.850*** (df = 10; 142)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 40: Results for models for all informal growth, removing 20% of the sample (group E) (sensitivity test 3)

Proportion of total informal growth (inf+nlo), %, 1990-2015 - reduced sample (no E cities)

	Dependent variable:						
	Log(allinf)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Clientelism Index (0-10 scale), 1990	-0.149**		-0.020	-0.020	-0.036	-0.036	-0.041
	(0.052)		(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.033)
GDP per capita (thousands), 1990		-0.041***	-0.039***	-0.039***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.036***
		(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
City population (millions), 1990				0.008	0.007	0.006	0.011
				(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
City pop. density (p/ha), 1990				0.0001	0.0002	0.0002	0.001
				(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
National annual pop. growth rate (%), avg. 1985-1995					-0.083	-0.084	0.003
					(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.097)
National urban pop. (%), 1990					0.081	0.082	-0.017
					(0.340)	(0.367)	(0.377)
Capital city (N=0, Y=1)						0.007	-0.068
						(0.113)	(0.097)
Cohesion Index, 1990						0.002	-0.025
						(0.370)	(0.342)
Inclusion growth (%), 1990-2015						-0.010	-0.022
						(0.520)	(0.513)
Part of former USSR (N=0, Y=1)							0.728***
							(0.167)
Constant	4.780***	4.371***	4.466***	4.430***	4.636***	4.638***	4.473***
	(0.259)	(0.110)	(0.133)	(0.149)	(0.341)	(0.583)	(0.490)
Observations	152	152	152	152	152	152	152
R^2	0.215	0.496	0.499	0.502	0.508	0.508	0.562
Adjusted R^2	0.209	0.493	0.492	0.488	0.487	0.476	0.531
Residual Std. Error	0.627 (df = 150)	0.502 (df = 150)	0.503 (df = 149)	0.505 (df = 147)	0.505 (df = 145)	0.511 (df = 142)	0.483 (df = 141)
F Statistic	40.971*** (df = 1; 150)	147.895*** (df = 1; 150)	74.211*** (df = 2; 149)	37.005*** (df = 4; 147)	24.905*** (df = 6; 145)	16.261*** (df = 9; 142)	18.097*** (df = 10; 141)
Note:							*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Bibliography

Abankwa, V., United Nations Human Settlements Programme, & Ghana Women Land Access Trust (Eds.). (2009). *Ghana: Accra urban profile*. UN-Habitat.

Accra Metropolitan Assembly. (2018). *2018-2021 Medium Term Development Plan*.

Accra Metropolitan Assembly. (2019, March 28). *Three e-waste projects inaugurated at Agbogbloshie*. https://ama.gov.gh/news-details.php?n=cHJwcjg2OHIzN3E4NzQ0MnNxN3BzbzlzMjZyc3IxMjlwNjQybjRvNA==

Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities. (2018). *Preliminary Resilience Assessment Summary*.

Accra Metropolitan Assembly & 100 Resilient Cities. (2019). *Accra Resilience Strategy*.

Accra Planning and Development Programme, United Nations Development Programme, & United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). (1991). *Strategic Plan for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area: Draft Final Report*. Ministry of Local Government, Department of Town and Country Planning.

Acheampong, R. A. (2019). *Spatial Planning in Ghana: Origins, Contemporary Reforms and Practices, and New Perspectives*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02011-8

Acquah, A. A., D'Souza, C., Martin, B., Arko-Mensah, J., Nti, A. A., Kwarteng, L., Takyi, S., Quakyi, I. A., Robins, T. G., & Fobil, J. N. (2019). Processes and challenges associated with informal electronic waste recycling at Agbogbloshie, a suburb of Accra, Ghana. *Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting*, *63*(1), 938–942. https://doi.org/10.1177/1071181319631219

Acuto, M., Dinardi, C., & Marx, C. (2019). Transcending (in)formal urbanism. *Urban Studies*, *56*(3), 475–487. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018810602

Adam, A.-W. (2013). *Perceptions of Slum Dwellers and Municipal Officials on Factors Impacting the Provision of Basic Slum Services in Accra, Ghana* [Master's Thesis]. Erasmus University - International Institute of Social Studies.

Adjei Mensah, C., Antwi, K. B., & Acheampong, P. K. (2013). Behavioural dimension of the growth of informal settlements in Kumasi City, Ghana. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, *3*(12).

Adom, K. (2016). Tackling informal entrepreneurship in Ghana: A critical analysis of the dualist/modernist policy approach, some evidence from Accra. *International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business*, *28*(2/3), 216. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJESB.2016.076640

African Planning Association, & UN-Habitat. (2014). *The State of Planning in Africa*. http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=3537&alt=1

Agyei, Y. A., Kumi, E., & Yeboah, T. (2016). Is better to be a kayayei than to be unemployed: Reflecting on the role of head portering in Ghana's informal economy. *GeoJournal; Dordrecht*, *81*(2), 293–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-015-9620-z

Agyemang, F. S., & Morrison, N. (2018). Recognising the barriers to securing affordable housing through the land use planning system in Sub-Saharan Africa: A perspective from Ghana. *Urban Studies*, *55*(12), 2640–2659. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098017724092

Álvarez-Rivadulla, M. J. (2017). *Squatters and the politics of marginality in Uruguay*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Alves, G. (2018). *Determinants of Slum Formation: The Role of Local Politics and Policies* [Working Paper]. CAF. http://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1158

Amedzro, K. K. (2012). *Expulsion of the informal sector through decongestion exercises in Accra Metropolitan Area: Response to the informal sector by city authorities* [MSc Thesis]. University College London.

Amnesty International. (2011). *'When we sleep, we don't sleep': Living under threat of forced eviction in Ghana* (AFR 28/003/2011).

Amoah, O. B. (2018, October 1). *Point of View with O.B Amoah and Dr. Emmanuel Akwetey on the election of MMDCEs* (B. Avle, Interviewer) [Interview]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umXGMOJxDEA

Amoako, C. (2016). Brutal presence or convenient absence: The role of the state in the politics of flooding in informal Accra, Ghana. *Geoforum*, *77*, 5–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.10.003

Amoako, C., & Cobbinah, P. (2011). Slum improvement in the Kumasi metropolis, Ghana: A review of approaches and results. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, *13*(8).

Amoateng, P., Cobbinah, P. B., & Owusu-Adade, K. (2013). Managing physical development in peri-urban areas of Kumasi, Ghana: A case of Abuakwa. *Journal of Urban and Environmental Engineering (JUEE)*, *7*(1). https://doi.org/10.4090/juee.2013.v7n1.

Amorse, A. B. (2017). *Akufo-Addo's Inner City and Zongo Development Ministry a Threat to NDC's Survival*. The Ghana Guardian News. https://ghanaguardian.com/akufo-addos-inner-city-zongo-development-ministry-threat-ndcs-survival

Amuzu, D. (2018). Environmental injustice of informal e-waste recycling in Agbogbloshie-Accra: Urban political ecology perspective. *Local Environment*, *23*(6), 603–618. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2018.1456515

Andrews, E. (2017). *Navigating land rights institutions in the Greater Accra Region of Southern Ghana: An actor network theory approach* [Master's Thesis]. University of Ottawa.

Angel, S., Archer, R. W., & Tanphiphat, S. (Eds.). (1983). *Land for housing the poor: Papers of a seminar held in Bangkok, January 1982*. Select Books.

Angel, S., Blei, A. M., Parent, J., Lamson-Hall, P., & Sánchez, N. G. (2016). *Atlas of Urban Expansion: The 2016 Edition*.

