
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
11-2013
Publication Source
Journal of Public Economics
Volume
107
Start Page
31
Last Page
46
DOI
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.08.004
Abstract
Voluntary emissions offset programs between developing and industrialized countries suffer from adverse selection, because participants will self-select into the program. In contrast, pure subsidies for mitigation lead to full participation and hence efficiency, but require large financial transfers which make them unattractive to industrialized countries. We present a simple model to demonstrate the impact of three policy options on the performance of offset programs: (1) baseline scale increases, (2) offset discounting and (3) setting stringent baselines. With baseline scale increases, entire political jurisdictions such as regions or nations are assigned a single, aggregate baseline and must choose whether to participate as one entity. We find that increasing scale both improves efficiency and reduces transfers from offset buyers to sellers. Offset discounting means paying less than the value of abatement and can be paired with trading ratios between offsets and allowances in a cap-and-trade system. We show that discounting is inefficient, but can make offsets more attractive to industrialized countries. Setting stringent baselines also involves a tradeoff between efficiency and transfers. We finally show that Pareto efficient policies that are individually rational for buyers and sellers entail some combination of discounting and/or stringent baselines: offset policies are never first-best, but can be efficiency improving, especially with increased scale.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© 2013. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
offsets, deforestation, baselines, adverse selection, climate change policy, opt-in programs
Recommended Citation
van Benthem, A., & Kerr, S. (2013). Scale and Transfers in International Emissions Offset Programs. Journal of Public Economics, 107 31-46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.08.004
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Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.