Accounting Papers
Title
Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
1-2003
Publication Source
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume
34
Issue
1-3
Start Page
149
Last Page
180
DOI
10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00073-3
Abstract
Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., “open” conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© 2003. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
conference call, corporate disclosure, selective disclosure, price volatility, institutional investor
Recommended Citation
Bushee, B. J., Matsumoto, D. A., & Miller, G. S. (2003). Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34 (1-3), 149-180. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00073-3
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.