Angel, S., Lamson-Hall, P., Madrid, M., Blei, A. M., & Parent, J. (2016). *Atlas of Urban Expansion: The 2016 Edition (Volume 2: Blocks and Roads)*.

Anyidoho, N. A. (2013). *Informal Economy Monitoring Study: Street Vendors in Accra, Ghana*. WIEGO.

Appadurai, A. (2001). Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics. *Environment and Urbanization*, *13*(2), 23–43.

Appiah, D., & Abdulai, A.-G. (2017). *Competitive clientelism and the politics of core public sector reform in Ghana*. The University of Manchester. https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100058245019.0x000001

Appiah, E. (2014, August 6). *Work on $323m Achimota Eco Park set to start October*. Joy News. https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/August-6th/government-secures-320m-for-achimota-eco-park-set-to-start-october.php

Appiah, F. (2019, June 25). *Fear Grip Chiefs As Asantehene Destools Two Chiefs, More Cases Pending*. Modern Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/941152/fear-grip-chiefs-as-asantehene-destools-two-chiefs.html

Arku, G., Mensah, K. O., Allotey, N. K., & Addo Frempong, E. (2016). Non-compliance with building permit regulations in Accra-Tema city-region, Ghana: Exploring the reasons from the perspective of multiple stakeholders. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *17*(3), 361–384. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2016.1192216

Asian Development Bank. (2013). *Urban operational plan: 2012-2020*. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3110688

Asian Development Bank. (2014, October 22). *Urban Innovations Series* [Text]. Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/publications/series/urban-innovations

Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, W. (2019). *Democracy for sale: Elections, clientelism, and the state in Indonesia*. Cornell University Press.

Auerbach, A. (2016). Clients and Communities. *World Politics*, *68*(01), 111–148. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000313

Auerbach, A., Bussell, J., Chauchard, S., Jensenius, F., Nellis, G., Schneider, M., Sircar, N., Pavithra, S., Thachil, T., Vaishnav, M., Verma, R., & Ziegfeld, A. (2016, September). *Rethinking Electoral Politics in India*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Rethinking Electoral Politics in India (Workshop).

Auerbach, A., & Thachil, T. (2016). *Capability, Connectivity, and Co-Ethnicity: The Origins of Political Brokerage in India's Urban Slums*.

Auyero, J. (2000). The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account. *Latin American Research Review*, *35*(3), 55–81.

Awal, M., & Paller, J. W. (2016). *Who really governs urban Ghana?* http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/publications/who-really-governs-urban-ghana/

Ayee, J. R. A., & Crook, R. (2003). *"Toilet wars": Urban sanitation services and the politics of public-private partnerships in Ghana*. Institute of Development Studies.

Ayee, J. R. A., Frempong, A. K. D., Asante, R., & Boafo-Arthur, K. (2011). *Local power struggles, conflicts and conflict resolution: The causes, dynamics and policy implications of land-related conflicts in the greater Accra and eastern regions of Ghana* (No. 3; CODESRIA Research Reports). CODESRIA.

Banks, N. (2016). Livelihoods Limitations: The Political Economy of Urban Poverty in Dhaka, Bangladesh. *Development and Change*, *47*(2), 266–292. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12219

Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2018). *A Theory of Clientelistic Politics versus Programmatic Politics* (dp-317; Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series). Boston University - Department of Economics. https://ideas.repec.org/p/bos/iedwpr/dp-317.html

Barriga, M. D. (1995). The Politics of Urban Expansion in Mexico City: A Case Study of Ejido Urbanization in the Ajusco Foothills, 1938-1990. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development*, *24*(3/4), 363–396.

Bartels, L. E. (2016). *The Uneven Waters of Accra and the concept of Environmental Justice: Towards new pathways of analyzing water inequalities* (No. 3; WaterPower Working Paper). Governance and Sustainability Lab, Trier University. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328477356_The_Uneven_Waters_of_Accra_and_the_Concept_of_Environmental_Justice_-_Towards_New_Pathways_of_Analyzing_Water_Inequalities

Bartels, L. E. (2019). Peri-urbanization as "Quiet Encroachment" by the middle class. The case of P&T in Greater Accra. *Urban Geography*. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02723638.2019.1664810

Bartels, L. E., Bruns, A., & Alba, R. (2018). The production of uneven access to land and water in peri-urban spaces: De facto privatisation in greater Accra. *Local Environment*, *23*(12), 1172–1189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2018.1533932

Bawumia, M. (2019, October 3). Following my visit to Agbogbloshie and Old Fadama [...] [Tweet]. *@MBawumia*. twitter.com/MBawumia/status/1179706471346589698

Bayat, A. (2013). *Life as politics: How ordinary people change the Middle East* (Second edition). Stanford University Press.

Bénit-Gbaffou, C. (2012). Party politics, civil society and local democracy – Reflections from Johannesburg. *Geoforum*, *43*(2), 178–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.08.006

Bénit-Gbaffou, C., & Oldfield, S. (2014). Claiming 'Rights' in the African City. In Sue Parnell & S. Oldfield (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook on cities of the Global South*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Benjamin, S. (2005). Touts, Pirates and Ghosts. *Sarai Reader*, *Bare Acts*, 242–254.

Benjamin, S. (2008). Occupancy Urbanism: Radicalizing Politics and Economy beyond Policy and Programs. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *32*(3), 719–729.

Berry, S. (2002). The Everyday Politics of Rent-Seeking: Land Allocation on the Outskirts of Kumase, Ghana. In K. Juul & C. Lund (Eds.), *Negotiating property in Africa*. Heinemann.

Bhan, G. (2013). Planned Illegalities: Housing and the "Failure" of Planning in Delhi: 1947-2010. *Economic & Political Weekly*, *48*(24), 58–70.

Bhan, G. (2016). *In the public's interest: Evictions, citizenship, and inequality in contemporary Delhi*. University of Georgia Press.

Bigg, M. M. (2015, June 22). Protesters clash with Ghana security forces over bulldozed houses. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ghana-protest-idUSKBN0P228W20150622

Birch, E. L., & Mensah, J. K. (2020). *Implementing SDG7 in the Informal Settlements: The Case of Accra, Ghana—Focus Group Discussion Report (unpublished)*.

Björkman, L. (2014a). "You can't buy a vote": Meanings of money in a Mumbai election. *American Ethnologist*, *41*(4), 617–634.

Björkman, L. (2014b). Becoming a Slum: From Municipal Colony to Illegal Settlement in Liberalization-Era Mumbai. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *38*(1), 36–59.

Blair, G., Cooper, J., Cuppock, A., Humphreys, M., & Sonnet, L. (2018). *estimatr: Fast Estimators for Design-Based Inference* (Version R package version 0.14) [Computer software]. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=estimatr

Boamah, E. F., & Amoako, C. (2019). Planning by (mis)rule of laws: The idiom and dilemma of planning within Ghana's dual legal land systems. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 239965441985540. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419855400

Bob-Milliar, G. M., & Obeng-Odoom, F. (2011). The Informal Economy Is An Employer, A Nuisance, And A Goldmine: Multiple Representations Of And Responses To Informality In Accra, Ghana. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development*, *40*(3/4), 263–284. JSTOR.

Booth, D., & Therkildsen, O. (2012). *The political economy of development in Africa: A joint statement from five research programmes*. Africa Power and Politics Programme; Developmental Leadership Programme; Elites, Production and Poverty: A Comparative Analysis; Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in Africa; Tracking Development.

