Imagining the Possibilities of the Post-Marxist Moment: Anarchism, Castoriadis, and the Project of Autonomy

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Introduction

"It is not a matter of deducing the revolution, but of making it. And the only factor making a connection between these two elements about which we, as revolutionaries, can speak is our own activity, the activity of a revolutionary organization."

- Cornelius Castoriadis, "Recommending the Revolution " in *The Castoriadis Reader,* 2010, p. 130.

In the wake of the social movements of the 1960s, the Left found itself in crisis. With widespread disillusionment with socialist projects of the Eastern bloc and Marxism in general, the era marked the beginning of the "post-Marxist moment," replete with heavy undertones of structuralist despair. The 1970s gave way to the consolidation of the global neoliberal consensus, uniting the parliamentary Right and Left in their unassailable endorsement of the free market. Yet, this atmosphere of uncertainty—however ominous and pervasive—did not signal the death of radical left politics; instead, the Left seems to have found alternative ways to resume and revitalize its project. In particular, as demonstrated by recent anti-globalization protests such as Occupy Wall Street (2008), anti-authoritarian and anti-centrist movements that expressly reject the top-down organizational structure of Marxism have taken center stage—movements that prioritize traditional anarchist principles such as autonomy, voluntary

association, self-organization, mutual aid, and direct democracy. Indeed, anarchism—although the term itself is not explicitly mentioned by most activists—arguably seems to have taken the place of Marxism as the driving philosophy behind contemporary progressive movements.

In this paper, I explore the political and philosophical significance of anarchism in the post-Marxist moment, with particular reference to the ideas of Cornelius Castoriadis. In particular, I argue that anarchist theory enables a radical renewal of leftist politics by, on the one hand, maintaining the same revolutionary optimism that characterized Marx's thought, yet on the other, rejecting its dogmatism and teleological conception of history. Ultimately, I maintain that anarchist theory produces a new conception of autonomy not as the product of a cataclysmic break with the past that has yet to occur, but as an attitude of freely questioning and creating the rules of collectivity that must be practiced in the here and now. Finally, I explore how anarchist theory may be applicable to the modern context, particularly in its implied challenge to the validity of identity politics.

A History of the Conflict Between Marxists and Anarchists

Despite their similar commitment to anti-capitalism, idealism, and the project of liberty and equality, Marxists and anarchists have experienced enduring strife due to fundamental theoretical differences. Their antagonistic relationship expressed itself in pre-revolutionary days in the divisions between Proudhon and Marx, reaching its height in the bitter fight between Bakunin and Marx in the International Workingmen's Association (later called the First International)[1] in the 1870s.[2] At the center of this conflict was the role of the state. That is, while Marx contended that workers must seize the state to establish and consolidate proletarian rule at the

beginning stages of socialism, Bakunin—in line with his anarchist beliefs—believed that such a "dictatorship of the proletariat" would ultimately produce new forms of oppression.[3] Firmly opposed to any kind of state including parliamentary representative democracies, the anarchists maintained that "despotism resided not so much in the form of the State, but in the very principle of the State and political power."[4] This critique persisted well into the twentieth century, as anarchists denounced the Soviet Union for imposing yet another form of hierarchical power on workers and diminishing their autonomy in the workplace. Castoriadis, for instance, contended that the relationship between the Soviet state and its people was yet another manifestation of the exploitative relationship of director versus executant—a power dynamic that characterizes all undemocratic societies. In lieu of such "state socialism" or any kind of representational organization (e.g., political parties), anarchists demanded a new politics featuring non-statist and direct forms of democracy in which workers themselves would manage their own affairs.

