Date of this Version
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Healy and Palepu, J. Account. Econ. (2001), this issue, provide a broad review of the empirical disclosure literature. This discussion focuses on the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, and assumes firms’ disclosure policies are endogenously determined by the same forces that shape firms’ governance structures and management incentives. This provides not only a more focused view of the literature, but also alternative explanations for some of the results discussed in Review and specific suggestions for future research.
© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
disclosure, information asymmetry, cost of capital, managerial incentives, corporate governance
Core, J. E. (2001). A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 441-456. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00036-2
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.