Boudreau, J.-A., & Davis, D. E. (2017). Introduction: A processual approach to informalization. *Current Sociology*, *65*(2), 151–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392116657286

Brady, C., & Hooper, M. (2019). Redefining Engagement with Socio-spatially Marginalised Populations: Learning from Ghana's Ministry of Inner City and Zongo Development. *Urbanisation*, 245574711986853. https://doi.org/10.1177/2455747119868532

Broadbent, E. (2012). *Research-based evidence in African policy debates: Case study of decongestion in Accra, Ghana* (Evidence Based Policy Development Network (EBPDN) Working Paper).

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote Buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, *39*(2), 66–88.

Burgwal, G. (1995). *Struggle of the poor: Neighborhood organization and clientelist practice in a Quito squatter settlement*. CEDLA.

Bussell, J. (2019). *Clients and constituents: Political responsiveness in patronage democracies*. Oxford University Press.

Bustikova, L., & Corduneanu-Huci, C. (2017). Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity. *World Politics*, *69*(02), 277–326. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000265

Calvino, I. (1974). *Invisible cities* (W. Weaver, Trans.). Vintage.

Carothers, T., & de Gramont, D. (2013). *Development aid confronts politics: The almost revolution*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2020). *The World Factbook 2020—Field Listing: Languages*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/402.html

Chalana, M., & Hou, J. (Eds.). (2016). *Messy urbanism understanding the "other" cities of Asia*. Hong Kong University Press.

Chattaraj, D., Choudhury, K., & Joshi, M. (2017). The Tenth Delhi: Economy, politics and space in the post-liberalisation metropolis. *Decision*, *44*(2), 147–160. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40622-017-0154-8

Chidambaram, S. (2011). *Welfare, patronage, and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India's urban slums* [PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University]. http://search.proquest.com/docview/925813415?accountid=14707

Citi Newsroom. (2019, December 1). Government cancels December 17 Referendum. *Citinewsroom*. https://citinewsroom.com/2019/12/govt-cancels-december-17-referendum/

Cobbinah, P. B., & Darkwah, R. M. (2017). Urban planning and politics in Ghana. *GeoJournal*, *82*(6), 1229–1245. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-016-9750-y

Cobbinah, P. B., Poku-Boansi, M., & Peprah, C. (2017). Urban environmental problems in Ghana. *Environmental Development*, *23*, 33–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2017.05.001

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Cornell, A., Dahlum, S., Gjerløw, H., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Krusell, J., Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., … Ziblatt, D. (2018). *V-Dem Country-Year Dataset 2018*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18

Coslovsky, S. V. (2015). Beyond Bureaucracy: How Prosecutors and Public Defenders Enforce Urban Planning Laws in São Paulo, Brazil. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *39*(6), 1103–1119. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12330

Crentsil, A. O., & Owusu, G. (2018). Accra's Decongestion Policy: Another Face of Urban Clearance or Bulldozing Approach? *International Development Policy | Revue Internationale de Politique de Développement*, *10 | 2018*(10), 213–228. https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.2719

Cunha, A. (2009). Informal Land Subdivision and Real Estate Regularization: A Comparative Study between Colombia and Brazil. *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review*, *40*(2), 315.

d'Auria, V. (2010). From Tropical Transitions to Ekistic Experimentation: Doxiadis Associates in Tema, Ghana. *Positions*, *1*, 40–63.

da Silva, R. de C. O., & Shaw, K. (2012). Hip-hop and Sociality in a Brazilian Favela. In C. McFarlane & M. Waibel (Eds.), *Urban informalities: Reflections on the formal and informal*. Ashgate.

Datta, A. (2012). *The illegal city: Space, law and gender in a Delhi squatter settlement*. Ashgate.

Daum, K., Stoler, J., & Grant, R. J. (2017). Toward a More Sustainable Trajectory for E-Waste Policy: A Review of a Decade of E-Waste Research in Accra, Ghana. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, *14*(2), 135. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14020135

Davidoff, P. (1965). Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, *31*(4), 331–338.

Davis, D. E. (2014). Modernist Planning and the Foundations of Urban Violence in Latin America. *Built Environment*, *40*(3), 376–393. https://doi.org/10.2148/benv.40.3.376

Davis, D. E. (2018). Reflections on "The Politics of Informality": What We Know, How We Got There, and Where We Might Head Next. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *53*(3), 365–378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-018-9273-2

Davis, M. (2006). *Planet of Slums*. Verso.

De, I., & Nag, T. (2016). Dangers of Decentralisation in Urban Slums: A Comparative Study of Water Supply and Drainage Service Delivery in Kolkata, India. *Development Policy Review*, *34*(2), 253–276. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12149

de Wit, J. (2017). *Urban poverty, local governance and everyday politics in Mumbai* (First South Asia edition). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

de Wit, J., & Berner, E. (2009). Progressive patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, CBOs and the limits to slum dwellers' empowerment. *Development and Change*, *40*(5), 948; 948.

Duho, R. Q. (2019, March 30). *790 LUSPA staff migrated to Local Government Service*. Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghana-news-790-luspa-staff-migrated-to-local-government-service.html

Elyachar, J. (2005). *Markets of dispossession: NGOs, economic development, and the state in Cairo*. Duke Univ. Press.

European Coordination Via Campesina. (2016, November 23). *How do we define Land Grabbing?* European Coordination Via Campesina. https://www.eurovia.org/how-do-we-define-land-grabbing/

Fage, J. D., Maier, D. J., Davies, O., & Boateng, E. A. (2019, July 12). *Ghana*. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ghana

Fawaz, M. (2017). Exceptions and the actually existing practice of planning: Beirut (Lebanon) as case study. *Urban Studies*, *54*(8), 1938–1955. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098016640453

Ferguson, J. (1990). *The anti-politics machine: "development," depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. University of Minnesota Press.

Fergusson, L., Larreguy, H., & Riaño, J. F. (2016). *Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico*.

Florczyk, A. J., Corbane, C., Schiavina, M., Pesaresi, M., Maffenini, L., Melchiorri, M., Politis, P., Sabo, F., Freire, S., Ehrlich, D., Kemper, T., Tommasi, P., Airaghi, D., & Zanchetta, L. (2019). *GHS Urban Centre Database 2015, multitemporal and multidimensional attributes, R2019A*. European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC).

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Rationality and power: Democracy in practice*. University of Chicago Press.

Follmann, A. (2015). Urban mega-projects for a 'world-class' riverfront – The interplay of informality, flexibility and exceptionality along the Yamuna in Delhi, India. *Habitat International*, *45*, 213–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2014.02.007

Forester, J. (2014). Learning the Craft of Academic Writing. In E. A. Silva, P. Healey, N. Harris, & P. V. den Broeck (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Planning Research Methods* (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315851884

Forestry Commission of Ghana. (n.d.). *Achimota Ecological Park Project—Investment Opportunities*. Forestry Commission of Ghana. Retrieved December 16, 2019, from https://www.fcghana.org/page.php?page=283&section=28&typ=1&subs=287

Fox, J., & Weisberg, S. (2011). *An {R} Companion to Applied Regression*. Sage.

Fox, S. (2014). The Political Economy of Slums: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*, *54*, 191–203. https://doi.org///dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.08.005

Frey, A. (2018a). *Political Machines and the Distribution of Anti-Clientelism Goods* [Working paper]. https://www.andersonfrey.com/uploads/5/9/0/0/59009301/paper_nov18.pdf

Frey, A. (2018b). *Cash Transfers, Clientelism, and Political Enfranchisement: Evidence from Brazil* [Working paper].

