Accounting Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

9-2001

Publication Source

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volume

31

Issue

1-3

Start Page

441

Last Page

456

DOI

10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00036-2

Abstract

Healy and Palepu, J. Account. Econ. (2001), this issue, provide a broad review of the empirical disclosure literature. This discussion focuses on the empirical voluntary disclosure literature, and assumes firms’ disclosure policies are endogenously determined by the same forces that shape firms’ governance structures and management incentives. This provides not only a more focused view of the literature, but also alternative explanations for some of the results discussed in Review and specific suggestions for future research.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

disclosure, information asymmetry, cost of capital, managerial incentives, corporate governance

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.