Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

7-2014

Publication Source

Economics Letters

Volume

124

Issue

1

Start Page

33

Last Page

36

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.010

Abstract

This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2014. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

collusion, antitrust, crime

Embargo Date

4-21-2016

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.