Fridy, K. S., & Myers, W. M. (2019). Challenges to decentralisation in Ghana: Where do citizens seek assistance? *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *57*(1), 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2018.1514217

Frimpong, J. (2017). *Planning Regimes in Accra, Ghana*. University of Waterloo.

Frisken, F. (2007). *The public metropolis: The political dynamics of urban expansion in the Toronto region, 1924-2003*. Canadian Scholars' Press.

Fuseini, I., & Kemp, J. (2015). A review of spatial planning in Ghana's socio-economic development trajectory: A sustainable development perspective. *Land Use Policy*, *47*, 309–320. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.04.020

Gaisie, E., Kim, H. M., & Han, S. S. (2019). Accra towards a city-region: Devolution, spatial development and urban challenges. *Cities*, *95*, 102398. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102398

Gandhi, A. (2012). "Informal Moral Economies" and Urban Governance in India. In C. McFarlane & M. Waibel (Eds.), *Urban informalities: Reflections on the formal and informal*. Ashgate.

Gandy, M. (2006). Planning, Anti-planning and the Infrastructure Crisis Facing Metropolitan Lagos. *Urban Studies*, *43*(2), 371–396. https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500406751

Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., & Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, *58*(2), 415–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12058

Gay, R. (1998). Rethinking Clientelism: Demands, Discourses and Practices in Contemporary Brazil. *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe / European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, *65*, 7–24.

Gay, R. (2006). The even more difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Brazil. In P. Fernandez-Kelly & J. Shefner (Eds.), *Out of the shadows: Political action and the informal economy in Latin America* (pp. 195–217). Pennsylvania State University Press.

German Embassy - Accra. (n.d.). *Germany supports Government of Ghana with 25 Million Euros to tackle environmental impact of E-waste.* Retrieved March 16, 2020, from https://accra.diplo.de/gh-en/botschaft/themen/ewaste-project-launch/1164856

Ghana Statistical Service. (2014). *Ghana Living Standards Survey 6—Main Report*.

Ghana Statistical Service. (2015a). *Ghana Poverty Mapping Report*.

Ghana Statistical Service. (2015b). *National Employment Report*.

Ghana Trade Union Congress. (2013). *Case law involving street vendors in Accra*.

Ghanaian Chronicle. (2018, August 1). *Ningo-Prampram DCE Goes Tough On Land Fraud*. Modern Ghana. https://www.modernghana.com/news/872716/ningo-prampram-dce-goes-tough-on-land-fraud.html

GhanaWeb. (2012, October 17). *Takoradi Residents Petition Mahama Over Land Sales*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Takoradi-Residents-Petition-Mahama-Over-Land-Sales-253385

GhanaWeb. (2018a, January 2). *AMA to decongest Accra*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/AMA-to-decongest-Accra-614072

GhanaWeb. (2018b, August 17). *We'll eject Agbogbloshie squatters despite protest – AMA*. GhanaWeb. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/We-ll-eject-Agbogbloshie-squatters-despite-protest-AMA-677537

GhanaWeb. (2018c, November 21). *5 new districts coming*. GhanaWeb. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/5-new-districts-coming-702671

GhanaWeb. (2019a, February 19). *Government to inaugurate six new districts today*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Government-to-inaugurate-six-new-districts-today-724450

GhanaWeb. (2019b, February 20). *Bill for election of MMDCEs laid in Parliament*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Bill-for-election-of-MMDCEs-laid-in-Parliament-724873

GhanaWeb. (2019c, April 18). *AMA shrinked to help develop Accra better – O.B. Amoah*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/AMA-shrinked-to-help-develop-Accra-better-O-B-Amoah-739476

GhanaWeb. (2019d, May 14). *Nima redevelopment project: Residents to get free housing in 'glamorous apartments.'* https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Nima-redevelopment-project-Residents-will-get-free-housing-in-glamorous-apartments-Atta-Akyea-746189

GhanaWeb. (2019e, May 29). *Referendum on election of MMDCEs slated for December 29*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Referendum-on-election-of-MMDCEs-slated-for-December-29-750445

GhanaWeb. (2019f, June 26). *Ayawaso West assembly demolishes structures along Tema motorway*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ayawaso-West-assembly-demolishes-structures-along-Tema-motorway-758280

GhanaWeb. (2019g, August 2). *Chaos at Amasaman as traders protest 'unannounced demolition' exercise*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Chaos-at-Amasaman-as-traders-protest-unannounced-demolition-exercise-768861

GhanaWeb. (2019h, August 3). *Ablekuma North Municipal embarks on demolition exercise*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ablekuma-North-Municipal-embarks-on-demolition-exercise-769076

GhanaWeb. (2019i, August 3). *Unauthorised structures along Odorkor highway demolished*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Unauthorised-structures-along-Odorkor-highway-demolished-769016

GhanaWeb. (2019j, August 21). *Glefe slums go down as demolition leaves hundreds homeless*. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Glefe-slums-go-down-as-demolition-leaves-hundreds-homeless-774148

Ghertner, D. A. (2015). *Rule by aesthetics: World-class city making in Delhi*. Oxford University Press.

Gillespie, T. (2016). Accumulation by urban dispossession: Struggles over urban space in Accra, Ghana. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *41*(1), 66–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12105

Gillespie, T. (2017). From quiet to bold encroachment: Contesting dispossession in Accra's informal sector. *Urban Geography*, *38*(7), 974–992. https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2016.1191792

Goodfellow, T. (2012). *State effectiveness and the politics of urban development in East Africa: A puzzle of two cities, 2000-2010*. The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Goodfellow, T. (2015). Taming the "Rogue" Sector: Studying State Effectiveness in Africa through Informal Transport Politics. *Comparative Politics*, *47*(2), 127–147.

Goodfellow, T. (2018). Seeing Political Settlements through the City: A Framework for Comparative Analysis of Urban Transformation: Seeing Political Settlements through the City. *Development and Change*, *49*(1), 199–222. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12361

Goodfellow, T. (2019). Political Informality: Deals, Trust Networks, and the Negotiation of Value in the Urban Realm. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2019.1577385

Government of Ghana. (2012). *Ghana National Urban Policy Action Plan*. Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. http://www.ghanaiandiaspora.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ghana-national-urban-policy-action-plan-2012.pdf

Government of Ghana. (2014). *National Employment Policy*. Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations.

Government of Ghana. (2015a). *National Housing Policy*. Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing.

Government of Ghana. (2015b). *National Spatial Development Framework (2015-2035)*.

Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 925 Act (2016).

Local Governance Act, Pub. L. No. Act 936 (2016).

Government of Ghana. (2017). *Greater Accra Regional Spatial Development Framework*. Ministry of Land and Natural Resources - Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority.

Government of India. (2013). *Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017)—Faster, Sustainable and More Inclusive Growth*. Planning Commission. http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/planrel/12thplan/pdf/12fyp_vol1.pdf

Government of the Gold Coast. (1911). *Gold Coast—Report for 1910* (No. 688; Colonial Reports - Annual).

Government of the Gold Coast. (1933). *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Gold Coast, 1931-32* (No. 1602; Colonial Reports - Annual).

Government of the Gold Coast. (1934). *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Gold Coast, 1932-33* (No. 1657; Colonial Reports - Annual).

Government of the Gold Coast. (1936). *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Gold Coast, 1934-35* (No. 1748; Colonial Reports - Annual).

