Penalties and the Deterrence of Unlawful Collusion

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Business Economics and Public Policy Papers
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collusion
antitrust
crime
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Economics
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
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Harrington, Joseph E
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This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.

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2014-07-01
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Economics Letters
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