Another important conflict revolved around the issue of class. Although both schools of thought agreed that the proletariat had an important role to play, Marx saw the proletariat as the exclusive leading agent of revolution, whereas Bakunin argued that other social strata (e.g., peasants, intellectual declasses, the unemployed, etc) could lead the struggle as well.[5] This critique of the narrow conception of class in Marxist theory has been continued by modern anarchist theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe. In particular, they argue that contemporary politics is no longer characterized solely by the struggles of the proletariat, but is rather fragmented by a series of different movements composed of different populations.[6] In addition, both classical and modern anarchists have advocated for combating domination not only in the workplace (the sphere that Marxists tend to primarily focus on), but in all social relationships that manifest in our

everyday lives, including the private sphere.[7]

Lastly, anarchists have distinguished themselves from Marxists in their commitment to rejecting hierarchy even during the process of revolutionary action; in other words, for anarchists, the spirit that embodies the end goal of liberation must also be embodied in the means deployed to achieve it. David Graeber captures this sentiment in his observation that Marxism has tended toward "theoretical or analytical discourse about revolutionary strategy," while anarchism has tended toward "ethical discourse about revolutionary practice."[8] That is, anarchism demands that the desired future social relations and practices of the group be reflected by and implemented in its present modes of organization—a mode of organizing also known as "prefigurative politics."[9] For example, many anarchist groups today make decisions via a "consensus process" that first and foremost respects the need for a diversity in perspectives; in this process, group members focus on devising a concrete plan of action that may not be wholeheartedly embraced by everyone, but is nevertheless a plan that no one feels is a fundamental violation of the group's principles. Another prominent example can be found in the 1999 Seattle WTO Protests, in which activists intentionally adopted a decentralized form of organization to stay true to their anti-centrist philosophy.[10] In essence, anarchists attempt to form "the structure of the new society within the shell of the old," refusing to let the imperfect conditions of their current circumstances deter them from at least attempting to carry out their vision.[11]

Cornelius Castoriadis and His Intellectual Trajectory

This contemporary shift from Marxist to anarchist patterns of thought can be clearly traced in the intellectual trajectory of one particular revolutionary theorist: Cornelius Castoriadis. Although Castoriadis never explicitly labeled

himself as an anarchist, his gradual disillusionment with Marxism and later outright criticism of it as an anti-revolutionary ideology renders him a figure that is well-positioned to ground my discussion of anarchist politics vis-a-vis Marxism.

Like many leftists of the late twentieth century, Castoriadis started out as a committed Marxist. However, a year after joining the communist party in Greece in 1941, he decided to leave, accusing it of chauvinism, authoritarianism, and centralism.[12] While he joined a Trotskist group thereafter, hoping to avoid the disillusionment he had experienced in the communist party, he was disappointed yet again. In 1949, Castoriadis cut all ties with Marxism, forming an autonomous group in France called Socialisme ou Barbarie, which criticized apologists who clung to Marxism in the name of the "true thought of Marx" while ignoring its real-life effects in justifying and legitimizing totalitarian regimes. In the end, Castoriadis abandoned the term "socialism" altogether. Instead, he advocated for the project of individual and collective autonomy, in which all social institutions would be re-examined and re-instituted according to the conscious deliberation of the members of the community themselves.[13] The revolutionary optimism that initially led him to Marxism had later led him to repudiate it and, in its place, create new ways of sustaining political hope.

The Radical Philosophy of Castoriadis

The philosophy of Castoriadis and Socialisme ou Barbarie inspired and rejuvenated many progressives feeling lost in the wake of Marxism; it has even been cited as "probably the single most important theoretical influence on the student insurrectionaries of May 1968" by some scholars.[14] In the following section, I attempt to explain the immense revolutionary thrust of his work by exploring its three major tenets: the

rejection of "Absolute Knowledge," a belief in "constrained creativity," and the redefinition of "revolution."

a) Rejection of "Absolute Knowledge"

At the baseline of Castoriadis's philosophy is a rejection of "Absolute knowledge"—that is, the "acceptance… that there is no meaning given as a gift or any guarantee of meaning, that there is no meaning other than that created in and through history."[15] His refusal to blindly embrace any inherited category of thought manifests itself in his rejection of the thought of both classical anarchists (such as Bakunin and Kropotkin who relied on essentialist understandings of human nature) and Marxists (who depended on a teleological understanding of history). On the one hand, Castoriadis revolutionized the anarchist tradition itself by distinguishing himself from Bakunin and Kropotkin—nineteenth-century thinkers who believed that a rational social logic formed the basis of human development. For instance, both Bakunin and Kropotkin claimed that this logic could be found in the natural instinct in humans toward cooperation.[16] In essentializing human nature as fundamentally benign, they envisioned a free society that would allow "man's immanent humanity and rationality finally to be realized."[17] Castoriadis, in stark contrast, would have denounced their belief in such a concept as "human nature." Indeed, he argued that the institution of society is always the result of autonomous action by human beings, not by extra-social sources such as human nature, God, or "Reason" that humans have historically concealed their agency behind.

