Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Working Paper

Date of this Version

8-2005

Publication Source

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volume

120

Issue

3

Start Page

917

Last Page

962

DOI

10.1093/qje/120.3.917

Abstract

We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, with their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than under relative incentives. We show that this is due to workers partially internalizing the negative externality their effort imposes on others under relative incentives, especially when working alongside their friends. Under piece rates, the relationship among workers does not affect productivity. Further analysis reveals that workers internalize the externality only when they can monitor others and be monitored. This rules out pure altruism as the underlying motive of workers' behavior.

Copyright/Permission Statement

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Quarterly Journal of Economics following peer review. The version of record Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran Rasul; Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 120, Issue 3, 1 August 2005, Pages 917–962, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/120.3.917

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.