Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

11-2012

Publication Source

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

64

Issue

3

Start Page

277

Last Page

289

DOI

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.05.005

Abstract

In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players–patient and impatient–and a player’s type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of cooperative play, while if both players are patient types–and this is common knowledge–then they can cooperate with a grim trigger strategy. We find that the longer that players have gone without cooperating, the lower is the probability that they will cooperate in the next period. While the probability of cooperation emerging is always positive, there is a positive probability that cooperation never occurs.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2012. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Embargo Date

6-9-2014

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.