This study provides unique evidence for the potential use of the implementation of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) as an indication of managerial influence in compensation setting processes within publicly traded firms. While many firms utilize anti-takeover provisions to protect their ability to adhere to its corporate strategy and policy, the imposition of an anti-takeover provision distinctly predicts both a structural and aggregate change in the compensation packages of CEOs in S&P 500 firms. In the three years following a firm’s implementation of an anti-takeover provision, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of total executive compensation increases by 42% relative to the CAGR across all S&P 500 firms. Moreover, these altered compensation plans more heavily favor increasing levels of stock-based and bonus-based compensation than the average packages of S&P 500 CEOs. Thus, this study provides principal evidence of managerial influence in the compensation setting processes within by publicly traded firms.