Accounting Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

1-2003

Publication Source

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volume

34

Issue

1-3

Start Page

149

Last Page

180

DOI

10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00073-3

Abstract

Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., “open” conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2003. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

conference call, corporate disclosure, selective disclosure, price volatility, institutional investor

Included in

Accounting Commons

Share

COinS
 

Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.