Accounting Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
12-2010
Publication Source
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume
50
Issue
2-3
Start Page
179
Last Page
234
DOI
10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001
Abstract
We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors.
Copyright/Permission Statement
© . This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Keywords
financial accounting, corporate governance, board structure, executive compensation, debt contracts, informal contracts
Recommended Citation
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010). The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50 (2-3), 179-234. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.