Date of this Version
Journal of Competition Law & Economics
This article identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms established an agreement to coordinate their prices. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting is contrary to competition. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance to conclude concerted action.
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Competition Law and Economics following peer review. The version of record Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.; POSTED PRICING AS A PLUS FACTOR, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, Volume 7, Issue 1, 1 March 2011, Pages 1–35 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq030
Harrington, J. E. (2011). Posted Pricing as a Plus Factor. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 7 (1), 1-35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhq030
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.