The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels

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Accounting Papers
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contracting
managerial compensation
managerial ownership
equity incentives
stock options
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Business Administration, Management, and Operations
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Core, John E
Guay, Wayne R
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We predict and find that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives. We model optimal equity incentive levels for CEOs, and use the residuals from this model to measure deviations between CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives and optimal levels. We find that grants of new incentives from options and restricted stock are negatively related to these deviations. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms set optimal equity incentive levels and grant new equity incentives in a manner that is consistent with economic theory.

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1999-12-01
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Journal of Accounting and Economics
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