Accounting Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

6-2016

Publication Source

Journal of Accounting Research

Volume

54

Issue

3

Start Page

863

Last Page

893

DOI

10.1111/1475-679X.12118

Abstract

This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.

Copyright/Permission Statement

This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: FRIEDMAN, H. L. and HEINLE, M. S. (2016), Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation. Journal of Accounting Research, 54: 863–893. doi:10.1111/1475-679X.12118, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12118/abstract. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms.

Keywords

disclosure, regulation, lobbying

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.