Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

6-2014

Publication Source

Journal of Public Economics

Volume

114

Issue

C

Start Page

19

Last Page

28

DOI

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.006

Abstract

Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists, as has been implemented in Israel and Singapore, provides an incentive for registration and has the potential to increase the pool of deceased donor organs. However, the implementation of a priority rule might allow for loopholes – as is the case in Israel – in which an individual can register to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs. We experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation and find that the majority of subjects use the loophole when available. The existence of a loophole completely eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule. When information about loophole use is made public, subjects respond to others' use of the loophole by withholding donation such that the priority system with a loophole generates fewer donations than an allocation system without priority.

Keywords

organ donation, experiments, public goods

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.