More importantly, Castoriadis's rejection of "Absolute Knowledge" informed his criticism of Marxism and its teleological conception of history. In particular, Castoriadis accused teleology of abolishing time and erroneously believing in its inherent capacity to alter the conditions of the

world. Because teleology wrongly presupposes that the end is already determined, he lamented that, within this framework, historical time becomes "a simple abstract medium of successive coexistence or a mere receptacle for the dialectical sequences."[18]

Depicting the historical determinism of Marxists as essentially a psychological comfort mechanism which absolves the current generation of any responsibility, Castoriadis distinguished himself by accepting uncertainty and defining theory as the "uncertain attempt to realize the project of elucidating the world."[19] In this sense, he argued that "revolutionary praxis is…not required to produce the complete and detailed scheme of the society it intends to establish"[20]—a stab at the infeasible attempt by Marxism to outline a predetermined blueprint for its revolution.

In line with his embrace of uncertainty, Castoriadis also set himself apart from Marxists by accepting the possibility of change within his theory. In fact, even during the period in which he identified as a Marxist, Castoriadis made a commitment to defending traditional Marxist positions "so long as a new examination has not persuaded [me] that these positions must be abandoned."[21] Indeed, this position describes precisely what he did later in his life, when he replaced the Marxist principles he once adhered to with new ones that better suited the needs of the movement. In other words, he refused to be a "philosopher who wants to be radical (yet) remains a prisoner" of a definitive theory.[22] He thus established that revolutionary theory maintains its value only insofar as it is dynamic—never absolute and constantly open to modification according to the development of the movement: "without development of revolutionary theory, no development of revolutionary action."[23] In this regard, he characterized true democracy as a tragic regime that explicitly renounces its self-institution as a closed or static society based on religious or transcendent ideas. Instead, he accepted

that democratic society is constantly subject to change, even if that change is regressive and reactionary.

In sum, by rejecting all forms of "Absolute Knowledge" and all narratives that privilege the role of external entities in shaping society (e.g. gods, ancestors, etc), Castoriadis urges us to confront our own agency as the force which has always instituted and continues to institute the world we live in. He thus envisioned an "autonomous society" that would be characterized by "explicit and lucid self-institution,"[24] in which its members are fully aware that they determine their own lives via conscious reflection, deliberation, and discussion.

b) Belief in Constrained Creativity

Castoriadis's philosophy also contains a nuanced understanding of the world as neither completely deterministic nor completely random. The most fundamental starting point for this theory involves a belief in the possibility of creation or the emergence of the new—a premise that boldly challenged the cynicism of structuralism. In this context, he drew an important distinction between "self-reference" and "reflectiveness." The former, he claimed, simply denoted the process of the subject actively referring to itself (and thereby distinguishing itself from others) and was necessarily implied in that every subject has the property of self-finality.[25] The latter, however, implied the possibility of actively putting oneself, one's activity, and the social boundaries that surrounds oneself into question—in other words, the capacity for reflective self-representation and deliberate activity. This latter capacity of "reflectiveness" constituted the basis of the project of autonomy for him, which, in essence, demands human beings to recognize the power of their imagination in creating new institutions and transforming old ones. Thus, on the one hand, Castoriadis's belief in the creative potential of

the human imagination became the basis of his revolutionary optimism, or, alternatively, his assumption that another world is possible. In response to the question of whether society will be able to properly take advantage of this potential to coherently addresses the problems it faces, he maintained that although we cannot know for certain, what we do know is that "all societies in history have been capable of giving coherent responses to the problems of their globality."[26] Castoriadis thus demonstrated a confident optimism that humans have historically been able to and will continue to tap into their imaginative capacities to propel movements of liberation.

