Goldstone Research Unit

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

12-2010

Publication Source

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volume

1

Issue

4

Start Page

499

Last Page

514

DOI

10.1007/s13164-010-0021-4

Abstract

Because reasoning allows us to justify our beliefs and evaluate these justifications it is central to folk epistemology. Following Sperber, and contrary to classical views, it will be argued that reasoning evolved not to complement individual cognition but as an argumentative device. This hypothesis is more consistent with the prevalence of the confirmation and disconfirmation biases. It will be suggested that these biases render the individual use of reasoning hazardous, but that when reasoning is used in its natural, argumentative, context they can represent a smart way to divide labor without loosing epistemic value.

Copyright/Permission Statement

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0021-4

 

Date Posted: 11 March 2015

This document has been peer reviewed.