Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

3-2011

Publication Source

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

Volume

7

Issue

1

Start Page

1

Last Page

35

DOI

10.1093/joclec/nhq030

Abstract

This article identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms established an agreement to coordinate their prices. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting is contrary to competition. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance to conclude concerted action.

Copyright/Permission Statement

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Competition Law and Economics following peer review. The version of record Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.; POSTED PRICING AS A PLUS FACTOR, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, 1 March 2011, Pages 1–35 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq030

Comments

At the time of publication, author Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. was affiliated with John Hopkins University. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Business, Economy and Public Policy Department at the University of Pennsylvania.

Embargo Date

1-28-2013

Share

COinS
 

Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.