On the other hand, despite his deep-rooted faith in human creativity, Castoriadis also shrewdly realized that such creative powers are constrained. While humans have the ability to explicitly question the existing social imaginary significations[27] or self-evident truths of their contemporary world, Castoriadis explained that this act necessarily takes place under constraints imposed by historical conditions, such as language and time, which define and delimit the possible scope of action.

Autonomy on the Individual Psychical Level

In order to understand Castoriadis's radical politics and his conception of constrained creativity, it is useful to refer to his psychoanalytic discussion of the subject. Namely, in the context of Lacan's statement that "The Unconscious is the discourse of the Other," Castoriadis posited that, in the field of psychoanalysis, the discourse of the Other represents an oppressive force that leads the subject to be expressed by someone else rather than express himself. As a result, he noted that some have been led to conceptualize "autonomy" as the phenomenon of my discourse replacing the discourse of the Other which dominates me.

In contrast to this position, Castoriadis held that such a total elimination of the discourse of the Other is impossible because "the Other is each time present in the activity that 'eliminates' him."[28] In other words, "my" discourse could never entirely be "mine," as every subject is always necessarily in contact with others in a society and history that precedes both him and his quest for "his" own pure discourse. Thus, Castoriadis established that autonomy is not the "ideal person who has become a pure Ego once and for all"[29] and is entirely unaffected by the Other, but rather a real person who establishes a new relation between his discourse and the discourse of the Other—in essence, one who consciously reorganizes the Other's discourse and accepts its mixture with his own so that he can become responsible for what he says.

Autonomy on the Social-Historical Level

Just as Castoriadis maintained that individuals achieve autonomy in relation to other people, he also held that autonomy on the social-historical level is realized in the context of the presence of other people and institutions that define us. According to Castoriadis, because no individual can escape the symbolic dimension (which is comprised of the discourses of the Other) he is placed into, no society—not even the "higher phase" of society that some call communism—can escape "this second-order symbolism represented by institutions."[30] In other words, since no subject can create a new society on the basis of nothing, an automatically self-legislating society that no longer requires institutions to facilitate collective discussion and choice is a myth. The attempt of Marxists to "leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom" or "mark the end of prehistory and the entry into its true history"[31] is, thus, nonsensical. In the view of Castoriadis, society is characterized by "the tension of instituting society and of instituted society (of history made

and of history in the making),"[32] but there will always be a distance between the two at any given moment. Because this distance guarantees no "final" form of social relations, he denounced any effort to abolish this distance and eliminate the complex mass of oppressive systems overnight as a mere fantasy.

Yet, at the same time that Castoriadis claimed that such instituting activity is constrained by social-historical conditions, he nevertheless acknowledged that the possibility of change—no matter how gradual or constrained—is always present and, thus, the very point of revolutionary action. For instance, on the level of the individual, Castoriadis described psychoanalysis as a "practico-poetic activity" that is intended to transform the individual and bring out his reflective capabilities that will, ultimately, empower him to interrogate his unconscious thoughts and emerge as a truly autonomous subject.[33] This transformative goal of psychoanalysis, Castoriadis explained, ought to also serve as the goal of radical politics. In short, politics must aim to construct an autonomous society that consciously reflects on and rebuilds itself—to redefine history as the realm of alterity.

Castoriadis thus refused to submit to theoretical simplicity through his insistence that the world is certainly limited by, but not necessarily determined by, human significations. Avoiding a simplistic replacement of Marxism yet also denying structuralist nihilism, Castoriadis urges us to take on the difficult task of relying on our system of significations to change that very system.

c) Redefinition of "Revolution"