Government of the Gold Coast. (1938). *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Gold Coast, 1936-37* (No. 1836; Colonial Reports - Annual).

Grant, R. (2009). *Globalizing city: The urban and economic transformation of Accra, Ghana*. Syracuse Univ. Press.

Grant, R., Oteng-Ababio, M., & Sivilien, J. (2019). Greater Accra's new urban extension at Ningo-Prampram: Urban promise or urban peril? *International Planning Studies*, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563475.2019.1664896

Graphic Online. (2018, October 8). *Govt engages Singaporean planner to redevelop Accra into modern city*. Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/govt-engages-singaporean-planner-to-redevelop-accra-into-modern-city.html

Gray, O. (2004). *Demeaned but empowered: The social power of the urban poor in Jamaica*. University of the West Indies Press,.

Green, E. (2010). Patronage, District Creation, and Reform in Uganda. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *45*(1), 83–103. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9058-8

Grindle, M. S. (2012). *Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective*. Harvard University Press.

Gyesi, Z. K. (2018, January 18). "Ghana needs a ministry for informal sector." *Graphic Online*. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/ghana-needs-a-ministry-for-informal-sector.html

Hackenbroch, K., & Hossain, S. (2012). "The organised encroachment of the powerful"—Everyday practices of public space and water supply in Dhaka, Bangladesh. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *13*(3), 397–420. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.694265

Haid, C. G. (2016). The Janus face of urban governance: State, informality and ambiguity in Berlin. *Current Sociology*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392116657299

Harrison, P., Pieterse, E., Scheba, S., & Rubin, M. (2018). *Daily Practices of Informality Amidst Urban Poverty*. African Centre for Cities. https://www.africancentreforcities.net/daily-practices-informality-amidst-urban-poverty/

Hart, J. (2019, November 26). Colonial Governance, Modernization, and the Process of Informalization in Accra. *The Metropole*. https://themetropole.blog/2019/11/26/colonial-governance-modernization-and-the-process-of-informalization-in-accra/

Hart, K. (1973). Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *11*(1), 61–89.

Hart, K. (2016). Reflections on Ghana's Informal Economy at Fifty Years. *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, *7*(1), 123–124. https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2016.0002

Harvey, D. (2008). The Right to the City. *New Left Review*, *53*, 23–40.
Hasan, A., & Mohib, M. (2003). *The case of Karachi, Pakistan* (Understanding Slums: Case Studies for the Global Report on Human Settlements 2003). https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Karachi.pdf
Hays, S. P. (1974). The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial America. *Journal of Urban History*, *1*(1), 6–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/009614427400100102
Herrera, V. M. S. (2017). *Water and politics: Clientelism and reform in urban Mexico*. University of Michigan Press.
Hicken, A., & Nathan, N. L. (2020). Clientelism's Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032657
Hlavac, M. (2018). *stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables* [R package version 5.2.2]. Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI).
Holland, A. C. (2016). Forbearance. *The American Political Science Review; Washington*, *110*(2), 232–246. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000083
Holland, A. C. (2017). *Forbearance as redistribution: The politics of informal welfare in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
Housing the Masses. (2010). *Final report to People's Dialogue on human settlements on community-led enumeration of Old Fadama community, Accra, Ghana*. https://knowyourcity.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2009.May3_.2010.Old_Fadama_Enumeration-1_1.pdf
Huchzermeyer, M. (2011). *Cities with "slums": From informal settlement eradication to a right to the city in Africa*. UCT Press.
Hutchison, J. (2007). The 'Disallowed' Political Participation of Manila's Urban Poor. *Democratization*, *14*(5), 853–872. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701635696
ICF Consulting Services. (2017). *Urban Governance and Services in Ghana: Institutional, financial and functional constraints to effective service delivery* [Research Monograph]. UKAID & Cities Alliance.
Inskeep, S. (2011). *Instant city: Life and death in Karachi*. Penguin Press.
International Labour Organization. (1972). *Employment, incomes and equality*. ILO.
Iyer, L., & Mani, A. (2012). Traveling agents: Political change and bureaucratic turnover in India. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, *94*(3), 723–739. JSTOR.
Jackson, I. (2019). *Sharing Stories from Jamestown: The Creation of Mercantile Accra, Ghana*. https://doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/54k89
Japan International Cooperation Agency, Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd., CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd., & Almec Corporation. (2013). *The Study on the Comprehensive Urban Development Plan for Greater Kumasi in The Republic of Ghana, Final Report Summary*. Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology & Innovation; Town and Country Planning Department. http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12145777.pdf

Jha, S., Rao, V., & Woolcock, M. (2005). *Governance in the gullies: Democratic responsiveness and leadership in Delhi's slums* (No. 3694; Policy Research Working Paper Series). World Bank.

Joireman, S. F. (2011). *Where there is no government: Enforcing property rights in common law Africa*. Oxford University Press.

Juul, K., & Lund, C. (2002). Introduction. In K. Juul & C. Lund (Eds.), *Negotiating property in Africa*. Heinemann.

Keefer, P., & Vlaicu, R. (2005). *Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism*. The World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3472

Khan, A. H. (1992). *Orangi Pilot Project Programs*. https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/822-PKOR92-11567.pdf

Khan, M. (1995). State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist Explanations. In J. Harriss, J. Hunter, & C. Lewis (Eds.), *The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development* (pp. 71–86). Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=166438

Khan, M. (2010). *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions*. School of Oriental and African Studies. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/

Kitschelt, H. (2013). *Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project*. Duke University. https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/

Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). Citizen-politician linkages: An introduction. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge University Press.

Kjær, A. M. (2017). Land governance as grey zone: The political incentives of land reform implementation in Africa. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *55*(4), 426–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2017.1272876

Klopp, J. M. (2012). Towards a Political Economy of Transportation Policy and Practice in Nairobi. *Urban Forum*, *23*(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12132-011-9116-y

Korah, P. I., Cobbinah, P. B., Nunbogu, A. M., & Gyogluu, S. (2017). Spatial plans and urban development trajectory in Kumasi, Ghana. *GeoJournal*, *82*(6), 1113–1134. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-016-9731-1

Koto, P. S. (2015). An empirical analysis of the informal sector in Ghana. *Journal of Developing Areas*, *49*(2), 93–108.

Kramon, E. (2016). Electoral Handouts as Information. *World Politics*, *68*(3), 454–498.

Kumar, A. (2011). *Understanding the emerging role of motorcycles in African cities: A political economy perspective* (Urban Transport Series). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Kumar, A., & Barrett, F. (2008). *Stuck in traffic: Urban transport in Africa* (Working Paper No. 44980). World Bank.

Lall, S. V. (2013). *Planning, connecting, and financing cities–now: Priorities for city leaders*. World Bank Group.

Lall, S. V., Henderson, J. V., & Venables, A. J. (2017). *Africa's cities: Opening doors to the world*. World Bank.

Lapomarda, V. A. (1970). Maurice Joseph Tobin: The Decline of Bossism in Boston. *The New England Quarterly*, *43*(3), 355–381. https://doi.org/10.2307/363303

Larbi, W. O. (1996). Spatial planning and urban fragmentation in Accra. *Third World Planning Review*, *18*(2), 193–215.

Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., & Trucco, L. (2018). *Breaking Clientelism or Rewarding Incumbents? Evidence from an Urban Titling Program in Mexico* [Working paper]. https://www.dropbox.com/s/y2thc5nzg237sgs/CORETT_v18.pdf?dl=0

Ledeneva, A. (2018). Introduction: The informal view of the world – key challenges and main findings of the Global Informality Project. In A. Ledeneva (Ed.), *The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality, Volume 1* (Vol. 1). UCL Press.

