Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

5-2010

Publication Source

Journal of Health Economics

Volume

29

Issue

3

Start Page

438

Last Page

444

DOI

10.1016/j.jhealeco.2010.02.004

Abstract

To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2010. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Comments

At the time of publication, author Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Business, Economics and Public Policy Department at the University of Pennsylvania.

Keywords

pricing, pharmaceutical products, pandemic

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.