Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2006

Publication Source

Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics

Volume

2

Issue

1

Start Page

1

Last Page

105

DOI

10.1561/0700000021

Abstract

This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000–2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel sup- pliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.

Comments

At the time of publication, author Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. Currently (August 2017), he is a faculty member at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.

Keywords

cartels, microeconomics

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017