Lastly, in line with his theorization of "constrained creativity," Castoriadis redefined the term "revolution" as not a cataclysmic break from the past, but an attitude of autonomy that can be practiced on the level of everyday life—a

change that rendered the task of "revolutionary action" significantly less daunting. Totalizing systems such as Marxism (in which each element in society only gains significance in relation to the others) have no choice but to depict revolutions as cataclysmic ruptures; there may be several attempts at revolution, but true success is only achieved through "the revolution" that overthrows the totality of society. Anarchism and Castoriadis's thought in particular encourages us to think about revolution not as a "thing," but an "action." Such action need not subvert entire governments; instead, it can materialize in pursuits as simple as the creation of "alternative forms of organization,...new forms of communication, less alienated ways of organizing life"[34] that challenge some forms of domination and, in doing so, reconstructs social relations to reflect that challenge. In particular, Castoriadis argued that instead of discussing the historical inevitability of socialism or non-socialism, one must immerse oneself in the domain of "making/doing."[35] In other words, we must refuse to submit to nihilism whenever we do not foresee our actions resulting in "the" cataclysmic break; rather, we ought to realize our attempts to create autonomous communities in the present. Insofar as "we find ourselves, at this precise place…, among these people, within this horizon,"[36] Castoriadis demanded that we make a practical effort to revolutionize this horizon without torturing ourselves to try to determine the indeterminable character of far-away horizons on paper.

Moreover, in making this attempt, he advocated for applying such revolutionary action in all spheres of social activity taking place in everyday life. In other words, he believed in direct action that extended not only to the workplace, but also to the home, the neighborhood, interpersonal relationships, and local councils—aspects of daily existence that are often neglected by those "who are obsessed solely by strikes, 'political' events, or 'international' crises."[37] Such a position requires that, even on a micro-level, we must take

care to democratize people's activities and reject any trace of vanguardism such that "autonomy" can be realized to the greatest extent possible—even if it cannot be realized in a thoroughgoing fashion on a macro-level. Revolution, in this sense, becomes less of a product of any particular theory than an attitude in which one actively demonstrates faith in the possibility of achieving one's desired society.

Finally, Castoriadis noted that an integral part of revolutionary action is establishing that we engage in such action already. Rather than endorse the "absurd idea" that people react with solely passivity towards capitalist violence, Castoriadis urged us to highlight the ongoing efforts of people to democratize their lives.[38] He would have thus deeply appreciated Graeber's claim that "anarchist social relations and non-alienated forms of action are all around us"[39]—an observation which demonstrates that manifestations of direct democracy, mutual aid, and creativity have always been and will never cease shaping the mode of human interaction. As Graeber notes, the nineteenth century "founding figures" of anarchist thought never considered themselves the inventors of an unprecedented doctrine.[40] Indeed, there are countless examples of democratically organized resistance against domination throughout all of human history, and such resistances—no matter how small—constitute "revolution" in Castoriadis's terms.

On Identity Politics: The Modern Implications of Anarchist and Castoriadis's Thought

The emphasis of anarchist and Castoriadis's thought on questioning existing systems and creating new ones has significant implications for modern social movements. In particular, it has the potential to seriously question the validity of identity politics (or any essentialist politics that takes for granted pre-given or inherited categories) that seems to

dominate the modern Left. A number of contemporary anarchist thinkers have underscored the importance of abandoning the notion of stable foundations, fixed categories, and essentialist identities that dismiss contingency in politics. For instance, Alain Badiou argues that political change occurs when "subjects detach themselves from existing social ties and identities" and "become consumed by a political process that destabilizes existing socio-political conditions."[41] Similarly, Jacques Rancière identifies politics as the activity of dislocating existing social relations.[42] Ernesto Laclau, finally, maintains that political identities are "not the outcome of the logic of history or the rational development of social forces," but the result of "a hegemonic articulation among actors engaged in political struggle."[43]

Castoriadis—although never explicitly commenting on the modern phenomenon of identity politics—expressed a similar distaste towards blindly accepting pre-given political categories, most notably through his rejection of class essentialism. Namely, he dismissed the Marxist notion that the proletariat is the sole depositary or primary agent of the revolutionary project in the current day. In particular, he explained that the overwhelming majority of the population in modern capitalist societies could not be described as "the proletariat" in the traditional Marxist sense, as almost everyone had become a wage earner. In his view, modern capitalism had not developed an opposition between two clearly separate groups (bourgeoisie and proletariat), but had instead become a complex "bureaucratized society with a pyramidal, hierarchical structure.[44] Thus, he concluded that the only relevant way to differentiate between the mass of wage earners is to look at their attitude toward the established system.[45] This led him to repudiate Orthodox Marxist categories that would characterize the vast majority of workers who belong to the intermediate strata within the pyramid today as non-revolutionaries. As an alternative, he called for a non-essentialist definition

of "revolutionary agent" as anyone who believed in combating—not accepting—the system.

