Date of this Version
The RAND Journal of Economics
We develop a job-market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Araujo, Aloisio, Daniel Gottlieb, and Humberto Moreira. “A Model of Mixed Signals with Applications to Countersignaling,” RAND Journal of Economics, winter 2007, pp. 1020-1043 , which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms.
Araujo, A., Gottlieb, D. A., & Moreira, H. (2007). A Model of Mixed Signals With Applications to Countersignalling. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38 (4), 1020-1043. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.