Levenson, Z. (2017). Precarious welfare states: Urban struggles over housing delivery in post-apartheid South Africa. *International Sociology*, *32*(4), 474–492. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580917701586

Levy, B. (2014). *Working with the grain: Integrating governance and growth in development strategies*. Oxford University Press.

Leyl, S. (2015, February 28). Singapore at 50: From swamp to skyscrapers. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31626174

Lindberg, S. I. (2010). What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *48*(1), 117–142.

MacLeod, G. (2011). Urban Politics Reconsidered: Growth Machine to Post-democratic City? *Urban Studies*, *48*(12), 2629–2660. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098011415715

Maoulidi, M. (2010). *A water and sanitation needs assessment for Kumasi* (16/2010; MCI Social Sector Working Paper Series). Millenium Cities Initiative - The Earth Institute at Columbia University. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270703801_WATER_AND_SANITATION_NEEDS_ASSESSMENT_FOR_KUMASI_GHANA

Maxwell, J. A. (2013). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach* (3rd ed.). SAGE Publications.

Mayne, A. (2017). *Slums: The history of a global injustice*. Reaktion Books Ltd.

McCaffery, P. (1993). *When bosses ruled Philadelphia: The emergence of the Republican machine, 1867-1933*. Pennsylvania State University Press.

McFarlane, C., & Waibel, M. (2012). Introduction: The Informal-formal Divide in Context. In C. McFarlane & M. Waibel (Eds.), *Urban informalities: Reflections on the formal and informal* (pp. 1–12). Ashgate.

McGrath, A. (2016). A modified agent-based model of slum formation. *Berkeley Planning Journal*, *28*(1), 68–99.

McTernan, B. A. (2014, October 20). Accra slum dwellers suspect cholera demolitions are a pretext for profit. *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/oct/20/accra-cholera-ghana-mensah-guinea-slums-demolished-commercial-profit

MICZD. (2018). *Ministry of Inner-cities & Zongo Development | Government of Ghana | Official Website of MICZD Ghana*. http://www.miczd.gov.gh/

Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation. (2016). *June 3, 2015 Floods in Accra, Assessment Summary Draft Report*.

Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture, & Adjaye Associates. (2017). *Marine Drive Accra, Concept*.

Minter, A. (2016, January 13). *The Burning Truth Behind an E-Waste Dump in Africa*. Smithsonian. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/burning-truth-behind-e-waste-dump-africa-180957597/

Mitlin, D. (2008). With and beyond the state—Co-production as a route to political influence, power and transformation for grassroots organizations. *Environment and Urbanization*, *20*(2), 339–360. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247808096117

Mitlin, D. (2013). A class act: Professional support to people's organizations in towns and cities of the global South. *Environment and Urbanization*, *25*(2), 483–499. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247813488862

Mitlin, D. (2014). *Politics, informality and clientelism – exploring a pro-poor urban politics* (No. 34; ESID Working Papers). Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID).

Mitlin, D. (2018). Beyond contention: Urban social movements and their multiple approaches to secure transformation. *Environment and Urbanization*, *30*(2), 557–574. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247818791012

Mitlin, D., & Mogaladi, J. (2013). Social movements and the struggle for shelter: A case study of eThekwini (Durban). *Progress in Planning*, *84*, 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.progress.2012.12.001

Molotch, H. (1976). The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *82*(2), 302–332.

Mukhija, V., & Loukaitou-Sideris, A. (2014). *The Informal American City: Beyond Taco Trucks and Day Labor*. MIT Press.

Muller, W. C. (2007). Political institutions and linkage strategies. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. Cambridge University Press.

Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Job Creation. (2014). *Constraints to Informal Sector Growth—Identifying Firms with Rapid Growth Potential* (No. 3; Research Highlights).

Murillo, M. V., Oliveros, V., & Zarazaga, R. (2019). *The Most Vulnerable Poor: Clientelism among Slum Dwellers*. https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.26295.68008

Nada, M. (2014). The Politics and Governance of Implementing Urban Expansion Policies in Egyptian Cities. *Égypte/Monde arabe*, *11*, 145–176. https://doi.org/10.4000/ema.3294

Nahiduzzaman, K. M. (2006). *Housing the Urban Poor: Planning, Business and Politics—A Case Study of Duaripara Slum, Dhaka city, Bangladesh*. Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

Naidoo, P., & Wallace, P. (2019, April 10). *Ghana Is the Star in IMF's 2019 Economic Growth Forecast*. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/ghana-is-the-star-in-imf-s-2019-economic-growth-forecast-chart

Nathan, N. L. (2019). *Electoral politics and Africa's urban transition: Class and ethnicity in Ghana*. Cambridge University Press.

Navarro, I. A., & Turnbull, G. K. (2010). The Legacy Effect of Squatter Settlements on Urban Redevelopment. In J. Beall, B. Guha-Khasnobis, & R. Kanbur (Eds.), *Urbanization and Development: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. Oxford University Press. https://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590148.003.0009?lang=en, //oxfordindex.oup.com:443/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590148.003.0009

Nelson, J. M. (1979). *Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations*. Princeton University Press. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1472232

Nima Redevelopment Project. (2019, May 15). In *The Pulse*. Joy News. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_02LYDCRuEg

Nunoo, C. (2019, September 20). *Old Fadama, Agbogbloshie to get social amenities*. Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/old-fadama-agbogbloshie-to-get-social-amenities.html

Nyabor, J. (2019, February 21). Akufo-Addo's 2019 State of the Nation Address [Full speech]. *Citi Newsroom*. https://citinewsroom.com/2019/02/21/akufo-addos-2019-state-of-the-nation-address-full-speech/

Obeng-Odoom, F. (2011). The Informal Sector in Ghana under Siege. *Journal of Developing Societies*, *27*(3–4), 355–392. https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X1102700406

Obeng-Odoom, F. (2013). *Governance for pro-poor urban development: Lessons from Ghana*. Routledge.

Okoye, V. (2013, February 26). Tourist-Friendly Informality Doesn't Always Tell the Whole Story. *The Informal City Dialogues*. https://nextcity.org/informalcity/entry/tourist-friendly-informality-doesnt-always-tell-the-whole-story

Old Fadama Demolition—Today Big Story (22-6-15). (2015, June 22). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI20XObRybc

Oppong, B. (2016). Slum or Sustainable Development? A Case Study of Sodom and Gomorrah in Accra, Ghana. *All Theses, Dissertations, and Other Capstone Projects*. https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/etds/600

Ortalo-Magné, F., & Prat, A. (2014). On the Political Economy of Urban Growth: Homeownership versus Affordability. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, *6*(1), 154–181.

Osei-Boateng, C., & Ampratwum, E. (2011). *The Informal Sector in Ghana*. FES Ghana. http://www.wiego.org/publications/informal-sector-in-ghana

Oteng-Ababio, M., & Grant, R. (2018). Ideological traces in Ghana's urban plans: How do traces get worked out in the Agbogbloshie, Accra? *Habitat International*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2018.10.007

Otoo, L. B. (2018, January 15). *Accra Eco-Park project to transform Achimota Forest*. Business & Financial Times Online. https://thebftonline.com/2018/business/accra-eco-park-project-to-transform-achimota-forest/

Owusu, G. (2015). Decentralized Development Planning and Fragmentation of Metropolitan Regions: The Case of the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area, Ghana. *Ghana Journal of Geography*, 7(1), 1–24.

