Behavioral Ethics Lab
Document Type
Book Chapter
Date of this Version
3-2009
Publication Source
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics
Start Page
159
Last Page
188
DOI
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195189254.003.0006
Abstract
Much of the history of game theory has been dominated by the problem of indeterminacy. The very search for better versions of rationality, as well as the long list of attempts to refine Nash equilibrium, can be seen as answers to the indeterminacy that has accompanied game theory through its history. More recently, the experimental approach to game theory has attempted a more radical solution: by directly generating a stream of behavioral observations, one hopes that behavioral hypotheses will be sharper, and predictions more accurate. This article looks at several attempts to address indeterminacy, including the shift to evolutionary models. However, because its goal is to establish whether rational choice models are inescapably doomed to produce indeterminate outcomes, it pays much more attention to the experimental turn in game theory, the difficulty it encounters, and the promising results obtained by more realistic models of rationality that include a social component.
Copyright/Permission Statement
Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
Recommended Citation
Bicchieri, C. (2009). Rationality and Indeterminacy. In Don Ross and Harold Kincaid (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics (pp. 159-188). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Included in
Behavioral Economics Commons, Epistemology Commons, Philosophy of Science Commons, Social Psychology Commons
Date Posted: 01 December 2016
This document has been peer reviewed.