Date of this Version
Proceedings of the Royal Society B
Most of the work in evolutionary game theory starts with a model of a social situation that gives rise to a particular payoff matrix and analyses how behaviour evolves through natural selection. Here, we invert this approach and ask, given a model of how individuals behave, how the payoff matrix will evolve through natural selection. In particular, we ask whether a prisoner’s dilemma game is stable against invasions by mutant genotypes that alter the payoffs. To answer this question, we develop a two-tiered framework with goal-oriented dynamics at the behavioural time scale and a diploid population genetic model at the evolutionary time scale. Our results are two-fold: first, we show that the prisoner’s dilemma is subject to invasions by mutants that provide incentives for cooperation to their partners, and that the resulting game is a coordination game similar to the hawk – dove game. Second, we find that for a large class of mutants and symmetric games, a stable genetic polymorphism will exist in the locus determining the payoff matrix, resulting in a complex pattern of behavioural diversity in the population. Our results highlight the importance of considering the evolution of payoff matrices to understand the evolution of animal social systems.
Akçay, E., & Roughgarden, J. (2011). The Evolution of Payoff Matrices: Providing Incentives to Cooperate. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 278 (1715), 2198-2206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.2105
Date Posted: 30 September 2015
This document has been peer reviewed.