Business Economics and Public Policy Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

10-2013

Publication Source

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Volume

94

Issue

C

Start Page

103

Last Page

115

DOI

10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.003

Abstract

This paper considers a model of legislative decision-making, in which information must be collected from a strategic lobbyist. The legislature appoints a committee to communicate with the lobbyist and propose a bill, and determines whether the proposal is processed under open or closed rule. Consistent with empirical evidence, it can be optimal for the legislature to appoint a biased committee and, depending on the lobbyist's bias, both open and closed rule are used in equilibrium. For small lobbyist bias, it is optimal to choose closed rule and a committee whose interests are perfectly aligned with the lobbyist's. For intermediate lobbyist bias, closed rule remains optimal with a committee whose preferences lie between those of the legislature and those of the lobbyist. For large lobbyist bias, open rule and a committee biased against the lobbyist become optimal.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2013. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

informational theories of legislature, committees, lobbying, procedural rules

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.