Date of this Version
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and determines whether the proposal is processed under open or closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee and, depending on the lobbyist's bias, both open and closed rule are used in equilibrium. For small lobbyist bias, it is optimal to choose closed rule and a committee whose interests are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist's. For intermediate lobbyist bias, closed rule remains optimal with a committee whose preferences lie between those of the legislature and those of the lobbyist. For large lobbyist bias, open rule and a committee biased against the lobbyist become optimal.
© 2013. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
informational theories of legislature, committees, lobbying, procedural rules
Ambrus, A., Azevedo, E., Kamada, Y., & Takagi, Y. (2013). Legislative Committees as Information Intermediaries: A Unified Theory of Committee Selection and Amendment Rules. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 94 (C), 103-115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.