On a theoretical level, this refusal to unquestioningly accept inherited systems of categorization poses a fundamental challenge to all forms of identity politics (extending beyond class to include race, gender, etc). As Graeber explains, in the contemporary world with the rise of post-Marxism, the dominant way in which one makes a political claim is to assert some group identity.[46] However, as he points out, what we call "identities" are largely those aspects that are forcibly imposed upon people. In the United States, most identities are products of a history of oppression. For instance, a person labeled as "Black" is constantly (and, on many occasions, unwillingly) reminded of his identity as "Black" at any given moment, which leads all of his attempts at self-invention to occur within these restrictive racial constraints.[47] The Zapatista rebels of Chiapas and their revolt in 1994 offer another telling example of the oppressive effects of identity. Graeber explains that the Zapatistas—a group of rebels demanding radical democratic transformation of the international community—were immediately redefined as a band of Mayan Indians protesting for indigenous autonomy.[48] Although the rebels' vision encompassed much more than merely indigenous rights, their identity as "indigenous" was the only factor deemed important by the international media, humanitarian organizations, and politicians. In effect, these rebels were told that as Maya, "the only possible political statement they could make to non-Mayas would be about their Maya identity itself."[49] The prospect of them transcending their indigenousness and trying to change the broader nature of political possibilities was seen as inconceivable.

The Zapatistas's efforts to achieve true autonomy—to establish a community in which they would be free to determine for themselves what sort of people they wish to be—were thus derailed. Indeed, the role of "identities" in modern

politics is precisely to hinder the act of collectively imagining how we would constitute ourselves and our community in the absence of such identities. As Castoriadis explains, the institutions of a society are validated insofar as individuals participate in its social imaginary significations. An individual's proclamation that "I am something" (e.g., U.S. citizen, a Southern business owner, an African American woman, a gay student) acquires meaning through and—in turn—legitimizes such self-representations, which have their basis not in objective reality but historically instituted concepts (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, nationality) that underpin our social imaginary.[50] To internalize such a proclamation is, therefore, to leave uninterrogated the socially constructed nature of such concepts.

The crisis of contemporary Western society, Castoriadis argued, lies in the fact that the social imaginary significations (or "identities") with which it characterizes its members is "crumbling apart, flattening out, and becoming empty and self-contradictory."[51] In other words, the traditional and inherited categories that constitute modern "identities" are increasingly incompatible with today's social realities and the needs of individuals; the vocabulary of modern politics no longer provide the means to make sense of the world. For instance, feminist movements that seek to elevate the status of the "woman" inevitably encounter their limits insofar as the traditional signification of "woman" has become outdated and contradictory to the needs of the group it refers to today; for example, one cannot call for the equality of "woman" and "man" if the term "woman" itself was instituted such that it only took on significance in relation to "man" in the first place. Likewise, racial equality movements that prize "Black power" face a dead end when their wish to transcend the disadvantages of "Blackness" in contemporary America conflict with their acceptance of the socially instituted category of "Black" (and "race" in general). To overcome such

obstacles, it is paramount to remember that these identities were instituted in the context of perpetuating oppression to begin with. As a result, any group that seeks to autonomously define itself must ultimately rid itself of the baggage of such inherited identities and the oppressive significations they hold. Anarchist thought—as well as the works of Castoriadis—may act as valuable resources, empowering them to imagine the identities that they themselves wish to take on and re-constitute a world in which they are able to do so.

Conclusion

The Left is not dead. Unburdened by the structuralist despair that threatened to paralyze the movement after the demise of Marxism, anarchism—with the help of notable theorists such as Cornelius Castoriadis—has paved a way to carry on the revolutionary energy of the past. Amid the constant confrontation of our imagination against the forces that attempt to permanently institutionalize it, Castoriadis provides us with tempered yet radical hope that our imagination may prevail. A renewed definition of "liberation" and "autonomy," a confidence in the possibility of change despite its slow, constrained, and uncertain nature, and a conviction that such change can still be meaningful on the scale of everyday life are only some of the many tools that anarchism offers us in the post-Marxist moment.

