Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
dynamic stochastic games
Markov-perfect equilibrium
learning-by-doing
organizational forgetting
industry dynamics
multiple equilibria
Economics
Industrial Organization
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Besanko, David
Doraszelski, Ulrich
Kryukov, Yaroslav
Satterthwaite, Mark
Contributor
Abstract

Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, varying degrees of long-run industry concentration ranging from moderate leadership to absolute dominance, and multiple equilibria.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Series name and number
Publication date
2010-03-01
Journal title
Econometrica
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
Recommended citation
Collection