Date of this Version
Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics
This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 2000–2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and a market allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price but more importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agreement and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members, methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel sup- pliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operational procedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s organizational structure.
Harrington, J. E. (2006). How Do Cartels Operate?. Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2 (1), 1-105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0700000021
Date Posted: 27 November 2017