Accounting Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

1-2003

Publication Source

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volume

34

Issue

1-3

Start Page

89

Last Page

127

DOI

10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00088-5

Abstract

The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of “new economy” firms. We find that the determinants of equity grants are significantly different in new versus old economy firms. We also find that employee retention objectives, which new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a significant impact on new hire grants, but not subsequent grants. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower than expected grants and/or existing holdings of options are associated with poorer performance in subsequent years.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2003. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Keywords

management compensation; stock option; incentive

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.