Owusu, G., & Afutu-Kotey, R. L. (2010). Poor urban communities and municipal interface in Ghana: A case study of Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis. *African Studies Quarterly*, *12*(1), 1-. General OneFile.

Owusu-Ansah, J. K., & Braimah, I. (2013). The dual land management systems as an influence on physical development outcomes around Kumasi, Ghana. *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment*, *28*(4), 689–703. JSTOR.

Owusu-Sekyere, E., Amoah, S. T., & Teng-Zeng, F. (2016). Tug of war: Street trading and city governance in Kumasi, Ghana. *Development in Practice*, *26*(7), 906–919. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1210088

Ozlu, M. O., Alemayehu, A., Mukim, M., Lall, S. V., Kerr, O. T., Kaganova, O., Viola, C. O., Hill, R., Hamilton, E., Bidgood, A. T., Ayane, B. L., Aguilera De Llano, A. I., Egziabher, T. G., & Gebretsadik, S. Z. (2015). *Ethiopia—Urbanization review: Urban institutions for a middle-income Ethiopia*. World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/543201468000586809/Ethiopia-Urbanization-review-urban-institutions-for-a-middle-income-Ethiopia

Paller, J. W. (2014a). *African slums: Constructing democracy in unexpected places* [Ph.D., The University of Wisconsin - Madison]. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1609567187/abstract/14E0E6391DBB457APQ/1

Paller, J. W. (2014b). Informal Institutions and Personal Rule in Urban Ghana. *African Studies Review*, *57*(3), 123–142.

Paller, J. W. (2016). *Informal Practices of Accountability in Urban Africa* [Data set]. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0172

Paller, J. W. (2017). The Contentious Politics of African Urbanization. *Current History*, *116*(790), 163–169.

Paller, J. W. (2019a). *Democracy in Ghana: Everyday politics in urban Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Paller, J. W. (2019b, April 19). *The meaning of party politics in Ghana's urban neighborhoods*. Africa Is a Country. https://africasacountry.com/2019/04/the-meaning-of-party-politics-in-ghanas-urban-neighborhoods

Paller, J. W. (2019c). Building permanence: Fire outbreaks and emergent tenure security in urban Ghana. *Africa*, *89*(03), 437–456. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972019000469

Parks, T., & Cole, W. (2010). *Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice* (Occasional Paper No. 2). The Asia Foundation.

Parnell, Susan, & Robinson, J. (2012). (Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism. *Urban Geography*, *33*(4), 593–617. https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.4.593

Pasotti, E. (2010). *Political branding in cities: The decline of machine politics in Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago*. Cambridge University Press.

Patel, A., Crooks, A. T., & Koizumi, N. (2012). Slumulation: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach to Slum Formations. *J. Artificial Societies and Social Simulation*, *15*.

Patel, B. (2015, April 22). *Managing politics of urban planning*. http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/VlE1ANfbnunacRpaojBU2N/Managing-politics-of-urban-planning.html

Patel, S., Arputham, J., & Bartlett, S. (2016). "We beat the path by walking": How the women of Mahila Milan in India learned to plan, design, finance and build housing. *Environment and Urbanization*, *28*(1), 223–240. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247815617440

Payne, G. (1989). *Informal housing and land subdivisions in Third World cities: A review of the literature*. Centre for Development and Environmental Planning, Oxford Polytechnic.

Payne, G. (2016). *GPA 20Plus20: Reflections on urban development*. Geoffrey Payne and Associates. http://newgpa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GPA20@20-FINAL.pdf

People's Dialogue, Cities Alliance, Slum Dwellers International, Accra Metropolitan Assembly, & GHAFUP. (2016). *City wide informal settlement: Putting Accra Metropolitan Assembly's Informal Settlements on the map (Land, services and citizenship (LSC) project II)*.

Perlman, J. (2010). *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*. Oxford University Press.

Perlman, J. E. (1976). *The myth of marginality: Urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro*. University of California Press.

Pethe, A., Nallathiga, R., Gandhi, S., & Tandel, V. (2014). Re-thinking urban planning in India: Learning from the wedge between the de jure and de facto development in Mumbai. *Cities*, *39*, 120–132.

Phelps, N. A., & Wood, A. M. (2011). The New Post-suburban Politics? *Urban Studies*, *48*(12), 2591–2610. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098011411944

Piliavsky, A. (Ed.). (2014). *Patronage as Politics in South Asia*. Cambridge University Press.

Post, A. E. (2018). Cities and Politics in the Developing World. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *21*(1), 115–133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042716-102405

Pradel-Miquel, M. (2017). Crisis, (re-)informalization processes and protest: The case of Barcelona. *Current Sociology; London*, *65*(2), 209–221. http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1177/0011392116657291

PSUP. (2015). *Slum Almanac 2015/2016: Tracking Improvement in the Lives of Slum Dwellers*. Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme. http://unhabitat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02-old/Slum%20Almanac%202015-2016_EN.pdf

R Core Team. (2017). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing*. R Foundation for Statistical Computing.

Rajack, R., Pethe, A., Ngau, P., & Barhate, S. (2013). The political economy of urban land management: Evidence from Mumbai and Nairobi. *Annual World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty 2013*.

Resnick, D. (2019). The Politics of Crackdowns on Africa's Informal Vendors. *Comparative Politics*. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041519X15615651139961

Riis, J. A. (1969). *The battle with the slum*. Patterson Smith,. (Original work published 1902)

Robins, S. L. (2008). *From revolution to rights in South Africa: Social movements, NGOs &popular politics after apartheid*. James Currey.

Rojo, G., Jha, S., & Wibbels, E. (2014). *Political Networks, Clientelism and Public Goods: Evidence from Slums in Udaipur, India*. https://sites.duke.edu/wibbels/files/2014/10/RojoJhaWibbels.pdf

Roy, A. (2003). *City requiem, Calcutta: Gender and the politics of poverty*. Univ. of Minnesota Press.

Roy, A. (2009). Why India Cannot Plan Its Cities: Informality, Insurgence and the Idiom of Urbanization. *Planning Theory*, *8*(1), 76–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095208099299

Roy, A. (2012). Urban informality: The production of space and practice of planning. In R. Weber & R. Crane (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of urban planning* (pp. 691–705).

Roy, D., Lees, M. H., Palavalli, B., Pfeffer, K., & Sloot, M. A. P. (2014). The emergence of slums: A contemporary view on simulation models. *Environmental Modelling & Software*, *59*, 76–90. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2014.05.004

Sanyal, B. (Ed.). (under review). *Hidden Success (manuscript)*. MIT Press.

Sanyal, B. (2005). Hybrid Planning Cultures: The Search for the Global Cultural Commons. In *Comparative Planning Cultures*. Routledge. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=801673

Sarfoh, K. O. (2010). *Lost in translation - the nexus of multi-layered housing policy gaps: The case of Ghana* [Thesis, University of St Andrews]. https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/1697

Sassen, S. (2005). The Global City: Introducing a Concept. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *11*(2), 27–43.

Satterthwaite, D., & Mitlin, D. (2013). *Reducing Urban Poverty in the Global South*. Taylor and Francis. http://www.123library.org/book_details/?id=103777

Schindler, S. (2017). Beyond a state-centric approach to urban informality: Interactions between Delhi's middle class and the informal service sector. *Current Sociology*, *65*(2), 248–259. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392116657296

Shami, M., & Majid, H. (2014). *The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in Slums: Preliminary results from a field study in urban Pakistan* [Working Paper]. International Growth Centre.

