Business Economics and Public Policy Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
5-2010
Publication Source
Journal of Health Economics
Volume
29
Issue
3
Start Page
438
Last Page
444
DOI
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.02.004
Abstract
To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© 2010. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
pricing, pharmaceutical products, pandemic
Recommended Citation
Harrington, J. E., & Hsu, E. B. (2010). Stockpiling Anti-viral Drugs for a Pandemic: The Role of Manufacturer Reserve Programs. Journal of Health Economics, 29 (3), 438-444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.02.004
Included in
Business Commons, Economics Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.
Comments
At the time of publication, author Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Business, Economics and Public Policy Department at the University of Pennsylvania.