Copyright (c) 2009 University of Pennsylvania All rights reserved. http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs Recent documents in Neuroethics Publications en-us Mon, 29 Jun 2009 22:32:52 PDT 3600 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/44 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/44 Thu, 18 Dec 2008 11:48:30 PST The empirical and theoretical consideration of ethical decision making has focused on the process of moral judgment; however, a precondition to judgment is moral sensitivity, the ability to detect and evaluate moral issues [Rest, J. R. (1984). The major components of morality. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behaviour, and moral development (pp. 24-38). New York, NY: Wiley]. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and contextually standardized, real life moral issues, we demonstrate that sensitivity to moral issues is associated with activation of the polar medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal posterior cingulate cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). These activations suggest that moral sensitivity is related to access to knowledge unique to one's self, supported by autobiographical memory retrieval and social perspective taking. We also assessed whether sensitivity to rule-based or "justice" moral issues versus social situational or "care" moral issues is associated with dissociable neural processing events. Sensitivity to justice issues was associated with greater activation of the left intraparietal sulcus, whereas sensitivity to care issues was associated with greater activation of the ventral posterior cingulate cortex, ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and thalamus. These results suggest a role for access to self histories and identities and social perspectives in sensitivity to moral issues, provide neural representations of the subcomponent process of moral sensitivity originally proposed by Rest, and support differing neural information processing for the interpretive recognition of justice and care moral issues. Diana Robertson http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/43 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/43 Wed, 17 Dec 2008 12:10:34 PST Few people would argue against treating the traumatic psychological effects of war or violence. But what about taking a drug to lessen the pain of our common daily struggles, such as the end of a relationship or anxiety about one's job? Is this a "cosmetic" enhancement of human life, even a danger to character, or is it an ethical choice? For guidance, the author looks to the history of treating physical pain and argues that, despite growing knowledge of the biological basis for psychological pain, many find it hard to find a consistent principled position when it comes down to specific instances of alleviating human suffering Anjan Chatterjee http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/42 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/42 Wed, 17 Dec 2008 10:41:36 PST In this article, we propose actions that will help society accept the benefits of enhancement, given appropriate research and evolved regulation. Prescription drugs are regulated as such not for their enhancing properties but primarily for considerations of safety and potential abuse. Still, cognitive enhancement has much to offer individuals and society, and a proper societal response will involve making enhancements available while managing their risks. Henry Greely http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/41 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/41 Wed, 17 Dec 2008 10:33:13 PST Arthur Caplan http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/40 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/40 Wed, 17 Dec 2008 10:30:54 PST Arthur Caplan http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/39 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/39 Mon, 15 Dec 2008 06:17:28 PST Rationale: Adderall (mixed amphetamine salts) is used by healthy normal individuals to enhance attention. Research with healthy normal participants and those with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder indicate a possible inverse relationship between attentional function and creativity. This raises the possibility that Adderall could decrease creativity in people using it for cognitive enhancement.Objective: This study was designed to find out whether Adderall impairs creativity in healthy young adults.Material and methods: In a double-blind placebo-controlled study, the effects of Adderall on the performance of 16 healthy young adults were measured on four tests of creativity from the psychological literature: two tasks requiring divergent thought and two requiring convergent thought.Results: Adderall affected performance on the convergent tasks only, in one case enhancing it, particularly for lower performing individuals, and in the other case enhancing it for the lower-performing and impairing it for higher-performing individuals.Conclusion: The preliminary evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that Adderall has an overall negative effect on creativity. Its effects on divergent creative thought cannot be inferred with confidence from this study because of the ambiguity of null results. Its effects on convergent creative thought appear to be dependent on the baseline creativity of the individual. Those in the higher range of the normal distribution may be unaffected or impaired, whereas those in the lower range of the normal distribution experience enhancement. Martha J. Farah http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/38 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/38 Tue, 04 Nov 2008 08:03:59 PST A decade of spectacular progress in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technology and systems neuroscience research has so far yielded few changes in our daily lives. The dearth of clinical applications of this prolific and academically promising research tool began raising the eyebrows of the public and the research funding agencies. This may be one of the reasons for the enthusiasm and interest paid to the growing body of literature suggesting that blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI of the brain could be sensitive to the differences between lie and truth. The word 'differences' is critical here since it refers to the often-ignored core concept of BOLD fMRI: it is only sensitive to differences between two brain states. Thus, available studies report using fMRI to discriminate between lie and truth or some other comparative state rather than to positively identify deception. This nuance is an example of the extent to which applied neuroscience research does not lend itself to the type of over-simplification that has plagued the interpretation of fMRI-based lie detection by the popular press and the increasingly vocal academic critics. As an early contributor to the modest stream of data on fMRI-based lie detection, I was asked by Dr Aldert Vrij to write a piece in favour of fMRI-based lie detection, to be contrasted with a piece by Dr Sean Spence presenting an opposite point of view (Spence, 2008). This seemingly straightforward task presented two hurdles: having to respond to the popular as well as scientific view of what lie detection with fMRI is and present a wholly positive view of evolving experimental data. Daniel D. Langleben http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/37 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/37 Tue, 26 Aug 2008 07:20:47 PDT "After covering the basic tenets of Transhumanism, I discuss what I take to be the most important philosophical element of the transhumanist picture -- its unique perspective on the nature and development of persons.... Examining the enhancement issue through the vantage point of the metaphysical problem of personal identity shall thereby present a serious challenge to Transhumanism. Indeed, this is a pressing issue for any argument made for or against enhancement." Susan Schneider http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/36 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/36 Wed, 05 Mar 2008 07:57:03 PST Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior. Martha J. Farah http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/35 http://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/35 Mon, 04 Feb 2008 09:00:31 PST Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being's capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states are only contingently related. If the other person is acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article I consider another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind-body problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with the new analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy. The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely brain-damaged patients who are incapable of intentional communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours and who lack language. Martha J. Farah