1   Founded in 1864, the First International was a class worker union primarily led by Karl Marx that aimed to unite diverse revolutionary currents.

2   Here, Marx accused Bakunin of organizing a secret conspiracy behind the scenes, while Bakunin claimed Marx had already dominated and manipulated the General Council of the International. Specifically, while the anarchists and Marx agreed that the International should promote labor unions, Marx demanded that every national branch of the International form a political party to run in elections, while Bakunin opposed this measure (See Price, 2017).

3   Saul Newman, "Anarchism, Poststructuralism and the Future of Radical Politics," The Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. 36, 2 (2007)

4   Ibid, p. 7.

5   Ibid.

6   Ibid.

7   Nathan Clough and Renata Blumberg, "Toward Anarchist and Autonomist Marxist Geographies by Nathan Clough & Renata Blumberg," ACME, vol. 11, 3 (2012)

8   David Graeber, "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology," Prickly Paradigm Press (2004), p. 6.

9   Nathan Clough and Renata Blumberg, "Toward Anarchist and Autonomist Marxist Geographies by Nathan Clough & Renata Blumberg," ACME, vol. 11, 3 (2012)

10   Ibid.

11   Ibid.

12   Vangelis Papadimitropoulos, "From Resistance to Autonomy: Power and Social Change in the Work of Castoriadis and Foucault," International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities, vol. 3, 11 (2018)

13   David Graeber, "Fetishism as social creativity," SAGE Publications, vol. 5, 4 (2005)

14   Ibid, p. 409.

15   Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 316.

16   Ibid.

17   Saul Newman, "Anarchism, Poststructuralism and the Future of Radical Politics," The Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. 36, 2 (2007), p. 13.

18   Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Social Imaginary and the Institution" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 202

19   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Marxism and Revolutionary Theory" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 149

20   Ibid, p. 165

21   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Presentation of Socialisme ou Barbarie" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 37

22   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Marxism and Revolutionary Theory" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 146

23   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Presentation of Socialisme ou Barbarie" in , 2010, p. 37

24   Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Logic of Magmas and the Question of Autonomy" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 314

25   Cornelius Castoriadis, "The State of the Subject Today," in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination

26   Cornelius Castoriadis, "An Introductory Interview," in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 31

27   According to Castoriadis, society is instituted through a "magma of social imaginary significations." Such significations, which have their predominant basis in language, establish social norms that the individual psyche learns to internalize in order to become a socialized individual. These significations provide human society with a coherent understanding of the world, offer criteria for 'truth' which answer

questions regarding its own existence, and pattern social relations and human behavior.

28   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Marxism and Revolutionary Theory," in in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 182

29   Ibid, p. 179

30   Ibid, p. 189

31   Ibid, p. 185

32   Ibid, p. 184

33   Warren Breckman, "From the Symbolic Turn to the Social Imaginary: Castoriadis's Project of Autonomy," in Adventures of the Symbolic: Post-Marxism and Democratic Theory, ch. 3

34   David Graeber, "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology," Prickly Paradigm Press (2004), p. 40

35   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Marxism and Revolutionary Theory," in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010.

36   Ibid p. 176

37   Cornelius Castoriadis, "An Introductory Overview" in in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 28

38   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Recommencing the Revolution" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010

39   David Graeber, "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology," Prickly Paradigm Press (2004), p. 76

40   Ibid, p. 3.

41   Saul Newman, "Anarchism, Poststructuralism and the Future of Radical Politics," The Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. 36, 2 (2007), p. 14.

42   Ibid, p. 14.

43   Ibid, p. 15.

44   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Recommencing the Revolution" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 129

45   Cornelius Castoriadis, "An Introductory Overview" in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 27

46   David Graeber, "Fragments of an Anarchist Anthro-
pology," Prickly Paradigm Press (2004), p. 101
47   Ibid, p. 102
48   Ibid, p. 103.
49   Ibid, p. 103.
50   Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Crisis of Western
Societies"in The Castoriadis Reader, 2010, p. 261
51   Ibid, p. 262