Shannon, W. V. (1969, June). The Political Machine I: Rise And Fall The Age Of The Bosses. *American Heritage*, *20*(4). http://www.americanheritage.com/content/political-machine-i-rise-and-fall-age-bosses

Shefner, J. (2006). "Do you think democracy is a magical thing?" From basic needs to democratization in informal politics. In P. Fernandez-Kelly & J. Shefner (Eds.), *Out of the shadows: Political action and the informal economy in Latin America* (pp. 241–267). Pennsylvania State University Press.

Sigman, R., & Lindberg, S. I. (2017). *Neopatrimonialism and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation of Africa's Political Regimes* (No. 56; V–Dem Working Paper Series). V–Dem Institute.

Sparling, R. A. (2019). *Political corruption: The underside of civic morality* (1st edition). University of Pennsylvania Press.

Spaull, J. (2015, May 10). *World's biggest e-dump, or vital supplies for Ghana?* SciDev.Net. http://www.scidev.net/index.cfm?originalUrl=/global/digital-divide/multimedia/electronic-waste-dump-supplies-ghana.html&

Sridharan, N. (2011). Spatial Inequality and the Politics of Urban Expansion. *Environment and Urbanization ASIA*, *2*(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1177/097542531100200204

Stacey, P. (2018). Urban development and emerging relations of informal property and land-based authority in Accra. *Africa*, *88*(01), 63–80. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972017000572

Stacey, P. (2019). *State of slum: Precarity and informal governance at the margins in Accra*. Zed. http://proxy.cm.umoncton.ca/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/umoncton-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5724852

Stacey, P., & Lund, C. (2016). In a state of slum: Governance in an informal urban settlement in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies; Cambridge*, *54*(4), 591–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X16000586

Stoquart, R., & Majale, M. (2015). *Mid-Term Evaluation of the Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme II (PSUP II)*.

Syagga, P., Mitullah, W., & Karirah-Gitau, S. (2002). *A rapid economic appraisal of rents in slums and informal settlements* (m). Government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT Collaborative Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiative.

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2019). *Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political participation, protest and democracy*. http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2018.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy2018

Tieleman, J., & Uitermark, J. (2018). Chiefs in the City: Traditional Authority in the Modern State. *Sociology*, 003803851880932. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038518809325

Tomsa, D., & Ufen, A. (Eds.). (2013). *Party politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and electoral competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines*. Routledge.

Trevallion, B. A. W., & Hood, A. G. (1958). *Accra—A Plan for the Town: The Report for the Minister of Housing*. Town and Country Planning Division of the Ministry of Housing.

UN-Habitat. (n.d.). *UN-HABITAT Best Practices Database: Award Winners*. http://mirror.unhabitat.org/bp/bp.list.aspx

UN-Habitat. (2009). *Planning Sustainable Cities: Global Report on Human Settlements 2009*. https://unhabitat.org/books/global-report-on-human-settlements-2009-planning-sustainable-cities/

UN-Habitat. (2014). *State of African Cities Re-imagining sustainable urban transitions*. UN-Habitat. https://unhabitat.org/books/state-of-african-cities-2014-re-imagining-sustainable-urban-transitions/

UN-Habitat. (2016, July 27). *Ningo-Prampram planning authority approves Accra's planned city extension*. https://unhabitat.org/ningo-prampram-planning-authority-approves-accras-planned-city-extension/

United Nations. (2016). *The New Urban Agenda*. Habitat III. http://habitat3.org/the-new-urban-agenda/

United Nations. (2018). *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision, Online Edition*. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.

Venter, C. (2013). The lurch towards formalisation: Lessons from the implementation of BRT in Johannesburg, South Africa. *Research in Transportation Economics*, *39*(1), 114–120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.06.003

Watson, V. (2009). Seeing from the South: Refocusing Urban Planning on the Globe's Central Urban Issues. *Urban Studies*, *46*(11), 2259–2275. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098009342598

Watson, V. (2014). African urban fantasies: Dreams or nightmares? *Environment and Urbanization*, *26*(1), 215–231. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247813513705

Weidmann, N. B., Kuse, D., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2010). The Geography of the International System: The CShapes Dataset. *International Interactions*, *36*(1), 86–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903554614

Weinstein, L. (2014). *The Durable Slum: Dharavi and the Right to Stay Put in Globalizing Mumbai*. University of Minnesota Press.

Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, *56*(3), 568–583. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x

Westminster Foundation for Democracy, & CDD-Ghana. (2018). *The Cost of Politics in Ghana*. http://www.wfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Cost_Of_Politics_Ghana.pdf

Wickham, H. (2016). *ggplot2: Elegant graphics for data analysis*. Springer.

WIEGO. (n.d.). *Keith Hart: Coiner of Term "Informal Sector."* Retrieved May 2, 2018, from http://www.wiego.org/informal-economy/keith-hart-coiner-term-%E2%80%9Cinformal-sector%E2%80%9D

Williams, M. J. (2018). *Beyond State Capacity: Bureaucratic Performance, Policy Implementation, and Reform*. https://martinjwilliamsdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/williams_beyondstatecapacity_180716.pdf

Wood, G. (2003). Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The "Faustian Bargain." *World Development*, *31*(3), 455–471. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00213-9

World Bank. (1997). *Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank*.

World Bank. (2003). *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. World Bank.

World Bank. (2010). *City of Accra, Ghana consultative citizens' report card* (No. 55117). The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/540521468249314253/City-of-Accra-Ghana-consultative-citizens-report-card

World Bank. (2013, September 25). *Enforcing Accountability: World Bank Debars Ghanaian Company for Sanctionable Misconduct Relating to a Waste Management Project in Liberia* [Text/HTML]. World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/09/25/world-bank-debars-ghanaian-company-sanctionable-misconduct-waste-management-project-liberia

World Bank. (2015). *Rising through cities in Ghana: Urbanization review - overview report* (No. 96449; pp. 1–70). World Bank.

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/613251468182958526/Rising-through-cities-in-Ghana-urbanization-review-overview-report

World Bank. (2017a). *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*. World Bank Group.

World Bank. (2017b). *Enhancing urban resilience in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area* (No. 115296; pp. 1–146). The World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/949241495793834492/Enhancing-urban-resilience-in-the-Greater-Accra-Metropolitan-Area

World Bank. (2018). *Concept Note—Greater Accra Climate Resilient and Integrated Development Project*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association.

WSUP. (2016). *Improving the quality of public toilet services in Kumasi* (PN#027; Practice Note). https://www.wsup.com/content/uploads/2017/08/PN027-Improving-the-quality-of-public-toilet-services-in-Kumasi.pdf

Yeboah, E., & Obeng-Odoom, F. (2010). 'We are not the only ones to blame': District Assemblies' perspectives on the state of planning in Ghana. *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*, 7.

Yeebo, Y. (2014, November 6). *The Bridge to Sodom and Gomorrah*. The Big Roundtable. https://thebigroundtable.com/the-bridge-to-sodom-and-gomorrah-d80d1ceaf560

Yiftachel, O. (2009). Theoretical Notes On `Gray Cities': The Coming of Urban Apartheid? *Planning Theory*, *8*(1), 88–100.

Yıldırım, K. (2020). Clientelism and dominant incumbent parties: Party competition in an urban Turkish neighbourhood. *Democratization*, *27*(1), 81–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1658744

Index

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Z