Date of this Version
The Journal of Industrial Economics
A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm. A firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted (‘prosecution effect’) or because it fears another firm will apply (‘pre-emption effect’). Policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre-emption—and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program—are also explored.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Joseph Harrington (2013), Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption, Journal of Industrial Economics, 61, 1 - 27, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12014. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms
Harrington, J. E. (2013). Corporate Leniency Programs When Firms Have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 61 (1), 1-27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12014
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.