Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2-2015

Publication Source

International Economic Review

Volume

56

Issue

1

Start Page

133

Last Page

153

DOI

10.1111/iere.12097

Abstract

This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.

Copyright/Permission Statement

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bos, I. and Harrington, J. E. (2015), COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE. International Economic Review, 56: 133–153. doi:10.1111/iere.12097, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12097. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms

Embargo Date

1-23-2017

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.